Abstract
A model of set theory ZFC is defined in our recent research, in which, for a given , there exists a good lightface well-ordering of the reals, but no well-orderings of the reals (not necessarily good) exist in the previous class . Therefore, the conjunction is consistent, modulo the consistency of ZFC itself. In this paper, we significantly clarify and strengthen this result. We prove the consistency of the conjunction for any given on the basis of the consistency of , second-order Peano arithmetic, which is a much weaker assumption than the consistency of ZFC used in the earlier result. This is a new result that may lead to further progress in studies of the projective hierarchy.
MSC:
03E15; 03E35
1. Introduction
The following theorem, devoted to the problem of “effective” well-orderability of the real line , was established in our recent paper [1].
Theorem 1
(= Theorem 1 in [1]). Let . There is a generic extension of , in which:
- ()
- - well-ordering of the set ω1;
- ()
- well-
Here are lightface projective classes. We refer to [1] for introductory material and references to earlier research on this topic. Generally we refer to Moschovakis’ monograph [2] in matters of modern notation in descriptive set theory. We recall that a -good well-ordering is any well-ordering ≼ such that the class is closed under ≼-bounded quantification, so that if is a binary relation on the reals, then the relations
belong to as well. Gödel [3] proved that the axiom of constructibility implies the existence of a -good well-ordering of , and such well-orderings are behind some crucial applications of constructibility in set theory, see Section 5A in [2].
The goal of this paper is to reprove Theorem 1 in the context of second-order Peano arithmetic . This theory governs the interrelations between the natural numbers and sets of natural numbers, and is widely assumed to lay down working foundations for essential parts of modern mathematics, see, e.g., Simpson [4]. The specific version of second-order Peano arithmetic considered here contains Peano’s axioms for numbers, the axioms of Induction and Extensionality, and the Comprehension and Countable Choice schemata resp. and , see Section 8 for details.
Note that claims and of Theorem 1 can be adequately presented by certain formulas of the language of , based on suitable universal formulas for classes and . Therefore, for any given , the conjunction ∧ is essentially a formula, say , of the language of , and the theorem implies that is consistent with , and, hence, with as well. Thus, it becomes a natural problem to establish the consistency result of Theorem 1 on the base of the tools rather than (much stronger)
ZFC tools. This problem is solved by the next theorem, which is the main result of this paper.
Theorem 2.
Let . Assuming that is consistent, the conjunction of and of Theorem 1 is consistent with .
2. Outline of the Proof
Given as in Theorem 1, a generic extension of was defined in [1], in which and of Theorem 1 hold. This model involves a product forcing notion , defined in , the constructible universe, as the finite support product of -many forcing notions similar to Jensen’s “minimal singleton” forcing as in [5]. This forcing notion depends on the index in Theorems 1 and 2, of course, but we suppress this dependence, assuming that is fixed once and for all.
The method of finite-support products of Jensen’s forcing, which we owe to Enayat [6], has brought several results similar to Theorem 1 in our recent papers. Some of them are mentioned in [1]. Some other results are as follows.
- A model of ZFC in [7] with a Groszek–Laver pair (see [8]), which consists of two OD-undistinguishable classes , whose union is a set.
- A model of ZFC in [9] in which, for a given , reals = constructible reals.
- Models in [10] with counterexamples to the separation theorem for both and .
- A model of ZFC in [11] in which the full basis theorem holds for the effective projective hierarchy but there is no well-ordering of the reals.
We may also mention a very recent paper [12] related to this research line.
The factors of the product forcing in [1] are forcing notions that consist of perfect trees in Therefore, , and, in fact, is a definable class in , and a CCC forcing. (We recall that a partially ordered set or class P satisfies CCC, or the countable chain condition, if every antichain is at most countable.) Thus, we may think about treating as a class-forcing over . Yet, there is a serious obstacle noted in Section 31 in [1]: the construction of involves a -sequence, which goes on in rather than . We overcome this difficulty in this paper. We make use of a recent construction of definable-⋄ sequences by Enayat and Hamkins [13], to obtain a definable- sequence inside (Theorem 4), or rather by means of
a theory known to be equiconsistent with and to have (more exactly, ) as a natural model. The upper minus stands for the absence of the Power Sets axiom, whereas l and c in the lower index stand for the constructibility () and countability.
