Not Just White and Liberal: Race, Secularity, and Visions of American Society

Abstract

The following paper investigates the impact of racial differences on societal and political attitudes among secular individuals in the United States. Using data from the 2014 American Mosaic Project, our analyses focus on the relationships between secularity, race, and comfort with conservative Christian and atheist views, as well as opinions on whether the president should be religious. The results indicate substantial variation in these attitudes across racial groups, with secular non-Whites displaying unique sociopolitical preferences compared with their White counterparts. This challenges the oversimplified view of secularity as a predominantly White, liberal phenomenon, uncovering a more complex interplay between race, secularity, and sociopolitical orientations. These findings contribute to the sociology of religion by highlighting the diverse ways in which secular and religious identities intersect with race in contemporary American society, offering insights valuable for scholars, policymakers, and social activists in an increasingly secular age.

1. Introduction

As American religious life changes amid rising disaffiliation, it is essential to understand how these changes impact society, politics, and individual identities. This paper focuses on notable trends like the decline in religious adherence and the growing number of secular identities, particularly the “nones” who identify as atheists, agnostics, or without any specific religious affiliation. Such shifts play a key role in shaping our social, cultural, and political environments. Using data from the 2014 American Mosaic Project, we examine the multidimensional relationships between secularity and political/societal visions. Specifically, we explore how these elements influence people’s comfort with a conservative Christian’s view of society, comfort with an atheist’s view of society, and opinions on whether the president should be religious. This research aims to clarify the dynamics of an American society navigating both a religious decline and a rise in secular norms.

Extending the foundational work of Chaves (2011), Putnam and Campbell (2010), and Norris and Inglehart (2019), this research delves into the implications of these demographic shifts for the sociopolitical landscape of the nation. The decline in traditional religious affiliations is not only a reflection of broader sociocultural shifts (such as modernization and the rise of individualism) but is also a major force shaping political affiliations, policy preferences, and societal norms. This study addresses a significant gap in the literature by exploring secular underrepresented racial identities through using quantitative methods and investigates the intersection of various demographic changes with political preferences, shedding light on the unique ways the religious and secular landscape is influenced by the growing nonreligious ethos of contemporary America.

Secularization has long been a key, if often debated, idea in the sociology of religion. Earlier theories tended to tell a straightforward story: as societies modernize, religious belief, authority, and practice gradually decline (Berger 1967). But that story no longer holds in quite the same way. More recent scholars have shown that secularization does not unfold the same way everywhere. Casanova (1994) and Taylor (2007), for example, point out that secularization can mean many things, from religion’s retreat from public institutions to changing personal beliefs, to new ways people think about religious authority itself. In this view, secularization is not simply about the fading away of religion. It is more complex. Ultimately, it is about how religion changes shape, how it is redefined, and how its social role shifts in different settings.

Our work builds on this more flexible understanding. We affirm that secularization is not a single, universal trend. It is a process that looks different depending on who you are and where you stand. Following Blankholm (2022), we see secular identity not as neutral or detached, but as something deeply shaped by religious history, race, class, and politics. Secularity has in many cases become its own moral and political identity, especially for White liberals. But that pattern does not hold across all racial groups. Black and Hispanic secular individuals, for example, often experience their nonreligion differently, facing unique forms of stigma, community tension, or political ambiguity (Burge 2023). Our study contributes to this growing conversation by examining how secular identity intersects with race to influence people’s attitudes toward religious authority and public leadership, what we refer to as “visions of society.” In doing so, we aim to provide a more nuanced understanding of what secularization really looks like on the ground.

Furthermore, this research casts a critical eye toward the intersections of race, religiosity, and secularity, challenging the predominant scholarly focus on White conservative Christianity to reveal the diverse manifestations of secularity and religious affiliation across different racial and ethnic groups. Through this lens, this study brings to light the distinct experiences and perspectives of racialized secularity, particularly among Black and Hispanic communities, and how these diverge from the predominantly White narratives of secular identity. We investigate the sociopolitical ramifications of these intersections, examining their influence on attitudes toward governance, morality, public policy, and the broader societal vision.

Specifically, this paper examines predictors of attitudes toward atheist and conservative Christian visions of society and the desirability of religious presidents. It unveils significant variations across racial and secular lines, highlighting the complex interplay of these factors in shaping sociopolitical beliefs and attitudes. The findings challenge oversimplified narratives about the secular–religious divide and secularity as a predominantly White and liberal phenomenon, emphasizing the nuanced and multifaceted nature of identity and belief in American society. Broadly, our work joins recent efforts to rethink secularization not as a uniform decline, but as the reconfiguration of religious authority across racial and political contexts (Blankholm 2022; Gorski and Perry 2022; Campbell et al. 2020). Rather than assuming secularity is inherently liberal or culturally detached, we analyze how it is differently racialized and politicized in American life.

