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Article

Understanding the Unconscious: Yogācāra Buddhism and Psychoanalysis

Department of Psychology, School of Humanities, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China
Religions 2026, 17(1), 75; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel17010075
Submission received: 7 October 2025 / Revised: 13 December 2025 / Accepted: 7 January 2026 / Published: 9 January 2026
(This article belongs to the Section Religions and Health/Psychology/Social Sciences)

Abstract

The unconscious is a core concept in both the Yogācāra Buddhism and psychoanalytic traditions. It is easy to assume that the understanding of the unconscious in Yogācāra cannot coexist with the understanding of the unconscious in psychoanalysis, because the unconscious in Yogācāra (i.e., ālayavijñāna) primarily explains how the world is constructed by it, while the unconscious in psychoanalysis primarily explains how neurosis develops. Due to this difference in the understanding of the unconscious, Yogācāra Buddhism and psychoanalysis have developed different psychotherapeutic methods. Yogācāra’s therapeutic method is to observe emptiness, while psychoanalysis aims to transform the pathogenic unconscious into the conscious. But there is a potential for mutual enrichment between the two in psychotherapy. Psychoanalysis’s emphasis on functions of the self can help people avoid misunderstanding Yogācāra’s doctrine of “non-self”. Yogācāra can help psychoanalysis explore deeper levels of the unconscious.

1. Introduction

Buddhism is an ancient religion with a history spanning over 2000 years. Its vitality is truly remarkable. However, in contemporary society, Buddhists who wish to follow the Buddha’s path to enlightenment, scholars interested in Buddhist studies, and the general public who have a curious view of Buddhism often find themselves deeply confused by the vast body of Buddhist scriptures: these texts are so difficult to understand, let alone to live or practice according to the Buddha’s teachings. Modern scholars use various perspectives to study Buddhism, including philology, archeology, philosophy, and psychology. Philological studies reveal information about Buddhism, such as the origins of classic texts, their transmission methods, the compilation process, and the differences between texts in different languages (Lüders 1954; Norman 1997). Archeological studies present information about the Buddha’s life, the types of Buddhist relics, and the diversity of Buddhist practices (Beal 1869; Coningham 2002; Dutt 1962; Mitra 1971). Philosophical studies treat Buddhism as a philosophical system (Conze 1962), and recently, the debate about whether Buddhism is a form of idealism has intensified (Garfield 2002; Gold 2022; Kochumuttom 1982; Muller 2023; Sharf 2016; Trivedi 2005). Psychological studies, on the one hand, aim to engage in dialogue with modern psychology from a Buddhist perspective (de Silva 2005; Kalupahana 1987; Waldron 2003), and on the other hand, strive to uncover psychotherapeutic resources within Buddhism from a psychological perspective (Epstein 1995; Levine 2000; Loy 2002; Shonin et al. 2014; Riker 2020; Suler 1993; Tola and Dragonetti 2005).
However, in terms of Buddhism’s practical impact on real life, the perspective of psychotherapy is particularly noteworthy. Due to the extreme competitiveness of contemporary society, modern people often suffer from serious mental problems. According to the World Health Organization, mental health is a crucial component of health, well-being, and sustainable development, yet mental health problems remain widespread, with over one billion people worldwide suffering from mental illness (WHO 2025). Buddhism offers a unique approach to psychotherapy (Qiu and Xu 2025; Rungreangkulkij et al. 2011; Shonin et al. 2014). Therefore, this article mainly focuses on the value of Buddhism in contemporary psychotherapy. Specifically, it will approach the topic from a comparative perspective between Yogācāra Buddhism and psychoanalysis. Although Freud himself held a negative view of religion (Freud 1930), more psychoanalysts were deeply attracted to the profound psychological insights into human behavior found in Buddhism (Sun 1924). Alexander (1931) regarded the meditative state of Buddhism as an artificially induced catatonia. Suzuki et al. (1960) attempted to integrate Buddhism into psychology through a dialogue between psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism. Suler (1993) argued that self-psychology in psychoanalysis can be reconciled with the Buddhist doctrine of non-self. Rubin (1996) examined the dialogue between psychoanalysis and Buddhism on how to enhance self-understanding and inner peace and attempted to combine the two. Engler (1998) noted the conflict between psychoanalysis and Buddhism and proposed a method of reconciliation: the self focused on by psychoanalysis and the non-self emphasized by Buddhism represent different stages of personal development. Safran (2003) suggested that the dialogue between Buddhism and psychoanalysis has the potential to enrich both traditions.
However, most comparative studies of the two have primarily focused on the concept of the self. To revitalize the dialogue between these two fields, and because a comprehensive and in-depth discussion is impossible within the scope of a single article, I have chosen to focus on the concept of ālayavijñāna in Yogācāra Buddhism (Szanyi 2024) and the concept of the unconscious in psychoanalysis as the main subject of this dialogue. Some excellent theoretical studies have already been conducted on this topic (Connelly 2016; Jiang 2006; Moon 2016; Trejo 2022; Xu 2023; Waldron 2003; Young-Eisendrath 2018). However, the task of developing a specific approach or method of psychotherapy from this dialogue remains incomplete or has not received sufficient attention.
This article aims to explore the potential value of Yogācāra Buddhism in psychotherapy (Anacker 2005). In this regard, Kabat-Zinn is an excellent model. His mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR) program successfully transformed ancient mindfulness techniques into a mind–body medicine technique (Kabat-Zinn 2013). However, I also believe that if we only retain the technical elements of Yogācāra Buddhism, as Kabat-Zinn did, we will miss the essence of its psychotherapeutic potential. In this direction, Connelly (2016) and Trejo (2022) have already proposed some good ideas, and experts in psychiatry have also shown interest in Yogācāra Buddhism (Tola and Dragonetti 2005), but we are still far from truly transforming Yogācāra Buddhism into a technique applicable to mental health.
Yogācāra Buddhism can enrich psychotherapy because its ideas can help people examine their inner activities, thereby gaining beneficial insights into their mental health problems. Yogācāra’s ālayavijñāna is very similar to the unconscious in psychoanalysis, providing a framework for understanding and addressing one’s mental health problems. Accordingly, this study’s framework comprises the following: (1) the similarities between Yogācāra Buddhism and psychoanalysis (Section 2); (2) the different approaches of Yogācāra Buddhism and psychoanalysis to psychotherapy (Section 3); (4) the mutual enrichment between Yogācāra Buddhism and psychoanalysis (Section 4); and (5) conclusions (Section 5).

