Beauty in Petrus Hispanus’s Commentary on De Divinis Nominibus

Abstract

Although an edition of Petrus Hispanus’ commentary on Pseudo-Dionysius’ De divinis nominibus has long been available, his contribution to the pivotal question of beauty—so extensively explored by medieval commentators on this treatise—has remained virtually unnoticed. This article seeks to address that lacuna by examining the principal passages devoted to beauty, primarily in Chapter 4, where Pseudo-Dionysius’s presents God as subsistent beauty and as the source of both good and beauty, thereby articulating a profound connection between goodness, beauty and being. The study undertakes a comparative analysis of Petrus Hispanus’ commentary and the gloss on the same Dionysian text by Thomas Gallus, upon whom Petrus Hispanus depends to a considerable degree. This comparison reveals that, in the section on beauty, Petrus Hispanus offers a richer and more nuanced treatment than Gallus’ paraphrase. The theme of beauty emerges in close relation to the soul’s ascent toward God within a Christian framework deeply shaped by Neoplatonic thought. While Petrus Hispanus retains traditional descriptions of beauty—such as harmony or order—he also emphasizes its intelligible nature more strongly than either Dionysius or Vercelli did, assigning to the intellect a privileged role in the apprehension of beauty.

1. Introduction

Theological and philosophical reflection on beauty provides a privileged context for contemplating how the image becomes associated with word in the dissemination of religious faith in Middle Ages. Medieval Christianity uses images to convey its dogmatic teachings, while its intellectuals develop a reflection on beauty as a characteristic feature of God, who diffuses it in different ways in His creatures.

Despite the conceptual importance of beauty, we have to wait until the 15th century, in the late Middle Ages, to find a treatise devoted exclusively to this notion, such as De venustate mundi et pulchritudine Dei by Dionysius the Carthusian (Torrijos-Castrillejo 2025). Most reflections on beauty during this period are scattered across works of different kinds, but the commentaries on Pseudo-Dionysius’ treatise De divinis nominibus occupy a prominent place (Marenbon 2011, p. 27). In the fourth chapter of this work, this Christian theologian, strongly influenced by Neoplatonism, speaks of God as beautiful and as the source of beauty in the universe. Commenting on this work, Albertus Magnus composed what is probably the most important reflection of 13th century scholasticism on the question of beauty (Anzulewicz 2018, 2025; Costarelli Brandi 2015; Llamas Roig 2023). In these pages, we will deal with a somewhat earlier commentary, attributed to Petrus Hispanus, which was neglected by the most important scholars of medieval thought on beauty throughout the 20th century (Maritain 1920; Panofsky 1951; De Bruyne 1955; Tatarkiewicz 1962; Assunto 1982; Eco 1987) and even later.

Petrus Hispanus’ commentaries on Pseudo-Dionysius are still largely unknown. To give an example, despite his considerable stature among the great intellectuals of the 13th century, he has been overlooked as a commentator on Pseudo-Dionysius in the recent comprehensive work edited by Edwards et al. (2022). For this reason, although we have had an edition of his commentary on De divinis nominibus for quite some time, his contribution to the important question of beauty has until now been neglected, with the exception of some paragraphs in an article by Pouillon (1946, pp. 284–85). This article predates the aforementioned edition by Manuel Alonso by more than a decade. He published this work together with a series of commentaries on Pseudo-Dionysius, which he attributes to Peter of Lisbon, the future Pope John XXI (Petrus Hispanus 1957). According to Alonso Alonso (1957), all these commentaries were written by the same author and were composed between 1246 and 1250. This dating takes into account the obvious dependence of Thomas of Vercelli’s (Thomas Gallus’) gloss on the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius. Alonso also identifies differences between them: although many pericopes coincide, there is notably greater dissimilarity in the commentary on De divinis nominibus (Alonso Alonso 1957, p. LI). He also points out that it uses the translation by John Sarracenus, preferring it to that of John Scotus Eriugena.

It has recently become increasingly clear that the Petrus Hispanus who later ascended to the papacy as John XXI cannot be identified as the author of the Summulae logicales (pace De Rijk 1970, 1972). His authorship of the commentaries on Pseudo-Dionysius has been questioned by Ruello (1952, pp. 167–69) and more recently, without detailed analysis, by D’Ors (2001, p. 252). However, Barbosa (1982, pp. 25–28) and Meirinhos (1996, p. 72; 2002, pp. 253–68; 2018, p. 357) regard these commentaries as authentic. For the purposes of this study, I will therefore refer to the author of the commentaries on Pseudo-Dionysius simply as Petrus Hispanus. Due to these critical issues, I will also omit a comparison with other works attributed to Petrus Hispanus.