This study stands as a significant contribution to the sociology of religion, providing a detailed and nuanced analysis of the changing religious and secular landscape in the United States and its implications for politics, society, and individual identity. Through this work, this paper not only enriches the academic discourse on nonreligion but also provides valuable insights for policymakers, social activists, and the broader public, facilitating a deeper understanding of the complex interrelations between religious belief, racial identity, and the sociopolitical fabric of the nation.

2. Secularity, Politics, and Societal Vision

The ever-changing religious landscape of the United States has significant implications for society and politics. The U.S. Religion Census of 2020 revealed a notable decline in religious adherents. The rise of the unaffiliated (nones) began in the 1970s and has risen to prominence in every corner of religious dialogue, from academic circles to the mainstream media, as one of the most noteworthy trends in American religion. Chaves (2011) emphasizes how these shifts reflect broader sociocultural changes, such as increasing urbanization and the rise of individualism. Understanding this decline in religious adherence is crucial to grasping the sociopolitical fabric of the nation. The concept of the “God Gap,” explored by scholars like Putnam and Campbell (2010), further reveals how political and religious identities are inextricably linked.

Norris and Inglehart (2019) provide a foundational understanding of how religion and politics track together on the individual level, specifically highlighting how, as societies become more economically secure, the political influence of religion will gradually wane, resulting in a more secularized political arena. This relationship is also explored by Wald and Calhoun-Brown (2014), who discuss the sociopolitical mobilization of religious groups and document various patterns of adherence between certain denominations and expressions of conservatism/liberalism. Secular individuals, unsurprisingly, exhibit a preference for secular governance (Baker and Smith 2015). Putnam and Campbell’s (2010) work is complemented by that of Wald et al. (2005), which discusses how religious groups seek leaders who reflect their values. Secular individuals’ preference for secular leaders is examined by Jelen (2010), highlighting the influence of individualism and rational–legal authority in their political choices.

The interplay between religious and secular groups involves complex dynamics. Smidt et al. (2009) examine tensions and misunderstandings between these groups, a theme further explored by Edgell et al. (2006). These studies utilize frameworks like social conflict theory and group polarization to analyze how religious and secular identities shape societal norms and perceptions. The emergence of political secularism as a sociological phenomenon is also well-documented and timely in our culture rife with politicized Christianity (Whitehead 2023). Mooney and Schuldt (2008) discuss the association between political secularism and permissive views on morality issues such as abortion. This trend is contextualized within broader sociological discussions on individual rights and the privatization of morality (Casanova 1994).

Extending the analysis, scholars have explored the broader implications of increasing secularism in politics. This includes its influence on policy decisions in areas traditionally dominated by religious doctrine, such as LGBTQ+ rights and euthanasia. Norris and Inglehart (2011) and Taylor (2007) have used theories of secularization, modernization, and post-secularism to understand these evolving dynamics. The exploration of the intersection between religious and secular identities reveals their profound impact on societal and political landscapes. However, other identities influencing the development of secular or religious worldviews, such as race, have been notably neglected in quantitative studies.

3. White Racism, Anti-Secularism, and Right-Wing Partisanship

It has become a well-received fashion to discuss racism and anti-secularism together. For example, a burgeoning scholarship on the intersectionality of race and religion has emphasized how racism and anti-secularism are concomitant sentiments amongst some White Christians (Wilde 2018; Yukich and Edgell 2020). Specifically, scholars on White Christian Nationalism (Gorski and Perry 2022; Whitehead and Perry 2020) find that anti-secularization and racism are highly correlated. Recent research in political science explains the correlation and argues that Christian Statism has now been absorbed into the right-wing populist agenda of White identity politics (Armaly et al. 2022; Djupe et al. 2023; Norris and Inglehart 2019). Jardina notes that White identity politics euphemizes overt racism with ethnocultural nationalism and color-blind racism. White identity politics promotes the notion that White Americans have become the new marginalized group as the American culture has abandoned (White) Judeo-Christian heritage. Accordingly, religiosity, racism, and Republican membership becomes inseparable amongst this group.

However, the conventional wisdom asymmetrically focuses on White conservative Christians, and its explanatory credibility is questionable in three dimensions. First, scholars often find it hard to understand why non-White conservative religionists such as Black Protestants or Asian evangelicals may also embrace the notion of living in a Christian America (e.g., Gorski and Perry 2022). Second, recent criticisms find that the popular literature is mistaken as White Christian nationalism contains a dual sentiment of anti-secularism (Braunstein 2021; Smith and Adler 2022; Li and Froese 2023): one is Christian Statism, and the other is Religious Traditionalism. While Christian Statism is associated with overt White racism and xenophobia, Religious Traditionalism perpetuates more color-blind ecumenism and conservative civil religion (Hollinger 2022; Li and Froese 2023). However, little discussed is how Religious Traditionalism is as intertwined with White identity politics and Republican partisanship as Christian Statism. Taken together, as there are more nuances between race and religion, we think it is problematic to simplify anti-secularism as White racism.

