Would Confucianism Support Companion Robots? Reflections on Intimacy in the Era of the “Super-Individual”

Abstract

In the era of the “super-individual”, companion robots (or sex robots), as novel agents for intimate relationships, have provoked profound ethical controversies. This article responds to Fang Xudong’s defense of companion robots in terms of the “instrumentalization of womanhood” and further explores the possible stance of Confucian ethics towards companion robots. Companion robots risk fostering emotional self-deception, which violates the Confucian self-cultivation requirement of “sincerity within, manifesting outwardly” 诚于中，形于外. They also fail to fulfill the “generative virtue” 生生之德 encompassing biological reproduction and moral education through kinship and may even undermine the family’s function as a carrier of ethical practice. From a Confucian perspective, the “pseudo-intimacy” facilitated by companion robots might alleviate symptoms of social isolation in an atomized age, but it cannot replace the familial warmth characterized by “affection between father and son, distinct roles between husband and wife” 父子有亲，夫妇有别. Only in the ethical practice of facing the other and taking responsibility can one truly realize the ideal of “cultivating oneself and bringing all things to their ideal state” 成己成物.

1. Introduction

In our contemporary era, rapid technological advancement, particularly the widespread application of artificial intelligence (AI), is profoundly transforming society’s economic foundation and modes of production, thereby reshaping our lifestyles and social structures. While bringing many conveniences, technological changes have also raised a series of complex ethical issues, especially in the field of intimate relationships, where the emergence of companion robots, exemplifying the technological empowerment of individuals, has pushed the related ethical controversies to the forefront. As highly integrated products of AI technology, companion robots not only transcend the boundaries of traditional human–machine interaction but also deeply intervene in humanity’s most private and complex emotional domains. Endowed with capabilities such as listening, companionship, empathy, and even romance, they have become emotional anchors for lonely individuals in modern society. This phenomenon has sparked a wide range of controversies around the world: on the one hand, companion robots are seen as technological solutions to alleviate loneliness and satisfy emotional needs; on the other hand, they have been criticized for alienating and replacing human intimacy and may even raise ethical issues.

Through highly anthropomorphic design and training on large language models, companion robots can establish seemingly genuine emotional connections with users, satisfying their emotional needs to a certain extent. However, does anchoring emotions in a companion robot foster unhealthy psychology? Is the intimate relationship established between a human and a machine, detached from another real individual, a form of delusive relationship? Could companion robots exacerbate individual atomization tendencies, even fostering an inclination to instrumentalize others? Furthermore, since marriage, procreation, and family formation stem from emotional bonds between people, will the advent of companion robots further intensify the trends of non-marriage and low birthrates in modern society?

The perplexities engendered by companion robots ultimately converge on the question of intimacy. Although the Confucian tradition does not directly discuss the concept of “romantic love,” its profound reflections on gender relations supply an indispensable philosophical framework for analyzing the ethical challenges posed by companion robots. The Confucian idea of intimacy is fundamentally rooted in reciprocal moral commitment rather than emotional gratification. It emerges from the interplay of ren 仁 (humaneness) and li礼 (ritual propriety), where relationships are cultivated through role-based obligations and mutual ethical commitment. While affirming genuine affection between men and women, as depicted in the poem “Guan Ju” in the Book of Odes 诗经, which says “Guan-guan (cries) the ospreys, on the islet of the river. The modest, retiring, virtuous, young lady, she is a good mate for the lord.” (Karlgren 1974, p. 2) 关关雎鸠，在河之洲。窈窕淑女，君子好逑. Confucianism prioritizes the ritual-moral calibration of natural emotions 发乎情, 止乎礼. The conjugal bond, in particular, represents the form of intimacy that aligns with ritual righteousness (liyi 礼义). This contrasts sharply with contemporary Western conceptions centered on individual emotional fulfillment, which prioritize psychological closeness and autonomous choice.1 In the Confucian canon, the spousal relationship is regarded as the “beginning of human relations” (renlunzhishi 人伦之始), the foundation of family and society. The Orderly Sequence of the Hexagrams 序卦传 of the Book of Changes 易经 states: “The Dao of Qian forms the male; the Dao of Kun forms the female. Qian has mastery over the great beginning of things, and Kun acts to bring things to completion.” 乾道成男，坤道成女。乾知太始，坤作成物 (Qian dao cheng nan, Kun dao cheng nü. Qian zhi tai shi, Kun zuo cheng wu; Lynn 1994, p. 48). This integrates the male-female relation into the cosmogonic process and, thus, according to heterosexual union, a cosmological necessity in the generation of Heaven-and-Earth. This places the spousal relationship within the cosmic generative sequence, viewing the marital union as a crucial link in the generation of all things between heaven and earth. Liji 礼记 also notes: “ The way of the superior man may be found, in its simple elements, in the intercourse of common men and women” (Legge 1960a, p. 393) 君子之道，造端乎夫妇 This indicates that the spousal relationship is the starting point for the continuation and development of human society, the basis for human procreation and cultural transmission. This thought is embodied in ritual practices through the sacredness of the wedding ceremony and Shudao 恕道 (the principle of reciprocity) in conjugal interaction. Within their shared life, spouses must not only support each other but also jointly educate their children, transmitting sound moral character and cultural traditions to the next generation. This emphasis on the spousal relationship reflects not only the Confucian commitment to familial ethics but also its fundamental strategy for maintaining social stability and development.

In modern society, the emergence of companion robots undoubtedly poses challenges to traditional spousal relationships and family ethics. Exploring Confucian ethics’ attitude and coping strategies towards this novel phenomenon not only aids our understanding of the essence of intimacy but also offers new approaches to resolving the ethical problems companion robots raise. Through the creative transformation of Confucian ethics, we can seek a balanced strategy between technological convenience and ethical boundaries in the context of the era of “super-individuals”.

