From Folklore to Conspiracy Beliefs: A Gramscian Approach to Conspiracy Theory Studies

Abstract

This paper applies Antonio Gramsci’s theory of folklore—defined as the cultural expressions of subaltern groups reflecting their lived experiences of subalternity—to contemporary conspiracy beliefs, arguing that these beliefs function as a form of what he called “modern folklore”. Drawing on Gramsci’s insights into hegemony, it examines how subaltern beliefs emerge as both reflections of and responses to sociocultural conditions. The paper demonstrates that conspiracy mentality, akin to Gramscian folklore, inadequately encapsulates the issues and aspirations of those feeling marginalised and not represented within hegemonic systems. It outlines how distorted elements of modern scientific and political thought are integrated into folklore, resulting in inconsistent and fragmented worldviews. Key topics include the role of commercial literature in shaping subaltern consciousness and the political implications of conspiracy beliefs, particularly how they are utilised by reactionary movements to further their agendas. The analysis concludes with two case studies: one from Gramsci’s writings and another on contemporary conspiracy beliefs related to COVID-19, illustrating how these examples exemplify modern folklore. This approach offers a critical framework for understanding the social, cultural, and political origins and functions of conspiracy beliefs, highlighting the relevance of Gramsci’s thought to conspiracy theory studies.

1. Introduction

The rise of conspiracy beliefs in contemporary discourse has sparked widespread scholarly interest. Recently, these phenomena, traditionally considered as mere irrationalities or pathologies, have been increasingly recognised as complex cultural expressions that reflect deeper social and political issues. Yet, despite this growing body of research, the work of Antonio Gramsci, whose insights into culture, power, and subalternity have profoundly influenced numerous academic fields, remains largely ignored in the context of conspiracy theory studies.

Gramsci, an Italian intellectual and politician, founder of the former Italian Communist Party, developed his most significant ideas during his imprisonment under fascism in the late 1920s and 1930s. In Prison Notebooks, he elaborated his concept of “hegemony”, which explains how dominant groups secure the consent of “subaltern social groups” through cultural means, rather than mere coercion, to maintain a stratified social order. Gramsci’s framework for understanding how subaltern groups interpret social reality, often in opposition to dominant narratives, is encapsulated in his concept of “folklore”. This category, arguably including modern conspiracy beliefs, encompasses diverse and often contradictory worldviews, mentalities, practices, and beliefs that emerge from subaltern lived experiences, while being profoundly shaped by hegemonic forces, such as commercial literature, information, and political propaganda. Consequently, elements from the dominant culture are often stripped of their original context and inconsistently inserted into the worldviews of subaltern groups, which are filled with anachronistic elements, thus reinforcing their peripherality from modern political and scientific discourse.

This paper addresses the gap in the literature by using Gramsci’s theory of folklore as a lens for analysing conspiracy beliefs’ origins and sociopolitical implications.1 Gramsci viewed folklore not merely as superstition but as a significant cultural expression of subaltern perspectives, highlighting both the constraints and potential within these beliefs to reflect lived marginalisation and challenge the dominant worldview. His critique of the engagement between dominant groups and popular beliefs, including the influence of the cultural industry and commercial literature, offers insights into the contemporary proliferation of conspiracy beliefs. According to Gramsci, popular narratives not only mirror subaltern discontent but often serve as a “narcotic” that inhibits critical thought and social change.

Finally, Gramsci’s observations illuminate the political dimensions of conspiracy beliefs, particularly their connection with reactionary political practices and vulnerability to manipulation by reactionary forces. He warns against the paternalistic relationship and the manipulation of popular beliefs by dominant groups, underscoring both the danger of these beliefs being unilaterally repressed without being understood and the risk of them being co-opted to reinforce existing power structures rather than challenging them. In response to these challenges, Gramsci advocates for the education and self-emancipation of subaltern groups, emphasising the need to critically engage with the “human content” of subaltern beliefs, rather than dismiss them.

By situating conspiracy beliefs within Gramsci’s critique of folklore, we aim to offer an interdisciplinary perspective on their enduring appeal and the challenges they pose to progressive social movements. To this end, we begin in Section 2 by exploring Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, with particular emphasis on folklore and subaltern groups, before introducing, in Section 3, the Gramscian notion of modern folklore and establishing its relevance for understanding the contemporary emergence and spread of conspiracy beliefs. Section 4 presents a discussion of the role of popular fiction and commercial literature in reinforcing modern folklore, through a comparative analysis of Gramsci’s contribution to contemporary literary studies. Section 5 then focuses on Gramsci’s critique of the folklore studies of his time, not only comparing them to current studies on conspiracy beliefs but also examining the broader pedagogical and political interaction between dominant classes and modern folklore. Section 6 integrates a discussion of Gramsci’s prescriptions for engaging with folklore within his broader pedagogy of the subaltern. Gramsci’s notes on Davide Lazaretti’s movement are presented in Section 7 as an early case study, illustrating his conceptualisation of modern folklore, followed in Section 8 by an application of the theory to conspiracy beliefs related to COVID-19. Finally, Section 9 offers the conclusion.

2. Hegemony and Subaltern Groups: The Gramscian Theory of Folklore

To understand what Gramsci means by folklore and modern folklore, it is necessary to begin with his general conception of society and culture, as articulated in Prison Notebooks between 1929 and 1935. As a Marxist, he maintained a vision of human history and societies based on a class framework, while deepening the understanding of the interplay between class exploitation and intertwined forms of the hierarchical organisation of society, such as those based on gender, race, religion, culture and language, geographic origin or location, etc. In this sense, he broadened his focus from the working class’ perspective to its potential role in the emancipation of all “subaltern groups”, characterised by social instrumentalisation, fragmentation, and marginalisation, while also acknowledging the non-monolithic character of the dominant ones.2

Unlike other contemporary Marxists, this awareness enabled him to recognise the relevance of cultural dynamics interacting with the social positioning and conditions of different subaltern individuals beyond any reductionism and indeterminate abstractness. Therefore, the core of his analysis was to understand the internal stratification of national and global cultures, conceived as complex ensembles of beliefs and practices held by different social groups, spanning from elite intellectual production to subaltern one through national popular culture.

In this framework, Gramsci’s concept of “hegemony” unites these diverse attitudes, representing both the complex of the “relations of force” proper to a given social formation and the historical process through which dominant classes build political consent and shape the “material organisation” of the national community’s life (Gramsci 2011, vol. 2, p. 52 (PN 3§49)). In this sense, Gramsci explains that hegemony does not consist, except to a very small degree, of strategies based on deliberate manipulation and fraud but rather in a deeply embedded network of institutional and cultural practices—what he terms “civil society” and metaphorically describes as a “succession of sturdy fortresses and emplacements” (Gramsci 2011, vol. 3, p. 169 (PN 7§16)). The nodes in this network, also defined by Gramsci as “centres of irradiation” and exemplified by the education system, newspapers, cultured and popular literature, theatre, radio and cinema, public meetings of all kinds, relations of “conversation” between different social strata, etc., disseminate the dominant worldview and embed its values in social relationships through habitual forms of public and private life (Gramsci 2014, p. 2345 (PN 29§3)). In this sense, hegemony works less by the use of direct force and more through a complex of more or less implicit pedagogical relations, tending to create a shared sense of reality that reflects the historical perspective of the dominant classes, while being perceived by all social groups as natural and inevitable. Thus, exerting hegemony means forging and spreading a worldview along with a society that is objectively consistent with it, since its social relations are organised according to its principles.

In other words, hegemony simultaneously crafts truth and reality (see Frosini 2010), with the naturalisation of the existing social order and the spontaneous adherence to it as the resulting outcome. This is why social groups’ adherence to the hegemonic conception of the world precedes and does not necessarily imply their active participation in it. Instead, their adherence manifests as passive compliance with a discursive order and epistemology, whose alignment with objective reality is typically reinforced by individual and collective experience. In this way, even a naïve, unsystematic opposition to the hegemonic order becomes a mere mechanical reaction, ultimately reaffirming it. As Gramsci notes, “subaltern groups are always subject to the initiatives of the dominant groups, even when they rebel and rise up” (Gramsci 2011, vol. 2, p. 21 (PN 3§14); Gramsci 2014, p. 1105 (PN 9§15); Gramsci 2021, p. 6 (PN 25§2)). Although such opposition may expose the system’s inherent instability and demonstrate the potential for its historical transcendence, it is, thus, considered by Gramsci as strictly part of the hegemonic system itself, rather than posing an effective threat to its existence. Conversely, only an organised opposition, capable of cultural and political autonomous initiative, can “break subordination” and obtain “‘permanent victory” by establishing a new hegemonic equilibrium (Gramsci 2021, p. 6 (PN 25§2)).

In this sense, while hegemony represents the unifying force of all subaltern divergent behaviours through their “spontaneous”3 adherence to the dominant order, social behaviours and cultural expressions that challenge assimilation and subordination are often subject to repression to ensure the reproduction of the hegemonic system. Although the use of force is generally more pronounced when the dominant groups perceive a genuine threat to the prevailing hegemonic order, repression can also be pre-emptively applied to manage emerging dissent, highlighting the system’s reliance on both consent and coercion to maintain its dominance. As a consequence, the direct use of force by the dominant groups, what Gramsci refers to as “domination”, should not be seen as an alternative and contrary device to hegemony but rather as an essential and internal moment in its normal reproduction (Gramsci 2014, pp. 1518–19 (PN 12§1); Gramsci 2011, vol. 2, pp. 200–1 (PN 4§49)).

As we have tried to depict, hegemony holds an inherently contradictory character, translating in the composite forms through which different social groups tend to absorb the dominant conception of the world according to their social position and immediate interest. As long as social conditions remain unchanged and are passively experienced, society keeps its hierarchical nature also from a cultural perspective, due to the unequal access to the management and fruits of its material and intellectual development. This is reflected in the way Gramsci articulates the category of dominant conception of the world, conceived as a result of the exercise of hegemony, through the categories of “philosophy”, “common sense”, and “folklore”. All of them represent for Gramsci actual ways of thinking, among which there is only a quantitative difference rather than a qualitative one, i.e., a difference relating to their inner consistency and systematicity degree (Gramsci 2014, pp. 1342–43 (PN 10§52)).

Of these three forms of thinking, only “philosophy” or “cultured culture”—understood as the collection of scientific and philosophical achievements and attitudes of a particular epoch—represents the adequate and systematic expression of the dominant conception of the world of that epoch. As such, it is never embraced by society as a whole but rather reserved for intellectuals organically tied to the dominant class and deputed to the active exercise of hegemony. Conversely, the rest of society, including individuals from the dominant classes, tends to “acritically absorb” that philosophy from their social environment, converting it to a certain mentality and worldview, depending on the individual’s social position and degree of integration (Gramsci 2011, vol. 3, p. 333 (PN 8§173)). In this way, an unsystematic and stratified, albeit conform, way of thinking, which Gramsci referred to as “common sense”, is spread out of centres of irradiation among social groups. The latter consists of a mixture of elements of different conceptions of the world from different epochs, in which the current state of scientific knowledge is only the prevailing ingredient, as a result of the hegemonic initiative of the intellectuals from the dominant classes. For this reason, Gramsci further describes common sense as a dynamic and evolving entity, continuously shaped by scientific and philosophical knowledge, which is disseminated through hegemonic institutions and media and affirmed as a new complex of commonplaces. Because of its stratified and acritical nature, common sense is also designated by Gramsci as “folklore of philosophy”. Indeed, in Gramsci’s view, common sense stands midway between philosophy and “real folklore”, representing the dominant conception of the world as it dogmatically manifests in the mindset of the “average person” in a society defined by specific temporal and spatial conditions (Gramsci 2011, vol. 3, p. 333 (PN 8§173); Gramsci 2014, p. 2271 (PN 24§4)).

