Stability Analysis of Low-Carbon Technology Innovation Cooperation under a Reward and Punishment Mechanism
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Review of the Literature
2.1. A Study of the Evolution of LCTI
2.2. Research Methodology of LCTI
3. Model Construction
3.1. Basic Assumptions
3.2. Model Establishment
3.3. Replicator Dynamic Analysis
3.3.1. Stability Analysis of Enterprise A
3.3.2. Stability Analysis of Enterprise B
3.3.3. Stability Analysis of Government
3.4. Stability Analysis of Equilibrium Points
4. Numerical Simulation and Results
4.1. The Dynamic Evolution of ESS
4.2. Punishment Analysis
4.3. Parametric Analysis of Coefficient Parameters
4.4. Reward Analysis
4.5. Cost Analysis
5. Discussion and Implications
5.1. Reward and Punishment Mechanism of LCTI
5.2. Policy Implications
6. Conclusions and Limitation
6.1. Conclusions
6.2. Limitation
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Parameters | Meanings |
---|---|
Market value of LCTI. | |
Extra gains earned by firms from total market returns when they choose opportunism (hence also the losses incurred by reciprocal firms). | |
Total cost of investment required for corporate LCTI. | |
Additional cost to companies when they choose reciprocity for LCTI. | |
Proportion of the share of enterprise A in the market. | |
Government’s carbon tax subsidy for LCTI. | |
Probability of LCTI success under reciprocity. | |
Probability of LCTI success under opportunism. | |
Environmental and economic gains for the government when participating in LCTI. | |
Additional benefits to the government when both enterprises A and B practice reciprocity. | |
Additional benefits to the government when only one enterprise chooses reciprocity. | |
Government penalties for enterprise A when it chooses opportunism. | |
Government penalties for enterprise B when it chooses opportunism. | |
Environmental and economic losses incurred by the government when one business chooses opportunism and the other reciprocity. | |
Environmental and economic gains for the government when both enterprises choose opportunism. |
Enterprise A | Enterprise B | Government | |
---|---|---|---|
Participation | Non-Participation | ||
Reciprocity | Reciprocity | ||
Opportunism | |||
Opportunism | Reciprocity | ||
Opportunism |
Strategy Combination | Enterprise A | Enterprise B | Government |
---|---|---|---|
Equilibrium Points | Eigenvalues | Eigenvalue Symbol | State | Stability Condition |
---|---|---|---|---|
uncertain | Unstable point | — | ||
uncertain | ||||
uncertain | ESS | ① | ||
uncertain | ||||
uncertain | Unstable point | — | ||
uncertain | ||||
uncertain | ESS | ② | ||
uncertain | ||||
uncertain | Unstable point | — | ||
uncertain | ||||
uncertain | ESS | ③ | ||
uncertain | ||||
uncertain | Unstable point | — | ||
uncertain | ||||
uncertain | ESS | ④ | ||
uncertain | ||||
eigenvalues with different valence | Saddle point |
Case 1 | 4 | 0.5 | 2 | 1 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.55 | 0.45 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
Case 2 | 3.5 | 0.7 | 2 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 1.2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
Case 3 | 4 | 1.5 | 2 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.2 | 2.5 | 0.5 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
Case 4 | 4 | 0.4 | 2 | 1.8 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 1.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
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Wang, M.; He, R.; Ren, K.; He, Y.; Zhou, J. Stability Analysis of Low-Carbon Technology Innovation Cooperation under a Reward and Punishment Mechanism. Systems 2022, 10, 118. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems10040118
Wang M, He R, Ren K, He Y, Zhou J. Stability Analysis of Low-Carbon Technology Innovation Cooperation under a Reward and Punishment Mechanism. Systems. 2022; 10(4):118. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems10040118
Chicago/Turabian StyleWang, Min, Runxin He, Kai Ren, Youshi He, and Jianya Zhou. 2022. "Stability Analysis of Low-Carbon Technology Innovation Cooperation under a Reward and Punishment Mechanism" Systems 10, no. 4: 118. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems10040118