Analysis of the Multinational Policies of the Han-Zhao State in Ancient China

Abstract

The Han-Zhao state (also known as “Former Zhao”, 304–329 AD), founded by Liú Yuán, the Left Wise King of the Xiongnu, is one of the earliest examples of a dual monarchy in global history. Its structure represents not only the fusion of the cultures of the Sinicized Xiongnu rulers and the Han Chinese of the Central Plains, but also the joint governance of a minority regime and the Han Chinese civilization. As an early dual monarchy, the Han-Zhao state implemented a political, military, and cultural system that maintained the coexistence of the Xiongnu traditions and Han Chinese dominance, thereby making it a “dual monarchy”. Thus, while Han-Zhao preserved the traditional governance model of the Xiongnu, it was deeply influenced by Han Chinese rituals and principles of governance. This study analyzes the ethnic and cultural institutions of the Han-Zhao state to explore its uniqueness as a dual monarchy and its influence on the integration of multi-ethnic regimes in later periods. It seeks to enrich the global understanding of the concept of dual monarchy and provide a new perspective on ethnic integration and cultural governance in Chinese history.

1. Studies on the Definition of China’s Minority Dynasties

In the study of the political history of China’s minority regimes, a key issue is how to interpret the differences in governance between these dynasties and the traditional Han dynasties, thereby elucidating their distinctive political features. Thus, the Han-Zhao State possesses a special significance by virtue of its pioneering and exemplary character.

Although Cheng-Han1 (303–347 CE), established slightly earlier by the Ba Di peoples, predated Han-Zhao in strict chronology, its influence never extended beyond southwestern Sichuan and thus fell short of fundamentally reshaping the broader Chinese political order. Cheng-Han’s institutional experiments—while noteworthy among regional regimes—remained firmly anchored in Sichuan’s longstanding Han administrative conventions, undergirded by the entrenched interests of the Li clan and allied émigré networks from the commanderies (Z. Wang 2024). Crucially, these reforms lacked a unified framework capable of sustaining genuinely multi-ethnic power sharing. By contrast, Han-Zhao directly precipitated the collapse of the Western Jin dynasty and inaugurated a new era of non-Han contestation for control of the Central Plains. Its pioneering measures—including the dual “Hu–Han” governance model, an internal “Hu-Hu” bureaucratic apparatus, the Chanyu tribunal, and kinship-based theories of legitimacy—provide a far richer corpus of evidence for understanding how minority regimes in early China conceptualized and exercised political authority (Y.-j. Feng 2020).

A systematic analysis of Han-Zhao thus enables a more nuanced comparison between minority polities and orthodox Han dynasties in terms of their sources of authority, operational modalities, and constructions of legitimacy; in so doing, it deepens our appreciation of the “unity-in-diversity” paradigm that underlay the imperial political system. This comparative lens not only illuminates the distinctive trajectories of institutional innovation pursued by minority-led regimes but also yields fresh insights into the inclusiveness and adaptive capacities of the Chinese imperial order as a whole.

To illustrate the broader significance of this approach, one may turn to the Qing dynasty—arguably the most intensively scrutinized case in modern studies of China’s multi-ethnic history. As a minority-ruled state that ultimately unified and governed vast territories, the Qing has often been celebrated for achieving a “grand unity” surpassing that of all predecessors. Although Emperor Qianlong famously proclaimed “uniting all under heaven” as the Qing’s supreme achievement, historians continue to debate which power bases and administrative practices genuinely undergirded this “grand unification” (Han 2014). A rigorous investigation of the institutional architecture of early minority polities such as Han-Zhao can therefore shed valuable light on the historical precedents and political logics that informed the Qing model of imperial governance.

1.1. The Manchu-Mongol Non-Chinese Theory

In some East Asian countries—including the rump state of the Southern Ming dynasty—historical events such as Emperor Chongzhen’s ascension to heaven and Emperor Hongguang’s capture are often interpreted as signs of “the submergence of China” or “China is no more”. This interpretation once enabled the extreme, Japan-originated notion of “the transformation between Chinese and barbarians (the Hua Yi Bian Tai/Transition)” to gain popularity among certain Chinese revolutionaries. Against this backdrop, Mr. Qian Mu2 distinguished the Manchu Qing dynasty’s rule from that of the Ming dynasty and other Han regimes by proposing a division between a “tribal regime” and a “scholar-official regime”. He argued that the Manchu regime sought to control the government and consolidate power through tribal forces, with its operations marked by clear self-interest; as a result, the measures it employed functioned more as instruments of control or “magic” than as a genuine political system. Moreover, the Manchu tribal mode of rule differed from the traditional notion of imperial autocracy, exhibiting characteristics of tribal despotism (Yang 2010).

However, Qian Mu did not explain how, once the Manchus—motivated by self-interest—entered the Central Plains and established the Qing dynasty, they were able to effectively govern such a vast territory and numerous peoples (Yang 2010). In fact, whether it was the Mongol Yuan dynasty that once unified China, the Jurchen-led Jin dynasty that dominated northern China, or even the ancient Han-Zhao of the Xiongnu, each had either achieved or endeavored to achieve this very objective. Clearly, this viewpoint bears the marks of modern nationalist sentiment—the “Manchu-Mongol are not China” argument—that tends to classify minority regimes, particularly the modern Qing dynasty, as a distinct group utterly different from Han regimes. It sets the ruling elites of minority groups like the Manchus in opposition to the Han literati class. Consequently, they contend that although the Qing dynasty ruled over an expansive Chinese realm, its methods of governance appeared barbaric and uncivilized.

In modern history, Japanese academia, in coordination with the imperialist colonial expansion of the “Manchuria and Mongolia Policy”, proposed the theory that “Manchuria and Mongolia have historically not been Chinese territories”. This theory attempted to distort history through academic means, emphasizing the supposed fundamental cultural differences between the regions of Manchuria and Mongolia and China to create ethnic divisions and provide a theoretical basis for Japan’s expansionist policies. The modern Japanese view of “Manchuria and Mongolia” was deeply influenced by militaristic and imperialist elements within various sectors of Japanese society. These historical revisions exaggerated grievances between the Manchu and Mongol peoples and the Han Chinese, aiming to incite ethnic conflicts and disunify multi-ethnic China. Such erroneous views on Manchuria and Mongolia not only misled segments of the Japanese population about the relationship between these regions and China but also negatively influenced some Chinese individuals, leading a few to hold similar erroneous beliefs even today (Shi 2016).

However, throughout Chinese history, beginning in 304 AD, when the Xiongnu leader Liu Yuan established the Han-Zhao in northern China, the integration of Hu (non-Han peoples) and Han, as well as the dualistic governance model, became central to the nation-building and institutional exploration of northern China’s ethnic minorities. This historical fact demonstrates that frontier regions such as Manchuria and Mongolia were never separate from Chinese civilization. Instead, they were integrated into China’s historical trajectory through the formation of multi-ethnic communities and dualistic empires.

The roots of the “Manchu-Mongol Non-Chinese Theory” date back to an earlier period and are deeply influenced by traditional nationalist concepts such as the “Hua-Yi distinction3”. As early as 1732, during Japan’s Edo period, Confucian scholars Hayashi Shunsō and Hayashi Nobutatsu compiled the Hua Yi Bian Tai/Transition (《華夷變態》). The term “Hua Yi Bian Tai/Transition” refers to the idea that the Qing dynasty, established by the Manchu Eight Banners, had replaced the Ming dynasty, where the Han Chinese ruled as the dominant class. In this view, China was occupied by “barbarians”, and Chinese civilization was “forced” to transform into a barbaric state. This work, with its strong “Hua-Yi distinction” and nationalist overtones, can be considered a precursor to the “Manchu-Mongol Non-Chinese Theory”. Such writings also reflected the contempt Japanese intellectuals held for the Qing dynasty, as well as their admiration for attempts to restore the Ming dynasty, which they romanticized as a “battle of national identity”.

By 1894, during the First Sino-Japanese War, Munakata Kotarō wrote An Address to the Heroes of the Eighteen Provinces (《告十八省豪傑書》) in classical Chinese, calling for a Han Chinese uprising against the Qing dynasty. This work strongly promoted nationalist sentiments aligned with the idea of “anti-Qing and restoration of the Ming”.

During the Xinhai Revolution (1911), Uchida Ryōhei, a core member of the “Black Dragon Society” (kokuryūkai), outwardly appeared to actively support and highly praise the revolution. However, he explicitly stated the following:

The reason we risk our lives to support Sun Yat-sen’s revolution is that it aligns with Japan’s interests. Sun uses the banner of restoring the Han and overthrowing the Manchu as his revolutionary cause, aiming to establish a Han-dominated China. Therefore, we support the Han Chinese, so that the Manchus will turn to Russia for assistance. Afterward, Japan and China will cooperate to defeat Russia, seizing ‘Manchuria’ and Siberia for ourselves and laying the foundation for expanding our control over the continent.

In 1927, Ishiwara Kanji, one of the masterminds behind the Mukden Incident (918 Incident), stated the following in his lecture at the Army War College, The Current and Future National Defense of Japan:

Manchuria and Mongolia are not the territories of the Han ethnicity. Their connection is, if anything, closer to our nation (Japan). From the perspective of ethnic self-determination, ‘Manchuria and Mongolia’ belong to the Manchu and Mongolian peoples.

In 1928, Uchida Ryōhei and Tōyama Mitsuru submitted a memorandum to Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi, advocating for the Japanese government to “quickly resolve the Manchurian-Mongolian issue” and “separate Manchuria and Mongolia from China proper”, claiming that doing so would “establish the foundation of peace in the East and fulfill Japan’s divine duty and mission” (M. Wang 2024). In 1931, following the Mukden Incident and Japan’s occupation of Northeast China, the puppet state of Manchukuo was established, and Japanese influence began to extend into the Inner Mongolia region. While promoting the “Manchu-Mongol Non-Chinese Theory” in Han Chinese areas, Japan simultaneously propagated ideas of Mongolian independence in Mongolia (The Editorial Office of the History of the 14 Years of Japanese Occupation in Northeast China & Japanese Colonial Culture Research Association 2010). On the eve of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Japan supported the establishment of a puppet Mongolian Autonomous Government under Demchugdongrub4.

In 1933, Yano Jinichi published The History of Manchukuo, in which the central argument was that “Manchuria has never been part of China’s territory”. His reasoning included claims that “Manchuria was a specially reserved area for the Bannermen during the Qing dynasty, representing the empire of the Manchus, not that of China”. Furthermore, he argued that “Manchukuo has been a nation coexisting with China since the time of the Yellow Emperor5”.

Similarly, Shiratori Kurakichi, in his book Manchukuo from a Historical Perspective, proposed that “Manchuria was a region of competition among the Manchus, Mongols, and Han Chinese, with power struggles sometimes occurring along a north–south axis and other times along an east–west axis. Its history has been intermittent rather than continuous”. He further asserted that “The Chinese regard Manchuria, much like the Western Regions and Mongolia, as a land beyond the frontier or outside the Great Wall, treating it as territory beyond the sphere of Chinese civilization”.

In summary, Japan’s economic cooperation and political involvement in Manchuria and Mongolia not only reflected its colonial ambitions at the time but also revealed its need for regional security and resource control. During this process, the regions of Manchuria and Mongolia gradually transitioned from being strategic buffer zones to becoming key areas for Japan to expand its political and economic interests. The Manchu-Mongol Non-Chinese Theory was not only a product of traditional nationalist thought but also closely related to modern Japan’s strategy, culture, and economy in the Manchurian and Mongolian regions. This ideology, from the early discourse of Hayashi Gahō to the multi-layered propaganda by Japanese scholars and military circles in the early 20th century, ultimately became one of the tools for Japan’s colonial implementation in the Manchurian and Mongolian regions. The core assertions of this theory include, first, that the culture and ethnicity of the Manchurian and Mongolian regions are fundamentally distinct from Chinese culture and ethnicity, and, second, that the history of these regions was predominantly shaped by northern nomadic peoples, lacking direct connections to the Central Plains dynasties. These claims not only misled Japanese public understanding of Chinese history but also provided a theoretical foundation for Japan’s colonial rule in Manchuria. Moreover, this theory fostered a wave of “Han chauvinism”, which promoted ethnic hatred and encouraged division within China (Shi 2016).

These assertions disregard the historical fact of the long-term coexistence and integration of ethnic minorities and Han culture, and they attempt to sever the historical connection between Manchuria, Mongolia, and China’s multi-ethnic community. This sentiment was further intensified amid the ethnic tensions of the late Qing period, particularly in the historical perceptions of Manchuria and Mongolia, where Han chauvinism became increasingly pronounced. With the end of the Xinhai Revolution and the establishment of the Republic of China, many scholars began to critically reflect on the negative ramifications of this doctrine, emphasizing both the principle of “Five Races Under One Union” and the inheritance of the Qing dynasty’s political legacy.

1.2. The Sinicization School

In contrast to the viewpoint that carries the notion of the “Manchu-Mongol Non-Chinese Theory”, another argument follows the “Sinicization theory”, which posits that whenever a non-Han ruling group enters a region predominantly inhabited by the Han people, they are almost invariably assimilated into Han culture. The methods of governance they adopt also inevitably follow those left behind by the Han, with these foreign groups having only the qualification to “learn” governance strategies, and thus incapable of developing their own truly independent political and cultural identity.

In scholarly discourse, the term “Sinicization” is employed largely by convention, and its precise meaning has seldom been subjected to rigorous analysis. For example, in his 1967 essay “The Significance of the Ch’ing Period in Chinese History”, American historian Ping-ti Ho observes the following:

The Qing court implemented an institutionalized policy of Sinicization centered on the Cheng–Zhu school of neo-Confucianism. This not only facilitated the transformation of the Manchu Eight-Banner tribal regime into a unified, centralized empire, but also secured the loyal support of the Confucian elite; it was precisely between 1851 and 1864 that these elites fought tenaciously to suppress the Han Chinese Taiping rebels, thereby saving this ‘foreign’ dynasty.