Adapting the whole structure of the proof of Theorem 1 in [1], we introduce here as a definable class forcing in satisfying the definable CCC. Then we use the class forcing theory of S. D. Friedman [14,15], developed by Antos and Gitman [16] to be applicable over , and check that -generic extensions of a universe satisfy ∧ above.
The final reduction to will be based on the equiconsistency of , , and , see Section 8. This is how the proof of Theorem 2 is organized in this paper. We will freely use the notation and results of the previous article [1] in the course of the proof.
3. On Power-Less Set Theory
Recall that is the set of all hereditarily countable sets. Thus, if the transitive closure is at most countable. Note that under .
We recall that is a subtheory of , obtained as follows:
- (a)
- We exclude the Power Set axiom PS;
- (b)
- The well-orderability axiom WA, which claims that every set can be well-ordered, is substituted for the usual set-theoretic Axiom of Choice AC of ZFC;
- (c)
- The Separation schema is preserved, but the Replacement schema (which happens to be not sufficiently strong in the absence of PS) is substituted with the Collection schema: .
A comprehensive account of main features of is given in, e.g., [16,17].
We may note that if holds, then the set is a natural model of the theory defined by (1) above. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 1.
The ground set universe of (not including classes) is denoted by . Accordingly, will be the collection (a proper class) of all ordinals in .
Remark 1.
Arguing in , we will often consider (definable) proper classes because they will play a more essential role than is common in ZFC. We will also consider such things as class-size collections of proper classes, e.g., class-long sequences of proper classes , with the understanding that the real thing considered in this case is some (definable) class whose slices are equal to the given classes .
4. Some Preliminary Constructions in Power-Less Set Theory
The construction of the forcing notion for the proof of Theorem 1 in [1] goes on in the universe of and involves the following principal elements.
- (1)
- The collection PT of all perfect treesArboreal forcings, i.e., those satisfying , in § 3 of [1].In the context of , such a P can be either a set or a (definable) proper class. Let AF be the class of all arboreal forcings P which are sets.
- (2)
- By § 3 of [1], an arboreal forcing P is:
- -
- regular, if, for any , the intersection of corresponding perfect sets is clopen in or in ;
- -
- special, if there is a finite or countable antichain such that — the antichain A is unique and P is countable in this case.
- (3)
- The class MT of all multitrees, i.e., maps , such that is finite.
- (4)
- Multiforcings, i.e., maps , such that , in § 6 of [1]. A multiforcing is:
- -
- small, in case both and each forcing , , are (countable) sets rather than proper classes, or equivalently (in ), itself is a set;
- -
- special, in case is countable and each is special, as in (2);
- -
- regular, in case all are regular, as in (2).
All special multiforcings are small and regular—hence, sets in . Non-small multiforcings are proper classes, of course. See Remark 1. - (5)
- If is a multiforcing then is a collection of all -multitrees , i.e., those satisfying and for all . Clearly, both and itself are just different representations of the finite-support product , see § 6 of [1]. If is a set (equivalently, a small multiforcing), then is a set as well.
- (6)
- The collection MFsp of all special (therefore small) multiforcings , i.e., such that is at most countable and if , then is special in § 16 of [1].
- (7)
- The operation of component-wise union of multiforcings, § 6 of [1].
- (8)
- The relation of refinement of multiforcings, § 7 of [1]. The relation (sealing refinement, § 8 of [1]) means that and is pre-dense in . Some related notions such as (types of sealing refinements) are introduced in § § 9–13 of [1], and summarized in the common sealing refinement relation in § 14 of [1], meaning that holds for all dense in , which either belong to M or are coded in some way by elements of M.
- (9)
- For any ordinal, — the collection of all -increasing sequences of special multiforcings, of length , in § 16 of [1]. If , then the componentwise union is a multiforcing, and a set in case and a proper class in case .