Without a doubt, Petrus Hispanus’ gloss is based on the Extractio by Thomas of Vercelli (which may be consulted in Dionysius Cartusianus (1902, pp. 203–5) for our section; it is also printed in Petrus Hispanus (1957, pp. 595–663)). This paraphrase should not be confused with Vercelli’s Explanatio (Lawell 2022, p. 380), reproduced in Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio Mediaevalis 223 (Thomas Gallus 2011). In general terms, Petrus Hispanus follows Thomas of Vercelli’s Extractio quite closely, yet regularly supplements it with clarifications intended to elucidate almost each statement or even word. Moreover, as noted above, he modifies the reading of Dionysius’ text in accordance with the version by John Sarracenus. Given his relevance for 13th century aesthetics, it should also be noted that Petrus Hispanus was familiar with the commentaries on Pseudo-Dionysius and the Canticle of Canticles by Pseudo-Thomas Gallus (Lawell 2024, pp. 37–39; 2025, p. 200).

In the following pages, I will focus on the section of the fourth chapter of De divinis nominibus devoted to beauty. I will then outline Petrus Hispanus’ distinctive contribution to this commentary. To do so, I will highlight the points at which he diverges from the commentary of Vercelli and examine the ways in which he develops his own paraphrase. Although this portion of the work does not yield especially innovative insights on the notion of beauty, its close study offers a valuable opportunity to consider Petrus Hispanus’ methodological approach to the Dionysian text. Within this section, we will first encounter the portrayal of God as Beauty itself and as the source of all created beauty. Second, the text of Pseudo-Dionysius allows us to reflect on the mystical ascent toward God as the origin of every form of beauty. Third, God—understood as supreme Beauty—appears as the ultimate object of the creature’s love.

2. The First Cause as Beauty and Source of Beauty

A first point of divergence between the paraphrases of Vercelli and Petrus Hispanus appears in the section on beauty in Chapter 4. On this occasion, I reproduce both texts, as they offer a clear illustration of Petrus Hispanus’ method in his gloss. In the passage from Petrus Hispanus (here and throughout), I italicise the verbal correspondences with the translation of John Sarracenus used by Petrus Hispanus himself and transcribed by Manuel Alonso; additionally, I underline those elements that reveal his dependence on Thomas of Vercelli:

Thomas Gallus (1902, p. 203bD)

Petrus Hispanus (1957, pp. 329–30)

Et ex ipsa praexistente, pulchra omnia existentia habent esse pulchrum, singula secundum proportionem suam; et propter pulchrum sunt omnium concordiae et amicitiae et communiones, et pulchro omnia uniuntur. Thanks to this pre-existing nature, all existing beautiful things become beautiful, each according to its proportion. Because of beauty all the concords, all the friendships, and all the communions are born, and by virtue of beauty all things unite.

Et ex ista sic preexistente, pulchra omnia existentia habent esse pulchra, singula secundum suam proportionem. Et propter pulchrum, idest amore pulchritudinis sunt omnium concordie in rebus naturalibus, omnium amicitie in rebus spiritualibus, omnium conmuniones in celestibus spiritibus. Vel sunt omnium concordie in materiis, amicitie in formis, conmuniones in conpositis. Et pulchro omnia uniuntur ut magis unita magis fiant pulchra. Thanks to this pre-existing nature, all existing beautiful things become beautiful, each according to its proportion. Because of beauty, that is, for the sake of beauty, all the concords in natural things, all the friendships in spiritual things, and all the communions in the heavenly spirits are born. In other way: All concords in material things, friendships in forms, and communions in compounds are born. By virtue of beauty, all things unite so that, the more they unite, the more beautiful they are.

In this passage, it becomes evident that Petrus Hispanus aims to clarify in greater detail those points that Vercelli left unexamined (he does not address them in either his Extractio or his Expositio). In particular, Petrus Hispanus seeks to specify more precisely the meaning of the Dionysian triad concordiae, amicitiae and communiones, which he first associates with three types of union: he links ‘concord’ to the union found in natural things, ‘friendship’ to the union characteristic of spiritual beings, and ‘communion’ to the union established among celestial spirits. Secondly, his exegesis refers not to three distinct spheres of reality, but to three components of creatures: concord is associated with matter, friendship with form, and communion with composites.1

Alonso Alonso (1957, p. XXXVII) has used this latter passage to argue that the commentator holds natural things to be composed of materia, forma, compositum, and virtus—a conception that is indeed quite distinctive and which, according to Alonso, finds a notable parallel in the commentary on the De anima attributed to Petrus Hispanus (materia, forma, compositum, and essentia).

