1. Introduction
Traditional finance theory proposes that in an efficient market, asset prices must equate to the present value of their prospective future cash flows (
Brzeszczyński et al. 2015). Assuming the efficient-market hypothesis (EMH), asset prices reflect all the information about the fundamental value of the underlying security. Thus, movements in the stock market shall originate only with the new information about the fundamental value of the underlying security (
Zhang 2008). However, researchers have raised their concerns over the validity of EMH in the real-life stock markets (
Woo et al. 2020), mainly because of the enduring evidence of market anomalies (
Guo et al. 2017b). Moreover, there are limited arbitrage opportunities available as different types of costs, such as transaction costs, etc., that can bar the arbitrageurs from taking advantage of market mispricing by irrational investors (
Shleifer 2000). Therefore, to explain market anomalies, behavioral finance takes account of deviations from hyper-rationality due to investor sentiments and explores how this may affect asset prices, market outcomes, and the behavior of other investors (
Zhang 2008;
Shi et al. 2020).
Market sentiments generally refer to the “beliefs about future cash flows or discount rates that are not supported by the prevailing fundamentals” (
Baker and Wurgler 2006). Sentiment-driven irrational investors in some periods overestimate the returns and in other periods underestimate the returns, probably because of overconfidence, speculation, and herding behavior (
Barberis and Thaler 2003). Market sentiments play an integral role in the firm decision-making process. Managers tend to make heavy investments during the high investor sentiments period, while firms do not invest when sentiments are below fundamentals (
Baker and Wurgler 2000). Moreover, the effect of investor sentiments on firm decisions to pay a dividend (
Baker and Wurgler 2004), make investments (
Gilchrist et al. 2005), curtail leverage (
Cagli et al. 2018), and issue equity or debt (
Baker and Wurgler 2002) is well documented.
The recent financial crisis has highlighted the significance of a firm’s bankruptcy risk in the financial literature (
Oude Avenhuis 2013). Studies on bankruptcy risk reveal that it has a significant relationship with a firm’s investment decisions (
Rose-Ackerman 1991), stock returns (
Dichev 1998), bond returns (
Altman and Hotchkiss 1993), and operational restructuring (
Sudarsanam and Lai 2001). However, we observe a scarcity of research that addresses whether market sentiments have some degree of influence on firm bankruptcy risk.
Firms are like living organisms that generally evolve sequentially from birth to decline in their corporate life cycle (
Miller and Friesen 1984;
Adizes 2004), but inherently different from them due to their ability to skip a life cycle stage or revert to any previous stage (
Dickinson 2011). Consequently, the strategies, structures, capabilities, and resources of the firm vary meaningfully with the change in its development phase (
Miller and Friesen 1984). Studies on corporate life cycle also suggest that corporate life cycle stages have a strong impact on a firm’s financing (
Ahsan et al. 2016), investment (
Richardson 2006), risk (
Habib and Hasan 2017), working capital management (
Wang et al. 2020), investment and financing efficiency (
Ahmed et al. 2020;
Graciosa et al. 2020), earning management (
Hussain et al. 2020), dividend policy (
Byun et al. 2021), and profitability (
Akbar 2014;
Khan et al. 2016;
Akbar et al. 2020b). However, we do not find any literature investigating the effect of corporate life cycle stages on the relationship between firm bankruptcy risk and market sentiments. To bridge this gap, the present research aims to examine the influence of market sentiments on bankruptcy risk of Pakistani listed firms and to observe whether this sentiment–risk relationship responds to the prevailing stage of the corporate life cycle in this important emerging market.
We have selected the Pakistan stock exchange (PSX) because of its exclusive market position due to following reasons. First, Bloomberg rated PSX as the third best performing market in the world since 2009 (
Bloomberg 2016). Second, market sentiments play an integral role in the investment decision-making by Pakistani investors (
Ahmed and Ullah 2013), and these sentiments are systematic components that are priced in the stock market (
Sadaqat and Butt 2016). Moreover, stock returns on PSX can satisfactorily be explained by the Fama–French three-factor model (
Ali et al. 2018). Third, PSX has a very low level of co-integration with developed equity markets (
Hasan et al. 2008), offering global investors opportunities for portfolio diversification. Finally, in their review article,
Habib and Hasan (
2019) observed that very few studies are available on the implications of corporate life cycle in the context of emerging economies.
