Evolutionary Game Analysis of Participations in Museum Public–Private Partnership Projects Based on System Dynamics
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Conceptual Framework
2.1. Operational Modes for Museum PPP Projects
2.1.1. The Museum’s “Outsourcing” Model
2.1.2. Museum IP Authorization for Cultural and Creative Industries
2.1.3. Tax System Reform
2.1.4. Build Foundations and Establish Think Tanks
2.1.5. Develop an Efficient Donation Funding System That Gives Priority to Social Donors
2.2. Participants in Museum PPP Projects
3. Research Methodology
3.1. Model Assumptions and Descriptions
3.2. Replication Dynamic Equations
3.3. Evolutionary Stable Strategy Aanalysis
4. Simulation Analysis
4.1. System Dynamics (SD) Model Establishment
4.2. Parameter Setting
4.3. Results and Discussion
5. Conclusions and Management Insights
- (1)
- In comparison with the current status of museum PPP projects around the world, China is still at an early stage, making it imperative to establish a multi-participant mechanism that ensures high-quality promotion and sustainable development;
- (2)
- In the museum PPP project, the strategic decisions made by the museums and social forces will interact. As long as both parties benefit from the game, that is, if the additional benefits of positive behavior exceed those of “free-riding” behavior, there are two stable strategies—(effort, active promotion) and (speculation, passive promotion);
- (3)
- Government incentives can have a critical impact on the evolution of museum PPP projects at varying phases of their implementation. In the early stage of project implementation, government incentives are required to reach a certain level to achieve the ideal state of evolution (effort, active promotion). As project implementation transitions to maturity, the level of government incentives can be appropriately reduced to alleviate financial pressures while still ensuring the desired state of system evolutionary convergence (effort, active promotion).
- (1)
- This paper clarifies the interest demands and behavior-oriented conflicts among participants in museum PPP projects, and then reveals the dynamic evolutionary characteristics of their behavioral strategies;
- (2)
- The influence of government incentives on the participation behavior of museum PPP projects is analyzed, and it is found that government incentives play an important regulatory role;
- (3)
- The combination of evolutionary game and system dynamics provides more quantitative evidence for the research and promotion of museum PPP projects based on numerous existing theoretical studies.
- (1)
- The formulation of scientific long-term incentive policies is essential for optimizing the role of incentives. The government should take reasonable measures to control the level of incentives, optimize the structure of incentive policies, enrich the approaches to incentives, and improve the flexibility of incentives in involving social forces through financing, funds, donations, and technological inputs. Given that the current PPP projects in the domestic museum sector are still in their infancy, the government should increase the level of incentives to further accelerate the transition to the mature stage and promote the construction of the projects with maximum efficiency;
- (2)
- With a focus on improving the quality and effectiveness of museum PPP project operations, a reasonable operating model must be designed to create favorable conditions for the smooth operation of the project. Additionally, performance evaluation and benefits distribution systems must be established and optimized to ensure high-quality project accomplishments while better safeguarding and enhancing the overall benefits of social forces and museums;
- (3)
- In order to reduce project risks and ease operational pressures, it is necessary to effectively leverage and coordinate professional support for museum PPP projects among the public or intermediaries, professional agencies, museum departments, research institutions, insurance companies, consumers (individuals or institutions), and financial institutions. In addition, it is also necessary to strengthen the supervision of the museums and social forces involved in the project to minimize the “free-riding” behavior.
- (4)
- However, it should be noted that the presented research is by no means free of limitations. In this paper, only two subjects in museum PPP projects are considered, that is, museums and social forces. There are, however, more subjects interacting in reality, such as the general public. The public, the real beneficiaries of public cultural services, can monitor the development and implementation of projects and make demands, thus ensuring the quality of the projects. In addition, the participation behavior of subjects will not only be influenced by government incentives, but also be profoundly affected by other factors, such as various compensation mechanisms, benefit distribution, and risk sharing issues, so the boundaries of the system will be expanded and the interaction relationships within the system will be more complex. Hopefully, future research will expand the types of subjects and factors affecting museum projects, expand the assumptions, and increase the relevance of the research, thereby improving the stability and depth of museum PPP projects.