Petrus Hispanus then adds a brief paragraph to Vercelli’s explanation, supplementing it by restricting the ‘motion’ of the first cause to the bestowal of sensorial capacities and locomotion upon animate beings. Unlike Vercelli, he makes explicit that God ‘contains all things’ in the sense that he preserves them:

[…] continens omnia, singula in propria natura conservans, amore videlicet proprie pulchritudinis. Pulchritudo enim creature est pulchritudo cause. Unde eam servat sicut propriam. Vel aliter: continet ea amore proprie pulchritudinis, quia amando propriam pulchritudinem velut causam continet alienam sicut effectum cause. Non enim potest amari causa sine effectu eius et sic amor cause continentia est effectus.

(Petrus Hispanus 1957, p. 330)

[The first cause] contains all things, preserving each of them in its own nature, for the sake of its own beauty. The beauty of the creature is the beauty of its cause. Therefore, it preserves it as its own. In other way: It contains them for the sake of its own beauty, because, loving its own beauty as a cause, it contains the beauty of the others as the effect of that cause. Certainly, the cause cannot be loved without its effect, and thus the love of the cause also contains the effect.

A creature’s beauty does not depend on itself but on its cause; the first cause, through its conserving action, sustains the beauty imparted to the creature. Here too, Petrus Hispanus offers a second interpretation: the first cause may be said to contain created beauty within itself, insofar as every cause virtually possesses its effect. The first cause’s love for its own beauty thus contains the beauty of creatures, inasmuch as every effect is contained within its cause.

At this point, Dionysius turns to God’s exemplary and final causality. Vercelli supplements this by explaining that such exemplarity is located in the divine Word.2 Petrus Hispanus, however, omits this reference to the Word and instead appeals to the identification of the good with the beauty, which appears shortly thereafter in the Dionysian text. With regard to final causality, Petrus Hispanus develops the point more fully than Vercelli, offering two interpretations:

Et ipsum pulchrum est finis omnium sicut finalis causa, quia omnis intentio creature ibi finitur. Etenim pulchri causa cuncta fiunt ut videlicet eterne pulchritudini creata pulchritudo coniungatur. Vel causa pulchri cuncta fiunt ut fiat refluxus rivuli ad fontem vel effectus ad causam. Unde sicut a bono fluxerunt cuncta bona, sic a pulchro fluxerunt omnia pulchra.

(Petrus Hispanus 1957, p. 330)

Beauty itself is the end of all things as a final cause, because every intention of the creature is finalised in it. Thus, all things are produced because of beauty, so that created beauty is united with eternal beauty. In other way: All things are produced because of beauty so that there is a reflux from the stream to the source or from the effect to the cause. Therefore, just as all good things have flowed from the good, so too have all beautiful things flowed from the beautiful.

The fact that the first cause is also the final cause is explained by the orientation of every creature’s intentio towards it. The generation of things entails a certain union with the first cause, insofar as they are produced by it as by an end. This is reflected in the second interpretation offered by our author, which understands this dynamic as a return-flow from effect to cause. Such an account enables him to speak of the procession of creatures within the metaphysics of fluxus.

When he reaches the well-known Dionysian passage identifying the bonum and the pulchrum, in connection with the claim that everything participates in both, Petrus Hispanus adds the following explanation to Vercelli’s text:

Quia quicquid habent existentia quamvis minima, omnia sunt rationem pulchritudinis et bonitatis habentia set secundum plus et minus. Que vero minus habent vel plus, non solum illud sibi desiderant conservari set etiam augmentari. Dicamus autem audacter quod non tantum illa que sunt actu existentia, set etiam illa que habere non possunt actum conpletum essendi, ut est instans vel momentum quod partim est et partim non est, quasi medium inter ens et non ens, participat pulchro et bono, quia quantumcumque de ente capiat modicum, est tamen pulchrum et bonum.

(Petrus Hispanus 1957, pp. 330–31)

Everything that existing things possess, even their smallest possession, has the character of beauty and goodness, albeit to a greater or lesser degree. Things that possess less or more not only desire to preserve it, but also to increase it. Let us say, then, boldly that not only things that exist in act [desire it], but also those that cannot possess the complete act of being. For example, a thing, during the instant or moment when it is partly and partly not, as an intermediate between being and non-being, even it participates in beauty and goodness, because, even though it takes only a little of being, it is nevertheless beautiful and good.

