Constructive Realism: “Why Ancestor Is Possible” in Zhu Xi’s Religion View

Abstract

Traditional Chinese ancestor worship implicitly raises a fundamental question: How are ancestors possible? This question was formally articulated in the Zhu Xi’ philosophy. Qi holds ontological status: the “birth” of things arises from the aggregation of qi, while their “death” means the dispersion of qi—a clearly naturalistic proposition. Yet, paradoxically, Zhu Xi also asserts that during sacrificial rituals, deceased ancestors can exist in some form, reflecting a realist stance toward religious objects. These two propositions appear contradictory. To resolve this contradiction, He implicitly proposes “constructive realism”, suggesting that whether ancestors “exist” can only be meaningfully considered when the ritual participant possesses a state of chengjing gange.

1. Introduction

The Qingming Festival is a cornerstone of Chinese tradition, deeply rooted in ancestral veneration and filial piety. The living honor their departed ancestors by visiting their gravesites and participating in rituals such as placing offerings like cooked food and wine, burning joss paper and paper silver ingots, and tidying burial mounds. Through these acts, they seek to establish a spiritual connection with their ancestors, praying for blessings and prosperity in the coming year. Ancestral worship rituals are typically collectively conducted by extended families and held annually, serving as a yearly family reunion. Even if tensions or conflicts exist among family members, they set aside grievances on this day to unite in honoring their ancestors, upholding the shared reverence for their lineage. Of course, the focus of this paper is not the Qingming Festival itself, but rather an exploration of a related philosophical question: why ancestor is possible? At first glance, this inquiry may seem nonsense. Within the traditional Chinese worldview, the existence of ancestors is taken as self-evident—every individual is seen as part of an unbroken chain of descent, generationally continuous, culminating in the emergence of the present “us.” The question of “why ancestor is possible?” does not seek to trace bloodline genealogy but instead interrogates whether “ancestor” possess reality within ritual practices. In the context of Marxism as China’s dominant ideology—where atheism is widely endorsed—what meaning can be ascribed to Qingming Festival rituals that honor ancestors lacking such reality? This question is profoundly intriguing. We shall examine it through the lens of Zhu Xi (朱熹, 1130–1200), the Southern Song Dynasty neo-Confucian philosopher, who grappled with analogous issues in his analysis of ancestral sacrifices.

The question “why ancestor is possible?” fundamentally probes how to understand the reality of religious objects. Zhu Xi’s philosophy does not simplistically affirm or negate religious objects, as is typical in conventional discourse. All things are generated from qi (vital force 气), and their dissolution signifies the dispersion of qi—a clearly naturalistic stance. Paradoxically, however, Zhu Xi also holds that within classical religious practices, ancestors can reappear and partake of the offerings provided by their descendants, thereby adopting a realist position toward the deceased. This paper seeks to explore how Zhu Xi sustains a theoretical tension between these two conflicting positions. This paper will unfold through the following four dimensions: First, we examine Zhu Xi’s establishment of the ontological status of qi in his philosophical system, arguing that qi and li (principle 理) are non-hierarchical, representing two interdependent aspects of existence. Second, building upon qi’s ontology, we advance a naturalistic interpretation of life and death, wherein birth marks qi’s aggregation and death its dispersion. Third, we analyze Zhu Xi’s realist commitment to religious objects, which contradicts his naturalism. This contradiction manifests in his simultaneous denial of ancestral qi’s persistence and affirmation of their ritual “presence.” Fourth, we resolve this contradiction by reconstructing Zhu Xi’s implicit “constructive realism”. However, “constructive realism” is not the sole answer, but rather a promotion to deepen scholarly discourse on Zhu Xi’s religious philosophy.