Racialized Secularity

The past literature suggests that the ways in which secularity and atheism are embraced differ by an individual’s race or ethnicity. Take, for example, how the political trend of secular or atheist individuals voting for more extreme liberal candidates who do not mention their personal faith over candidates that do is seen more for White individuals than it is for people of color (Campbell et al. 2020). According to past research, the uncompromising version of secularism that refuses to tolerate any form of religion has been conceptualized as a phenomenon that is not compatible with non-White culture (King and Ryan 2025). This incompatibility has been reported by non-believing Hispanics who report feeling tension between their secular identity and their Hispanic identity because of how integrated Catholic beliefs and practices are within Hispanic culture (Blankholm 2022). The same sentiment is felt by secular African Americans who share that their intersectionality ostracizes them both from their Black communities because of their secularity, as well as their secular communities because of how Blackness is seen as inherently tied to Black church culture (Abbott et al. 2020; Blankholm 2022). Both groups have shared similar experiences of identity negotiation that involve compromising secularity and a racial or ethnic culture, which is distinct from the experiences shared by White atheists or non-believers.

The difficulty for African Americans in simply rejecting religious culture for a secular one may stem from how connected the Black Church is in their greater culture, which, in turn, influences the behaviors of non-believing African Americans. The Black Church is understood as a key crossroad for African American social networks and political activism (Gates 2022; Pattillo-McCoy 1998), so much so that the Black Church’s values and beliefs have created a cultural toolkit that is applied to functions outside of the church (Pattillo-McCoy 1998) and influences secular parts of Black culture (Sorett 2016). Historically, the Black Church culture has helped create an African American solidarity that transcends denominational and class boundaries (Ellison 1991).

Within Black culture, Christianity has been regarded as essential for an authentic Black identity (Hart 2013), and church attendance is even sometimes considered semi-involuntary in certain communities because of the social capital it provides (Ellison and Sherkat 1995). Indeed, reports on patterns of religious attendance find that African Americans are among the groups with the highest rates of religious attendance (Brown et al. 2013), though it should be noted that younger generations of African Americans have shown lower rates of attendance, but still higher than most other racial groups (Smith et al. 2025). Given these findings, it is unsurprising to see how African American atheists report feeling ostracized by their Black peers despite having a cultural presence since the Harlem Renaissance, with figures such as Langston Hughes and Zora Neale Hurston (Abbott et al. 2020; Cameron 2019).

It is also important to note how Black atheists have also felt stigmatized by non-Black atheists to the point of having to carve out their own intellectual space distinct from other atheist groups (Pinn 2001; Swann 2019). Black atheists have also noted that White atheist groups ignore issues of social justice and racial inequality, perhaps indicating their hesitancy to vote for an atheist candidate (Swann 2019). Considering these observations, it is logical to observe how nonreligious or non-attending African Americans would still exhibit some religious behaviors despite their reported nonreligious identity due to the stigma placed on them as nonreligious or atheist. This is seen through how many non-attending African Americans still perform some form of prayer or use religious coping mechanisms more often than their nonreligious White counterparts (Brown et al. 2013). It is clear that the religious foundations of Black culture also influence secular African Americans in ways that are distinct from secular Whites.

The semi-involuntary nature of being a part of a religious community may also extend to other marginalized groups. Research by Edgell et al. (2017) examines the “social risk” that contributes to the likelihood of identifying oneself as religious or nonreligious, concluding that marginalized groups, such as women and people of color, are less likely to be nonreligious out of a motivation to avoid the risk of being discriminated against as nonreligious. Similar conclusions are found by Friesen and Holman (2022), who investigate the relationship between risk aversion with political participation and religiosity, where, among African American men, risk correlates with religiosity, suggesting how identifying with religious communities may be safer and more socially beneficial than identifying as nonreligious. Indeed, this fear of discrimination and stigma against the nonreligious has some legitimacy, as those with stronger support for public religious expression have been found to associate with very narrow views of what is considered acceptable religion to be displayed and also correlate with negative views of religious out-groups (Stewart et al. 2018).

Synthesizing these past findings, it may be reasonable to conclude that opinions on secularity and nonreligion may be shaped by racial identity, where people of color—especially African Americans—express hesitancy toward supporting social and political ideas that favor or associate with nonreligious views. As a stigmatized identity, identifying as nonreligious, atheist, or secular comes with a lot of social risk, and when also considering how embedded religious communities and beliefs are within communities of people of color, secularity may be a more difficult option to commit to for non-White individuals.

Given these past findings, we expect to find the following patterns:

H₁: 

Whites will be more polarized by secularity in their attitudes toward atheists than people of other races.

H_1a: 

African Americans will be less agreeable toward atheists’ perceived vision of society, regardless of their religious identification.

H₂: 

Religious and secular Whites will have the strongest difference in their opinions on conservative Christians’ perceived vision of society compared with individuals of other races.

H₃: 

Whites will be more polarized by secularity in their attitudes toward having a religious president than people of other races.