Petrus Hispanus explains that all entities—even those with minimal ontological consistency—participate in goodness and beauty, though in varying degrees. This participation gives rise to an appetite for the increase of that goodness and beauty. He paraphrases the words of Pseudo-Dionysius concerning the participation of ‘non-being’ in goodness and beauty (audebit autem et hoc dicere sermo quod et non existens participat pulchro et bono), interpreting this ‘non-being’ as a reference to motion: even a transitory form, an imperfect act, therefore participates in the good and the beautiful. This is noteworthy, because this phrase is not found in Thomas Gallus’s Extractio (assuming that the non-critical version printed in the work of Dionysius the Carthusian is accurate). In his Expositio, Gallus does consider the sentence, but interprets it in relation to the contemplation of angelic intelligence, which is called ‘non-being’ on account of its excessive knowledge, not because of any deficiency (Thomas Gallus 2011, p. 215, lines 874–75). In this respect, Petrus Hispanus’ exposition shows a closer approximation than Vercelli’s to a ‘transcendental’ view of pulchrum, understood as a feature traceable in things insofar as they are beings—although we are still far from the claim that ens and pulchrum are convertibilia, as affirmed by Ulrich of Strassburg, Dionysius the Carthusian, and Jean Gerson (Torrijos-Castrillejo 2024, notes 6, 8, 10, 12 and 13).

3. The Relation of Angels and Souls to the Fluxus Proceeding from the First Cause

The following section offers Petrus Hispanus an opportunity to unpack the precise meaning of each of Dionysius’ terms in far greater detail than Thomas of Vercelli provides, incorporating along the way a couple of biblical citations. Then, after Dionysius has spoken of the motion of angelic intellects, Petrus Hispanus pauses his paraphrase to insert an extended commentary, which I reproduce here:

Nota differentiam inter motum circularem, directum et obliquum. Motus enim circularis in angelis est tantum ad accipiendum divinas distributiones sine intermissione et sine mensuratione. Sine intermissione quo ad se, quia semper tendit in Deum et movetur ut semper magis habeat Deum. Sine mensuratione vero quo ad ipsum Deum qui, quantum in ipso est, in conmunicando se angelis sine mensura est. Est enim non solum effluens set et supereffluens. Ideo enim iste motus dicitur circularis, quia, sicut a centro ad circumferentiam exeunt infinite linee, sic a Deo ad animam infinite gratie et intelligentie, que sicut circulus sunt sine principio et fine, quia ab eodem fluentes ad eundem sunt sine deficientia revertentes. Motus vero rectus et obliquus non sunt ad accipiendum sed ad conmunicandum, licet differenter. Nam in motu angeli directo tota intentio, tota affectio et tota angeli operatio est ut inferioribus conmunicet de dato sibi lumine. Et sicut ipse qui movetur directus est totaliter ad dandum, sic inferiores directi et recti sunt totaliter ad accipiendum. Ideo recta omnia dicuntur pertransire, quia tam in dante quam in accipiente est rectitudo. Nichil enim a dante accipit qui se ad hoc accipiendum non erigit. In motu vero angeli obliquo quanquam tota intentio et affectio angeli feratur ad dandum non tamen tota operatio, que videlicet est circa pulchrum et bonum et bonum chorum agens, idest pulchritudinis et bonitatis sue fontem principalem laudans; licet autem in dante non sit operatio vel actio ut inferiori conmunicationem faciat, est tamen intenta et affectuosa oblatio ut accipiat. Que quidem oblatio nichil aliud est quam proprii luminis representatio quam sic ferre offerre est. Manet ergo circa laudem boni actu set lumen offert affectu.

(Petrus Hispanus 1957, pp. 333–34)

Notice the difference between circular, direct, and oblique motion. [A] On one hand, circular motion occurs only in angels, in order to take divine distributions without interruption and without measure. Without interruption in relation to himself, because he always tends towards God and moves in such a way that he always possesses more and more of God. Without measure in relation to God, because He has no measure in communicating Himself to angels. In fact, He is not only emanating, but superemanating. Therefore, this motion is called “circular” because, just as infinite lines emanate from the centre towards the circumference, so too infinite graces and intelligences spring from God towards the soul, which are like a circle, without beginning or end, because they flow from Him and return to Him without diminution. On the other hand, straight and oblique motion are not directed towards taking anything, but towards communicating something, although each in a different way. [B] In the direct motion of the angel, the angel’s entire intention, affection and operation is to communicate to those below something of the light that has been given to him. Just as the one who moves with direct motion is totally oriented towards giving, so too are his inferiors totally directed and oriented towards receiving. Consequently, it is said that he passes through all things straight, because there is straightness both in the one who gives and in the one who receives. Whoever is not ready to receive this receives nothing from the giver. [C] However, in the angel’s oblique motion, although all the angel’s intention and affection is directed towards giving, not all of his operation does so, which seems to act in relation to beauty, goodness and good harmony, that is, he praises his main source of beauty and goodness. Although there is no operation or action in the giver that produces communication with the lower, there is a deliberate and affectionate offering for the lower to receive. Such an offering is nothing other than the representation of the own light of the giver. To carry such a representation in this way is to offer it. Therefore, by his act, he remains in regard to the praise of the good, but by his affection, he offers light.