2. The Ontological Status of Qi

In Zhu Xi’s philosophy, the relationship between li and qi is explicitly dualistic. While Zhu emphasizes their unity, this unity operates within a dualistic framework, insisting on their “buza buli” (neither conflated nor separated 不杂不离) nature. Li and qi remain two independent foundational concepts. Zhu Xi assigned each of the two distinct realms: li to xing—er—shang (the metaphysical realm 形而上) and qi to xing—er—xia (the phenomenal realm 形而下). “Between heaven and earth, there are li and qi. Li is the metaphysical Dao (The Way 道), the foundation of all living things; qi is the phenomenal vessel, the instrument through which life is generated.” (天地之间, 有理有气。理也者, 形而上之道也, 生物之本也, 气也者, 形而下之器也, 生物之具也) (Gu 2017, p. 1109). That which is “xing—er—shang” transcends the realm of sensory perception—”what is metaphysical lies beyond the reach of sight and hearing.”(其形而上者有非视听所及) (Li 2020, p. 1865). That which is “xing—er—xia” belongs to the domain of the senses—”the phenomenal is but the coarse particulars.” (形而下者只是那查滓) (Li 2020, p. 119) Though the two may be integrated into a unity, they cannot be reduced to a single undifferentiated substance.

In fact, a close reading of Zhu Xi’s texts reveals that the positioning of qi remains ambiguously defined. Statements like “qi is what condenses and generates living things” (气则能酝酿凝聚生物也) (Li 2020, p. 4) describe qi’s functional role in producing the world, yet Zhu Xi refrains from explicitly defining qi’s meaning itself. His many formulations—”yin—yang are qi”, “Thunder is merely qi”, “Spirits and ghosts are qi”, “The psyche is qi”, “To speak of human desires is to speak of qi”, “This thing is qi”, “Heaven is simply qi”—treat qi as a predicate that describes the attributes of subjects without clarifying qi itself. This structure explains what the subject is but leaves what qi is unresolved. A scholar askes Zhu a question on “the priority of li and qi” that recorded in Zhuzi Yulei (Classified Conversations of Master Zhu 朱子语类):

问: “有是理便有是气, 似不可分先后?” 曰: “要之, 也先有理。只不可说是今日有是理, 明日却有是气; 也须有先后。且如万一山河大地都陷了, 毕竟理却只在这里。”

A student asks: “If the existence of li necessarily entails the existence of qi, does this not render their sequence inseparable?” Zhu Xi responds: “In essence, li must precede qi. However, one must not interpret this as li existing today and qi suddenly arising tomorrow. Their relationship must have in order, but is not temporal. Even if—hypothetically—the mountains, rivers, and earth were to collapse into nothingness, li would still persist.”

(Li 2020, p. 4)

In New History of Chinese Philosophy, Feng Youlan cites Zhu Xi’s final statement—“Even if—hypothetically—the mountains, rivers, and earth were to collapse into nothingness, li would still persist.”—and concludes “While there is no Taiji (the Great Ultimate 太极) devoid of yin—yang in actual existence, such a Taiji exists theoretically” (Feng 1998, p. 188). Feng interprets Zhu Xi’s notion of “precede” as logical priority, not existential priority. However, Feng overlooks a critical distinction in Zhu Xi’s text: the difference between “qi” and “mountains, rivers, and earth”. “Mountains, rivers, and earth” is qi, but the collapse or destruction of “mountains, rivers, and earth” does not imply the annihilation of qi itself. “Mountains, rivers, and earth” is tangible, material forms, “Heaven and earth are the heavy, turbid forms of the phenomenal” (天地是那有形了重浊底) (Li 2020, p. 2069). These are derivative concepts of qi. Feng’s interpretation addresses only the relationship between li and tangible qi, neglecting the distinction between qi and its tangible derivatives. When interpreting I Ching (易传) phrases “the transformative way of the Qian (the Creative 乾)” (乾道变化) and “each attains its proper nature and destiny” (各正性命), Zhu Xi offers an alternative perspective: Before “each attains its proper nature and destiny,” there exists formless qi. He explains as follows:

“乾道变化”, 似是再说” 元亨”。”变化”字, 且只大概恁地说, 不比《系辞》所说底子细。”各正性命”, 他那元亨时虽正了, 然未成形质, 到这里方成。

“The phrase ‘the transformative way of the Qian’ seems to refer to the stages of yuan—heng (origination 元 and flourishing 亨). The term ‘transformations’ is used here in a broad sense, unlike the detailed explanations in the Appended Remarks (系辞). As for ‘each attains its proper nature and destiny,’ although li is already present during yuan—heng, they have not yet taken on xingzhi (form or substance 形质). It is only at the stage of zhen (proper 贞) that things achieve their material forms”

(Li 2020, p. 2068).

