Federalism in Afghanistan: Power Interests, Religion, and Ethnicity in Political Discourse

Abstract

Federalism is a contemporary principle of constitutional organization, rooted mainly in Western constitutional traditions. It entails a system in which individual constituent states retain limited sovereignty and autonomy, while collectively forming a unified overarching state. This model stands in clear and fundamental opposition to the Taliban’s centralized and fundamentalist Islamist concept of governance. Nevertheless, or perhaps precisely because of this, the concept of federalism has sparked intense and controversial debate among Afghan activists and intellectuals since the Taliban’s return to power on 15 August 2021. While federalism has been a subject of discussion within smaller political and intellectual circles since the 1950s and 1960s, it has emerged as a significantly more prominent topic of debate over the past thirty years. In particular, the persistent and systematic discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities under the Taliban has intensified calls for political decentralization and proposals for regional autonomy. The article seeks to categorize the current debates on federalism in Afghanistan chronologically and discursively, analyzing the positions of its proponents and opponents through the lens of their religious and ethnic affiliations. Notably, the article does not treat ethnicity as a fixed or essential category, but rather as a socially and discursively constructed phenomenon.

1. Introduction

Modernity is generally defined by three closely interconnected processes: industrialization, enlightenment, and secularization. In political terms, it aims to limit the concentration of power in the hands of the state, a single ruler, or a dominant group. Instead, it promotes the widest possible form of decentralization. Therefore, a core feature of the modern state is the separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches (cf. Hafner 2009).

Federalism is a political principle that emerged as part of the broader process of decentralizing state power. It is closely associated with the principles of modern Western governance (Krause 2025, p. 17) and, in simplified terms, refers to a constitutional framework in which individual member states retain a degree of autonomy and sovereignty, while being united under a larger federal system.

Contemporary Western-oriented federalism is defined by four core characteristics. First, it is grounded in modern constitutional discourse, in which the distribution and exercise of political power are formally regulated and legitimized by a constitution. Second, it is based on the principle of popular sovereignty, deriving legitimacy not from divine or monarchical authority or individual state power, but from the collective will of the people. Third, there is a dual separation of powers: vertical, between the central government and the constituent states; and horizontal, among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Fourth, it is characterized by a consensual political style that emphasizes broad agreement among all member states through inclusive negotiation and decision-making processes (cf. Krause 2025, pp. 8–20).

Reflecting on Western experiences with federalism, successful federal systems are those that have managed to strike a balance between the authority of the central state and the autonomy of the constituent units. Federalism requires both a strong sense of commitment and responsibility toward the state as a whole, as well as the protection of regional self-governance. When this balance is disrupted, federalism risks sliding into separatism—as exemplified by the case of Catalonia—or devolving into a superficial structure, as occurred in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

Today, several states in the Islamic world have federal structures, although their paths of development differ significantly from those in the West. Malaysia, for instance, is a federal state in which individual member states possess their own legal systems and enjoy a degree of autonomy—particularly in the domain of Islamic law, where some states implement religious legislation independently of federal authority (Ostwald 2017). The Islamic Republic of Pakistan is a federal, semi-presidential democracy composed of autonomous provinces and regions governed under the 1973 Constitution, which has undergone multiple amendments and has at times been suspended during periods of military rule (Shah 2022). Following the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Iraq adopted a federal constitution that allowed for the creation of several autonomous regions, the most prominent and institutionally advanced being the Kurdish region, Kurdistan (Özden 2010).

Although Afghanistan’s historical trajectory differs markedly from that of many Islamic and Western nations, the idea of federalism has periodically emerged in its political discourse. As early as the 1950s and 1960s, small political and intellectual circles began engaging with federalist thought. Between 1992 and 1996, the Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan—predominantly composed of Shiite Hazaras and led by Abdul Ali Mazari (1947–1995)—explicitly adopted federalism as part of its political platform. Following the fall of the Taliban in 2001, federalism reemerged in discussions about establishing a stable system of governance. Since the Taliban returned to power on 15 August 2021, federalism has once again become a contentious issue, with some political figures and intellectuals vocally supporting it.