2. The Similarities Between Yogācāra Buddhism and Psychoanalysis: The Limitations of the Conscious

Previously, some scholars comparing Yogācāra Buddhism and psychoanalysis primarily focused on their differences, specifically the tension between the Yogācāra emphasis on non-self and the psychoanalytic focus on the self (Engler 2003; Rubin 1996; Oh 2022; Safran 2003; Young-Eisendrath 2018). Beyond this, there are many other differences between the two, which I will elaborate on below. However, starting with the differences will, to some extent, magnify the distance between the two, even leading some to believe that such a comparison is unnecessary. Therefore, I would like to begin by highlighting a similarity between Yogācāra Buddhism and psychoanalysis: both clearly recognize the limitations of consciousness. In other words, both hold that mental processes of which a person is unaware largely determine their behavior. First, both agree that the human mind can be divided into two parts: one perceptible and the other imperceptible, with the consciousness comprising only a small proportion. Second, Yogācāra Buddhism considers ālayavijñāna to be the foundation of the conscious, meaning conscious activities are based on seeds stored in ālayavijñāna. Similarly, Freud assumes that unconscious processes determine conscious processes. Third, Yogācāra Buddhism argues that intermittent consciousness cannot serve as the foundation of life; only the constant and continuous ālayavijñāna can. Likewise, Freud believed that the conscious is discontinuous, and the gaps between conscious events should be filled by the unconscious. Finally, both advocate for subtly altering the unconscious by enhancing awareness of one’s own activities, thereby achieving a therapeutic effect.

