Modelling the Relation between Managers, Shadow Cost of External Finance and Corporate Investment
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Theory
2.1. Corporate Investment in a Perfect Capital Market
2.2. Corporate Investment in Presence of Misaligned Managers
3. Conclusions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Iona, A. Modelling the Relation between Managers, Shadow Cost of External Finance and Corporate Investment. Mathematics 2019, 7, 1050. https://doi.org/10.3390/math7111050
Iona A. Modelling the Relation between Managers, Shadow Cost of External Finance and Corporate Investment. Mathematics. 2019; 7(11):1050. https://doi.org/10.3390/math7111050
Chicago/Turabian StyleIona, Alfonsina. 2019. "Modelling the Relation between Managers, Shadow Cost of External Finance and Corporate Investment" Mathematics 7, no. 11: 1050. https://doi.org/10.3390/math7111050
APA StyleIona, A. (2019). Modelling the Relation between Managers, Shadow Cost of External Finance and Corporate Investment. Mathematics, 7(11), 1050. https://doi.org/10.3390/math7111050