This section presents a representative case study to validate the proposed DRT framework in a safety-critical aviation context. Specifically, we consider the brake system of a commercial aircraft, a subsystem characterized by progressive wear, cumulative stress exposure, and operational sensitivity to load and temperature. Given its relevance to flight safety and maintenance cost, this use case provides a compelling environment for testing the risk-driven modeling and decision-making capabilities of the DRT architecture.
3.1. Overview of Use Case and System Components
The selected use case focuses on the predictive risk modeling of an aircraft brake system, a mission-critical subsystem known for its performance degradation under cyclical mechanical and thermal loads. Aircraft braking systems are subjected to extreme conditions such as high landing weights, elevated temperatures, and rapid deceleration demands. These operating conditions introduce gradual wear, stress accumulation, and potential performance instability, making brake systems ideal candidates for digital risk modeling through a DRT framework.
The primary motivation for selecting this system lies in its high failure impact, well-characterized degradation pathways, and the availability of both simulated and real-world operational data. In commercial aviation, brake system failures can lead to significant operational disruptions, maintenance delays, and safety-critical incidents. Consequently, early identification of failure risks and risk-aware maintenance planning are essential components of fleet-wide resilience.
Within the DRT framework, the brake system is modeled through a multi-layer computational architecture:
The digital twin simulation layer replicates the physical evolution of the system across operational cycles, producing synthetic time series for core physical indicators.
The feature extraction layer captures domain-relevant degradation signatures, specifically brake thickness wear , heat stress accumulation , and pressure loss rate .
The hazard modeling layer computes a compound hazard rate based on these features, incorporating nonlinear and probabilistic effects that account for both slow degradation and sudden shifts (e.g., thermal spikes).
The risk evaluation layer translates these hazard dynamics into system-level risk metrics, including CVaR, resilience score, and early warning triggers.
The brake system’s structural simplicity, coupled with its nonlinear degradation behavior and operational impact, makes it a representative and scalable use case for validating the modularity, transparency, and performance of the proposed DRT framework.
Traditional reliability models, such as constant-failure-rate assumptions or simple mean time-to-failure (MTTF) calculations, lack the capacity to dynamically respond to evolving operational states or multi-factor stress patterns. In contrast, the DRT framework introduces time-varying hazard functions that reflect real-time degradation and environmental conditions. This dynamic capability enables not only more accurate risk forecasts but also context-sensitive decision-making. The aircraft brake system, characterized by both progressive wear and sudden thermal overloads, exemplifies a domain where such capabilities outperform static reliability estimators and justify the use of risk-aware digital architectures.
3.2. Digital Twin Simulation Layer
The DT simulation layer is responsible for reproducing the behavior of the aircraft brake system under variable operational conditions. This component serves as the data-generating foundation of the DRT framework and is designed to capture realistic patterns of degradation, stress accumulation, and response variability over successive flight cycles.
To enable analysis of both typical and edge-case scenarios, we construct a synthetic simulation environment that reflects core operating features of the brake system. The simulation proceeds over a discrete time horizon of flight cycles, generating time series for three condition-relevant features:
—brake pad thickness [mm], decreasing linearly with wear and subject to small stochastic noise representing environmental variation;
—cumulative heat stress [arbitrary units], modeled as a nonlinear increasing function affected by load cycles and thermal dissipation;
—pressure loss rate [%], assumed to increase modestly due to fatigue and mechanical seal wear.
The degradation processes were modeled using stylized but realistic assumptions, informed by maintenance engineering knowledge.
Brake thickness was modeled as with mm/flight, and small Gaussian noise representing fluctuations in wear per cycle. Heat stress was modeled quadratically to reflect compounding thermal effects, and pressure loss increased with a saturating trend.
Figure 3 presents the temporal evolution of three key features extracted from sensor data: brake thickness, heat stress, and pressure loss rate.
These features are chosen due to their relevance to the degradation and risk profile of aircraft braking systems. As shown, the brake thickness exhibits a gradual monotonic decrease due to normal wear, accompanied by small fluctuations caused by operational noise. In contrast, heat stress increases nearly linearly with usage, reflecting thermal accumulation effects under repeated braking events. The pressure loss rate, while increasing more slowly, also shows a consistent upward trend, indicating early signs of system inefficiency or leakage.
