The Symposium of Methodius of Olympus and the Critique of Fatalism

Abstract

This study examines a specific section of the Symposium by Methodius of Olympus, a Church Father of the late 3rd and early 4th centuries, focusing on the critique of astrological fatalism. In Methodius’s Symposium, the virgin Thecla offers a series of rational arguments against the notion of an inescapable fate governing human events, emphasizing the primacy of human free will and responsibility. Notably, Thecla’s refutation of fatalism relies almost entirely on classical philosophical reasoning—citing Homer and echoing Platonic thought—rather than on Scripture, thereby engaging pagan cultural ideas on common ground. The paper highlights how Thecla’s excursus on fate, unique within the dialogue, underscores the centrality of human freedom in Methodius’s theology. Furthermore, a comparison with Methodius’s dialogue On Free Will suggests that the Symposium’s anti-fatalistic arguments are consistent with his broader defence of free will as God’s greatest gift to humanity, which requires the synergistic participation of human freedom alongside divine grace.

1. Introduction

The present study focuses on a rather limited section of the Symposium of Methodius of Olympus, a Church Father who lived at the turn of the third and fourth centuries. Little information has come down to us about Methodius. The main source, which in any case is not without contradictions and problematic aspects, is Jerome1. Which information can we consider reliable about the life of the author this article deals with? Most scholars agree that Methodius was a writer and bishop from Olympus in Lycia, Asia Minor, who lived in the second half of the 3rd century and the first decade of the 4th. He probably died a martyr’s death in the persecution of 311–312, which took place under Maximinus Daza.

Of his works, only the Symposium has come down to us in its entirety in its original language, Greek. With respect to the subject of the present study, I believe it is worth mentioning at least two other Methodian writings, the dialogues On Free Will and On the Resurrection, which have been preserved only in part in the original language and in full in an early Slavonic translation2. The first is a dialogue in which two proponents of dualistic theories on God and matter clash with a spokesman of Christian doctrine. The theme on which the three characters confront each other is that of evil, matter and human freedom. As will be seen later, there are passages within this writing that are quite close in theme to the section of the Symposium that is the subject of the present study. On the Resurrection, on the other hand, is a dialogue in which Aglaophon and Proclus speak from the heterodox perspective, while Methodius–Eubulius and Memianus represent the orthodox position. The former radically reject the resurrection of the flesh, whereas the latter defend this dogma—understood as the reconstitution of the same body, both in its material substance and external form—using arguments of various kinds.

Scholars seem to agree in considering On the Resurrection one of the Methodian works belonging to the writer’s last phase, a phase in which he comes to a direct and explicit confrontation with Origen. The Symposium, on the other hand, would belong to an earlier phase, in which the author still tends to conceive of himself as a disciple of the great Alexandrian3, although the evolution of the Methodian attitude cannot be traced too clearly4. The Symposium could, therefore, have been composed between 260 and 280. I will not deal with the problem of the location of On Free Will in relation to the Symposium at this point, as I will have to return to this later.

With the Symposium, the Methodian work on which this article focuses, the author from the very title places himself in dialogue with Plato’s work of the same name. If, however, the narrative frame of Plato’s dialogue is constituted by a banquet in Agathon’s house, at which the diners—including Socrates himself—decide to sing the praises of eros in turn, in the Methodian work, the narrative frame is represented by the meeting of ten virgins who gather at the garden of Virtue, the daughter of Philosophy: each of the ten virgins—the reference to the Gospel parable is evident—is invited by the hostess to present a speech in praise of chastity5.

As is evident from this brief presentation of the work, Methodius constructs his dialogue according to a structure similar to that of Plato’s writing: a double prologue (the first in which one person questions another about an event, the second in which the event in question is evoked), a central part with the speeches concerning a single theme and, finally, an epilogue. The bishop of Olympus also scatters the prologue and, in general, the entire work with numerous allusions to the Symposium and other writings of the philosopher of Athens6.

The ten Methodian virgins, in describing the value of the Christian ἁγνεία, almost always take their cue from the exegesis of Scripture. Such is also the case with the virgin Thecla7, the eighth virgin to take the floor, the one who proposes the critique of fatalism with which this article is concerned. It is a common theme within early Christian literature. It is with the Stoic Chrysippus (c. 280–206 BC) that a first systematization of certain fatalistic conceptions is achieved, a systematization that represents the first polemical objective of a series of writings defending free will from Academic, Peripatetic, Epicurean, Skeptical, Neoplatonic, and Christian perspectives. To the objective represented by the Stoic current is added astrological fatalism of Chaldean origin. As will be seen in the course of the study, the anti-astrological polemic of Christian authors is expressed through a series of τόποι, some of which date back to Carneades (c. 219–129 BC), scholarch of an Academy dominated by skeptical tendencies8.