4. Data and Methods

Our sample, coming from the 2014 American Mosaic Project, is a nationally representative online survey contracted through the survey company Gesellschaft für Konsumforschung (GfK) with funding from the National Science Foundation. The survey was drafted during the summer of 2013 and fielded during a two-week period in early 2014. Participants were selected from GfK’s nationally representative Knowledge Networks panel sampling frame, which uses probability-based random address sampling from U.S. Postal Service records to recruit respondents in English- and Spanish-speaking households through direct mail, telephone follow-up, and online registration. GfK provides laptop computers for respondent households lacking Internet access.

Using probability-proportional-to-size weighted sampling, GfK drew a sample consisting of 2400 adults, including two oversamples of 400 Black and 400 Hispanic respondents, from their panel. Sample weights were applied to the data to adjust for these ethnic- and language-based oversamples, in addition to poststratification sample weights for noncoverage and nonresponse biases, similar to those used in comparable national surveys such as the General Social Survey (GSS) and the Current Population Survey (CPS) (see Chang and Krosnick (2002) and Huggins and Eyerman (2001) for more information on Internet survey reliability).

While respondents were paid for their participation, GfK caps participation in multiple surveys at two to four per month, does not allow for self-selection into either the frame or survey sample, and corrects for frequent sampling of respondents on particular demographic characteristics in their sampling procedure. Before fielding, the BAM survey underwent two rounds of pretesting and revisions with a convenience sample of undergraduates at an East Coast university and a random sample of 50 respondents from GfK’s panel.

To test differences among secular people, all analyses included an interaction term between race and secularity. Given our analysis aims to highlight the differences in secularity across races, we recoded a categorical measure of religious identification from the BAM survey based on a modified version of the Steensland et al. (2000) approach, which asked respondents, “What is your current religious preference, if any?” Secularity was coded as a binary 0 for those who identify with any traditional religious preference, while secular is coded as 1 if the respondent identifies as “Spiritual”, “Atheist”, “Agnostic”, or “Nothing in particular”. Racial identification was originally asked with five options: “White, Non-Hispanic”, “Black, Non-Hispanic”, “Other, Non-Hispanic”, “Hispanic”, or “Two + Races, Non-Hispanic”. For this analysis, the categories of “Other, Non-Hispanic” and “Two + Races, Non-Hispanic” were merged due to the small populations in each group. Merging them increased the group size to over one hundred, allowing us to maintain statistical power in our analysis. Descriptive statistics are presented in

Table 1. Descriptives (unweighted).

Variable	Observations	Mean/Percentage	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Political ideology	2466			0	2
Liberal	748	30.33%
Moderate	842	34.14%
Conservative	876	35.52%
Race
White	1555	61.68%
Black	427	16.94%
Hispanic	428	16.98%
Other	111	4.40%
Religious or secular				0	1
Secular	752	30.43%
Religious	1719	69.57%
Gender				1	2
Male	1257	49.86%
Female	1264	50.15%
Education
Less than high school	286	11.34%
High school	776	30.78%
Some college	696	27.61%
BA+	763	30.27%
Income	2521	11.81991	4.449106	1	19
Age				1	4
18–29	405	16.07%
30–44	553	21.94%
45–59	726	28.80%
60+	837	33.20%
President should be religious	2431			0	3
Strongly agree	541	22.25%
Somewhat agree	956	39.33%
Somewhat disagree	652	26.82%
Strongly disagree	282	11.60%
Agree with atheists View of America	2431			0	3
Almost completely agree	142	5.85%
Mostly agree	483	19.88%
Somewhat agree	737	30.34%
Not at all	1067	43.93%
Agree with conservative Christian view of America	2431			0	3
Almost completely agree	304	12.49%
Mostly agree	704	28.94%
Somewhat agree	789	32.43%
Not at all	636	26.14%

below.

Political ideology was coded as “Liberal”, “Moderate”, and “Conservative”, with anyone who responded more liberal than moderate coded as liberal, and anyone who responded as more conservative than moderate coded as conservative. Education was included as well and was coded as a four-point scale, from “Less than High School Degree” to a bachelor’s degree or more (BA+). We used the income variable as provided in the dataset, which asks the respondent their household income, which has nineteen categories, from “less than $5000”, all the way to “$175,000 or more”. The modal response for this variable was two hundred and ninety-five respondents who reported having household incomes between USD 100,000 to USD 124,999. This indicated a skew toward higher income in this survey. Gender and age were also included as controls. We report three ordinary least-squares regressions (OLSs). All OLS analyses were conducted with sample weights designed to preserve the oversample sizes for African Americans and Hispanics.

Our three dependent variables allow us to better understand how secularity and race may shape the way religious and secular respondents understand religion’s (and atheism’s) roles in society. The first two questions were worded as “Here is a list of different groups of people who live in this country. For each one, please indicate how much you think people in this group agree with YOUR vision of American society.” The two groups we focused on were the groups that we expected would be uniquely polarizing in American society: atheists and conservative Christians. Four potential answers were available, from “Almost completely Agree” (with my view of Society) to “Not at all”. These two questions were then reverse-coded, so that a higher value indicated more agreement with this group's vision of American society. Our third question was worded as “How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements? A president should have strong religious beliefs”. Respondents had four potential answers, from “Strongly Agree” to “Strongly Disagree”. This was also then reverse-coded so that higher values indicated more agreement with the idea that a president should have strong religious beliefs.

