Market-Oriented Transformation and Development of Local Government Financing Platforms in China: Exploratory Research Based on Multiple Cases
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Theoretical Analysis and Current Situation Analysis of the GFP
2.1. Theoretical Analysis
2.2. Current Situation Analysis
2.2.1. The Necessity of Market-Oriented Transformation
2.2.2. The Feasibility of Market-Oriented Transformation
2.2.3. The Dilemma of Market-Oriented Transformation
3. The Connotation of Market-Oriented Transformation of the GFP
3.1. What Is a Local Government Financing Platform (GFP)?
3.2. What Is the Market-Oriented Transformation of the GFP?
3.3. What Is the Symbol of Successful Market-Oriented Transformation of the GFP?
3.3.1. Business Marketization
3.3.2. Management Marketization
3.3.3. Financing Marketization
4. Case Selection and Description
4.1. Research Method
4.2. Case Study on Market-Oriented Transformation of GFPs in Q City, JS Province
4.2.1. Problems before Transformation
4.2.2. The Plan of Market-Oriented Transformation
4.2.3. Summary of Phased Achievements of Transformation and Development
4.3. Case Study on Market-Oriented Transformation of GFPs in Y National Industrial Park in JS Province
4.3.1. Problems before Transformation
4.3.2. The Plan of Market-Oriented Transformation
4.3.3. Summary of Phased Achievements of Transformation and Development
4.4. Case Study on Market-Oriented Transformation of GFPs in Y City, XX Province
4.4.1. Problems before Transformation
4.4.2. The Plan of Market-Oriented Transformation
4.4.3. Summary of Phased Achievements of Transformation and Development
4.5. Case Study on Market-Oriented Transformation of GFPs in S District, W City, XX Province
4.5.1. Problems before Transformation
4.5.2. The Plan of Market-Oriented Transformation
4.5.3. Summary of Phased Achievements of Transformation and Development
5. Summary of Key Points and Paths of Market-Oriented Transformation of GFP
5.1. Summary of Key Points
5.2. Summary of Market-Oriented Transformation Path of the GFP
- 1.
- The first stage: manage old accounts, prevent risks, and build a structure
- 2.
- The second stage: ensure operation and seek development
- 3.
- The third stage: steady growth and strong strength
6. Discussion and Suggestions
6.1. Discussion
6.2. Suggestions on Market-Oriented Transformation of GFP
6.2.1. Improve the Supervision System to Prevent the Loss of State-Owned Assets
6.2.2. Properly Handle the Relationship between Government and Enterprises, and Standardize the Corporate Governance Structure
6.2.3. Optimize Industrial Layout and Improve the Allocation and Operation Efficiency of State-Owned Capital
6.2.4. Implement Talent Development Strategy and Accelerate Market-Oriented Transformation
7. Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Research
7.1. Conclusions
7.2. Limitations and Future Research Directions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Number | Problems | Concrete Manifestation |
---|---|---|
1 | High debt repayment pressure and high financing cost | By the end of 2019, the financial liabilities of GFPs were CNY 63 billion, the average cost of loans was 6.41%, and the total annual interest paid was CNY 3.78 billion, reaching 53% of the city’s general public budget, with an asset liability ratio of 72.93% (the average asset liability ratio of China’s urban investment companies was 57%). |
2 | Low focus on main business and poor profitability | The seven GFPs have overlapping businesses, scattered industries, strong dependence on the government, and low market-oriented income. For example, the market-oriented income of trading and investment accounts for only 8%. In 2019, the total profit of state-owned enterprises was less than CNY 100 million, and the annual income of some GFPs could not cover the financing interest to be paid every year. |
3 | Misplaced rights and responsibilities and complicated levels | The equity and management rights of 84 enterprises are inconsistent. The nominal management level reaches 5 levels, which is not in line with the policy of generally not exceeding 3 levels. |
4 | The staff scale is large, the management is not standardized, and the personnel structure is unreasonable | By the end of April 2020, there were 3385 employees in GFPs, of which 509 were dispatched. The appointment process of middle-level cadres in GFPs is not standardized, and there is a lack of professionals in business development and project operation. |