If the sequence yuan—heng—li—zhen (origination, flourishing, benefit, proper 元亨利贞) represents the process of cosmic actualization, then prior to the zhen stage, there exists the operation of formless qi. If this analysis holds, Feng’s interpretation of “precede” as “logical priority” becomes difficult to sustain. While li may precede tangible qi existentially, it does not precede formless qi.

However, Feng’s assertion regarding Zhu Xi’s ontological relationship between li and qi—“In terms of existence, li and qi are mutually dependent. As Zhu Xi states, ‘Movement and stillness have no absolute beginning; yin and yang have no origin’. This means the ‘dynamic flow of cosmic function’ is without start or end, rendering the question of li and qi’s existential priority meaningless” (Feng 1998, p. 188)—is correct. The mutual dependence of li and qi can be summarized as “coexistence and co—presence”, as Zhu Xi declares: “There has never been qi without li, nor li without qi” (天下未有无理之气, 亦未有无气之理) (Li 2020, p. 2). Zhu Xi posits that “existence” has two faces: xing—er—shang li and xing—er—xia qi. He clarifies: “The distinction between the xing—er—shang and xing—er—xia lies in how we parse the aggregation and dispersal of forms—this is precisely their boundary,”(形而上、形而下, 只就形处离合分别, 此正是界至处) (Li 2020, p. 2890) “Yet within these xing—er—shang ‘vessels’, each contains its own li, which is the xing—er—shang Dao” (然这形而下之器之中, 便各自有个道理, 此便是形而上之道) (Li 2020, p. 1820). Tangible vessels are governed by particular li corresponding to their material forms, while formless qi operates under universal li. The stages of yuan, heng, and li correspond to the dynamic flow of qi in its undifferentiated, formless state. In contrast, Zhen crystallizes the specific nature of concrete entities, as Chen Chun (陈淳, one of Zhu Xi’s four major disciples) states: “Once the shengyi (generative intent 生意) of a thing is settled, we call it zhen” (就起生意之已定者而言, 则谓之正) (Chen 1983, p. 4). Therefore, li is not an epistemological concept but an ontological one, intrinsically tied to the existential dynamics of qi.

In Zhu Xi’s philosophy, “qi” represents the actualizing aspect of existence, while “li” embodies its normative aspect, both holding ontological status.1 Commenting on the Doctrine of the Mean (中庸章句) passage “what is decreed by heaven is called nature” (天命之谓性), Zhu Xi explains as follows:

天以阴阳五行化生万物, 气以成形, 而理亦赋焉, 犹命令也。于是人物之生, 因各得其所赋之理, 以为健顺五常之德, 所谓性也。

“Heaven generates the myriad things through the interactions of yin—yang and the five phases. Qi coalesces into forms, while li is simultaneously endowed within them, akin to a command. Thus, in the birth of humans and things, each receives the li bestowed upon them, which manifests as the virtues of strength, adaptability, and the five constants. This is what we call xing (nature 性)”

(Zhu 2012, p. 17).

The existence of concrete things requires both qi and li. The concrete qi of material forms and the concrete li operate in mutual correspondence; neither can be omitted. Yang Lian (杨廉, a famous scholar of the school of principle in Ming Dynasty) described this theory as: “When one is unified, all are unified; when multiplicity arises, all are multiple. This is why li and qi cannot be separated” (盖一则皆一, 万则皆万, 此理气之所以不相离也) (Yang 2002, p. 84). In this relationship, there is no inherently “more fundamental” status granted to li. This is evident in Chen Chun, who defines li as: “li is nothing but the normative standard inherent in things themselves” (只是事物上一个当然之则便是理) (Chen 1983, p. 42). Here, Chen emphasizes understanding li through the normative demands of concrete existence rather than as a transcendent, metaphysically prior entity.