Without claiming to be exhaustive, this article aims to categorize ongoing debates among Afghan intellectuals and political activists, recognizing that the line between these roles is often fluid in the Afghan context. The analysis identifies the key actors engaged in the federalism discourse and examines how they position themselves and which ethnic, religious, and political affiliations they draw upon. Additionally, the article explores the main arguments for and against federalism, paying particular attention to the role of Islam in shaping these positions.

The article demonstrates that demands for federalist structures in Afghanistan tend to intensify particularly when marginalized or non-privileged groups become increasingly aware of their political and social disadvantages. Conversely, when these groups perceive themselves as adequately represented and integrated within the existing political framework, interest in alternative models of governance—such as federalism—tends to diminish.

2. Federalism in Afghanistan—Perspectives of Western Research

In this context, Western research refers to publications from a Western academic context, particularly in English or German. This category also encompasses works by Afghan authors, provided they are published within this linguistic and academic area.

Thus far, Western academic literature by non-Afghan specialists has only marginally addressed the topic of federalism in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, existing discussions generally view federalism as a positive approach for the country. This perspective is largely based on Afghanistan’s ongoing instability, which has persisted despite decades of an international military presence. In this context, federalism is seen as a potential solution for promoting stability and decentralization.

Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili (2014), a political scientist, is one example of this. In her article In-formal Federalism: Self-Governance and Power Sharing in Afghanistan (Kulturabteilung der Nationalen Kongresspartei Afghanistans 2014), she highlights traditional village-level self-governance structures, describing them as forms of informal federalism, and argues that these local mechanisms could contribute to democratic stabilization.

German historian and Afghanistan expert Albrecht Jebens has argued similarly. In a speech delivered on 22 August 2018, he advocated for the adoption of a federal system in Afghanistan characterized by strong provincial autonomy and a weak central government, drawing parallels to the Swiss model.1

In this context, the works of Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay (2005) (Afghanistan: Multicultural Federalism as a Means to Achieve Democracy, Representation, and Stability, 2005)2 and Bryan E. Carroll (2009) (Afghanistan as a Federal System with Autonomous Regions, 2009)3 are also noteworthy. Both studies strongly advocate federalism as a solution to Afghanistan’s persisting conflicts. However, none of these works address the internal Afghan discourse on federalism.

Publications by Afghan authors written in Western languages often reflect the underlying ethno-political tensions in Afghanistan. Authors of Pashtun background frequently reject or minimize the relevance of federalism, while non-Pashtun writers tend to support it—sometimes advocating for it in strongly assertive or exclusivist terms.

Mohammad Nazif Shahrani, a U.S.-based Afghan academic of Tajik origin, advocates for a decentralized federal system in his work War, Factionalism, and the State in Afghanistan (Shahrani 2002). He argues that such a model would be better suited to accommodating Afghanistan’s ethnic and regional diversity and could foster the development of a more inclusive and representative political system.

In his article Diversity, Human Rights, and Federalism: The Case of Afghanistan, Ali Ahmadi analyzes the relationship between federal structures and the realization of human rights. He concludes that federalism is the only viable solution for addressing the structural causes of the conflict and ensuring the ethnic groups’ right to self-determination (cf. Ahmadi 2021).

Qais Alamdar argues in his bachelor’s thesis Federalism in Afghanistan: Is Federalism a Way for Long-term Political, Economic, and Social Stability in Afghanistan? (published in 2023) that centralized forms of government have historically failed to establish a just and stable order. He views federalism as a means for promoting justice and stability among the country’s diverse ethnic groups (Alamdar 2023).

Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady, a Pashtun politician, held key ministerial positions in both Hamid Karzai’s government (2004–2014) and under President Ashraf Ghani (2014–2021). He also chaired the national Pashtun-oriented Afghan Millat party (known as the Social Democratic Party of Afghanistan). Ahady is a prominent opponent of federalism. In 1995, Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady published an article expressing concern over the declining influence of Pashtuns in Afghanistan against the backdrop of a shifting political landscape marked by the rising power of non-Pashtun groups. While Ahady acknowledges the emergence of federalist tendencies as a political reality, he underscores the importance of preserving the Pashtun character of the Afghan state:

“Pashtun unhappiness stems from the attitude of the minorities regarding the identity of the state. Pashtuns’ believe that they constitute the majority in Afghanistan, that the Afghan state was formed by the Pashtuns’, that Afghanistan is the only Pashtun state in the world, and that the minorities should accept the Afghan character of the state. Most other ethnic groups in the region have their own state. No ethnic minority can seriously question the Persian character of Iran, the Turkish character of Turkey, the Tajik character of Tajikistan, and the Uzbek character of Uzbekistan. The Pashtuns’ argue that the same should hold for Afghanistan.”

(Ahady 1995, p. 633 f.)

While Ahady acknowledges that regional and local decisions on specific provincial matters could be made at a local level, he cautions that such measures should not reinforce ethnic minority identities:

“If the motivation for federalism were the promotion of regional and local decision-making on provincial issues, the Pashtuns’ might have accepted it, but if the objective is to strengthen minority identities and weaken the Afghan character of the state, the Pashtuns’’ sensitivity to federalism is understandable.”

(Ahady 1995, p. 634)

Another example of opposition to federalism is Hazrat Omar Zakhilwal, a prominent Pashtun politician who held important political offices in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021. After the Taliban seized power, he worked as a consultant. In 2001, he criticized the federal model for Afghanistan in an article published in English:

“Many who know the ground reality in Afghanistan would agree that federalism is not only unnecessary under the circumstances, but it also would serve as a recipe for deeper divisions among diverse ethnic groups in Afghanistan and would lead to a subsequent disintegration of the country.”

(Zakhilwal 2001)

Works by authors of Afghan origin in Western linguistic and academic contexts often lack historical or discursive classifications of debates about Afghanistan’s federalism.

Thus, Western, non-Afghan scholars who have addressed the issue of federalism—particularly since the international intervention in 2001—tend to regard a federal system as a viable solution for stabilizing Afghanistan. Their analysis focuses on the extent to which federalism can contribute to the resolution of long-standing conflicts and facilitate political restructuring. By contrast, authors of Afghan origin who publish in Western academia often adopt ethnic or sectarian positions—mirroring Afghanistan’s internal social tensions. Nevertheless, a comprehensive examination of the actual internal Afghan discourse on federalism remains absent. The following sections provide an in-depth analysis of these debates.

3. Who Speaks of Federalism in Afghanistan?

Taher Badakhshi (1933–1979), a leftist Tajik intellectual and political activist, was likely among the first prominent figures in Afghanistan to articulate federalism as a political vision. In his previously unpublished writings dating back to 1958 (1337 h. Sh.), he described federalism as his personal “utopia” (La’lzada 2022). While the concept was later adopted by other political activists and groups—primarily leftists, many of whom were non-Pashtun—it did not become the subject of sustained theoretical discourse.

Afghan historian and politician Mir Mohammad Siddiq Farhang (1915–1990) argued in his work Afghanestan dar panj qarn-e akhir (Afghanistan in the Last Five Centuries) that federalism was at least briefly considered in some circles during the 1964 (1343 A.D.) Afghan constitution debates (cf. Farhang 2006, p. 855). However, these considerations appear to have been either deliberately ignored or failed to find any significant resonance in the broader political debate.

Abdul Ali Mazari, leader of the Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan, a Shia-majority and ethnically predominantly Hazara movement, appears to have been the only major political figure advocating federalism as a core political program during the sanguinary and disruptive conflicts among the Mujahedin (1992–1996). In an interview4 likely held in November 1993,5 he firmly endorsed a federal system as the only fair solution to address regional and ethnic disparities and to unite all Afghan citizens. Mazari supported his position by referencing successful federal systems in the West, including the United States, which he called a ‘pioneer of freedom and democracy’, and Germany, which he described as a ‘technical and military power’.6