At the same time, however, Gramsci also acknowledges that the formation of a common sense aligned with contemporary scientific and philosophical developments is often hindered by the contradictions inherent in the exercise of hegemony, which not only justifies and naturalises existing inequalities but also reproduces the marginalisation of certain social groups. Over time, the relationship between popular and cultured culture, thus, becomes less dynamic and deteriorates, leading the common sense of a given time to lay the groundwork for the “future” form of folklore, as “a more or less rigidified phase of popular knowledge of a certain time and place” (Gramsci 2014, p. 2271 (PN 24§4)). This dynamic is particularly strong among the most marginalised segments of society, in which the dominant worldview is spread in a less systematic manner, leading to an even more fragile, incomplete, and inconsistent adherence among these groups to common sense. For this reason, Gramsci considers folklore in the narrow sense as a complex phenomenon, deeply related to social instrumentalisation and subordination as well as to marginalisation and cultural exclusion. As a result, when Gramsci defines folklore as the “system of beliefs, superstitions, opinions, points of view, and behaviours” that emerge from the rigidification of common sense, he identifies the primary carriers of this cultural form in subaltern groups and, particularly, in their most marginal and peripheral elements (Gramsci 2021, p. 73 (PN 11§12); Gramsci 2011, vol. 1, p. 49 (PN 3§48)):4

This conception of the world is not elaborated and systematised because the people (that is, the ensemble of the subaltern and instrumental classes of every form of society that has existed thus far), by definition, cannot hold conceptions that are elaborated, systematic, and politically organised and centralised in their albeit contradictory development. Instead, it is a multifarious conception, not only in the sense that it is made up of diverse parts and juxtapositions, but also in the sense that it consists of layers, some of which are very crude and others less so—if, indeed, one does not want to speak of a hodgepodge of fragments from all the conceptions of the world and of life that have followed one another throughout history. Indeed, only in folklore does one find the surviving evidence, albeit mangled and contaminated, of most of those conceptions.

(Gramsci 2021, p. 130 (PN 27§1))

Thus, folklore appears not merely as a kind of “contemporary prehistory”, a mere residual of the conceptions of past eras but rather as a complex cultural phenomenon, whose origin and function are to be sought in the current material and cultural conditions of life experienced by subaltern groups (Gramsci 2014, p. 1105 (PN 9§15); Gramsci 2021, p. 130 (PN 27§1)). In this sense, folklore is primarily conceived as a result of their cultural marginalisation within the hegemonic system, which excludes them from developing a critical and organic conception of the world, that aligns with their social interests and needs. Second, it is also identified as the product of their systemic subjection to the cultural and political initiative of the dominant classes, whose cultural frameworks serve as a perennial and evolving reservoir of notions, references, and motifs that enter relentlessly, albeit acritically and disorganically, into folklore (Gramsci 2011, vol. 2, p. 21 (PN 3§14); Gramsci 2014, p. 1105 (PN 9§15); Gramsci 2021, p. 6 (PN 25§2)). At the same time, however, folklore always represents an oppositional stance to the dominant, “official” culture, although—as Gramsci points out—mostly in a mechanical, merely reflected way (Gramsci 2021, p. 130 (PN 27§1)).

Interestingly, Gramsci distinguishes between different kinds of oppositional attitudes within folklore, according to both its regressive or progressive stance and its more passive or reactive posture. With respect to the first point, Gramsci notes that a prevalence of “fossilised” elements, reflecting the anachronistic conditions of life, mostly brings with it a conservative or even reactionary stance, giving folklore a regressive tinge; conversely, a prevalence of “generally creative and progressive innovations” can spontaneously result from evolving forms and conditions of life that “stand in contradiction to, or are simply different from, the morality of the ruling strata” (Gramsci 2021, p. 131 (PN 27§1)). With respect to the second point, Gramsci observes elsewhere that the oppositional attitudes embedded in subaltern worldviews remain mostly passive and implicit, often manifesting as indifference and derealisation, due to the “fewer ‘moral regrets’” of subaltern groups, which feel that “what they do does not concern them except in a broad sense” (Gramsci 2014, p. 1833 (PN 15§74)). Differently, during periods of serious hegemonic crisis and worsening material conditions of life, more active attitudes of cultural and practical opposition and resistance inevitably arise (Gramsci 2011, vol. 2, p. 49 ff. (PN 3§48)).

Regardless of these differences, Gramsci unambiguously considers folklore as an inadequate, and ultimately counterproductive, instrument of genuine emancipation. Indeed, while it may express an actual loss of consensus by the hegemonic system and even a genuine aspiration for change by subaltern groups, it lacks the coherence and self-consciousness needed for real social transformations. Thus, they remain on the margins of the dominant worldview and risk exacerbating, rather than overcoming, their own marginalisation.

In this framework, the existence of folklore must be understood as the corresponding cultural expression of the inability of subaltern groups to achieve autonomous historical initiative and genuine emancipation. Its social spread serves as a significant symptom of the crisis of authority experienced by the ruling classes and the presence of dissent among subaltern groups, which often struggle to adequately identify and express their needs. For this reason, Gramsci emphasises the importance of engaging with folklore not merely as an object of detached analysis but with a “sympathetic” approach, aiming to better understand and potentially enhance the conceptions, aspirations, and conditions of subaltern groups (Gramsci 2011, vol. 2, p. 49 ff. (PN 3§48); Gramsci 2014, p. 1506 (PN 11§67)).5 This sets the stage for an exploration of how these dynamics evolve within contemporary society, particularly concerning Gramsci’s notion of “modern folklore”.

3. From Folklore to Conspiracy Mentality: The Gramscian Theory of “Modern Folklore”

Building upon Gramsci’s general conception of hegemony and folklore, it is crucial now to focus on his insights in the evolution of these dynamics within the context of modern societies, particularly regarding the emergence of what he terms “modern folklore”. In this regard, though not systematically developed, his observations on the relationship between folklore and the evolution of modern scientific and political thought are particularly insightful. It is precisely in this context that Gramsci introduces the notion—rather late and likely tentative in nature—6 of “modern folklore”, by observing that

Even modern thought and science constantly add new elements to “modern folklore”, insofar as certain scientific notions and certain opinions, torn from their context and more or less distorted, fall into the popular domain constantly and are “inserted” into the mosaic of tradition.

(Gramsci 2021, p. 130 (PN 27§1))

On a par with what has been said about folklore in general, Gramsci, thus, acknowledges “modern folklore” as a heterogeneous and crystallised system of beliefs and practices, still resulting from the constant falling of isolated elements from the current higher culture into a cultural framework sedimented from the past. Yet, in line with his observations, a specific difference occurs in modern times, due to the special role played by science and secularised political thought in shaping the bourgeois conception of the world, in comparison to the preponderance of religion and transcendence in forming the worldviews of the dominant classes in earlier formations of society.

On the one hand, this historical transformation is marked by an unprecedented degree of development of the hegemonic organisation, driven by the rise of new centres of irradiation, such as mass public education, mass media, and popular science publishing houses. These institutions actively promote the formation of a modern common sense, primarily through the dissemination, albeit largely dogmatic, of concepts and notions proper to modern scientific thought. On the other hand, the accelerated and uncontrolled nature of scientific and technical development characteristic of modern capitalist societies constantly widens the potential divide between the current state of the art of higher culture and the way of thinking of the majority, still largely tied to prescientific conceptions of the world (Gramsci 2014, p. 1501 (PN 11§66); p. 1540 (PN 12§2); p. 2273 (PN 24§8); cf. Gramsci 2011, (vol. 2), p. 68 (PN 3§72)).

In line with Gramsci’s framework, this tendency can result, in the long term, into the rigidification and degeneration of modern common sense, whose development cannot keep pace with the rapid and destabilising transformations modern science and technologies go through, together with the increasing complexity of social phenomena that accompanies them. It is precisely in this gap, between a stagnating common sense and the rapid evolution of higher culture, that modern folklore emerges, consisting of the persistence of an apparently anachronistic, superstitious and “magical conception of the world” into which elements of modern thought are inserted in a decontextualised and distorted way. On the one hand, this process stems from the enduring passivisation of popular masses, reflected in their persistent reliance on fatalistic explanations and a perennial fascination with the supernatural and the occult (see Gramsci 2014, p. 1770 (PN 15§13); p. 1875 (PN 16§12)). On the other hand, it accelerates as the hegemonic system increasingly fails to improve the material and cultural conditions of subaltern groups, triggering—along with their increasing social marginalisation—a “crisis of authority” of the ruling classes, coupledwith a loss of trust among subaltern groups towards the official culture. This second point perfectly grasped by a famous passage in Prison Notebooks that, although it does not explicitly speak of modern folklore, similarly related the “wave of materialism” that Gramsci registered among the popular classes of his time to the “crisis of authority” undergone by the ruling classes:

If the ruling class has lost consensus, that is, if it no longer “leads” but only “rules”—it possesses sheer coercive power—this actually means that the great masses have become detached from traditional ideologies, they no longer believe what they previously used to believe, etc. The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born: in this interregnum, morbid phenomena of the most varied kind come to pass.

(Gramsci 2011, vol. 2, pp. 32–33 (PN 3§34))

Gramsci’s reference to “morbid phenomena” applies well to the emergence and spread of modern folklore, as it captures the cultural disarray during periods of “interregnum”, due to the lack of autonomous initiative from subaltern groups and their inability to lead consciously a political and cultural transition towards a new, more advanced hegemonic equilibrium.

The Gramscian notion of “modern folklore”, though often overlooked in the literature, offers a productive lens through which to understand conspiracy beliefs. While Gramsci uses the term sparingly in Prison Notebooks, its conceptual importance becomes clear when paired with his references to a “folklore of the future”, suggesting that folklore is not restricted to premodern remnants of subaltern cultures, as long understood in Gramscian literature.7 Instead, we contend that Gramsci’s approach allows for the extension of this concept to modern cultural forms, such as conspiracy and denialist beliefs, which embody key characteristics of folklore in general while adapting to the intellectual and social conditions of contemporary, industrialised societies.8

As proved by a wide range of scholarly research, conspiracy beliefs feature many of the characteristics related by Gramsci to folklore. As already noted above, this does not mean in any way to treat conspiracy beliefs as a folkloric phenomenon in the current anthropological or ethnological sense but rather assess the relevance of Gramsci’s attitude towards subaltern cultures in spontaneous opposition to the hegemonic one. In order to demonstrate our point, we will now systematically go through the main features that conspiracy beliefs, according to the literature, shared with Gramsci’s concept of folklore and modern folklore. This analysis identifies five key aspects in which Gramsci’s theory of modern folklore illuminates the nature of conspiracy beliefs: (1) It examines the persistence of mindsets derived from formerly dominant worldviews, particularly religious and magical thought. (2) It highlights the coexistence of heterogeneous and inconsistent elements within conspiracy beliefs, reflecting a key characteristic of Gramscian folklore. (3) The dependency of subaltern culture on official knowledge is discussed, illustrating how elements of scientific and political thought become distorted within conspiracy narratives. (4) The inadequate character of the opposition inherent to conspiracy beliefs is explored, especially in contexts of widespread yet disorganised distrust towards dominant classes. Finally, (5) the pliability of Gramsci’s concept of subaltern groups is emphasised, acknowledging the varied social and cultural conditions that shape the experiences of conspiracy believers. Together, these points demonstrate the relevance of Gramsci’s theory of modern folklore for understanding the complexities of conspiracy beliefs.

(1) A first point may be identified in the persistence of a mindset from formerly dominant worldviews, with special reference to religious and magical thought. This is strongly in line with Gramsci’s conception of modern folklore as a repository of older, residual cultural elements, which he often refers to as magical or superstitious conceptions of the world, that persist alongside and in conflict with elements from currently dominant worldviews. Correspondingly, conspiracy theory studies have long highlighted the persistent tension between modern scientific rationality and premodern, magical ways of thinking in conspiracy beliefs (Dyrendal 2020; Pannofino 2024). This line of analysis began with Karl Popper ([1945] 2013), who famously characterised conspiracy myths as “the result of the secularisation of religious superstition” (Popper [1945] 2013, pp. 305–6). Although widely influential (see, e.g., Pipes 1997; Barkun 2003), Popper’s interpretation has been criticised in more recent literature for its stigmatising connotations, as it overshadows a normative link between the persistence of religious or magical elements in conspiracy mentality and a lack of rationality. However, more recent studies, such as Harambam and Aupers (2015), emphasise the need to understand the religious elements within conspiracy beliefs without automatically equating them with irrationality. This perfectly aligns with Gramsci’s analysis, where the religious and magical elements in modern folklore are not merely remnants of an outdated mindset but stem from the historically enduring appeal of mystical, supernatural and fatalistic conceptions which both reflect and contribute to the persistent passivity that characterises the subaltern condition.