In 1996, Zhang Jinsong offered the following definition in his article “A Review of Wanyan Liang’s Sinicization Reforms” (J. Zhang 1996):

In China, the phenomenon whereby relatively ‘barbarian’ conquering peoples are assimilated by those they conquer is termed ‘Sinicization,’ meaning that the language, script, customs, and psychological outlook of a minority group become fully integrated into Han culture.

Chen Youbing’s 1998 study, “A Brief Discussion on ‘Sinicization’”, offers a far more systematic analysis of the term (Chen 1998). From the standpoint of cultural transformation, Chen argues that Sinicization is essentially an ethnic–cultural reformation process, in which minority groups absorb and identify with Han culture—above all its Confucian core—while adapting and reshaping their own traditions accordingly. He further observes that the principal architects of Sinicization were often minority leaders whose chief aims were to foster economic development and secure political authority in the Central Plains. Their instruments were predominantly intellectual and cultural, implemented peacefully through top-down legislation. In Chen’s view, Sinicization thus served as a vital conduit in China’s broader project of ethnic integration (Qi 2006).

From the Xiongnu of the Han-Zhao to the Manchu rule over China during the Qing dynasty, this principle is considered to apply. Therefore, the Qing dynasty’s conception of “unification” is seen merely as a reflection of the Confucian classical expressions found in the Chunqiu Gongyang Zhuang (Spring and Autumn Annals, Gongyang Tradition). For example, in the Qing dynasty’s diplomatic documents, such as The Beginnings and Developments of Foreign Affairs (籌辦夷務始末) during the Daoguang, Xianfeng, and Tongzhi reigns, the Qing government did not regard itself as “barbarians” but firmly upheld the orthodox position of “China”. The argument can be simplified as follows: a people who dare to label others as “barbarians” clearly cannot themselves be considered as such, at least within their own cultural system; they had transcended this label. This not only reflects the confidence and self-awareness displayed by the Qing government in diplomatic contexts but also reveals a clear distinction it made between its political identity and cultural recognition. The political identity obtained through military pressure at the beginning of the Qing dynasty was never fully equated with the cultural identity formed over time by the people. As a result, Qing rulers consistently emphasized and borrowed from Han governance traditions in their administration, seeking to consolidate their power while gaining deeper legitimacy.

In fact, the Qing government was well aware that mere reliance on military and administrative measures was insufficient to sustain its rule. Take, for instance, the political treatise The Dayi Juemi Lu (literally, “Records of Great Righteousness Resolving Confusion”), promulgated in the seventh year of Yongzheng’s reign (1729) by Emperor Shizong of Qing, Yinqi, in response to anti-Qing forces such as Zeng Jing and Lü Liuliang. On its surface, this work denounced anti-government activities; however, it effectively addressed two critical questions for all Han Chinese: first, whether the Qing’s replacement of the Ming dynasty was supported by legitimacy or legal rationale, and second, whether Emperor Yongzheng himself possessed the requisite virtue and moral integrity of a Son of Heaven. The former question echoed the age-old debate of distinguishing between the civilized and the barbarian, while the latter critically examined the moral self-discipline and political credibility of the Qing’s supreme ruler. It is precisely against this backdrop that the Qing government sought to achieve a dual recognition—both political and cultural—through the process of Sinicization, thereby ensuring that its rule not only provided pragmatic political governance but also garnered widespread cultural legitimacy (Han 2014).

1.3. The “New Qing History” School

Sinicization theory has long exerted a profound influence on the study of China’s multi-ethnic dynasties, particularly within the traditional Qing historiography. However, by the late twentieth century, the emergence of the “New Qing History” school initiated a critical reassessment of this traditional Sinicization perspective (Y. Liu 2021; Zhang and Hao 2023).

Representatives of the “New Qing History” school, such as Evelyn Sakakida Rawski and Mark C. Elliott, argue that the success of the Qing dynasty cannot be simply attributed to a wholesale assimilation of Han culture. Instead, it lies in the political acumen and military advantages embedded within its “Inner Asian” heritage—that is, the political wisdom and martial prowess of non-Han peoples such as the Manchus and Mongols—as well as its effective coordination and governance of diverse ethnic and regional traditions. They emphasize that although the Qing dynasty adopted Confucian institutions in governance, it retained its own unique ethnic characteristics, which cannot be fully captured by the aforementioned Sinicization theory (Cams 2016).

With regard to the question of what defines the “New Qing History” school, Pamela Kyle Crossley—counted among its four principal figures—was candid in her interview with Liu Shanshan:

In the United States, only a small handful of scholars ever label their own work ‘New Qing History’, and I happen not to be one of them.

In America, ‘New Qing History’ is not a widely accepted concept.

One of the hallmark events of the “New Qing History” school was the debate between Ping-ti Ho and Evelyn Rawski. In 1996, upon her election as president of the Association for Asian Studies, Evelyn Sakakida Rawski delivered her inaugural address, “Reenvisioning the Qing: The Significance of the Qing Period in Chinese History”, in which she launched a scathing critique of Ping-ti Ho’s 1967 essay “The Significance of the Ch’ing Period in Chinese History” and its Sinicization thesis. Rawski argued that the Qing dynasty’s ability to sustain nearly three centuries of rule rested not on a wholesale adoption of Han culture, but on its skillful leveraging of Inner Asian, non-Han cultural ties—so much so that Manchu sovereigns resembled the khans of Central Asia more than a conventional Han Chinese imperial house (Xu 2016).

Responding to Rawski’s claims, Ping-ti Ho published “Defending Sinicization: Rebuttal of Evelyn Rawski’s ‘Reenvisioning the Qing’ (Part I)” in 2000 (Ho and Zhang 2000b), where he countered:

To govern China, one must first possess the capacity to rule its vast multitude. Between 1650 and 1800, China’s population surged dramatically; the Manchus’ relative success in meeting this challenge owed largely to their employment of traditional Han policies and institutions. Their connections with non-Han peoples may diverge from orthodox conceptions of Tang- and Song-era Han rule, but that does not imply that the core of their governance was not grounded in Han political principles. Recent research on the Qing’s inland Asian territories has further enriched our understanding of its administration in both densely populated and frontier regions. Rawski erects a false dichotomy between Sinicization and Manchu–non-Han relations, suggesting that new findings on Manchu rule invalidate everything we thought we knew—an argument that simply does not hold.

To refute Rawski’s fundamental premise, one need not summon an exhaustive body of international scholarship on early conquest dynasties; a close reading of her own bibliographic overview reveals the flaw. She claims, ‘The reevaluation of Qing history described above accords with recent findings on early conquest regimes.’… It is astonishing that Rawski offers no original insights yet dismisses scholarly consensus so readily. Still more incredible is her failure to foresee that a simple bibliographic check would expose the falsity of her assertions.

In the follow-up “Defending Sinicization: Rebuttal of Evelyn Rawski’s ‘Reenvisioning the Qing’ (Part II)” (Ho and Zhang 2000a), Ho delivers his verdict without reservation:

Rawski would be better served by exploring the evolving role of Sinicization in Chinese history—especially now that contemporary China is preoccupied with redefining its cultural relationship with the West, thus forging new linkages between Sinicization, Westernization, and modernization—rather than comfortably aligning herself with the trendy ‘cultural-critical’ faction and substituting vacuous rhetoric for genuine scholarly and historical insight.

The majority of Chinese scholars have vociferously criticized the so-called “New Qing History” school chiefly because it repudiates the Sinicization thesis—thereby striking at the very core of China’s traditional historical narrative. Yet, despite the clamor of dissent from within China’s academic circles, not all New Qing History proponents adhere to identical or even comparable scholarly tenets. For example, Pamela Kyle Crossley has repeatedly stressed that her objection is not to the “Hanicization” (漢化) invoked by contemporary Chinese researchers, but rather to the historiographical construct of “Sinicization” formulated by John King Fairbank, Mary Clabaugh Wright, and their successors.

In addressing the New Qing History school’s central question—“What, precisely, was the Qing Empire (China)?”—its leading scholars advance markedly different interpretations. Pamela Kyle Crossley argues that the Qing state was a truly “universal” empire composed of five constituent peoples—Manchu, Mongol, Han, Tibetan, and Hui—emphasizing its model of multi-ethnic coexistence and collective sovereignty. James A. Millward and Emma Jinhua Teng, in their respective inquiries into Qing administration in Xinjiang and Taiwan, contend that the dynasty’s rule in these territories exhibited unmistakable affinities with colonial governance. Millward maintains that the modern conception of “China” did not crystallize with the Republic’s founding in 1912, nor even during the late-nineteenth-century twilight of the Qing; rather, it coalesced gradually from the mid-Qing onward. Over this protracted interval of institutional adaptation, an ideology of “Greater China” emerged—one rooted in the empire’s own geographic breadth and ethnic heterogeneity. Within this integrative imaginary, Jiayuguan functioned less as a strategic rampart than as a symbolic bastion: a psychological demarcation line grounded in inherited cultural notions of frontier, separating one imperial zone from another. Viewed from this perspective, Xinjiang acquires a heuristic significance analogous to the “frontier” in American historiography, becoming an indispensable site for probing the Inner Asian dynamics that profoundly shaped Qing statecraft (Millward 1996, 2021).

In response to the controversies brought about by the New Qing History and the issue of Xinjiang, Millward made the following statement:

Many have insinuated—or even outright stated—that the “New Qing History” is part of an academic conspiracy to divide China and destabilize the nation. However, this interpretation is a misunderstanding. While I can understand why they might feel this way, their assumption is incorrect. The purpose of what has come to be known as “New Qing History” is, in fact, to recalibrate and refine the scholarly discourse of earlier historians—such as John K. Fairbank—on topics like the tribute system, the process of Sinicization, and the idea of China as the civilizational center.

After the Qing conquest of Xinjiang, there was no large-scale indigenous uprising for almost a century. Although there were occasional cross-border interventions, no major local rebellion took place. Such sustained stability under imperial rule is rare not only in Chinese history but in world history more broadly. It is precisely for this reason that the question of how the Qing managed its frontier territories becomes especially significant. Thus, far from attacking or denigrating China, my research should be seen as a positive affirmation of the Qing dynasty’s governance of its borderlands.

However, there are valid grounds to suspect that, over the past decade, James A. Millward may have harbored political motivations—potentially impure—in his public addresses and academic research concerning the Xinjiang issue. The passage below distills key elements of Millward’s research on the historical development of Xinjiang, where he posits that China’s governance of the region—from the Qing Dynasty to the People’s Republic of China—embodies colonial characteristics in distinct ways:

PRC state propaganda stresses the military colonies established in the 2nd century BCE by the Han empire in parts of what is now Xinjiang. But these claims are no more relevant to contemporary PRC policies than Roman outposts in Britain would be to modern Italian–UK relations, or Ottoman imperial administration in Egypt is to Turkish–Egyptian relations today.

before the CCP took control of Xinjiang in 1949, the previous government of the region, in power since 1945, had been an uneasy coalition of the Guomindang (KMT), or Chinese Nationalist Party, and the Eastern Turkestan Republic (ETR) or Eastern Turkestan People’s Republic (ETPR), which had formed with Soviet support to resist the imposition of Guomindang rule in 1944.

the current PRC assimilationism seeks to forcibly submerge Xinjiang non-Han peoples into an invented identity, mandating that distinctive ethnic features be scrubbed away through false historical narratives, cultural and language erasure, rhetoric about shared bloodlines, and coerced re-education—while at the same time implementing birth suppression measures for non-Hans and incentivizing Han in-migration tore-engineer demographic ratios in Xinjiang.

Nonetheless, Millward’s argument fails to account for the prolonged and de facto dominance of Han warlord regimes in Xinjiang during the Republic of China era, particularly under the leadership of Yang Zengxin and later Sheng Shicai. Moreover, Millward asserts that large-scale Han migration to Xinjiang only began in the 1950s, spurred by the expansion of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. However, historical records reveal that, as early as the Qing Dynasty during Emperor Qianlong’s reign, a significant number of Han settlers had already relocated to Xinjiang from provinces such as Shaanxi and Gansu. Consequently, Millward’s perspective may inadvertently mislead readers into believing that Xinjiang was largely autonomous following the fall of the Qing Dynasty, and that this autonomy persisted until the reoccupation of the region by the Chinese Communist Party in 1949, which allegedly established a form of “colonial rule” that remains in place to this day.

Emma Jinhua Teng argues that the Qing dynasty’s rule over Taiwan was similar to the control exerted by contemporary European powers over their colonies. For example, the travel writings and maps created by Qing literati about Taiwan were akin to the exploration reports written by British and French explorers in Africa and India. These transformed “unknown lands” into governable domains, constructing imaginaries of governance through texts and images. In the official pictorial album Tribute Illustrations (circa 1751), Qing officials classified Taiwan’s indigenous population into two categories: “Raw Savages” (Chinese: shengfan, 生番), referring to tribes without Sinicized features, and “Cooked Savages” (Chinese: shufan, 熟番), referring to tribes with certain Sinicized traits. The government moved from restricting their movement and land rights using a pass system to implementing the “kaishanfufan (開山撫番)” policy, which relied on Han migration and military force to suppress resistance and consolidate control over the entire island. This appears to have some similarities to the colonization of the Americas. The Qing court commissioned the Jesuits to produce the Kangxi Taiwan Atlas and the Taiwan Gazetteer, both of which asserted the empire’s control over Taiwan on both strategic and symbolic levels. In 1887, the Qing dynasty elevated Taiwan to the status of a province, establishing a provincial governor (xunfu), military training stations (lianbing suo), and a land registration system. Taiwan thus transitioned from a “barbarous island” located “overseas” into a “Chinese province”. This transformation signified a shift in China’s perception of its “overseas” territories, marking the country’s movement from an established political structure to a new spatial image of an empire that transcended boundaries (Teng 2007).