5 | Weak supervision and bad relationship between government and enterprise | The supervision of state-owned assets needs to be strengthened, the property right management, financial supervision, evaluation system, and other systems need to be improved, and there is no unified supervision of state-owned assets. The debt responsibility of the GFPs is not clear, and the coordinated development mechanism has not been formed. |
6 | Poor asset effectiveness of state-owned enterprises | The proportion of effective assets (assets with cash flow) in total assets of GFPs is generally low, and effective assets need to be supplemented. |
7 | The value of administrative assets and resources is not fully revealed | The book value of the real estate assets under the names of 29 competent units is CNY 180 million, and the pre-evaluation value is CNY 1.5–1.9 billion. However, the asset warrants are not complete, and some government franchise resources have not been fully exploited. |
Number | Problems | Concrete Manifestation |
---|---|---|
1 | Fewer operating assets | Over the years, after the GFP in Y City obtained the financing funds, it lent the funds to various committees and offices, institutions, schools, hospitals, and other units at the request of the government. As a result, in addition to the reserved land injected by the government, the assets of the GFP are mostly accounts receivable from other state-owned enterprises and institutions. |
2 | The nature of the debt is unclear, the contradiction is prominent, and the current account situation is complex | The GFP believes that the purpose of corporate financing is to serve local economic development, so the company’s debts are all government debts, and the contradiction of unclear debt nature is particularly prominent. |
3 | Weak financing capacity and heavy debt pressure | The two-level differentiation of capital cost control is serious. Some enterprises have low debt issuance cost and long term, while some enterprises cannot obtain loans from banks and other financial institutions, and can only survive through high-cost products such as financial leasing and trust. There is great pressure on debt interest repayment every year. A financing platform once issued a phase of corporate bonds in 2016, and then failed to issue bonds for three consecutive years. |
4 | The autonomy of enterprise management decision making is insufficient and the marketization is insufficient | Most GFPs have administrative business objectives and personnel arrangements. The business plan of the enterprise is greatly affected by the appointment and removal of government officials and lacks long-term planning. |
5 | The enterprise management is not standardized, and the incentive of the system is not always good | Enterprises from the person in charge to ordinary employees lack the enthusiasm to become bigger and stronger. Some enterprise employees reflect that “more work and more mistakes, less work and less mistakes”. |
6 | There are dual problems of “Absence” and “Offside” in the supervision | The assets, property rights, and business autonomy of enterprise legal persons are difficult to implement, and the procurement of office supplies for as small an amount as tens of thousands of yuan needs approval. |
Number | Characteristics | Concrete Manifestation |
---|---|---|
1 | A large number of platforms and extensive development | There are more than 140 platforms in the region. |
2 | The management level is chaotic | The management system of GFPs in S District is not clear, the business model is not unified, the synergy between platforms is weak, and the organization and management efficiency need to be improved. |
3 | The main business is not prominent | The business categories of GFPs have a high degree of overlap. The business scale is small, scattered, and weak, and the industrial chain development is incomplete. The business content mainly focuses on the investment and financing functions of public welfare projects, and the operational business segment of the platform is weak. |
4 | The credit rating of the platform is generally low | The original businesses are mostly derived from government administrative orders, they lack the awareness and ability of independent development, and the development foundation is weak. |
5 | There are many shell companies | The main businesses of the GFPs are mostly based on undertaking government public welfare investment projects. There is no business entity and a lack of qualification. The ability to obtain operating income through internal blood supply and the development of operational projects is weak. |
Number | Question |
---|---|
1 | What do you think are the key points of the “three-year action of state-owned enterprise reform” led by the state? |