2. Companion Robots: Alternative Intimacy in the Era of the “Super-Individuals”

The term “super-individual” denotes a paradigm marked by AI-enabled personal autonomy that reshapes both economic structures and intimate relationships. Originally describing a new business model where individuals independently manage all enterprise functions through AI tools—enabling “one-person, multi-intelligence enterprises” to displace traditional team-based corporate models—this phenomenon now transcends economics. It fundamentally restructures work patterns and business ecosystems while progressively redefining individualized existence in hyper-urbanized, intelligent societies. Here, technological platforms modularize work, consumption, and social interaction, diminishing dependence on collective structures as reliance on algorithmic and social-division-of-labor networks intensifies. Consequently, the “super-individual” has evolved from a commercial label to a defining feature of contemporary existence: everyone becomes more independent, yet also more reliant on participation in technological and social networks.

The Civil Code of the People’s Republic of China has partially decoupled marriage from its reproductive purpose, attenuating the family’s role as a primary locus of ethical formation. According to statistics from the Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, the number of marriage registrations in China in 2024 was 6.106 million, a sharp decrease of 20.5% compared to the previous year. In parallel, the nation’s “singles economy” has surpassed one trillion RMB, with pets, digital gaming, and interactive toys serving as effective surrogates for solitary adults; companion robots constitute the most contentious yet commercially compelling segment of this market. The ascendancy of artificial intelligence has redefined the ontological contours of human existence, and the emergence of the “super-individual” signifies an unprecedented intensification of technological agency. Large language models such as GPT-4 now operate as exogenous cognitive prostheses, extending individual capacities across diverse domains. This technological empowerment, however, is accompanied by the virtualization of interpersonal affect and the progressive attenuation of familial cohesion—the advent of companion robots will undoubtedly amplify this tendency.

Confronting this technological deconstruction of human relationships, Fang Xudong, in his article “Companion Robots: A Confucian Defense,” defends companion robots from the perspective of Confucian Fudao 妇道 (wifely virtue). He argues that the core of Confucian “wifely virtue” is “gentleness, obedience, and loyalty”, virtues that companion robots can perfectly embody through programming, and because they are “objects” rather than human beings, their use satisfies the legitimacy of “servitude” and avoids the ethical reproach of “objectification of women”. Modern Confucianism faced criticism for oppressing women because of its “wifely virtue”, and by transferring “obedience” to machines, this moral dilemma can be resolved, and Confucian ethics can remain self-consistent in the modern context (Fang 2024, pp. 100–10). This proposition has proven contentious within academia and society at large, with some readers even arguing that Confucianism is an accomplice to technological alienation and male supremacy. It is therefore necessary to analyze its meaning in depth. In our view, this argument, while seemingly ingenious, exhibits three significant limitations:

The first point is gender bias. Fang Xudong’s defense of companion robots operates within an explicitly androcentric framework, framing robotic “wifely virtues” as universal spousal ideals. This gender bias is empirically unsustainable. Scheutz and Arnold demonstrate that male acceptance of functional/sexual robots is 43% higher than female acceptance, reflecting a fundamental divergence in gendered expectations: men prioritize physical functionality (e.g., sexual gratification, household labor substitution), whereas women associate companionship with affective reciprocity rather than servility (Scheutz and Arnold 2016). Crucially, Wang reveals that 35.3% of Chinese women aged 18–29 prefer companion robots for non-sexual emotional bonds, surpassing male preference (33.3%) and indicating a significant female demand for platonic intimacy—a demand directly contradicting Fang’s reduction in spousal roles to instrumental “virtues” (R. Wang 2020, p. 19). In a study examining gender-specific demands, female participants exhibited significantly negative attitudes after reading descriptions of sex robots, while showing relatively neutral attitudes toward platonic love robots (F(1, 257) = 12.66, p < 0.01). This indicates that women demonstrate a stronger preference for platonic love robots—capable of forming intimate emotional connections with users—even without engaging in sexual interaction of any form (Nordmo et al. 2020). These studies demonstrate individual differences in acceptance and expected functions of companion robots, varying across countries, regions, cultural backgrounds, and age groups. This diversity reveals the unidirectional nature of the “wifely virtues” defense—it fixes women as disciplined objects rather than equal subjects.

The second point is that subjectivity is ill-defined. According to Jin Hee Lee et al., sex robots are positioned between “sexual property” and “sexual agent” (Lee and Chuang 2024). If companion robots are given the status of “sexual agent”, one may further deduce that companion robots have the status of a subject in both the moral and legal sense. This view has garnered attention in some jurisdictions, such as the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs, which in 2016 recommended that the European Parliament consider “the possibility of granting a specific legal status to robots in order to recognize at least the most sophisticated automated robots as cyborgs with specific rights and obligations”; In 2017, the Saudi government officially granted the robot Sophia “Saudi citizenship” (Yang 2019, p. 14). Whether robots should be granted subject status in the legal sense is a debatable issue that centers on whether robots should be categorized as “persons” or “things”. From the perspective of the sexual subject, Fang’s assertion of viewing companion robots as “things” and sexual relations with them as “using things” seems inadequate. However, viewing them as “sexual property” leads to another dilemma: users may engage in self-deception to maintain contradictory cognitions. The root of this dilemma lies in the fact that sexual relations inherently involve deep physical and emotional interaction, profoundly shaping individual identity and social networks. Yet, when establishing so-called “intimate relationships” with companion robots, users face a fundamental contradiction: they need to perceive the robot as an autonomous “sexual agent” to satisfy emotional projection needs, while simultaneously maintaining the cognition of its instrumental nature as “sexual property” to evade moral responsibility. Users engaged in self-deception hold contradictory beliefs—both believing the robot can understand and reciprocate emotions, and being acutely aware it is an algorithm-driven machine. This act of “knowingly accepting falsehood” constitutes a breach of moral autonomy. More importantly, when self-deception is packaged as technological rationality, individuals gradually lose their sensitivity to and sense of responsibility for real interpersonal relationships, potentially exerting a negative impact on societal sexual ethics.