- (10)
- The collection of all -increasing sequences of special multiforcings, of countable transfinite length. The relation on means that a sequence is a proper extension of . If M is any set, then means that , and in addition , where and . See § 16 of [1].
Of those, perfect trees, special arboreal forcings, multitrees, special multiforcings, sequences in are pretty legitimate objects (sets) in . If is a special multiforcing then (all -multitrees as in (5)) is a set in . On the other hand, collections PT, AF, MFsp, , as well as any sequence in , and similar uncountable objects are definable classes in , and accordingly so that all associated results in Sections 3–14 and 16 in [1] remain true in , with the understanding that some objects are proper classes, of course. In particular, the following results are true.
Theorem 3
(Theorem 4 in [1]). In , if is a small regular multiforcing and M a countable set, then there is a special multiforcing satisfying and .
Lemma 1
(Lemma 21 in [1]). In , assume that M is any (countable) set. Then:
- (i)
- If and , then there exists a sequence such that
- (ii)
- If , , , , and a set is open dense in , then , so that is pre-dense in .
Lemma 2
(Lemma 22 in [1]). In , the following ternary relation belongs to the class : “”.
Now we approach the construction of the forcing notion in § § 18–20 of [1]. The main issue with this construction is that it involves a -sequence in [1]. The ZFC construction of such a sequence (as, e.g., in [18]) formally can be maintained as a proper class in . However, unfortunately, the proof of the -property does not go through in because its
ZFC proof involves ordinals beyond , and hence, does not directly translate to the setup. The next section provides an appropriate substitution.
5. Definable Sequence by Means of Power-Less Set Theory
It is established in a recent paper (Theorem 4.1 in [13]) that, under , there is an Ord-long class-sequence satisfying a ⋄-property for all definable classes. Inspired by this result, we prove the following theorem using nearly the same method:
Theorem 4
(). There is a sequence of sets such that: for any definable (with parameters) classes , if C is club in , then for some .
Any sequence of sets as in the theorem can be seen as guessing sufficiently often initial segments of any definable within any definable club (i.e., closed unbounded) . This is the best possible result in of such kind. But ZFC with the axiom of constructibility, a stronger result is possible, in which the guessing property holds for arbitrary (not necessarily definable) sets . This is basically the fundamental “diamond” theorem of Jensen, see, e.g., Theorem 13.21 in [18].
We use the standard notation , , (slanted lightface ) for classes of lightface definability over a given transitive set X, e.g., (no parameters allowed), and , , for
boldface definability in X (parameters from X allowed). Simply means definability in the whole universe, i.e., when arguing under , and , is understood similarly. We call , , and the like
types rather than classes in this paper since the word ‘class’ has a special technical meaning in the context of , that is, a definable collection of sets.
Proof.
We argue under . As the axiom of constructibility is assumed by , let be the Gödel well-ordering of the universe, of definability type . Define the sets by transfinite recursion. Suppose that has been defined for all . We put unless
- (*)
- is a limit ordinal, and there is a set and a club (closed unbounded set) , with both and definable (allowing parameters) in the structure .
If (*) holds, then pick the least such pair , minimizing first on the Gödel codes of the defining formulas of and , and then, using the well-order , on the parameters used in the definitions. For this minimal pair, let . This completes the inductive definition. The definition makes use of the truth predicate for the structure .
We claim that the sequence is as required. First of all, the truth predicate is known to be , and so is the restricted order , with as the only parameter. It routinely follows that the class sequence is in the universe of .
Further, suppose towards the contrary that are counterexamples, so that C is a club in , both are classes definable by specific formulas resp. (with some parameters not explicitly indicated), so that
and for all .
We may assume, without loss of generality, that these formulas are chosen so as to be minimal in the sense of the construction, so that, successively, their Gödel codes are as small as possible, and the the parameters involved form a -minimal tuple, respectively.
Let m be a sufficiently large natural number, larger than the Gödel codes of the formulas and their subformulas, and large enough so that the minimality condition we just formulated is expressible by a formula. Let be any limit ordinal such that all the parameters used in the definitions belong to , and such that is an elementary submodel of the whole universe of the theory considered, w.r.t. all formulas. It follows that the restrictions , and also and are definable in by the same definitions and parameters as their counterparts in .