Emma Jinhua Teng, in Taiwan in the Chinese Imagination, 17th–19th Centuries (Teng 2007), argues the following:

The “imperialism” is essentially a Western phenomenon has also been by scholars of modern China’s “postcoloniality”, who have tended to China’s historical experiences with Western imperialism while ignoring own history as an imperialist power. This is due in no small part to the recent denials that the Chinese were ever anything but victims of imperialism; official PRC discourse refers to Qing expansionism as “national unification”, “Chinese imperialism” is heresy. I seek to remedy this situation by that China’s postcoloniality must also be understood in terms of the legacy of expansionism.

I consider Qing expansionism at once an imperial and colonial phenomenon.

“Chinese imperialism” is rendered particularly complex by the fact that the Qing dynasty itself was a conquest dynasty. The majority Han Chinese population was subjugated by the Manchu ruling class. Yet, the Qing adopted many of the political, economic, and cultural institutions of the previous Chinese imperial dynasties, becoming somewhat “sinicized” in the process. At the same time, ethnic Han Chinese actively participated in the military and political life of the Qing, joining the ruling class and perhaps becoming somewhat “Manchuized” in the process. This ethnic complexity was further intensified with Qing expansionism. While the Qing relied on its multiethnic troops to conquer frontier territories, the colonists who settled these frontiers were nearly exclusively Han Chinese.

By contrast, Mark C. Elliott offers a far more radical reappraisal. In his 2001 book The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China, he insists that the so-called “High Qing” era was not a “pax Sinica” at all but rather a “pax Manjurica”—a Manchu peace underwritten by the political genius and military organization of the Inner Asian peoples. In his later work, Emperor Qianlong: Son of Heaven, Man of the World (2009), Elliott even asserts bluntly that “Qianlong is a non-Chinese ruler of China”. Intriguingly, when this volume appeared in Chinese translation, he quietly revised the phrase to “Qianlong is not a Han Chinese emperor” (R. Wang 2018, 2021).

Elliott further contends that the Qing dynasty’s enduring place among the world’s great empires was owed entirely to the Manchus’ unique fusion of political savvy and martial prowess—and that the role of Han participation in unifying and administering the realm has been systematically downplayed (Zhang and Elliott 2016). He argues that the process he terms “acculturation” (explicitly rejecting both “Sinicization” and “assimilation”) eroded the Manchus’ traditional virtues of valor, frugality, and horsemanship, ultimately sapping their will to power and precipitating the dynasty’s downfall. In his view, once Manchus adopted Han luxury and complacency, they lost their fighting spirit and descended into indolence and poverty (R. Wang 2018, 2021).

Yet the historical record is far more nuanced. Throughout China’s history, Han-founded regimes routinely maintained formidable armies; from the moment Qing forces crossed the Great Wall to the dynasty’s close, Han enlistment remained a crucial pillar of its military strength. The decline of the Eight Banners’ martial capacity stemmed from a complex interplay of economic, social, and institutional factors—hardly the simple by-product of a single process of “acculturation”.

At the Fourth “Thought and Method” High-End Forum held at Beijing Normal University, Orlidd posed his own challenge to those skeptical of New Qing History:

If Chinese historians insist on talking only about ‘Sinicization’, then how can scholars of England under the Norman dynasty or India under the Mughal Empire enter into the conversation? Who cares whether they can participate? Are we Chinese academics only happy conversing with those in our own subfield?

In response, Wang Rongzu—formerly a professor at Virginia State University, visiting researcher at the Australian National University, and guest professor at Fudan University, National Taiwan University, National Chengchi University, and National Taiwan Normal University—offered this rebuttal (R. Wang 2018):

‘Sinicization’ is neither an academic slogan nor an empty theory, but a historical fact that actually occurred. It is precisely because some deny Sinicization that it has become the focal point of historical debate.

Proponents of ‘New Qing History’ fear the concept of ‘Sinicization’ above all else and assail it without reserve, even dismissing it as a product of modern Chinese nationalism. They assert that ethnic groups possess their own consciousness and self-identity, so that when the Manchus adopt Han culture it can only be termed ‘acculturation’ rather than ‘assimilation.’ Elliott claims not to believe that the Manchus lost their group ‘self-identity,’ yet he cannot evade the many concrete instances of Sinicization under Qianlong: the emperor’s admiration for Han learning, his veneration of Confucius, his emphasis on filial piety, his identification with the literati, and his maintenance of the institutions and structures of earlier Chinese dynasties. Qianlong was deeply steeped in Han culture: he preferred Han-style robes; he ranked himself among the shi gentry; he performed rituals at the Yu and Ming Mausolea; he visited the Fan Zhongyan shrine; he paid homage at the Temple of Confucius in Qufu—kneeling three times and kowtowing nine times before Confucius’s statue; he practiced utmost filial devotion to his mother; and he composed over 40,000 poems in Chinese. Are these not unmistakable signs of Sinicization? Faced with such irrefutable evidence, Elliott strains to moderate his claims, even awkwardly suggesting that although Qianlong had studied the classics and believed that self-cultivation and governance were grounded in them, he did not necessarily ‘accept’ these principles. Elliott further contends that Qianlong fashioned himself as an ‘ardent Confucian’ only to secure the support of the literati and thus legitimize his rule of China.

Moreover, in an interview with the Shanghai Book Review, Elliott openly acknowledged the influence of pre-World War II Japanese scholarship on his work. Asked whether his views echoed the old Japanese imperial “Manchu-Mongol non-China theory”, or whether his research might be co-opted by political forces, he replied with the following:

Some allege that because New Qing History draws on Japanese studies from before World War II, its scholars share the political objectives of those Japanese researchers—that is, serving imperialist ends and plotting to fracture the People’s Republic of China. It is true that many Japanese scholars of that era harbored such motives, and today they themselves admit it; we acknowledge it too. If you look closely at their work, you see them speak of ‘alien conquest’—arguing that Mongols, as an ‘alien’ people, ruled China, and likewise the Manchus, and therefore the Japanese could do the same. But to claim that any similarity between New Qing History and pre-war Japanese scholarship renders New Qing History scholars politically suspect is to go too far.

Proponents of New Qing History argue that the success of Qing rule did not stem from the historical paradigms and governing practices inherited from Han Chinese dynasties, such as the Ming, but rather from the unique “Manchu characteristics” of the regime (Déry 2020). They emphasize that it was the ability of the Qing to coordinate and incorporate the diverse traditional practices of various ethnic regions that underpinned its rule. In this view, the formation of a “Great Unity” was not merely the result of emulating the experiences of Han dynasties, as suggested by the Sinicization model; rather, it emerged from a balanced synthesis of different ethnic traditions, where the Han not only constituted just one component of the whole, but their cultural influence provided only partial support to the overall configuration. Nevertheless, many scholars within the New Qing History framework have drawn parallels between the Qing dynasty’s expansion and control over regions such as Central and Northern Asia and the modern Western colonial expansion into the East. Consequently, while the research avenues opened by New Qing History exhibit certain scientific and progressive merits, they are also accompanied by limitations. Because of an overemphasis on the Qing dynasty’s “ethnic particularities”, such approaches are often accused of bearing the imprint of a Western colonial historiography. Moreover, given the inherent sensitivity surrounding China’s multi-ethnic historical questions, these interpretations readily become politicized or subject to disparagement (Liu and Huang 2023).

In essence, New Qing History reconceives the Qing as a “non-Han” conquest dynasty founded by ethnic minorities, insists on the primacy of Manchu identity (and rejects any notion of Manchu “Sinicization”), and calls for a reexamination of Qing rule through new lenses—especially ethnicity and frontier studies—while centering Manchu6 in its historiography, drawing on Mongolian, Korean,7 Uyghur, and other non-Han sources. The advancements embodied in the “New Qing History” and other recent historiographical perspectives lie in their greater emphasis on the symbiotic and cooperative relationships among different ethnic groups compared to the traditional Sinicization theory. Although scholars from the New Qing History school uniformly advocate for the use of Manchu-language sources, notable figures within this school—such as Mark C. Elliott and Pamela Kyle Crossley—have not exclusively relied on these materials. Their use of Manchu sources has not been exhaustive, and their dependence on Chinese-language sources remains as extensive. Furthermore, misinterpretations or overinterpretations of Manchu texts are not uncommon. Influenced by this discourse, Yang Zhen from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in his two articles—“The Limitations of Manchu Sources in Qing History Research” and “Revisiting the Value and Limitations of Manchu Sources in Qing History Research”—observes that while earlier Qing historiography largely overlooked Manchu materials, a countervailing trend has recently gained momentum. This new trend asserts, almost dogmatically, that Qing history must be primarily grounded in Manchu sources, positing that one cannot properly study the Qing dynasty without proficiency in Manchu—a similarly extreme stance.

Many Chinese scholars have frequently critiqued practitioners of New Qing History for perceived shortcomings in both the accuracy and political orientation of their use of non-Han-language sources, such as Manchu. However, there is no doubt that these scholars—and others employing transcultural, multilingual methodologies—have had a profound influence on their Chinese counterparts. They have inspired and facilitated more pluralistic approaches to the study of non-Han regimes. For instance, in his examination of ethnic classification under the Yuan dynasty, Professor Hu Xiaopeng of Northwest Normal University built upon the pioneering work of Japanese scholar Yoshiyuki Funada, who utilized a variety of non-Chinese sources—including the Secret History of the Mongols, the Jami‘ al-tawārīkh, and The Travels of Marco Polo—to reconstruct the ethnic hierarchies and classifications of the Mongols, Semu, and Han during the Yuan dynasty using traditional Chinese historical materials. Hu advanced this foundation by conducting a detailed lexical analysis of Mongolian terms such as “qari”, “qarin”, “qariqari”, and “qariirgen”, found in the Secret History of the Mongols, and comparing these findings with Ming–Qing-period Mongolian chronicles such as Erdeniin Tobchi, Altan Tobchi, and The Yellow History. This allowed him to articulate the ethnic classifications and hierarchies of the Yuan dynasty (X.-p. Hu 2013, 2022).

In fact, the establishment of the Han-Zhao state represents an early manifestation of such multi-ethnic symbiosis in both Chinese and even global history. The Han-Zhao state achieved ethnic coexistence through its dual policy of Hu-Han integration, a model that was later reflected in the historical practices of minority groups such as the Khitans, Jurchens, Manchus, and Mongols during the Liao, Jin, Yuan, and Qing dynasties, respectively. These regimes incorporated core elements of Han culture while simultaneously preserving their own traditional characteristics, thereby creating a unified “Chinese entity” as a state structure. This framework sought to balance cultural unity and ethnic diversity within the broader context of China.

The establishment of the Han-Zhao state marked a significant period of large-scale multi-ethnic integration in northern China during early Chinese history, involving the Xiongnu, Han, and other ethnic groups. Liu Yuan founded his regime not only based on the Xiongnu Chuge tribe but also by extensively incorporating many Han intellectuals and commoners into its political, military, and cultural systems. This practice of ethnic integration demonstrates that frontier ethnic regimes were not isolated entities in opposition to Central Plains civilization. Instead, they developed alongside and interacted with Han culture within the framework of a shared community. Investigating the political structure and cultural identity of the Han-Zhao regime can expose the theoretical biases of “Han chauvinism” and its core narrative of the “Manchu-Mongol Non-Chinese Theory”. This analysis refutes the central claim that minority regimes were inherently separate from and in opposition to Han culture. Only by integrating both “Sinicization” and “Inner Asia”—or, more broadly, multicultural factors—can we fully grasp the historical trajectories of China’s minority regimes and their singular place in the sweep of Chinese history.

2. The Concept of Dual Monarchy in the Han-Zhao State

The term dual monarchy typically calls to mind the political structure exemplified by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in which the same monarch rules two separate states or regions that share policies and resources in military, diplomatic, financial, and other areas, while maintaining autonomy in domestic governance. The essence of this political system lies in the distribution and sharing of power between the ruler and various political entities, often involving the coexistence and cooperation of multiple nations, cultures, and legal systems. The core feature of a dual monarchy is the principle of “dividing to govern and uniting as one” in the political, economic, and cultural spheres. Such empires are controlled by a monarch who implements unified military and foreign policies across independent regions, while allowing these regions a degree of autonomy in internal affairs. Such a system aims to maintain the coexistence of different ethnic groups or cultures and to reduce the likelihood of rebellion or division due to oppressive rule (Y.-f. Zhang 2004).

Thus, the dual monarchy is a complex governing structure that aims to maintain diversity and stability under a unified monarchical authority. Dual monarchies are rare in global history, notably exemplified by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Denmark–Norway, and the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, which achieved prolonged stability by integrating various ethnicities and cultures. However, this stability is not without challenges, especially regarding ethnic identity and cultural autonomy.

In the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 established two coexisting states, Austria and Hungary. Although both states shared fiscal, military, and diplomatic governance under one government, they retained independent control over domestic and cultural affairs. This agreement granted Hungary substantial autonomy over its domestic affairs, allowing it to adjust its policies on language, culture, and education according to its own needs. Consequently, Hungary had an independent parliament and administrative system with significant autonomy, particularly in matters concerning national issues and language policy (Gao 2015).

In the fields of language and education, the Austro-Hungarian Empire did not simply adopt a single German national model but instead maintained the cultural and linguistic autonomy of different groups within its multi-ethnic regions. Language became not only a marker of local identity but also an important tool for national identification. This policy profoundly divided linguistic communities within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In the 1870s, the educational reforms of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Imperial Elementary School Act (Reichsvolksschulgesetz) of 1869 explicitly guaranteed the right to use various national languages in public education, allowing minority groups to establish schools in their native languages in their respective regions. This Act, to some extent, facilitated the modernization of nations and strengthened national identity (Judson 2006, 2016).

According to Judson (2006, 2016), language policy in the Austro-Hungarian Empire was not only a communication tool but also an important symbol of ethnic politics and identity. Language policy simultaneously provided a breeding ground for intense ethnic conflicts. Nationalists, through popular movements, school education, and local autonomy, strengthened the cohesion of their respective ethnic groups and posed greater challenges to the central government. For instance, in the Hungarian region, the government adopted a series of measures to promote the use of Hungarian and sought to reinforce the language’s status through the education system. In particular, the Apponyi Law of 1907 further mandated the compulsory use of Hungarian in education. Although these policies were intended to promote Magyarization, they also sparked controversy and significantly impacted non-Hungarian-speaking ethnic groups and regions.