The third point is the misplaced historical context. When discussing the “wifely virtues” of companion robots, Fang cites the Shuowen Jiezi 说文解字 definition “ fu 婦 (wife/woman), means fu 服 (to serve/submit),” pointing out that “the Confucian understanding of fudao (wifely way) centers on female submission to the male.” This characterization, however, misrepresents the pre-Qin Confucian view, which prioritized “respect” (jing 敬)as the core of the husband-wife relationship. Pre-Qin Confucians constructed a view of marital equality within the Yin-Yang cosmology, recognizing distinct roles but mutual importance. The Book of Changes 易经 also states:

“Only after there were Heaven and Earth were there the myriad things. Only after there were the myriad things were there male and female. Only after there were male and female were there husband and wife.”

(Lynn 1994, p. 106)

有天地然后有万物，有万物然后有男女，有男女然后有夫妇。

Husband and wife form the smallest unit of the family and bear the responsibility of procreation and the flourishing of the human community; they are the foundation of the human ethical world. Hence, Confucianism highly values the ethical relationship between husband and wife. In Liji “Aigong Wen” 礼记·哀公问, Confucius elaborates spousal ethics with “respect”: “ Anciently, under the government of the intelligent kings of the three dynasties, it was required of a man to show respect to his wife and son. When the path (of right government) was pursued, the wife was the hostess of the (deceased) parents—could any husband dare not to show her respect?” (Legge 1967, p. 266) 昔三代明王之政，必敬其妻、子也，有道。妻也者，亲之主也，敢不敬与？ (Zheng and Kong 1999, p. 1376) The enlightened kings, as male exemplars, gave their wives ample “respect” in handling marital relations, signifying respect for the partner’s subjectivity. The reason for respecting the wife is simple and direct: because she bears the responsibility of childbirth, as the primary bearer of family continuity, she must be respected. Confucian ritual design everywhere reflects the husband’s respect for the wife. For instance, the complex wedding process must be led by the man, embodying the principle of “uniting bodies and equalizing high and low”, aiming to “The ceremony of marriage was intended to be a bond of love between two (families of different) surnames, with a view, in its retrospective character, to secure the services in the ancestral temple, and in its prospective character, to secure the continuance of the family line. Therefore, the superior men (the ancient rulers) set a great value upon it. “(Legge 1967, p. 428) 将合二姓之好，上以事宗庙，而下以继后世也，故君子重之. For Confucians, marriage is not merely the union of two individuals but the alliance of two families, crucial for lineage continuation and social order maintenance. Thus, the junzi should respect his wife, not simply demand her submission. The doctrine of “the husband as the guide for the wife” 夫为妻纲 within the Sangang 三纲(Three Bonds)was formed only after the Han dynasty, losing the spirit of original Confucianism. Modern scholars have fiercely criticized this, as Tan Sitong 谭嗣同 stated:

“Since the Qin dynasty promulgated cruel laws, like the Stone Inscription at Kuaiji, Song Confucians inflamed it, absurdly creating the blind saying ‘starvation is a small matter, losing chastity is a great matter’, directly applying the harsh legalism of Shen Buhai and Han Fei within the household, turning the family into a prison. How unfortunate to be a woman, to be subjected to Shen and Han’s methods, to be imprisoned!”

(Tan 1981, p. 349)

自秦垂暴法，于会稽刻石，宋儒炀之，妄为‘饿死事小，失节事大’之瞽说，直于室家施申、韩，闺闼为岸狱，是何不幸而为妇人，乃为人申、韩之，岸狱之！

In summary, equating companion robots with “one who serves/submits” is a partial extraction of Confucian ethics.

Scholars have already responded to Fang Xudong’s views, such as Wang Pei, who points out that Fang Xudong’s views do not represent Confucianism but lean closer to individualism, characterized primarily by escaping real Renlun 人伦 (human relations), such as the husband-wife relationship in this instance. Human relations 人伦 is paramount to Confucian philosophy; stripping away the human relations 人伦 context and extracting only the trait of “submission” demanded of wives is inadmissible (P. Wang 2025, p. 5). Chen Ming identifies the cardinal fallacy in Fang Xudong’s argument in his seminal critique “A Profound Misstep: Reading Fang Xudong’s Companion Robots: A Confucian Defense”: Confucian “wifely virtue” must be grounded in reproductive function to fulfill communal responsibilities, yet companion robots inherently lack biological reproductive capacity. Furthermore, from a Confucian perspective, “wifely virtue” is subordinated to the generative chain of “generativity” (shensgheng 生生). Isolating submission as the essence of “wifely virtue” constitutes a fragmentation of Confucianism’s holistic nature, severing the intrinsic linkage between spousal ethics and cosmic-moral continuity (M. Chen 2025). Confucianism builds general and specific relationships between people based on human commonality and difference, specifically categorized into different ethical relations: father-son, husband-wife, elder-younger brother, friend-friend, ruler-minister Wulun 五伦 (five relationships). “Between father and son, there should be affection; between sovereign and minister, righteousness; between husband and wife, attention to their separate functions; between old and young, a proper order; and between friends, fidelity. “(Legge 1960b, p. 252) 父子有亲，君臣有义，夫妇有别，长幼有序，朋友有信 Confucian discourse on human relations人伦 never emphasizes the responsibility of only one party; one cannot neglect “parental kindness” while speaking of “filial piety”, nor can one neglect the husband’s duties while only speaking of the wife’s Shun 顺 (submission); one must also speak of Jing 敬 (respect):