As we can see, he lingers over the threefold distinction between circular, rectilinear and oblique angelic motion—a topic extensively examined by commentators on Pseudo-Dionysius. For Petrus Hispanus, circular motion [A] expresses the communication that God maintains with the angels, a communication marked by perpetuity and superabundance. The first meaning he assigns to this ‘circular motion’ is not strictly grounded in circularity itself; rather, he employs the image of the circle to evoke the typically Neoplatonic radiation from centre to circumference. Yet, when he turns to explain the characteristics of the flow of intellectual gifts from the first cause—namely, perpetuity and superabundance—he does appeal to circularity as such: this flow springs from God and returns to Him, for these intellectual gifts enable the angels’ reditio to the first cause and a more profound communion with God.

The other two angelic motions refer to the communication of what the angel receives from God to those beneath him. His rectilinear motion [B] is wholly devoted to giving, whereas his oblique motion [C] does not in fact give anything; rather, he manifests to his inferiors what he is disposed to give, doing so by displaying his own reflected radiance.

This threefold account of the angelic motion has played a significant historical role in discussions of the modes of contemplation, which explains why Petrus Hispanus likewise emphasises it. Similarly, a little later—when Dionysius turns from angels to souls—Petrus Hispanus again inserts a substantial digression into his paraphrase. Let us first consider the circular motion of the soul:

Nota breviter circularem motum anime esse quando de interioribus ad exteriora investiganda egreditur et de exterioribus3 ad interiora regreditur et per memoriam et rationem ad intelligentiam circumvolvitur. Nec per talem circumvolutionem errare a se permittitur set ad se ipsam convertitur a multiplici rerum consideratione revocata. Deinde minuens suas cogitationes faciem suam ad se convertit, sola soli intendens. Sicque uniformis facta, quia tantum sibi soli est intenta unitur suis virtutibus, scilicet deiformi intellectui et affectui, per quorum alterum in summam pulchritudinem sive unitatem, per alium vero in summam per excessum manuducitur bonitatem. Que quidem pulchra bonitas et bona pulchritudo omnia superans sicut circulus est. Cuius circumferentie uniformiter se habent ad centrum. Et ipse circulus nec principium habet nec finem. Centrum anime dicere possumus cor a quo procedunt cogitationes sicut circumferentie. Unde quando anima cogitationes a corde exeuntes et in consideratione creaturarum pure egredientes ad ipsum cor sine aliqua distractione vel dispersione revocat et per ipsas quietatas in Deum movetur, tunc motus circularis agi dicitur. Quia videlicet a se egrediens et per creaturas progrediens in Deum est ingrediens.

(Petrus Hispanus 1957, p. 335)

Note briefly that the circular motion of the soul occurs when it leaves its interiority to investigate the exterior, returns from the exterior to its interior, and, through memory and reason, returns to intelligence. This circumvolution does not allow it to wander far from itself, but rather returns to itself, being summoned back after considering the multitude of things. Then, slowing down its thoughts, it turns its face back to itself, seeking to be alone with the One who is alone. Thus it becomes uniform, because, focusing only on itself, it unites all its forces—that is, its deiform intellect and affection—through which it is led by the hand by superabundance: through one of these forces [i.e., intellect], to supreme beauty or unity; through the other [i.e., affection], to supreme goodness. This beautiful goodness and this good beauty surpass all things, just as the circle, whose circumferences are uniformly located with respect to the centre. The circle itself has neither beginning nor end. We can call the heart the “centre of the soul”, from which thoughts proceed like circumferences. Therefore, when the soul calls back to itself the thoughts that come from the heart and which, when considering creatures, return with purity to the heart without any distraction or dispersion, and the soul moves towards God thanks to such calm thoughts, then it is said that circular motion occurs. In effect, it comes out of itself, moves through creatures and enters into God.