“Existence” is inherently dynamic and does not require li to act as an underlying motive force. Consequently, li itself is beyond notions of movement or stillness. Mou Zongsan’s (牟宗三) critique—that Zhu Xi’s li is “a transcendent, static determinant lying behind the ‘actuality of qi’s existence’”—is misplaced. This criticism, in a sense, operates within the framework of Xinxue (the School of Mind 心学), which posits li as the sole ontological reality while relegating qi to a derivative status. Mou argued that Zhu Xi’s concept of “li” contains a contradiction between “one” and “many”: if “li” is singular and unified (“one”), then the multiplicity (“many”) becomes untenable; Conversely, if li were multiple, the notion of oneness would be untenable. (Mou 1999, p. 459) After analysis, Mou came to the conclusion: “Zhu Xi’s view is that the one is a true one (truly one in essence), and the many is merely a provisional and illusory construct.” Li does not possess a real multiplicity simply because of the multiplicity found in existence, “Due to the multiplicity in the appearances of existence, we provisionally speak of it as many; due to the presence of form in existence, we provisionally speak of it as having form—but in terms of its essential nature, li is truly one and formless.”(Mou 1999, p. 460) In simple terms, this means that li is a substance that runs through all things while remaining unchanged in itself. It does not transform into different contents while being embodied in different things.

Mou’s critique is misplaced because Zhu Xi’s understanding of li—as it operates through qi across diverse existential domains—varies contextually. In the dynamic flow of qi, li manifests as the four phases of cosmic actualization: yuan, heng, li, and zhen; in the cycle of seasons, li manifests the order of spring, summer, autumn, and winter; in human nature, li appears as the four virtues: ren (benevolence 仁), yi (righteousness 义), li (propriety 礼), and zhi (wisdom 智). As recorded in Zhuzi Yulei:

曰: “一物各具一太极。”问: “此生之道, 其实也是仁义礼智信?” 曰: “只是一个道理, 界破看, 以一岁言之, 有春夏秋冬; 以乾言之, 有元亨利贞; 以一月言之, 有晦朔弦望; 以一日言之, 有旦昼暮夜。”

Someone asks: “Is this generative principle in fact the same as ren, yi, li, zhi, and xin (trustworthiness)?” Zhu Xi replies: “It is just one single principle. When viewed in terms of distinctions: in a year, it becomes spring, summer, autumn, and winter; in terms of Qian, it is yuan, heng, li, zhen; in a month, it is the new moon, first quarter, full moon, and last quarter; in a day, it is morning, noon, evening, and night”

(Li 2020, p. 500).

The specific forms and configurations of qi differ, and accordingly, the corresponding li also differs. Li and qi operate in correspondence with each other. It is not the case that li always remains strictly “one.”

Qi’s ontological status holds profound significance in Zhu Xi’s philosophy. Within the framework of Lixue, qi’s role is inadequately articulated, leading to widespread misinterpretations. Li is often regarded as a hierarchically superior entity to qi, whether ontologically or logically. This paper, however, argues that both qi and li are ontological facets of existence, sharing a relationship of coexistence and co-presence. We will steadfastly uphold this proposition and apply it to the discussions that follow.