The virgin Thecla begins her speech by stating that virginity makes one like God. The soul of those who practice it flies up to the meadows of immortality, where it can contemplate the selfsame realities of righteousness, continence, truth, etc. A long exegesis of Apoc 12:1–6 is thus proposed, an exegesis that constitutes the central and most extensive part of Thecla’s discourse. The woman in childbirth is the Church, which gives birth to the baptized; the dragon is the devil, who lays snares for those who have been born in Christ; the desert in which the woman takes refuge is the land of virtue. The virgins are called to defeat the Beast, whose heads represent the various vices. The explanation of the New Testament passage aims to present the Christian virgins with the example of the Mother, the Church, who was able to resist the devil’s threats. That of the virgins is a struggle that requires a proper use of freedom. Linking the theme of freedom, indispensable in the fight against evil, with that of criticism of the fatalist view, Thecla states:

Now it is possible for us to determine beforehand and to prefer what is better instead of what is earthly, since we have received minds that are independent of all compulsion (αὐτοκράτορα καὶ αὐτεξούσιον τὸν λογισμὸν εἰληφότας καὶ πάσης ἀνάγκης ἐκτὸς) in the choice of whatever we, as our own masters (αὐτοδεσπότως), think best: we are not slaves to Fate or to the whims of Fortune (οὐ δουλεύοντας εἱμαρμένῃ καὶ τύχαις). *** So that each one of us might not be merely human, but might become good and blessed by following the human examen of Christ and by modelling oneself on Him and living in imitation of Him.

(Methodius, symp. VIII,13,30–36)9

The virgin, in fact, considers that the greatest evil is to refer the causes of sins to the movements of the stars (τὸ τὰς αἰτίας τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων εἰς τὰς τῶν ἀστέρων κινήσεις ἀναφέρειν, ibid. VIII,13,37–39)10 and to say that our life is governed by the necessity of fate (τὸν βίον ἡμῶν οἰακίζεσθαι τῆς εἱμαρμένης ταῖς ἀνάγκαις, ibid. VIII,13,39–40)11. This is the position of one who relied more on conjecture than on reasoning (Ὑπονοίᾳ γὰρ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ φρονεῖν, ibid. VIII,13,41)12. Thecla therefore asks Virtue, the hostess, for permission to extraordinarily prolong the discourse with an additional part in which she claims to refute fatalism and, specifically, that view that binds the fate of men to the movement of the stars. As is evident from the words above, with the section in question, the virgin seeks to convey the idea that there is nothing external that can influence the free and voluntary choice to live a chaste life and, more generally, to choose what is best, disowning what does not live up to it13.

Virtue grants her this and even states that the speech can only be considered perfect with this further addition. This is the only instance in the entire work in which one of the speakers makes such a request, which, moreover, is followed by Virtue’s concession14. This section (ibid. VIII,14–17), which is added to the eulogy of chastity and which thematically retains a certain independence from it, makes Thecla’s speech by far the most extensive15. I wonder whether this excursus might constitute one of the elements that could explain Thecla’s victory in the oratorical competition, given its exceptional nature. As will become clear throughout this article, this exceptionality lies not so much in the content of her arguments as in the way they are integrated into the Symposium, a Christian dialogue on virginity.

In presenting the theme she wishes to explore, that of human freedom and the falsity of the fatalist position that limits its value, Thecla quotes Homer, Od. I,34: “By their own wickedness they suffer misery beyond what is fated” (σφῇσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὑπέρμορον ἄλγε̕ ἔχουσιν, in Methodius, symp. VIII,13,49)16, a passage quoted by Thecla also in ibid. VIII,16,63. In the incipit of the Homeric poem, Zeus, when speaking in the council of gods, alludes to the human habit of attributing to a god every misfortune whose cause is not obvious. I believe that this quotation from Thecla already offers the horizon within which the virgin wishes to place her reflection on fatalism: Thecla wishes to place the question on common ground with pagan culture and for this she will resort above all to rational arguments that can be accepted by believers and non-believers alike. It is striking, in this sense, the almost total absence of references to the Holy Scriptures throughout the excursus in question, which is quite exceptional in a writing like the Symposium, always interwoven with references to the Bible17.