2.1. The Unconscious in Yogācāra Buddhism: Ālayavijñāna

Yogācāra Buddhism provides the most systematic and detailed version of the theory of mind in the Buddhist tradition (Jiang 2006; Schmithausen 1987; Szanyi 2024; Waldron 2003), and is one of the two major schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism (the other is Madhyamika). The most prominent representatives of Yogācāra Buddhism include Maitreya, Asanga, Vasubandhu, and Hsuan Tsang. The fundamental concept of Yogācāra Buddhism is ālayavijñāna. The purpose is to get rid of the attachment to the existence of the self and the external world, and to explain that their existence is just an illusion projected by ālayavijñāna. “If people want to really know all Buddhas of all times, they should contemplate the nature of the cosmos: all is but mental construction.” (Cleary 1993, p. 452).
Yogācāra Buddhism proposed the eight-consciousness model of the human mind, which divides the mind into eight parts: eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, mind consciousness, manas consciousness, and ālaya consciousness. The first six consciousnesses belong to the category of consciousness because they are all perceptible. Manas consciousness and ālaya consciousness belong to the category of the unconscious because they are not perceptible. Manas is the unconscious root of the self-concept of human beings, because it mistakenly believes that the seeing part of ālayavijñāna is eternal and unchanging, and thus firmly believes that the eternal self exists. Ālayavijñāna is the eighth consciousness. The verb meaning of it means to store, while the noun meaning of it is storehouse. The function of ālayavijñāna is to store the seeds of all dharmas. More specifically, ālayavijñāna stores the seeds (memories) of all phenomena generated by the activities of six consciousnesses, and then projects them into the body and the external world. “Being born, it (ālayavijñāna) has a twofold activity: it develops, internally (i.e., as internal object), into Bijas and a body possessed of sense-organs, and externally, into the receptacle-world.” (Hsuan Tsang 1973, p. 137) In other words, everything is the manifestation or maturity of the seeds of dharmas in ālayavijñāna, or its imaginary projection. Ālayavijñāna is unknowable, so it is often regarded as the Buddhist unconscious or unconscious mind (Waldron 2003, p. xi).
In Yogācāra Buddhism, ālayavijñāna is proposed to solve four basic problems: (1) To solve the contradiction between no-self and reincarnation subject: it is not that there is an unchanging soul walking in the six realms, but that the six realms are manifested in ālayavijñāna. It is always changing, so it is not a constant and unchanging self-existent entity. (2) To solve the problem of karma and causal continuity: the constantly changing ālayavijñāna can store all karmic seeds, thus forming a continuous causal chain. (3) To solve the problem of ontology: the existence of all things is the image projected by ālayavijñāna. (4) To solve the problem of epistemology: the apprehending part of ālayavijñāna is the subject of cognition, and the apprehended part of it is the object of cognition. Both the seeing part and the image part are unified in ālayavijñāna, thus establishing a non-dual epistemology and avoiding the subject–object dichotomy problem that has plagued Western philosophy for thousands of years.
In recent years, a frequent debate surrounding Yogācāra Buddhism, which centers on ālayavijñāna, has been whether it is a form of idealism. Although some scholars argue that Yogacara Buddhism is a form of idealism (Garfield 2002; Kellner and Taber 2014; Muller 2023; Williams et al. 2002), other scholars point out that there are still essential differences between it and idealism (Connelly 2016; Gold 2022; Kochumuttom 1982; Lusthaus 2002; Trivedi 2005). I advocate that these two seemingly contradictory views can be reconciled at different levels. It is important to note two levels of truth: conventional truth and ultimate truth. At the level of conventional truth, Yogacara Buddhism is an epistemological idealism. It avoids the ontological claim that things actually exist. Instead, it argues that what we know is given to us through the constructive activities of the mind (consciousness, ideas, concepts, or categories, etc.). Therefore, what we know is not the things themselves, but rather products of mental constructions. A representative of epistemological idealism in Western philosophy is Kant (Trivedi 2005). The level of conventional truth points to an analysis of what appears in ālayavijñāna, and everything is its imaginary projection. At the level of the ultimate truth, Yogacara Buddhism is not a form of idealism, but rather a Buddhist epistemology. Ālayavijñāna is beyond the conscious, and perceived and known only by enlightened beings (arhats, bodhisattvas, Buddha). Whatever can be stated in language is only conventional, but ultimate truth is ineffable.

2.2. The Unconscious in Psychoanalysis

In psychoanalysis, the concept most similar to ālayavijñāna is the unconscious. When Freud proposed the hypothesis of the unconscious, he was unaware of the Yogācāra’s ideas about ālayavijñāna. He was largely influenced by 19th-century German philosophy of the unconscious (Gödde 2010). Freud referred to the concepts of repression, threshold, and resistance developed by Johann F. Herbart and Gustav A. Lindner (Herbart 1886; Lindner 1873) as common psychological abstractions, and used them to conceptualize his observations of neuroses and dreams. In The Interpretation of Dreams and in his letters to his friend Wilhelm Fliess, Freud cited two other philosophers: Gustav Theodor Fechner and Theodor Lipps. Regarding the concept of the unconscious, Fechner initially followed Herbart’s view, claiming that when sensations and representations fall below the psychophysical threshold, they are unconscious but still capable of producing effects (Fechner 1860). Of particular importance to Freud was that he found philosophical justification for the unconscious in Lipps’ works. “In addition to the existence of conscious mental processes, there are also unconscious mental processes. In fact, we assume that unconscious processes are the basis and accompaniment of all conscious processes. As we have said, conscious processes arise from unconscious processes when conditions are right and return to them again” (Lipps 1883, pp. 149–50). Although Lipps seems to have anticipated Freud’s assumption of the unconscious in clinical psychology, they used the words “the conscious” and “the unconscious” in completely different senses.
For Lipps, the unconscious has no empirical basis, but is a deductive philosophical reasoning. This actually continues the idea of deducing the unconscious from the conscious since Leibniz and Kant. Lipps’s philosophy of the unconscious is actually still an extension of the philosophy of the conscious. However, for Freud, the unconscious has an empirical basis from mistakes, dreams, neurosis, etc. Therefore, the unconscious is no longer completely imperceptible as philosophers claim, but can be indirectly perceived through mistakes, dreams, and neurotic symptoms. Therefore, Freud’s thought of the unconscious got rid of the color of metaphysics and had the characteristics of modern science.
The hypothesis of the unconscious is the most revolutionary idea in psychoanalysis. Freud used the unconscious to prove that all mental events are meaningful (Boss 1982). He found that a mental event appears in the conscious, disappears after a period of time, and may reappear after a long time. If the human mind is all conscious, then people cannot explain the fact that the mind will never be interrupted during a person’s life, but the conscious will often be interrupted. For example, in deep sleep, people have no consciousness, but they are still alive. Therefore, the meaning of all mental events cannot be explained by conscious events alone. In order to establish a continuous causal chain between all mental events, there must be unconscious events to fill the gaps between conscious events. Freud subverted the hierarchical division of consciousness and unconsciousness in traditional philosophy. Freud said: “Everything conscious has an unconscious preliminary stage; whereas what is unconscious may remain at that stage and nevertheless claim to be regarded as having the full value of a psychical process. The unconscious is the true psychical reality; in its innermost nature it is as much unknown to us as the reality of the external world” (Freud 1900, pp. 612–13).
Freud divided the human mind into three parts: consciousness, preconsciousness, and unconsciousness. Consciousness is similar to perception, which is the subjective perception of physical objects. Similarly, the conscious can perceive mental activities and regulate cathexis in the body according to the pleasure principle and the pain principle. The preconscious is the intermediary between the conscious and the unconscious. With the regulation of pleasure and pain feelings by the preconscious, mechanisms such as censorship, repression, and attention emerge and determine which thought processes can enter consciousness or be excluded from consciousness. The preconscious can also become conscious because the excitement in the preconscious can be conscious (Xu 2023, p. 195).
But the most important and largest part of the mind is the unconscious. The unconscious is a system of the mind that cannot be perceived, but which fundamentally determines the conscious. The unconscious refers only to that part which is initially repressed and then transformed and brought into consciousness. Therefore, the unconscious in psychoanalysis is only a small part of the real unconscious (ālayavijñāna). The unconscious consists of drives that release cathexes. The unconscious has five properties: (1) Each unconscious drive is independent of the other, and when two drives are activated at the same time, they merge into one. (2) There is neither affirmation nor negation in the unconscious system, because both affirmation and negation appear only after conscious examination. (3) The intensity of cathexis is variable, and different cathexes can be concentrated by condensation. (4) Unconscious processes have no time and can only have time through conscious activity. (5) The unconscious does not follow the principle of reality, but only the principles of pleasure, pain and power (Freud 1915, pp. 186–89).
However, on the question of the existence of the world, Freud still adhered to the position of the subject–object dichotomy. He called the unconscious psychical reality (Freud 1900, p. 613). The unconscious is the true psychical reality, and psychical reality is different from material reality (Freud 1900, p. 620). Moreover, he distinguished between internal and external stimuli (Freud 1900, p. 537). He regarded psychoanalysis as a part of natural sciences, so he summarized his position as a scientific Weltanschauung, that is, emphasizing the reality of the external world (Freud 1933, pp. 158–82). Although he did not want to be a philosopher, he obviously took a philosophical position close to materialism. Later psychoanalysts also basically held a similar position, for example, in Kohut. “The self…is conceptualized…as a content of the mental apparatus. While it is thus not an agency of the mind, it is a structure within the mind (Kohut 1971, p. xv).

