Simulating and Contrasting the Game of Open Access in Diverse Cultural Contexts: A Social Simulation Model
Abstract
:1. Introduction
that numerous research communities, all around the world, have explicitly embraced (e.g., [2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19]). However, conflict arises among those who believe in some form of that principle and those who believe that the publishing status quo is a better solution. This conflict is primarily economic in nature, as supporting open access entails removing access charges for content distribution, which typically involves certain costs that need to be covered. The publishing status quo promotes access charges, which is called Toll or Readers’ Subscription Access (TA).“on the principle that making research freely available to the public supports a greater global exchange of knowledge”
2. Open Access in Science as a Game of Interests
3. The Game of Open Access in SocLab: Scenario 0
3.1. Scenario 0
3.1.1. Solidarities among Actors
3.1.2. Stakes and Effect Functions
4. Results of the Simulations and Scenario Analysis
4.1. Scenario 0
4.1.1. Simulation of Scenario 0
4.1.2. Analysis of the Structure of Scenario 0
4.2. Comparison of Scenarios
4.2.1. Simulation of Scenarios 1–4
- Scenario 1: Resources controlled by Academics and Funders are decreased. This generates an important reduction in the satisfaction of all actors, except Administrators, whose satisfaction only varies slightly, and Publishers, for whom it increases. The capacity of Publishers to reach their own goals increases (this is the most remarkable result), while, as expected, that of Politicians and Funders decreases. Similar results are obtained for influence, as the influence of most of the actors decreases, but that of Academics only varies slightly, and that of Publishers does not vary. The number of simulation steps falls by one-third with respect to the number in Scenario 0, which indicates a reduced amount of conflict in the game. Consequently, Publishers have a better position in the game, while Academics, Politicians and Funders have a worse position than in Scenario 0, which is linked to the disengagement of Funders and Politicians, who are less active in this game.
- Scenarios 2 and 3: In these scenarios, the extremist position of Publishers in favor of toll access increases the number of simulation steps compared to Scenario 0, suggesting that the game presents a stronger degree of conflict than that scenario. All other actors also take an extremist position, now strongly supportive of open access. Academics, Administrators and Funders join the position of Politicians in favor of open access. The satisfaction of all actors, except Funders, decreases (for this scenario, the regulated configuration is very close to the Nash equilibrium configuration, as we will see below). Remarkably, the capacity of Publishers to reach their goals decreases. The influence of three actors—Academics, Funders and Politicians—does not vary significantly compared to Scenario 0, while that of Administrators and Publishers decreases, especially that of Publishers. Thus, Publishers are in a worse position when taking an extremist position against open access than when they are more permissive, as occurs in Scenario 0.
- Scenario 4: Looking at the results in Table 9 and Table 10, the solidarity of Funders with Academics seems to reduce the amount of conflict, as suggested by the significant decrease in the number of simulation steps. Interestingly, the regulated configuration of Scenario 4 was close to that of Scenario 0. Surprisingly, while Funders increase their support for open access (the resource they control rises), Academics decrease theirs, and Publishers slightly augment theirs. Academics are now satisfied with less effort than in Scenario 0, and consequently, Publishers relax slightly. It seems that it is difficult for all actors to reach a better state of satisfaction than in Scenario 0, as the game is very stable; in Scenario 4, while Funders work partly in favor of Academics, Academics somewhat disengage from the game, which in turn causes Publishers to relax, so that in the end, the amount of conflict decreases. Funders’ level of satisfaction undergoes a small reduction, as expected, since they pursue their own benefits only only to an extent of 60%, while that of Academics slightly increases, and, surprisingly, that of Publishers undergoes a more significant increase than that of Academics. Meanwhile, the level of satisfaction of Publishers and Administrators does not vary. Compared with Scenario 0, similar to what occurred in Scenario 1, the capacity of Publishers to realize their goals increases. This means that the increase in the solidarity of Funders with Academics unexpectedly has a relevant impact on Publishers, making them a bit more permissive regarding open access, increasing their level of satisfaction and capacity (the value of their resource increases to a small degree, augmenting their support for open access). Influence undergoes only small changes, especially in the following cases: the influence of Funders and Publishers undergoes a small increase, while the influence of Academics slightly decreases.