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Parameters | Descriptions | Notes |
---|---|---|
The proportion of social force groups that make an effort | ||
The proportion of museum groups that choose an active promotion | ||
The basic benefits received by social forces that participate in a museum PPP project | ||
The additional revenue streamed from a “free rider” for social forces | ||
The basic benefits received by museums that promote the museum PPP project | ||
The additional revenue generated by the “free rider” for museums | ||
The ratio of increased investment income of social forces when only social forces make an effort | ||
The ratio of increased investment income of museums when only museums actively promote the project | ||
The ratio of increased investment income of social forces when social forces and museums choose positive behaviors at the same time | ||
The ratio of increased investment income of museums when social forces and museums choose positive behaviors at the same time | ||
The operating costs incurred by social forces when they make an effort for the project | ||
The operating costs incurred by museums when they actively promote the project | ||
The reduction ratio of operating costs of the project when the local government offers a social forces–museums support fund | ||
The government incentives (such as tax deductions, rewards, etc.) when the social forces make an effort |
Social Forces (S) | Museums (M) | |
---|---|---|
Active Promotion y | Passive Promotion | |
Effort x | ||
Speculation |
Equilibrium Point | ||
---|---|---|
Equilibrium Point | Stability | ||
---|---|---|---|
Uncertain | Saddle point | ||
Unstable point | |||
Uncertain | Saddle point | ||
ESS |
Equilibrium Point | Stability | ||
---|---|---|---|
Uncertain | Saddle point | ||
Unstable point | |||
ESS | |||
Uncertain | Saddle point |
Equilibrium Point | Stability | ||
---|---|---|---|
Uncertain | Saddle point | ||
Uncertain | Saddle point | ||
Uncertain | Saddle point | ||
Uncertain | Saddle point |
Equilibrium Point | Stability | ||
---|---|---|---|
Uncertain | Saddle point | ||
Uncertain | Saddle point | ||
ESS | |||
Unstable point |
Equilibrium Point | Stability | ||
---|---|---|---|
ESS | |||
Unstable point | |||
Unstable point | |||
ESS |
Equilibrium Point | Stability | ||
---|---|---|---|
ESS | |||
Unstable point | |||
Uncertain | Saddle point | ||
Uncertain | Saddle point |
Equilibrium Point | Stability | ||
---|---|---|---|
ESS | |||
Uncertain | Saddle point | ||
Unstable point | |||
Uncertain | Saddle point |
Equilibrium Point | Stability | ||
---|---|---|---|
ESS | |||
Uncertain | Saddle point | ||
Uncertain | Saddle point | ||
Unstable point |
Variable Type | Specific Variable |
Level variable | The proportion of the efforts of social forces (x); The proportion of active promotion of museums (y) |
Rate variable | The changing rate of the efforts of social forces (); The changing rate of active promotion of museums () |
Auxiliary variable | Benefits of social forces under different behavior strategies (); Benefits of museums under different behavior strategies () |
Constant | , P |
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Wang, S.; Yu, L.; Qiu, R. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Participations in Museum Public–Private Partnership Projects Based on System Dynamics. Systems 2023, 11, 7. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems11010007
Wang S, Yu L, Qiu R. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Participations in Museum Public–Private Partnership Projects Based on System Dynamics. Systems. 2023; 11(1):7. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems11010007
Chicago/Turabian StyleWang, Siyi, Liying Yu, and Ran Qiu. 2023. "Evolutionary Game Analysis of Participations in Museum Public–Private Partnership Projects Based on System Dynamics" Systems 11, no. 1: 7. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems11010007
APA StyleWang, S., Yu, L., & Qiu, R. (2023). Evolutionary Game Analysis of Participations in Museum Public–Private Partnership Projects Based on System Dynamics. Systems, 11(1), 7. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems11010007