3. The Different Approaches of Yogācāra Buddhism and Psychoanalysis to Psychotherapy

There are many differences between Yogācāra Buddhism and psychoanalysis (Safran 2003). After all, the former is an ancient Eastern spiritual practice, while the latter is a modern Western medical treatment. However, the main purpose of this article is to explore their enriching aspects in psychotherapy through comparison. Therefore, this article will not discuss many of their differences but will focus on the differences in their psychotherapeutic methods. These differences are mainly based on their different understandings of the unconscious.

3.1. The Conceptual Basis of Difference: Different Understandings of the Unconscious

The functions of ālayavijñāna include preserving the seeds of all current things, such as the first seven consciousnesses, being attached to the inner self by the seventh consciousness and manifesting the bodies of sentient beings and the material world outside the body (Lin 2000). In psychoanalysis, the unconscious is a repository for storing unacceptable or unpleasant feelings, thoughts, drives and memories outside our consciousness (Freud 1915, pp. 159–204). The functions of ālayavijñāna include both active and passive aspects, because it can store seeds and serve as a storage. In psychoanalysis, the function of the unconscious is more passive. The ālayavijñāna can project not only the sense of self, but also the material world. In other words, Yogācāra Buddhism advocates that everything is just a projection of the ālayavijñāna. This function is not possessed by the unconscious in psychoanalysis.
In order to achieve the ultimate goal of treatment, Yogācāra Buddhism requires the ālayavijñāna to be transformed, that is, to transform vijñāna (consciousness) into wisdom, while psychoanalysis only wants to turn the unconscious into the conscious. Yogācāra Buddhism advocates that by always doing good things (belief, sense of shame, sense of integrity, non-covetousness, non-anger, non-delusion, diligence, composure of mind, vigilance, equanimity and non-injury) and not doing bad things (covetousness, anger, delusion, conceit, doubt, false views, fury, concealment, vexation, envy, parsimony), the seeds of good can be cultivated in ālayavijñāna and the seeds of evil can be eliminated. When the practice reaches perfection, ālayavijñāna will be transformed into the great mirror wisdom. Although the great mirror wisdom at this time can still be regarded as a subject, this subject no longer has the self-attachment and the Dharma attachment, and therefore is free from all afflictive emotions and delusions. The main goal of psychoanalysis is to transform the unconscious into consciousness. Psychoanalysts help patients gain insight into their unconscious drives or bad internal working patterns so that patients can better manage them, because when primitive drives exist in the unconscious, they are likely to have destructive effects (Sommers-Flanagan and Sommers-Flanagan 2018). At this point, patients may have gotten rid of the neurosis and become mentally healthy person. However, in the view of Yogācāra, a mentally healthy person still has troubles and delusions because he still has the self-attachment and the Dharma attachment.
Yogācāra pursues the non-self, while psychoanalysis aims to strengthen the self. However, some people may misunderstand Yogācāra and think that the ālayavijñāna mentioned by it is a new self. However, Yogācāra still adheres to the core teachings of Buddhism about the non-self. The ālayavijñāna is like a torrential flow, but it is not an entity, just a changing process. People must never regard it as an independent and eternal self. “The clinging consciousness is very deep and subtle; all potentials are like a torrential flow. I do not explain this to the ignorant, for fear they will get the idea it is self” (Cleary 1995, p. 21). Regarding the self, Freud proposed a three-fold structure of personality: the id, the ego, and the superego. The id is the unconscious reservoir of drives and operates according to the pleasure principle. The superego contains conscience as a punishment factor and the self-ideal as a motivational factor. The ego is a function that mediates between the id and the superego. Psychoanalytic therapy aims to effectively deal with the conflict between primitive drives and external requests by strengthening the self (Sommers-Flanagan and Sommers-Flanagan 2018). But from the perspective of Yogācāra, the healthy self referred to by psychoanalysis is actually good citta, and in this way, people can avoid becoming egoistic.

