Dual Structure and Paradigm Breakthrough: Reconstructing the Intellectual History of Dependent Origination in Sectarian Buddhism

Abstract

The evolution of the theory of dependent origination in sectarian Buddhism (部派佛教) follows two logical threads: one is the debate on the ontological nature of dharmas, which drove the shift towards a “non-substantiality” (Nairātmyavāda 無體論) interpretation of dependent origination; the other is the discussion of the nature of dependent origination, which led to a shift towards a theory of unconditioned (Asaṃskṛtavāda 無為論). On the ontological nature of dharmas, the Sarvāstivāda (有部), rooted in the doctrine of “substantial existence in three times” (Trikāla-dravyāstitva 三世實有), established a “substantial dependent origination” (有體緣起論), arguing through three principles: self-nature inclusion (自性攝), substance without function (有體無用), and the real existence of causes and conditions (因緣實有). In contrast, schools such as the Mahāsāṃghika (大眾部), Dārṣṭāntika (譬喻師), and Sautrāntika (經量部) introduced theories like the “simultaneous arising of two minds” (二心俱生), “cognition having no object” (緣無境), and “seed-function”, propelling the shift towards a theory of non-substantialism. Concerning the nature of the law of dependent origination, the Sarvāstivāda asserted that “dependent origination is conditioned”, while the Vibhajyavāda (分別說部) pioneered the notion that “dependent origination is unconditioned”, abstracting the law of dependent origination from the phenomenal world into a transcendental existence, initiating a shift towards a theory of unconditioned and giving rise to two interpretative paths: one is the Mahāsāṃghika’s “intrinsic nature of the links of dependent origination” (緣起支性), leading to the construction of the “relational unconditioned” (關係性無為); the other is the Mahīśāsaka’s (化地部) “dependent origination as suchness” (緣起真如), leading to the construction of the “principle-based unconditioned” (理體性無為). The deep interaction of these two turns not only propelled the diverse development of sectarian Buddhism theories of dependent origination but also provided theoretical prototypes for Mahayana Buddhism’s (大乘佛教) theories, such as the theory of “dependent origination under ultimate reality” (實相緣起), “suchness-based dependent origination” (真如緣起), and “innate pure mind dependent origination” (自性清淨心緣起).

1. The Posing of the Question

The theory of dependent origination is the foundational doctrine of Buddhism. Its earliest formulation is the “Twelve Links of Dependent Origination”, proclaimed by the Buddha during his first turning of the Dharma wheel and constituting his most essential teaching. Its classical definition is as follows: “When this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises. When this does not exist, that does not come to be; with the cessation of this, that ceases” 此有故彼有此生故彼生此無故彼無此滅故彼滅 (T02, no. 99, p. 67a5-7). This profoundly reveals the conditioned nature of all phenomena: every existence in the phenomenal world arises and ceases interdependently. Yet, as Buddhism entered the period of sectarian divisions (beginning circa 3rd century BCE), the interpretation of dependent origination faced new philosophical challenges: how to account for the continuity of karma while steadfastly upholding the principle of anātman (non-self) and how to understand the universality and necessity of the law of dependent origination itself. It was precisely these fundamental questions that shaped the evolution of dependent origination theory within sectarian Buddhism, giving rise to two core logical trajectories.

The first was the debate over the nature of dharmas, where the Sarvāstivāda school constructed a theory of substantial dependent origination based on the principle of “substance without function”, while other schools, such as the Mahāsāṃghika, promoted a shift towards non-substantialism from different philosophical perspectives.

The second was the debate over the nature of the law of dependent origination, with the Sarvāstivāda asserting that dependent origination is a conditioned phenomenon, whereas other schools, such as Mahāsāṃghika, stated that it is unconditioned, promoting a shift towards unconditioned theory.

The dynamic interaction between these two main lines not only highlights the internal tensions within Hinayana theories of dependent origination but also laid the theoretical foundation for the diverse developments of Mahayana Buddhism’s “unconditioned dependent origination” (無為緣起論). Although existing studies have discussed these shifts at various levels, there remain many inadequacies that require further in-depth investigation.

Scholarship has explored the issue of the turn towards the denial of substantial existence from multiple dimensions. Tobita Yasuhiro (Tobita 2016, pp. 1–19), through analyzing the Sarvāstivāda critique of the Mahāsāṃghika theory of “self-cognition” (svasaṃvedana 自識), revealed the Mahāsāṃghika’s turn towards the denial of substantial existence at the ontological level. Yamada Kyōdō (Yamada 1957, pp. 184–87) and Yoshinari Maeda (Maeda 1989, pp. 215–37) focused on the debate between the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of “cognition having an object” (緣有境) and the Dārṣṭāntika doctrine of “cognition having no object” (緣無境), revealing the Dārṣṭāntika’s turn towards the denial of substantial existence at the epistemological level. William S. Waldron (Waldron 1994, pp. 199–258) pointed out that the Sautrāntika replaced the Sarvāstivādin concept of “acquisition” (prāpti 得) with “nominal seeds” to explain the continuity of karmic force, revealing the Sautrāntika’s turn towards the denial of substantial existence at the soteriological level. It is worth noting that the Abhidharma schools’ turn towards the denial of substantial existence was not complete; their fundamental theoretical framework still belonged to the affirmation of substantial existence. Taking the Sautrāntika as an example, while their theory of “nominal seeds” possesses characteristics of the denial of substantial existence, it serves merely as the dynamic cause for dependent origination. The true agents of dependent origination remain substantially existent entities existing moment by moment, thereby forming a model of dependent origination characterized by “momentary continuity” (kṣaṇika-saṃtati 剎那相續). This model of dependent origination is essentially a synthesis of the affirmation and denial of substantial existence, constituting an intermediate stage in the transformation from the Sarvāstivāda to the Vijñānavāda. Chadha Monima (Monima 2015, pp. 543–60), although noticing the commonality between the Sautrāntika and Vijñānavāda in negating “continuous substance”, neglects that the former is still confined to the substantialist framework of thinking.

Scholarship has predominantly examined the issue of the turn towards the doctrine of the unconditioned from the perspective of the “formative period of Mahāyāna Buddhism”, yet there remains a lack of in-depth analysis regarding the evolutionary trajectory from Hīnayāna theories of dependent origination to the three major systems of Mahāyāna dependent origination.