(2) A second aspect can be identified in the coexistence of heterogeneous and inherently inconsistent ways of thinking, beliefs, and opinions that are mechanically connected within one’s worldview. While this point is crucial in Gramsci’s conceptualisation of folklore as a “hodgepodge of fragments from all the conceptions of the world and of life that have followed one another throughout history”, it finds a peculiar application to the world of conspiracy beliefs, whose lack of logical consistency and radical heterogeneity are largely recognised (see, e.g., Dentith 2018; Solinas 2023). This is particularly relevant to conspiracy mentality, when understood as a necessary but not sufficient condition for the emergence of and adherence to explicitly codified conspiracy myths. Indeed, while conspiracy mentality can often remain confined to certain domains of reality and coexist with more contemporary common sense attitudes and beliefs, this is less blatant for the belief in explicitly codified conspiracy myths, which tend to pervasively influence the entire worldview of their adherents. However, even conspiracy myths continue to exhibit this heterogeneity and radical inconsistency; although, they mimick the systematic character of scientific theories, as we will further explore in point 3 of this section. Goertzel’s (1994) findings that conspiracy belief in different conspiracy myths tend to be correlated aligns with this notion, illustrating how the latter tend to “stick together” and mutually reinforce one another, even in the absence of strict consistency. Similarly, Barkun (2003) claims that the occult nature of the plans presupposed by many conspiracy myths makes it possible to link extremely heterogeneous events in a deliberate design and provide a single, unfalsifiable explanation for them all.

(3) The third point is represented by the passive dependency of folklore on the official knowledge, whose “fragments” “constantly fall into the popular domain”, where they are assimilated in a distorted way. As already argued, in contemporary societies, this falling mainly involves notions and practices from modern scientific and political thought, as the latter represents the systematic core of the dominant conception of the world. As already mentioned, modern folklore is therefore not reducible to the mere anachronistic persistence of a religious or magical conception of the world in modern times but rather implies the retrieval by subaltern groups of notions and practices from the dominant culture, a phenomenon largely evidenced by conspiracy theory studies. Therefore, rather than being dismissed as purely irrational forms of thought—implying a rejection of scientific reasoning—scholars, such as Harambam and Aupers (2015), Drążkiewicz (2022), and Pannofino (2024), have demonstrated that conspiracy beliefs often mimic scientific and political practices. In addition to the previously noted tendency towards mock systematicity within conspiracy myths, there is also a distorted reliance on the scientific method, emphasising hypothesis testing that escapes falsification and evidence demands that often results in the reversal of the burden of proof. This results in what is sometimes referred to as a “crippled epistemology” (see Sunstein and Vermeule 2009), where scientific concepts, sources, and data are distorted, selectively used, or replaced with unverified or dubious information. The emergence and spread of conspiracy beliefs would then be related to a disorganised relationship with scientific discourse, often characterised by “cherry-picked evidence” (see McIntyre 2022), as well as to the popularisation of the radical doubt—in place of appeals to authority—applied without methodological rigour. This recalls Beck’s (1992) argument that in contemporary societies, the authority of science and technology is increasingly questioned and that even experts are required to bear the burden of proof. However, due to the incomplete democratisation of knowledge initiated by the scientific revolution, subaltern groups tend to experience science only in its elitist and authoritarian dimensions, without actively partaking in its management, development, and social benefits.

(4) A fourth feature, strictly connected to the previous one, needs to be found in the spontaneously oppositional character of subaltern beliefs with respect to the dominant culture and classes. As already discussed, Gramsci identifies the implicit, mechanical, and therefore, inadequate character of the opposition embedded in folklore and spontaneous subaltern movements, while emphasising their tendency to exacerbate in times of hegemonic crisis and loss of consensus. In parallel, conspiracy theory studies highlight three key elements that resonate with this Gramscian framework. First, the attitude of conspiracy believers to systematically distrust official narratives, translating in the construction of alternative explanations that must conflict with the official one (see Coady 2006, p. 117; Dentith 2018, p. 10). This pervasive suspicion, often directed towards the actions and statements of those in power, reflects a broader scepticism towards institutions and authorities, mirroring the spontaneous opposition of subaltern groups described by Gramsci. In this sense, favourable conditions for the spread of conspiracy mentality arise from systemic dynamics, particularly a pervasive distrust of institutions, manifesting as a belief in overarching “powers that be”, variously represented by political actors, industrial and financial corporations, mass media, scientists, and technology (see Jolley and Douglas 2014; Imhoff et al. 2018; Imhoff and Lamberty 2020a). In the realm of conspiracy beliefs, this mindset leads people to assume that what appears in the public sphere is the result of deliberate manipulation and orchestration by covert forces rather than a result of complex social processes. This aligns closely with Gramsci’s observations regarding the spontaneous responses of subaltern groups to hegemonic instability, characterised by “crises of authority” and general distrust of ruling classes and their intellectuals. These factors are structurally linked to a mechanical opposition to cultured culture and narratives, creating fertile ground for “morbid phenomena”, such as conspiracy mentality and conspiracy-related behaviours, which often take the form of counter conducts, extending to protests and rebellion. Lastly, the mechanical and, therefore, inadequate opposition of spontaneous subaltern cultures to the dominant one, underscored by Gramsci, is also echoed by conspiracy theory studies, which report the inability of conspiracy beliefs to resolve the epistemic, existential, and social needs they seek to address (see Douglas et al. 2019). As we will explore in Section 4 and Section 5, this inadequacy reflects the systematic subjection of subaltern groups to the cultural and political initiatives of the dominant classes, manifesting both in their narcotic function and their vulnerability to direct repression or manipulation. This dynamic is exacerbated by paternalistic responses from ruling classes, which seek to manage or suppress these beliefs rather than engage with them critically. Consequently, such dynamics not only co-opt subaltern spontaneous opposition but also perpetuate the status quo, deepening the alienation of those who hold these beliefs.

(5) Finally, the fifth reason why Gramsci’s theory of folklore is particularly suited to understanding the emergence of conspiracy mentality is the pliability of his concept of subaltern groups. Indeed, as already observed, Gramsci identifies a complex of social and cultural conditions of instrumentalisation, fragmentation, oppression, exclusion, and marginalisation with this term, which vary in origins, nature, and effects, encompassing not only economic class but also race, gender, religious, cultural, linguistic, and geographic factors. Importantly, “subaltern groups” in Gramsci’s sense does not merely refer to what is normally understood by “marginalised groups” but to any groups positioned in a relation of subordination to the dominant hegemonic order. This subordination may encompass individuals that, while enjoying some forms of economic or social advantage, are or feel excluded from the capacity to exercise political agency or autonomous direction over their lives. Consequently, Gramsci’s concept of subalternity converges with that of intersectionality, where conditions of economic advantage, for example, coexist and interact with other forms of social subalternity, as in the case of housewives.9 At the same time, as we shall see more fully in the fifth section of this paper, Gramsci’s remarks that individuals from the dominant classes tend to adopt in some cases folkloric attitudes or beliefs peculiar to subaltern groups—either through spontaneous or instrumental adherence—confirm the suitability of his approach for studying conspiracy beliefs. This perfectly matches the layered and heterogeneous demographic composition of conspiracy believers, who, as research has widely shown, are often members of low-status groups seeking to address or explain their specific conditions of social marginalisation (see Goertzel 1994; Abalakina-Paap et al. 1999; Douglas et al. 2019; Nefes and Romero-Reche 2020; Smallpage et al. 2020 for a comprehensive literature review). From a Marxist perspective, Jameson (1988) has famously assessed conspiracy beliefs as the “poor person’s cognitive mapping in the postmodern age”, linking them to the increasing complexity and widespread feelings of helplessness and disorientation, especially among the most disadvantaged social strata. The existence of a significant negative correlation between the likelihood of adhering to a conspiracy myth and educational level is also particularly important from a Gramscian perspective, as his concept of subaltern groups highlights the limitations of hegemonic forces to effectively disseminate dominant cultural narratives through education among these groups (see Swami et al. 2014; Jabkowski et al. 2023). This recalls Gramsci’s observation that folklore must always be understood in relation to the material and cultural conditions of its adherents. Other contributions, echoing Gramsci’s perspective, indicate that disadvantaged groups facing marginalisation and systemic discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion, or gender are particularly likely to develop a conspiracy mentality and embrace conspiracy myths, particularly when they target or are relevant for their social role or reference group.10 This underscores the need to consider the specific social, political, and cultural contexts that contribute to the emergence and spread of conspiracy mentality, further confirming Gramsci’s indications on the nature of “modern folklore”.

Given these convergences between Gramsci’s theory and the analysis of conspiracy beliefs, it is even more surprising that explicit references to Gramsci are systematically absent in conspiracy theory studies, even within cultural studies, where his legacy is broadly acknowledged in other fields.11 This gap reflects a lack of recognition of the interpretive potential offered by his analysis of folklore and subaltern culture, which could enrich academic discourse and provide robust theoretical tools for addressing contemporary phenomena, such as conspiracism, denialism, and other anti- and pseudo-scientific attitudes, striking examples of what Gramsci identifies as modern folklore.

Actually, a broader exclusion of Marxism as a scientific reference and methodological framework can be observed across most scholarly trends within conspiracy theory studies, with only a few exceptions (see, e.g., Jameson 1988). Of course, this is partly attributable to the lasting influence of Popper’s seminal work, which polemically characterised Marxism itself as a derivative of “conspiracy theory of society”, albeit with a more sophisticated veneer (Popper [1945] 2013, p. 206; Parker 2001, p. 198; Boudon 2004, p. 41; Nefes and Romero-Reche 2020, p. 95; Giry and Gürpinar 2020, p. 317). Popper’s critique of Marxism focused on its alleged unfalsifiability, arguing that it presented a narrative of class struggle that explained all social phenomena by attributing them to the covert actions of “monopolists, capitalists, or imperialists” much like the conspiracy myths that identify “powerful men or groups, whose wickedness is responsible for all the evils we suffer from”, for societal evils (Popper [1945] 2013, pp. 305–6). However, as some critical contributions have pointed out, the parallels between Marxism and conspiracy myths are not found in this caricatured depiction of Marxism. Instead, they lie in the fact that both seem to address the needs of subaltern groups, while diverging fundamentally in their methods of explanation and action (Harambam 2017, p. 135). Marxism—particularly in its more developed forms, such as Gramsci’s theory of hegemony—is not the undetermined, all-encompassing theory Popper suggests. Rather, it is an open research program that seeks to provide a differentiated, historically grounded analysis of social relationships and structures, understood as complex yet inherently hierarchical phenomena, while empowering subaltern groups to critically engage with and transform their understanding of the world. Moreover, in both Marx and Gramsci, the concept of dominant classes is, therefore, far from monolithic; rather, it serves as a collective term for a composite group with internal conflicts, shifting balances, and a network of competing interests. In particular, Gramsci’s notion of hegemony emphasises the complex dynamics between the state and civil society, shaped by the fluctuating equilibria among and within dominant classes, intellectuals, and subaltern groups. This nuanced interplay of forces creates a common sense that internalises power relations without reducing them to a single, orchestrated plan or a complex of deliberate acts of manipulation, as conspiracy myths necessarily imply.

To sum up, Gramsci’s analysis of folklore provides valuable insights into how the beliefs of subaltern groups—including conspiratorial beliefs—are shaped within contemporary hegemonic systems. As discussed, the features that support this argument include the residual persistence of superstitious beliefs, the inconsistent juxtaposition of facts within a monologic narrative, the dependence on distorted dominant and scientific cultures, the oppositional attitude towards the latter, and the layered composition of those who believe in conspiracies. To fully develop Gramsci’s argument, it is now essential to investigate how these dynamics are reinforced and perpetuated through specific channels operating within the same hegemonic framework; thus, we will examine in the next section the hegemonic relations of implicit pedagogy exemplified in Gramsci’s analysis of popular literature, followed in Section 5 by an analysis of explicit pedagogy as illustrated by Gramsci’s critique of folklore studies of his times, paternalistic education, and the manipulation of folklore by ruling classes.