I believe that this feature of Thecla’s arguments in this part of her discourse is not necessarily in contradiction with what some scholars have observed, according to which the primary audience of the anti-astrological section would be the followers of Christ. Indeed, the Symposium, due to the characteristics it presents, can only have as its addressees Christians, who, very often, do not hesitate to reconcile their faith in Christ with practices proper to astral fatalism18. And yet, while addressing Christians first and foremost, Thecla decides to employ arguments proper to a polemic that, as we have said, did not originate in the Christian sphere and that, on the contrary, by the time Christianity began to spread, had already developed over several centuries. The virgin therefore gives priority to those arguments that do not derive their value from Revelation, but from their intrinsic logical coherence.

It is now time to analyze, at least in its main arguments, the section of Thecla’s speech against fatalism.

2. The Virgin Thecla and Her Argument Against Fatalism

It seems to me that the argument developed by Thecla against fatalism is organized around five groups of arguments, followed by a conclusion. All the arguments are punctuated by a refrain that is repeated throughout the section: “Therefore destiny does not exist” (Oὐκ ἄρα γένεσις/Oὐκ ἄρα εἱμαρμένη)19.

• (§§ 210–217) The nature of the signs of the zodiac, the constituent elements of astrology, is based on myths and legends with no rational foundation. The cosmological model that those who practice astrology defend is presented. Furthermore, if the signs of the zodiac are only present in the sky from a certain point in time, did our ancestors live without a destiny?
• (§§ 218–219) If the stars are endowed with a divine nature, how can they determine the most negative actions of human beings? If they are alien to passions and pain, how can they determine in human life that to which they themselves are alien?
• (§§ 220–224) If man is governed by the movement of the heavenly bodies, which, in turn, is caused by God, the latter is the cause of evil. However, if justice is distinct from injustice, God cannot be the cause of injustice. The same is said with respect to temperance and intemperance and, more generally, with respect to good and evil. In conclusion, God cannot be the cause of evil, because He is good.
• (§§ 224–227) Laws and fatalism cannot be reconciled: if a violent act is determined by the necessity of fate, laws seek to prevent what has been determined by fate. They, therefore, eliminate fatalism, as they show that virtue, being directed towards the freedom of the human being, can be taught.
• (§§ 227–229) If the wicked are wicked because of the necessity of fate and the good are good for the same reason, then the former are not deserving of punishment and the latter are not deserving of praise. However, wickedness is blameworthy, while virtue is pleasing to God.

In the conclusion of her excursus (§§ 229–231), Thecla states that, ultimately, virtue and vice depend on two tendencies that have their origin within the human being and not outside, as those who advocate astrology and fatalism believe. The end of Thecla’s speech is followed by a brief exchange between Eubulion and Gregorion (§§ 231–232), the two women who converse in the play’s prologue and epilogue. Both emphasize Thecla’s great oratorical ability, an ability, moreover, accompanied by great candour and an irrepressible love for Christ20.

As will be seen below, the arguments developed by Thecla are quite common in antifatalist and anti-astrological polemics in pagan and Christian circles. According to Macías and González (2005, pp. 322–27), an exception is Thecla’s attack on the cosmic model defended by those who practice astrology, an attack that is found at the beginning of the section (§§ 210–217) and which, in the opinion of the two scholars, is surprising for its originality. The model the virgin mocks is the traditional one in classical times, based on a spherical world with the earth at its centre. The Church Fathers are faced with two basic cosmic models: the traditional Greek model and the biblically derived Jewish model, with a flat earth, a heavenly vault resting on the earth, and a firmament located below the sky. The defence of the biblical model over the traditional Greek one arose within Syriac Christianity in the mid-4th century. Thus, although Methodius does not make an explicit statement in favour of the biblical cosmological model, by ridiculing the traditional Greek model, he is anticipating a polemic that would later erupt in the second half of the 4th century21.

On this point, having carefully read Thecla’s reasoning, I find no significant evidence to sufficiently justify Macías and González’s interpretation. In my opinion, what Thecla is primarily criticizing is the existence of the zodiacal constellations and their purported influence on human affairs. I find no critique of the Greek model itself, which is based on a spherical world with the Earth at its centre. Even less so do I find any indication of a defence of the biblical model, as the two mentioned scholars claim. Consequently, I believe the assessment of the argument’s novelty—according to the scholars, a precursor to a controversy that would arise about a century later—should also be reconsidered. Overall, I find it rather speculative to draw all these elements from the text.