The contribution of this research is threefold. First, it extends the market sentiments literature by investigating its impact on a firm’s bankruptcy risk. In contrast, prior studies predominantly concentrated on the role of market sentiments in influencing investment risk, equity risk, and the overall risk of a firm. Furthermore, our results make an empirical contribution by demonstrating that firms’ managers take a higher risk during periods of high market sentiments. Second, we contribute to the growing body of literature on the corporate life cycle by demonstrating its relevance in the context of the managerial decision-making process. The study findings assert that corporate managers do change their risk-taking behavior at various stages of the corporate life cycle. Third, this research has practical implications for corporate regulators, investors, creditors, and other stakeholders to stay vigilant of the irrational behavior of managers at different stages of the corporate life cycle and take corrective actions when necessary. Notwithstanding, corporate regulators can devise an efficient risk management framework for enterprises in light of the empirical evidence of this research to ensure corporate sustainability at various stages of firm life cycle.
The rest of this study is organized as follows;
Section 2 presents a synthesis of literature and proposes the research hypotheses.
Section 3 outlines research methodology, and
Section 4 entails results and discussion.
Section 5 presents robustness testing, while
Section 6 concludes this study by outlining policy prescriptions for corporate regulators and stakeholders.
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
Market-wide sentiments play an important role in firms’ investment decisions as, during the period of high market sentiment, the overvaluation of stocks will encourage the managers to invest more (
Polk and Sapienza 2004). However, these overpriced firms’ managers tend to invest in negative NPV projects, whereas underpriced firms forego positive NPV projects (
Baker et al. 2003). These findings contend that market overvaluation (undervaluation) coincides with higher (lower) investments even though the returns to these investments could be lower (higher) than expectations (
Arif and Lee 2014). Moreover, some observe that during the period of high (low) investor sentiments, the returns on small, highly volatile, young, distressed, and extreme growth stocks will be low (high) (
Baker and Wurgler 2006). Others find that high (low) market sentiments will yield low (high) returns in G7 stock markets (
Bathia and Bredin 2013), reporting a negative association between investor sentiments and market returns, and researchers observe that young, medium growth, and large firms are more likely to get affected by sentiments (
Vieira 2016). They consider bankruptcy risk to further investigate inconsistent patterns in the cross-section of returns (
Fama and French 1996) and find that market sentiment provides a plausible explanation of why higher insolvency risk is linked to lower stock returns (
Dichev 1998).
Furthermore, considering economic policy uncertainty (EPU) as a news variable,
Chiang (
2019) reveals that EPU has significant predictive power to anticipate future returns on a stock market. Some investors possess conservative heuristics that allow them to underweigh recent and/or past observations of earnings shocks to stock prices (
Lam et al. 2012). Investors may underestimate the fundamental information of low book-to-market equity stocks and overreact to the information related to the firm’s future growth, resulting in overpricing of these stocks. Consequently, these financially distressed firms earn lower stock returns (
Campbell et al. 2008). A recent study observes that sentiments can enhance the intensity of credit risk contagion (
Jiang and Fan 2018). Apart from this evidence, the pecking order theory (
Myers and Majluf 1984) postulates that firms follow a financing hierarchy. Firms give first preference to internal funds, then debt, and lastly, equity capital. They further argue that when a firm issues new equity, investors believe that managers perceive their stock to be overvalued and are thus taking advantage of this overvaluation or positive sentiments.