3.2. Different Psychotherapeutic Methods

(1)
Yogācāra’s Method of Treatment
The Yogācāra Buddhism attributes human illness to two types of obstacles: the barrier of afflictive emotions and the barrier of delusion. The barrier of afflictive emotions stems from people’s attachment to an independent and permanent self-existence. The barrier of delusion stems from people’s attachment to the independent existence of the external world. It is these two barriers that lead people into endless suffering. The barrier of afflictive emotions corresponds to emotional or mental problems, such as greed, anger, ignorance, arrogance, and doubt. The barrier of delusion corresponds to problems in thinking and cognition, such as problems with concepts such as being or not-being, truth or falsehood, good or bad. Some psychologists describe the barrier of afflictive emotions as “ontological addiction”, that is, “the unwillingness to relinquish an erroneous and deep-rooted belief in an inherently existing ‘self’ or ‘I’ as well as the ‘impaired functionality’ that arises from such a belief” (Shonin et al. 2013, p. 64). The Theravada Buddhism aims to treat the barrier of afflictive emotions, while the Mahayana Buddhism believes that the root of it is the barrier of delusion. Therefore, the Mahayana Buddhism treats the afflictions and the obstruction of knowledge. The treatment method of Yogācāra Buddhism is to remove two barriers through observing emptiness (śūnyatā).
The Yogācāra method of treatment is to observe emptiness. But its view of emptiness is different from the analytical emptiness asserted by Theravada Buddhism, and also different from emptiness of essence asserted by Madhyamaka. Analytical emptiness is the emptiness of phenomena, which means that all things are composed of different parts and have no independent and permanent attributes. In other words, all things are formed by the combination of causes and conditions, and the separation of causes and conditions will lead to the destruction or transformation of all things (Yao 2005). However, analytical emptiness only breaks phenomena, not the essence, that is, it does not completely deny the existence of essence. The emptiness of essence means that the essence of all things is empty. Cause, effect, five aggregates, six realms, four conditions, time, space, etc., are all non-existent. “Whatever is in correspondence with śūnyatā, all is in correspondence (i.e., possible). Again, whatever is not in correspondence with sunyata, all is not in correspondence” (Inada 1993, p. 147).
The Yogācāra’s view of emptiness not only advocates that phenomena and essences of all things are empty, but also advocates that the externality of phenomena and essences is also empty, so everything is not separated from vijñāna (consciousness). The view of emptiness advocated by Theravada Buddhism and Madhyamika still relies on the dual structure of cognition; that is, there is still an external condition as a background. Although all phenomena and essences manifested by external conditions are empty, external conditions are not empty yet. As for Madhyamika, it only says that everything has no self-nature, but does not deny its objective existence. Yogācāra Buddhism must break through both the objective reality without self-nature and the subjective reality. “If, in perceiving the sphere of objects, wisdom no longer conceives any idea of the object. Then that wisdom is in the state of Vijnaptimatrata, because both the object to be apprehended and the act of apprehending by consciousness are absent (Hsuan Tsang 1973, p. cxxxvii)”. The emptiness referred to by Yogācāra Buddhism is the emptiness after the elimination of the subject–object dichotomy. First, eliminate the object to be apprehended, then eliminate the subject, and finally achieve the separation of the object and the subject.
The Yogācāra’s view of emptiness is based on the eight-consciousness model. It claims that only the eight-consciousness model can present true conversion. The six-consciousness model of Theravada Buddhism can only achieve the result of breaking the attachment to self, but not the attachment to dharma. Madhyamika surpassed Theravada Buddhism in overcoming the attachment to dharma, but did not completely break external objects because Madhyamika still uses dualistic thinking. For example, the two truths (conventional truth and ultimate truth) still remain in dualistic thinking. The six-consciousness model and the two-truth theory can only break delusion, but cannot reveal the truth.
Yogācāra Buddhism transcends dualistic thinking through the doctrine of the three natures. The three natures are the imaginary nature, the other-dependent nature, and the complete and realized nature. The imaginary nature is false discrimination. Before reaching the state of Arhat or Bodhisattva, people are trapped in the imaginary nature, that is, they take delusion as reality. Even those people who are considered mentally healthy and socially adaptable by medicine are still in a state of delusion according to Yogācāra Buddhism (Shonin et al. 2014, p. 126). The main purpose of the Madhyamika is to eliminate the imaginary nature. The imaginary nature is also the fundamental object of treatment. Reality and ego are of imaginary nature. Before people eliminate the imaginary nature, they are deceived by the false image world constructed by consciousness. The other-dependent nature refers to infinite causes and conditions of all things. “The self-nature which results from dependence on others, consists of discriminations produced by causes and conditions (Hsuan Tsang 1973, p. 621).” The ālayavijñāna is the other-dependent nature. It can contain all seeds and give rise to all dharmas (phenomena). “The perfumer engenders the Bija (seeds); the Bija produces the actual dharma (Hsuan Tsang 1973, p. 135).” It should be noted that ālayavijñāna is by no means an entity like matter or mind. Yogācāra is a staunch opponent of the “ontological addiction” proposed by Shonin and others. The other-dependent nature is divided into two states: defilement and purity. In the defiled state, the other-dependent nature is the ālayavijñāna. But in the pure state, it is transformed into the great mirror wisdom. What ordinary people know is all false discrimination, and only saints can see the perfect reality. However, the complete and realized nature is not a kind of entity, nor is it any one thing, but the dharma nature of the other-dependent nature. It is the state that appears after all delusions are eliminated, that is, the true nature of all dharmas. The complete and realized nature is not only beyond words, but also inaccessible to the conscious. If people deny the complete and realized nature, they will fall into the emptiness wrongly grasped (durgṛhītā śūnyatā) (Fok Tan 2014, p. 92).