4. Modern Folklore and Popular Fiction Between Gramsci and Literary Studies

Gramsci’s observations on contemporary popular fiction are particularly insightful as an example of “implicit pedagogy”, illuminating the relationship between mass literature and the rise of conspiracy mentality, where elements of commercial storytelling tend to exacerbate susceptibility of the subaltern to daydreaming and fantastically assimilating modern scientific and political thought. Thus, among all the centres of irradiation, popular fiction, e.g., through literature and cinema, seems to offer an important narrative framework to gather all the heterogeneous elements that conspiracy beliefs are made of, while creating at the same time a fictitious yet appealing “argumentative style” (see Hofstadter 1964). Consequently, the connection between Gramsci’s treatment of literature and contemporary literary studies warrants focused attention, as it is crucial for understanding modern subaltern cultural attitudes.12 As we shall see in this paragraph, the distinctive line of inquiry initiated by Gramsci regarding the social function of modern popular literature anticipated many insights and arguments that are now prominent in literary studies on the relationship between narrative and conspiracy beliefs. However, this continuity has completely been overlooked in contemporary literature, along with Gramsci’s specificity in terms of approach and methodology, which still hold significant potential for advancing these studies.

As previously discussed regarding the concepts of folklore and common sense, the issue of popular and commercial literature is also prominently featured in Gramsci’s list of “main topics” on the first page of Notebook 1, specifically noted as “The popular literature of ‘serial novels’ and the reasons for its continued success”. Moreover, the sixteenth item on this list introduces a column titled “Father Bresciani’s progeny”, through which Gramsci examines the degenerative trends among Italian authors of popular novels, starting with the 19th-century Jesuit novelist Antonio Bresciani (Gramsci 2011, vol. 1, p. 99 (PN 1)). Gramsci viewed Bresciani as a prime example of literature that is anti-artistic, paternalistic, and profoundly reactionary, while recent critics have also identified him as a significant promoter of anti-Semitism and Jewish–Masonic conspiracy myths during the Risorgimento (see Eco 2019). Gramsci’s sensitivity to popular culture is strikingly progressive for his time. He acknowledges the profound cultural significance of commercial literature, theatre, and cinema, even as he critiques their artistic merits.13 Consequently, a substantial number of notes in Prison Notebooks are dedicated to the subject of modern popular literature, with some degree of systematisation in Notebook 21.

These notes particularly address the commercialisation of literature and the rise of popular genres, including the historical novel, gothic novel, pulp novel, detective story, and science fiction—genres whose diverse spread and success Gramsci recognised across various social strata (Gramsci 2014, p. 2120 (PN 21§6); Gramsci 2011, vol. 2, p. 77 (PN 3§78)). Although Gramsci, for obvious reasons, primarily focuses on literature and theatre, he does not overlook the role of cinema and other emerging expressive means, which in his time were still in their infancy. He notes, for example, that certain types of serialised popular novels—such as ideological–political, sentimental–popular, detective, historical, mystery, and adventure science fiction—correspond to theatrical and cinematic works of a similar nature. Gramsci sees early cinema, arising during the peak of serialised novel popularity, as inheriting and adapting the literary traits of these genres, maintaining them as foundational to the structure of screenwriting (Gramsci 2011, vol. 2, pp. 77–78 (PN 3§78)). In addition to analysing this varied success and its underlying causes, Gramsci extensively explores how contemporary commercial literature—and, by extension, cinema—interacts with the formation of common sense and the folkloric worldviews prevailing among subaltern groups to whom these productions were directed.

Particular attention is given to the widespread success of detective and “intrigue” novels, reflecting on Aldo Sorani’s 1930 article, Conan Doyle e la fortuna del romanzo poliziesco (Gramsci 2014, p. 2130 ff. (PN 21§13); Gramsci 2011, vol. 3, p. 15 ff. (PN 6§17)). He notes Sorani’s exploration of the genre’s popularity across social classes and his attempt to identify its psychological roots in a rebellion spirit against the “mechanisation and standardisation of modern life”. On the one hand, Gramsci acknowledges the validity of this observation, arguing that the desire to escape the Taylorist regimentation of human activity is a poignant expression of the social position of subaltern groups, whose existence is always “rationalised by coercion”, rather than genuinely rational, because “if it is rational for dominant groups, is not rational for those dominated” (Gramsci 2014, p. 2132 (PN 21§13); Gramsci 2011, vol. 3, p. 16. (PN 6§17)). On the other hand, Gramsci criticises Sorani’s explanation as overly general and applicable to various periods and forms of entertainment, both commercial and artistic. Indeed, expanding on Sorani’s insights, Gramsci posits that this tendency to escapism belongs not only to detective novels but rather to popular literature in general, as a part of a larger cultural inclination, where readers seek both entertainment and engagement with imaginative realities for practical purposes. Not by chance, this trend also resonates—as Gramsci notes—with earlier phenomena, such as the popularity of chivalric epics, and is closely tied to functions traditionally fulfilled by religion.

Furthermore, echoing Boltanski (2014) and others’ reflections, Gramsci contends to Sorani that the widespread success of detective and “intrigue” literature in the modern age transcends mere escapism. While it may offer a reprieve from modern life’s monotony, its deeper appeal lies in the interest among the populace in “beautiful adventures”, i.e., free and self-directed experiences, demonstrating a powerful sense of agency in the outlined characters. These stories provide a contrast to the “bad adventurousness” of modern life, marked by precariousness and a sense of powerlessness. In this sense, detective fiction offers more than an escape from routine; it gives readers a sense of control and agency in a world perceived as largely uncertain and ununderstandable (Gramsci 2014, p. 2133 (PN 21§13)).

From this perspective, conspiracy theory studies have similarly highlighted the powerful role of storytelling in shaping social beliefs and attitudes, focusing on fiction and narratives, such as thrillers, spy, science fiction, and detective novels. In particular, the rise and popularity of conspiracy and detective fiction have been strongly connected to the development of modern societies and the increasing anxiety and precariousness they inherently bring, as noted by Fenster (1999); Coale (2005); Boltanski (2014). The perception of diminished control, driven by the growing complexity of society and the state’s apparatus, aligns with a cultural trend where individuals turn to narratives that offer intuitive yet imaginative explanations for complex phenomena, restoring a sense of agency through heroic figures in an uncertain and largely ununderstandable world.

In line with other literary studies, Gramsci also emphasises the interest in scientific and psychological elements to the widespread popularity of modern fiction. However, Gramsci observes that the enduring appeal of these genres lies not solely in their logical and scientific elements but also and increasingly in their ability to popularise them, by combining them with the “arbitrary” and the “fantastic”. This ability resonates with Solinas (2023) observation that conspiracy narratives often employ a “magical significance”, arbitrarily connecting unrelated events to create fantastical yet apparently coherent explanations. Moreover, other interpretations of these narratives further delve into epistemological themes, like the nature of proof, deduction mechanisms, and the trustworthiness of appearances (McHale 1992; Jones and Soderlund 2017), highlighting how these narratives do not merely reflect broader cultural anxieties but also play an active role in forming and reinforcing individual and collective views of reality. This aligns with Gramsci’s argument that popular literature offers readers a sort of “psychological stimulation”, capable of transcending the limitations of proper logical and scientific notions, promoting their re-signification within the framework of the intellectual tools currently available to individuals from subaltern groups. This well results from Gramsci’s observations about the parallel historical developments of detective novels and science fiction:

Verne’s books do not contain anything that is completely impossible […]. The play of imagination is not entirely “arbitrary” and therefore has the capacity to stimulate the imagination of the reader who is already captivated by the ideology of the inevitable progress of scientific development in the realm of controlling natural forces. Wells and Poe are different precisely because the “arbitrary”, to a very large extent, predominates in their work […]: in Verne’s works, there is an alliance between human intellect and material forces, whereas in Wells and Poe, human intellect predominates. […] The same can be said of the detective stories […]. Sherlock Holmes features a (too) rational balance between intelligence and science. Today, there is more interest in the individual achievement of the hero, the «psychic» technique per se; therefore, Poe and Chesterton are more interesting, etc.

(Gramsci 2014, pp. 2126–27 (PN 21§10), translation by the authors; cf. Gramsci 2011, vol. 2, pp. 121–22 (PN 3§149))

Finally, Gramsci underscores the enduring public fascination with judicial proceedings and the widespread distrust of the justice system in popular sentiment, contributing to the popularity of the private or amateur detective, often seen as more reliable than official law enforcement. This sentiment also extends to the romanticisation of “great criminals”, portrayed sympathetically as figures superior to the judicial apparatus and, occasionally, even as true dispensers of justice.

Gramsci traces the origins of detective fiction to the margins of literature dealing with causes célèbres—sensational court cases that captivated public interest, by incorporating popular ideologies about the administration of justice, particularly when intertwined with political passions. While detective novels focused on adventure and intrigue often revolve around the conflict between professional criminality and the forces of legal order, causes célèbres literature typically depicts the struggle between common people and the “obscure forces of tyranny”, embodied by figures such as Jesuits, Freemasons, or secret police linked to the raison d’état or the ambitions of individual princes. In turn, the genre of causes célèbres is closely connected to works like The Count of Monte Cristo, dramatising celebrated legal cases and representing, for Gramsci, a negative yet paradigmatic example of serial novel. It is in relation to serial novels that we find Gramsci’s most significant observations on the interplay between contemporary popular literature and the formation of popular beliefs within the subaltern groups, to whom these works are directed (Gramsci 2014, pp. 2128–29 (PN 21§12); cf. Gramsci 2011, vol. 2, pp. 123–24 (PN 3§153)).

Gramsci emphasises the importance of the concept of “interesting” in literature, whether artistic or commercial, as it is crucial for capturing and maintaining the audience’s attention. In his view, what is considered “interesting” varies across individuals and social groups, and it plays a key role in the success of a work. While in truly artistic literature, the interesting elements are organically integrated within the artistic conception, in commercial literature, these elements are often mechanically sought and “doled out industrially” to ensure immediate commercial success. In this sense, while Gramsci acknowledges that commercial literature often lacks the artistic value found in more traditional forms of art, he insists that it nonetheless holds significant relevance for the study of the history of culture. Indeed, precisely because of the deliberate search and mechanical insertion of interesting elements, commercial literature reflects and reinforces the “philosophy of the age”, that is, the mass of sentiments and worldviews shared by the social strata to which these works are directed (Gramsci 2011, vol. 2, p. 311 ff. (PN 5§54)). For this reason, Gramsci argued that commercial literature and especially serial novels, as exemplified by Dumas’ The Count of Monte Cristo, contribute to reproducing the social and political passivity of individuals from subaltern groups, functioning as a kind of “narcotic” or cultural “opium” that provides an imaginative outlet for their social resentment:

This literature is a “narcotic” of the people, an “opium”. (A. Dumas’s Count of Monte Cristo, which is perhaps the biggest “opiate” of all popular novels, could be analysed from this perspective. What man in the street does not believe he has been treated unjustly by the powerful and does not fantasise about the “punishment” to inflict on them? Edmond Dantès offers him a model, “intoxicates” him with excitement, replaces the belief in a transcendental justice, in which he no longer “systematically” believes).

(Gramsci 2014, p. 313 (PN 5§54))

Gramsci further deepens this analysis by drawing connections between these fantasies and the psychological dynamics explored by psychoanalysts. He suggests that the widespread appeal of such narratives is rooted in a collective social “inferiority complex” that generates fantasies of retribution against those seen as responsible for the adversities faced by the subaltern:

The serial novel is a substitute for (and, at the same time, it stimulates) the fantasies of the common man; it really is daydreaming. One can look at what Freud and the psychoanalysts have to say about daydreaming. In this case, one could say that the fantasies of the people stem from a social “inferiority complex” that is the source of fantasies about revenge, punishing those responsible for their adversities, etc. The Count of Monte Cristo contains all the ingredients to induce these flights of fancy and hence to administer a narcotic that dulls the sense of pain, etc.