We are presented with a path of contemplation that begins with the soul’s ecstasy outside itself and is followed by a return to its own interiority. Along this path, understanding and will play a central role, for through them beauty and goodness are attained. Here, beauty is identified as the object of understanding and goodness as the object of the will. In its return, the soul becomes unified within the immanence of its own spirit, having previously been dispersed among the multiplicity of external things, and comes to rest in self-knowledge—a ‘solitude’ in which God is present. This repose is likewise unifying for the soul. It is the Neoplatonic ascent of the soul, which achieves unity by returning to itself, as later reshaped by authors such as Augustine into an encounter with God. Dionysius had also already integrated this Neoplatonic process into his conception of theosis (Russell 2004, pp. 258–62; De Andia 2022, pp. 659–61). After treating the circular motion of the soul, Petrus Hispanus proceeds to explain its oblique motion:

Oblique autem dicitur moveri a se quando secundum capacitatem naturalem a Deo illuminatur non intellectuali et simplici illuminatione set rationali et symbolica iuxta conditionem mortalium. Et sicut temporali et transitoria contemplatione a variis et multiplicibus creaturis elevatur ad contemplationes divine cognitionis que simplificant et uniunt animam in Deo. Nota quod motus anime obliquus non incipit ab illuminatione intellectuali que est spiritualis set a rationali que diffuse investigat bonitatem Dei in creaturis. Et ista talis illuminatio est quasi naturalis quia ad creaturas anima exeundo et quasi se eis per cogitationem conmunicando et per eas transitum faciendo per varias et multiplices creaturarum considerationes ad divinas agitur contemplationes. Quibus mediantibus que erat iam quasi in eorum consideratione materialis et multiplex facta, fit in Deo simplex per deiformem intellectum et una per deiformem affectum.

(Petrus Hispanus 1957, pp. 335–36)

On the other hand, it is said to move with oblique motion when it is illuminated by God according to its natural capacity, not with intellectual and simple illumination, but with rational and symbolic illumination, in accordance with the condition of mortals; just as through temporal and transitory contemplation it is elevated from the varied and multiple creatures to the contemplations of divine knowledge that simplify and unite the soul in God. Notice that the oblique motion of the soul does not begin with intellectual illumination, which is spiritual, but with rational illumination, which investigates the goodness of God present diffusely in creatures. Such an illumination is similar to a natural one, because the soul, going out towards creatures, as if giving itself to them through thought and making a transition through them with varied and multiple considerations of creatures, is led to divine contemplations. Through them, the soul, which had already become, so to speak, material and multiple in its consideration of them, in God it becomes simple through its deiform intellect and becomes one through its deiform affection.

Here, oblique motion signifies a path that presupposes an illumination proportionate to the nature of the soul. Therefore, a more ‘rational’ than ‘intellectual’ mode of progress is set in motion, for it does not set aside the soul’s discursive character. On this path, the soul likewise goes out of itself, insofar as it disperses itself among creatures—yet it does so in order to travel through them on its journey toward God. Thus the soul, too, becomes unified and deiform. Finally, Petrus Hispanus turns to consider rectilinear motion:

Directe autem dicitur moveri anima quando ad exteriora progreditur non tamen inde ad se ipsam reflectitur, quod esset motus circularis; set ex illis tanquam simbolis multiplicibus ad ea que ipsam tangunt, progreditur. Ex hiis verbis colligitur quid sit directo motu animam moveri ad exteriora querendo divinam bonitatem moveri, non tamen ex exteriorum investigatione querit reflexionem ad sui intima set edificationem ad sui extrema, ut verbi gratia intima nostra sunt affectionum et cogitationum deificatio. Extrema vero sunt sensuum et morum conpositio. Tunc autem anima recte vel directe movetur, quando per exteriorum creaturarum ordinationem querit eorum que circa ipsam sunt, idest morum et sensuum conpositionem. Nota quod isti tres anime motus in hoc differunt: Quia circularis ab eodem incipit, idest a Deo, et in eodem desinit. Obliquus vero ab interiori incipit et per extrema progrediens in interioribus desinit. Directus autem ab exterioribus incipit et in proxima desinit.

(Petrus Hispanus 1957, p. 336)

It is said that the soul moves with rectilinear motion when it goes out towards the exterior, but does not reflect on itself from there, as happens in circular motion. Rather, it advances from external things, as if they were many symbols, to what interests it. From these words, we can deduce what it means for the soul to move with rectilinear motion: to move outward in search of divine goodness, but without seeking any reflection on its own intimacy after investigating the exterior, but rather seeking the edification of its own exteriority. The edification of our interiority consists of the deification of our affections and thoughts, while the edification of our exteriority is the arrangement of our senses and customs. The soul moves straight or with rectilinear motion when, through the ordering of external creatures, it seeks the arrangement of the things that concern it, that is, its customs and senses. Notice that these three motions of the soul differ in the following ways: the circular motion begins and ends at the same point, that is, in God; the oblique motion begins in the interior, continues through the exterior, and ends in the interior; the rectilinear motion begins in the exterior and ends in the proximate.