First, regarding the theoretical prehistory of the Madhyamaka (中觀宗) doctrine of “dependent origination under ultimate reality” (實相緣起), although Honjō Yoshifumi (Honjō 1989, pp. 410–15) and Shimizu Toshi (Shimizu 2015, pp. 210–35) revealed the conceptual continuity between the Sarvāstivādin theory of “the substantial existence of dharmatā” (法性實有) and the Madhyamaka doctrine of “ultimate reality” (實相), they nevertheless failed to explicate how “dharmatā nature” (法性) transformed from “inherent existence” (自性有) to the “emptiness of inherent existence” (無自性空). Yìnshùn (Yìnshùn 2011, pp. 155–56) observed that the “intrinsic nature of the links of dependent origination” facilitated the development of “emptiness” (śūnyatā 空性) thought but, similarly, did not clarify the transformation logic between these concepts. Integrating these perspectives reveals that the Madhyamaka theory of “dependent origination under ultimate reality” constitutes a philosophical synthesis of the Sarvāstivādin doctrine of “the substantial existence of dharmatā” and the Mahāsāṃghika theory of the “intrinsic nature of the links of dependent origination”—a transformative logic that remains systematically undemonstrated in current scholarship.

Secondly, regarding the theoretical prehistory of the Yogācāra doctrine of “suchness-based dependent origination” (真如緣起), although Shiina Rokurō (Shiina 1921, pp. 82–119) and Ikeda Rentarō (Ikeda 2020, pp. 1–20) noted the superficial connection between the Mahīśāsaka concept of “dependent origination as suchness” and the Yogācāra doctrine of “tathatā as unconditioned” (tathatāasaṃskṛta 真如無為), they overlooked their fundamental divergence. The Mahīśāsaka’s “dependent origination as suchness” is essentially “substantial tathatā” (實體真如)—a position epitomized by their theory that “the bhavāṅga persists until the end of cyclic existence” (窮生死蘊), which constructs tathatā as a constant entity that transcends dependent origination. This is what Lǚ Chéng (Lǚ 2005, pp. 272–73) termed the “transformed existence of a self” (變相有我). In contrast, the Yogācāra’s “tathatā as unconditioned” (真如無為) is not an independent substance, separate from ālayavijñāna (阿賴耶識), but rather the “consummated nature” (pariniṣpanna-svabhāva 圓成實性) actualized through the “transformation of the basis” (āśrayaparāvṛtti 轉依). The transformation logic from “substantial tathatā” (實體真如) to “tathatā as the nature of consciousness” (識性真如) urgently requires clarification.

Finally, concerning the theoretical prehistory of the Tathāgatagarbha school’s (如來藏係) doctrine of “innate pure mind dependent origination” (自性清淨心緣起), although Alex Wayman (Wayman 1978, pp. 35–50) noted the historical connection between the Mahāsāṃghika theory of the “intrinsic purity of mind-nature” (心性本淨) and tathāgatagarbha thought, he failed to elucidate the profound relationship between the “intrinsic nature of the links of dependent origination” (緣起支性) and the “tathāgatagarbha dependent origination” (如來藏緣起). Specifically, the intrinsic nature of the links of dependent origination results in the principle of dependent origination as unconditioned, providing a transcendental form for tathāgatagarbha dependent origination. The “intrinsic purity of mind-nature” transforms mind-nature into the unconditioned, injecting the potential of original awakening into the tathāgatagarbha. The two together shape a dependent origination model that is “identical with the subject and identical with the fundamental substance (即主體即理體1)”. Residing here, the law of dependent origination transforms from a causal format of the objective world into a pattern of awakening manifestation of the subjective world. This transformational logic requires systematic examination.

In summary, although existing research has discussed the turn towards theories of non-substantial existence and the turn towards the doctrine of the unconditioned at various levels, it remains confined to fragmented investigations of isolated issues, failing to systematically examine their interrelationships. In view of this, this study intends to use the two shifts as the main thread, to re-examine the history and evolution of the dependent origination thought in early Buddhism, and to investigate the deeper logic of the transition from the Hīnayāna theory of dependent origination to the Mahāyāna theory of dependent origination. The following three core conclusions are drawn.

First, the development of dependent origination theory in Abhidharma Buddhism consistently unfolds along two interconnected axes: the turn towards non-substantiality and the turn towards the unconditioned.

Second, these dual turns evolve not linearly but through dynamic interaction: the non-substantiality turn dismantles the empirical foundation of traditional dependent origination, creating a conceptual space for the metaphysical reorientation of the unconditioned. Conversely, the unconditioned turn enriches the philosophical implications of non-substantiality through the ontologization of dependent origination, elevating “non-substantiality” from a negational concept to a constructive element of a new ontological framework.

Third, the profound interplay between these dual turns ultimately catalyzes the evolution of the Abhidharmic “dependent origination as unconditioned” (緣起無爲論) into the Mahāyāna “unconditioned dependent origination” (無爲緣起論). The latter, as manifested in the three major Mahāyāna systems (Madhyamaka, Yogācāra, and Tathāgatagarbha), emerges through the critical reconfiguration of foundational Abhidharmic conceptual elements.

2. From “Substantial Dependent Origination” (有體緣起) to “Non-Substantial Dependent Origination” (無體緣起)

Having clarified the dual conceptual shifts and core controversies in the evolution of dependent origination theory within Abhidharma Buddhism, this section begins by examining the debate over “the nature of dharmic existence”. It analyzes the paradigmatic shift from the Sarvāstivāda school’s “substantialist dependent origination” to the “non-substantialist dependent origination” advocated for by the Mahāsāṃghikas, Sautrāntikas, and other schools. Central to this investigation are the following questions:

• What inherent theoretical contradictions within the substantialist model prompted critiques and reconstructions by other schools?
• How did the turn towards non-substantiality achieve multidimensional breakthroughs—ontologically, epistemologically, and in karma theory—thereby expanding Buddhism’s conceptual horizons?

To this end, this section systematically traces the theoretical formation and deconstruction trajectory of substantialist dependent origination, revealing the underlying logic of this paradigmatic transformation.

2.1. The Triple-Logical Construction of the Theory of Substantial Dependent Origination and Its Theoretical Predicaments

On the issue of the intrinsic nature of all dharmas, the Sarvāstivāda school, grounded in the doctrine of “the real existence of the three times”, constructed a realist theory of dependent origination characterized by substantialism. Its argument unfolds through a tripartite logical framework: “self-nature inclusion”, “substance without function”, and the “real existence of cause and conditions”.

• “Self-nature inclusion” establishes the ontological foundation for the independent, real existence of dharmic substance.
• “Substance without function” reveals that, while dharmic substances are real, they are not self-creating, thereby denying their self-agency.
• Precisely because the dharmic substance lacks efficacy upon itself, the “real existence of cause and conditions” becomes the necessary external dynamic force driving its arising, ceasing, and flux.