Not new, however, is the argument employed by Thecla that there can be no destiny if the constellations that determine it were born at a specific time, leaving the previous period somewhat ‘uncovered’ (cf. symp. VIII,14,59–15,25). What about those who were born before the zodiacal signs were placed among the stars? In fact, they survived perfectly well, even though they were not influenced by zodiacal constellations, which did not yet exist. A similar argument is found, for example, in Tatian, orat. 922.

Let us now turn to Thecla’s argument that the stars, being endowed with a divine nature and being strangers to passions and pain, cannot determine the more negative actions of human beings (§§ 218–219). Origen, like Methodius, also believes that the stars are beings that enjoy a more blissful life than humans23. The great Alexandrian, in fact, cannot accept the idea widespread in certain Gnostic groups that some celestial bodies are malignant and others benign24. Yet Origen considers the stars to be endowed with a soul, rationality and free will and, consequently, believes that they are not exempt from the experience of sin and evil25. Thecla, on the other hand, explains that there is no action that does not start from a desire, nor a desire that does not arise from a need. Consequently, divinity, devoid of need, is unable to conceive of anything evil. Similarly, the stars, close to the divine nature and, therefore, devoid of deficiencies, cannot conceive evil (cf. symp. VIII,16,1–5). In the opinion of Burns (2017, pp. 215–17), Methodius, opposed to the theory of the sin of the stars, may have considered the Origenian notion of the possibility of sin of celestial bodies as a concession to the supporters of astrology26.

Something similar can perhaps also be said with respect to another possible source of Methodius, namely the Liber legum regionum or Against Fate by Bardaisan of Edessa, a Syriac author who lived between the 2nd and 3rd centuries and who, with this dialogue-like writing, claimed to address the issue of human freedom, refuting astral determinism27. With regard to the argument of laws instituted by human beings in an anti-fatalist function, an argument used by both Bardaisan and Methodius, this will be discussed later. Here, however, I would like to highlight a point of discontinuity between the dialogue of the Syriac writer and that of the bishop of Olympus. According to Bardaisan, the stars exercise some power over human nature, although they are not entirely responsible for the sin of human beings28. Thecla, on the other hand, bluntly rejects the possibility that the stars exert any causal force within human affairs. Burns (2017, pp. 214–15) considers that, in Thecla’s eyes, Bardaisan’s position, as well as that of Origen, previously mentioned, is an unnecessary surrender in favor of the proponents of astrology.

The Methodian virgin, at this point, develops what we might call a ‘theological’ argument, closely related to the previous one. Whoever claims that man is governed by the movement of the heavenly bodies is also asserting that God is the cause of evil, since it is He who directs all astral movement. However, God cannot be the cause of evil, because He is good (§§ 220–224). With these words Thecla begins to present the argument in question:

Those who lay down the definition that man has no free will (μὴ εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον αὐτεξούσιον) but is governed by the ineluctable necessities and the unwritten decrees of Fate, commit impiety against God Himself, since they declare that He is the source and cause of man’s sins (τὸν θεὸν παρεκτικὸν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων αὐτὸν κακῶν καὶ ποιητὴν). For if He harmoniously directs the entire circular motion of the stars with ineffable and inscrutable wisdom, and if, on the other hand, the stars produce the qualities of vice and virtue in life, dragging men to these things by the chains of necessity, then they declare that God is the cause and source of all evil (αἴτιον τῶν κακῶν τὸν θεὸν ἀποφαίνονται καὶ δότην). But God is not the cause of harm to anyone. Hence there are no horoscopes.

(Methodius, symp. VIII,16,12–23)29

Is the ‘theological’ argument an exception to the purely rational and philosophical style that the virgin is adopting in this section, as noted above? Actually, it is not an exception at all, for it is not difficult to see how, in this part of the anti-astrological section, Thecla echoes Platonic ideas and expressions. For instance, when Thecla, immediately after the passage quoted above, states that “the divine is just, good, wise, true, beneficent, not responsible for evil, free from passion, and so forth” (τὸ θεῖον δίκαιον, ἀγαθόν, σοφόν, ἀληθές, ὠφέλιμον, ἀναίτιον κακῶν, ἀσύμπλοκον πάθους καὶ πᾶν ὅ τι τοιοῦτον, ibid. VIII,16,24–26)30, she is in all probability taking up the list of divine virtues found in Plato, Phdr. 246e31. Moreover, when the eighth orator later states that “whichever of these is the cause, God is not responsible” (Ὁπότερον δ̕ ἂν τούτων ᾖ τὸ αἴτιον, ὁ θεὸς ἀναίτιος, Methodius, symp. VIII,16,100–101)32, seems to paraphrase the famous passage from the myth of Er in which the priest declares that “The blame is his who chooses: God is blameless” (αἰτία ἑλομένου· θεὸς ἀναίτιος, Plato, R. X,617e)33.