4.2.2. Analysis of the Results Given the Structures of Scenarios 1–4
5. Discussion
6. Conclusions
- Scenario 0. This scenario represents the base model that can be observed in most of Europe and North America. It exhibits a medium level of conflict, a moderate degree of satisfaction for Academics, a high degree of satisfaction for Politicians and Funders, and a low degree of satisfaction for Publishers.
- Scenario 1. This scenario cancels out Politicians’ and Funders’ interest in the resources, indicating their high level of disengagement from the game. Compared to Scenario 0, the quality of open access decreases, including a reduced level of satisfaction and influence on the part of Academics.
- Scenarios 2 and 3. These scenarios represent a more negative perception of Publishers toward open access compared to Scenario 0. In these scenarios, the negative effect of open access on Publishers is stronger, particularly in Scenario 3. Publishers do not consider alternative actions or strategies to either mitigate the negative effects of or gain benefits from open access, such as engaging in hybrid publications. In these cases, the goodness of open access decreases, Academics’ satisfaction decreases, the amount of conflict in the game increases, and the regulated state approaches the Nash equilibrium.
- Scenario 4. In this scenario, Funders’ solidarity with Academics is increased compared to the base model. As a result, open access is further promoted when compared to Scenario 0. Academics experience increased levels of satisfaction and reduced amounts of conflict. Paradoxically, Academics participate less in open access (their resource, open publications, is lower), but they receive better benefits in terms of level of satisfaction than in Scenario 0.
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A. Bases of Social Simulation with SocLab
Appendix B. Description of the Scenarios
- Scenario 0.
Effect | Academics | Administrators | Funders | Publishers | Politicians | Relevance |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
PublishOA | 2.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 1.5 | 2.0 | 7.5 |
SupportOA | 0.0 | 3.0 | 0.0 | 1.5 | 0.0 | 4.5 |
DemandOAPublications | 2.5 | 0.0 | 3.5 | 1.5 | 3.5 | 11 |
GrantOA | 3.0 | 3.5 | 1.0 | 4.0 | 1.0 | 12.5 |
DemandOA | 2.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 1.5 | 3.5 | 14.5 |
- 2.
- Scenarios 1–4.
- Scenario 1. This scenario was set in the SocLab model by cancelling the impact of all resources for Politicians and Funders, that is, by setting the interest of these actors in all resources to zero. As mentioned above, this represents a situation that is common in many regions around the world, including in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and some developed countries, where Politicians and Funders are scarcely involved in the game; that is, they are inactive with respect to Scenario 0. Their only active role is a function for the solidarity of Politicians with the rest of the actors. Politicians and Funders are too “timid”, cautious or disengaged to assume an active role in favor of open access. This could be due to the weakness of the national states and their institutions, the vested interests of some officials against open access, and even a lack of clarity and understanding of the usefulness of open access for national and public benefit.
- Scenario 2. In this scenario, Publishers are less permissive with regard to open access than in Scenario 0. The effect function of GrantOA on Publishers is a straight line with its maximum value on the leftmost side (GrantOA = −10, corresponding to effect = 10; see the graph in the middle of Figure A1). This and the next scenario aim to investigate how a more active position of Publishers targeting their own benefit affects the game and open access. In Scenario 0, Publishers are somewhat permissive with respect to open access; the best impact of the effect function they have on themselves does not occur when support to toll access is at its maximum (see the left side of the effect function of GrantOA on Publishers in Table A1, or the graph on the left side of Figure A1), but rather when it is about a quarter to the right of the left-most point. By contrast, in Scenario 2, Publishers are less permissive: the effect function of GrantOA on Publishers is a straight line, with its maximum value being the leftmost value (GrantOA = −10, corresponding to effect = 10; see the graph in the middle of Figure A1).
- Scenario 3. Publishers are even less permissive than in Scenario 2. The effect function of resource GrantOA on Publishers has a stronger negative slope than in Scenario 2 (see Figure A1). This scenario is similar to Scenario 2, but assumes that Publishers are even less permissive: The effect function of the resource GrantOA on Publishers has a stronger negative slope than in Scenario 2 (see the right side of Figure A1).