The continuous monitoring of such features enables dynamic estimation of the hazard rate and supports the implementation of proactive maintenance strategies discussed in later sections. Together, these features provide the input signal for subsequent feature projection and hazard modeling layers.
This simulation layer serves a dual purpose: first, it enables validation of the downstream layers of the DRT framework without requiring proprietary or sensitive airline data; second, it permits controlled experimentation across scenarios (e.g., stress intensification, delayed inspections), supporting sensitivity analyses and robustness checks.
The modularity of the simulation engine also allows for integration with higher-fidelity digital twins in future implementations, where physical modeling and sensor data fusion may enrich the degradation profiles beyond the current semi-synthetic setting.
3.3. Feature Extraction and Hazard Modeling
Following the generation of synthetic operational data in the simulation layer, the next stage of the DRT pipeline involves projecting this raw signal into a feature space suitable for risk modeling. The key variables of interest brake thickness , heat stress and pressure loss rate are treated as condition-based indicators that feed into a stochastic hazard model.
To ensure interpretability and model tractability, the projection step involves a normalization of each feature to a bounded, non-dimensional form, followed by the construction of a hazard rate function
, defined over the operational horizon. The hazard function is designed to reflect both instantaneous risk and cumulative degradation effects, modeled via a nonlinear function
where
are scaling coefficients that encode domain knowledge regarding the relative importance of brake wear, thermal loading, and pressure instability. For this case study, the parameters were empirically selected as
.
This structure ensures that hazard increases with higher heat stress and pressure loss, while inversely responding to brake thickness (i.e., worn brakes increase failure probability).
Figure 4 illustrates the joint evolution of the performance level
and the hazard rate
of the aircraft brake system over 20,000 flight cycles.
Performance level is defined as the normalized braking efficiency:
where
is the effective braking efficiency at cycle
, and
is the nominal certified value at the beginning of service. Braking efficiency quantifies the ability of the brake system to convert kinetic energy into braking force, gradually declining with pad wear, thermal fade, and fatigue.
In parallel, the hazard rate increases monotonically with accumulated cycles, reflecting the growing probability of failure per cycle. The figure emphasizes their inverse relationship: as braking efficiency diminishes, the risk of failure rises.
This dual representation connects observable degradation (braking efficiency) with probabilistic failure modeling (hazard rate) and underpins the DRT framework for predictive risk analysis and resilience assessment.
The hazard rate is then treated as a conditional intensity function within a non-homogeneous Poisson process, which models the probability of system failure within a given interval. This probabilistic formulation allows integration of the hazard model into higher-order risk measures, such as CVaR and resilience metrics, in subsequent layers.
From a systems engineering perspective, this stage also plays a crucial role in separating physical degradation from abstract risk metrics, enabling modular calibration and retraining of the hazard model as more data or domain updates become available.
To illustrate the adaptability and predictive power of the DRT hazard modeling layer, we introduce a comparative simulation involving two operational profiles:
A nominal scenario, representing regular wear and moderate thermal stress accumulation across 100 flight cycles;
A high-stress scenario, reflecting accelerated wear due to compounded mechanical and thermal loads, simulating more adverse operational conditions.
Both scenarios were modeled using the same structural DRT pipeline, with scenario-specific inputs for degradation rate and thermal exposure.
Figure 5 shows the resulting hazard trajectories. The high-stress profile exhibits earlier and more intense nonlinear hazard spikes, crossing the predefined risk threshold significantly sooner than in the nominal case. This demonstrates the DRT’s ability to detect emergent risks in real time and differentiate between seemingly similar operational states.
To assess how these hazard dynamics translate into risk-sensitive cost implications, CVaR was computed across a range of inspection timings.
Figure 6 presents the CVaR curves for both scenarios. While both exhibit U-shaped cost profiles centered around an optimal inspection window (near cycle 65), the high-stress scenario incurs significantly greater CVaR values when inspections are delayed. This emphasizes the DRT’s utility in supporting time-critical maintenance decisions and avoiding worst-case financial outcomes under escalating degradation.