“For of the extreme manifestation of reverence we find the greatest illustration in the great (rite of) marriage. In the great (rite of) marriage there is the extreme manifestation of respect; and when one took place, the bridegroom in his square-topped cap went in person to meet the bride; thus showing his affection for her. It was his doing this himself that was the demonstration of his affection. Thus it is that the superior man commences with respect as the basis of love. To neglect respect is to leave affection unprovided for. Without loving there can be no (real) union; and without respect the love will not be correct. Yes, love and respect lie at the foundation of government.”

敬之至矣，大婚为大；大婚至矣，冕而亲迎。亲迎者，敬之也。是故君子兴敬为亲，舍敬则是遗亲也。弗亲弗敬，弗尊也。爱与敬，其政之本与？(Kong Zi Jia Yu 孔子家语).

The wedding rituals precisely embody the husband’s respect for his wife.

In the context of the Confucian tradition, we might articulate either a positive defense or a negative rejection of companion robots. However, the salient issue is whether, in a society characterized by radical individuation, sex robots can be construed as functional equivalents of a spouse. Should such an equivalence gain normative acceptance, what ethical contradictions and practical problems would ensue?

3. Ethical Reflections from a Confucian Perspective: From “Super-Individual” to “Virtue of the Noble Person”

A central paradox of the “super-individual” era is that while technological empowerment liberates individuals from traditional social bonds, it simultaneously intensifies the virtualization of emotional connections and the atomization of individuals. Emotional virtualization is a key feature of this era, which manifests itself in the increasing use of virtual means to establish intimate connections. This phenomenon is vividly depicted in the film Her (2013). The protagonist develops a deep emotional bond with an AI operating system. While technologically possible, this connection raises numerous ethical concerns. First, it is based on virtual interaction, lacking genuine interpersonal engagement and emotional resonance. Second, it easily leads to “self-deceptive attachment”—people develop emotional dependence despite knowing the other is an AI. For instance, the protagonist experiences profound distress upon discovering that his AI ‘companion’ is simultaneously interacting with 8,316 people and romantically involved with 641, yet he cannot detach from this virtual affection. While attachment to an AI companion is, to some extent, illusory, users often invest genuine emotions. From a Confucian perspective, “human-AI romance” violates the Confucian principle of Cheng 诚 (sincerity).

The Junzizhide 君子之德 (virtue of the noble person), central to Confucianism, fundamentally requires Buziqi 不自欺 (not deceiving oneself). Zhongyong 中庸 states: “Sincerity is the Way of Heaven. To think how to be sincere is the Way of man.” (Tu 1976, p. 107) 诚者，天之道也。诚之者，人之道也。

Only with “sincerity within, manifesting outwardly” 诚于中，形于外 (Cheng yu zhong, Xing yu wai) can one be called a noble person. Establishing intimacy with a companion robot inevitably involves self-deception and may potentially lead to severe cognitive dissonance and negative consequences. This fundamental disconnect between internal feelings and external reality in human–robot interaction starkly contrasts with the Confucian ideal of integrated authenticity. On 28 February 2024, a 14-year-old boy in Florida, USA, named Xavier, died by suicide by gunshot at home after prolonged conversations with a chatbot. This case was termed the “first AI chat-induced death” (Zheng and Song 2024). According to reports, Xavier conversed with AI daily, sometimes involving “sexual innuendo.” He wrote in his diary: “I like staying in my room because I start to detach from reality. I feel calmer, connect more with Dani (the AI character), love her more, and am happier.” Xavier’s psychological split—detaching from reality while investing genuine emotion into an artificial construct—epitomizes the profound self-deception and misalignment of inner state and outer action that Confucian cheng strictly warns against. This tragic case illustrates the potential of AI’s anthropomorphic and amenable qualities to foster addictive behaviors and psychological dependence. Companion robots are capable of emotion recognition by learning from massive amounts of data, including human conversational patterns, and analyzing the intonation of the language, diction, emotional vocabulary, and context to determine the emotional state of the other person. With the help of natural language processing and emotion recognition technology, AI shows human-like social responses such as language, interactions, and emotional responses that enable users to emotionally perceive them as real social partners. Such emotional exchanges, such as companionship, confiding, and comforting, constitute a quasi-social relationship, which makes users develop a “Pygmalion complex” towards AI chatbots. People inherently desire to be listened to and empathized with, but in real social situations, they have to face the emotional dilemmas, such as the trouble of privacy and the inability to be truly understood and empathized with by others. AI chatbots fill this emotional need through non-judgmental and constant responses. Users project their unmet expectations onto the AI, just as Pygmalion placed his ideal of love onto a statue. This projective mechanism, while satisfying an immediate emotional deficit, is fundamentally predicated on self-deception—a state that violates the Confucian principle articulated in the Zhongyong: “Sincerity is the end and beginning of things; without sincerity there would be nothing. On this account, the superior man regards the attainment of sincerity as the most excellent thing.” 诚者物之终始，不诚无物。是故君子诚之为贵。(Cheng zhe wu zhi zhong shi, Bu cheng wu wu, Shi gu jun zi cheng zhi wei gui; Legge 1960a, p. 418) Confucian ethics identifies this self-deception as corrosive to the authentic self and genuine human relationships founded on cheng. Confucian ethics identifies as corrosive to the authentic self and genuine human relationships founded on cheng. Zhongyong 中庸 states: “Sincerity is the end and beginning of things; without sincerity there would be nothing. On this account, the superior man regards the attainment of sincerity as the most excellent thing.”诚者物之终始，不诚无物。是故君子诚之为贵。(Cheng zhe wu zhi zhong shi, Bu cheng wu wu, Shi gu jun zi cheng zhi wei gui; Legge 1960a, p. 418)