In the Bohemia region, the tension between the Czech- and German-speaking populations was particularly pronounced. Czech nationalists promoted the use of the Czech language and worked to expand its presence within the education system, striving for political and cultural equality for the Czech people. However, the German-speaking community insisted on promoting the German language in these regions, believing that it would foster social unity and progress. These linguistic struggles played out in many parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and in some areas, they even transformed into a covert “ethnic war”, with control over education and language dissemination channels becoming a means to gain local political dominance.

Nevertheless, the dual monarchy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire maintained a relatively long period of stability, partly due to its flexible policies in political governance, which allowed various ethnic groups to enjoy autonomy while still recognizing the Emperor’s supreme authority. While acknowledging the cultural and self-governing rights of different ethnicities, the empire reinforced unified governance over all its subjects through centralized administrative institutions, such as the Austrian Parliament and the Hungarian legislature. According to historical records, many local communities in the empire, even when facing pressure from nationalists, chose to rely on the imperial framework as a tool to resist the oppression of local elites, leading to the formation of cross-ethnic alliances. This multi-ethnic governance model of the empire, though complex and contradictory, effectively preserved internal unity and external strength at certain periods of its history. Similarly, the governance structure of the Han-Zhao state also exhibited characteristics of a dual monarchy. Although the establishment of the Han-Zhao regime shares similarities with the Merovingian Dynasty in terms of its temporal context (Late Antiquity) and early legitimacy claims, politically it more closely resembles the Carolingian Empire during the Han period. However, the Han-Zhao regime displayed a unique duality of ethnic autonomy: the central government of Han-Zhao modeled its political system on traditional Chinese dynastic structures, yet the division of rule between the Han and Xiongnu, alongside the retention of certain Xiongnu customs, created significant contrasts. The conflict between the Xiongnu Emperor’s and Confucian Han ceremonial culture further distinguished the Han-Zhao from the Merovingian Dynasty or the Holy Roman Empire (including the Carolingian Empire), both of which were fully converted to Roman Christianity.

The Han-Zhao state (Han state) was established in 304 by Liu Yuan, a Xiongnu leader. It marked the first instance of the Xiongnu elite, and even East Asian minority groups, integrating into the political system of the Central Plains by emulating the structure of the Chinese empire. Liu Yuan’s rise was rooted in the decline of the Western Jin, accompanied by ethnic tensions and political instability. Although the political system of the Han-Zhao drew upon traditional Chinese models, its military and political strategies incorporated Xiongnu governance characteristics, resulting in a unique blend of cultural and political elements. This blending is referred to as the “division of rule between the Hu and Han” policy. The Xiongnu nobility controlled military and local governance through the Chanyu Tai (Platform), while the Han elites managed the civil administration and cultural dissemination by following the traditional offices of the Three Lords and Nine Ministers8. This governance structure not only alleviated tensions between the Han and Xiongnu but also enhanced the regime’s legitimacy by incorporating Han cultural and administrative practices. Within the realm of ceremonial institutions, the Han-Zhao regime simultaneously preserved the Xiongnu’s ancestral sacrificial rites and adopted the Han model of grand court assemblies and imperial edict promulgation. At each major ritual—whether enthronement, commemorative sacrifice, or seasonal festival—Xiongnu nobles and Han officials observed their own protocols: the former meticulously invoked an unbroken “Xiongnu genealogy” in every liturgical gesture, while the latter emphasized the orthodox deference owed to Han imperial ritual. These alternating rites, enacted within a single ceremonial enclosure, not only embodied the power sharing of a dual monarchy but also, in the daily lived experience of subjects, deeply fashioned dual “Han” and “Hu” identities. As Thomas S. Mullaney argues in Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China, ethnic identity must be both “recognized” and “reproduced” through ritual—and the Han-Zhao example offers a striking historical validation of this thesis (Mullaney 2011).

Like other historical dual monarchies, the Han-Zhao state’s duality extended beyond ethnic and cultural coexistence to encompass the multiple distribution of political power. Like the Austro-Hungarian and Denmark–Norway dual monarchies, the rulers of the Han-Zhao state sought to stabilize internal diversity through shared power. However, the Han-Zhao state demonstrated this model much earlier, becoming one of the earliest attempts at this form of governance.

One might invoke Harrell’s “primordial–contingent” model to illuminate this institutional arrangement (Wen 2012). Under its “primordial” register, the Xiongnu commander derives authority from bloodline and genealogical succession, thereby personifying the traditional functions of ritual leadership, military muster, and intra-tribal deliberation. This ancestral mandate not only embodies the continuity of his lineage but also serves as the very emblem of cohesion within the Xiongnu polity. In contrast, Han Chinese civil officials function as bearers of “contingent” authority, drawing upon bureaucratic precedent and ritual prescriptions to oversee court governance and ceremonial observances. Through their deployment of Sinicized symbols—official seals, court robes, and prescribed rites—they project an unmistakable Han orthodoxy onto the northern steppe. Such a context-sensitive division of labor exemplifies the customary strategies by which multi-ethnic regimes administered heterogeneous populations. Together, these two symbolic systems interlock to form a dynamic “symbolic field”, one that both reinforces the Xiongnu elite’s attachment to their heritage and simultaneously broadcasts the regime’s legitimacy to the Han Chinese of the Central Plains.

The structure of the Han-Zhao state was unique among dual monarchies. For example, the Austro-Hungarian model sought to solve the empire’s ethnic issues by granting autonomy to Hungary, but the core of the system remained highly centralized, particularly in diplomatic and military affairs. By contrast, the Han-Zhao state’s dual structure was more flexible, demonstrating creativity in merging Xiongnu and Han cultures and institutions. Politically, the Han-Zhao state preserved the Xiongnu nobility’s control over the military while maintaining a Han bureaucratic system to manage civil and cultural affairs. In the military sphere, Xiongnu aristocrats deliberately accentuated nomadic iconography—riding cymbals9 and Hu-style mounted archery—to assert their distinction from the Western Jin. Yet, at the level of local administration and ceremonial practice, they readily incorporated Han ritual protocols, noble titulature, and the zhongzhu (tomb-sacrificial officiant) system, thereby crafting a familiar politico-cultural milieu for Han Chinese and other assimilated elites. By weaving together these disparate symbolic repertoires, the regime transformed the binary “Hu–Han” dichotomy into a pluralistic, malleable field of identity—far more than a simple paradigm of ethnic segregation or superficial cultural borrowing.

Table 1. Comparison between the Han-Zhao and Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Comparison Dimension	Han-Zhao	Austro-Hungarian Empire
Establishment time and background	Established in 304, founded by Liu Yuan of the Xiongnu during the late Western Jin Dynasty amid internal chaos, peasant uprisings, and Xiongnu tribal divisions.	Established in 1867 through the Austro-Hungarian Compromise, following Austria’s defeat in the Austro-Prussian War, to stabilize Hungary and restructure rule.
Dissolution causes	Severe internal conflicts: ① Over-centralization of imperial power weakened the authority of the Xiongnu aristocracy. ② Intensified conflicts between Han and Xiongnu. ③ External pressure (rise of Later Zhao).	Collapse after World War I: ① Rise of nationalism caused centrifugal tendencies among ethnic groups. ② Military defeat (1918). ③ International support for dismantling the empire into nation states.
Political legitimacy	1. Source: Combined legitimacy from Xiongnu traditions and Han dynasty orthodoxy. ① Xiongnu traditions: Liu Yuan claimed to be a descendant of ‘Modu Chanyu’ and adopted the title of ‘Great Chanyu’ to inherit tribal authority. ② Han Chinese heritage: Proclaimed as the ‘King of Han’ and mimicked Han bureaucratic systems to gain legitimacy among the Chinese. 2. Issues: The ‘Han-Xiongnu dual governance’ policy intensified ethnic divisions; centralization alienated Xiongnu nobility.	1. Source: Legitimacy derived from multiple foundations. ① Royal heritage: The Habsburg monarchy had historical authority since the medieval period. ② Legal framework: The 1867 Compromise formalized Austria and Hungary as equal partners under a shared monarch. ③ International status: Recognized as a major European power with legitimacy supported by global diplomacy. 2. Issues: Lack of unified legitimacy across ethnic groups; some ethnic groups rejected imperial structure.
Ethnic policy	‘Han-Xiongnu Dual Governance’ Policy: ① Han Chinese: Left and Right Superintendents managed Han affairs, with an ‘Interior Minister’ for every 10,000 households. ② Xiongnu: Managed by the Chanyu Platform, led by the ‘Great Chanyu’ and assisted by ‘Left and Right Aides’ and local officers. Policy issue: Strengthened ethnic segregation, exacerbating Han-Xiongnu tensions and weakening cohesion.	Multiethnic governance strategy: ① Granted autonomy to some regions, such as the Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia. ② Bilingual policies (German and Hungarian) with allowance for ethnic groups to use native languages. Issue: Nationalism and unequal treatment of ethnic groups (e.g., Czechs) led to discontent and eventual disintegration.
Economic structure	Traditional agriculture and tribal economy: ① Predominantly agrarian economy, supplemented by Xiongnu nomadic traditions. ② Resource acquisition relied on military expansion but lacked centralized economic development.	Industrial economy: ① Fourth-largest machinery industry globally, with significant modernization, especially in Austrian and Czech territories. ② Customs union facilitated economic cooperation, though Hungarian regions lagged economically.
Military features	Xiongnu cavalry-centric military: ① Flexible cavalry forces, but reliant on nomadic economic systems with limited supplies. ② Han-style infantry integration was insufficient, and the military lacked cohesion.	Modernized military: ① Unified foreign and defense policies with relatively modernized armed forces. ② Multi-ethnic composition of the army caused internal conflicts and morale issues.
Culture and language	Dual cultural system: ① Xiongnu culture: continued nomadic traditions such as the Chanyu title. ② Han culture: Liu Yuan adopted Han education and imitated Chinese political systems.	Multilingual and multicultural: ① Official languages included German and Hungarian, with significant use of other ethnic languages (e.g., Czech, Polish). ② Rich cultural heritage, including Vienna’s influence as a center of music and arts.
Religious beliefs	Coexistence of Xiongnu traditional beliefs and integration of Confucian, Buddhist, and Daoist influences from the Han.	Predominantly Roman Catholic, with minority groups practicing Eastern Orthodoxy, Protestantism, Judaism, and Islam.
Social structure	Emphasized ethnic separation; Han and Xiongnu managed separately. Nobility held significant power, but over-centralization led to alienation and internal strife.	Defined social hierarchy with Austrian and Hungarian elites dominating politics. Other ethnic groups, such as Czechs, were marginalized, leading to severe social divides.

presents a detailed comparison between the Han Zhao and the Austro-Hungarian Empire in terms of their founding backgrounds, reasons for collapse, political legitimacy, and existing ethnic issues.

Still, the Han-Zhao state faced challenges similar to those that other dual monarchies faced. Throughout history, dual monarchies have struggled to maintain ethnic and cultural balance and often fell into crisis due to internal conflicts and external pressures. Similarly, while the Han-Zhao state achieved a temporarily stable political unity between the Xiongnu and Han populations through dual governance in its early years, its reliance on military power and the internal power struggles among the Xiongnu nobility eventually led to instability.

Dual empires worldwide often face internal and external pressures that ultimately lead to their fragmentation; the Han-Zhao encountered similar challenges. After Liu Cong’s coup in 313, which destroyed the Jin Dynasty’s rule in North China (known as the “Disaster of Yongjia”), the nominal sovereignty over the Central Plains (China’s core) shifted to the Han state. The Han-Zhao territory was home to both Han Chinese and multiple ethnic minorities. Liu Cong inherited and furthered Liu Yuan’s policy of “division of rule between the Hu and Han”, maintaining political stability through a dual system. However, this system, in practice, intensified ethnic conflicts, leading to a lack of cohesion among local rulers in ethnically diverse regions and accelerating the formation of local separatism. Simultaneously, as the Han-Zhao territory expanded rapidly, inefficient local administration resulted in the gradual development of autonomous governance models, weakening central control over localities and eroding the authority of the central government and the Emperor.

After Liu Cong’s death in July 318, his successor, Liu Can, indulged in debauchery and indiscriminately executed ministers, which intensified internal power struggles and political fragmentation within the Han-Zhao. In August, Jin Zhun, a Xiongnu noble, orchestrated a coup, plunging the Han state into anarchy. In 319, Liu Yuan’s nephew, Liu Yao, suppressed the rebellion, but the Han state was divided into “Former Zhao” (Liu Yao) and “Later Zhao” (Shi Le). Former Zhao pursued frequent external expansionist policies; however, these wars severely damaged the economy, caused a significant population decline, and strained finances. Simultaneously, Liu Yao excessively strengthened imperial power, leading to the alienation and resentment of the Xiongnu nobility. As Shi Le’s “Later Zhao” rose in the Hebei region, it rapidly expanded through efficient military management and political control, becoming the greatest competitor to Former Zhao. Despite Liu Yao’s multiple military campaigns against Later Zhao during his reign, the frequent internal turmoil and power struggles within the Han-Zhao regime weakened centralization, dispersing military forces and rendering sustained and effective resistance against Later Zhao impossible. In 329, Liu Yao was defeated and captured. Crown Prince Liu Xi attempted to defend Shanggui (now Tianshui, Gansu province) but failed, leading to the fall of the Han-Zhao state (Zhuang 2011).

In summary, history shows that dual monarchies often disintegrated under internal and external pressures. The Han-Zhao state faced similar challenges, as it managed to maintain temporary stability through its dual structure but ultimately collapsed due to internal power struggles and ethnic tensions. One of the earliest examples of dual monarchy in world history, it provided valuable lessons for the governance of multi-ethnic and multicultural states in later Chinese dynasties. It demonstrates how power sharing could secure short-term stability between different cultures and institutions, even as it lays bare the fragility of such structures in the long term. When a regime cannot effectively reconcile conflicts between ethnic groups and cultures, the dual or pluralistic political structure catalyzes the empire’s downfall.