The theme Thecla is developing is in fact a central aspect of Platonic thought, an aspect that emerges with great force in the second and tenth books of the Republic. It is clear that, in Plato’s eyes, Homer is among those who propagated the idea that some evils derive from the gods. Indeed, in the Iliad, the idea of a divinity responsible as much for the goods as for the evils that befall man is dominant34. For Plato, on the other hand, the god is good, is only the cause of goods and has no responsibility for evils. It will therefore be necessary to look for another cause of evils, other than the godhead. Even in the myth of Er, to which Thecla may be alluding, the irresponsibility of the divine is reconfirmed and, at the same time, the value of the individual’s responsibility is emphasized when he assumes a certain pattern of life.

The philosopher of Athens, therefore, seeks to remove all forms of negative causality from the intelligible and divine sphere. On the other hand, he makes the cause of evil coincide with the heart of the phenomenal world, to which man also belongs. It is as if he distinguishes between two forms of evil: a ‘passive’ evil, which belongs to the sensible sphere as such, and an ‘active’ evil, which can be traced back to man’s behavior35. If the Christian Methodius takes up Platonic expressions concerning the goodness of God, his irresponsibility for evil and the responsibility of man, he cannot at all take up—and indeed distances himself from—the idea that the cause of negativity resides, on a cosmic level, in corporeality. Suffice it to recall that a large part of the discourse of Theophila, the second speaker, is dedicated to defending the positivity of matter and, therefore, to affirming man’s responsibility in the event of its misuse36.

In the concluding part of her discourse, Thecla introduces the anti-astrological argument based on laws: if crimes of various kinds are determined by fate, then laws that aim to prevent or punish them are contrary to fate. Consequently, laws and fate are irreconcilable (§§ 224–227). I quote some of the virgin’s words: “For the law forbids the things which destiny determines; and destiny compels men to do the things which the law forbids. Thus the law is at war with destiny” (Πολέμιον ἄρα γενέσει νόμος) (Methodius, symp. VIII,16,68–70)37. And further on: “But the law destroys destiny, teaching that virtue can be learned and is acquired by effort, and that vice is to be avoided and arises from lack of discipline. Hence destiny does not exist” (ibid. VIII,16,90–92)38.

Here again, we are faced with a reworking of an actual τόπος, already employed by Carneades, a scholarch of the Academy who lived at the turn of the 3rd and 2nd centuries BC. He, critical towards the arts of divination in general, elaborated a number of arguments based on logic and common sense, which had a certain amount of success. Among the various objections advanced against genethliac astrology, a technique that predicts the entire destiny of men on the basis of the configuration of the sky at the moment of birth, the νόμιμα βαρβαρικά stands out. The life of each people is governed by specific laws, customs and habits. It follows that men are not so much conditioned by the stars as by the institutions they have given themselves39.

Between the 2nd and 3rd centuries of our era, the Christian Bardaisan took up the argument of the νόμιμα βαρβαρικά in the dialogue already mentioned, the Liber legum regionum (also known as Against Fate)40. The version elaborated by Bardaisan became the most widespread, especially in Christian circles. According to some scholars, Thecla also took up this argument in the form taken by authors shortly before or almost contemporary with Methodius, such as Bardaisan rather than in the original version formulated by Carneades41. In any case, given the wide circulation of the argument, it is difficult to establish exact intertextual dependency relations between the different testimonies.

We have thus come to the last argument of the anti-astrological section of Thecla’s discourse. If the wicked are wicked by necessity of fate, they cannot be blamed; similarly, if the good act well for the same cause, they cannot be praised (§§ 227–229).

This argument is closely related to the previous one and, like the latter, is not distinguished by any originality42. Here again, Carneades can be regarded as the father of the moral objection: if human affairs are predetermined by fate, then reward, praise and blame lose their meaning. Denying human freedom amounts to dissolving all forms of moral responsibility, ultimately justifying even the most immoral actions; no social order would be possible43.