Mazari’s ideological evolution is particularly noteworthy. While his early political engagement was heavily shaped by Ayatollah Khomeini’s ideas and the doctrine of Wilayat-e Faqih (the rule of the Islamic jurist)7, his later support for a Western-style political system—specifically, federalism—marks a notable shift. This transition suggests that Mazari came to see federalism as a more effective model for protecting and upholding the rights of ethnic and religious minorities.8

During Mazari’s lifetime, the Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan reportedly drafted a proposed Constitution for the Federal Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. This document was later revised and published by Mohammad Sarvar Danesh, a religious scholar and senior party member who went on to hold key political positions in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2001–2021). The preamble of the draft articulates the following programmatic vision:

“The Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan is confident that the best form of Islamic rule in the country for resolving the national question, ending the various racial, linguistic, and regional differences, is the creation of state structures based on federal principles and considering the division of regions according to national, historical, cultural, and other social characteristics.”

(Danesh 2019, p. 367)

Over the past two decades, Abdul Latif Pedram has emerged as a staunch advocate for federalism. Initially a supporter of the communist government before turning against it, Pedram went on to found the National Congress Party of Afghanistan in 2004, a self-described liberal, secular, and decentralized movement.

In 2014 (1393 h. Sh.), the party’s Department of Culture published the anthology Federalism gozina-ye monaseb bara-ye afghanestan (Federalism: A Suitable Choice for Afghanistan).9 The book features multiple contributions, including an article by Pedram and an interview with him, in which he emphatically asserts that only federalism can guarantee freedom, justice, and democracy, and thus ultimately the satisfaction of all ethnic and social groups in Afghanistan (cf. Pedram 2014, pp. 1–6).

A year after the Taliban’s return to power, former Afghan Vice President and prominent Hazara politician Mohammad Sarvar Danesh (mentioned above) founded the Justice and Freedom Party of Afghanistan in 2022, promoting a firmly federalist political agenda. He later published a comprehensive book on federalism, analyzing the concept both historically and through the lens of state theory, while explicitly advocating for its adoption in Afghanistan (Danesh 2022).10

However, many critics of Pashtun origin have opposed the idea of federalism for Afghanistan. One of the most prominent contributions in this context is Abdul Hamid Mobarez’s (1998) book Federalism wa ʿAwaqeb-e Ān dar Afghanestan (Federalism and Its Consequences in Afghanistan). Mobarez (1932–2024), a respected journalist and political figure of Pashtun background, served as governor of several provinces—including Bamyan, Logar, and Nimruz—during the reign of King Zahir Shah (1914–2007).

However, his arguments are partly marred by ahistorical and subjective generalizations. Among other points, he opposes the idea of federalism in Afghanistan by presenting the following arguments:

“Afghanistan has existed for thousands of years as a country [sic!], a centralized country. This kind of existence is part of the Afghan culture. If you ask Afghans, they are all committed to their fatherland. If you go back in history, you realize that under all rulers and in all wars, all the people of this country have defended the country, without distinction, without discrimination [sic!]. There was no racial or religious discrimination [sic!] in Afghanistan… There was no forced resettlement [sic!] in Afghanistan… The feeling of not belonging does not exist among the groups of people in Afghanistan; this is only a construct of the defective brains of some sick intellectuals [sic]…”

(Mobarez 1998, p. 80 f.)

Mohammad Taher Hashemi, a scholar and political official, employs the same argument, stating that Afghanistan has remained a politically unified entity for “thousands” of years, impervious to disruption. He contends that federalism must therefore be rejected to prevent Afghanistan’s historical cohesion. He further invokes conspiracy theories, insinuating that federalism’s supporters in Afghanistan—whether consciously or unconsciously—have separatist intentions, allegedly influenced by some neighboring states (cf. Hashemi 1992) (Quoted from: Mobarez 1998, p. 64).