(Gramsci 2011, vol. 3, p. 106 (PN 6§134))

In this way, Gramsci’s analysis reveals that commercial literature functions as an embedded hegemonic tool that acts to maintain the cultural and intellectual passivity of subaltern groups. By mechanically adhering to the elements of interest to subaltern groups, it tends to reinforce the pre-existing complex of beliefs, opinions, and intellectual attitudes, contributing both to their preservation and their manipulability by the reactionary fractions of the dominant groups.14

Gramsci also addresses a similar issue in his discussions of other centres of irradiation, such as modern mass media, particularly scientific journalism, which he critiques for its limited capacity to effectively counter the magical worldview prevalent among popular strata (Gramsci 2014, pp. 2273–74 (PN 24§8)). Naturally, he could not foresee “new” centres of irradiation, such as the internet and social media, which, thus, fall outside the scope of his analysis. However, the concept of centres of irradiation of hegemony and subaltern culture, including “public meetings of all kinds” and “relations of ‘conversations’” across social strata, suggests that his framework can and should be extended to these domains (Gramsci 2014, p. 2345 (PN 29§3), translation by the authors). Moreover, the unique mechanisms of social networks—in particular, their use of recommendation algorithms, as widely documented—15 amplify on an unprecedented scale what Gramsci described as the “industrial dosing” of the “interesting” element within cultural industry. As a result, these new phenomena tend to exacerbate the tendency of hegemonic tools to reinforce and hetero-direct the pre-existing beliefs of the subaltern and foster their cultural passivisation.

After examining Gramsci’s conception of folklore—how it emerges and evolves within modern society as “modern folklore” and how it is reinforced by hegemonic forces, such as commercial literature—we must now consider how, according to Gramsci, modern folklore is actively engaged with by dominant classes and their intellectuals, as well as how it should be addressed by intellectuals organically tied to subaltern groups.

In order to do that, we will first present Gramsci’s critique to folklore studies of his time, discussing them in connection with the main trajectories in contemporary conspiracy theory studies. Secondly, we will discuss Gramsci’s pedagogical stance towards subaltern groups and his prescriptions for engaging with folklore.

5. Subaltern Groups Through Hegemonic Lenses: From Gramsci’s Critique of Folklore Studies to Conspiracy Theory Studies

As previously argued, in Gramsci’s social theory, hegemony entails a network of implicit pedagogical relationships that collectively shape a shared worldview, albeit with varying degrees of coherence across different social strata. In the preceding section, we examined commercial literature as an example of implicit pedagogy directed at groups characterised by folkloric and conspiratorial beliefs. However, the cultural initiative of the dominant classes also involves more direct forms of “pedagogical” engagement with subaltern groups, which Gramsci critiques in contrast to more progressive pedagogical stances.

Gramsci argues that the dominant approach to folklore and subaltern groups is characterised both academically and politically by intellectual attitudes, such as naturalisation, infantilisation, pathologisation, and criminalisation. He criticises the folklore studies of his time for adopting a detached, erudite approach that focuses on static documentation rather than a sympathetic understanding of popular beliefs. This critique is exemplified in his analysis of Henri De Man, whom Gramsci accuses of adopting a “scientistic” posture—treating subaltern beliefs and popular psychology as natural objects to be studied rather than historical phenomena to be understood on the basis of the underlying material and cultural conditions of their bearers. De Man’s empirical focus creates what Gramsci identifies as a form of “abstract sociology”, a classificatory system that overlooks the transformative possibilities within popular consciousness. In this regard, Gramsci likens the dominant approach in folklore studies to that of a zoologist observing insects, which reduces the subaltern to mere specimens instead of actively engaging with their lived realities and fostering their critical evolution (Gramsci 2011, vol. 2, p. 49 (PN 3§48); Gramsci 2011, vol. 3, pp. 159–60 (PN 7§6); Gramsci 2014, pp. 1430–31 (PN 11§25), p. 1501 (PN 11§66), p. 1506 (PN 11§67)).

This critique extends to Gramsci’s second point: the academic tendency to pathologise popular beliefs. While the documentary approach reduces folklore to a static object of observation, the dominant academic discourse often goes further by isolating the most eccentric or extreme aspects of subaltern culture, reducing them to mere symptoms of individual irrationality or mental illness:

Instead of studying the origins of a collective event and the reasons why it was widespread, why it was collective, one isolated the protagonist and limited oneself to producing his pathological biography, all too often using points of departure that were unverified or open to a different interpretation.

(Gramsci 2021, p. 3 (PN 27§1))

This judgement strictly mirrors mainstream trends in conspiracy theory studies, where conspiracy believers are often depicted as paranoid or irrational, thus overlooking the collective and contextual nature of these beliefs. As recent literature has widely pointed out (see, e.g., Butter and Knight 2020; Harambam 2017; Basham 2018), the psychopathologisation of individuals who believe in conspiratorial plans has long been the dominant trend both within and outside academia, traditionally associating conspiratorial thinking with a paranoid “style” (see Hofstadter 1964). The consequent tendency to stereotype and stigmatise conspiracists as paranoid personalities closely traces back to the method criticised by Gramsci of explaining the emergence of folklore and subaltern practices through the analysis of pathological aspects of isolated individuals. More recently, the focus on individual psychological aspects, resulting from the methodological individualism and naturalist perspective dominant in currently prevailing approaches, such as social psychology, while avoiding explicit psychopathologisation, fails to adequately conceive conspiracy beliefs in their inherently social and historical dimensions, which are largely reduced to situational factors and treated as modulating triggers (cf. Douglas et al. 2019; Van Prooijen et al. 2020). This limitation recalls Gramsci’s criticism of abstract sociological treatments of popular psychology and folklore, which overlook the inherent historicity of these phenomena, reducing them to natural and invariant expressions of universal human psychology.16

However, according to Gramsci, this academic stance is only the result of the intellectual systematisation of a broader elitist sentiment in society, where dominant classes express derision, contempt, concern, or objectification towards subaltern groups. Gramsci encapsulates this attitude in his statement, saying that, “to a social elite, the components of subaltern groups always have something barbaric or pathological about them” (Gramsci 2021, p. 3 (PN 27§1)). Such a paternalistic attitude, manifesting in various forms, is linked to what Gramsci refers to as “right-wing sarcasm”—an elitist intellectual “style” prone to mock the mindset and beliefs prevalent among subaltern groups. As Gramsci argues, this attitude seeks to destroy not only the contingent, “immediate form” of subaltern worldviews—their eccentricity, naivety, and inconsistency—but also their deeper “human content”, i.e., the complex of perceptions, innermost sentiments, and aspirations of the subaltern, which genuinely, yet inadequately, express their material and cultural conditions of life (Gramsci 2014, p. 2300 (PN 26§5); Gramsci 2011, vol. 1, p. 118 (PN 1§29)). Such an intellectual posture underpins the coercive nature of hegemonic education and the dissemination of common sense among subaltern groups, paralleling the paternalistic and racialised attitudes of civilisation programs targeting colonised populations (Gramsci 2014, p. 2112 (PN 21§3), p. 1197 (PN 9§135), p. 1366 ff. (PN 11§1)).

An alternative, though equally problematic, approach is seen in intellectual and political practices aimed at conserving the spontaneous and naïve forms of subaltern culture, thereby reinforcing the social marginalisation of subaltern groups. This tendency can manifest in two apparently opposing attitudes: on the one hand, there are those who Gramsci terms the “admirers of folklore”. These intellectuals, as Gramsci argues, mistake the deeply rooted psychological and historical dimensions of popular beliefs, such as witchcraft and superstitions, for a form of higher knowledge that somehow surpasses modern science. He refers to this position as “intellectual teratology”, a belief that reviving archaic modes of thought—like alchemy or occultism—could restore science to a more fruitful path of discovery. In a manner closely reminiscent of the Enlightenment myth of the good savage, admirers of folklore advocate for the preservation of such naïve worldviews, which ultimately hinders the systematic development of a critical consciousness necessary for the emancipation of subaltern groups (Gramsci 2011, vol. 2, p. 49 (PN 3§48)).

Interestingly, this criticism can in a sense be levelled at the prevailing approach in cultural studies to regard conspiracy beliefs as autonomous forms of popular expression. Of course, contemporary cultural studies offer valuable critiques of the psychopathologising and stigmatising tendencies in conspiracy theory studies and represent sometimes a virtuous example of Gramsci’s notion of “sympathetic understanding”. However, the sometimes-prevailing tendency within cultural studies to view conspiracy myths as autonomous countercultures, resulting from “creative ideation” and potentially capable of challenging the status quo—tends to overestimate their ability to articulate an autonomous and coherent conception of the world, capable of genuinely competing with official narratives. In this sense, as noted by Gramsci about the “admirers of folklore”, the idealisation of spontaneous subaltern culture neglects its structural subjection to the hegemonic culture as well as the reality that true emancipation necessitates the systematic development of a critical worldview, capable of fully assimilating modern scientific and political thought and the related intellectual tools. Therefore, despite their claimed proximity to subaltern groups, the “admirers of folklore” risk, for the Italian thinker, contributing to the preservation and reproduction of the existing conditions of subalternity and marginalisation, instead of effectively promoting their overcoming (Gramsci 2011, vol. 2, p. 49 (PN 3§48)).

On the other hand, Gramsci also critiques the deliberate manipulation of subaltern beliefs by reactionary forces. For example, he discusses this in relation to the political exploitation of spontaneous antisemitism among Piedmontese peasants during the Italian Risorgimento, where he notes that “the reactionaries and the clericals wanted to portray the liberal reforms of 1848 as an ‘invention’ of the Jews” in order to stir up the peasants against the revolutionary bourgeoisie (Gramsci 2014, p. 2035 (PN 19§25); Gramsci 2011, vol. 1, p. 110 (PN 1§19)). This kind of manipulation can involve both adhering or exploiting pre-existing reactionary elements within spontaneous subaltern beliefs and endowing them with more structured narratives, which the latter would otherwise lack. In this sense, Gramsci recognises both the possibility that reactionary subaltern beliefs result in spontaneous “regressive” social subaltern movements, that “in the modern world […] are more frequent” than the “progressive” ones, and that they are often deliberately fomented or co-opted by the dominant groups (Gramsci 2011, p. 52 (PN 3§48)). This perspective clearly emerges from Gramsci’s “research programme” in six points on the history of subaltern groups, particularly point 3, where he underscores the need to study “the formation of new parties among dominant groups to secure the consent of subaltern social groups and maintain control over them” (Gramsci 2021, p. 10 (PN 25§5)). Through such processes, reactionary forces can guide subaltern discontent into reactionary or conservative channels, reinforcing the status quo rather than challenging it. As Gramsci observed elsewhere, through the opportunistic embrace of subaltern elements, reactionary intellectuals and politicians may ultimately adopt folkloristic connotations, exemplified by the “popularism” and “superman complex” attributed to the Italian writer and “patriot” Gabriele D’Annunzio (Gramsci 2014, p. 1661 (PN 14§7), p. 1200 ff. (PN 9§141)). This calculated exploitation serves to reinforce the passivity of subaltern groups, as it instrumentalises their worldview without addressing the deeper causes of their subordination.

This dynamic is particularly relevant in understanding an often-overlooked element of Gramsci’s critique of fascism, which he saw as a political phenomenon with evident folkloristic–opportunistic traits. In a 1924 article titled Crisi Politica, Gramsci asserted: “Mussolini possesses nothing of the statesman or dictator except for some picturesque external poses: he is not an element of national life; he is a phenomenon of provincial folklore, destined to be remembered in the history of the various provincial masks of Italy more than in the context of Cromwell, Bolívar, or Garibaldi” (Gramsci 2022, p. 131). Gramsci’s depiction of Mussolini as a folkloristic figure underscores the way fascism capitalised on popular sentiments and beliefs to manipulate subaltern groups and place the existing power structures under its control, while preventing the emergence of an autonomous political consciousness among the subaltern groups.