In the opinion of Amand (1973, p. 340), the scholar who most thoroughly analyzed the survival of Carneades’ arguments in Greek philosophy and early Christian theology during the first four centuries, a direct use of Carneades’ ethical arguments must be excluded. However, it is possible to attribute a neo-academic origin to “ces syllogismes arides, raccourcis et dépourvus de toute forme oratoire”. According to the scholar, it cannot be ruled out that Methodius drew them from a scholastic manual, a hypothesis that gains consistency if one considers the diffusion of the ὑπομνήματα in the philosophical teaching of the imperial era.

When the virgin Thecla feels that astrological fatalism has been satisfactorily refuted, she concludes with these words:

so that even a child could by now see clearly and perceive their error; for good and evil are within our power and are not determined by the stars (ἐφ̕ ἡμῖν ἐστι τὸ διαπράξασθαι τὸ καλὸν ἢ τὸ κακὸν καὶ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ἀστράσι). For we have two motions within us, the desire of the body and that of the soul (Δύο γὰρ κινήσεε ἐν ἡμῖν ἔστον· ἐπιθυμία πεφυκότε σαρκὸς καὶ ψυχῆς), and they are distinct from each other. Hence too they have received two different names, virtue and vice (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς, ἡ δὲ κακίας). And we of course, should be led on by the most glorious and golden persuasion of virtue, choosing what is best rather than what is base.

(Methodius, symp. VIII,17,5–11)44

The virgin Thecla seems to conclude her discourse by introducing a certain dichotomy between flesh and soul, ἐπιθυμία of the flesh as wickedness and ἐπιθυμία of the soul as virtue. It is hardly surprising that the Symposium contains traces of a certain dualism of Platonic and Alexandrian origin, considering the plurality of influences exerted by various authors on the virgins and, in particular, the affinity with Origenian thought, which is especially evident in Methodius’ early writings45. In any case, I think it is useful to read this passage in the light of other Methodian places in which the author, trying to avoid misunderstandings in the interpretation of certain Pauline passages, specifies that sometimes the term σάρξ indicates not so much the bodily dimension, as a dissolute way of living this dimension46.

It is time to question the reasons that may have led the virgin Thecla to develop a reflection in an anti-fatalist key. This will lead us to assess the importance of the theme of freedom in the Symposium and, more generally, in Methodian work.

3. The Importance of the Theme of Freedom in the Symposium and a Comparison with On Free Will

The exceptionality of this section has already been mentioned in relation to the overall development of the work: Thecla’s request to prolong the discourse with an anti-astrological excursus is extraordinary; the length of the virgin’s discourse with this ‘unexpected’ addition is extraordinary; and so too, in a certain sense, is its content, given that in this section Thecla neither directly addresses the theme of chastity nor interprets Scripture, as she did in the first part of her speech and as all her companions do. It seems to me, therefore, appropriate to try to understand the reasons that may have led Thecla and, therefore, Methodius to propose this reflection.

As is evident from the analysis just conducted on the anti-fatalist section, the great theme raised by Thecla is that of the freedom of the human being. In Thecla’s eyes and, in all likelihood, in the eyes of any Christian, the greatest danger inherent in astrological fatalism consists in the denial of human freedom and responsibility: to subtract God, the creator of the entire universe, including the celestial bodies, from any responsibility for the existence of evil is to affirm the dizzying value of human freedom.

It seems to me that this theme is central throughout Methodius’ dialogue. Consider, for example, the speech of the virgin Theophila, the second speaker. In my doctoral thesis, I asked myself why a virgin, in a dialogue entirely devoted to the theme of chastity, focuses her entire speech on the goodness of the conjugal act and procreation. Evidently, the virgin intends to demonstrate that the proposed chastity cannot be confused with Encratitic continence. Here, in summary, is the significance of Theophila’s contribution and its value within the work as a whole: Methodian virgins are free in the face of conjugal union, as they are in the face of all the reality of the world, just as Jesus was. The choice of the virginal state is not an obligatory choice in a context in which other states of life, such as the corporal and sexual element, would be rejected. This very freedom accentuates even more the radicality of a total consecration to God. For this reason, Theophila’s contribution should not be understood as a parenthesis on the margins of the subject of virginity. On the contrary, in-depth exploration of the relationship between man and woman allows us to understand the virginal condition from the correct perspective47.

Moreover, as already mentioned, when the virgin Theophila responds to Marcella’s objection regarding the existence of illegitimate children, she is able to insist even more explicitly on the centrality of the freedom of the human being. After evoking the image of the house and the clay, Theophila defends the goodness of every being who has come into the world, however much the parents may have conceived him through an adulterous act (Methodius, symp. II,4–5). There are no realities that are bad in themselves, but there are actions that misuse a reality conceived for a good end48.