3. Naturalism on Life and Death

Based on the principle of coexistence and co-presence between li and qi, the generation of humans (and all things) is not rooted in li as a primordial source. Instead, as articulated in the Commentary on the Doctrine of the Mean through the “ming—de” (endow—accept 命—得) framework, it emerges from the dynamic flow of qi. “Li” is pure and vast, with all tokens in it. It encompasses the normative principles of all existence. Zhu Xi states the following:

是这一个事, 便只是这一个道理。精粗一贯, 元无两样。今人只见前面一段事无形无兆, 将谓是空荡荡; 却不知道” 冲漠无朕, 万象森然已具”。如释氏便只是说” 空”, 老氏便只是说” 无”, 却不知道莫实于理。

“A single existence corresponds to a single li. The refined essence and coarse manifestations are unified, fundamentally indistinguishable. Modern observers, seeing only the formless and inchoate aspects of existence, might mistake it for a vacuous emptiness. Yet they fail to grasp that ‘within the absolute void, the li of all existences have already been fully existed.’ Buddhists speak only of ‘emptiness’, and Daoists of ‘non—being’, but they overlook the fact that nothing is more real than li”

(Li 2020, p. 2971).

The realm of li is not a domain isolated from actual existence. In the dynamic flow of qi, when a thing is contingently generated, the corresponding li is spontaneously endowed within it. This act of “endow” is natural and non-contrived, requiring no human intervention.

Modern philosophy may regard this “endow” as odd or epistemologically inaccessible. For Zhu Xi, however, there is nothing queer about endowment—it is simply the natural and necessary process by which things come into being. We need not impose overly harsh criticism on Zhu Xi here, especially since none of his contemporaries raised such objections. This issue was not rigorously put forward until Feng Youlan, who challenged Zhu Xi’s axiom “youwu biyouze” (Where there exists one thing, there must exist a principle 有物必有则), questioning: “How does this ‘you’ (exist 有) come to be?” We have addressed this question in a previous paper and will not elaborate further here. We need only understand: Why did Zhu Xi employ the concepts of endowment instead of grounding his theory in teleology to validate the normative reality of existence? If Zhu Xi had relied on teleology, the existence of actual beings (humans and things) would be framed as instrumental to achieving a good purpose, thereby presupposing normativity as an external mandate. While this approach might simplify theoretical coherence, it would sacrifice the autonomy—reducing humans to mere instruments for realizing “the good.” Clearly, Zhu Xi rejected such a positioning of beings.

Zhu Xi rejects the notion that existence is orchestrated according to a predetermined “good” purpose. Instead, he posited that the dynamic flow of qi itself constitutes the generation of life, spontaneously producing diverse humans and things. As Zhu Xi states: “I say that heaven and earth have no other task—they take the generation of life as their core purpose. The singular primordial qi circulates and flows without the slightest pause, doing nothing but giving birth to the myriad things” (某谓天地别无勾当, 只是以生物为心。一元之气, 运转流通, 略无停间, 只是生出许多万物而已) (Li 2020, p. 5). Zhu Xi employs the term “tiandizhixin” (heart—mind of heaven and earth 天地之心) to describe the capacity for “generating life”, stating: “Just as observing ‘the transformations of heaven and earth, and the flourishing of plants,’ one can thereby understand tiandizhixin”(犹观”天地变化, 草木蕃”, 斯可以知天地之心矣) (Li 2020, p. 1037). While heart—mind in Chinese philosophy typically connotes intentionality, governance, or purpose, Zhu Xi explicitly rejects such anthropomorphic interpretations, he clarifies: “The growth of all things is a time when heaven and earth are ‘non—intentional’.” (万物生长, 是天地无心时) (Li 2020, p. 6).

By rejecting the teleology of the “good”, we can better grasp Zhu Xi’s perspective on life and death. Life and death are outcomes of the natural, spontaneous flow of qi, not predetermined ends. As some passages recorded in Zhuzi Yulei:

(1) 天地初间只是阴阳之气。这一个气运行, 磨来磨去, 磨得急了, 便拶许多渣滓; 里面无处出, 便结成个地在中央。气之清者便为天, 为日月, 为星辰, 只在外, 常周环运转。地便只在中央不动, 不是在下。

In the primordial state of the cosmos, there existed only the interplay of yin and yang qi. This singular qi churned and circulated. As its motion intensified and friction grew, turbid residues were pressed outward. With no space to escape inward, these residues coalesced at the center, forming the earth. The purer, lighter qi ascended to become the heavens, the sun, the moon, and the stars, perpetually revolving around the periphery. The earth remained fixed at the center, not “below” but as the gravitational core of the cosmos

(Li 2020, pp. 6–7).