Consequently, investors will place a lower value to the newly issued equity of such firms. To avoid this phenomenon, at the time of high/positive market sentiments when the market-to-book ratio of a company is also high, the managers will tend to borrow funds from external sources because this type of borrowing will be available at low rates and easy pay-back conditions. All of this evidence supports the notion that high market sentiments lead to substantial borrowing and lower stock returns mainly because of substantial investment in negative NPV projects that further increase the bankruptcy risk of a firm. Based on these arguments, we develop our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (H1). High market sentiments lead to higher corporate bankruptcy risk.
Firms with positive investor sentiments will assume high bankruptcy risk by making heavy investments. However, this is not the case forever. For example, during the stock market boom of the 1920s, real investment did not seem to rise sharply, and capital expenditures for 1925 to 1928 were 8.72, 8.69, 7.93, and 7.93 (billion USD) respectively (
Blanchard et al. 1993). While, after the market crash of 1987, investment witnessed a growth of 0.081% for 1988 (
Barro 1990). One plausible reason for these competing pieces of evidence provided by the economists such as
Schumpeter (
1939) is that a firm’s aggregate investment could respond to the stage of its life cycle. They further assert that during the periods of high growth conjectures and less financial constraints (i.e., high market sentiments), firms usually tend to over-invest. On the contrary, during economic retrenchments when most firms face financial constraints (i.e., low market sentiments), firms are likely to under-invest.
Moreover, the “firms in financial distress are likely to be disproportionately sensitive to broad waves of investor sentiment” (
Baker and Wurgler 2007). It is also documented that their debt maturity structure can be different during the different stages of firms’ life cycle. Growth stage companies can have debt at lower rates as compared to introductory firms (
Al-Hadi et al. 2019). Based on these propositions, we argue that firm bankruptcy risk at different stages of its life cycle may respond differently to the prevalent market-wide sentiments. For instance, during the introduction stage of the life cycle, firms require higher investment in plant and equipment (
Jaafar and Halim 2016) and are also more prone to market mispricing because of information asymmetry and perceived uncertainty about their future returns. Consequently, these firms tend to assume more risk by making heavy investments (
Polk and Sapienza 2004).
Firms at the introductory and decline stages are more likely to take risks, and at growth and maturity stages are risk-averse. During high investor sentiment periods, managers increase their risk-taking propensities. Each stage of the corporate life cycle has explanatory power to judge the firm’s risk-taking behavior (
Zhang and Xu 2020). Growth firms heavily rely on external financing, as their demand for capital is higher than their ability to generate funds internally (
Lemmon and Zender 2010). As such, these firms require additional capital to establish their brand identity and product differentiation. Therefore, they strive to sustain the overvaluation of stocks to raise more capital to fund projects, and their cost of equity capital will be lower than introduction firms (
Hasan et al. 2015). Another study argues that more CSR activities can reduce financial distress, and this association is more pronounced at firms’ maturity stage (
Habib and Hasan 2017).
Consistent with the life cycle theory, firms paying more dividends are larger, more profitable but possess fewer chances of growth than less dividend-paying firms (
Coulton and Ruddock 2011). Moreover, mature firms are likely to invest less in intangibles such as advertisement and R&D (
Adizes 2004) and prefer to maintain their existing assets and profit levels (
Richardson 2006) due to a lack of future growth opportunities that lead to lesser need for additional borrowing (
Barclay and Smith 2005). Based on these arguments, market sentiments seem to be unimportant for the investment decisions of mature firms. Furthermore, lack of profit and loss of market share characterize the decline phase of the corporate life cycle (
Benmelech et al. 2010). To overcome this problem and revert to profitability, declining firms assume more risk by investing substantially in R&D (
Dickinson 2011) financed through additional capital that will be easily available during the period of high market sentiments. Moreover, the role of the shakeout stage in the corporate life cycle is unclear in theory (
Dickinson 2011).