Opponents of federalism often see “mystery hands” (dast-ha-ye marmuz) behind the federalism debate, allegedly serving foreign interests. Mobarez (as noted earlier) recounts in his book—referring to another author without providing reliable evidence—that Zia ul-Haq’s government apparatus sought to integrate Afghanistan into a confederation with Pakistan following the Mujahedeen’s victory over the Soviet Union, aiming to strengthen its geostrategic position vis-à-vis the arch-enemy India. To implement this plan, they relied on Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in particular and supported him heavily. However, after Ahmad Shah Masud, leader of the Mujahedin, undermined Hekmatyar’s claims to power, Pakistan changed its strategy. It attempted to achieve the same goal with the help of the Taliban. However, the Taliban’s rule quickly collapsed, so “the question of the federalization of Afghanistan was finally raised” (Mobarez 1998, pp. 55–59).

Opponents cautioned against a “Yugoslavization” of Afghanistan, arguing that federalism was being promoted naïvely and without considering the country’s unique social and political realities. Pashtun scholar A’zam Sistani wrote in 2003:

“Insisting on the establishment of a federal system in Afghanistan is far too premature. And implementing it in Afghanistan, where many ethnic groups have numerous claims ranging from political, social, and military positions to minority and majority rights, will only exacerbate the many problems of this war-torn and still war-torn country. Rather than prosperity, it will bring disaster and even lead to the disintegration and fate of Yugoslavia under the auspices of the United Nations.”

(Sistani 2003, Nezam-e federali)

While supporters of federalism firmly reject the accusation that their backing is ethnically motivated, opponents tend to interpret federalism as an inherently ethnic model unsuitable for Afghanistan. Pashtun intellectual Basharmal Pasarlai explicitly describes federalism as an ethnic model driven by foreign countries and malicious intent, leading to Afghanistan’s disintegration and destitution. He goes on to say: “Federalism and disintegration are two sides of the same coin” (Pasarlai 2024, Federalism).

Numerous Pashtun representatives remain strongly opposed to the introduction of a federal system in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, it would be impossible to provide a comprehensive overview of all positions here. Two notable Pashtun figures—one politician and one intellectual—illustrate this opposition. The influential politician and former foreign minister Hanif Atmar explicitly positioned himself against the introduction of federalist structures in Afghanistan after the Islamic Republic’s collapse.11 Mohammad Harun Amirzada, an academic, warns against the potential consequences of a federal system, especially in light of the country’s geography. He maintains that federalism could ultimately be of no lasting benefit to any ethnic group, Pashtun or otherwise (cf. Amirzada n.d., “Bahthe-e nezam-e”).

Generally, non-Pashtun authors and stakeholders repeatedly raise the issue of federalism and increasingly support its implementation in Afghanistan. Conversely, influential Pashtun politicians and intellectuals largely take a negative stance. Federalism’s supporters span sectarian lines, including Sunni Tajik activists and Shia Hazara authors. Moreover, some of the most vocal proponents of federalism are secular or leftist thinkers and activists.

4. Arguments for and Against

Both sides mainly justify their stance based on Afghanistan’s political, social, and geographical realities. Since many authors present similar, repetitive arguments, I will summarize them as follows: On the one hand, proponents of federalism emphasize to the country’s geographical, ethnic, linguistic, and religious heterogeneity. On the other hand, they see Afghanistan’s recent political history—almost exclusively characterized by a centralized autocracy of the Pashtuns’—as a persistent privileging of this ethnic group. Other ethnic groups and regions have suffered deprivation, discrimination, oppression, and in some cases mass destruction throughout Afghanistan’s political history to date. They conclude that federalism is the most suitable political system to ensure satisfaction and justice for all people in the country, given Afghanistan’s diversity and the unfortunate experiences of a centralized Pashtun-led government system (cf. Sultani 2023; Pedram 2014, p. 4; Danesh 2022, p. 70 ff.).

Furthermore, some argue that federalism is essential not only because of ethnic diversity, but as the only system that can guarantee freedom, justice, and, in particular, democracy. A federal system provides all citizens and ethnic groups with the opportunity to directly participate in shaping their lives (Pedram 2014).