Yogācāra reveals the true nature of the self and the world as emptiness, which can completely free us from the ever-increasing tendency to be self-centered and to cling to the existence of the external world. “If all phenomena are empty of self-nature, there is nothing to cling to and nothing to reject. Suffering cannot arise (Connelly 2016, p. 152).” Yogācāra’s method to observe emptiness can provide anyone who is willing to practice Yogācāra meditation with a way to get rid of suffering and move towards a life of happiness, compassion, and wisdom.
(2)
Psychoanalytic Method of Treatment
Psychoanalytic treatment is centered on the transformation of the unconscious to the conscious. “The task of a psycho-analytic treatment can be expressed in this formula: its task is to make conscious everything that is pathogenically unconscious” (Freud 1917, p. 282). Therefore, psychoanalytic treatment is committed to getting patients to speak out about their pathogenic unconsciousness. Specific methods include: free association and dream analysis, etc. (Sommers-Flanagan 2018).
Free association is the basic rule of psychoanalysis. Each treatment usually starts with free association, that is, letting the patient say whatever comes to mind, no matter how embarrassing or guilty the thoughts in his mind are at the time, he should speak without reservation. It is this free and relaxed speech that allows the unconscious mental events that were suppressed in the past to emerge. The purpose of free association is to make the patient and the therapist aware of the trauma, conflict or desire hidden in the patient’s unconsciousness. However, defense mechanisms (such as repression, denial, rationalization, etc.) often hinder free association, so sometimes it is necessary to use the method of dream interpretation to make patients aware of their thoughts or conflicts in the unconscious. “We already know that the state of sleep in itself leads to a certain relaxation of the repressions. A repressed drive, owing to this reduction in the pressure weighing down upon it, becomes able to express itself far more clearly in a dream than it can be allowed to be expressed by a symptom during the day. The study of dreams, therefore, becomes the most convenient means of access to a knowledge of the repressed unconscious, of which the libido withdrawn from the ego forms a part (Freud 1917, p. 456).” Dreams are the bridge between the conscious and the unconscious. They are also the product of the resonance between recent experiences and thoughts (the conscious) and past experiences (the unconscious). In dreams, even very remote experiences of childhood emerge from the unconscious and are transformed into dream images, which, if not forgotten, can enter the conscious and become the consciousness of the dreamer.
The object of psychoanalytic treatment is neurosis. Freud abandoned the popular somatic reductionism and boldly proposed that the symptoms of neurosis are very meaningful to patients, and the reason why patients do not know this meaning is that this meaning has been repressed into the unconscious. For example, the root of obsessive–compulsive disorder lies in the unconscious. “Everywhere the sense of the symptoms is unknown to the patient, and that analysis regularly shows that these symptoms are derivatives of unconscious processes (Freud 1917, pp. 278–79).” This results in the fact that no matter how obsessive-compulsive patients suppress conscious opposing thoughts at the conscious level, they cannot really overcome it, because the root of opposing thoughts is in the unconscious.
Freud subdivided the formation of two kinds of symptoms. The first situation is that it was conscious at the beginning and then unconscious. The second situation is that it was always unconscious. But no matter what, symptoms are extremely dependent on unconscious mental processes. In the process of symptom formation from the conscious into the unconscious, repression plays a key role. Repression is the mental process of turning the conscious into the unconscious. In addition, the root of repression is the mental function responsible for censorship, which pushes those painful, immoral, and illegal mental processes back to the unconscious system (Freud 1917, p. 342). In addition, when explaining the formation of symptoms, Freud not only introduced the concept of repression, but also introduced the concept of preconsciousness, and established a mental dynamic mechanism from the unconscious to the preconscious, then to the conscious, and then vice versa. Freud used a very famous spatial metaphor: the reception room is used to represent the unconscious system, a smaller salon space is used to represent the preconscious, the end of the salon space is used to represent the conscious, and the guard is used to represent impedance. The guard is between the reception room and the salon space. If the guard believes that the visitor in the reception room is not in compliance with the regulations, he will not allow him to enter the salon space. This is equivalent to the suppression of unconscious activities, and the guard is equivalent to the resistance that psychoanalysis wants to eliminate (Freud 1917, pp. 295–6). In addition, dreams and mental illness will make the guard relax the requirements for entry.
In the formation of neurotic symptoms, because the (often traumatic and possibly immoral) mental processes do not become conscious in the normal way, symptoms replace the unfinished mental processes and appear in the consciousness. Correspondingly, the unfinished mental processes are repressed in the unconscious. This repression makes the repressed mental processes seem unfinished. These mental processes constantly seek to complete themselves, which provides the energy to maintain symptoms. Therefore, psychoanalytic treatment does not seem to eliminate the repressed mental processes, but to promote their completion. The way psychoanalysis promotes the completion of the mental processes that caused past trauma is to let these processes pass through the barrier between the unconscious and the conscious, observe them in the conscious, treat them with indifference, and not judge their superiority or inferiority. The awareness of the mind no longer supports some mental processes and represses others as in the past, but only acts as a bystander, allowing all mental processes to confront each other at the conscious level.