Our sample was politically diverse, overwhelmingly White, and fairly diverse in terms of both age and education levels. Importantly, 30% of our sample was secular, and amongst that 30%, we had 476 secular Whites (31% of Whites), 138 secular Blacks (34%), 93 secular Hispanics (22%), and 56 secular others (31%). Given these sample sizes, it is important to note that any findings regarding our “other” category have to be taken into consideration, given the small sample size, though they were the group with the largest percentage of secularists, with 41% of these individuals being secularists.

5. Results

This question was worded as “Please indicate how much you think people in this group agree with YOUR vision of American society. Atheists”, and the respondent could select from a four-point scale, from “Not at all” to “strongly agree”. All coefficients are presented in

Table 2. Comfort with atheists’ vision of society.

	(1)	(2)
Variables	Model 1	Model 2
(Liberal)
Moderate	−0.246 ***	−0.233 ***
	(−0.124)	(−0.118)
Conservative	−0.347 ***	−0.316 ***
	(−0.177)	(−0.161)
(White)
Black	−0.315 ***	−0.198 **
	(−0.124)	(−0.0780)
Hispanic	0.172 **	0.279 ***
	(−0.0681)	(−0.111)
Other	−0.0291	0.165
	(−0.00764)	−0.0432
(Religious)
Secular	0.392 ***	0.540 ***
	(0.196)	(0.27)
Black and secular		−0.325 **
		(−0.0816)
Hispanic and secular		−0.362 **
		(−0.0759)
Other race and secular		−0.468 **
		(−0.0839)
(Male)
Female	−0.0757 *	−0.0711 *
	(−0.0403)	(−0.0379)
(Less than high school)
High school/GED	−0.124 *	−0.108
	(−0.0602)	(−0.0526)
Some college	0.0949	0.106
	(0.0459)	(0.0511)
BA+	0.222 ***	0.234 ***
	(0.107)	−0.113
Income	−0.00081	−0.00039
	(−0.00390)	(−0.00188)
(18–29)
30–44	−0.270 ***	−0.267 ***
	(−0.126)	(−0.124)
45–59	−0.257 ***	−0.261 ***
	(−0.122)	(−0.124)
60+	−0.329 ***	−0.328 ***
	(−0.153)	(−0.152)
Constant	1.235 ***	1.151 ***
Observations	2382	2382
Adjusted R-squared	0.143	0.149

Beta coefficients in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, and * p < 0.05.

, below, with standardized coefficients in parentheses under the unstandardized coefficient for ease of interpretation across categories. In model one, political moderates (cf = −0.246 ***) and conservatives (cf = −0.347 ***) report less agreement with atheist visions of society, relative to their liberal counterparts, similar to African Americans (cf = −0.314 ***), women (cf = −0.0751 *), those with a high school education (cf = −0.125 *), and every age group relative to our reference group. When considering comfort with atheists' vision of society, secular (cf = 0.393 ***), Hispanic (cf = 0.172 ***), and college-educated Americans (cf = 0.218 ***) report statistically higher levels of agreement.

Of note, our interaction effect is significant and substantial across all racial categories, which we will unpack below. The negative coefficients indicate we see less polarization on this question within racial groups between the religious and secular than we would expect if we accounted for these identities separately. We wish to additionally highlight the consistency of the findings across both models, when accounting for the interaction of secularity and race, statistical significance remains across most of our variables. We can explain about 15% of the variance based on our final model.

Among the secular, we report large differences in the predictive margins of saying atheists agree with my vision of society, as shown above in Figure 1. Most striking is among Black individuals, where we see that both religious and secular people report lower predicted values that are much more in line with religious White Americans than any other group. Hispanic individuals are far less polarized than Whites, with religious Hispanics reporting more agreement with atheists’ vision of society than their Black or White religious counterparts. Similarly, our “other” category is much less polarized, with minimal disagreement between religious and secular individuals on this question.

Interestingly, outside of White Americans, no racial group has statistically significant differences between secular and religious respondents, as shown through the overlapping confidence intervals. These findings indicate far less polarization within other racial groups, as well as highlighting the substantial stigmatization of atheists and their perceived vision of how society should be structured among African Americans, regardless of their beliefs being religious or secular in nature, and, alternatively, how little stigmatization of atheists and their perceived vision seems to exist in the Hispanic community. These findings are consistent with Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 1a, indicating support for the hypothesis that Whites are uniquely polarized on this question, and that Black respondents would report less agreeableness toward atheists and their perceived vision for American society.

5.1. Comfort with Conservative Christians’ Vision of Society

Similarly to our previous question, this question regarding conservative Christians is worded as “Please indicate how much you think people in this group agree with YOUR vision of American society. Conservative Christians” and the respondent could select from a four-point scale, from “Not at all” to “Strongly agree”. All coefficients are standardized for ease of interpretation across different variables and results are presented below in

Table 3. Comfort with conservative Christians’ vision of society.