Federalism’s opponents use Afghanistan’s same characteristics—particularly its linguistic, ethnic, and confessional heterogeneity—as a key argument against a federal state system. As discussed in the section Who Speaks of Federalism in Afghanistan?, critics like Mobarez and Sistani argue that Afghanistan’s diversity necessitates a strong central government. Accordingly, only such a government could prevent Afghanistan from disintegrating into smaller ethnic or linguistic factions under the pretext of democratization. They contend that already the very idea of federalism poses a serious threat to national unity and stability.

5. Islam and Federalism

Given the historical evolution of ideas, it is incomprehensible to expect Islam to explicitly address concepts that only emerged in modern times. Yet—for reasons I will not discuss here12—repeated attempts have been made to legitimize such ideas Islamically or even present them as inherent to Islam. Such efforts of Islamic legitimization are particularly common among those who either adopt a fundamentally Islamic theological approach or who regard Islam as a decisive factor for their socio-political agenda. A model example of such endeavors is the integration of socialist ideas into contemporary Islamic political discourse. In 1949, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood founded the Islamic Socialist Front (al-Jabha al-islamiyya al-ishterakiyya) to promote socialist positions as being inherent to Islam (cf. Reissner 2010, p. 132). Within this context, the Egyptian author ʿAbd al-Hamid Jawda al-Sahhar (1913–1974) published Abu Dhar Ghaffari, accompanied by a foreword by Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949), then leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The book describes the Prophet’s companion Abu Dhar Ghaffari (d. 652), a critic of the third caliph ‘Uthman ibn’ Affan’s (d. 656) governance, as something of a socialist mastermind.13 Ali Shariati (1933–1977), one of the most important ideologists of the ‘Islamic’ revolution in Iran, later translated the work into Persian. In his youth, Shariati aligned with the movement of socialist believers in God, aiming to position Islam as a source of modern revolutionary ideas. He sought to “Islamize” key concepts like worldview, ideology, socialism, and revolution, reinterpreting Islam historical narratives as materialist historical (see Poya 2014, pp. 95–130).

Similarly, in the debate over federalism in Afghanistan, advocates of the concept—which is clearly influenced by Western thought and lacks a foundation in Islamic intellectual tradition—seek or construct Islamic justifications for it.

One notable example is the above-mentioned Shiite religious scholar and Hazara politician Sarvar Danesh, who has authored numerous works on federalism. In his book Jostari dar bara-ye federalism (An Analysis of Federalism), published after his escape from Afghanistan, Sarvar Danesh argues that Islam is not only compatible with federalism but has historically always promoted federalist structures. He argues that Islam inherently embraces diversity across social and cultural levels (Danesh 2022, p. 79).

Danesh further outlines three central features of Islamic political practice throughout Muslim history:

• A single citizenship granting equal rights to adherents of different religions, including Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, and Zoroastrianism.
• A unified Islamic nation comprising different ethnic groups and peoples, including Arabs and non-Arabs.
• A shared religious foundation for all Muslims, acknowledging confessional, legal, and theological diversity, for example, in the form of different schools of law and faiths. Islamic tradition has never sought to suppress the identities of other peoples in the name of Islam (Danesh 2022, p. 81).

Danesh later qualifies the previously established theses, some of which lack historical accuracy. Although he initially stresses Islam’s support for social, cultural, linguistic, and religious diversity, he clearly restricts this generalization merely a few pages later. Responding to concerns about whether the concept of umma wahida (“a unified [religious] community”) implies that all other identities must be Islamically assimilated, and how federal identities could be promoted under this premise, Danesh clarifies that the concept of umma wahida primarily refers to a shared religious belief and value foundation, without necessarily rejecting the existence of ethnic or linguistic diversity (Danesh 2022, p. 83). However, this statement reveals that Danesh ultimately does not extend Islam’s previously emphasized comprehensive tolerance for ambiguity to the area of religious beliefs, contradicting his original claim.