3.5. Visual Insights and Decision Maps
In safety-critical applications like aviation, decision support systems must not only be accurate but also interpretable and actionable for human operators. The visual components of the DRT, such as radar charts, early-warning overlays, and 2D decision maps, serve as cognitive bridges between complex analytics and operational insight. By translating mathematical risk models into intuitive dashboards, the DRT supports real-time human-in-the-loop maintenance workflows, reduces reliance on black-box estimations, and improves stakeholder confidence in the system’s outputs.
To enable actionable interpretation of the computed risk measures and support operational decisions, the DRT architecture integrates a series of visual analytics tools. These provide human-understandable diagnostics and help convert high-dimensional, time-dependent data into prescriptive insights for maintenance planning.
To enhance the interpretability of resilience assessment, a set of four resilience dimensions is proposed (
Table 1). These dimensions capture complementary aspects of system performance under stress: (i) degradation tolerance, (ii) recovery speed, (iii) maximum performance loss, and (iv) stability. In this study, stress is defined as the combined effect of environmental and operational loads (e.g., thermal, mechanical, or usage intensity). Five representative stress scenarios (S1–S5) are analyzed, ranging from nominal operation (S1) to extreme combined load and thermal conditions (S5).
Figure 8 presents the resilience profiles as a function of stress level using a line chart, which makes nonlinear deterioration patterns explicit. Degradation tolerance and recovery speed decline steadily, stability remains robust until high stress levels, and maximum performance loss accelerates sharply under compounding hazards.
Figure 9 shows the same data in a grouped bar chart, emphasizing trade-offs across scenarios: at low stress (S1–S2) the four dimensions remain balanced, whereas at high stress (S4–S5) degradation tolerance and recovery speed decline disproportionately while maximum performance loss dominates the profile.
Together, the table and figures demonstrate how the DRT framework translates quantitative resilience metrics into interpretable decision aids, supporting scenario-based robustness evaluation in safety-critical systems.
To demonstrate the decision-support role of the DRT, three representative maintenance strategies are considered. Delayed maintenance, also referred to as the baseline strategy (corrective, run-to-failure), performs interventions only after excessive delay or failure, which reduces short-term costs but increases risk exposure and unplanned downtime. Threshold-triggered maintenance, or the early maintenance strategy (preventive), initiates interventions once a predefined threshold such as wear, hazard value, or reliability limit is reached, thereby reducing the likelihood of failure but potentially leading to unnecessary actions if thresholds are conservative. Proactive maintenance, also called the risk-based strategy (predictive), adapts interventions dynamically using DRT-derived measures such as hazard trajectories, CVaR values, or resilience indices, balancing safety and cost through condition-aware decision-making. Together, these strategies illustrate how the DRT framework not only evaluates risks but also supports rational maintenance policies that optimize the trade-off between reliability, safety, and efficiency.
To evaluate the impact of different maintenance strategies on system risk evolution, we constructed a decision map using DRT outputs. As shown in
Figure 10, the two-dimensional space is defined by the hazard index (λ-normalized) and a corresponding risk functional (CVaR).
The system’s operational state is classified into three zones:
The safe zone (green) is characterized by low hazard levels and acceptable risk values.
The monitoring zone (orange) indicates emerging risk that may warrant observation or adjustment.
The intervention zone (red) signifies high-risk conditions requiring immediate action.
Each trajectory corresponds to a different strategy. The baseline strategy (black line) follows a standard maintenance schedule and enters the intervention zone intermittently. The early maintenance scenario (blue dashed line) triggers inspections and component replacements at more conservative thresholds, preventing entry into the red zone entirely. In contrast, the delayed maintenance strategy (purple dash-dotted line) postpones inspections, resulting in steeper hazard growth and prolonged exposure to critical risk.
This visualization supports scenario-based robustness evaluation and demonstrates the practical use of DRT for explainable decision-making in safety-critical operations. By comparing trajectories, decision-makers can identify control policies that minimize risk exposure over time.
To complement the graphical analysis in
Figure 9,
Table 2 provides a comparative summary of the three maintenance strategies in terms of their risk characteristics and operational implications. The comparison highlights how each strategy affects the system’s exposure to different risk zones, offering a compact view of the trade-offs between risk prevention, monitoring burden, and intervention delays. These attributes can inform risk-informed maintenance scheduling and real-time decision-making in safety-critical domains.