These three principles progress sequentially, forming a logically closed framework that provides a self-consistent theoretical explanation for the dependent origination of arising and ceasing within the phenomenal world. However, the inherent duality of substance and function within this substantialist framework ultimately served as the primary catalyst driving the transformation of the paradigm of dependent origination towards non-substantialist theories.

2.1.1. “Self-Nature Inclusion”: The Ontological Grounding of Dharma-Substance Reality

In the metaphysical domain of sectarian Buddhism, there is a fundamental ontological challenge concerning the essence of existence: does the legitimacy of the existence of dharmas stem from self-nature establishment or from being endowed by others? This leads to the debate between “self-nature inclusion” and “other-nature inclusion”.2 The Vaibhāṣikas use the master–subordinate relationship in the secular world as an analogy for the existence of dharmas, arguing that the nature of dharmas is held by others. The Sarvāstivāda points out that the theory of other-nature inclusion implies an ontological crisis: if the legitimacy of the existence of dharmas depends on being endowed by others, it would fall into “the pantheistic dilemma where one dharma’s self-nature should encompass all dharmas” (一法自性應是一切法) (T27, no. 1545, p. 306c7-8), leading to the paradox of causality where the birth of one dharma necessitates the birth of all dharmas and the extinction of one dharma necessitates the extinction of all dharmas. To address this, the Sarvāstivāda proposes the proposition that “all dharmas are included in self-nature”, shifting the ontological foundation from external dependence to internal self-sufficiency. Yìnshùn notes that the essence of self-nature inclusion is similar to an individual maintaining their independence while transitioning through different social roles (Yìnshùn 2009, pp. 67–69), thereby revealing that dharmas, within the interplay of the causal network, do not dissolve their independent self-nature. This ontological shift towards “legislating existence for oneself” avoids the theological metaphor of attributing “mind” to “Brahman” (大梵) and rejects the secular metaphor of attributing “body” to a monarch, thus opening up vast theoretical space for the diverse evolution of dependent origination within the tension between “substantial self-sustenance” and “non-self-dependent origination”.3

2.1.2. The Theoretical Breakthrough of “Substance Without Function” and the Proof of the Sarvāstivāda

The Sarvāstivāda establishes the existential foundation of phenomena as “being-in-itself” (是其自己) through the concept of “self-nature inclusion”, but, to avoid falling into the theoretical pitfalls of the Svatantrikan view (自在論), it creatively proposes the doctrine of “own-nature without function” (ātmānirupayoga 自體無用), establishing the basis of dependent origination for the “being-for-itself” (在其自己) of phenomena. The Mahāvibhāṣā (《大毗婆沙》), Volume 8, states,

“A good expounder of the Dharma, while explaining that phenomena have substance and so on but no function, contrasts this with the view of non-Buddhist schools which attribute both substance and function.” 善說法者雖說諸法有實體等而無作用外道所說兼有作用.

(T27, no. 1545, p. 39a20-22)

This assertion delineates the intellectual boundary between Buddhist philosophy and traditional Indian philosophy: non-Buddhist “substance and function theory” (有體有用論) binds substantiality with agency, granting entities the privilege of self-generation; the Sarvāstivāda’s “substance without function theory” (有體無用論) separates the two, reducing substance to pure existence units, whose arising, cessation, and transformation are entirely dependent on the external regulations of dependent origination.

The philosophical significance of this theoretical rupture is comparable to Descartes’ epistemological revolution of the dualism between mind and body (身心二元論). By distinguishing between the “self in phenomena” (法我) and “self of the individual” (pudgalātmān 補特伽羅), the Sarvāstivāda, while affirming the actual existence of dharmas, negates their subjective agency, confining their activities to the relational space outside themselves, much like Descartes confined mental activities to the realm of the mind separate from extension. This “non-extended entity theory” both dismantles the mystical foundation of the Upanishads (《奧義書》) that attributes existence to “Brahman” and dissolves the ontological self-sufficiency of the Vaisesika school’s “real meaning of sentences” (實句義). It thus opens up a unique metaphysical space for Buddhist dependent origination theory. In response, the Sarvāstivāda further provides proof from both ontological and epistemological perspectives.

Ontological proofs revolve around two core propositions: “Self-nature cannot be its own efficient cause (自性於自性非能作因)” (T27, no. 1545, p. 103c27) and “The self cannot initiate itself (自體於自體無等起)” (T27, no. 1545, p. 980a5). The first proposition delves into the dual aspects of “efficient cause”, namely “having effect” and “being unobstructed”, revealing that the essence lacks the inherent conditions for self-generation: on one hand, the self does not have a positive effect on itself, indicating a lack of intrinsic motivational force; on the other hand, there is no unobstructed effect of the self on itself, implying inherent self-restraint. The second proposition negates the self-sustenance of the essence from a spatiotemporal perspective: temporally, the essence’s continuation is fragmented by spatialized units of time into “continuous without subject”, which is not self-continuation by the subject; spatially, the existence of the essence lacks extensiveness, and its successive movement entirely depends on the interplay of causes and conditions.

Epistemological proofs revolve around two core propositions: “Self-nature does not know its own nature (自性不知自性)” (T27, no. 1545, p. 43a18-19) and “The self lacks corresponding mechanisms (自體無相應)” (T27, no. 1545, p. 980a6-7). The first proposition presupposes an innate disjunction between subject and object, confining cognitive activities within a dualistic framework of “knower–known (能知-所知)”, thereby eliminating the logical possibility of self-cognition. The second proposition reveals that, even if self-cognition is presupposed, the essence lacks intrinsic corresponding mechanisms, thus nullifying the practical feasibility of self-reference. Through the arguments of these two propositions, the Sarvāstivāda thoroughly negated the possibility of “self-awareness (自識)”. However, the Mahāsāṃghika posited that “the mind and mental factors can understand their own nature (心心所法能了自性)” (T27, no. 1545, p. 42c11-12), establishing the theory of “self-awareness”, which became the foundational theory for the Mahayana Buddhist doctrine of consciousness arising from conditions.4

The Sarvāstivāda’s “substance without function” theory reveals the fundamental disjunction between the actual existence and functionality of dharmas: if the inherent nature of all phenomena cannot self-generate, then all their activities must rely solely on external causes and conditions. Consequently, the proposal of the “real existence of causes and conditions” becomes inevitable.

