Should Computability Be Epistemic? a Logical and Physical Point of View
AbstractAlthough the formalizations of computability provided in the 1930s have proven to be equivalent, two different accounts of computability may be distinguished regarding computability as an epistemic concept. While computability, according to the epistemic account, should be based on epistemic constraints related to the capacities of human computers, the non-epistemic account considers computability as based on manipulations of symbols that require no human capacities other than the capacity of manipulating symbols according to a set of rules. In this paper, I shall evaluate, both from a logical and physical point of view, whether computability should be regarded as an epistemic concept, i.e., whether epistemic constraints should be added on (physical) computability for considering functions as (physically) computable. Specifically, I shall argue that the introduction of epistemic constraints have deep implications for the set of computable functions, for the logical and physical Church-Turing thesis—cornerstones of logical and physical computability respectively—might turn out to be false according to which epistemic constraints are accepted. View Full-Text
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Franchette, F. Should Computability Be Epistemic? a Logical and Physical Point of View. Philosophies 2016, 1, 15-27.
Franchette F. Should Computability Be Epistemic? a Logical and Physical Point of View. Philosophies. 2016; 1(1):15-27.Chicago/Turabian Style
Franchette, Florent. 2016. "Should Computability Be Epistemic? a Logical and Physical Point of View." Philosophies 1, no. 1: 15-27.