	(1)	(2)
Variable	Model 1	Model 2
(Liberal)
Moderate	0.233 ***	0.229 ***
	(0.113)	(0.111)
Conservative	0.779 ***	0.769 ***
	(0.38)	(0.375)
(White)
Black	−0.0476	−0.0623
	(−0.0180)	(−0.0235)
Hispanic	−0.0722	−0.153 *
	(−0.0274)	(−0.0579)
Other	0.136	0.117
	(0.0339)	(0.0292)
(Religious)
Secular	−0.633 ***	−0.688 ***
	(−0.302)	(−0.328)
Black and secular		0.0379
		(0.00915)
Hispanic and secular		0.297 **
		(0.0596)
Other race and secular		0.0581
		(0.00994)
(Male)
Female	0.0101	0.0107
	(0.00512)	(0.00546)
(Less than high school)
High school/GED	−0.034	−0.0366
	(−0.0158)	(−0.0170)
Some college	−0.0548	−0.0601
	(−0.0253)	(−0.0277)
BA+	−0.231 ***	−0.239 ***
	(−0.106)	(−0.110)
Income	−0.00134	−0.00149
	(−0.00615)	(−0.00685)
(18–29)
30–44	−0.0333	−0.034
	(−0.0148)	(−0.0151)
45–59	−0.0756	−0.0743
	(−0.0344)	(−0.0338)
Constant	1.250 ***	1.281 ***
Observations	2385	2385
Adjusted R-squared	0.2504	0.2517

Beta coefficients in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, and * p < 0.05.

. The largest effect sizes are for political conservatives (cf = 0.779 ***; beta = 0.38) relative to their liberal counterparts, followed by secular individuals (cf = −0.633 ***; beta = −0.302) relative to their religious counterparts, seemingly indicating this comfort is as much a political as a religious question. Across both models, we see that in comparison with liberals, moderates and conservatives unsurprisingly report higher levels of agreement with conservative Christians’ vision of society.

Alternatively, we see that those with high levels of education (BA+) in both models, as well as those who are Hispanic (in our second model), report lower levels of agreement with conservative Christians’ vision of society. When considering our interaction terms, the results indicate that the combination of secularism and racial identity interacts in such a way as to show that secularity interacts differently across ethnicity for Hispanic respondents, but not any of our other racial categories. The combination of secularity and identity leads them to be less polarized on their comfort with conservative Christians' vision of society, relative to what you would expect accounting for their racial background or secularity individually. These results, perhaps unsurprisingly, indicate that comfort with conservative Christians’ vision of society is primarily shaped by the difference between religious and secular, as well as political differences, more so than by racial differences. We can explain 25% of the variance in the data with our final model.

Figure 2 below shows that this difference among Hispanics is, in part, because of their slightly reduced agreement with conservative Christians among religious Hispanics, in conjunction with slightly increased agreement among secularist Hispanics. This could be, in part, because religious Hispanics are disproportionately Catholic and may not view themselves as aligned with conservative Christians, who are likely to be evangelical Christians within the American imagination. It is interesting that we do not see the same level of variation amongst views regarding conservative Christians as we did among views of atheists, indicating that atheists are stigmatized amongst African Americans (and normalized among Hispanic respondents) in a way that conservative Christians are not. Based on our results, we have partial support for Hypothesis Two, as White respondents are more polarized than our Hispanic respondents, but not statistically, relative to our Black or ‘other’ respondents when accounting for all potentially relevant control variables.

5.2. President Should Be Religious

The models below, presented in

Table 4. The president should be religious.

	(1)	(2)
Variables	Model 1	Model 2
(Liberal)
Moderate	0.244 ***	0.239 ***
	(0.122)	(0.119)
Conservative	0.540 ***	0.525 ***
	(0.272)	(0.265)
(White)
Black	0.337 ***	0.281 ***
	(0.129)	(0.108)
Hispanic	−0.0698	−0.123 *
	(−0.0274)	(−0.0482)
Other	0.0776	−0.049
	(0.0201)	(−0.0127)
(Religious)
Secular	−0.730 ***	−0.806 ***
	(−0.360)	(−0.398)
Black and secular		0.151
		(0.0372)
Hispanic and secular		0.181
		(0.0368)
Other race and secular		0.301 *
		(0.0532)
(Male)
Female	0.0811 *	0.0783 *
	(0.0426)	(0.0412)
(Less than high school)
High school/GED	0.0101	0.00058
	(0.00487)	(0.000279)
Some college	−0.0777	−0.0837
	(−0.0369)	(−0.0398)
BA+	−0.276 ***	−0.283 ***
	(−0.131)	(−0.135)
Income	−0.0131 **	−0.0135 **
	(−0.0623)	(−0.0640)
(18–29)
30–44	0.166 ***	0.163 ***
	(0.0763)	(0.0751)
45–59	0.202 ***	0.203 ***
	(0.0948)	(0.0953)
60+	0.269 ***	0.268 ***
	(0.124)	(0.123)
Constant	1.635 ***	1.682 ***
Observations	2385	2385
Adjusted R-squared	0.279	0.281

Beta coefficients in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, and * p < 0.05.