2.1.3. The Sarvāstivāda’s Proof of the “Real Existence of Cause and Conditions” and Its Theoretical Dilemmas

Regarding the doctrine of “real existence of causes and conditions”, the Sarvāstivāda argues from both ontological and epistemological perspectives. Ontologically, the Sarvāstivāda distinguishes between two modes of existence: “self-existence” and “causal existence”. They affirm the reality of dependent origination by examining it from both positive and negative aspects. “Self-existence” refers to “all dharmas residing in their own nature (一切法各住自體)” (T27, no. 1545, p. 200a21), emphasizing the self-sustained nature of dharmas. However, this does not imply independent existence in the sense of the Svabhāvavāda but rather self-holding in the sense of being “self-nature inclusion”. This non-dependent mode of existence serves as a counterproof to the “real existence of causes and conditions”: if dharmas remain solely within the static domain of “self-existence”, the arising and ceasing of phenomena in the world would be impossible, thereby proving the objective necessity of causal conditions. In contrast to the static essence of “self-existence”, “causal existence” reveals the dynamic operational mechanism of “arising when conditions are favorable and ceasing when conditions are unfavorable (得勢時生失勢時滅)” (T27, no. 1545, p. 200a23), highlighting the potentiality essence of causation. That is, causation represents genuine physical potential energy—not merely a conceptual construct of cause and effect.5 Epistemologically, the Sarvāstivāda asserts that the objective condition (ālambanapratyaya 所緣緣) is real, criticizing the theory of “causation without objective referents” proposed by the Dārṣṭāntika. According to the Sarvāstivāda, cognitive activities depend on the assistance of the objective condition; if the object is not real, the potential effect that triggers mental awareness would cease to exist. This critique reveals the isomorphism between the “reality of the object (境界實有)” and “reality of causation (緣性實有)”, indicating that the cognitive object is not a passive recipient of cognitive activity but a potential condition that propels cognitive activity.

Although the Sarvāstivāda constructed a meticulous theory of dependent origination based on the doctrine of areal existence due to conditions, it remained entangled in the theoretical dilemma between the “self-subsistence of substance” and “impermanence of dependent origination”. This tension crystallized in the “substance–potency dichotomy (實體-勢能二分)”: under the principle of self-nature synthesis, the existence of dharmas appears to be self-sufficient; however, according to the doctrine of real existence due to conditions, the arising and ceasing of dharmas entirely depend on external potency. This dualistic model of substance and function gave rise to the Sarvāstivāda’s “instantaneous theory of dependent origination” (刹那緣起論), wherein phenomena “arise in one instant and cease in the next (一剎那生一剎那滅)” (T27, no. 1545, p. 769b11). This model of dependent origination harbors deep internal contradictions: if dharmas exist only for a moment, their essential nature degenerates into fragmented existence within a temporal sequence; if one acknowledges the continuity of dharmas across instants, it undermines the fundamental doctrine of the impermanence of all phenomena. This contradiction directly propelled the transformation of the paradigm of dependent origination from substantialism to non-substantialism.

2.2. Multifaceted Trajectories of the Shift to Non-Substantiality and Their Theoretical Constraints

As discussed, the Sarvāstivādin theory of the “duality of substance and function” directly propelled the paradigm shift in dependent origination towards non-substantialism. What, then, were the specific pathways of this transformation? In essence, it manifested through three distinct philosophical trajectories.

• The Mahāsāṃghikas advocated for the doctrine of the “simultaneous arising of two minds”, deconstructing the substantiality of mind-consciousness and thereby undermining the ontological foundation of the real existence of all dharmas.
• The Dārṣṭāntikas proposed the theory of “cognition having no object”, deconstructing the subject–object cognitive structure and initiating the non-substantialist turn within the epistemological dimension.
• The Sautrāntikas employed the theory of “seed-function” to reconceptualize the continuity of karma, effecting the paradigm shift towards non-substantialism in the dimension of karma theory.

The Mahāsāṃghika school’s doctrine of the “simultaneous arising of two minds” inaugurated a new Buddhist understanding of existence, positing that two distinct mental consciousnesses can coexist, thereby dissolving the substantiality of mind. This novel cognitive paradigm catalyzed the non-substantiality turn in dependent origination theory and spurred the Dārṣṭāntikas’ systematic deconstruction of substantialism. On the one hand, it extensively de-substantialized the “five categories of dharma (五位法)”, and, on the other hand, it eliminated the real existence of conditions, shifting dependent origination’s foundation from substance-ontology to a relational framework. This laid the theoretical groundwork for the Vijñānavāda doctrine of “consciousness-only without objects”.

The cognitive revolution at the ontological level precipitated an epistemological breakthrough: the dualistic framework of “knower” (能知) and “known” (所知) as separate substances was reconstituted into two cognitive functions of a single stream of consciousness. This is exemplified by the Mahāsāṃghika’s doctrine of “self-cognizing consciousness” (自識說), which asserts the following: “Wisdom, by its intrinsic nature, cognizes both itself and others—just as a lamp, by its intrinsic nature, illuminates itself and others (智等能了為自性故能了自他如燈能照為自性故能照自他)” (T27, no. 1545, p. 42c12-14). Within this framework, the substance-based subject–object dichotomy was transformed into a relational structure of subject–object non-duality. Following the deconstruction of the object’s substantiality, the Dārṣṭāntikas further advanced the “causation without objective referents” theory, positing that cognitive objects may either be “non-substantial existents” arising dependently or illusory non-existents. This distinction between two modes of “objectlessness (無境)” laid the theoretical groundwork for Vijñānavāda’s “threefold object domain” doctrine (三類境說).

On the issue of karmic continuity, the Buddhist schools exhibited an evolutionary trajectory shifting from substantialism to functionalism, crystallized in the core lineage: “Sarvāstivāda’s theory of non-manifest form as substance (無表色實體論) → Mahāsāṃghika’s theory of mind-only and different maturation (唯心異熟論) → Sautrāntika’s seed-perfuming doctrine (種子熏習論)”. Building on the axiom of “substantial existence in three times”, the Sarvāstivāda constructed a karmic-continuity system centered on a non-manifest form (avijñapti-rūpa 無表色), defined by three logical pillars: (1) establishing the non-manifest form as the material substrate of karma; (2) ensuring the temporal non-lapsing continuity (avipraṇāśa 不失性) of sentient beings through “acquisition” (prāpti 得); (3) instantiating karmic fruition via the real causal functions of “taking effect” (phala-pratilābha 取果) and “bestowing effect” (phala-dāna 與果). Yet this system failed to resolve karmic continuity in formless realms (ārūpyadhātu 無色界) and non-perception attainment (asamjñā-samāpatti 無心定), thereby creating conceptual space for the Mahāsāṃghika’s mentalist turn. Asserting that “only mind and mental factors possess vipāka-cause and vipāka-fruit (唯心心所有異熟因及異熟果)” (T27, no. 1545, p. 96a28), they compressed karmic causality from the five aggregates (pañca-skandha 五蘊) into the mental domain, structured by three tenets: (1) confining vipāka causality to mind-mental factors, reducing life-transmigration to pure mental activity; (2) invoking “self-cognizing consciousness” to internalize karmic continuity as mental reflexivity, eliminating external forces like “acquisition” and “taking effect”; (3) recasting karmic fruition via “innately pure mind” as mental manifestation—where karmic effects unfold as the self-actualization of latent mental potentials. While transcending the Sarvāstivāda’s framework, this model did not elucidate the internal perfuming mechanism of consciousness—thus creating space for the Dārṣṭāntika–Sautrāntika lineage’s “seed-perfuming theory”6 (Yìnshùn 2009, pp. 471–74).