3. Xiongnu King Liu Yuan’s Claim to the Political Legitimacy of the Han Dynasty

As a representative of the Southern Xiongnu nobility, Liu Yuan faced the challenge of establishing political legitimacy in founding the Han-Zhao state. As a non-Han leader from a minority group, he needed to find a form of governance that both the Han Chinese society in the Central Plains and the Xiongnu tribes would accept. Liu Yuan cleverly utilized the historical legacy of the Han Dynasty and the cultural ideology of the Central Plains, especially by claiming a special relationship with the Han Dynasty to legitimize his rule. This strategy not only ensured the early stability of the Han-Zhao state but also allowed it to temporarily find a point of equilibrium amid its ethnic conflicts and cultural tensions.

3.1. Inheritance of the Han Symbol

Early in the establishment of the Han-Zhao state, Liu Yuan sought to legitimize his rule by raising the banner of the Han. This was a key strategy to address the legitimacy crisis he faced as a Xiongnu ruler over the Central Plains, a region traditionally dominated by the Han Chinese. Liu Yuan adopted the slogan of reviving the Han dynasty and named his regime “Han”. This move not only acknowledged the powerful cultural influence of the Han dynasty but also sought to win the recognition of Han Chinese scholars and the general populace of the Central Plains (S. Feng 2022).

The symbol of the Han held profound significance in the culture of the Central Plains, as it represented the long-lasting unity, civilization, strength, and legitimacy of the former Han dynasties (Western Han and Eastern Han). Feng Yujie further notes that, from the very inception of Cheng–Han, non-Han elites had already appropriated the Han court template—employing feudal enfeoffment rituals modeled on imperial precedent to signal both their deference to and ambition within the Han cultural order. In Cheng–Han’s early years, for instance, Li Mù was posthumously invested as Prince of Lǒngxī—despite the fact that his fief lay well beyond the boundaries of modern Sichuan—underscoring the regime’s claim to erstwhile Han territories. Similarly, other princely enfeoffments were conferred within lands still governed by the Western Jin, thereby proclaiming Cheng–Han’s intent to “restore” the full territorial reach of the Han dynasty (Z. Wang 2024). Although these measures represented a relatively rudimentary strategy for constructing political legitimacy, the same logic would later be elaborated into a far more systematic and sophisticated apparatus under the subsequent Han–Zhao régime.

To address the identity crisis caused by the sentiment that “the Jin people (Chinese) may not be one with us”, Liu Yuan began leveraging historical resources such as “The Han ruled the world for generations, their grace rooted in people’s hearts”. Liu Yuan, for his part, styled himself the “nephew of the Han imperial clan”, invoking fictive kinship with Han Gaozu, Emperor Guangwu of the Eastern Han, and Liu Bei of Shu Han—thereby transforming blood ties into a powerful vehicle for his avowed mission of inheriting Han orthodoxy and reviving the Han house (S. Feng 2022). He tirelessly mobilized Han literati, displaced court officials, and ordinary subjects alike to accept Xiongnu sovereignty and to devote themselves to the construction of the new regime. As Wang Antai and his colleagues observe:

Liu Yuán, rising in arms as a scion of the Xiongnu chanyu and invoking the former brotherhood between Han and Xiongnu, proclaimed himself the legitimate heir of the Han dynasty, inheriting its territorial dominion and world-order. Every commandery and county established by the Han—and governed by its appointed officials—became territory that Liu Yuán was ‘obliged to restore’. … Although in the early phase of state-building Liu Yuán had yet to expand his borders, the fiefs he conferred lay almost entirely outside his direct control—that is, within Western Jin domains. The very purpose of these enfeoffments was to announce that he would imminently represent Han orthodoxy and recover Han domains, thus negating the Western Jin’s legitimacy; by preemptively distributing princely titles across the land, he signaled that ‘all under heaven’ belonged to the Han (Han–Zhao) realm.

Liu Cóng likewise enfeoffed his sons as Prince of Wu (Liu Chěng), Prince of Dai (Liu Héng), and Prince of Shu (Liu Qióng). In particular, the name Liu Héng echoed that of Emperor Wén of the Western Han—who himself had borne the title Prince of Dai before his accession—so elevating Liu Héng to Prince of Dai carried the clear implication of equating him with Emperor Wén.

In the second year of Yongjia (308 CE) under Emperor Huai of Jin, Liu Yuan issued an enthronement edict tracing the history of the Western Han, Eastern Han, and Shu Han, weaving a “complete lineage of the Liu Han imperial family” that connected Liu Bang, Liu Xiu, Liu Bei, and himself. This edict resembled a concise family genealogy recounting the rise and fall of the dynasty, presenting Liu Yuan as a member of the family and a continuation of royal blood. Liu Yuan frequently used terms like “my great ancestor”, “my forefathers”, and “my progenitor” to emphasize his Han identity, claiming the foundation of his state as “continuing the legacy of the three ancestors”.

These statements constitute a newly “created historical memory”, wherein Liu Yuan deliberately omitted his foreign Xiongnu heritage, intentionally erasing the lineage of his Xiongnu ancestors. Through this process of “structural amnesia”, characterized by invention and forgetting, Liu Yuan sought to achieve ethnic identity and solidarity (Pan 2021).

This political narrative imbued Liu Yuan’s regime with the legitimacy of the Han dynasty, allowing his rule to gain some acceptance among Han Chinese scholars and the general populace.

In ancient Chinese culture, the concept of the Mandate of Heaven is central to political legitimacy. In addition to claiming blood relations, Liu Yuan also employed a series of symbolic rituals and propaganda to promote the idea that the Mandate of Heaven was now in his favor. He centered his argument on the idea that “emperorship is not inherited but is conferred based on virtue”, suggesting that imperial power is determined not by hereditary succession but by one’s virtue and the Mandate of Heaven.

This assertion of Liu Yuan drew from the discourse in the New Sayings (Xin Yu), which argued that “King Wen was born among the Dong Yi, and Yu the Great was born among the Xirong10”, indicating that even non-Han rulers could gain control over the empire through virtue. Lin Yuan’s fabrication was an attempt to dissolve the cultural disadvantage of the Xiongnu rulers. This strategy showcased Liu Yuan’s cultural knowledge to Han Chinese scholars and vested his Xiongnu lineage with political legitimacy (L. Wang 2022).

Furthermore, Liu Yuan reinforced his claim to the Mandate of Heaven through a series of auspicious omens, such as the discovery of a jade seal during the relocation of the capital to Pingyang. These symbolic events, deliberately publicized, became important symbols of Liu Yuan’s political legitimacy. Through this process, Liu Yuan effectively leveraged the Central Plains’ cultural understanding of the Mandate of Heaven, portraying himself as the rightful ruler chosen by divine will, ultimately enhancing his recognition among the Han Chinese elites.

3.2. Legitimacy of the Regime and Political Mobilization

Liu Yuan’s claim to political legitimacy was an effective strategy for creating a positive image and an even more crucial tool for maintaining internal unity and stability within the regime. By skillfully positioning himself as the successor to the Han dynasty, Liu Yuan attracted the support of Han Chinese scholars and Central Plains elites and simultaneously retained centralized power and stability within the Xiongnu. The Han Chinese rituals and the concept of the Mandate of Heaven were not entirely rejected by the Xiongnu nobility, partly due to Liu Yuan’s respect for and integration of Xiongnu cultural traditions (X.-q. Hu 2008).

Liu Yuan raised the banner of “Han” to represent the state of the Chuge. Behind this banner was not only the construction of the legal lineage of the Xiongnu Chuge tribe but also an engagement with the concept of legitimacy in the Central Plains dynasties, which has thus become a focal point in Han-Zhao studies. Current research primarily approaches the topic from practical considerations, suggesting that Liu Yuan’s choice of the Han lineage was driven by the necessity of state building. It served as a means to unify the people and provided the Chuge tribe with a legitimate foundation to oppose the Western Jin regime under the Sima clan (X.-q. Hu 2008).

In the early period of the Han-Zhao state, Liu Yuan, through alliances with the Central Plains aristocracy and recognition of Han Chinese culture, successfully mobilized many Han Chinese and Xiongnu supporters. His claims to legitimacy not only garnered cultural recognition for the regime but also granted justification for its military conquests. By reviving the call to restore the Han dynasty, Liu Yuan rallied both Hu (non-Han) and Han peoples to resist the remnants of the Western Jin, driving the expansion and consolidation of the Han-Zhao state.

However, this structure of legitimacy began to erode during Liu Cong’s reign. Liu Cong clashed with Han Chinese scholars over issues of ritual, and, in his later years, adopted autocratic policies and favored the Xiongnu nobility, leading to power struggles and internal divisions within the regime. The foundation of the regime’s legitimacy gradually collapsed due to its failure to resolve cultural conflicts and power distribution issues, ultimately accelerating the disintegration of the Han-Zhao state.

4. From “Han Dynasty” to “Zhao Dynasty”: The Shift in the Political Legitimacy of the Han-Zhao State

In the history of the Han-Zhao state established by the Xiongnu Chuge tribe, two landmark events marked state formation: one was Liu Yuan founding the Chuge Han state, and the other was Liu Yao’s renaming of the state, changing “Han” to “Zhao”. Consequently, the history of the Chuge is divided into the Han and Zhao phases. Significant academic research has centered around the establishment of Han and Zhao. The political legitimacy of the Han-Zhao state was initially built and consolidated through the identification with and inheritance of the symbolic “Han”. However, as the regime developed, this legitimacy underwent significant transformations (X.-q. Hu 2008).

In the second year of Tai Xing (319 CE) under Emperor Yuan of Jin, Liu Yao renamed the state “Zhao”, abandoning the “Liu Han imperial lineage” identity promoted by Liu Yuan and Liu Cong and establishing an independent identity. Previously titled Prince of Zhongshan, Liu Yao’s choice of “Zhao” as the state name was a historical and geographical reference, as Zhongshan was the ancient homeland of the Zhao state. By adopting “Zhao” as a new political symbol, Liu Yao not only established a cultural connection with the Zhao region but also signaled his intent to break free from the constraints of the “Han” label and its association with the Han imperial lineage. This move proclaimed the independence of the Former Zhao regime and marked a shift from legitimacy based on Han dynasty succession to a legitimacy system of independent creation.

Regarding the doctrine of the Five Elements (Wu De) and historical destiny, Liu Yao declared that his regime succeeded the Western Jin’s Metal virtue with the Water virtue, thereby denying the legitimacy of the Eastern Jin regime in Jiangnan. This act formally incorporated independent regimes of non-Han ethnic groups into the historical narrative of China. Liu Yao’s approach was unprecedented in Chinese history, profoundly influencing subsequent regimes such as Later Zhao, Former Yan, Former Qin, and Later Qin, which all sought their legitimacy within the framework of the Five Elements (X.-q. Hu 2008; Pan 2021).

Liu Yao’s decision to rename the state “Zhao” was a demonstration of not only the regime’s independence but also the political realities of the time. Since Liu Yuan’s establishment of the regime, the Han-Zhao government had continuously called for the revival of the Han dynasty, gaining support from Han Chinese scholars and segments of the population of the Central Plains. However, with the fall of the Western Jin Dynasty and the changing situation in the north, Liu Yao realized that continued reliance on Han symbols no longer met the needs of the regime’s development. By changing the state’s name to Zhao, Liu Yao aimed to consolidate his rule, emphasize the independence of the Han-Zhao state, reduce its dependence on Han cultural symbols, and strengthen the dominant position of the Xiongnu ethnic group within the government.

Luo Xin believes that Liu Yuan established his regime by “leaning on the Han Dynasty” as a foundation. However, in response to changing circumstances, Liu Yao opted for “independent positioning” to attract Hu (non-Han) peoples. By adopting the title “Zhao” and invoking the name of Modu Chanyu, he positioned his Zhao regime in opposition to Shi Le’s Zhao regime. Luo also suggests that Liu Yao attempted to establish a new legitimacy by integrating his regime into the historical lineage of Huaxia (Chinese civilization) under the legal traditions of Wei and Jin, making him the first among the Sixteen Kingdoms in the north to do so (Qi and Chen 2022).

Wu Honglin argues that behind the two dynastic titles with Central Plains cultural significance, “Han” and “Zhao”, lies the self-identification consciousness of the migrating ethnic groups (Qi and Chen 2022).

Li Lei believes that Liu Yao’s renaming of “Han” to “Zhao” was intended to leverage the historical connections between the Five Divisions of the Chuge tribe and the conflicts between Sima Yong and Sima Ying. This move aimed to win over the “Eastern refugees” (displaced individuals from the Central Plains) in Guanzhong (central Shaanxi) and gain the support of the Hebei population, ultimately undermining Sima Bao’s legitimacy in Guanzhong and Shi Le’s rule in Hebei (Qi and Chen 2022).

This shift in the political legitimacy of the Han-Zhao state was reflected not only in the change in the state name but also in internal adjustments and foreign policies. Liu Yao implemented significant reforms in matters of culture and governance to adapt to the independent identity of the Zhao dynasty. During this period, Liu Yao vigorously promoted Confucian culture, particularly through the establishment of the Imperial Academy and the teaching of Confucian classics, further spreading Han culture. However, Liu Yao did not abandon Xiongnu traditions, maintaining the core power of the Xiongnu nobility within the regime and striving to balance both Hu and Han cultures.

Politically, Liu Yao further centralized power, strengthening imperial authority and consolidating his control over local powers, thereby solidifying the regime. He continued to expand his military influence and tightened his control over the north, which increased the regime’s stability and gradually positioned Former Zhao as a major political force in the north.

However, the establishment of the Zhao dynasty also intensified ethnic tensions and cultural conflicts within the Han-Zhao state. The conflict between the Xiongnu nobility and Han Chinese scholars became more pronounced during Liu Yao’s reign, especially as his promotion of Han culture caused dissatisfaction among some Xiongnu nobles. This internal conflict affected the stability of the Han-Zhao state. As Shi Le rose to power in the north and declared himself King of Zhao in 319, the Han-Zhao state faced new challenges. The establishment of the later Zhao regime by Shi Le marked a further fragmentation of political power in the north and intensified the confrontation between Former and Later Zhao.