(2) 问: “生第一人时如何?” 曰: “以气化。二五之精合而成形, 释家谓之化生, 如今物之化生者甚多, 如虱然。”

Someone asks, “How did the first human come into being?” Zhu Xi responds, “Through the transformation of qi. The essences of yin—yang and the five phases coalesced to form the human body. Buddhists refer to this as ‘spontaneous generation’, and such processes are abundant in nature—for example, lice emerge in this manner”

(Li 2020, p. 9).

(3) 人之生, 适遇其气, 有得清者, 有得浊者, 贵贱寿夭皆然, 故有参错不齐如此。圣贤在上, 则其气中和; 不然, 则其气偏行。故有得其气清, 聪明而无福禄者; 亦有得其气浊, 有福禄而无知者。皆其气数使然。

The fate of human life is determined by the qi one encounters at birth. Some receive pure qi, others turbid qi. Thus, distinctions of nobility and commonality, longevity and premature death arise, resulting in such unevenness among people. When sages and worthies govern society, qi attains a harmonious equilibrium; otherwise, qi flows in skewed patterns. Hence, there are those endowed with pure qi—intelligent yet lacking fortune—and those with turbid qi—wealthy yet ignorant. All such outcomes are dictated by the configuration of qi

(Li 2020, p. 10).

(4) 厚之问: “人死为禽兽, 恐无此理。然亲见永春人家有子, 耳上有猪毛及猪皮, 如何?”曰: “此不足怪。向见籍溪供事一兵, 胸前有猪毛, 睡时作猪鸣。此只是禀得猪气。”

Hou Zhi asks, “Does it make sense that humans could be reborn as animals after death? I find this hard to accept. Yet I personally witnessed a family in Yongchuan whose child had pig hair on his ears and pig—like skin. How do you explain this?” Zhu Xi replies, “This is not so strange. I once observed a soldier in Jixi who had pig hair on his chest and snorted like a pig in his sleep. This is simply a case of inheriting pig qi”

(Li 2020, pp. 56–57).

(5) 人所以生, 精气聚也。人只有许多气, 须有个尽时; 尽则魂气归于天, 形魄归于地而死矣。

Human life arises from the condensation of jingqi (refined vital force 精气). Each person possesses a finite measure of qi, which inevitably depletes over time. When this qi is exhausted, the hunqi (ethereal soul 魂气) ascends to heaven, while the xingpo (corporeal form 形魄) returns to earth—this is what we call death

(Li 2020, p. 46).

(6) 气聚则生, 气散则死。

Life emerges from the condensation of qi; death follows its dispersal

(Li 2020, p. 1230).

The key passages from the Zhuzi Yulei cited above provide substantial evidence for the following perspective:

(1) All phenomena in the cosmos arise as “turbid residues” formed during the natural flow of qi. The yin—yang qi itself is formless and intangible. When it condenses into residues, it gains form and substance, becoming concrete existences.

(2) Humans and things are indistinguishable; both are products formed through the dynamic flow and condensation of qi.

From the two points discussed above, we can conclude that Zhu Xi held a naturalistic stance, albeit one that is rudimentary in its formulation.

(3) Human differences arise from variations in the condensation of qi.

(4) The condensation of qi is contingent, not predetermined.

(5) When qi disperses, death occurs—there is no doctrine of reincarnation or transmigration.

The phenomena of human “life” and “death” result from the natural flow of qi, with no preordained design. Zhu Xi once employed the metaphor of a grindstone to illustrate this process: “The operations of cosmic creation are like a grindstone—unceasingly rotating. The birth of all things resembles grains scattered from the grindstone: some coarse, some fine, inherently uneven” (造化之运如磨, 上面常转而不止。万物之生, 似磨中撒出, 有粗有细, 自是不齐) (Li 2020, p. 9). This analogy bears a striking resemblance to modern astrophysical explanations of star and planet formation, where rotating nebulae gradually coalesce gaseous matter into celestial bodies. While Zhu Xi obviously lacked knowledge of modern astrophysics, his metaphor resonates intuitively with contemporary scientific imagery.