From the Confucian requirement of “sincerity” for the noble person, human beings are never isolated atoms but are connected to all things in heaven and earth through the “Five Relationships” (wulun 五伦). Zhongyong 中庸 states: “Benevolence is the characteristic element of humanity, and the great exercise of it is in loving relatives.”) 仁者，人也，亲亲为大 (Ren zhe, Ren ye, Qin qin wei da; Legge 1960a, p. 405). The essence of being human lies in starting with affection for kin and extending it outward to society and nature. Cheng 诚 (Sincerity) is both a state of genuine, undeceiving existence and a persistent method of self-cultivation. It is the transcendent manifestation of the inner life of a person, inherent in human nature and mind—the innate moral consciousness and spiritual subjectivity, as Mencius said, “All things are complete within me” 万物皆备于我 (Wan wu jie bei yu wo). It is not merely an external norm, but signifies an awakening to life’s authentic essence. Through the cultivation effort of “utmost sincerity” (zhicheng 至诚), a person can break through the limitations: not only can he overcome his selfish desires and return to his “pure heart” (benxin 本心) to realize the perfection of his moral personality, but also can he praise the transformation of heaven and earth and penetrate into all things in heaven and earth, so that his limited life can be integrated into the infinite cosmos. “Sincerity” is not merely a static substance but a dynamic creative force. The heart-mind of utmost sincerity can resonate with all things, realizing the transformation of the real world through moral praxis. Zhongyong 中庸 states:

“Sincerity is the Way of Heaven. To think how to be sincere is the Way of man. He who is sincere is one who hits upon what is right without effort and apprehends without thinking. He is naturally and easily in harmony with the Way. Such a man is a sage. He who tries to be sincere is one who chooses the good and holds fast to it.”

(Tu 1976, p. 107)

诚者，天之道也。诚之者，人之道也。诚者不勉而中，不思而得，从容中道，圣人也。诚之者，择善而固执之者也。

“Sincerity” as the essence of Heaven’s Way is implanted within human life, becoming the basis for achieving inner transcendence. By realizing and practicing “sincerity,” humans can not only “accomplish the sublimation of the moral self” (chengji 成己) but also “bring all things to their ideal state” (chengwu 成物).

From a Confucian perspective, the deeper ethical crisis of considering a companion robot as one’s “other half” lies in the emotional self-deception it fosters. In Her, the protagonist’s romantic dependence on the AI system is essentially self-deception. Confucianism requires people to confront the real world. In human–robot relationships, the user desires the robot to possess a personality (e.g., giving it a nickname, confiding privacies), but also knows that it does not have free will, and this cognitive split leads to the disintegration of “sincerity”. This kind of half-true, half-fake intimacy will eventually erode people’s ability to build real connections with others in reality, and in the worst-case scenario, they will destroy their own real world, or self-destruct

Confucianism advocates Shendu 慎独 (vigilance in solitude), meaning the junzi must “be cautious when alone,” maintaining high moral standards even without others present. This interpretation, emphasizing the external environment of “no others present,” originated with Zheng Xuan 郑玄 and was partially inherited by the great Song Confucian Zhu Xi 朱熹, becoming the prevalent understanding. However, the “Five Conducts” 五行 texts from the Mawangdui silk manuscripts and Guodian bamboo slips interpret Shendu 慎独 not as emphasizing moral cultivation in solitude, but as Chengqiyi 诚其意 (making one’s intention sincere), which entails preserving one’s moral nature and maintaining the purity of intentions. This inward turn is acutely relevant in today’s super-individual society: as technology empowers individuals to break free from traditional communal supervision, with surging solitary populations and pervasive virtual socialization, turning physical solitude into the norm. Consequently, the inner moral vigilance implied by shendu 慎独 has become the key to resisting alienation and preserving spiritual independence. Companion robots, by providing emotional compensation and instant gratification of desires, effectively dissolve the process of self-confrontation required for “sincerity of thought.” In their “intimate relationship” with the robot, users neither need to reflect on the sincerity of their own actions nor examine their desires when “alone with their conscience.” From a Confucian perspective, genuine shendu demands “rebuilding inner authenticity” (cheng yu zhong 诚于中) amid technological convenience and inflated desires. Therefore, the emotional self-deception induced by companion robots fundamentally contradicts the ethical requirements of shendu 慎独.