Gramsci’s observations extend well into the contemporary political landscape, where conspiracy myths are increasingly used for profit and political gain as well as to foster specific political and geopolitical agendas, both in authoritarian and democratic regimes.17 As broadly highlighted by the literature, conspiracy beliefs are increasingly exploited by contemporary political actors and public figures to galvanise support and deflect criticism, strictly close to how reactionary forces exploited traditional forms of folklore to manipulate subaltern groups in the past. This dynamic is crucial for understanding the interaction between “spontaneous” conspiracy beliefs and codified conspiracy myths that may be opportunistically fostered and spread by interested economic and political actors. In this context, Gramsci’s notion of “myth” gains particular significance, representing “a creation of concrete fantasy which acts on a dispersed and shattered people to arouse and organise its collective will” (Gramsci 2014, p. 544 (PN 13§1), translation from Gramsci 2000, p. 239). While Gramsci acknowledges that myth is an essential element of political practice—vital for translating theory into praxis and reconciling rationality with passion—he cautions against its unilateral exploitation (see Liguori 2009, p. 544). When social or political movements rely solely on the passionate aspects of myth, as seen in the employment of conspiracy myths, it can become a tool for the instrumental manipulation of mass sentiments, leading to populist mobilisation rather than genuine collective empowerment. In this sense, the leveraging or even active development and dissemination of conspiracy myths by authoritarian regimes or populist parties within democratic societies well exemplifies what Gramsci meant by the systemic subjection of the subaltern to the initiatives of dominant groups aimed “to secure the consent of subaltern social groups and maintain control over them.” This dynamic not only has the potential to passively catalyse subaltern groups but also reinforces existing hegemonic equilibria and power relations by portraying dissenting voices as irrational or dangerous, echoing Gramsci’s insights on the exploitation of subaltern beliefs by reactionary forces to maintain control and passivity during political instability and crisis.

Such practices highlight a critical intersection between Gramsci’s theory of modern folklore and conspiracy theory studies, wherein both fields must contend with the complexities of popular belief systems and their potential for political exploitation. This understanding underscores the necessity of a Gramscian approach that critically interrogates these beliefs, while remaining cognisant of their sociopolitical contexts, moving beyond mere categorisation, infantilisation, or pathologisation.

After examining Gramsci’s conception of folklore—how it emerges and evolves within modern society as “modern folklore” and how it is reproduced and reinforced through commercial literature and the active initiative of dominant classes—we must now consider how, according to Gramsci, folklore and, thus, conspiracy beliefs can be transcended and effectively replaced. As emerged in the previous sections, this task cannot merely imply a full alignment of subaltern groups with the existing conception of the world and common sense, as the latter inherently embody and reproduce the existing hegemony equilibrium and subalternity relations. Rather, it necessarily involves challenging the latter in such a way that the “human content” underlying the spontaneous beliefs and cultural attitudes of subaltern groups, including their oppositional character, can find an autonomous, rational form capable of giving rise to a consistent yet radically new conception of the world. It implies, in other words, both a whole pedagogy of the subaltern and a complete renewal in the spirit of folklore and conspiracy theory studies. As Gramsci puts it

clearly, for the goal to be achieved, folklore studies must not only be deepened and extended but also undergo a change of spirit. Folklore must not be conceived as an oddity, a strange or picturesque thing; rather, it must be regarded as something very serious and to be taken seriously. Only in this way will its teaching be more effective and really generate a new culture among the great popular masses—so that the separation between modern culture and popular culture or folklore will disappear.

(Gramsci 2021, p. 132 (PN 27§1))

6. Engaging “Sympathetically” with Popular Beliefs: Gramsci’s Pedagogy of the Subaltern

In Gramsci’s framework, folklore represents a phenomenon that, regardless of its progressive or regressive nuances, ultimately fails to serve as a genuine instrument for the emancipation of subaltern groups. In this sense, while Gramsci insists that folklore must be “taken seriously”, which entails grasping its “human content”—the material and cultural conditions it expresses and the “living core of the aspirations” it contains (Gramsci 2014, p. 2300 (PN 26§5); Gramsci 2011, vol. 1, p. 118 (PN 1§29))—he also argues for the pressing need to transcend folklore and replace it in favour of a more coherent and grounded worldview that can effectively address this human content and support the conscious emancipative initiatives of the subaltern. This transition is critical in understanding conspiracy beliefs as an expression of modern folklore, since a lack of accessible education regarding the complexities of contemporary knowledge inevitably breeds the misuse of scientific reference along with their insertion in an unfitted conception of the world. This happens because of the mismatch between scientific development and the evolution of common sense, which, if not put in a position to adapt to the new state of the art of the cultured culture, necessarily falls into a process of rigidification that turns it into folklore.

In stark contrast to reactionary approaches that aim to eradicate, repress, or manipulate the human content embedded in subaltern cultural attitudes, Gramsci advocates for a pedagogical approach endowed with what he refers to as “passionated”, “positive”, or “progressive sarcasm” as opposed to the “right-wing sarcasm”, discussed in the previous section:

In the face of popular beliefs and illusions […] there exists a passionately “positive” sarcasm that is creative and progressive: one understands that the intention is not to mock the most intimate feeling of those illusions and beliefs but their immediate form which is linked to a particular “perishable” world […] One seeks to give the living core of aspirations contained in those beliefs a new form (thus to innovate, to better determine those aspirations), not to destroy them. […] In its original form, sarcasm should be considered an expression that highlights the contradictions of a transitional period; it seeks to maintain contact with the human subaltern expressions of old conceptions while simultaneously accentuating the distance from those that are dominant and ruling. This occurs in anticipation of new conceptions that, having gained strength through historical development, will come to dominate until they acquire the force of “popular beliefs”.

(Gramsci 2014, pp. 2300–301 (PN 26§5); Gramsci 2011, vol. 1, p. 118 (PN 1§29))

Gramsci’s pedagogical attitude is deeply rooted in his broader conception of Marxism, which he sees as a systematic effort to provide working-class and subaltern groups with a revolutionary worldview. This worldview must articulate their feelings of opposition and social marginalisation, offering them a coherent, scientifically informed, and socially responsible explanation. Therefore, Gramsci argues for studying folklore “historically and not sociologically, actively (that is, in order to transform them by means of education into a modem mentality) and not descriptively” as done by mainstream folklore studies. This means that while folklore should be analysed, it must also be engaged sympathetically, that is recognising it as an inadequate but genuine expression of the perceptions and aspirations developed by the subaltern on the basis of their actual conditions of life and experiences (Gramsci 2011, vol. 2, p. 49 (PN 3§48); Gramsci 2014, p. 1506 (PN 11§67)).

For Gramsci, effective education is grounded in the actual cultural and material conditions of those being educated. This pedagogical process is inherently dialectical, requiring the recognition of spontaneity as both an outcome and a prerequisite for conscious leadership (Gramsci 2011, vol. 2, p. 48 ff. (PN 3§48)). However, precisely due to their social marginalisation and disintegretion, subaltern groups have been historically excluded from the possibility of developing organic intellectuals and, therefore, of being subject to a systematic education designed on the basis of their own material and cultural conditions. Conversely, they have been alternatively subjected either to educational programmes designed from the cultural and material conditions of the dominant groups themselves or aimed at providing an inferior education to directly reproduce them in their subordinate and instrumental position. This is why the exertion of hegemony, in a class-based society, necessarily results for subaltern groups in a mutilated education and a distorted assimilation of modern scientific and philosophical thought, necessarily leading to simplistic understandings of complex social issues.

To counter this, Gramsci emphasises the need for fostering organic relationships between intellectuals and subaltern groups, bridging the gap between popular and cultured culture. He asserts that such a contact should not be pursued by limiting scientific inquiry or maintaining a low level of understanding among the masses but building an intellectual–moral bloc that facilitates political conditions for broad-based intellectual advancement (Gramsci 2014, pp. 1384–85 (Q11§12)).

Creating this class of intellectuals is a long-term process fraught with uncertainty. Lacking historical agency, subaltern groups often find it challenging to achieve the cohesion necessary for exercising hegemony or developing an adequate worldview. Without concerted social and cultural efforts, subaltern culture risks stagnating or regressing to folkloristic or superstitious forms—a predicament Gramsci recognises as one that Marxism itself has often been subjected to (Gramsci 2021, pp. 122–23 (PN 16§9)). This dynamic mirrors the contemporary situation, where the spread of conspiracy beliefs and related regressive forms of opposition has been noted in the literature as a consequence of the decline of twentieth-century mass movements that aimed to foster the scientific and political self-discipline of subaltern groups, with conspiracy beliefs being sometimes described as degenerated or surrogate forms of class consciousness (see, e.g., Paterna 2023).

For Gramsci, developing a new class of organic intellectuals within subaltern groups cannot be limited to the mere organisation of political parties or economic reforms. It necessitates a comprehensive societal effort focused on a cultural struggle to achieve a new hegemonic equilibrium, marked by an “intellectual and moral reform” that promotes a new culture and social organisation based on the equal participation of all individuals in collective life (Gramsci 2021, p. 122–23 (PN 16§9)). The necessity for a comprehensive social transformation is reflected in Gramsci’s call, e.g., for a new type of scientific journalism (see Gramsci 2014, p. 2273 (PN 24§8); Gramsci 2011, vol. 2, p. 68 (PN 3§72)) and popular literature to address “the intellectual and artistic needs” of individuals from subaltern groups (Gramsci 2014, pp. 2118–19 (PN 21§5)), alongside his emphasis on the importance of reforming both education and teacher training:

Scientific ideas were intended to insert the child into the societas rerum, the world of things, while lessons in rights and duties were intended to insert him into the state and into civil society. The scientific ideas the children learned conflicted with the magical conception of the world and nature which they absorbed from an environment steeped in folklore; while the idea of civic rights and duties conflicted with tendencies towards individualistic and localistic barbarism, another dimension of folklore. The school combated folklore, indeed every residue of traditional conceptions of the world. It taught a more modern outlook based essentially on an awareness of the simple and fundamental fact that there exist objective, intractable natural laws to which man must adapt himself if he is to master them in his turn and that there exist social and state laws which are the product of human activity, which are established by men and can be altered by men in the interests of their collective development.

(Gramsci 2014, p. 1540–41 (PN 12§2), translation from Gramsci 2000, p. 311)

[the] formative activity by the state—which it carries out in its general political operations but especially in the schools—does not take place on a tabula rasa. In fact, the state competes and clashes with other implicit and explicit conceptions, and folklore is by no means the weakest or the least tenacious among them, which is why it must be “overcome”. For the teacher, therefore, knowing “folklore” means knowing what other conceptions of the world and of life are actually at work in the intellectual and moral formation of the younger generations in order to eradicate them and replace them with conceptions that are considered superior.

(Gramsci 2021, pp. 131–32 (PN 27§1))

Apart from the practical differences between pedagogical methods for youngsters and adults, one could derive from Gramsci’s general conception of education that it is not merely a process designed to fit specific material and cultural starting conditions but one that must evolve in response to them and the needs they generate. For Gramsci, schooling should not merely foster the passive acceptance of scientific knowledge and dogmatic thinking but aim to instil “intellectual self-discipline and moral autonomy” especially in individuals from historically marginalised social groups. Education should promote the widespread assimilation of modern scientific methods, encouraging critical and creative thinking across all societal sectors rather than maintaining it as a “monopoly” of academia (Gramsci 2014, pp. 1536–37 (PN 12§1); cf. Gramsci 2011, p. 212 (PN 4§50)). As argued, this is particularly relevant to conspiracy mentality, where the distorted assimilation of scientific methods and concepts often combines with attitudes of distrust and radical scepticism towards scientific evidence and official science, as perceived as elitist and, therefore, driven by social forces with vested interests.

Ultimately, education must be closely intertwined with practices of social and political self-emancipation, aimed at transforming both the worldview of subaltern groups and the material conditions of their existence. Only in this way can society cultivate individuals with a “cohesive moral and social consciousness”, capable of interpreting their personal perceptions and collective experiences within the complexity of the modern world, by making independent use of the intellectual tools offered by scientific and political thought (Gramsci 2014, pp. 1536–37 (PN 12§1); cf. Gramsci 2011, p. 212 (PN 4§50)).