Rectilinear motion also possesses a certain ecstatic quality, yet it lacks the moment in which the soul returns to itself, as occurs in circular motion. It advances toward its goal, but not directly toward the first cause; rather, it concerns the external actions that human beings must rightly order. In particular, the ordering of customs and senses constitutes the kind of exteriority which the soul ‘moves’ in this rectilinear manner. Through this departure from itself, the soul nonetheless seeks the first cause as the supreme good toward which these external actions are ultimately directed.

Finally, we encounter a synthesis of the soul’s three motions. It becomes clearer that circular motion originates in God Himself, who bestows gifts upon the soul so that it may return to Him. Oblique motion begins in the soul, which goes forth toward creatures in order to return to itself. Rectilinear motion, by contrast, begins in the exterior and remains there—though in those external realities closest to the soul.

In this section, we perceive the extent to which Petrus Hispanus associates beauty with order, employing terms such as compositio and ordinatio. Indeed, in the opening chapter, he devoted a few words to beauty, departing from both John Sarracenus’ translation and Thomas of Vercelli’s paraphrase (from whom he borrows the reference to decor and armonia), writing as follows:

Laudatur ut sapiens et pulchra ipsa deitas. Quia omnia que ab ipsa creata sunt, in propria natura sine corruptione aliqua conservat et implet omni ordine et decore. Incorruptio igitur nature sive conservatio sine corruptione pertinet ad sapientiam. Armonia vero, idest ordo rerum et concordia et decor pertinet ad pulchritudinem, quasi dicat: Quia Deus sapiens est, omnia conservat sine lesione. Quia vero pulcher est, omnia implet concordia et decore.

(Petrus Hispanus 1957, p. 259)

Divinity is praised as wise and beautiful, because all things have been created by it, it preserves them in their own nature without any corruption, and fills them with all order and beauty. The incorruptibility of nature or its preservation without corruption is the work of wisdom. Harmony—that is, the order of things—concord and elegance are the work of beauty, as if to say: Since God is wise, He preserves all things without harm. Since He is beautiful, He fills all things with concord and elegance.

Order and harmony are notions closely related to those of concord, friendship and communion discussed earlier. God’s creative and conservative activity establishes an order within plurality, such that this order appears as a manifold and multiform expression of the one and homogeneous divine beauty.

4. Divine Beauty and Goodness as the Goal of Love

The following section offers a detailed enumeration of realities that proceed from the good and the beautiful, and find their consistency and purpose in them. As in the preceding pages, Petrus Hispanus does not merely reproduce Thomas of Vercelli’s paraphrase; rather, he supplements each term with clarifications and illustrative examples to elucidate the concepts. The previous paragraph established that the good and the beautiful are the causes of all things, and that all things tend toward them as their perfection.

In the section that follows, Dionysius begins by affirming that the good and the beautiful are—according to John Sarracenus’ translation—desiderabile, amabile, and diligibile. Petrus Hispanus, with characteristic thoroughness, distributes these three notions among divine power, wisdom, and goodness, presenting them as reasons for these three tendencies of creatures (Petrus Hispanus 1957, p. 340). A second interpretation of these concepts would link them not to divine attributes but to the three effects produced in animate beings: substantia, virtus, and actio, through which they acquire, respectively, esse, distinctio, and perfectio (Petrus Hispanus 1957, p. 341). Throughout this section, Petrus Hispanus also diverges somewhat from Thomas of Vercelli, adding further reflections on how all things desire the good and the beautiful—even when voluntary agents commit evil, in which case they are deceived by false goodness and beauty.

In the subsequent section, Petrus Hispanus shows himself to be even more independent of Thomas of Vercelli and, to some extent, of Pseudo-Dionysius’s own text. He not only supplements Dionysius’ account of God’s providential care for creatures with considerations on the supernatural order of grace and glory (Petrus Hispanus 1957, p. 342), but also introduces a reference to Trinitarian theology absent from both Dionysius and Vercelli. Dionysius’ mention of the fruitfulness of divine love provides the occasion for this development: drawing on the fruitfulness manifested in the divine processions, Petrus Hispanus relates it to the fruitfulness displayed in creatures:

Ipse enim amor qui operatur bona in existentibus, preexistens ab eterno in bono inconmutabili excessive, non permisit eum manere sine fecunditate germinis eternalis vel temporalis. Germina eternalia sunt filius et spiritus sanctus. Temporalia vero sunt omnes alie creature. Prima germina sic in Deo sunt quod Deus sunt. Alia vero sic in Deo sunt quod Deus sint per ydeam et sic a Deo sunt quod Deus non sunt per essentiam. Vere dico quod amor sic in Deo excedens et copiosus non fuit in Deo otiosus, sed movit ipsum ad creandum res secundum excessum bonitatis qui est generativus omnium. Quia enim Deus excessum habet amoris, ideo vicem gerere voluit creatoris, ut videlicet haberet a quo serviretur et qui tanta eius bonitatis dulcedine frueretur.