Shi Le’s rise led to fierce competition between Former and Later Zhao, especially in the struggle for control over the remaining Jin forces in the north. The conflict between the two Zhao regimes became increasingly sharp. During this period, political instability within the Han-Zhao state intensified, and Liu Yao became increasingly passive in the face of Shi Le’s growing influence. The former Zhao regime not only faced the threat of Later Zhao but also struggled with internal ethnic conflicts and political disputes (Zhuang 2011).

Despite Liu Yao’s efforts to consolidate the regime’s legitimacy by renaming the state to Zhao and promoting cultural and political reforms, these measures ultimately failed to prevent the regime’s gradual disintegration. With the rise of the later Zhao, the Han-Zhao state gradually lost control over the north and was eventually destroyed by Later Zhao in 329, ending the Han-Zhao state.

5. The Integration of and Conflict Between Han Culture and Xiongnu Traditions

The dual nature of the Han-Zhao state is reflected both in its inheritance of the culture and political structure of the Han people from the Central Plains and its preservation of the traditional governance methods of the Xiongnu. This dual characteristic is evident not only in the regime’s claims of legitimacy and cultural assimilation but also in its actual power distribution and dual construction of administrative systems. The Han-Zhao state maintained the military and tribal management systems of the Xiongnu nobility through the establishment and operation of the Chanyu Platform (單于台), an institution with traditional Xiongnu significance, while imitating the bureaucratic system of the Han people for its central government positions. This dual structure stabilized the regime in its early stages but also planted the seeds of its future internal divisions.

5.1. Sinicization of Legitimacy in the Han-Zhao State

Liu Yuan was immersed in Chinese culture from a young age. During his time in Luoyang as a hostage of the Western Jin dynasty, he studied numerous Han Chinese classics and political theories, becoming well-versed in Han Chinese rites and governance models. He understood the importance the Central Plains aristocracy placed on orthodoxy, so at the founding of the Han-Zhao state he chose to legitimize his rule by adopting the Han dynasty’s state name and rituals.

In the eyes of Han Chinese scholars, the Xiongnu people were naturally unfit to be rulers—a view deeply rooted in Central Plains culture. For example, traditional Confucian thought emphasized that “Those not of our kin must have different hearts”, a belief that influenced the political ethics of the Central Plains since the Spring and Autumn period. Thus, Liu Yuan needed to find a way to overcome this cultural barrier and establish the legitimacy of his regime.

When Liu Yuan established his regime in 304, he not only proclaimed himself “King of Han” but also actively promoted the idea of “reviving the Han dynasty”, advocating that “the throne is not fixed but bestowed upon virtue” and referring to such ideas as “maternal uncles and brothers” to mobilize the support of the people of the Central Plains. These narratives reinforced his connection to the Han dynasty and allowed him to utilize Han Chinese historical and cultural symbols to confer political legitimacy upon himself.

By linking his tribe and regime to the history of the Han dynasty, Liu Yuan based the legitimacy of his rule on the continuity of the Han dynasty, attracting the support of numerous Han Chinese scholars and local forces. This strategy of Sinicization not only established political legitimacy in terms of ideology but also helped Liu Yuan incorporate Han Chinese rites and administrative systems into the core management structure of the Han-Zhao state.

The Han-Zhao state established key central positions, such as Chancellor and Grand Marshal, which followed the bureaucratic system of the Han Chinese, especially in handling civil affairs and maintaining central authority. In this regard, the regime imitated the rites and administrative methods of the Central Plains. This Sinicization sought not only to win the support of Han Chinese scholars and local powers but also to make the Xiongnu regime appear more legitimate and orthodox.

However, this policy of Sinicization did not extend across all aspects. Traditional Xiongnu structures continued to play an important role, particularly in military organization and aristocratic governance. The traditional Xiongnu power system still dominated the internal operations of the regime. This dual-track system became the core feature of the Han-Zhao state’s dual structure.

5.2. Dual Governance and the Integration of Hu and Han Peoples

The duality of ethnic policies in the Han-Zhao state is reflected in the coexistence of Hu-Han segregation and Hu-Han integration. Hu-Han segregation refers to the separation of the Xiongnu and other ethnic minorities from the Han people in administrative and military affairs, aiming to preserve the independence and traditions of each ethnic group. This segregation policy does not imply the exclusion of integration; rather, it adopts a dual-track governance model to ensure that the interests of all ethnic groups are safeguarded. When Liu Yuan established the Han state, he implemented a system in which Xiongnu royal titles coexisted with Han-Wei official systems. Members of the Liu clan, the ruling elite of the Chuge (Chanyu) tribe, held both Xiongnu royal titles and Han-Wei official positions. Militarily, the Xiongnu and other minority troops were primarily commanded by Xiongnu nobles, who controlled military power through an institution known as the “Chanyu Platform”. This institution was also responsible for managing the subordinate minority tribes.

Within the dualistic structure of the Han-Zhao state, the “Chanyu Platform” was an essential institution. It not only perpetuated the traditional Xiongnu military and tribal governance system but also represented the central role of Xiongnu nobles in the regime. The establishment of the Chanyu Platform can be traced back to the tribal confederation system of the Xiongnu. Its primary function was to oversee and manage the Xiongnu and other minority tribes. The Chanyu Platform was responsible not only for coordinating the Xiongnu forces but also for managing other minority tribes under the Han-Zhao state, such as the Xianbei, Jie, and Qiang peoples.

Chinese academia has reached a consensus on the implementation of the “Hu-Han segregation” governance policy in the Han-Zhao state. However, there is significant divergence regarding the relationship between the “Hu” under this policy and the Chuge (Chanyu Platform and the Chuge central tribe). Chen Yinke argued that the Six Yi tribes (六夷部落) included the core population of the Han-Zhao state and were part of the “Hu system” within the “Hu-Han segregation” framework. This view is also supported by Wang Zhongluo in The History of Wei, Jin, Southern, and Northern Dynasties (《魏晋南北朝史》), Han Guopan in An Outline of the History of Wei, Jin, Southern, and Northern Dynasties (《魏晋南北朝史纲》), and Zhou Weizhou in A History of the Han-Zhao state (《汉赵国史》).

However, Huang Lie contended that “the Five Divisions (五部民) should not fall under the jurisdiction of the Chanyu’s Left and Right Assistants, which manage the Six Yi”. Similarly, Gao Min, when discussing the administrative targets of the Chanyu’s Left and Right Assistants, excluded the Xiongnu central tribe from their jurisdiction, suggesting that the Chanyu system did not govern the Xiongnu central tribe. Previously, the Chuge tribe was under the jurisdiction of the Chanyu Platform, while the Han people were governed by the Left and Right Directors of Retainers. If the Chuge central tribe were removed from the Chanyu Platform’s jurisdiction, the tripartite power structure within the Han-Zhao state would become more evident.

Chen Zhong’an and Wang Su pointed out that the Han-Zhao state comprised “three relatively independent ethnic groups”: the Xiongnu royal family, the Han people, and the Six Yi tribes. Chen Yong, in his article “An Investigation of Similarities and Differences Between the Hu and Chuge in the Han-Zhao state—With a Discussion on Hu-Han Segregation in the Han-Zhao state” (《汉赵国胡与屠各异同考——兼说汉赵国的胡汉分治》), delved deeper into this issue. He explicitly stated that the Six Yi did not include the Xiongnu and that “Hu-Hu segregation” was present within the “Hu-Han segregation” framework.

In 308 AD, Liu Yuan formally declared himself Emperor. Within the context of the imperial system, Liu Yuan’s eldest son, Liu He, was promoted from Guard General (卫將軍) to Grand General (大將軍) and later to Grand Marshal (大司馬) and Prince of Liang (梁王). Liu Yuan’s ascension to the imperial throne meant that he could no longer concurrently hold the title of Grand Chanyu (大單于), as “Han” had transitioned from being a state title to representing a universal title for the realm. Under the Han system, the position of Grand Chanyu was subordinate to that of the Emperor. The redefinition of the relationship between the Chinese Emperor and the Xiongnu Chanyu occurred during the reign of Emperor Xuan of the Western Han. During this period, Huhanye Chanyu (呼韩邪單于), facing internal turmoil within the Xiongnu, sought assistance from the Han court. Despite receiving ceremonious treatment during his audience with the Han Emperor, Huhanye Chanyu pledged allegiance to the Han court, which established the precedent for a “ruler-subject relationship” between the Chinese Emperor and the Xiongnu Chanyu.

By the late Eastern Han period, when Cao Cao (Chinese:曹操) detained Chanyu Huchuquan (呼厨泉單于) within the interior regions of China, the Xiongnu Chanyu further lost the independence of a vassal state ruler. Gradually, the position of the Chanyu became assimilated into the internal order of the Central Plains dynasties.

Two years after ascending to the throne, Liu Yuan appointed his son Liu Cong as “Grand Marshal, Grand Chanyu, and Supervisor of the Secretariat” and established the Chanyu Platform (單于台) west of Pingyang. In the same year, Liu Yuan passed away. This arrangement, made during Liu Yuan’s critical illness, was a strategic plan for the future of the Chuge Han state—a “plan of entrusted responsibility”. By relinquishing the title of Grand Chanyu and allowing it to be held by a subordinate, Liu Yuan clearly delineated the hierarchical distinction between the titles of Grand Chanyu and Emperor. Additionally, the Xiongnu’s traditional supreme title, “Grand Chanyu”, was positioned below the title of Emperor in the Central Plains dynasties.

This move established the status of “Grand Chanyu” within the Han-Zhao state. While it held significant power and prestige, it ultimately remained subordinate to the Emperor. This decision also formally incorporated the title of “Chanyu” into the official administrative system of the Central Plains dynasties. The conferment of this title was now subject to the authority of the Emperor, serving more as a symbol of status and power. The original nomadic leadership characteristics associated with the title were gradually eroded.

5.3. The Fusion and Conflict Between the Central Plains Han and Xiongnu Traditions

Within the Han-Zhao state, the internal cultural framework exhibited a dual structure. On one hand, there existed the rigorously regulated and institutionalized ceremonial system long established by the Central Plains Han; on the other, there prevailed the distinctive lifestyles and customs characteristic of the nomadic peoples, as exemplified by the Xiongnu. The Central Plains’ ritual system is a ceremonial framework that, through prolonged historical evolution, became increasingly solidified. Its core function lay in conveying the legitimacy of power, the mandate of heaven, and the social hierarchy through formal, symbolic rites (Pan and Zhu 2024).

It is essential here to distinguish clearly between “ritual” and “custom”: the term “ritual” refers to institutionalized ceremonies and norms that serve symbolic and political legitimization functions, whereas “custom” denotes the conventional practices formed in social life. The Xiongnu were not without their own “rituals”; for instance, their sacrificial systems—such as the “Dragon Shrine” and the worship of the sun and moon—fall within the category of ritual (Pan and Zhu 2024), whereas practices like cousin marriage and the preference for the robust over the elderly belong to the realm of custom (Liang and Miao 2024).

Although the Xiongnu lacked the ancestral temple rites characteristic of the Central Plains Han, they maintained a self-contained sacrificial system. The Records of the Grand Historian recount that during the month of May, the Xiongnu held a grand assembly at Longcheng, where they offered sacrifices to their ancestors, the heavens, the earth, and various deities. The Chanyu would commence his day with a morning salute to the sun at the camp and conclude it with an evening homage to the moon, thereby establishing what came to be known as the “Three Dragon Shrine” system (as recorded in the Book of the Later Han: The Southern Xiongnu Biographies). These sacrificial activities carried distinct political symbolism, intended to reinforce the Chanyu’s authority as divinely sanctioned. Moreover, the Xiongnu bolstered their ruling legitimacy through “divine providence myths”, such as the legend of the fish leaping over the dragon gate at the birth of Liu Yuan (cited in the Book of Jin: Record of Liu Yuanhai11’s Birth). This myth illustrates the synthesis of Xiongnu ritual practices with the veneration of natural deities. Although their forms of worship were relatively austere, their function paralleled that of the Central Plains’ ceremonial system, serving to legitimize political power (Wu 2017).

When Liu Yuan declared himself Emperor, he emulated the Han model by performing the South Suburban Sacrifice to Heaven, venerating the ancestral figures of the Han dynasty, and adopting “Han” as his state’s name in an effort to fortify his rule through the lens of Confucian orthodoxy. He established the positions of the Three Excellencies and the Nine Ministers, integrated the Han bureaucratic system, and even centered education around the Classic of Filial Piety to promote the study of Confucian ethics among the Xiongnu nobility. These initiatives reveal that the Xiongnu elite actively embraced the Central Plains’ ritual system to bridge cultural divides and win the support of Han scholars (B. Liu 2020).

However, Xiongnu traditional customs also played an important role in the Han-Zhao state. The social structure of the Xiongnu—a nomadic people—differed significantly from that of the agricultural civilization of the Central Plains. In Xiongnu tradition, tribal alliances and military nobility held far greater importance than the central bureaucratic system, which stood in stark contrast to the ritual and civil official systems of the Central Plains. The Xiongnu nobility maintained control over the military and the tribes through the institution of the Grand Chanyu, and this power structure partially counteracted the influence of Han rituals on the regime.

Xiongnu society was deeply influenced by reverence for natural deities, the worship of heroes and martial strength, and a profound emphasis on family and kinship. These cultural values stand in fundamental contrast to the Central Plains’ Confucian ideals, which uphold elaborate ritual and musical systems, family ethics, and the concept of cosmic harmony between heaven and man. The Xiongnu aristocracy, anchored in nomadic traditions and tribal alliances, emphasized flexible power dynamics and martial customs rather than strict adherence to fixed ceremonial norms.