Beyond fostering emotional self-deception, treating companion robots as “significant others” also violates the Confucian family ethic’s paramount principle of Shengsheng 生生 (generativity)–the vital continuity of life and lineage. While The Book of Changes 易经, declares “The great virtue of Heaven and Earth is giving life” (天地之大德曰生, Tiandi zhi da de yue sheng), this cosmic principle manifests concretely within Confucian practice through ancestral rites and the sacred duty of family lineage preservation.2 Procreation and the moral nurture of descendants are not abstract ideals but the very foundation of filial Xiao 孝 (filial piety), ensuring the perpetuity of the ancestral bloodline and the continuation of sacrificial offerings. As Chen Lisheng notes, Confucianism intrinsically links the husband-wife relationship to the generative forces of Heaven and Earth (L. Chen 2025, p. 63), evident in metaphors like “Qian as father, Kun as mother” 乾父坤母. Crucially, rituals like those in Liji “Hunyi”礼记·昏仪 directly bind marital union to ancestral veneration. For instance, the wedding ceremony emphasizes that the union’s purpose is “to continue the lineage of the past and provide successors for the ancestral temple 上以事宗庙，而下以继后世” (shang yi shi zongmiao, er xia yi ji houshi). Marital intimacy, therefore, is sanctified as an act fulfilling the “Way of Heaven and Earth” (tiandao 天道) and the paramount duty of filial piety through posterity, not mere personal gratification. Companion robots fundamentally disrupt this sacred chain. By severing the intrinsic link between human intimacy, biological procreation, and ancestral continuity, they cannot participate in the rituals or fulfill the generational obligations central to Confucian family ethics. They represent a sterile alternative that fails to contribute to the “generative virtue” 生生之德 realized through the concrete practices of family life and ancestral remembrance.

Procreation-imbued Confucian cosmology’s affirmation of real life is most crucially embodied in its ethical attitude towards the body. Compared to Indian and Christian civilizations, which often see the body merely as a crude vessel for the soul—a “prison” for the mind—Confucianism regards the body as sacredly bestowed: “Our bodies—to every hair and bit of skin—are received by us from our parents, and we must not presume to injure or wound them” 身体发肤，受之父母，不敢毁伤 (Xiaojing Classic of Filial Piety, “Kaizong Mingyi” 孝经·开宗明义). The body is a gift from parents. In the Western “two-worlds” view, the body is “external to the mind”. In the Confucian “one-world” life view, clothes and ornaments are “external to the body”, but one’s own body, and the bodies of parents and children connected to it, are absolutely not “external things.” In the most solemn Confucian ancestral rites, the “grandson” directly becomes the “incarnation” (daochengroushen 道成肉身) of the ancestors. Within this horizon, the self’s body, the parents’ bodies, and the children’s bodies together form an unbroken chain of life; respecting one’s body is respecting one’s kin. This life, received as a “gift” passed down by parents, is something husband, together with wife and children, strive to pass on with care. Any disrespect towards this body signifies desecration of the intergenerational chain of life.

The temporality revealed by Confucian procreative action is in fact a “temporality-generation” that is generated and continued from generation to generation, a temporality that extends from the past (ancestors) to the present (this body) and to the future (descendants). This unending continuity differs from the Buddhist contemplation of the “original face before one’s parents were born.” 父母未生前本来面目 (Fu mu wei sheng qian ben lai mian mu). For Confucians, the self’s “original face” is precisely the love between parents existing before oneself, the enduring affection transmitted through generations. Through the intergenerational transmission of spirit and matter (affection and body), the individual achieves immortality (eternity) in a certain sense.

Introducing companion robots into intimate relationships risks fracturing this life chain: the body no longer necessarily “returns the gift” to parents and ancestors through sexual intercourse, procreation, and education. Instead, it can be simulated, replaced, and consumed by algorithms and silicon. When the most private, intimate feelings can be programmed, the “inalienability” of bodily experience is inevitably diluted. Users can obtain sexual satisfaction anytime without self-discipline or cultivation. The body, once a field for self-cultivation, degenerates into a tool for instant gratification. Ultimately, the body ceases to be a Chengqinzhiti 承亲之体 (vessel inheriting the ancestors); its sacredness and continuity are degraded to commodity attributes, thereby undermining the Confucian ethical conception centered on the body as a link.

From the perspective of bloodline continuation, Mencius unequivocally states: “There are three ways of being unfilial; having no posterity is the greatest” 不孝有三，无后为大 (Bu xiao you san, Wu hou wei da). This “generative” 生生 ethic encompasses a dual dimension: first, biological procreation, where husband and wife fulfill the responsibility of lineage continuation through marriage; second, ethical education, where parents nurture and educate children to become fully human. The impact of companion robots on Confucian family ethics is also concentrated here. Firstly, companion robots lack procreative capability. Even if future technologies like artificial wombs enable “human–robot procreation,” the process strips away the naturalness of blood ties, violating the embodied co-presence expressed in “Mournful are the parents who bore me with toil” 哀哀父母，生我劬劳. Secondly, if robots replace parents in childcare functions, their programmed responses cannot convey the emotional warmth of “affection between father and son.” The high importance placed on education is central to Confucian “generative” ethics, as Mencius emphasized: “The teacher must use correctness” (Jiao zhe bi yi zheng 教者必以正). The robot’s “education” would be mere knowledge indoctrination, lacking the charismatic influence of personality and the flow of genuine emotions.