Having presented Gramsci’s conception of modern folklore in both positive and normative terms, we now turn to illustrating how it can be applied to the study of specific complexes of conspiracy beliefs, situated in given historical and cultural contexts. In order to do this, we will first go through a Gramscian “case study”, before applying his method of analysis to a paradigmatic case of contemporary conspiracy beliefs in the following section.

7. A Gramscian Case Study: The “Christ of Mount Amiata”

Although the concept of “modern folklore” was never operationalised by Gramsci, various historical references scattered throughout his writings show that this concept aligns well with his approach to analysing the cultural trends underlying specific events and dynamics within the history of subaltern groups. This is well exemplified in his analysis of the political movement led by Davide Lazzaretti in 19th century Tuscany, to which the first note of Prison Notebook 25 is devoted (Gramsci 2021, pp. 3–6 (PN 25§1)).18

Born into a peasant family in Tuscany in the mid-19th century, Lazzaretti led a dissolute early life but, around 1868, experienced a sort of revelation, beginning preaching among the peasants near Mount Amiata, where, in 1875, he finally settled a new religious and political community inspired by his ideas. Lazzaretti’s preachments combined contemporary political principles drawn from republican and democratic–radical movements of the time with anachronistic views and practices rooted in traditional societies. On the one hand, the resulting “Juridavidical Christian” movement—named after its founder—tried to implement a radically democratic organisation of society for that time. On the other hand, it retained a millenialist and messianic conception of the world, in which Lazzaretti himself figured as the “King of kings” and the new “Anoited of the Lord” (see Hobsbawm 1971).

The “modern folklore” effect produced by the distorted insertion of decontextualised elements of modern thought within a traditional, premodern conception of the world becomes especially clear in Lazzaretti’s speeches. While directly inspired by the demands and watchwords of the 1848 revolution and the Paris Commune, his rhetoric remained deeply rooted in traditional Christian eschatology, claiming: “The republic begins from this time forth in the world, but it will not be the republic of 1848; it will be the kingdom of God, the law of Justice that has succeeded the law of Grace” (Gramsci 2021, p. 5). Furthermore, while the movement advocated advanced political practices for its time, such as universal male and female suffrage, it also bizarrely employed traditional or mythical items, such as the piscatory ring or Moses’ staff as emblems of Lazzaretti’s authority (see Hobsbawm 1971). This mix of traditional attitudes and modern scientific and political references, exemplified by symbols like the red flag inscribed with “the Republic and the Kingdom of God” (Gramsci 2021, p. 5), well illustrates Gramsci’s conceptualisation of “modern folklore”. It highlights the chaotic outcomes of subaltern individuals attempting to make sense of their social marginalisation and distrust through an inadequate attempt to re-appropriate modern concepts, which they have encountered in a fragmented way and bizarrely assimilated within the framework of traditional subaltern thinking.

In continuity with what we have discussed in Section 4 of this paper, Gramsci also emphasises the influence of popular literature on Lazzaretti’s folklore beliefs. Indeed, he observes that Lazzaretti was an “insatiable reader” of materials, such as political leaflets and pamphlets as well as popular novels, from which he drew many of his political ideas, beliefs, and symbolic references. Building on the research of Danish scholar Emilio Rasmussen, Gramsci also notes that the pivotal “revelation” Lazzaretti claimed to have experienced in a cave closely mirrored the plot of Giuseppe Rovani’s historical novel Manfredi Pallavicino, which tells the story of the eponymous warrior, “the illegitimate son of a French king”, whose ghost Lazzaretti claimed to have encountered in the cave and who he also believed to be his ancestral father (Gramsci 2021, pp. 4–5).

Moreover, as discussed in Section 5 of this work, Lazzaretti’s case exemplifies Gramsci’s critique of both the repressive responses of the dominant classes to subaltern movements and the paternalistic, pathologising approach in the related studies of his time. First, he notes that Lazzaretti was deemed subversive by both the Catholic Church and the nascent Italian State, leading to his excommunication by the former and his execution by the latter’s law enforcement. Secondly, Gramsci thoroughly discusses the reception of Lazzaretti’s case in the anthropological and medical studies of his time, by noting that they fail to investigate the underlying social reasons for the emergence and expansion of the related social movement. Rather, as he noted, these studies focused on the most morbid and picturesque features of his personality, through the writing of several “pathological biographies”. An emblematic example is represented by the already mentioned Cesare Lombroso, whom Gramsci cites as particularly illustrative of this scholarly custom. Shortly after Lazzaretti’s execution, the Italian criminologist exhumed his corpse to search for alleged physical signs of criminal insanity, particularly on his skull, and published his findings in the book Pazzi ed anomali in 1886 (Gramsci 2021, p. 3).

Finally, Gramsci opposes the pathologising and paternalistic stance of mainstream folklore studies with the need of “sympathetically” studying folklore and subaltern movements, in order to understand and valorise the “human content” behind them. This is well illustrated by Gramsci’s own analysis of the historical circumstances surrounding the Juridavidical movement, which is worth summarising. Gramsci emphasised that the primary causes of the movement’s rise were rooted in the sociopolitical and religious context of the time. During a period marked by revolutionary upheavals across Europe and the national unification of Italy, the peasant masses of central Italy were largely excluded from these transformative processes. Their marginalisation was further exacerbated by the rift between the new Italian state and the Catholic Church. Pope Pius IX, who ruled the Papal States, issued the Non expedit decree in 1874, in response to the capture of Rome in 1870. This decree, which formalised the deteriorating relations between the two entities, stated that it was not appropriate for Catholics to participate in the political life of the Italian state, as it was seen as hostile to the Church’s temporal and spiritual authority. According to Gramsci, it was precisely this increasing exclusion of practising Catholics from the political life of the nation—culminating in the Non expedit decree just a year before the rise of the Juridavidical movement—that the Lazzaratinians were reacting to (Gramsci 2021, p. 4).

Thus, Gramsci’s analysis of Lazzaretti’s movement highlights his broader conception of folklore as both a reflection of subaltern conditions and a site of contradictory opposition to dominant ideologies, failing to evolve in ways that might lead to genuine emancipation, even when the oppositional character manifests itself in an explicit and partially conscious way. The judgement of Lazzaretti’s movement as subversive by both the Church and the Italian state and his final execution by the latter revealed the complex interplay between subaltern spontaneous opposition, the emergence of modern folklore, and the use of force as a moment of the “normal functioning of hegemony” in liberal societies. The elements of folklore and picturesque details, including Lazzaretti’s symbolism and narrative influenced by popular literature, further illustrate the intricate relationship between spontaneous cultural expressions and modern ideological conflicts.

In conclusion, Davide Lazzaretti’s movement exemplifies Gramsci’s concept of modern folklore: a heterogeneous blend of traditional ways of thinking and isolated modern notions emerging, reflecting and ultimately reproducing the sociocultural conditions of subaltern groups. As we will explore in the next section, this dynamic persists in contemporary conspiracy beliefs, such as those related with the COVID-19 pandemic, which can be seen as striking manifestations of modern folklore.

8. Back to (the Folklore of) the Future: From Lazzaretti to COVID-19

The COVID-19 pandemic provides a fertile ground for examining modern conspiracy beliefs through a Gramscian lens, particularly by conceptualising them as a form of modern folklore. This phenomenon reflects key elements of Gramsci’s analysis of subaltern cultural expressions, with conspiracy mentality functioning as both the expression of a “rigidified common sense”, in which anachronistic intellectual elements coexist with notions and attitudes of modern thought and as a spontaneous response to the political and social crises of the modern world. In line with the operative definition of modern folklore proposed in Section 3, we will summarise the primary trends in COVID-19-related conspiracy beliefs through the following five features: (1) the persistence of mindsets derived from formerly dominant worldviews, particularly clear in the religious turmoil and apocalyptic tones; (2) internal inconsistency and tendency to loose connections between agents and events; (3) reliance on distorted scientific narratives and notions; (4) their inherent oppositional content as well as their strict relation with socially oppositional attitudes and practices; finally, (5) their broad spread among subaltern social groups.

(1) COVID-19-related conspiracy beliefs often exhibit apocalyptic and millenarian attitudes, drawing on deep-seated narratives of imminent catastrophe and societal upheaval (see Sturm and Albrecht 2021; Scacco 2024). This reflects the enduring influence of premodern cosmologies, where crises are not the result of complex and impersonal dynamics but are attributed in a manichaeistic way to malevolent supernatural agents. In modern societies, these powerful forces are secularised into human beings, whose existence and action is still transcendently conceived as separated and opposed to the rest of the human community. In this sense, COVID-19-related conspiracy beliefs perfectly align with Gramsci’s notion of modern folklore as a repository of past magic and religious worldviews that continue to shape the collective consciousness of a part of society.

(2) As highlighted by a vast literature, a striking feature of conspiracy myths surrounding the COVID-19 is their internal heterogeneity and disregard for coherence (see Lewandowsky et al. 2023). Multiple, often contradictory narratives coexist: some claim that COVID-19 does not exist, while others assert that it was engineered by powerful elites, such as Big Pharma, Bill Gates, the Chinese authorities, or the U.S military (see Nie 2020; Imhoff and Lamberty 2020b). Many myths merge elements of both, claiming that the pandemic was either fabricated or manipulated for political or geopolitical gain or as part of a broader plan by elites to control the global population, while others inconsistently identify multiple conspirators, even when they represent manifestly conflicting interests (see Scacco 2024). This paradoxical structure is not accidental; rather, it reflects the contradictory and mock-systematic character of modern folklore. In the world of conspiracy beliefs, different agents of power are seen as possessing arbitrary and interchangeable motives, linked only by their evil intent. This reinforces Gramsci’s point that heterogeneity and contradictory nature is a prominent feature of folklore and, by extension, conspiracy thinking.

(3) A key feature of the COVID-19-related conspiracy beliefs is their distorted reliance on scientific references and principles. Common phenomena include the misinterpretation of statistics, the reversal of the burden of proof, resistance to falsification, selective citations of prestigious intellectuals, and pseudoscientific claims regarding the origins of the SARS-CoV-2-virus, 5G technology or vaccine side effects (see Lewandowsky et al. 2023). These narratives co-opt the language of science and appeal to dissenting scientists and fake experts, while rejecting the authority of established scientific institutions (see Rutjens et al. 2021; Jamieson 2021). This reflects the contradictory effects of a misaddressed “crisis of authority”, in which subaltern groups neither organically adhere to the dominant narrative nor possess sufficient autonomous intellectual initiatives to promote a scientifically grounded alternative worldview. The pandemic, managed primarily through scientific and medical expertise, has exposed the perceived cultural and social divide between ruling elites and the general population, thereby intensifying scepticism. The public’s difficulty in understanding viruses and vaccines, combined with the counterintuitive nature of a pandemic that often eludes common sense, complicates the response, especially among more marginalised, less educated groups. This gap in understanding can foster the emergence of forms of modern folklore, such as conspiracy beliefs, which serve as alternative explanations for phenomena that seem incomprehensible, particularly when individuals are expected to place their trust in paternalistic narratives without fully understanding the underlying complexities. Moreover, the rapid evolution of the contemporary information system, particularly with the development of the Internet, has led to a proliferation of accessible sources, often without adequate criteria for verifying their reliability. This has resulted in a dysfunctional approach to information consumption, which continues to follow traditional patterns despite the profound changes in the media landscape. The “infodemic” triggered by the pandemic has consequently left a significant portion of the population vulnerable to disinformation, further deepening their subaltern relationship to scientific knowledge and cultured culture. This historical trend aligns with Gramsci’s critical observations about the contradictory dependency of modern folklore on the distorted assimilation of concepts and attitudes from contemporary scientific thought, while illuminating one of the most blatant elements of the “human content” underlying these reactions.