Therefore, is club in , and form a minimal pair using those definitions for any . Thus, by the definition of , it follows that . Since is unbounded in
and C is closed, it follows that , and so contradicts our assumption about S and C. So there are no such counterexample classes, and we have finished. □
Following § 18 in [1], we proceed to the next definition.
Definition 2.
(). We fix a sequence given by Lemma 4.
As usual, let be the Gödel well-ordering of the set universe under .
We let th element of in the sense of ; thus, .
If and , then let .
If then let . Then, is still a sequence.
Let .
Let . Then, is still a sequence.
6. The Key Sequence and Key Forcing Notion
The next theorem (Theorem 5) is a crucial step towards the construction of the forcing notion that will prove Theorem 2. The theorem is a close version of Theorem 7 in [1]. The construction employs some ideas related to definable generic transfinite constructions, and it will go on by a transfinite inductive definition of a sequence in from countable subsequences. The result can be viewed as a maximal branch in , generic with respect to all sets of a given complexity.
Definition 3.
(in ). From now on, a number as in Theorem 2, is fixed.
A sequence blocks a set or class , if either belongs to W (a positive block) or no sequence extends
(a negative block).
Any sequence (that is, a definable proper class), satisfying the following four conditions (A)–(D) for this n, will be called a key sequence:
- (A)
- The set is equal to
- (B)
- Every is a crucial ordinal for , so that the relation holds, where is introduced by Definition 2 and by (8) of Section 4.
- (C)
- If in fact and is a boldface class (a definition with parameters), then there exists an ordinal such that the subsequence blocks W—so that either , or there is no sequence extending
- (D)
- The sequence belongs to the definability type in .
Theorem 5
(). There exists a key sequence .
Proof
(sketch). Argue under , with fixed, and strictly follow the proof of Theorem 7 in [1], with Theorem 3 and Lemmas 1 and 2 as the principal references. □
Definition 4
(). From now on, we fix a key sequence , given by Theorem 5 for the number fixed by Definition 3. It satisfies (A)–(D) of Definition 3. We call this fixed the key sequence.
Based on Definition 4, we introduce some derived notions.
Definition 5
(). Using the key sequence , we define the regular multiforcing , and the forcing notion .
We will call the key multiforcing below. Technically, is a class-long sequence of proper classes; see Remark 1. Accordingly, will be our
key forcing notion; technically, a definable proper subclass of the class MT of all multitrees. The following theorem presents the principal CCC property of in the ground universe of .
Theorem 6
(, Theorem 7 in [1]). The forcing notion satisfies countable chain condition CCC. Therefore, -generic extensions of preserve cardinals.
7. Forcing Method over Power-Less Set Theory and the Key Model
The forcing engine does not necessarily work in for an arbitrary class-size forcing notion. But there is a type of forcing notions that admits adequate treatment of forcing, similar to the standard ZFC case.
Definition 6
(S. D. Friedman, see [14,16]). A forcing notion (a partially ordered definable class) is pre-tame if for every class sequence of dense classes , parametrized by elements of a set a (so that is a definable class), and every condition , there is a condition and a sequence of subsets of P such that each is pre-dense below q in P.
Theorem 7
(S. D. Friedman, see [14,16]). In , let be a pre-tame class-forcing notion. Then P preserves and satisfies the main forcing principles including the truth—forcing and forcing definability theorems.
We recall that our key forcing , introduced by Definition 5, is a class forcing, satisfying CCC by Theorem 6. Therefore, is pre-tame under , as so obviously is any CCC forcing. We conclude that Theorem 7 is applicable, and, hence, usual forcing theorems are valid for -generic extensions of , the set universe. This justifies all forcing results in Chapters III and IV of [1], including Theorems 9 and 13 there, on the basis of . This argument validates the following theorem:
Theorem 8
(, Theorems 9 and 13 in [1]). Let (see Definition 3 on ). Any -generic extension of , the universe of discourse, is still a model of , in which statements and of Theorem 1 hold for the index .