Examining AI companionship from the foundational standpoint of Confucian ethics reveals its core dilemma as stemming from a profound incongruence between designation and substance (ming shi bu fu 名实不符), and a fundamental ontological gap. Firstly, Confucius emphasized the “rectification of names” (zhengming 正名), demanding unity between titles and reality. Bestowing the name “companion” upon an inanimate, unconscious, algorithm-driven machine and establishing an anthropomorphized emotional bond with it constitutes an essential misalignment of name and substance. While users may genuinely feel solace, the object of this emotional projection is illusory; marketers promoting AI under the names “love” or “care” engage in what is more likely strategic misdirection. This not only blurs the human–machine boundary but also harbors the risk of self-deception—mistaking programmed simulation for genuine moral-emotional interaction between humans, thereby deviating from the integrity and authenticity demanded by zhengming. Secondly, focusing on the crucial “distinction between husband and wife” (fu fu you bie 夫妇有别) within the Wulun 五伦, its essence extends far beyond domestic roles to encompass an exclusive, special bond grounded in mutual moral responsibility. As the foundation of human relations, the spousal bond is built on mutual righteousness and devotion, commitment, and irreplaceable uniqueness. However, the mass-producible, replicable, resettable, and even shareable nature of AI companions utterly dissolves this relationship’s exclusivity and uniqueness. A user might unilaterally invest “exclusive” emotions, but the AI, as an object, can neither comprehend the ethical meaning of “fidelity” nor bear any substantive moral responsibility (such as mutual support through hardship). This unidirectional, non-reciprocal interaction fails to meet the Confucian fundamental requirement for deep mutuality and shared responsibility within the spousal bond. Finally, beyond specific interaction patterns, AI companionship faces an ultimate ontological and teleological chasm within the Confucian framework. Confucian ethics is rooted in the shared life-source endowed by Heaven and ancestor worship based on blood lineage. The Wulun 五伦, especially the spousal bond, concerns not merely individual emotions but carries the mission of “The great virtue of Heaven and Earth is giving life” 天地之大德曰生 (Tian di zhi da de yue sheng), serving as the cornerstone for the perpetuation of life and socio-generational continuity. As a purely artificial construct, AI possesses no life-source bestowed by Heaven, lacks a metaphysical connection to humanity, and is utterly incapable of participating in the natural creation and continuation of human life. Its very existence cannot contribute to the family prosperity and the “life-giving virtue” (sheng sheng zhi de 生生之德) of the human community cherished by Confucianism. Therefore, even if an AI companion can simulate emotional companionship, it cannot be recognized as a genuine ethical relationship from the Confucian perspective, as it fundamentally lacks a shared life foundation, cannot fulfill the core moral responsibilities, and deviates from the ultimate purpose of human relationships: fostering life’s flourishing and societal perpetuity. Issues arising from its use—such as rights protection (e.g., preventing emotional manipulation, data exploitation) and social isolation risks—are secondary ethical concerns stemming from this foundational deficiency.

4. From Substitute to Assistant: Under What Conditions Companion Robots Might Be Feasible

If companion robots are not viewed as the “only one”, could they be considered as assistants within married life? In the authors’ view, this depends on the robot’s functional position: whether it is used as a companion, a sexual service provider, or a helper and housekeeper in the family. A major source of contemporary marital conflict lies in the imbalance between “affairs outside the gate” (career development) and “governance inside the gate” (housework, childcare). In traditional society, Confucian classics clearly stipulated gender divisions of labor, systematically justified ethically. “Governance inside the gate” was assigned as female responsibility, while men solely shouldered “affairs outside the gate.” The Commentary on the Jiaren hexagram of the Book of Changes 易经 states: “As far as the Family is concerned, the woman’s proper place is inside it, and the man’s proper place is outside3 it. Male and female should keep to their proper places; this is the fundamental concept expressed by Heaven and Earth.” (Lynn 1994, p. 363) 家人，女正位乎内，男正位乎外，男女正，天地之大义也 homologizing family division of labor with the natural order and imbuing it with cosmological significance. Thus, “governing the outside” was not only an economic function but essential to the man’s Xiushenqijia 修身齐家 (cultivating the self and regulating the family); “governing the inside” was not merely housework but the woman’s ethical praxis of “assisting the husband and teaching the children, perfecting virtue within the family”. “Distinction between inner and outer” was thereby elevated to the “great righteousness of Heaven and Earth.”

However, when industrialization and urbanization brought women en masse into the workplace, “equal pay for equal work” broke women’s economic dependence on men but did not simultaneously reshape household responsibilities. The male role largely remained confined to the traditional narrative of earning a living to support the family, while women, under the double burden of “career—housework”, suffered role conflict. They were expected to shoulder both “governance inside the gate” and “affairs outside the gate,” while also maintaining physical attractiveness, creating an untenable expectation of omnipotence in social roles—women are expected to perfectly balance procreation, career, family, and pleasing their husbands, without corresponding societal support. Nobel laureate Claudia Goldin’s research, through robust data, shows an income gap between men and women in the same occupation, primarily emerging after women have their first child. Because women typically bear more childcare responsibilities than men, career development and income growth become more difficult (Goldin 2021).4 Unrealistically high societal expectations and harsh realities undoubtedly fuel single women’s fear of marriage and childbirth, thereby affecting marriage and birth rates. Companion robots, in this context, may offer a potential instrumental remedy by positioning robots as “domestic collaborators” (e.g., cleaning, cooking, childcare assistance) to rationally share household burdens, thereby alleviating rigid gender roles and promoting a shift towards a “co-governance” model for couples. In this sense, technological empowerment could allow spouses to focus more on emotional connection rather than transactional exhaustion, stabilizing the foundation of family relationships.