Figure 11 illustrates the time evolution of the hazard rate
across three maintenance strategies: delayed maintenance (red), threshold-triggered maintenance (orange), and proactive maintenance (green). The horizontal dashed line marks the hazard threshold, beyond which system risk becomes unacceptable.
Each strategy demonstrates a characteristic sawtooth behavior where the hazard rate accumulates linearly due to wear and is periodically reduced by maintenance. Delayed maintenance allows the hazard to exceed the safe threshold before intervening. Threshold-triggered maintenance activates when the threshold is reached. Proactive maintenance performs actions before the threshold is breached, reducing risk exposure and enabling more stable reliability profiles. This comparison highlights the trade-off between risk containment and intervention frequency.
The 3D surface plot at
Figure 12 presents the evolution of the hazard rate over time (flight cycles) and varying levels of stress severity. The sawtooth structure along the time axis reflects periodic proactive maintenance activities, which reset the hazard rate before it exceeds the risk threshold. As stress severity increases along the vertical axis, the peak values of
also rise, emphasizing the role of operational conditions in driving failure risk. This figure visually supports the benefits of proactive maintenance in constraining hazard growth and preventing critical peaks.
Figure 13 illustrates the causal structure of DRT framework as a directed acyclic graph, organized across five distinct computational layers that correspond to the mathematical formulation presented in
Section 2.2. The graph representation enables transparent reasoning about information flow, causal dependencies, and intervention points within the DT to DRT transformation pipeline.
The physical system layer contains the fundamental observable variables that characterize the real-world system: true state, control inputs, sensor observations and environmental factors. These variables represent the stochastic dynamical system, where environmental noise influences both the system dynamics and measurement processes.
The digital twin layer encompasses the computational components that estimate and simulate system behavior: belief states representing probabilistic state estimates, trajectory generation for predictive simulation, and the simulation operator that produces forward-looking system behavior under various scenarios. The connection from environmental factors to the simulation component reflects how environmental parameters and noise models are incorporated into the predictive simulation process.
Risk features layer implements the projection operator that extracts risk-relevant indicators from system trajectories. In the aircraft brake system case study, these features include brake wear degradation, cumulative heat stress, and pressure loss rate. The projection operator transforms high-dimensional system states into interpretable degradation signatures that directly relate to failure mechanisms.
The hazard modeling layer applies the hazard mapping to convert risk features into stochastic failure intensities. The failure rate represents the instantaneous probability of system failure, while the reliability function provides cumulative failure probability over time.
The risk evaluation layer aggregates hazard information into actionable risk metrics through the risk functional. CVaR quantifies worst-case financial exposure, resilience metrics assess system robustness, and early warning alerts provide operational triggers. The maintenance decision node represents interventions using Pearl’s do-operator, enabling counterfactual reasoning about preventive actions.
The graph distinguishes three types of relationships through different arrow styles. Causal relationships (solid blue arrows) represent direct probabilistic dependencies following Pearl’s structural causal model framework, such as how environmental factors influence simulation processes or how degradation features causally affect failure rates. Functional mappings (dashed green arrows) indicate deterministic transformations within the DT to DRT operator chain, including the projection from trajectories to risk features and the mapping from hazards to risk measures. Intervention pathways (dashed red arrows) show how maintenance decisions can intervene on system components, enabling risk-aware control policies that modify feature trajectories or hazard processes.
This causal representation supports several key analytical capabilities. Modular inference allows individual components to be validated, calibrated, or replaced without affecting the overall framework structure. Counterfactual reasoning enables evaluation of hypothetical scenarios, such as “What would the risk level be if maintenance had been performed at cycle 50?” Traceable propagation ensures that changes in physical measurements can be systematically traced through feature extraction, hazard modeling, and risk evaluation to final decisions. Intervention analysis supports optimization of maintenance policies by modeling the causal effects of different action strategies on system-level risk outcomes.
This layered architecture reflects the mathematical progression from raw sensor data to prescriptive maintenance decisions, providing a formal foundation for implementing DRT in safety-critical applications where transparency, traceability, and causal reasoning are essential for operational acceptance and regulatory compliance.