, indicate the likelihood of saying a president should have strong religious beliefs (0–3), with 3 being strongly agree that the president should have strong religious beliefs. All coefficients are standardized for ease of interpretation across different variables. Looking first at agreement with the idea that the president should have strong religious beliefs, we see conservatives (cf = 0.540 ***; beta = 0.272), African Americans (cf = 0.337 ***; beta = 0.129), and moderates (cf = 0.244 ***; beta = 0.122) in model one. When looking at disagreement with this view, secular respondents (cf = −0.730 ***; beta = −0.360) are unsurprisingly unlikely to support the idea that our top office should be filled by a religious person.

When considering our controls, all age cohorts relative to our young adults agree that a president should be religious, relative to the reference group. Education and income play a role as well, with college-educated (cf = −0.276 ***; beta = −0.276 ***) and those with higher incomes (cf = −0.0131 ***; beta = −0.0623) being statistically significantly more likely to disagree relative to the rest of the sample. These findings are statistically significant across both models, with the notable exception of Hispanic respondents, who report less agreement when we account for the interaction of ethnicity and secularity.

When considering the interaction between secularity and racial/ethnic identity, we see some positive effects for the interaction between secularity and Hispanic identity, as well as our ‘other’ category, indicating the identities lead to increased agreement relative to what we would expect if we accounted for religious and racial/ethnic identity separately. Even when accounting for political ideology, we see evidence that race and secularity shape the way many of our respondents understand the importance that America’s president has a personal religious belief. It is important to note that, though the question does not specify the religion in question, we should assume that the respondent probably envisions a Christian of some stripe, given the historical precedent. Based on our final model, we can explain about 28% of the variance with our model.

As charted below in Figure 3, while religious individuals are more likely to say they would prefer a president with strong religious beliefs and secular individuals are more likely to say the opposite, White individuals show high levels of polarization. Interestingly, Black secular individuals and Black religious individuals show the highest levels of support for having a devout president relative to their religious and secular counterparts, and White and Hispanic counterparts. Alternatively, Hispanic respondents who are secular are broadly in line with their White counterparts, while Hispanic religious respondents show a slight decrease on this question relative to their White religious counterparts. Interestingly, our other category is less polarized on both ends, with reduced religious support and increased secular support for a president needing to have strong religious belief relative to the rest of the sample, though the confidence intervals are quite wide. These results seem to indicate a comfort with religiosity among secular Black individuals as well as our ‘other’ category. We have partial support for our hypothesis that Whites will be more polarized by secularity in their attitudes toward having a religious president than people of other races, as we do see more polarization relative to Hispanics and our ‘other’ category. Interestingly, though we see that the interaction between race and secularity is not significant for Black respondents, we do have evidence that Black respondents, in general, are statistically more likely to feel a president should be religious than their White and Hispanic counterparts.

6. Discussion and Limitations

This paper aimed to shed light on the complex relationship between secularity and race by reporting the results of regression models inquiring into attitudes regarding how respondents see their vision for American society relative to atheists and conservative Christians, as well as whether the respondents prefer a president with a strong religious faith. The American Mosaic Project contains a multitude of interesting sociopolitical variables with great potential for future work on racialized secularity. Before contextualizing our findings, it is useful to note several of our limitations.

First and foremost, these data were collected in 2014 and, as such, are a decade old. The rise of the ‘nones’ has been well documented in the decade since these data were collected, but even with this rise, Burge (2023) has noted that disaffiliation and polarization differ across racial groups. We have no reason to suspect that the numerical increase in secular Americans would change the dynamic found in this paper, given the differing ways secularity functions by race. It should be noted that the political climate of the United States has changed drastically, with much of the polarization being shaped by discourse surrounding topics and groups such as White Replacement Theory and conservative Christianity. Ultimately, our goal was to identify and acknowledge both past and current trends between secularity, race, and politics. While these results could differ from more modern samples, we hope these data highlight the complex relationship between secularity and race, especially when related to political values.

To better understand current political trends, future research should more closely investigate not only who is voting, but also who is not voting. A deeper story may emerge as new research examines both hesitancy and regret among minority groups before and after voting, and more should be undertaken to identify how the racialization of political parties may further motivate the voting decisions of these minority groups in tandem with racialized religious identities.

Another issue with this project is the inability to split our ‘other’ category into meaningful groups, such as biracial Americans, MENA Americans, and Asian Americans. Given that a third of Asian Americans are not religiously affiliated (Mohamed and Rotolo 2023), being able to better understand how secularity may shape their perspectives on these questions may give insight into an understudied and ever-growing group in the mosaic that is America. However, the data were limited by the small sample size if these categories were divided into their own unique groups. We would encourage future projects to continue and expand our understanding of the diversity of religious communities in America and the growing diversity of secular communities through the examination of minority populations, including Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians, with methods that provide stronger and more reliable statistical power.