Although the turn towards non-substantialism presented significant philosophical breakthroughs, its inherent dilemmas cannot be overlooked, manifesting primarily at three levels. First, there are residues of substantialism—for instance, while the Dārṣṭāntika denies the substantial reality of dharma, it retains the concept of “ultimate particles” (paramāṇu 極微), revealing a hidden reliance on substantialism within relational theory. Second, there is a contradiction in the dynamic–static structure of the continuity of life and karma—for example, although the Mahāsāṃghika explains the continuity of karma through the stream of consciousness (cittasaṃtāna 心識), it fails to clarify how karma maintains its stability within this stream. Third, there is the paradox of liberation theory—as seen in the Mahāsāṃghika’s opposition between the “intrinsic purity of mind-nature” and its “defilement by adventitious dust”, which falls into a dualism of good and evil. These dilemmas compelled Buddhist philosophy, after negating substantialism, to turn towards a more fundamental construction of the unconditioned theory, using the unconditioned dharmas that transcend arising and cessation to unify the binary oppositions within the realm of conditioned dharmas.

3. From “Conditioned Dependent Origination” (有為緣起) to “Unconditioned Dependent Origination” (無為緣起)

While the turn towards non-substantiality dismantled the ontological foundations of all phenomena, the Abhidharma schools’ inquiry into the nature of the principle of dependent origination persisted. As the “absence of inherent existence” of phenomena gradually became an established consensus, the debate over whether the principle of dependent origination constituted a “conditioned phenomenon” or an “unconditioned phenomenon” emerged as the new intellectual focal point. The Sarvāstivāda school, by constructing the theoretical framework of “substantialist dependent origination”, explicitly asserted that “dependent origination is a conditioned dharma”, maintaining a complete isomorphism between dependent origination and conditioned phenomena.7 Drawing from the Saṃyuktāgama’s (《雜阿含經》) concept of “the abiding nature of dharmas and the realm of dharma (法住法界)”, the Vibhajyavādins proposed the thesis that “dependent origination is an unconditioned dharma”, thereby extracting the principle of dependent origination from the phenomenal realm and initiating the unconditioned turn in dependent origination theory. Once the principle of dependent origination was established as independently existent, interpretive perspectives diverged within the schools: the Mahāsāṃghika adopted a nominalist stance, advancing the theory of “the nature of the links of dependent origination” based on relational determinism; the Mahīśāsaka, grounded in a realist perspective, proposed the theory of “dependent origination as ultimate reality” based on substantial determinism. Regarding the operational mechanism of unconditioned dependent origination, the Vibhajyavādins and Mahīśāsaka further developed two distinct theories: the “temporal container theory (時間容器論)” and the “eternal present theory (現在永恆論)”. These became the two classical theories of unconditioned dependent origination in sectarian Buddhism, providing theoretical prototypes for the multidimensional development of unconditioned dependent origination in Mahāyāna Buddhism.

3.1. The Sarvāstivāda Theory of Conditioned Dependent Origination and Its Theoretical Predicaments

Based on an empirical stance, the Sarvāstivāda school strictly confined the principle of dependent origination within the realm of conditioned phenomena, systematically constructing a thoroughly empirical causal theory through rigorous arguments concerning the nature, definition, and functional principles of dependent origination. However, the Sarvāstivāda remained deeply entrenched in the dualistic framework of “substantialism versus empiricism”, which sowed the seeds for the eventual collapse of its theoretical system. Take its understanding of the nature of time as an example: from a realistic standpoint, the Sarvāstivāda regarded the three periods of time (past, present, and future) as substantially existent entities. Yet, from an empirical perspective, neither past nor future time possesses experiential attributes. This conflict between substantial existence and non-empirical existence prompted the concept of time to be stripped from the empirical world, giving rise to the new doctrine of “unconditioned time”. Similarly, the Sarvāstivāda’s interpretation of dependent origination fell into the same logical paradox. Although strictly confined to the empirical domain, it simultaneously claimed transcendent universal applicability. This inherent contradiction ultimately drove the concept of dependent origination beyond empirical boundaries, leading to an intellectual shift towards the doctrine of “unconditioned dependent origination”.

3.1.1. The Sarvāstivāda Demonstration of Conditioned Dependent Origination

The Sarvāstivāda school’s argumentation for conditioned dependent origination unfolds across three dimensions: the svabhāva of dependent origination, its definition, and its operational principles.

Firstly, regarding the own-nature (svabhāva 自性) of dependent origination, the Mahāvibhāṣā rigorously delineates it based on the ontology of the trailokya (three realms): “In the desire realm (kāmadhātu 欲界) and form realm (rūpadhātu 色界), its intrinsic nature is the five aggregates (pañcaskandha 蘊). In the formless realm (arūpyadhātu 無色界), it is the four aggregates (欲色界五蘊為自性若無色界四蘊為自性)” (T27, no. 1545, p. 117c22-23). This definition carries two profound implications: (1) Domain Limitation—The occurrence of dependent origination is confined strictly within the three realms, thereby excluding metaphysical intervention by transcendental entities. This establishes dependent origination as an immanent principle of the empirical world; (2) Ontological Deconstruction—Defining its nature through aggregates reveals that dependent origination is fundamentally the temporary aggregation of substantially existent dharmas. This fundamentally negates any possibility of reifying a “subject of dependent origination” into an independent, self-subsistent entity.

Secondly, regarding the definition of dependent origination, the Mahāvibhāṣā centers on the doctrine of “substantial existence yet functional dependence”, unfolding its interpretation from the dual dimensions of the theory of the real existence of the substance of phenomena and the theory of the uselessness of its own nature. First, “Only dharmas possessing intrinsic characteristics may participate in dependent origination (有性相可從緣起)” (T27, no. 1545, p. 117c27). This proposition directly addresses the existential foundation of dependent origination: solely substantially existent dharmas with defined characteristics qualify as causal agents. This resonates with the Sarvāstivāda’s core tenet of tri-temporal existence (trikālāstivāda—past/present/future all substantially real). Second, “Dependent origination is so named because phenomena arise contingent upon conditions (待緣而起故名緣起)” (T27, no. 1545, p. 117c25). This reveals the non-autonomy of substantially existent dharmas: to engage in dependent origination, any dharma must depend on other existents. These two propositions demonstrate that the Sarvāstivāda’s definition of “dependent origination” exhibits isomorphic correspondence with its definition of “conditioned phenomena” (saṃskṛta-dharma 有為法).

