The Impact of Top Management Team Characteristics on the Risk Taking of Chinese Private Construction Enterprises
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Definition of Core Concepts, Literature Review, and Research Hypothesis
2.1. Definition of Core Concepts
2.1.1. TMT and TMT Characteristics
2.1.2. Risk-Taking Level
2.2. Literature Review
2.2.1. Risk Taking by Family Firms
2.2.2. TMT Age and Risk-Taking Level
2.2.3. TMT Gender and Risk-Taking Level
2.2.4. TMT Education and Risk-Taking Level
2.2.5. TMT Tenure and Risk-Taking Level
2.2.6. TMT Overseas Background and Risk-Taking Level
3. Research Design
3.1. Study Subjects and Data Sources
3.2. Variable Setting
3.2.1. Explained Variable
3.2.2. Core Explanatory Variables
- Age (Age): Average age of the company’s TMT.
- Gender (Gen): Proportion of women to the total number of TMT members.
- Education (Edu): After collecting details of the educational qualifications of various executives, a score is manually assigned, with technical secondary school and below being 1, junior college 2, undergraduate 3, master’s degree 4, and doctor’s degree 5. Finally, the average is taken to represent the average educational level of each company’s TMT each year.
- Tenure (Ten): Average tenure of TMT members.
- Overseas background (Ovs): The proportion of those with overseas backgrounds to the total TMT members.
3.2.3. Control Variables
- Main business profit margin (Mainpro). The main business profit margin is the percentage of the main business profit and the main business income. The higher the index, the higher the added value of the enterprise’s products, the stronger competitiveness of the main business market, the greater development potential and the higher profit level.
- Enterprise size (Siz). The natural logarithm of the company’s total assets at the end of the year measures its size.
- House price index (Hpr). This is the ratio of the national average house price in the current year to the national average house price in the previous year. As mentioned the private construction industry is closely related to the real estate industry, and fluctuations in one industry can directly impact the level of risk in another.
- Proportion of independent directors (Idr). Refers to the ratio of independent directors on the board. It is generally believed that independent directors can act as external supervisors of the company, playing a supervisory role in the company’s daily operations and limiting excessive risk behavior.
- Shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder (Tp1). Most Chinese private construction companies are family-owned enterprises and the largest shareholder is often the company’s founder. Further, the shareholding ratio is generally very high. However, if the shareholding ratio is too high, it may lead to the phenomenon where the decision making serves the interests of the family rather than the company [3].
3.3. Model Settings
4. Empirical Test
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
4.2. Regression Analysis
4.3. Robustness Test
4.4. Heterogeneity Analysis
5. Conclusions
5.1. Research Conclusions
5.2. Recommendations for Practice
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Type | Variable | Formula and Explanation |
---|---|---|
Explained variable | risk-taking level (Ris) | (Measure a company’s earnings volatility reflects the riskiness of investment decisions) |
Core explanatory variables | Age (Age) | Average age of the company’s TMT |
Gender (Gen) | (Proportion of women to the total number of TMT members) | |
Education (Edu) | With technical secondary school and below being 1, junior college 2, undergraduate 3, master’s degree 4, and doctor’s degree 5. Finally, the average is taken to represent the average educational level of each company’s TMT each year | |
Tenure (Ten) | Average tenure of TMT members | |
Overseas background (Ovs) | The proportion of those with overseas backgrounds to the total TMT members | |
Control variables | main business profit margin (Mainpro) | (the percentage of the main business profit and the main business income) |
Size (Siz) | (The natural logarithm of the company’s total assets at the end of the year) | |
houseprice index (Hpr) | (the ratio of the national average house price in the current year to the national average house price in the previous year) | |
proportion of independent directors (Idr) | (The ratio of independent directors on the board) | |
shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder (Tp1) | (The shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder) |
Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Ris | 648 | 0.0346 | 0.0594 | 0.0001 | 0.4496 |
Age | 648 | 47.3051 | 3.1497 | 37.0000 | 57.3571 |
Gen | 648 | 0.1919 | 0.1069 | 0.0000 | 0.5625 |
Edu | 648 | 3.2895 | 0.3581 | 2.2777 | 4.2631 |
Ten | 648 | 3.7375 | 1.3774 | 1.0000 | 8.5789 |
Ovs | 648 | 0.0696 | 0.0804 | 0.0000 | 0.5333 |
Mainpro | 648 | 0.0268 | 0.0438 | -0.4755 | 0.4807 |
Siz | 648 | 21.9990 | 1.4156 | 16.1847 | 26.4284 |
Hpr | 648 | 1.0815 | 0.0414 | 1.0139 | 1.2318 |
Idr | 648 | 0.3758 | 0.0512 | 0.2500 | 0.6000 |
Tp1 | 648 | 0.3188 | 0.1305 | 0.0449 | 0.8186 |
Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Age | −0.002 ** | −0.001 ** | ||||
(−2.29) | (−2.23) | |||||
Gen | −0.033 * | −0.052 ** | ||||
(−1.66) | (−2.56) | |||||
Edu | 0.016 ** | 0.015 ** | ||||
(2.57) | (2.19) | |||||
Ten | 0.002 | 0.002 | ||||
(1.15) | (1.08) | |||||
Ovs | 0.038 | 0.016 | ||||
(1.46) | (0.58) | |||||
Mainpro | −0.001 ** | −0.001 ** | −0.001 ** | −0.001 ** | −0.001 ** | −0.001 ** |
(−2.34) | (−2.21) | (−2.16) | (−2.29) | (−2.22) | (−2.29) | |
Siz | −0.010 *** | −0.011 *** | −0.012 *** | −0.010 *** | −0.010 *** | −0.012 *** |
(−5.97) | (−6.62) | (−6.93) | (−6.50) | (−6.54) | (−6.83) | |
Hpr | 0.058 | 0.056 | 0.056 | 0.060 | 0.058 | 0.049 |
(1.16) | (1.11) | (1.11) | (1.19) | (1.14) | (0.97) | |
Idr | 0.061 | 0.069 * | 0.046 | 0.058 | 0.061 | 0.054 |
(1.51) | (1.67) | (1.12) | (1.41) | (1.49) | (1.32) | |
Tp1 | −0.064 *** | −0.064 *** | −0.071 *** | −0.063 *** | −0.068 *** | −0.072 *** |
(−3.93) | (−3.90) | (−4.32) | (−3.87) | (−4.11) | (−4.37) | |
Constant | 0.252 *** | 0.210 *** | 0.182 ** | 0.190 *** | 0.198 *** | 0.269 *** |
(3.35) | (2.94) | (2.57) | (2.69) | (2.80) | (3.51) | |
Observations | 640 | 640 | 640 | 640 | 640 | 640 |
R−squared | 0.13 | 0.12 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.15 |
Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Age | −0.022 *** | −0.025 *** | ||||
(−3.07) | (−3.51) | |||||
Gen | −0.778 *** | −1.013 *** | ||||
(−3.70) | (−4.75) | |||||
Edu | 0.146 ** | 0.214 *** | ||||
(2.17) | (2.97) | |||||
Ten | 0.011 | 0.008 | ||||
(0.69) | (0.52) | |||||
Ovs | −0.250 | −0.551 * | ||||
(−0.89) | (−1.87) | |||||
Concrols | Yes | |||||
Constant | 1.028 | 0.593 | 0.083 | 0.167 | 0.139 | 1.446 * |
(1.28) | (0.78) | (0.11) | (0.22) | (0.18) | (1.79) | |
Observations | 642 | 642 | 642 | 642 | 642 | 642 |
R−squared | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.07 |
Variables | (1) | (2) |
---|---|---|
Age | −0.002 ** | |
(−2.33) | ||
Gen | −0.052 ** | |
(−2.57) | ||
Eduy | 0.006 ** | 0.006 ** |
(2.32) | (2.09) | |
Ten | 0.002 | |
(1.15) | ||
Ovs | 0.019 | |
(0.68) | ||
Mainpro | −0.001 ** | −0.001 ** |
(−2.16) | (−2.29) | |
Controls | √ | √ |
Constant | 0.129 * | 0.221 *** |
(1.70) | (2.67) | |
Observations | 640 | 640 |
R−squared | 0.13 | 0.15 |
Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Hage | 0.118 ** | 0.146 *** | |||
(2.58) | (3.21) | ||||
Hgen | −0.043 ** | −0.052 *** | |||
(−2.54) | (−3.09) | ||||
Hedu | −0.098 *** | −0.105 *** | |||
(−3.62) | (−3.71) | ||||
Hten | 0.027 *** | 0.019 ** | |||
(3.16) | (2.19) | ||||
Controls | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ |
Constant | 0.189 *** | 0.222 *** | 0.235 *** | 0.202 *** | 0.277 *** |
(2.68) | (3.11) | (3.31) | (2.87) | (3.89) | |
Observations | 640 | 640 | 640 | 640 | 640 |
R−squared | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.18 |
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Zhang, Y.; Cao, C.; Gu, J.; Garg, H. The Impact of Top Management Team Characteristics on the Risk Taking of Chinese Private Construction Enterprises. Systems 2023, 11, 67. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems11020067
Zhang Y, Cao C, Gu J, Garg H. The Impact of Top Management Team Characteristics on the Risk Taking of Chinese Private Construction Enterprises. Systems. 2023; 11(2):67. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems11020067
Chicago/Turabian StyleZhang, Yunhua, Chen Cao, Jiaxing Gu, and Harish Garg. 2023. "The Impact of Top Management Team Characteristics on the Risk Taking of Chinese Private Construction Enterprises" Systems 11, no. 2: 67. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems11020067
APA StyleZhang, Y., Cao, C., Gu, J., & Garg, H. (2023). The Impact of Top Management Team Characteristics on the Risk Taking of Chinese Private Construction Enterprises. Systems, 11(2), 67. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems11020067