The final dialogue between Eubulion and Gregorion (ibid. epil.) also reproposes the theme of human freedom. At the end of the work, in fact, we return to that external setting in which the two women dialogue that readers had encountered in the prologue. Through a rapid exchange, Eubulion manages to convince the second woman that a soul subject to passions is preferable to one untouched by them, since one who is tested by passions and resists demonstrates a higher moral form than one who remains untroubled.

In this way, Eubulion is presenting the desires, disturbances and trials of life as exercises of freedom, that is, as occasions in which freedom is brought into play in a more substantial way. Just as the sexual act is not bad in itself, but ends up being so when man decides to perform it under certain circumstances, so the trials that life presents are not bad in themselves, but become so when man succumbs to them. The relative positivity of the trials that life holds in store, a stimulus to act with greater commitment and assume greater responsibility, is a theme that runs through all of Method’s production49. It is not surprising, then, that the Symposium, a work entirely dedicated to the virginal state, closes on this question: the human being could not embrace virginity in an authentic and integral manner, were it not through the assent of his own freedom.

In general, it seems to me that Methodius does not want to give up two poles, both coessential. On the one hand, virginity is a μάθημα revealed by God, a gift bestowed by God on man by his free initiative. It is a gift of the Spirit that happens in the course of salvation history. This implies that, at the time of the prophets, it was not yet possible to live in chastity. On the other hand, God’s initiative ‘needs’ the free participation of the human being50. As an author that Methodius most likely knows states, “God wants to save us by counting on our own participation” (ἡμᾶς δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν βούλεται σῴζεσθαι, Clement of Alexandria, str. VI,12,96)51. Without one of these two poles, man is not offered a true Christian experience, nor is a genuinely lived virginity realized. If one forgets God’s initiative, one ends up thinking that virginity is the product of human decision, whereas it does not exist without a proposal that comes from God. At the same time, without the free adhesion of the human being, every proposal would be useless, since it is imposed from the outside and not accepted inwardly. Here, in short, are the two poles highlighted by Methodius: the freedom of God and the freedom of man.

It is precisely the latter, an exclusive gift that God wished to reserve for human beings, that constitutes the central theme of a dialogue of Methodius that, moreover, we have already mentioned several times in this article: On Free Will. At the end of this section, I intend to briefly consider a passage from this dialogue, which bears remarkable similarities to some passages in Thecla’s anti-astrological section. After demonstrating that by nature nothing is evil, the orthodox character answers the question of one of the two interlocutors, who asked him where the impulse to evil comes from in man. The Orthodox states that the first man was created master of himself, i.e., free (αὐτεξούσιον […], τουτέστιν ἐλεύθερον, Methodius, arbitr. 16,2)52. This is the greatest gift received from God, because all other beings, including the heavens, the sun and the earth, are subject necessarily to the divine order (ἀνάγκῃ δουλεύει τῷ θείῳ προστάγματι, ibid. 16,3)53. None of them can do anything other than that for which he was created. Man, on the other hand, having been created free, has the faculty to do what he wants (τὴν ἐξουσίαν […] τοῦ δύνασθαι ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται, ibid. 16,7)54 and thus finds himself choosing between two possibilities: to obey what God has ordered, deserving a reward, or to disobey, deserving on the contrary a punishment.

The argument of the orthodox character is not entirely alien to us. If man’s life were determined by fate and the movements of heavenly bodies, he could neither be rewarded nor punished, since he would not be responsible for his own actions. This is, in fact, the properly moral argument that the virgin Thecla develops at the end of the anti-astrological section of her discourse.

Patterson (1997, pp. 103–4) is convinced that Thecla’s excursus is a compendium rather than an anticipation of the argument of On Free Will. In his view, it is difficult to believe that the concise statement on free will in the concluding section of Thecla’s discourse is anything other than a compendium of what had been previously written. The most convincing hypothesis, however, seems to me—for several reasons—to be that of those who argue the anteriority of the Symposium to On Free Will55.

Firstly, I believe that On Free Will, as an attack on certain forms of dualism not distant from the Origenian position, is better explained as a composition following a rupture that had not yet fully taken place at the time of the Symposium. Secondly, the great formal distance between the Symposium and two works such as On Free Will and On the Resurrection is striking. The first one, in fact, is a dialogue that—as has been said—gives voice to figures whose personalities, from a human and theological point of view, do not coincide and, indeed, sometimes convey viewpoints that do not fully converge, although none of the virgins are presented as heterodox; the other two dialogues, on the other hand, although of the same literary genre as the Symposium, make a very clear distinction between heterodox and orthodox interlocutors, who, therefore, represent Methodius’ point of view in a coherent and unified manner.