The past literature has competing arguments about this stage of the life cycle. Some argue that this is the most exciting stage of a corporate life cycle when substantial major and minor product-line innovations occur. Consequently, firm size increases and organizations tend to be proactive and rapidly growing (
Miller and Friesen 1984;
Lester and Parnell 2008). On the contrary, others observe that number of products begins to decline at this stage of a firm’s life cycle leading to a decline in prices (
Dickinson 2011). Due to conflicting observations about the shakeout stage and following previous studies (
Habib and Hasan 2017;
Hasan et al. 2015;
Akbar et al. 2019), we consider the shakeout stage as a base to compare and interpret the results of other stages of the life cycle. As such, we put forward the second hypothesis as under:
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Compared to the shakeout stage, bankruptcy risk propensity of introduction, growth, and decline stage firms will be higher during the period of high market sentiments, whereas mature firms will continue to be risk-averse.
6. Conclusions
This study examines market sentiments as a potential determinant of firm bankruptcy risk propensity. It also investigates how the prevailing stage of the corporate life cycle might moderate any relationship between the two. For this purpose, we used
Baker and Stein’s (
2004) sentiment measure and
Dickinson’s (
2011) measure of corporate life cycle stages. Further, we employed two widely used measures of a firm’s bankruptcy risk—Z-score (
Altman 1968) and ZMI-score (
Zmijewski 1984)—as the dependent variables. We found that during the period of high market sentiments, managers tend to assume higher bankruptcy risk. Concerning the corporate life cycle stages, introduction, growth, and decline firms increase their bankruptcy risk during high market sentiments. In contrast, the sentiments do not significantly affect the bankruptcy risk behavior of mature firms. It is noteworthy that 43% of our sample consists of mature firms. Our empirical results entail that mature firms are more prudent in their risk management practices compared to their counterparts. During positive market sentiments, the introduction firms assume the highest bankruptcy risk, followed by the decline firms, while the risk-taking propensity of the growth firms was less pronounced.
The present research contributes to the corporate finance literature by exploring the nexus between market sentiments and a firm’s bankruptcy risk. Furthermore, our study unleashed the role of corporate life cycle in the association between market sentiments and a firm’s bankruptcy risk, which has practical and policy ramifications for various corporate stakeholders. Our empirical results suggest a fairly ‘U-shaped’ relationship between market sentiments and firm bankruptcy risk over the corporate life cycle, implying that firm regulators should have a proper risk assessment framework in place at each stage of the corporate life cycle to effectively control firms’ excessive bankruptcy risk-taking behavior in the capital market. This research provides a timeline of the observed risk-taking behavior of the managers, which has important implications for the stockholders as they should remain vigilant of managers’ irrational investment behavior over the corporate life cycle. In particular, investors can consider the firm’s respective life cycle stage to minimize the risk exposure of their investment portfolios. Overall, our results have practical significance and imperative theoretical value for corporate bankruptcy risk management practice, especially in an emerging market. Our work provides effective guidelines to regulators for the capital markets in emerging markets to formulate a dynamic and resilient bankruptcy risk management strategy for each stage of the corporate life cycle to avoid the chances of being bankrupt. Such a framework shall contribute to sustainability in the capital market.
The present research elucidates the sentiments–bankruptcy risk nexus over the corporate life cycle in the context of Pakistan. However, this research bears some limitations and identifies some directions for future research. First, it is single-country research conducted in Pakistan. Hence, the results may only be generalizable to other economies with similar dynamics and stages of economic development. Second, our data set is limited to the non-financial sector. Thus, the financial sector is out of the scope of this research. Although, the present study uncovers an important dimension in the corporate life cycle research. However, our study also bears some limitations. First, considering the data availability constraints, we have employed only one proxy to measure market sentiments. Second, we have used measures of bankruptcy risk that were developed in the context of developed economies, although their consistency in the case of emerging economies is well documented. It would be nice to develop and use bankruptcy risk measures exclusively for emerging economies.
Future lines of research in this domain can examine the impact of market sentiments on stock market volatility. Moreover, it will be interesting to see how risk-taking affects a firm’s operating performance at different stages of the corporate life cycle. Nevertheless, it will be interesting to see the role of gender in decision-making across the corporate life cycle (
Jiang and Akbar 2018). Finally, researchers should focus on developing measures of market sentiments that are specifically suitable for emerging markets.