- Scenario 4. Funders direct a considerable proportion of their positive solidarity towards Academics, specifically, 0.4 of the total (1). We investigate how the higher awareness on the part of Funders of the importance of open access compared to Scenario 0 promotes open access. This solidarity indicates that the satisfaction of Funders is composed of the pondered sum of two capabilities, theirs and that of Academics, which means that Funders act against actions disfavoring Academics’ satisfaction. Funders will manage their resources in favor of their own satisfaction and that of Academics. To understand one of the implications of this, a comparison of the direct impact of the effect function they exert on Funders can be performed between Scenario 0 and this scenario. In contrast to Scenario 0, in this scenario (Scenario 4), the effect of the resource on Academics’ satisfaction needs to be considered, as this impacts Funders’ satisfaction, given the solidarity of Funders with Academics. In Scenario 0, to increase Funders’ satisfaction, only the impact of the resource they control on themselves is important; thus, it is in Funders’ interest to promote open access only when the resource they control is below the middle value (0). The slope of this effect function on themselves is above 0 only when the resource is below 0, as shown in row 3, column 3 of Table A1. However, in this scenario (Scenario 4), Funders will also react in favor of open access, increasing the values of the resource they control when it is above 0 (i.e., in the range [0, 10]), given that this is in the interest of Academics. This encourages Academics’ satisfaction, and therefore Funders’ satisfaction, as the effect function of the resource controlled by Funders has a positive slope over Academics in the range [0, 10] (see row 2, column 1 of Table A1).
1 | For instance, the OSTP Nelson memo’s goal is declared as: “Ensuring Free, Immediate, and Equitable Access to Federally Funded Research” (Ensuring Free, Immediate, and Equitable Access to Federally Funded Research: Memorandum for the heads of executive departments and agencies, p. 1), with its first suggestion for federal agencies being as follows: “Update their public access policies as soon as possible, and no later than 31 December 2025, to make publications and their supporting data resulting from federally funded research publicly accessible without an embargo on their free and public release; 2. Establish transparent procedures that ensure scientific and research integrity is maintained in public access policies” (ibid, p. 1). |
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Actors | Actions |
---|---|
Academics | Publish Toll Access, TA |
Publish Open Access, OA | |
Perish | |
Administrators | Support TA |
Support OA | |
Support Both | |
Funders | Demand publications of any kind |
Demand OA publications | |
Demand nothing | |
Commercial Publishers (Editorial houses) | Grant TA |
Grant OA | |
Grant big deals | |
Grant OA with embargoes | |
Politicians | Permit TA |
Demand Green OA | |
Demand Gold OA | |
Demand Some OA |
Actors | Actions | Outcomes {Possible Values} |
---|---|---|
Academics | Publish TA Publish OA | Opportunity {Maximal, Minimal} Visibility {More, Less} Prestige {More, Less} Promotion {More, Less} Savings for society {More, Less} Quality results {More, Less} Income for publishers {More, Less} Societal impact & relevance {More, Less} |
Administrators | Support TA Support OA | |
Funders | Demand TA publications Demand OA publications | |
Publishers (Editorial houses) | Grant TA Grant OA | |
Politicians | Permit TA Demand OA |
Actor–Resource | Actor’s Behavior |