(Petrus Hispanus 1957, pp. 342–43)

The love, then, that produces goods in existing things and that pre-exists from eternity in the unchangeable and superabundant good, does not allow it to remain without the fruitfulness of an eternal or temporal seed. The Son and the Holy Spirit are eternal seeds, while all other creatures are temporal seeds. Therefore, the former seeds are in God in such a way that they are God Himself. The other things are in God in such a way that they are God by idea and, therefore, proceed from God in such a way that they are not God by essence. I say in truth that the excessive and copious love that is in God was not idle in God, but moved Him to create things according to the excess of His goodness, which is the generator of all things. Since God possesses an excess of love, He therefore wanted to take on the role of creator in order to have someone as a servant and to allow him to enjoy the immense sweetness of His goodness.

In addition to the eternal fruitfulness of divine love manifested in the processions of the Son and the Spirit, creation itself may be understood as a seed originating from God. By introducing here the doctrine of divine ideas, creatures are conceived as pre-existing in God as ideas, later receiving formation outside of Him. Unlike the two persons proceeding from the Father, these created seeds exist beyond God; they are not God Himself. This creative love reveals the superabundance of divine greatness while reaffirming the personal and free character of creation.

The section on beauty concludes at this point, once again paraphrasing the passage concerning the language we use to speak about God, with considerable reliance on Vercelli. From here onward, the focus shifts to the notion of love, and beauty assumes a less prominent role in the paraphrase.

5. Conclusions

Petrus Hispanus’ gloss on Pseudo-Dionysius’ De divinis nominibus is not among the most remarkable contributions to medieval thought on beauty. Perhaps for this reason, it has remained largely unnoticed until now. De Bruyne (1998, vol. 2, p. 161) mentions it without assigning particular importance, much as he does with Vercelli’s Extractio, preferring instead to focus on his Explanatio (De Bruyne 1998, vol. 2, pp. 58–71). Pouillon (1946, pp. 284–85) accords Petrus Hispanus’ paraphrase somewhat greater significance, though still only marginally.

Our study has made it possible to examine in detail how Petrus Hispanus engaged with Thomas Gallus’ text and to what extent his gloss reflects a personal character. It is neither a mere repetition nor simply a gloss on Vercelli’s paraphrase; rather, it incorporates personal reflections which, although often little more than brief notes, remain of genuine interest. At times, moreover, he introduces substantial paragraphs that give the work the character of a true commentary. Unfortunately, Petrus Hispanus’ significant contribution with respect to Vercelli is not primarily concerned with the question of beauty, but with the union of the angel and the soul with God. While Petrus Hispanus’ commentary is roughly contemporaneous with the influential commentary of Albertus Magnus (Resnick 2013, pp. 6–7), it nevertheless falls considerably short of addressing the notion of beauty with a similar degree of detail. It would accordingly be difficult to identify any discernible influence of Petrus Hispanus on the Dominican thinker under this aspect.

On the question of beauty, Petrus Hispanus had previously written in this same commentary P beauty (pulchritudo) is a divine name insofar as God is the source of all created beauty.4 It is not a name proper to any single divine person, but rather refers to the divine action by which gifts flow from the first cause to creatures. This also establishes a characteristically Neoplatonic return movement, reinterpreted within a Christian framework as a path of spiritual ascent.

The commentary on Chapter 4 does not offer a particularly original account of beauty, referring instead to order and harmony, and thus echoing traditional notions inherited from late antiquity, specially Augustine. It is noteworthy, for instance, that when distinguishing between beauty and goodness, Petrus Hispanus associates goodness with the will and beauty with the intellect: “deiformi intellectui et affectui, per quorum alterum [intellectus] in summam pulchritudinem sive unitatem, per alium [affectus] vero in summam per excessum manuducitur bonitatem” (Petrus Hispanus 1957, p. 335). Following Aertsen (2006, pp. 426–27), we can discern here a more cognitivist tendency, noticeable in the Dominican thought of Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, who understand pulchrum as closer to verum than to bonum—although this cognitivist tendency was already inchoated in the Summa Halensis (Costarelli Brandi 2025, pp. 118–20). Within this perspective, beauty appears primarily linked to contemplation and intellectual knowledge rather than to the goodness inherent in what is contemplated, which is nonetheless presupposed.

We also find a certain approximation to a transcendental view of beauty, insofar as Petrus Hispanus pays greater attention to its presence in being as being than does Thomas of Vercelli. Yet we remain far from a fully ‘transcendental’ understanding of pulchrum.