2 | In the previous reform of state-owned enterprises, many local governments have reorganized GFPs, but the newly established GFPs are still weak in market development. What do you think is the main problem? |
3 | This round of state-owned enterprise reforms particularly highlights the establishment of a market-oriented operating mechanism. How do you think the local government should handle the relationship with the market-oriented transformation process of GFPs? Are there any specific mechanisms that must be implemented? |
4 | From the perspective of GFPs, what do you think should be paid attention to after the second round of reorganization of GFPs to ensure sustainable development in the direction of marketization? Please give an example |
5 | Urban development is inseparable from the healthy and effective circulation of capital. Poor capital operation capacity is a common problem in many GFPs that are lagging behind in market-oriented transformation. In what areas do you think GFPs should enhance their capital operation capabilities? |
6 | In addition to the above issues, what other key points do you think should be paid attention to in the market-oriented transformation of GFPs? |
Number | Kind of Working Unit | Age | Experience (Years) | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Scientific research institutes | 46 | 14 | Professor |
2 | Scientific research institutes | 38 | 10 | Associate professor |
3 | Scientific research institutes | 55 | 20 | Professor |
4 | Scientific research institutes | 59 | 25 | Professor |
5 | Central government departments | 56 | 20 | Professor |
6 | Central government departments | 52 | 18 | Professor |
7 | Advisory body | 48 | 15 | Professor |
8 | Advisory body | 40 | 10 | Associate professor |
9 | Advisory body | 45 | 16 | Professor |
10 | Advisory body | 42 | 12 | Professor |
Number | Category | Key Points |
---|---|---|
1 | Reform of state-owned assets supervision | Sort out the city’s asset resources (asset resource attribute and ownership relationship); |
Platform integration and reorganization; | ||
Clear platform positioning and business layout; | ||
Government authorization and decentralization in place; | ||
The state-owned assets supervision system is complete. | ||
2 | Management Marketization | Improve the management and control system of parent and subsidiary companies (split the responsibilities and rights of investment control and management); |
Improve the corporate governance structure of the platform; | ||
Management system specification; | ||
Introduction, employment and marketization of salary mechanism; | ||
Strategic Marketization; | ||
Promotion of cultural soft power. | ||
3 | Business Marketization | Separate management; |
Specialized management; | ||
Market-oriented settlement of government business; | ||
Business diversification (industrial chain extension); | ||
Cultivate core industries of subsidiaries. | ||
4 | Asset Management | Sorting out the internal assets of the platform (governmental and operational, scale and ownership); |
External high-quality asset resource injection; | ||
Clear property rights of stock assets; | ||
Effective revitalization of stock assets; | ||
Marketization of business mode. | ||
5 | Capital Operation | Credit rating improvement; |
Diversified financing channels; | ||
Various financing instruments (corporate bonds, corporate bonds, asset securitization, special bonds, funds, etc.); | ||
Plate listing; | ||
Equity investment; | ||
Mixed reform (introduction of war investment and employee stock ownership). |
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Li, X.; Feng, G.; Hao, S. Market-Oriented Transformation and Development of Local Government Financing Platforms in China: Exploratory Research Based on Multiple Cases. Systems 2022, 10, 65. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems10030065
Li X, Feng G, Hao S. Market-Oriented Transformation and Development of Local Government Financing Platforms in China: Exploratory Research Based on Multiple Cases. Systems. 2022; 10(3):65. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems10030065
Chicago/Turabian StyleLi, Xiaoguang, Guoli Feng, and Shengyue Hao. 2022. "Market-Oriented Transformation and Development of Local Government Financing Platforms in China: Exploratory Research Based on Multiple Cases" Systems 10, no. 3: 65. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems10030065
APA StyleLi, X., Feng, G., & Hao, S. (2022). Market-Oriented Transformation and Development of Local Government Financing Platforms in China: Exploratory Research Based on Multiple Cases. Systems, 10(3), 65. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems10030065