Finally, regarding the operational principles of dependent origination, the Sarvāstivāda school constructs a “one dharma–dual aspect” causal model through its distinction between “dharmas of dependent origination” and “dharmas arisen from conditions 緣已生法” (T27, no. 1545, p. 118a25). This framework posits that the same dharma-substance possesses the dual attributes of “that which has the nature of production” (能生) and “that which is produced” (所生) in the causal sequence; the dependent origination dharma is that which has the nature of production, and the arisen dharma is that which is produced. This causal model replaces the substance-based causality view of “cause → effect” (因→果) with a “producer–produced” (能-所) structure. In the “cause → effect” model, the effect is a derivative of the cause and logically subordinate. However, in the “producer–produced” structure, the causal relationship is no longer a one-way hierarchical relationship but rather a functional transformation of the dharma entity at different temporal points, with an equal logical relationship.

3.1.2. Drawing the Future or Entering the Present: Two Temporal Models of Conditioned Dependent Origination

The Sarvāstivāda school, based on the subject–object distinction between dharmas of dependent origination and arisen dharmas, precisely delineates the causal position (hetu-avasthā 因位) and resultant position (phala-avasthā 果位) of conditioned dharmas. This positional transformation is strictly confined within temporal sequences. However, regarding the mode of temporal movement, Sarvāstivādin scholars diverged into two perspectives: the first was the mainstream substantialist position; the second was the empirical perspective of Venerable Pūrṇayaśas (望滿)8.

Based on their substantialist position, Sarvāstivādin scholars constructed three distinct temporal models of heterochronic causality: (1) The “Prior-Subsequent” Model (前生-後生). This framework lacks refined tri-temporal demarcation, simply emphasizing that prior dharmas (前生法) are the originating dependent origination dharmas, and the subsequently arisen dharma (後生法) is the dharma that has already arisen as that which is produced; (2) The “Past → Present/Future” Model (過去-現未). The past dharmas alone serve as dharmas of dependent origination, while present and future dharmas collectively constitute dharmas arisen from conditions; (3) The “Past/Present → Future” Model (過現-未來). This positions past and present dharmas as dharmas of dependent origination, and the future dharmas are dharmas arisen from conditions. The divergence between Models 2 and 3 centers on the status of present dharmas: Model 2 treats present dharmas as effects, stressing past dharmas’ causal influence on the present—implying karmic determinism (宿業決定論); Model 3 treats present dharmas as causes, highlighting their power to shape the future—embracing an agentive soteriology. As such, present life is not merely the fruit of past karma but the starting point for elevating future states of existence. Notably, both models classify future dharmas—not yet manifest in the empirical realm—as dharmas arisen from conditions. According to the substantialist doctrine of tri-temporal reality, future dharmas, although empirically unarisen, inherently belong to the category of actualized dharmas because their manifestation is ontologically inevitable. As Abhidharmakośa-śāstra (《阿毘達磨俱舍論》) IX states,

“How can future dharmas—not yet arisen—be termed dharmas arisen from conditions like past/present dharmas? How can unmanifest future dharmas qualify as ‘conditioned’? Because the volitional force behind them has already been activated. 如何未來未已起法可同過現說緣已生云何未來未已作法得同過現說名有為由能作思力已造故”.

(T29, no. 1558, p. 49c19-22)

Thus, by the iron law of karmic maturation (vipāka-niyāmatā 異熟業果), future dharmas—although empirically latent—are substantially real dharmas arisen from conditions in ontological terms.

In contrast, Pūrṇayaśas revised the Sarvāstivādin substantialist stance from an empiricist perspective, asserting that only past and present dharmas that have entered the world of experience can be called arisen dharmas (緣已生法), while future dharmas, not yet manifest in experience, belong exclusively to the category of conditioned dharmas (緣起法). Thus, he distinguished between “conditioned dharmas” and “arisen dharmas” within the framework of a two-part division of “potential existence–actual existence”. Specifically speaking, future dharmas have not yet manifested, but they have the potential function of dependent origination; therefore, they are conditioned dharmas and not arisen dharmas. The last five aggregates of the past and present have manifested and have no function of dependent origination; therefore, they are arisen dharmas and not conditioned dharmas. Past and present dharmas, excluding the last five aggregates, have manifested and also have the function of dependent origination; therefore, they are arisen dharmas and also conditioned dharmas. Unconditioned dharmas have not manifested and also have no function; therefore, they are not arisen dharmas, nor are they conditioned dharmas.

It is worth affirming that Vamāna’s negation of the manifest nature of future dharmas weakens the realistic stance that the three times truly exist and is more in line with a common-sense view of time. However, he does not offer further explanation as to how future dharmas pass from potentiality to reality. According to the line of reasoning in realism, the entrance of future dharmas into the present depends on two forces: past karma and present action. The former’s influence is irreversible, while current actions have a decisive function in the arising of future dharmas, thereby establishing the framework of liberation theory. However, according to the line of reasoning in Vamāna’s thought, future dharmas are not dharmas that have arisen in dependence on present conditions; their entrance into the present is not due to the pull of present dharmas but rather the sudden inrush of themselves into the world of experience. This would undermine the foundational basis of Buddhist liberation theory. Therefore, although Vamāna’s theory has an ideological tendency to deconstruct the theory of the real existence of the three times, he directs potentiality towards the entrance of the future into the present (future → present), rather than the present’s influence on the future (present ← future). Therefore, he did not develop a theory similar to the Sautrāntikas’ “the past and future have no substance (過未無體說)”.

In summary, the two models of temporal movement constructed by Sarvāstivādin scholars essentially reflect the intellectual conflict between substantialism and empiricism. This conflict ultimately undermined the logical presupposition that “the principle of dependent origination belongs to conditioned phenomena”.

3.2. The Unconditioned Turn in Dependent Origination Theory: From Empirical Relations to Transcendental Principles

Once the logical presupposition that “dependent origination belongs to conditioned phenomena” was dismantled by the intellectual paradox of the substantialism empiricism dichotomy, Buddhist dependent origination theory immediately initiated an intellectual shift towards the doctrine of unconditioned dependent origination. This shift has two main stages: first, the Vibhajyavādins, for the first time, extracted the law of dependent origination from the phenomenal realm, making it an independently existing entity; second, after being extracted from the phenomenal world, the law of dependent origination faced an interpretative divergence in the sense of “nominalism vs. realism”, which gave birth to the Mahāsaṃghika’s “the intrinsic nature of the links of dependent origination (緣起支性)” and the Mahīśāsaka’s “dependent origination as Suchness (緣起真如)”—two types of unconditioned theories of dependent origination.