Human existence is imbued with contingency, not predetermined by a Creator. Absent divine ordination, humans manifest diverse forms shaped by qi, each endowed with corresponding li to orient their mode of being. As illustrated in the earlier example of the Yongchuan man with pig—like hair, skin, and snoring—Zhu Xi attributes this to “inheriting pig qi (猪气)”. Such individuals exhibit porcine traits or behaviors, a phenomenon Zhu deems natural and coherent within his framework. Traditional scholarship labels this “determinism of temperament”, but we argue that Zhu Xi’s philosophy actually liberates humanity from rigid moral essentialism, constructing a theory that validates individuals’ existential paths based on their unique qi endowments.

Life and death are natural phenomena, and humans should not anguish over them. As Zhu Xi states, “Do not waver in the face of premature death or longevity; do not let life or death stir joy or sorrow in your heart—mind” (“夭寿不贰”, 不以生死为吾心之悦戚也) (Li 2020, p. 1737). The crucial task lies in comprehending li—that is, realizing the normative essence of being human—within the temporal interval between life and death. Zhu Xi explains: “What lies ahead is unknowable. When stepping out the door, fortune or calamity cannot be foreseen—only whether one’s actions are proper or not. If one submits to what is proper and maintains integrity until death, this is ‘proper destiny’. But if one dies under a collapsing wall or in shackles, this is not ‘proper destiny’.” (前面事都见不得。若出门吉凶祸福皆不可知, 但有正不正。自家只顺受他正底, 自家身分无过, 恁地死了, 便是正命。若立严墙之下, 与桎梏而死, 便不是正命) (Li 2020, p. 1738). That means: death aligned with li—even if premature—is morally justified, as it reflects adherence to one’s inherent normative principles; death resulting from reckless defiance of li (e.g., courting danger or moral corruption) is morally void, regardless of its timing; fear—driven survival at the cost of betraying li also negates “proper destiny,” as it abandons moral self-realization. Thus, Zhu Xi’s understanding of life and death transcends mere biological boundaries. His focus rests on whether human existence, in the interval between life and death, aligns with li intrinsic to one’s being.

4. Do Deceased Ancestors Possess Reality?

Zhu Xi’s understanding of life and death directly shaped his interpretation of religious practices: religious activities embody the normative essence of human existence. In the existential journey from life toward death, the critical question is whether individuals can achieve self-reflection through “acting as one ought”. Traditional Chinese religious life inevitably involves the issues of “ancestral spirits” and “ghosts and deities”. In ancestral sacrifices and rituals, the reality of these spirits becomes a pivotal concern. From a naturalistic standpoint, Zhu Xi should reject the existence of “ancestral spirits” and “ghosts and deities.” Paradoxically, his stance is ambivalent. He even attempts to reinterpret these concepts through his naturalism of qi, arguing that “ancestral spirits” and “ghosts and deities” are manifestations of qi’s function. A passage recorded in Zhuzi Yulei states the following:

光祖问: “先生所答崧卿书云云。如伊川又云: ‘伯有为厉, 别是一理。’又如何?” 曰: “亦自有这般底。然亦多是不得其死, 故强气未散。要之, 久之亦不会不散。如漳州一件公事: 妇杀夫, 密埋之。后为崇, 事才发觉, 当时便不为祟。此事恐奏裁免死, 遂于申诸司状上特批了。后妇人斩, 与妇人通者绞。以是知刑狱里面这般事, 若不与决罪偿命, 则死者之冤必不解。”

Guangzu asks, “In your letter replying to Songqing, you mentioned such matters. However, Cheng Yi also stated, ‘The vengeful spirit of Boyou constitutes a distinct principle.’ How should we reconcile this?” Zhu Xi replies: “Such phenomena indeed exist. Yet they mostly arise when individuals die unjustly, leaving their strong qi undispersed. Over time, however, even this qi will inevitably scatter. Consider a legal case from Zhangzhou: A woman murdered her husband and secretly buried him. The victim’s qi manifested as a haunting until the crime was exposed and justice served. Once the verdict was passed, the haunting ceased. The local officials, fearing the case might be appealed for clemency, explicitly annotated the judicial report. Ultimately, the woman was beheaded, and her accomplice was strangled. This demonstrates that in legal matters, if guilt is not adjudicated and life not avenged, the grievances of the deceased will remain unresolved”

(Li 2020, pp. 54–55).