(4) COVID-19-related conspiracy beliefs are oppositional in nature. This is evident not only in the related scepticism towards scientific knowledge, as previously discussed, but also in their well-documented alignment with more direct forms of resistance and rebellion to governmental and medical authorities (see Ripp and Röer 2022; Freeman et al. 2022). The resistance to public health measures, such as lockdowns and vaccines, can be seen as a mechanical, misfocused expression of dissent to the legitimacy of the ruling classes. This is primarily a consequence of a long-running crisis of authority, only compounded by the perceived negligence in the implementation of preventive measures prescribed by the WHO and subsequent inadequate management of the pandemic.19 After decades of socioeconomic decline and rising inequality, an increasing number of individuals have lost trust in the state’s capacity and willingness to act in the interest of the majority, as well as in the neutrality of scientific knowledge along with its business implications (Douglas 2021). Consequently, many spontaneously reject compliance with the stringent limitations imposed during the pandemic. While this can be interpreted as one of the major morbid symptoms of a growing, unresolved crisis of authority, it simultaneously reveals a crucial element of the “human content” behind these phenomena: the perception that elites are increasingly seen as “ruling” and “dominating” rather than “leading”, to use Gramsci’s distinction. This involves a spontaneous yet inadequate reaction against the perceived elitist drift in hegemonic structures, characterised by both technocratic tendencies and subordination to industrial interests, as well as the extensive use of paternalistic, passivising pedagogy in pandemic management.

(5) Gramsci’s concept of subaltern groups aptly captures the dynamics of COVID-19-related conspiracy mentality, particularly given the demographic heterogeneity among those who embrace or come up with the related beliefs. Research indicates that, across the world, many COVID-19-related conspiracy believers belong to low-status groups, often marginalised due to economic, racial, gender, or social factors, aligning with Gramsci’s assertion that subalternity encompasses a range of cultural and social conditions of oppression and exclusion. For instance, a study by Cénat et al. (2024) found that being Black and/or a woman, experiencing everyday racial discrimination, and major experience of discrimination were positively associated with COVID-19 vaccine mistrust, often mediated by conspiracy beliefs. Tai et al. (2022) emphasised that marginalised racial and ethnic groups in the U.S., including Black, Latinx, and American Indian populations, faced disproportionate health impacts during the pandemic, complicating vaccine uptake due to barriers, vaccine hesitancy, and misinformation. Correspondingly, Nanaw et al. (2024) demonstrates that lower trust in the healthcare system among these groups is linked to a reluctance to engage in preventive health behaviours, which, in turn, contributes to the heightened endorsement of conspiracy beliefs and related counter conducts. This lack of trust is particularly exacerbated by misinformation, as highlighted by Kricorian et al. (2022), who noted that individuals with lower educational levels and socioeconomic status were more likely to believe vaccine myths and, thus, less willing to receive the vaccine. Luo et al. (2024) further revealed that perceived discrimination intensified during the pandemic, negatively impacting health outcomes and contributing to the spread of conspiracy beliefs. Together, these studies underscore the complex interplay between social determinants—such as race or gender discrimination—conspiracy beliefs, and vaccine mistrust related to COVID-19. These insights reinforce Gramsci’s perspective on the necessity of understanding the emergence and spread of modern folklore in relation to the material and cultural conditions of subaltern groups, as well as the need to grasp its “human content” in a spontaneous yet misfocused reaction to perceived systemic marginalisation and discrimination.

It is also worthy to note that, in line with Gramsci’s insights regarding the role of popular fiction in forging and reinforcing subaltern beliefs, science fiction and catastrophic narratives—both through literature, home video, and social networks—have significantly shaped the COVID-19 pandemic imaginary. During the 2020 lockdown, previous books, as well as films and series, that had thematised epidemic catastrophes, regained popularity due to the parallels between people’s experiences and the fictitious medical emergencies depicted. In particular, the film Contagion by Steven Soderbergh was controversially broadcast both by ITV in England (26 March 2020) and by Mediaset in Italy (1 May 2020). This film is especially notable for its resemblance to the 2020 pandemic, which contributed to the propagation of certain commonplaces within the antivaccine rhetoric, while others can be traced back to series like Black Mirror and novels like Blindness by José Saramago (see Martina 2021).

During the COVID-19 pandemic, institutions, media, and intellectuals frequently pathologised, criminalised, and repressed conspiracy believers, particularly those opposing lockdowns and vaccine mandates. This response framed conspiracy mentality as an indicator of mental illness or irrationality, delegitimising the concerns of these individuals and portraying them as social threats linked to public health non-compliance. Mainstream narratives, amplified by sensational media portrayals, used stigmatising imagery to label conspiracy believers as dangerous deviants. Furthermore, the media and medical discourse often adopted a paternalistic tone, reinforcing a binary view of knowledge that positioned scientific consensus as inherently superior. Such simplifications neglected to engage with the lived experiences and concerns of conspiracy believers, bolstering institutional authority by framing pandemic responses as moral obligations and social duties. Moreover, the accusation of conspiracy beliefs is sometimes used instrumentally to discredit more complex and grounded forms of critical dissent (Perini and Van Schie 2024).

The failure of these policies to adequately address the underlying causes of conspiratorial attitudes, rather than just their consequences, allowed misinformation channels, pseudoscientific advocates, and reactionary populist movements and figures to exploit conspiracy beliefs opportunistically and foment resistance to pandemic measures for commercial or political aims. The transition from conspiracy mentality to adherence to more structured conspiracy myths and related practices is often mediated by deliberate misinformation and fomentation, illustrating how spontaneous forms of conspiracy mentality can take on the form of explicitly codified conspiracy myths and translate into social and political actions under the implicit or explicit initiative of dominant groups (Roozenbeek et al. 2020; Dow et al. 2021).

While conspiracy theory studies have thoroughly examined the dangers of the infodemic and the commercial and political manipulation of COVID-19-related conspiracy myths, little attention has been directed towards the negative effects of the pedagogical stance adopted by scientists and the media.20 In addition to moral stigma and pathologisation, this response involved “epistemic paternalism”, manifested through de-platforming and censorship as measures against the infodemic (see Aird 2022). While these actions aimed to mitigate misinformation and foster responsible behaviours, they likely contributed to the catalysation of conspiracy beliefs, promoting their shift to structured adherence to conspiracy myths and forms of collective mobilisations.

Consequently, the combination of pathologisation and repression, along with the political manipulation of conspiracy beliefs, alienated those distrustful of governmental narratives, further fracturing the public discourse. These dynamics resonate with Gramsci’s analysis of modern folklore as structurally subaltern to the dominant culture, in spite of its oppositional stance. Both the deliberate catalysation and instrumentalisation of these beliefs and their paternalistic stigmatising treatment illustrate Gramsci’s observation that “subaltern groups are always subject to the initiatives of the dominant classes”, which are often detached from the deeper needs and aspirations they embody.

Far from ascribing any scientific validity to COVID-19-related conspiracy myths or vaccine hesitancy—which have proven unable to spontaneously evolve into a political and emancipatory process for disadvantaged masses—this paper aims to highlight their historical rationality rooted in contradictory social conditions and needs. Addressing the rise of conspiratorial attitudes and social unrest requires engaging with the “human content” these attitudes express. As suggested earlier, and in line with Gramsci’s perspective, the progressive elements of modern folklore must be sought in the “aspirations and needs” it reflects. In this case, those aspirations relate to overcoming the social exclusion and passivity produced by the policies of recent decades and exacerbated during the pandemic. The lack of active participation in scientific development, both materially and intellectually, can be encapsulated in two emblematic examples: the controversial legal affairs of globally dominant pharmaceutical companies, notably Pfizer, and the paternalistic, at times, near-criminalising attitudes adopted by public figures and scientists, well exemplified by the Italian virologist Roberto Burioni.21

To sum up, the widespread social reactions and beliefs we have addressed so far ought to be understood first and foremost in relation to the layered “human content” they underlie. This entails considering not only the social origins of their adherents, particularly among subaltern groups who face economic, racial, and social marginalisation but also the pressing need for consent through active understanding and participation rather than passive trust in authority. The analysis has shown how COVID-19-related conspiracy beliefs have structurally arisen from a historical context marked by increasing inequality, the erosion of democratic participation, and a growing disconnect between scientific advancements and the common sense prevailing in the majority of the population. This context has been exacerbated by the pandemic, which has heightened feelings of mistrust towards governmental and scientific institutions, particularly among those who perceive themselves as being excluded from decision-making processes. Recognising this backdrop is essential to grasping the motivations driving these beliefs. Moreover, it means to treat them “sympathetically”, by recognising and seeking to valorise the needs and aspirations hidden behind their inadequate, historically contingent form.

9. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we applied Antonio Gramsci’s theory of folklore to the sociopolitical dynamics of conspiracy beliefs, interpreting them as forms of “modern folklore”. Through the lens of hegemony, we demonstrated that these beliefs stem from the lived experiences of subaltern groups, shaped by their marginalisation within dominant cultural systems. Gramsci’s insights into the dual nature of folklore—as both a spontaneous expression of subaltern conditions and a product of hegemony—provide a valuable framework for understanding the appeal and proliferation of conspiracy beliefs today. The distrust and resentment that characterise modern conspiracy beliefs mirror Gramsci’s concept of folklore, reflecting the oppositional stance of the subaltern. However, as Gramsci cautioned, folklore often serves as a passive opposition to hegemony; similarly, conspiracy beliefs fail to offer a coherent critique of power, risking reinforcement of the very systems they seek to challenge, often manipulated by political and economic actors to channel subaltern discontent.

Gramsci’s observation that crises of authority create “interregna”, where “the old is dying and the new cannot be born”, is particularly relevant here. In such moments, “morbid phenomena” like conspiracy beliefs proliferate, expressing opposition, while inadvertently reproducing existing power structures. As Gramsci advocated for a new hegemonic equilibrium through intellectual and moral reform, we too must engage those drawn to conspiracy beliefs in ways that foster critical thought and active participation, rather than stigmatisation and pathologisation.

Section 2 examined Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, revealing how folklore emerges as an oppositional yet reinforcing product of hegemonic dynamics, reflecting the material and cultural conditions of subaltern groups. Section 3 introduced Gramsci’s notion of modern folklore as a lens for understanding contemporary conspiracy beliefs, which assimilate contemporary scientific and political discourses in a distorted and fragmented way. Section 4 explored how commercial literature perpetuates passive intellectual consumption, paralleling Gramsci’s critique of serial novels with contemporary popular fiction’s role in stimulating conspiracy mentality. Section 5 compared Gramsci’s critique of intellectual detachment in folklore studies with current approaches that often pathologise or naturalise subaltern cultural expressions without addressing their sociopolitical roots.

Section 6 delved into Gramsci’s pedagogy of the subaltern, emphasising a “sympathetic” approach to popular beliefs. Gramsci advocated for education that transforms these beliefs by addressing their “human content” and aligning subaltern aspirations with a coherent worldview. This stands in stark contrast to reactionary manipulation or dismissive views of subaltern culture as irrational, as independently highlighted by some contemporary research.

Finally, Section 7 and Section 8 provided two case studies, one from Gramsci’s writings and the other from our contemporaneity. In the first case, Davide Lazzaretti’s movement is analysed, illustrating how subaltern responses to crises can blend progressive and regressive elements, embodying Gramsci’s notion of modern folklore. In the second one, the same theoretical framework is applied to conspiracy beliefs surrounding COVID-19, highlighting how these beliefs reflect growing distrust in hegemonic institutions and the appropriation of fragmented scientific narratives, particularly among marginalised groups.

By situating conspiracy beliefs within Gramsci’s critique of folklore and subaltern culture, this paper aims to enhance our understanding of their sociopolitical functions and enduring appeal. It underscores the importance of critically engaging with the human content of these beliefs, recognising their origins in subaltern marginalisation and spontaneous opposition, while addressing the mechanisms that co-opt them for hegemonic purposes. While this paper is aimed at outlining a conceptual framework, future research should further investigate its relevance to understand and address specific conspiracy beliefs and myths, using Gramsci’s insights to explore how they emerge and spread within the hegemonic structures of contemporary societies. This approach could also help develop alternative narratives to counter the regressive tendencies of conspiracy thinking and foster a more critical, engaged public and academic awareness in response to these rising phenomena.