To dismiss any doubts about the federalist stance of Islam, Danesh reiterates his earlier and later relativized claim that Islamic teachings embody the essence of federalism, asserting that Islam fundamentally helped shape the federalist stance (Danesh 2022, p. 83). In any case, the argumentation presented by Danesh appears inconsistent, with reoccurring contradictions. Paradoxically, he later admits that ideas such as parliamentarism, presidentialism, federalism, or centralism, etc., emerged in modern times and did not exist in the early or classical period of Islam. Yet, federalist traits are evident in Islamic history and political practice. He refers to “federalism-like structures in the political history of Muslims” (Danesh 2022, p. 84). Ultimately, the primary concern Danesh has is to anchor the federal system he advocates in the Islamic teachings and political tradition of Islam.

Those who have publicly criticized federalism to date usually refrain from justifying their position on religious grounds. Given that the concept of federalism has no equivalent in the Islamic political tradition, critics may see no reason to engage in a theological or historical debate.

6. Federalism: An Interest-Driven Debate

If one were to summarize the findings of political theorists and political practitioners from Machiavelli to Egon Bahr, the common denominator would be this: politics always revolves around asserting one’s own interests.14

This dynamic is evident in Afghanistan’s federalism debate, involving both professional politicians and numerous politically motivated authors. Those individuals and communities who have profited from the existing power relations thus far generally show little interest in seriously engaging with federalist models, often explicitly rejecting them. Conversely, marginalized individuals and communities predominantly favor federal structures, seeing them as potential instruments for gaining political influence and participating in government.

Among Pashtun intellectuals or political decision-makers, for example, there are hardly any supporters of federalism. However, at times—and depending on the individual—there is also a lack of support among other population groups once they see the prospect of privileges for themselves in certain power constellations. During the early stages of the Western invasion of Afghanistan, the long-standing political functionary Abdul Wahed Sarabi responded to the question of whether Afghanistan’s political leadership was considering a federal system in an interview with the weekly newspaper Der Freitag in December 2001 as follows:

“Hardly, the Pashtuns’ are afraid of a federal option, they think it would be the end of their rule. Rabbani and the Tajiks share the same view, even though they were also oppressed in the past. They simply hope to be as powerful in the future as the Pashtuns’ used to be. It is only among the Uzbeks, Turkmen, and Hazara that supporters of federalism can be found.”

(See Jörg 2001)

However, Sarabi’s generalizations must be corrected. As demonstrated above, many Tajik actors were and still are in favor of federalism. Conversely, influential figures from other ethnic groups, such as the Hazara, oppose federalist initiatives. Still, the core assertion that people and ethnic groups position themselves in this debate based on their own interests can hardly be disputed.

One striking example of the strongly interest-driven nature of the federalism debate in Afghanistan is the dramatic change in the political position of Sarvar Danesh before and after the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in August 2021. During the 2014 presidential elections, Danesh ran as Ashraf Ghani’s designated second vice president in his team and strongly advocated a centralized, presidential system of government. This placed him in opposition to Abdullah Abdullah and his team, who favored a decentralized, parliamentary system. Danesh consistently rejected parliamentary and federal structures for Afghanistan. His main argument was that the political parties in the country were strongly characterized by ethnicity and lacked broad national legitimacy. This, according to Danesh, could fuel political instability and intensify conflict within the framework of a parliamentary system15—an argument that is still echoed by opponents of federalism in favor of their position today.

Following his escape from Afghanistan, nevertheless, Danesh—now a vocal advocate as explained above—actively promoted the introduction of a federal system in Afghanistan from 2022 onwards, both politically and intellectually.

In this context, it is easier to understand why the return of the Taliban in 2021 resulted in a significant increase in activities and debates on federalism among non-Pashtun actors in the Afghan diaspora. In addition to numerous digital contributions and academic and non-academic publications on the topic, the Assembly of Federalists of Afghanistan was founded in Vienna in February 2024, convening again in February 2025. Unsurprisingly, the assembly’s organizers and supporters are exclusively non-Pashtun stakeholders. Prominent figures in the assembly include the Shiite Hazara scholar, politician, and chairman of the Justice and Freedom Party of Afghanistan, Sarvar Danesh; the Shiite Hazara politician and leader of the Islamic Unity Party of the Afghan People, Mohammad Mohaqqeq; the Uzbek militia commander and chairman of the Afghan National Islamic Party, Abdul Rashid Dostum; the Tajik politician and chairman of the Afghan National Congress Party, Latif Pedram; and the Tajik militia commander and politician Atta Mohammad Noor.16

In April 2025, the Assembly of Federalists of Afghanistan presented a draft for a federal constitution of Afghanistan.17 The text, which is referred to as the Draft Constitution of the Federal Republic of Afghanistan, is substantially modeled on the Draft Constitution of the Federal Islamic Republic of Afghanistan presented by the Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan in the 1990s. Given that Sarvar Danesh was the lead author of both drafts, this similarity in content is hardly surprising.