Figure 14 visualizes a 2D decision map based on projected feature values (brake thickness and heat stress). It defines “Safe”, “Caution”, and “Critical” zones, enabling real-time classification of system health status and providing interpretable feedback to operators or predictive maintenance systems.
Each zone encodes a combination of extracted features (e.g., degradation indicators, hazard intensities, or reliability margins) and the associated decision rules. By mapping trajectory-derived features into these regions, the decision map provides a visual and interpretable representation of when to continue operation, initiate inspection, or enforce corrective actions. This zone-based structure supports explainable decision-making, enabling operators and regulators to trace risk assessments back to measurable system features. Furthermore, it highlights the modularity of the DRT approach: alternative risk metrics or hazard functions can be incorporated without altering the overall geometry of the decision map.
Together, these visual tools enhance the explainability and transparency of the DRT, facilitating its integration into safety-critical workflows where trust, interpretability, and timing are essential.
3.6. Discussion of Key Findings
The empirical validation through the aircraft brake system case study demonstrates the operational viability and theoretical soundness of the proposed Digital Risk Twin framework. The results provide evidence for several critical aspects of risk-aware digital twin architectures in safety-critical applications.
The modular decomposition of the DRT pipeline into distinct computational layers facilitates transparent uncertainty propagation from observational data to strategic decision criteria. This architectural separation enables systematic validation of individual components while maintaining compositional guarantees for the integrated framework. Furthermore, the modular structure supports adaptive model refinement as empirical data availability and domain expertise evolve, addressing a fundamental limitation of monolithic reliability modeling approaches.
The formulation of the hazard function as a nonlinear combination of exponential, quadratic, and linear feature dependencies captures the complex, non-monotonic degradation patterns characteristic of engineering systems under multi-factorial stress. The empirical hazard trajectories exhibit sensitivity amplification whereby modest variations in system parameters manifest as substantial changes in failure probability—a phenomenon consistent with established reliability engineering principles but often inadequately represented in homogeneous Poisson failure models. This sensitivity underscores the necessity of continuous, feature-level risk monitoring in dynamic operational environments.
The optimization of inspection scheduling through risk-sensitive metrics, particularly conditional value at risk, yields actionable maintenance policies that balance competing economic objectives under uncertainty. The identification of intermediate inspection thresholds as CVaR-minimizing strategies corroborates theoretical predictions from stochastic control theory regarding the optimality of risk-constrained decision policies. This result provides empirical validation for the integration of coherent risk measures within digital twin architectures, advancing beyond purely expectation-based maintenance planning.
The visual analytics components serve dual functions as interpretability tools and cognitive interfaces for human–machine collaboration in maintenance decision-making. The radar charts, decision surfaces, and temporal overlays translate high-dimensional risk dynamics into intuitive representations accessible to domain experts across organizational hierarchies. Such visualization capabilities address a critical gap in current digital twin implementations, where complex analytical outputs often remain opaque to operational personnel.
The robustness analysis across varying degradation scenarios confirms the framework’s adaptability to operational heterogeneity while preserving structural consistency. The DRT’s capacity to discriminate between nominal and high-stress operational profiles through early risk signature detection validates the theoretical claims regarding the framework’s sensitivity to evolving system conditions. This adaptability is particularly relevant for applications in stochastic operational environments where system behavior exhibits significant temporal and contextual variation.
The most significant contribution lies in the establishment of a formal bridge between descriptive digital twin capabilities and prescriptive decision-making frameworks. Traditional digital twin implementations primarily serve monitoring and diagnostic functions, while the DRT architecture enables direct integration of risk quantification with strategic intervention planning. This transformation from passive observation to active risk management represents a fundamental advancement in digital twin methodology, with implications extending beyond individual asset management to system-of-systems applications.
The findings collectively support the proposition that Digital Risk Twins constitute a necessary evolution of digital twin technology for safety-critical applications. The framework’s generalizability across domains, demonstrated through its domain-agnostic mathematical formulation and modular implementation architecture, positions it as a foundational technology for next-generation risk-aware digital infrastructures in transportation, energy, and industrial systems where reliability and resilience are paramount operational requirements.