Drawing from the Saṃyuktāgama teaching, “Whether Buddhas arise or not, this principle abides eternally; the Dharma abides in the Dharma-realm若佛出世若未出世此法常住法住法界” (T02, no. 99, p. 84b16-17), the Vibhajyavādins pioneered the doctrine that “dependent origination is an unconditioned dharma” (緣起是無為法) (Yìnshùn 2011, pp. 216–17), believing that the law of dependent origination is a constant existence transcending phenomena, thereby abstracting it from the experiential world. The Sarvāstivādins, based on an empiricist stance, sharply criticized this, saying, “The dharma abides in the dharma-nature, which is the meaning of certainty, not the meaning of the unconditioned法住法性是決定義非無為義” (T27, no. 1545, p. 116c14). In their view, the Saṃyukta-āgama emphasizes the definiteness of the causal relationship between the limbs of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda 緣起支), rather than establishing a transcendental principle independent of phenomena. The difference between the two schools lies in whether the necessity of the law of cause and effect (因果) ultimately originates from the inherent connection of experiential phenomena or from a transcendental a priori existence.

Although the Sthaviravāda mainstream does not accept the Vibhajjavā-din doctrine of “dependent origination as unconditioned”, this view breaks the fixed mindset that “dependent origination is necessarily conditioned”. It shifts the interpretive framework of dependent origination from the empirical realm to the a priori realm. Having entered this a priori realm, the interpretive divergence over whether the principle of dependent origination constitutes a conceptual existence or an ontological reality gave rise to the Mahāsāṃghika theory of the “dharma nature of causal links (緣起支性)” and the Mahīśāsaka theory of the “suchness of dependent origination”.

The theory of “the intrinsic nature of the links of dependent origination” was established by the Mahāsāṃghika school and constitutes the shared doctrine of the Mahāsāṃghika, Ekavyavahārika (一說部), Lokottaravāda (說出世部), and Kukkuṭika (雞胤部) sects (T49, no. 2031, p. 15b25-26). Its core tenet asserts that, although the twelve links of dependent origination (十二緣起支) are conditioned phenomena (saṃskṛta-dharma有為法), the causal relationships between them are deterministic (X53, no. 844, p. 582b3-5). Conversely, the theory of “dependent origination as suchness” was established by the Mahīśāsaka school of the Sthavira lineage. The eminent master Kuiji (窺基) noted that both doctrines possessed their own rationale, yet he did not specify their concrete differences (X53, no. 844, p. 588b1). In reality, the distinction between them lies precisely in the differentiation made in the Abhidharmakośa-śāstra between “relational unconditioned (關係性無為)” and “principle-based unconditioned (理體性無為)”. The “intrinsic nature of the links” emphasizes the logical necessity inherent in the causal relationships of phenomena—a conceptual existence—while “dependent origination as suchness” points to an ontological reality.

However, it is crucial to note that, although the doctrine of “dependent origination as suchness” exhibits a tendency towards substantializing reality, it should not be conflated with traditional Brahmanism (doctrine of a substantial self/soul 梵我論) or equated with universals in the sense of Western philosophical realism. Its essential philosophical thrust lies in using “suchness” (tathatā 真如) to establish the deterministic nature of “dependent origination”, while simultaneously using “dependent origination” to dissolve any substantiality inherent in “suchness”. This mutual determination thereby avoids falling into metaphysical ontology. This bidirectional defining principle developed in the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra into the doctrine of “the suchness of the twelve links of dependent origination is the suchness of all dharmas十二緣起真如即一切法真如” (T06, no. 220, p. 557c15). Herein, the principle of dependent origination ultimately transcends mere logical necessity and ascends to become the ultimate reality of all phenomena.

3.3. Two Temporal Models of “Unconditioned Dependent Origination”: Time Container Theory and Present Eternalism

The doctrine of “unconditioned dependent origination” primarily addresses the ontological status of the principle of dependent origination. As for the actual occurrence mechanism of dependent origination processes, sectarian Buddhism further developed two distinct models of “unconditioned dependent origination” theories: first, the time container theory (時間容器論), proposed by the Vibhajjavādins (分別論者); second, present eternalism (現在永恆論), established by the Mahīśāsaka (化地部).

Building upon their acceptance of the real existence of the three time periods, the Vibhajjavādins advanced the following proposition: “The substance of time is permanent, phenomenal activities are impermanent世體是常行體無常” (T27, no. 1545, p. 393a12). This framework abstracts time from phenomena as an independently existing temporal container—analogous to Newton’s “absolute time”—within which conditioned dharmas flow, generating the appearance of time progressing from future to past. In contrast, the Mahīśāsakas, through their doctrine of “past and future having no substantial reality, the present being unconditioned 過去未來是無唯說現在無為是有” (T27, no. 1545, p. 613b24-25), defined time as an eternal instant devoid of duration, thereby entirely negating the continuity of the three time periods. The similarity between these two temporal models lies in their shared assertion that time exists independently of phenomena, and both deconstruct the flow of time, making it an absolutely static existence. Their divergence emerges in that the Vibhajjavādins preserved temporal duration as the existential field for the arising and ceasing of phenomena, while the Mahīśāsakas dissolved duration, deconstructing arising and ceasing within the eternal instant. Consequently, these positions construct two distinct models of unconditioned dependent origination: “conditional unconditioned dependent origination” (條件型無為緣起) and “essentialist unconditioned dependent origination” (本質型無為緣起).

The so-called “conditional unconditioned dependent origination” signifies that unconditioned dharmas constitute the necessary conditions for the occurrence of dependent origination activities. Specifically, according to the Vibhajjavādins, unconditioned dharmas are no longer merely “passive non-obstructive conditions” but instead become direct participants in dependent origination processes. Within this framework, “temporal unconditioned” (時間無為) provides the field of occurrence for dependent origination activities, and the “four characteristics as unconditioned” (四相無為) provide the dynamic guarantee for such activities. Originally, while the “four characteristics” were classified as conditioned dharmas in the Sarvāstivāda system, the Vibhajjavādins argue, “If the characteristics of conditioned phenomena were themselves conditioned, their inherent fragility would render them incapable of generating, sustaining, transforming, or ceasing phenomena. Precisely because these characteristics are unconditioned, their ontological potency enables them to generate, sustain, transform, and cease phenomena. 若有為相體是有為性羸劣故則應不能生法住法異法滅法以有為相體是無為性強盛故便能生法乃至滅法” (T27, no. 1545, p. 198a20-22). Consequently, the Vibhajjavādins elevate the four characteristics from a conditioned to unconditioned status, transforming them into the dynamic mechanism of dependent origination. This establishes a dual-structure model of unconditioned dependent origination: “temporal field + dynamic of characteristics” (時間場域+四相動力).