This cultural dualism became especially evident during the “establishment of the empress” incident under Liu Cong (Pan 2021). According to Central Plains rituals, an emperor could appoint only one empress12, who would serve as the highest symbol of court rituals, overseeing palace affairs and maintaining the imperial family’s lineage and order. However, Liu Cong attempted to appoint three empresses simultaneously—an Upper Empress, a Left Empress, and a Right Empress. This practice clearly diverged from the inherent norms of Han ritual and law, yet it aligned with the customary traditions among ethnic minorities such as the Xiongnu, where marriages were not constrained by generational hierarchy. Therefore, Xiongnu nobles supported this move (for example, Jin Zhun offered his two daughters to Liu Cong), while Han officials, such as Zuo Sili and Chen Yuanda, strongly objected, arguing that it would undermine the ritual order of the state and damage the legitimacy of the regime.

Liu Cong ultimately ignored the advice of the Han officials, revealing the Xiongnu nobility’s true power in the regime was beyond the constraints of Han rituals. This incident reflected the tension within the Han-Zhao state’s cultural dualism, where the traditional power and social structure of the Xiongnu clashed strongly with the rituals of the Central Plains. In Xiongnu culture, the relationship between the royal family and the nobility was more flexible, and the marriage system was not bound by the strict limitations of Central Plains rituals. By appointing three empresses, Liu Cong maintained close ties with the Xiongnu nobility and demonstrated the superior position of the Xiongnu ruling class in decision making. Through such acts, the Xiongnu nobility emphasized their independence in power and their reverence for traditional Xiongnu culture, whereas Han scholars believed such acts disrupted the ritual order of the Central Plains and affected the legitimacy of the regime. This cultural conflict led to the disappointment and alienation of Han scholars, and many Han officials, after realizing they could not change the Xiongnu-leaning tendencies of the regime, gradually distanced themselves from the power center of the Xiongnu nobility, with some even leaving the regime.

The dual cultural character of the Han-Zhao state essentially stemmed from a contest between two ritual systems: the Central Plains’ ceremonial framework provided a veneer of legitimacy for the regime, while the Xiongnu rites and customs continued to underpin its power dynamics. This intertwining not only facilitated certain elements of cultural integration—such as the adoption of loyalty and filial piety—but also laid the groundwork for latent interethnic tensions. This specific clash between Central Plains rituals and Xiongnu customs was not an isolated incident but a recurring cultural conflict throughout the rule of the Han-Zhao state. In handling state affairs, the Xiongnu nobility often relied more on traditional nomadic customs and military force rather than the rituals and norms of the Han bureaucratic system. Xiongnu noble traditions encouraged the maintenance of the ruling power through military actions and tribal alliances, which fundamentally differed from the Han approach of managing society through rituals and bureaucratic systems.

6. The Influence of the Han-Zhao State on Later Multi-Ethnic Chinese States

As the first imperial regime established by a non-Han ethnic group in Chinese history, the Han-Zhao state profoundly impacted the construction of multi-ethnic states in later periods. Although the Han-Zhao state existed for only a little over 20 years, its claims to political legitimacy, cultural strategies, and status as a paradigmatic example of ethnic integration provided important insights for subsequent multi-ethnic regimes, particularly those of the Northern Dynasties and the Yuan and Qing periods.

6.1. The First Instance of Minority Rule

The Han-Zhao state was the first centralized imperial regime with Chinese characteristics founded by a non-Han ruler. This event shattered the traditional notion in the Central Plains that “barbarians cannot be rulers” and paved the way for minority-led regimes in later periods. Through his proposition that “rulership is not fixed but is granted based on virtue” and his claim to being an “imperial nephew-brother”, Li Yuan built a framework of political legitimacy that diverged from traditional Han dynasty norms. This framework fundamentally challenged the previous belief that only Han people could be rulers of the Central Plains, providing a theoretical basis for later minority-led regimes, such as the Northern Wei, Liao, Jin, Yuan, and others (Bai 2017).

In subsequent periods, including the Northern Wei, Liao, Jin, Yuan, and Qing dynasties, minority ethnic ruling groups successfully established enduring and stable dominions in the Central Plains by inheriting and refining the governance practices of earlier minority regimes, such as the Han-Zhao. Emperor Xiaowen of the Northern Wei initiated Sinicization reforms, notably introducing the equal-field system and the three-elder system. These reforms were designed to enhance agricultural productivity and increase tax revenues. Additionally, he implemented policies to promote the Chinese language and customs among his people (Tian 2004).

Under Emperor Taizong, the Liao dynasty adopted a governance strategy characterized by the principle of “treating the Khitan with Khitan customs and the Han with Han customs”. This approach effectively managed the diverse populations within the realm. Known as “governing according to local customs (因俗而治)”, it involved the establishment of a dual administrative system to accommodate the distinct lifestyles of both the Khitan and Han peoples.

Kublai Khan, a Mongol leader, garnered substantial support from the Han Chinese in northern China through his Sinicization policies. This support was instrumental in his victory over his brother Ariq Böke during their civil war, leading to the consolidation of his power. Subsequently, Kublai Khan emulated Liu Yuan’s establishment of a “Han state” by reorganizing the “Great Mongol Nation” into the “Yuan Dynasty”, modeled on Han Chinese cultural norms. This development marked a significant departure from the traditional taboo against non-Han rulers, with Kublai Khan becoming the first non-Han emperor to unify China. The Qing dynasty, although founded by the Manchu people and initially employing the Eight Banners system to distinguish between Manchus and Han Chinese, gradually assimilated Han culture as its rule expanded into the Central Plains. The Qing rulers adopted Han cultural practices, particularly in governance and cultural concepts, rendering the political system virtually indistinguishable from those of Han Chinese regimes. The case of the Han-Zhao illustrates that minority ethnic regimes in China could consolidate their legitimacy and achieve long-term stability by embracing Han culture. This strategy fostered strong ties with the Han elite and promoted the integration of diverse ethnic groups. Following the Liao and Jin dynasties, the Mongol Empire not only absorbed the cultures of these ethnic groups but also somewhat integrated them into the broader identity of the Han Chinese. Consequently, the term “Khitan (Cathay)” became synonymous with “China” in many Central Asian and Eastern European countries.

6.2. A Pioneering Practice of Chinese Ethnic Integration

The Han-Zhao state was an important early practitioner of ethnic integration in Chinese history. Through its highly Sinicized background, the Liu Yuan family successfully achieved a preliminary fusion of Hu (non-Han) and Han cultures during their regime. While Liu Yuan and his successors absorbed Central Plains culture, they also maintained Xiongnu ethnic characteristics, skillfully balancing the two groups through policies, such as the separate governance of the Hu and Han peoples.

This bidirectional cultural assimilation provided a valuable model for later multi-ethnic regimes. For example, the ethnic integration policies of the Tang dynasty largely borrowed from those of the Han-Zhao state. The Tang dynasty not only absorbed the cultures of neighboring minority groups but also promoted interaction and integration between the central government and borderland ethnic minorities through intermarriage and political alliances. The dual cultural governance model of the Han-Zhao state provided a good example for the Tang dynasty, allowing it to build a strong imperial foundation based on ethnic diversity.

6.3. A Reinterpretation of the Political Legitimacy of Minority Regimes

The Han-Zhao serves as a significant example of early ethnic integration in Chinese history. The Liu Yuan family, during the establishment of Han Zhao, fused Hu and Han cultures through their extensive Sinicization efforts. While Liu Yuan and his successors embraced the culture of the Central Plains, they also maintained the distinctive ethnic characteristics of the Xiongnu. Through policies such as the “division of rule between the Hu and Han”, they skillfully balanced the interests of the Hu and Han peoples. This bidirectional cultural absorption not only inspired other ethnic minorities to emulate and establish Sinicized dynasties, but also provided valuable insights into multi-ethnic governance, which would later inform the policies of the unified, multi-ethnic Chinese empire.

After the Northern and Southern Dynasties, the ethnic integration policies of the Tang Dynasty largely inherited the model established by the Han-Zhao state. The title “Tian Kehan” (Khan of Heaven) proclaimed by the Tang emperors to the Western Regions and various tribal groups on the grasslands bears similarities to the title of “Great Chanyu” used by the Han-Zhao. Both titles were designed to enhance the ruler’s legitimacy over a multi-ethnic empire by bestowing upon them culturally and ethnically significant titles. The “Tian Kehan” system of the Tang Dynasty was not only a continuation and development of the traditions of Central Plains dynasties but also drew upon the Han-Zhao model of strengthening governance legitimacy through cultural integration.

In addition to the use of titles, the Tang Dynasty implemented indirect governance over ethnic minorities through the establishment of Protectorates (Duhu Fu). This system mirrored the Han-Zhao’s use of the Chanyu Platform to manage the Six Barbarians. A Protectorate was a military and administrative institution that originated in the Han Dynasty and became more widespread during the Tang Dynasty. Its primary responsibilities included “pacifying the various vassals and securing the frontier from external invaders”. This involved managing relations with surrounding ethnic groups, which included pacification, military expeditions, rewarding achievements, and punishing transgressions. The Protectorates exerted both direct and indirect control over frontier regions through military and administrative means. Specific duties of a Protectorate encompassed military defense, administrative management, and diplomatic liaison, with subordinates such as deputy generals and military officers carrying out the central government’s orders. These offices were essential tools for the imperial government to maintain direct control over frontier territories.

Table 2. Comparison between the Chanyu Platform of Han-Zhao and the Protectorates of the Tang Dynasty.

Institution	Chanyu Platform (Left and Right Aides)	Protectorates (Various Regions)
Background	Established by ethnic minority regimes during the Northern and Southern Dynasties and the Sixteen Kingdoms period to manage other minority groups, reflecting the policy of Hu-Han dual governance, suited for multi-ethnic regimes.	Established by Central Plains dynasties (e.g., Han, Tang) to supervise the ethnic minorities along the border, serving as military agencies for the central government to manage and control frontier regions.
Time of establishment	Began in the Sixteen Kingdoms period, with the establishment of the Chanyu Platform under the Former Zhao regime in 310 AD when Liu Yuan fell ill, becoming an important institution for Hu-Han dual governance.	The Western Regions Protectorate was established in 60 BC during the Han Dynasty. The Tang Dynasty began establishing protectorates like the Anxi Protectorate in the 14th year of the Zhenguan era (640 AD) and continued adjustments throughout the Tang period.
Main responsibilities	Managed the Hu tribes, maintained order in Hu regions, assisted the Emperor in ruling ethnic minorities, and governed based on local customs.	Governed the frontier ethnic groups, handled pacification, military expeditions, rewards, and punishments, maintained border stability, and ensured the central government’s control over the frontier.
Organizational structure	The Chanyu Platform had Left and Right Aides or Front and Back Aides, each governing 100,000 households, with a military officer in charge of every 10,000 households.	The Protectorates consisted of the Governor (Duhu), Deputy Governor, Chief of Staff, and Military Officer, with sub-offices like Military Secretary and various administrative roles, similar to the functions of a provincial government.
Highest official	The Great Chanyu, usually held by the Emperor or his heir, second only to the Emperor in status.	The Protectorate Governor (Duhu), appointed by the Emperor, often a prince overseeing large protectorates, with the Deputy Governor in charge of daily administration.
Applicable regions	Primarily for managing Hu tribes, as part of the Hu-Han dual governance policy, suited for the differing economic and societal structures of the Hu and Han peoples.	Applied to frontier regions under the Central Plains dynasties, including the Western Regions, Anbei, Chanyu, Anxi, Beiting, and Annan, managing various ethnic groups along the borders.
Culture and system	Reflects Hu-Han dual governance, blending the tribal system of the Hu and the feudal system of the Central Plains, with ethnic minority regimes adapting and innovating based on Central Plains institutions.	The feudal system and military management structure of the Central Plains dynasties were shaped by local customs, making them distinct from the management systems in the Han regions of China. This system reflects the direct or indirect rule of the Central Plains dynasties over the border areas.
Historical significance	Promoted cultural exchange and integration between the Hu and Han, advancing the feudalization process of ethnic minorities and laying the foundation for future ethnic integration.	Strengthened the Central Plains dynasties’ control over the frontier, promoted the development and stability of frontier regions, and ensured the exchange and integration between the Central Plains and frontier areas.

compares the similarities between the Han-Zhao’s Chanyu Platform and the Tang Dynasty’s Protectorates.

Regarding the “division of rule between the Hu and Han”, the Tang Dynasty, in addition to establishing Protectorates in areas populated by ethnic minorities, also implemented the Jimi system. This system involved the creation of Jimi prefectures, where local ethnic minority leaders were appointed as officials and granted a degree of autonomy. This policy shares similarities with the Hu-Han division of rule in the Han-Zhao regime. Both systems aimed to preserve the unity of the central government while respecting and leveraging the autonomous traditions of ethnic minorities to effectively govern a multi-ethnic population. In contrast to the Protectorates, the Jimi prefectures held a lower status, being more localized and autonomous, primarily aimed at maintaining peaceful relations between the central government and minority regions, thereby fostering ethnic integration.

By the Yuan Dynasty, the Jimi system gradually evolved into the Tusi system, under which ethnic minority leaders were appointed as Tusi, responsible for managing their own ethnic affairs, thus achieving an effective integration of local ethnic minorities with the central government. During the Ming and Qing Dynasties, the Tusi system gradually transitioned into the “Gaitu Guiliu (Transition from Native Chieftains to Centralized Governance)” policy, which involved the gradual transformation of Tusi-ruled regions into areas governed directly by the central government through appointed officials. This policy further strengthened the central government’s control over the frontier regions.

In summary, the ethnic integration practices of the Han-Zhao regime were not only of great significance in their own time but also provided valuable experiences and insights for the governance of multi-ethnic issues in later Chinese history. From the Protectorates and Jimi system of the Tang Dynasty to the Tusi system and the Banner system in the Ming and Qing Dynasties, the evolution and development of these policies and systems are closely linked to the broader trend of ethnic integration that began with the involvement of ethnic minorities in China during the Han-Zhao period.