4. The Mutual Enrichment Between Yogācāra Buddhism and Psychoanalysis

Yogācāra is a major branch of Buddhism, and it advocates an ancient spiritual practice. The premise of this practice is the devout belief in the truth revealed by the Buddha. But today is an era dominated by natural sciences and an era of conflict between multiple religious beliefs. It is difficult for most people today to understand the teachings of Yogācāra, let alone practice according to the requirements of Yogācāra. From the perspective of psychoanalysis, the teachings of Yogācāra are not religious dogmas that are far away from everyday life, but make people completely free from the pain of the mind, and the practice of Yogācāra is a specific way to get rid of afflictive emotions and delusions.

4.1. Possible Enrichment of Psychoanalysis to Yogācāra Buddhism

From a psychoanalytic perspective, Yogācāra Buddhism can be understood as an ancient form of psychotherapy. The Yogācāra explanation of suffering through the ālayavijñāna fits the psychoanalytic explanation of neurosis through the unconscious. The ālayavijñāna explains the reasons behind a person’s behavior, his tendencies, and how these tendencies lead to a deterioration in his mental health. If a person plants bad karmic seeds in ālayavijñāna (i.e., adopting bad behaviors, clinging to negative thoughts), then he has sown the seeds for a future deterioration in his mental health. Accordingly, if a person wants to change his mental health, he must strive to adopt beneficial behaviors (e.g., practicing mindfulness or meditation). The Yogācāra teachings and practices not only help people understand and change habitual ways of thinking and behaving, but also help people take positive actions (Trejo 2022). Through the lens of psychoanalysis, one can understand Yogācāra as an ancient form of psychotherapy.
In addition, the self-psychology of psychoanalysis, with its emphasis on the function of the self, makes it easier for practitioners of Yogācāra to reach the “Middle Way,” a state between neither self nor non-self. Kohut (1966) proposes the ideal of the mature self. A mature person possesses empathy, creativity, humor, the acceptance of transience, and wisdom (Riker 2020). The mature self has certain Buddhist attributes because it transcends the primary self and integrates into the universe. As Engler claims, there should be a stage of self before the stage of no-self. “The Buddhist teaching that one has no enduring self (‘emptiness’, no-self) is open to a fateful misinterpretation in our Western context, namely, that I do not need to struggle to find out who I am……The no-self doctrine seems to relieve me of the burden of these tasks and to justify their premature abandonment: if I am (spiritually) nobody, then I don’t need to become (mentally) somebody (Engler 2003, pp. 37–8).” Furthermore, those who readily accept the doctrine of “no-self” are often the empaths, and they are easily vulnerable to harm from individuals with narcissistic personality disorders due to their low narcissism (Teri 2022). The function of self, emphasized by Kohut and Engler, can help people avoid misunderstanding the Yogācāra’s doctrine of “no-self” and thus relinquish their self. People can easily move from the doctrine of “no-self” to the view of nothingness, which the Buddha himself resolutely opposes. “This is why I say it is better to believe in a self as big as Mount Sumeru than to give rise to the vain and empty view of nothingness (Pine 2012, p. 178).”