The so-called “essentialist unconditioned dependent origination” signifies that unconditioned dharmas are not a condition for dependent origination activities but constitute their ultimate essence. Specifically, the Mahīśāsakas dissolve temporal duration, thereby congealing dependent origination processes within an eternal instant. This, to a certain extent, actually eliminates the phenomenal nature of “dependent origination”, thereby equating “dependent origination” with the “unconditioned”. This model anticipates the Mahāyāna doctrine of suchness-dependent origination, yet it crucially differs in that the Mahīśāsakas still rely on a temporal entity to substantiate the identity between dependent origination and the unconditioned dharma, whereas Mahāyāna Buddhism abolishes the time dimension entirely, subsuming dependent origination wholly within the self-unfolding of suchness. Notably, due to its pronounced metaphysical character, the Mahīśāsaka theory of the eternal instant was later reconfigured by the Sautrāntika school into the “past–future unreality + present conditionedness” (過未無體+現在有為) framework. While retaining the negation of past and future reality, this revision reinstates the present as conditioned, thereby returning dependent origination theory to a phenomenological framework and ultimately evolving into the Yogācāra model of dependent origination.

4. Conclusions

Through the interactive model of dual transformations, we have uncovered the internal logic underlying the evolution of dependent origination thought in sectarian Buddhism. The critical question that remains is as follows: how did these dual processes catalyze the emergence of the Mahāyāna doctrine of unconditioned dependent origination? This transformative mechanism is specifically manifested in the following two aspects. On one hand, the non-substantiality turn dismantled the empirical foundations of traditional dependent origination theory by deconstructing the substantiality of phenomena. This reoriented Buddhist philosophy from substantialist thinking toward relational and functional thinking, thereby opening a conceptual space for the metaphysical turn in unconditioned theory. On the other hand, the unconditioned turn reconfigured the ontological framework by reifying the principle of dependent origination as a metaphysical ground. This elevated “non-substantiality” from a negational concept to a constructive element in a new ontology, whereby ultimate categories like emptiness (śūnyatā 空性), consciousness-nature (vijñaptidharmatā 識性), and primordial awareness (prakṛtiprabhāsvaracitta 本覺) became essentially defined by non-substantiality. The dialectical interaction of these two turns gave birth to Mahāyāna’s theory of “unconditioned dependent origination”. However, the dependent origination theories of the three major Mahāyāna systems are not a linear inheritance from sectarian thought. Instead, they formed distinct bodies of doctrine through the deep interaction of the dual turns, critically reorganizing various intellectual elements, ultimately resulting in three distinct paradigms of “unconditioned dependent origination”.

Regarding the Mādhyamika school’s “dependent origination of ultimate reality”, its core meaning is not that phenomena arise from an unconditioned dharma called “ultimate reality” but rather that the true nature of all conditioned dharmas is “ultimate reality”, thereby completely dissolving the substantial opposition between conditioned and unconditioned dharmas. As the Great Treatise on the Perfection of Wisdom explicitly states, “The dharmatā of conditioned dharmas is unconditioned (有為法實相即是無為)” (T25, no. 1509, p. 289a16-17). This means that “dependent origination”, “conditioned dharmas”, “unconditioned dharmas”, and “ultimate reality” are ultimately identical. This paradigm critically synthesizes the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of “the real existence of dharmas’ nature” and the Mahāsāṃghika doctrine of the theory of “dharma nature of causal links”. The former provides an ontological grounding for the reality of “ultimate reality”, while the latter, with its “de-substantializing” thinking, lays the foundation for the concept of “emptiness”. In summary, embodying its unique spirit of the Middle Way, the Mādhyamika school seeks balance between “emptiness” and “existence”, avoids falling into “generative” or “creationist” thinking, and simultaneously establishes the ultimate basis for the establishment of “dependent origination”.

The Yogācāra school’s dependent origination theory presents two theoretical approaches. “Ancient Yogācāra” bases the dependent origination activities of the defiled world and the pure world on the eighth consciousness and the ninth pure consciousness, respectively, constructing a dual structure of “conditioned dependent origination (defiled dependent origination)–unconditioned dependent origination (pure dependent origination).” “Contemporary Yogācāra” bases the dependent origination activities of both the defiled and pure worlds entirely on the ālayavijñāna, forming a thoroughgoing “conditioned dependent origination” paradigm. Historically, Ancient Yogācāra’s theory of unconditioned dependent origination originates from the Mahīśāsaka doctrine of “dependent origination as suchness”. The key difference is that “suchness” is no longer the ultimate basis for the dependent origination activities of the phenomenal world; it is only responsible for the existence of the unconditioned dharma-body. In essence, this “unconditioned dependent origination” paradigm points solely to the existence of unconditioned dharmas themselves, no longer serving as the direct basis for the existence of conditioned dharmas. Notably, like the Mādhyamika, Ancient Yogācāra’s unconditioned dependent origination theory deliberately avoids “generative” thinking, asserting that unconditioned dharmas are not generated by suchness but exist depending on suchness. Its most significant difference from the Mādhyamika, however, is its affirmation of the substantial existence of “suchness”.

The Tathāgatagarbha school’s “dependent origination of the innately pure mind” is a philosophical synthesis of the Mahāsāṃghika doctrine of the “innate purity of mind” and the Mahīśāsaka doctrine of “dependent origination as suchness”. The former renders mind-nature unconditioned, infusing tathāgatagarbha with the potential for innate enlightenment. The latter ontologizes the principle of dependent origination, providing the transcendental form for the dependent origination of the self-mind. This constructs a dependent origination model that is “simultaneously subjective and ontological”, ultimately transforming the principle of dependent origination from an objective causal pattern of the world into a form of subjective manifestation within the mind-world. Philosophically, this paradigm posits that all phenomena are products arising from the conditioned manifestation of suchness, signifying a return, in a certain sense, to “generative” thinking. While this breaks with the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra adherence to the traditional “non-generative” model, it resonates profoundly with the Chinese philosophical “substance-function” (體-用) thinking of “the unconditioned generates all conditioned phenomena without deliberate causation” (無為而無不為, from Lao Tzu’s Tao Te Ching). Consequently, it became a crucial pivot for the fusion of Indian and Chinese thought and did not only shape the mainstream trajectory of Chinese Buddhism’s development but also profoundly influenced the ontological reconstruction of Chinese philosophy.