6.4. Influence on the Political System

The political system of the Han-Zhao state exhibited a distinctive fusion of Hu (non-Han) and Han elements, leaving an indelible mark on the institutional structures of later multi-ethnic regimes. It adopted both the Central Plains’ Han ritual and bureaucratic systems while retaining the Xiongnu’s traditional methods of tribal governance. Through a dual political structure of separate governance for the Hu and Han people, the regime effectively governed a multi-ethnic state.

This directly influenced the administrative systems of later minority regimes. For example, after establishing their government, the Northern Wei gradually Sinicized their political system and promoted ethnic integration by appointing Han officials to senior positions. By the time of the Qing dynasty, the official system had largely inherited and developed the dual-track governance model of the Han-Zhao state’s Hu-Han separation. The Qing dynasty implemented a similar dual-track system to protect the interests of different ethnic groups. By establishing separate official systems for the Manchu and the Han, the Qing integrated Manchu nobles and Han bureaucrats into the governance system. In key central institutions, such as the Grand Council, the Six Ministries, and the Cabinet, the Qing ensured joint administration by officials from both the Manchu and Han ethnic groups. This system maintained the ruling position of the Manchu nobility while ensuring the Han bureaucratic system continued to play a significant role in the state’s operations, as in the Han-Zhao approach to governance.

During the Han-Zhao state, Liu Yuan employed a dual system of governance: Xiongnu nobles had control over the military and local governance, while Han elites were responsible for civil bureaucracy and cultural dissemination. The Qing dynasty further developed this separation model through the system of the Eight Banners, which facilitated the effective management of the Manchu, Mongol, Han, and other ethnic groups. The Eight Banners not only formed the basis of the military structure but also extended into the administrative and political realms, ensuring the central role of the Manchu nobles in state governance. In the early Qing Dynasty, the primary and elite military force of the Qing army was the Eight Banners, while during this period, the Han Chinese armed forces, known as the Green Standard army, served as auxiliary troops to the Eight Banners. However, with the corruption and decline of the Eight Banner army, the military position of the Green Standard, local militias, volunteer armies, and new armies gradually replaced that of the Eight Banners. Politically, the Qing Dynasty implemented the policy of “primacy of the Manchu”, dividing official positions between Manchu and Han. Manchu officials could hold Han positions, but Han officials could not hold Manchu positions. For the same office, such as that of the Minister or Vice Minister, Manchu officials held greater power than their Han counterparts. Manchus primarily occupied higher-ranking positions, ensuring that they maintained absolute dominance in government power. As a result, high-ranking officials were mostly Manchu, while lower-level officials, especially those in grassroots administrative roles, were primarily Han, thus ensuring that the Qing government was Manchu-led at the central level while Han officials held greater influence in local governance in the Han-Zhao state. This is very similar to the Han-Zhao’s practice of maintaining rule by dividing governance, where the Xiongnu nobility controlled the military while the Han people held local power.

The Qing dynasty also adopted different administrative approaches to governing non-Han ethnic regions. In frontier minority regions, such as Xinjiang, Tibet, and Mongolia, they preserved local traditional political structures, akin to how the Han-Zhao state maintained tribal management systems within the Xiongnu tribes. This policy preserved the ethnic characteristics of these regions while ensuring the Qing central government’s control over the frontiers, thereby establishing relative stability in an empire consisting of multi-ethnic groups.

This tradition of multi-ethnic governance persisted and underwent innovation throughout history up to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. For example, the formulation of the “Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism” significantly inherits the Qing dynasty’s Golden Urn system. The Golden Urn, used during the Qing dynasty to determine the reincarnations of living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism, was a means for the imperial central government to manage and control religious affairs among ethnic minorities. The new management measures, while respecting and preserving the religious cultures of ethnic minorities, ensured the orderly management of Tibetan Buddhism by the central government. Additionally, the administrative planning of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region also inherited and incorporated elements of the Qing dynasty’s League and Banner system. These measures not only preserved some of the traditional customs of different ethnic minorities but also provided effective mechanisms for their cooperation and coordination, thereby fostering ethnic unity and regional stability.

Table 3. Comparative analysis of minority governance systems and institutions in the Han-Zhao, Yuan, Qing, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Regime/Dynasty	Minority Policies	Institutions	Characteristics	Inheritance and Improvements
Han-Zhao	Dual governance (‘Hu-Han division’), with separate management of Han Chinese and non-Han affairs; established the ‘Chanyu Tai’ to oversee minority affairs; integrated sinicized structures with traditional tribal systems; and maintained cultural and institutional duality between Hu and Han.	Chanyu Tai.	Governance separated between Hu (ethnic minorities such as the Xiongnu) and Han, with Chanyu Tai responsible for Hu affairs and Han integrated into the Central Plains administrative system. Flexible governance, fostering Hu-Han alliances; Sinicized rituals and Confucianism while retaining traditional Hu practices.	The Chanyu Tai model and the Yuan’s Darughachi system share similar concepts; Han-Zhao dual governance may have provided a conceptual foundation for Yuan’s Darughachi system. This system may have also influenced the Qing Dynasty’s Eight Banners, where the Manchu military aristocracy led the Eight Banners as the core armed force, with the Green Standard army of Han Chinese serving as auxiliary troops. Eight Banner officials and troops generally did not interfere with local administrative affairs.
Yuan Dynasty	Practiced a de facto ethnic hierarchy (however, this hierarchy was not formally codified in law and had many exceptions in practice, particularly in areas such as military service, local administration, and social mobility), with Mongols at the top, followed by Semu (people from Central and Western Asia), Northern Chinese (Hanren), and Southern Chinese (Nanren), reflecting both cultural distinctions and administrative priorities in the Yuan Dynasty. Supported Tibetan Buddhism to strengthen governance in Tibet while also maintaining a policy of religious tolerance to manage the diverse religious practices within the empire, including Islam, Christianity, and Confucianism. Implemented the provincial administration system (xing sheng) to delegate authority across vast territories while appointing Darughachi (overseers) to represent Mongol interests, ensuring the balance between central authority and local governance.	Xuanzheng Yuan (Tibetan Affairs), Xing Sheng (Provinces), and Darughachi.	Ethnic hierarchy emphasized Mongol dominance; Darughachi governed local areas and ensured direct oversight from the central government; Tibetan Buddhism became a central pillar of Yuan governance of Tibet; and the provincial system became the prototype for modern regional administration.	Built upon Han-Zhao’s dual governance by institutionalizing ethnic stratification; provincial and Darughachi systems blended centralized control with local flexibility. Xuanzheng Yuan served as a precursor to the Qing Li-Fan Yuan (Board of Colonial Affairs) and influenced Tibet management.
Qing Dynasty	Established a military system centered around the original Jianzhou Jurchens, incorporating Mongols, Han Chinese, Koreans, and other ethnic groups into the Eight Banners system; most members of the Eight Banners became de facto Manchu military aristocrats and laid the foundation for the modern Manchu ethnicity; strengthened governance over the Mongols through the League–Banner system; and used the Golden Urn system to control the reincarnation of Tibetan Buddhist lamas as a symbolic measure of administering Tibet.	Li-Fan Yuan (Board for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs), Resident Ministers in Tibet, Eight Banners (military aristocratic group), and League–Banner System.	Eight Banners combined military and administrative control; Mongolian affairs improved upon Yuan Darughachi through stronger centralization in the League–Flag System; Gaitu Guiliu (Transition from Native Chieftains to Centralized Governance) integrated ethnic regions with the central state; and the Golden Urn ensured stability in Tibetan Buddhist institutions.	Qing retained Yuan practices like provincial administration and Tibetan affairs management through Li-Fan Yuan while strengthening them with new controls; the Golden Urn system innovated religious governance and continues to influence modern Tibetan policies.
People’s Republic of China (PRC)	Emphasized ethnic equality and regional autonomy; created specific laws such as the ‘Regulations on the Reincarnation of Tibetan Living Buddhas’ to regulate religious affairs; promoted economic development and cultural preservation in minority regions; and introduced the concept of a ‘Chinese National Community’.	State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Autonomous Regional Governments, ansd Religious Affairs Bureau.	Regional autonomy allowed minorities self-governance; laws regulated religious practices while promoting equality; protected minority languages through education and cultural policies; economic aid and infrastructure boosted development in border areas; and emphasized national unity alongside ethnic diversity.	Borrowed administrative structures from Qing’s Li-Fan Yuan and Golden Urn practices but modernized with legal frameworks; regional autonomy and economic development reflected Qing’s Gaitu Guiliu ideas adapted to modern state governance. Policies integrated ethnic equality with centralized administration.

presents the results of comparatively analyzing the impact of the Han-Zhao regime on subsequent Chinese states, particularly minority dynasties and modern China.

7. Conclusions

As one of the earliest dual monarchies in global history, the Han-Zhao state developed a pioneering dualistic system that effectively responded to the political situation of its time and provided a valuable model for China’s development into a multi-ethnic nation. The dualistic system of the Han-Zhao state holds groundbreaking significance in the history of world politics, showing certain similarities to the Holy Roman Empire and its successor, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, centuries later. Both systems exemplified a blend of centralized authority and local autonomy, respecting local cultures and granting self-governance to avoid the intensification of ethnic conflicts, thus maintaining long-term stability in multi-ethnic states. During some periods, these regimes achieved the integration and co-governance of multiple ethnicities and cultures. This balance of power not only strengthened the stability of the regimes but also demonstrated how institutional innovation could achieve effective governance amidst cultural and ethnic diversity, providing valuable lessons for subsequent regimes.

Liu Yuan consciously emphasized his connection to Han culture when founding the Han-Zhao state. He proclaimed himself a “descendant of the Han family” and used “Han Gaozu (Liu Bang)” and “Han Xuan Emperor (Liu Xun)” as spiritual symbols while posthumously elevating Liu Shan, the last emperor of Shu-Han during the Three Kingdoms period, as the legitimator of the Han-Zhao regime’s orthodoxy. This act was not merely a political maneuver but a profound manifestation of Liu Yuan’s alignment with Han cultural identity. In 318, Liu Yao took the momentous step of renaming the state from “Han” to “Zhao”. This change reflected not only an embrace of the Zhao region’s culture but also a symbolic integration into the central cultural traditions of the Central Plains. This move marked a clear distinction from Liu Yuan’s earlier efforts to legitimize the Han-Zhao state by invoking the restoration of the Han dynasty. Rather than simply reviving a bygone dynasty, Liu Yao sought to establish a new regime with distinct features. His decision to change the state’s name reveals his broader vision of forging a new state defined not by the legacy of the past but by a new cultural and political framework. Liu Yao’s innovative move underscores that the Han-Zhao rulers had recognized the limits of merely restoring the old regime and, instead, chose to assert their legitimacy through fresh cultural symbols and political structures. This groundbreaking step left a lasting impact on subsequent minority regimes in China. Henceforth, minority rulers did not simply claim to restore past dynasties of the Central Plains; rather, they began to blend their own cultural identities with new forms of political expression.

The Han-Zhao underscores the deep-rooted connection between the frontier regions and Central Plains culture, offering a robust challenge to the “Manchu-Mongol Non-Chinese Theory”. The Emperors of Han-Zhao implemented an official system and governance model in line with the traditions of the Central Plains, with imperial titles even surpassing that of the Great Chanyu. These efforts signify that even in regions traditionally regarded as “frontiers”, the Chinese ethnic minorities—beginning with the Han Zhao—tended to adopt political structures consistent with Han models. This perspective directly contests the central tenet of Han chauvinism in the “Manchu-Mongol Non-Chinese Theory” by exploring the history of the Xiongnu’s Hanification, a process that predates the histories of Manchuria and Mongolia. Although Han-Zhao and the Xiongnu cannot be directly equated with the later Chinese ethnic minorities, and although some Chinese elites have historically oscillated between maintaining their native cultures and adopting Han influences, studying the ethnic minorities of the Sixteen Kingdoms period, starting with Han-Zhao, provides an essential supplement to the research on multi-ethnic China and serves to refute the claims made by Japanese scholars regarding the “Manchu-Mongol Non-Chinese Theory”. To some extent, the rise of New Qing History and the Inner Asia perspective seeks to establish a distinct separation between frontier regimes and the Central Plains traditions, positing the argument that “frontiers are frontiers, and the Central Plains are the Central Plains”. This viewpoint, whether explicitly stated or subtly implied, lends theoretical weight to the claim that the Manchu and Mongol regimes exist outside the confines of “China proper”. In fact, certain interpretations of Inner Asia theory within New Qing History—similar to the “Manchu-Mongol not China” thesis—often reflect significant scholarly perspectives and political agendas, making them susceptible to criticisms of historical nihilism.

In contrast, a parallel line of research challenges such a rigid division, emphasizing the deep-rooted continuities and exchanges in both cultural and political practices that connect Central Plains authorities and frontier regimes. Seen from this perspective, the Han-Zhao state’s assertions of legitimacy represent a long-established logic of cross-border integration. Although Han-Zhao cannot be directly equated with later “unified” minority-ruled dynasties and their elite structures, its study offers an essential corrective to both the Japanese-influenced “Manchu-Mongol not China” argument and to segments of New Qing History scholarship that dismiss non-Han dynasties as irrelevant to the broader Chinese historical narrative.

In conclusion, as one of the earliest multi-ethnic empires to implement a dual-integrated governance framework, the Han-Zhao regime vividly exemplifies the historical wisdom of cross-cultural synthesis and institutional innovation. By appropriating the symbolic legitimacy of Han orthodoxy, its rulers not only repudiated the parochial “Manchu–Mongol non-Chinese” thesis—an ideology that sought to sever the frontier from the Central Plains—but also demonstrated, through a seamless fusion of bureaucratic apparatus and ritual praxis, that non-Han authorities in so-called “frontier” territories were predisposed to adopt the mature political architectures of the Central Plains. This paradigm encapsulates the enduring Chinese ethos of internal–external integration and symbiotic complementarity. In an era defined by accelerating globalization and intensifying competition among multi-ethnic states, the Han-Zhao experience offers indispensable insights for re-examining the intricate nexus between northern minority polities and the Central Plains, and provides a robust comparative lens for understanding the formation of other early universal empires and multi-ethnic states worldwide.