---|---|
Academics–PublishOA | From disfavoring (Low) to clearly favoring (High) the publishing of their contributions (papers) as open-access documents |
Administrators–SupportOA | From ignoring (Low) open-access journals to including and encouraging (High) the use of those journals for academic publications in their institutions |
Funders– DemandOAPublications | From ignoring open-access publications (maybe all publications) (Low) to demanding open access to the research resulting from projects they fund (High) |
Publishers–GrantOA | From not publishing anything as open access (Low) to only publishing as open access (High) |
Politicians–DemandOA | From ignoring open-access publications (maybe all publications) (Low) to demanding open access to the research resulting from projects they fund (High) |
Solidarity → | Academics | Administrators | Funders | Publishers | Politicians |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Academics | 1.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
Administrators | 0.0 | 0.9 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
Funders | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
Publishers | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 |
Politicians | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.6 |
Resources | Averages | Deviations |
---|---|---|
PublishOA | 8.05 | 1.94 |
SupportOA | 1.84 | 2.68 |
DemandOAPublications | 6.08 | 2.38 |
GrantOA | −2.13 | 1.12 |
DemandOA | 9.97 | 0.06 |
Num of simul. steps | 31,540.66 | 2298.34 |
Actors | Satisf. Averages | Satisf. Deviations | Influence Averages | Influence Deviations |
---|---|---|---|---|
Academics | 43.1 | 4.12 | 23.18 | 3.93 |
Administrators | 30.4 | 3.1 | 3.55 | 1.13 |
Funders | 79.74 | 3.92 | 58.17 | 3.28 |
Publishers | −5.17 | 4.63 | 27.31 | 6.38 |
Politicians | 65.76 | 2.69 | 101.37 | 0.91 |
Acad. | Admin | Funders | Publish. | Polit. | Satisf. | Auto-Sat. | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Academics | 99.1% | 0.0% | 80.5% | 39.5% | 100.0% | 75.4% | 19.5% |
Administrators | 9.5% | 85.1% | 19.5% | 45.5% | 100.0% | 73.9% | 25.5% |
Funders | 90.5% | 0.0% | 99.6% | 39.5% | 100.0% | 91.7% | 36.1% |
Publishers | 9.5% | 41.0% | 19.5% | 95.7% | 0.0% | 48.5% | 78.0% |
Politicians | 91.4% | 99.4% | 98.8% | 80.2% | 100.0% | 95.4% | 37.8% |
Influence | 94.7% | 100.0% | 96.8% | 83.4% | 100.0% | ||
Auto-Influence | 46.6% | 217.4% | 51.6% | 93.3% | 26.8% |
Max-Glob | Min-Glob | Acad-Max | Admin-Max | Fun-Max | Pub-Max | Pol-Max | Simul | Nash-Equil. | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
PublishOA | 10.0 | −10.0 | 10.0 | −10.0 | 10.0 | −10.0 | 10.0 | 8.05 | 10 |
SupportOA | 1.0 | −10.0 | −10.0 | 9.0 | −10.0 | −10.0 | 3.0 | 1.84 | 9 |
DemandOAPub | 10.0 | −10.0 | 10.0 | −10.0 | 10.0 | −10.0 | 10.0 | 6.08 | 10 |
GrantOA | 3.0 | −10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 | −5.0 | 4.0 | −2.1 | −5 |
DemandOA | 10.0 | −9.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 | 10.0 | −5.0 | 10.0 | 9.97 | 10 |
Academics | 69.0 | −97.2 | 90.0 | 12.1 | 90.0 | −82.2 | 72.0 | 43.7 | 45 |
Administrators | 43.4 | −77.8 | 31.8 | 72.6 | 31.8 | −60.9 | 48.6 | 31.6 | 27.1 |
Funders | 89.5 | −97.2 | 96.5 | −8.2 | 96.5 | −92.2 | 90.5 | 80.3 | 81.5 |
Publishers | −34.1 | 84.9 | −70.0 | −38.5 | −70.0 | 97.3 | −43.9 | −4.4 | −20.5 |
Politicians | 73.3 | −76.6 | 69.4 | −4.3 | 69.4 | −48.7 | 73.5 | 66.5 | 64.5 |
GLOBAL | 241.1 | −264.0 | 217.7 | 33.6 | 217.7 | −186.7 | 240.6 | 217.7 | 197.6 |
Sc-0 | Sc-1 | Sc-2 | Sc-3 | Sc-4 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
PublishOA | 8.05 | 3.15 | 8 | 9.08 | 5.83 |
SupportOA | 1.84 | 2.83 | 10 | 9.5 | 1.64 |