In other words, any -generic extension of , the universe of discourse, is still a model of and a model of statements and of Theorem 1. The following is a usual metamathematical corollary.
Corollary 1.
If is consistent, then so is the theory “∧ of Theorem 1”.
8. Reduction to Second-Order Peano Arithmetic
Following [4,19,20] the second order Peano arithmetic is a theory in the language with two sorts of variables—for natural numbers and for sets of them. We use for variables over ω and for variables over , reserving capital letters for subsets of and other sets. The axioms are as follows in (1)–(5):
- (1)
- Peano’s axioms for numbers.
- (2)
- Induction as one sentence: .
- (3)
- Extensionality for sets of natural numbers.
- (4)
- The Comprehension schema CA: , for every formula Φ in which x does not occur, and in Φ, we allow parameters—free variables other than k.
- (5)
- The schema of Countable Choice: , for every formula Φ with parameters allowed, where .
The theory is also known as (see, e.g., an early survey [19]), az (in [21] or elsewhere). See also [22]. We recall that the consistency of is the blanket assumption in Theorem 2. Yet, we can use the following equiconsistency result:
Theorem 9.
Theories and are equiconsistent.
Proof.
The theorem has been a well-known fact for some time, see, e.g., Theorem 5.25 in [19]. A rather natural way of proof is as follows.
- Step 1.
- Theory is interpreted in by the tree interpretation described in [19], §5, especially Theorem 5.11, or in [4], Definition VII.3.10 ff. Kreisel [20], VI(a)(ii), attributed this interpretation to the type of “crude” results.
- Step 2.
- Arguing in , we define the transitive class of all constructible sets, which models .
- Step 3.
- We argue in . If every ordinal is countable, then immediately all sets are countable, that is, we have . If there exist uncountable ordinals, then let be the least of them. Then, is a transitive set which models .
We conclude from Steps 1–3 that and are equiconsistent. □
Combining Theorems 9 and 8, we accomplish the proof of Theorem 2.
9. Conclusions and Problems
In this study, the method of definable sequences was employed to the construction of a model in which, for a given , there is a -good well-ordering of the reals, but no well-orderings of the reals exist in the class at the preceding level of the hierarchy, on the basis essentially of the second-order Peano arithmetic . This considerably strengthens and extends our earlier results, in which such a model was defined on the basis of a much stronger theory ZFC typically assumed in for independence results by the forcing method. This is a new result and a valuable improvement upon our earlier results in [1]. The technique developed in this paper may lead to further progress in studies of different aspects of the projective hierarchy. We hope that this study will contribute to the following fundamental problem by S. D. Friedman: find a model for a given n, in which all sets of reals are Lebesgue measurable and have the Baire and perfect set properties, and, at the same time, there exists a well-ordering of the reals, [14] (p. 209) and [15] (p. 602).
From our study, it is concluded that the technique of definable -sequences will lead to similar consistency and independence results on the basis of the consistency of .
Some problems that arise from our study are mentioned in § 32 in [1]. We adjoin the following problem specific to the research line of this article.
Problem 1.
Reprove the consistency result in [9], related to the equality “ reals = constructible reals” for any given , on the basis of the consistency of theory .
Author Contributions
Conceptualization, V.K. and V.L.; methodology, V.K. and V.L.; validation, V.K.; formal analysis, V.K. and V.L.; investigation, V.K. and V.L.; writing original draft preparation, V.K.; writing review and editing, V.K. and V.L.; project administration, V.L.; funding acquisition, V.L. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding
This research was partially supported by Russian Foundation for Basic Research RFBR
grant number 20-01-00670.
Institutional Review Board Statement
Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement
Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement
The study did not report any data.
Acknowledgments
We are thankful to Victoria Gitman for pointing out the paper [13], critically important for replacing the usual principle with the definable- as in Theorem 4 above. We thank the anonymous reviewers for their thorough review and highly appreciate the comments and suggestions, which significantly contributed to improving the quality of the publication.
Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
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