A final issue to address is the questions themselves. While we do not think the increase in the secular population changes the way secularity and race interact, our questions did address how these populations view themselves relative to atheists’ and conservative Christians’ visions of America. A vision of America is by its nature a political project, and given the rise of Trumpism and the ever-increasing awareness of Christian Nationalism and its deep connection to the Republican party, we can envision readers' concerns that our Black and Hispanic respondents may feel far more negatively about conservative Christians’ vision of society today given how closely that vision is aligned with this controversial figure. We also acknowledge Trump and the Republican Party’s connections with White nationalist rhetoric (Hartzell 2018). Though similar in many ways, the distinction remains important to name as both work in different ways to influence the relationship between race, politics, and religion. We would note to those readers, that if polling is indicative of real support, we would argue, perhaps, that this question would be even less racially polarized amongst our Hispanic and Black respondents today relative to when the data were collected, given record support for Donald Trump amongst some segments of the Black and Hispanic voting public (Sommer and Franco 2023, 2024; Petty et al. 2022).

It must also be noted that the survey itself had limitations. The questions on which several of our dependent variables relied were measured on a four-point scale, from “Not at all” to “Almost Completely Agree”. This deviation from a more traditional “Strongly Agree”-to-“Strongly Disagree” scale may have influenced the responses of the survey participants. Secondly, while this survey is admirable for its oversample of racial minorities, the relatively small scale of the sample may limit our findings, and it could be fruitful to have similar questions on a larger-scale survey, which would allow researchers to more deeply parse differences both across race and across types of secularity. It should also be noted that the survey skewed wealthier than the average American, which could influence our findings.

Examining our findings, we conclude that secularity’s effect on different political outcomes manifests differently among individuals of different races. By analyzing various political opinions with the inclusion of an interaction term between race and secularity, we hope to address the long-held assumption that secularity exists solely as a White, liberal ideology. Following the recent works by Blankholm (2022) and Burge (2023), who both provide strong evidence that secularity influences political opinions differently across different racial categories, our paper expands on these conclusions to understand the ways in which the political opinions of individuals are shaped both by their race and their religious or secular beliefs. Specifically, this paper investigates the degree to which individuals support an atheist vision for society, a conservative Christian vision for society, and a religious president.

First, looking at atheist worldviews, we found that while Whites were highly polarized by secularity in their support for atheist visions for society, there was much less polarization among Black and Hispanic individuals. We found that both secular and religious Blacks showed levels of support for atheist worldviews that were similar to religious Whites, while both religious and secular Hispanics showed levels of support that were closer to secular White scores. Our findings suggest that despite holding a secular identity, Blacks express discomfort toward an atheist vision for society. Referencing the previous literature, it is possible that the pattern found in the data stems from Black discomfort in a typical secular culture that is primarily White (Abbott et al. 2020; Swann 2019).

This lack of support for atheist visions of society relative to secular Whites may also stem from the intersectional space secular Blacks find themselves in, where ostracism from both secular White communities and religious Black communities leave them in a middle ground in regard to their opinions on secularity in the political realm (Swann 2019; Blankholm 2022; Abbott et al. 2020). Some research (Burge 2023) also indicates that Black Americans are less likely to identify as atheist, and this willful choosing of other identities may be another demonstration of discomfort with atheists and their perceived vision of society. It should also be noted that these predicted values are generally lower than our predicted values for conservative Christians, indicating higher disagreement with their views relative to those of conservative Christians. Overall, our findings suggest a deeper complexity in secularity in its effect on supporting different political beliefs.

In regard to supporting a conservative Christian vision of society, secular Hispanics expressed more support for conservative Christians than religious Hispanics. We suspect that religious Hispanics show less support for conservative Christians because religious Hispanics are disproportionately Catholic and may not identify with conservative Christians, who are typically viewed as evangelical Christians. Where Hispanics may find common ground with conservative Christian viewpoints is in their perspectives on gender essentialism and patriarchy, which is tied to both their religious tradition and Hispanic “machismo” that may show greater support among secular Hispanics (Ruiz et al. 2017; Heep 2014). Additionally, given the large statistical effect of political ideology in predicting agreement with conservative Christians, we cannot disregard the idea that the relationship between this religious group and conservative politics more generally may have shaped the responses of our sample.

Finally, when looking at opinions on whether a president should be religious, the effect of secularity is similar across Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics, where religious respondents agreed to a higher degree than secular respondents that the president should be religious, with Blacks being the most likely to agree that the president should have strong religious beliefs. It should be noted that while secular White and Hispanic respondents reported similar average low levels of agreement that the president should be religious, secular Blacks scored significantly higher, suggesting that despite identifying as nonreligious, secular Blacks still would prefer a president to be religious. This is perhaps unsurprising when we understand this finding in light of our previous result that Black Americans do not believe they agree with atheists’ vision of American society.