This submitted draft again illustrates the inherent difficulties of transferring Western secular concepts such as federalism to an Islamic-religious dominated context. Article 3, paragraph 1, stipulates: “[T]he adoption of a law that contradicts the principles and foundations of the holy religion of Islam is not permitted”. Such an Islamic-exclusivist regulation seems hardly compatible with the federal principles of political order, which are based on plurality and equality. Furthermore, this provision is in direct contradiction to paragraph 2 of the same article, which stipulates that “the adoption of a law that is inconsistent with the principles of democracy and the exercise of the sovereignty of the people is not permitted” (Ibid., p. 13).

Nevertheless, the more important question is whether, how, and to what extent federalism’s proponents can persuade opponents or skeptics—especially those from Pashtun circles—that a federal system does not automatically equate to a loss of power for the previously privileged groups, but rather contributes to securing their position in the long term and that the participation of the previously marginalized groups in political decision-making processes within the framework of federal structures will not weaken the power of the Pashtuns’, but rather stabilize it.

7. Conclusions

Although federalism is a modern political concept primarily rooted in the West, it has long since made its way into Islamic states, including Afghanistan. As early as the 1950s and 1960s, some political and intellectual figures in Afghanistan were already using the term, well before it became the official political platform of the Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan in the 1990s—a party largely shaped by Shiite and Hazara influences. The discourse on federalism, however, likely encountered its most favorable conditions only after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, under the protection of the Western military alliance. Nevertheless, despite sporadic efforts, the federalism debate during that period was never pursued in a sustained or consistent manner.

A key impediment was the lack of a unified position among the political elites of the non-Pashtun ethnic groups. Many representatives of these groups considered the concessions enshrined in the 2003 constitution sufficient.18 Additionally, minority representatives integrated into the political structures of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan often arguably felt more obliged to assume responsibility within the existing system than to insist on further-reaching demands. Intra-ethnic competition for political office further hindered efforts to unify around a common federalist agenda.

For instance, the opponents of federalism allege that figures such as Sarvar Danesh—mentioned here many times—who were previously vocal critics of federalism during their active political careers in the Islamic Republic now, in exile, make a name for themselves as its advocates.19

Notwithstanding some vagueness in the ethnic or confessional classification of individual contributors, Pashtun figures largely reject federalism, whereas representatives of other ethnic groups generally show a clear preference for federal models of organization.

Beyond ethnicity, the Hazara community also has a confessional dimension. Given the predominance of Twelver Shiite representatives, many feel religiously discriminated against, which further strengthens their motivation to support a federal system.

Afghanistan’s federalism debate sees both supporters and opponents invoking ethnic and linguistic, but also religious and confessional diversity. While some use this diversity to justify their federalist position, others view it as a reason to reject such a model. It is striking, however, that mainly actors with a religious–theological background who also belong to the Twelver Shiite Hazara explicitly discuss religious arguments.

Pashtun Sunnis who oppose federalism align their position with Afghan–Islamic tradition. Therefore, they see no need to justify it on religious grounds. Similarly, Tajik actors, who are also Sunni, find no need to support their federalist positions with religious arguments. It is therefore primarily the representatives of the Hazara with a theological background who seek to establish a positive link between Islam and federalism and legitimize them discursively.

The analysis shows that Afghan ethnic minorities—as long as they feel adequately represented and integrated into a political system—do not see the need to seek alternative state models, including federalism. It is only once they feel excluded from the participation that the demand for federalism becomes popular and is revived.