As for the specific case of the similarity between Thecla’s excursus and the orthodox discourse On Free Will, and differing from Patterson’s claims, I do not consider that an analysis of the two texts should necessarily lead to the conclusion that Thecla’s version is a summary of the discourse of On Free Will. Is it not possible that Thecla’s anti-astrological polemic, aimed at stimulating a sense of responsibility in virgins and Christians in general, was followed by the writing On Free Will, which makes the question of freedom and theodicy the pivot around which the entire work revolves? In my opinion, in this specific case, Patterson’s judgement is not sufficiently justified and, in general, it seems more natural to consider On Free Will as being posterior to the Symposium.

4. Conclusions

It is now time to look back at the path we have travelled and draw some brief conclusions on the anti-fatalist section of the speech of Thecla, the eighth speaker to take the floor in the Symposium of Methodius of Olympus. This is a particular section within the text, whose content manifests a certain independence from the general structure of the work: the theme of chastity, already developed by the virgin in the first part of her speech, is not directly addressed. In fact, the ‘improvised’ addition makes Thecla’s speech far more extended.

Precisely because of this characteristic, we wondered how the virgin comes to perceive this excursus as indispensable. Immediately before asking permission to add a reflection against fatalism, Thecla evokes the struggle of virgins against evil. That of the virgins is a real battle, which requires a righteous exercise of freedom. In this fight, there is nothing external that can influence the free and voluntary choice to lead a chaste life.

This is how his argument begins. In a work dense with references to Holy Scripture, the almost total absence of biblical references throughout the excursus in question is surprising. On the contrary, she twice quotes a passage from the Odyssey and supports her reflection with Platonic echoes. To combat fatalism and astrology, Thecla moves on a terrain that is not exclusively that of dogma and Revelation, but coincides with the space shared by pagan culture. The arguments she employs, in fact, are rational in nature and can be accepted by believers and non-believers alike. I wondered about the possible reasons behind this choice. It is certainly worth considering that the anti-fatalist controversy already had a history of its own in philosophy, well before the advent of the nova religio. There may also be a pedagogical motive: Thecla accuses those who believe in astrology of having clouded reasoning and of hiding the truth “in myth and fiction rather than treating it in a systematic way” (μύθοις μᾶλλον καὶ πλάσμασιν ἢ τέχνῃ τῶν λόγων, Methodius, symp. VIII,14,22–23)56. Thus, Thecla’s choice is precisely to challenge astrology through the τέχνη τῶν λόγων, a method that might prove effective with pagans, Christians, and those whose faith had taken on a syncretistic form not devoid of astrological elements.

We have identified five groups of arguments, followed by a conclusion. None of them is surprising in its originality. Even where some scholars have gone as far as to emphasize the originality of the virgin’s alleged criticism of the Greek cosmological model and her defence of the biblical one—elements that would seem to anticipate a controversy that would actually erupt about a century later—I have taken the liberty of expressing my doubts. It is not obvious to me that Thecla is criticizing the Greek model as such, and even less so does she present any explicit defence of the biblical one.

As for the rest, they are, to a large extent, arguments common to anti-fatalist and anti-astrological polemics in both pagan and Christian circles. Possible sources include Carneades, a representative of the skeptical academy, who, in the midst of the Hellenistic era, developed a series of anti-fatalist arguments that were destined to enjoy wide acclaim. Probably some of his arguments reached Methodius through the mediation of authors chronologically closer to him, such as the Christian Bardaisan of Edessa.

Even when the virgin expounds what I have called the theological argument, the reference is not biblical. In order to affirm that God is good and not responsible for evils, Thecla takes up Platonic ideas and expressions. However, she cannot accept from the philosopher of Athens the notion of corporeality as the cause of negativity. In fact, part of Theophila’s discourse is explicitly aimed at refuting such Platonic dualism.

We then questioned the value of the theme of freedom throughout the Symposium. Adherence to virginity cannot be imposed from outside, but can only arise from the leading role of personal freedom. God’s initiative cannot force the human being’s yes. The comparison with a passage from the Methodian dialogue On Free Will, finally, confirms how central this theme—freedom, the greatest gift that God has granted to mankind—is in the theological reflection of the bishop of Olympus.