DemandOAPub | 6.08 | −0.87 | 10 | 9.9 | 8.09 |
GrantOA | −2.13 | −2.19 | −10 | −9.97 | −1.14 |
DemandOA | 9.97 | 9.95 | 10 | 10 | 9.97 |
Num of simul. steps | 31,540.66 | 24,038.5 | 39,102.36 | 38,966.89 | 14,375.8 |
Satisfaction | Influence | |||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Sc-0 | Sc-1 | Sc-2 | Sc-3 | Sc-4 | Sc-0 | Sc-1 | Sc-2 | Sc-3 | Sc-4 | |
Academics | 43.1 | 22.9 | 29.2 | 29.7 | 50.7 | 23.18 | 1.7 | 23.7 | 25.5 | 21.3 |
Administrators | 30.4 | 34.4 | 11.8 | 11.7 | 34.2 | 3.55 | 4.5 | −2.6 | −2.1 | 4.7 |
Funders | 79.74 | 0 | 72.7 | 74.7 | 66.4 | 58.17 | −0.9 | 62.8 | 62.9 | 64.7 |
Publishers | −5.17 | 12.2 | −16.6 | −17.8 | 14.0 | 27.32 | 26.9 | −37 | −37 | 31.8 |
Politicians | 65.76 | 7.2 | 51.5 | 52.8 | 65 | 101.37 | 44.5 | 101.9 | 101.9 | 107.9 |
GLOBAL | 213.83 | 76.7 | 148.6 | 151.1 | 230.3 |
Scenario 1: Politicians and Funders Are “Inactive” | Scenario 2: Publishers Are Less Permissive Regarding Open Access | Scenario 3: Publishers Are Extremely Less Permissive Regarding Open Access | Funders Direct 40% of Their (Positive) Solidarity towards Academics | ||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
MG | mG | Ne | Re | MG | mG | Ne | Re | MG | mG | Ne | Re | MG | mG | Ne | Re | ||
States | PublishOA | −2 | 10 | 10 | 3.15 | 10 | −10 | 10 | 8 | 10 | −10 | 10 | 9.08 | 10 | −10 | 10 | 5.83 |
SupportOA | 1 | −10 | 9 | 2.83 | 1 | −10 | 9 | 10 | 1 | −10 | 9 | 9.5 | 1 | −10 | 9 | 1.64 | |
DemandOAPub | 10 | −10 | −10 | −0.87 | 10 | −10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | −10 | 10 | 9.9 | 10 | −10 | 10 | 8.09 | |
GrantOA | 2 | −10 | −5 | −2.19 | 10 | −10 | −10 | −10 | 10 | −2 | −10 | −9.97 | 10 | −10 | −4 | −1.14 | |
DemandOA | 10 | −8 | 10 | 9.95 | 10 | −9 | 10 | 10 | 10 | −9 | 10 | 10 | 10 | −9 | 10 | 9.96 | |
Satisf | Academics | 55.9 | −69.8 | −5 | 22.9 | 90 | −97.2 | 30 | 29.2 | 90 | −73.2 | 30 | 29.7 | 90 | −97.2 | 48 | 50.7 |
Administrators | 42.7 | −81.4 | 30.1 | 34.4 | 60.2 | −76.6 | 11.6 | 11.8 | 60.2 | −59.4 | 11.6 | 11.7 | 60.2 | −77.8 | 30.2 | 34.2 | |
Funders | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 96.5 | −97.2 | 76.5 | 72.7 | 96.5 | −89.2 | 76.5 | 74.7 | 93.9 | −97.2 | 68.7 | 66.4 | |
Publishers | −10.1 | 55.9 | 9.5 | 12.2 | −86.5 | 96.9 | −18.5 | −16.6 | −86.5 | 16.9 | −18.5 | −17.8 | −50.5 | 46 | −1.7 | 14 | |
Politicians | 9.4 | −11.1 | 3.7 | 7.2 | 71.1 | −75.4 | 54 | 51.5 | 71.1 | −67.6 | 54 | 52.8 | 71.1 | −76.6 | 66.3 | 65 | |
GLOBAL | 97.9 | −106.4 | 38.3 | 76.7 | 231.3 | −249.6 | 153.6 | 148.6 | 231.3 | −272.7 | 153.6 | 151.1 | 174.7 | −205.6 | 16.5 | 179.6 |
Scenario 0 | Scenario 1 | Scenario 2 | Scenario 3 | Scenario 4 | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
DState | DSat | DState | DSat | DState | DSat | DState | DSat | DState | DSat | |
Glob-Max | 6.78 | −23.4 | 12.87 | −21.2 | 21.91 | −82.7 | 21.72 | −80.2 | 12.06 | 4.9 |
Nash Equi | 8.88 | 20.1 | 13.28 | 38.4 | 2.03 | −5 | 1.05 | −2.5 | 9.13 | 16.1 |
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Terán, O.; Dávila, J. Simulating and Contrasting the Game of Open Access in Diverse Cultural Contexts: A Social Simulation Model. Publications 2023, 11, 40. https://doi.org/10.3390/publications11030040
Terán O, Dávila J. Simulating and Contrasting the Game of Open Access in Diverse Cultural Contexts: A Social Simulation Model. Publications. 2023; 11(3):40. https://doi.org/10.3390/publications11030040
Chicago/Turabian StyleTerán, Oswaldo, and Jacinto Dávila. 2023. "Simulating and Contrasting the Game of Open Access in Diverse Cultural Contexts: A Social Simulation Model" Publications 11, no. 3: 40. https://doi.org/10.3390/publications11030040