4.2. Possible Enrichment of Yogācāra Buddhism to Psychoanalysis

Yogācāra Buddhism can also provide enrichment to psychoanalysis. Freud discovered that symptoms are rooted in the unconscious. This discovery elevated psychoanalysis from a purely medical treatment to a profound philosophy of mind. However, Freud relied only on clinical practice and theoretical thinking, which prevented him from entering the real unconsciousness. Instead, he could only explore a tiny part that was transformed from the unconscious. However, since psychoanalysts lack spiritual training like the mindful meditation of Buddhists, they cannot extend the consciousness to the real unconscious realm. Through practice of mindful meditation, the Buddha realized the existence of the ālayavijñāna and truly solved the mystery of the unconscious. Yogācāra Buddhism can make the following supplements to psychoanalysis.
Psychoanalysis advocates tracing symptoms back to the unconscious and linking current mental events with past mental events, but from the perspective of Yogācāra Buddhism, this is far from enough. Although psychoanalysis can be traced back to infancy or even the womb, when a certain time point is set as the initial time point, the question will logically arise: what was before this? Philosopher Kant has recognized this difficulty (he called it the antinomy), so he proposed that reason is limited and that problems that reason cannot solve should be left to faith (Kant 1999). Psychoanalysis can only deal with a posteriori problems, without considering a priori problems. Yogācāra Buddhism advocates that there should be no starting point for human life; otherwise, the question of what is before the starting point will arise. If infancy (or even the womb) is not the beginning of a person’s life, then trauma or bad behavioral habits may come from an earlier time point (previous life). Of course, the Yogācāra’s concept of reincarnation may not be accepted by most people today. But the inspiration brought by Yogācāra Buddhism is that if the construction of personality precedes the time point that psychoanalysis can reach, then all the analyst and the patient can do is accept or endure the symptoms produced by a specific personality.
Psychoanalysis claims that when unconscious drives or desires cannot be satisfied, they are repressed into the unconscious, resulting in mental symptoms. Therefore, psychoanalytic therapy usually aims to relieve repression. Freud said: “It is true on the one hand that a thought which has to be warded off cannot become conscious, because it has undergone repression; but on the other hand, it sometimes happens that a thought of this kind is only repressed because for other reasons it has been withdrawn from conscious perception. Here are some hints of which we take advantage in our therapeutic procedure in order to undo repressions which have already been effected (Freud 1900, p. 617).” Although Freud proposed the sublimation mechanism, that is, sexual drive can be released through non-sexual channels (such as arts and sciences). But from the perspective of Yogācāra, Freud overestimates the evil aspects of the unconscious and ignores the good aspects. There are not only seeds of evil but also seeds of good in ālayavijñāna. Libido is not the deepest and most essential element of ālayavijñāna. Yogācāra claims that it is human nature to get rid of delusions and pursue wisdom (i.e., Buddha nature). Desires come from the unconscious, which does not mean that they must be satisfied. Therefore, if psychoanalysis can reach a deeper level, then the goal of the analysis should be to understand the deep human nature of purity and wisdom, that is, Buddha nature.

5. Conclusions

Despite my attempts to show the similarity between Yogācāra Buddhism and psychoanalysis, it is difficult to deny that there are great conceptual differences between the ālayavijñāna and the unconscious. In Yogācāra Buddhism, ālayavijñāna was developed in the context of the Buddha’s realization of the ultimate truth, the path to transcendence. In psychoanalysis, on the contrary, the unconscious was developed in the context of the psychoanalyst’s treatment of the neuroses faced by his patients, in order to better live in the world. The Buddha is the Great Physician, who is there to cure all human diseases. Without considering the context in which the Yogācāra teachings of no self and emptiness were developed, it is difficult to understand the model of the mind with the ālayavijñāna at its core. This model is there to cure all human diseases of afflictive emotions and delusions. It is quite difficult to explain these teachings completely in psychoanalytic terms. This is because psychoanalytic terms were invented in clinical situations to solve the problems of neurosis, while the Yogācāra teachings cover the fundamental problems that people can recognize.
Despite this conceptual gap, I believe that a dialogue between the two fields is still possible because they both attempt to treat human mental disorders through the path of the unconscious. The ālayavijñāna referred to by Yogācāra Buddhism is the unconscious, which is the most fundamental concept. They also both argue that what humans do is constrained by what they are not aware of. This commonality is the basis for making a dialogue between them possible.
Finally, I believe that despite the conceptual gap in practice, a dialogue between Yogācāra Buddhism and psychoanalysis can further clarify both. As I pointed out above, I hope that Yogācāra believers can realize the dangers of the doctrine of no-self to some people with a relatively weak sense of self. The practice of psychoanalysis to strengthen the self is beneficial to such people. On the other hand, psychoanalysts can dig deeper into the mysteries of the human mind by exploring the ālayavijñāna revealed by Yogācāra Buddhism. The trend of the entire society becoming more and more involved makes it increasingly necessary for people to have a deeper exploration of the human mind. Only an enlightened person can truly cope with this increasingly challenging world.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

No new data were created or analyzed in this study. Data sharing is not applicable to this article.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflict of interest.

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