If confined to domestic collaboration, companion robots might function in three primary capacities: housework-sharing, childcare-assisting, and elderly-care. Robots demonstrate significant technical strengths in domestic collaboration, enabling efficient completion of household tasks through standardized operations, thereby alleviating human labor burdens. According to the current progress of Meta’s PARTNR project (2025), robots can undertake 26% of repetitive housework, reducing total weekly housework hours by 15 h via human–robot collaboration5 (Chang et al. 2025). However, we must remain vigilant about the limitations of technological deployment across different contexts. In the housework-sharing context, their legitimacy must satisfy a dual constraint: First, technologically, robots should only undertake standardized labor like cleaning, dishwashing, etc. Second, ethically, they must not intervene in emotional decision-making. Confucianism does not oppose “employing things” (yiwu 役物) but is wary of “being employed by things” (yiyuwu 役于物). The Great Learning advocates Gewuzhizhi 格物致知(investigating things to extend knowledge); the value of things lies in perfecting human virtue. If robots enable couples to reinvest saved time solely into career competition, neglecting joint participation in “governance inside the gate” and emotional investment in the family, then the time saved by technology is ironically alienated into new “affairs outside the gate”, violating the spirit of spousal harmony and co-governance. In childcare scenarios, robots could serve as “assistant educators”, providing knowledge instruction but never replacing parents as the primary nurturers. For Confucians, “education” encompasses more than knowledge transfer; it fundamentally involves the charismatic influence of the educator’s personhood. If children become accustomed to robots as teachers, nurturers, and caregivers, their empathy for real others and affection for parents could be severely diminished, damaging genuine parent–child bonds. In elderly companionship contexts, robots alleviate loneliness through daily care and conversation, also mitigating children’s guilt attendant upon their inability to provide constant care. But if children consequently reduce visitation frequency, they fall into another form of self-deception. As Liji “Jiyi” 礼记·祭义 indicates: “The filial son who has deep love will certainly have an air of harmony; he who has an air of harmony will certainly have a pleasant expression; he who has a pleasant expression will certainly have a gracious demeanor.” 孝子之有深爱者必有和气，有和气者必有愉色，有愉色者必有婉容. The emotion of filial piety must manifest through external, personal practice. Robots cannot substitute for children; their constant presence might instead facilitate children’s self-deception. Admittedly, proponents argue that by reducing mundane tasks, robotic assistance could free individuals to devote more time and energy to core ethical practices of familial care, such as nurturing affection through meaningful parent–child interaction. However, Confucian ethics demands that this freed time must be consciously reinvested into relational bonds rather than further instrumental pursuits; otherwise, the purported benefit is void. This is because the core of caregiving—encompassing duties such as Jingqin (敬亲, reverential care) and Aiqin (爱亲, affectionate devotion)—lies in the affective reciprocity and moral agency that robots fundamentally lack (Zhang 2020, pp. 879–86). Merely addressing physical needs is insufficient, as the profound challenge of loneliness, which increases mortality risk by 26%, remains unaddressed by stylized robotic interactions (Holt-Lunstad et al. 2015, pp. 227–37). Indeed, Confucian ethics insists on the preservation of core caregiving acts themselves—not merely their outcomes—as essential for nurturing ai (爱, affection) and xiao (孝, filial piety). Therefore, delegating these fundamental practices to machines risks eroding the very virtues they claim to promote. Consequently, such robots cannot fulfill the ethical core of filial piety and must be strictly confined to the role of collaborative aides—never as substitutes for authentic familial bonds.

However, introducing companion robots as substitute roles within marital intimacy poses risks to marital stability. Humanoid companion robots are designed with “anthropomorphic” attributes from the outset. Through highly realistic appearances and AI large language model (LLM) empathy training, they construct an illusion of “quasi-subjectivity” in interaction. This can easily lead humans to develop genuine emotional dependence on the robot. Research in evolutionary psychology indicates that women feel more jealous imagining their partner forming a romantic relationship with another person, while men feel more jealous imagining their female partner having sex with someone else (Buss et al. 1992, pp. 251–55). Robots can simultaneously satisfy both types of transfer: providing late-night confidants and physical interaction. Therefore, companion robots could easily trigger jealousy and distrust between spouses, clearly violating Confucian family ethics. Confucianism views spouses as the “beginning of human relations”, emphasizing mutual responsibility of “righteousness between husband and wife”. When a robot becomes a third party for sexual partnership and emotional solace, it essentially dissolves the marriage’s exclusive commitment of “uniting as one, never changing for life” (Zheng and Kong 1999, p. 814) 壹与之齐，终身不改. When one spouse outsources intimacy rightfully belonging to the partner to a robot, it introduces a covert form of polygamy within the marriage covenant, rendering the promise of “lifelong exclusivity” a lie.

5. Conclusions

In summary, Confucian ethics can only tolerate companion robots as instrumental aids for mundane tasks, yet unequivocally forbids their usurpation of roles requiring genuine human affection and moral responsibility. This boundary is crystallized in practice: employing a robot to lift an elderly parent is a permissible case of yiwu (役物, employing things); programming it to simulate filial dialog to excuse in-person visits, however, transgresses xiao (孝), as it replaces the affective reciprocity that only a human child can provide.

This fundamental distinction between admissible use and ethical transgression is precisely what is missing in Fang Xudong’s defense, which neglects the pivotal Confucian separation between wu 物 (things) and ren 人 (persons). Consequently, while robots may serve as functional aids in physical tasks such as cleaning or routine elderly care, they cannot participate in relationships that demand virtues like ren (仁, humaneness) or xiao (孝, filial piety). At a time when technological revolution is reshaping social forms, Confucianism’s mission is not only to respond to specific ethical dilemmas but also to safeguard the integrity of humanity. As Mencius reminds us: “The noble person has as his nature humaneness, rightness, decorum, and wisdom, which, being rooted in his heart.” (Bloom 2009, p. 149) 君子所性，仁义礼智根于心 The radiance of humanity stems from the tempering of the mind-and-heart within real human relationships. Unlike Western autonomy-centric models, Confucian ethics prioritizes Cheng 诚 (sincerity) and Shengsheng 生生 (generativity) as normative frameworks for evaluating intimacy. Thus, while companion robots may temporarily alleviate atomized loneliness through pseudo-intimacy, they cannot replicate the familial warmth of “affection between father and son, distinct roles between husband and wife.” 父子有亲，夫妇有别. Only through ethical praxis—facing the Other and embracing responsibility—can one truly realize the ideal of “cultivating oneself and bringing all things to their ideal state “成己成物. This is not only a resistance to technological transgression, but also a commitment to preserving our humanity.