Zhu Xi acknowledges the reality of many folk legends about ghosts and spirits, interpreting them through his naturalism of qi. He posits that such entities arise when the condensation of qi deviates from normal due to improper death or disharmonious aggregation. These manifestations, though anomalous, are integral to the natural world and may even coexist alongside humans in daily life. Crucially, Zhu Xi’s recognition of the reality of ghosts and spirits is not aimed at validating their objective existence but rather at addressing a deeper philosophical question: How do we comprehend human value within a world of such complex composition? A passage recorded in Zhuzi Yulei states the following:

因言“僧家虚诞。向过雪峰, 见一僧云: ‘法堂上一木球, 才施主来做功德, 便会热。’ 某向他道: ‘和尚得恁不脱洒! 只要恋着这木球要热做甚!’ “因说”路当可向年十岁, 道人授以符印, 父兄知之, 取而焚之。后来又自有”。汉卿云: “后来也疏脱。”先生曰: “人只了得每日与鬼做头底, 是何如此无心得则鬼神服?若是此心洞然, 无些子私累, 鬼神如何不服!”

Zhu Xi once remarked on the absurdities of Buddhist practices: “During a visit to Xuefeng Temple, I encountered a monk who claimed, ‘The wooden ball in the dharma hall grows warm whenever a patron performs meritorious deeds.’ I retorted, ‘Venerable monk, why cling to such attachments? What use is a heated wooden ball!’” He then recounted another anecdote: “Lu Dangke, at the age of ten, was given talismanic seals by a Daoist priest. His family discovered this, confiscated the seals, and burned them. Yet later, he acquired them again on his own.” Hanqing commented: “In the end, he became negligent”. Zhu Xi responded: “Humans are perpetually entangled with ghosts in their daily affairs. How can one subdue ghosts and spirits without a selfless heart—mind? If the mind is utterly transparent, free from selfish burdens, how could spirits and ghosts not submit!”

(Li 2020, p. 68).

In Zhu Xi’s religious framework, there is no assertion that human beings are subordinate to ancestral spirits, ghosts, or deities. Instead, these religious entities serve as instrumental strategies for human beings to discover their own moral value, such as “the mind is utterly transparent, free from selfish burdens”. The key lies in transforming these entities—which evoke attachment, fear, or awe—into expressions of the subject’s moral “ought”. A passage recorded in Zhuzi Yulei states the following:

问: “人死气散, 是无踪影, 亦无鬼神。今人祭祀, 从何而求之?” 曰: “如子祭祖先, 以气类而求。以我之气感召, 便是祖先之气, 故想之如在, 此感通之理也。”味道又问: “子之于祖先, 固是如此。若祭其他鬼神, 则如之何?有来享之意否?”曰: “子之于祖先, 固有显然不易之理。若祭其他, 亦祭其所当祭。’祭如在, 祭神如神在。’如天子则祭天, 是其当祭, 亦有气类, 乌得而不来歆乎! 诸侯祭社稷, 故今祭社亦是从气类而祭, 乌得而不来歆乎! 今祭孔子必于学, 其气类亦可想。”长孺因说, 祭孔子不当以塑像, 只当用木主。曰: “向日白鹿洞欲塑孔子像于殿。某谓不必, 但置一空殿, 临时设席祭之。不然, 只塑孔子坐于地下, 则可用笾、豆、簠、簋。今塑像高高在上, 而设器皿于地, 甚无义理。”

Someone asks, “If upon death, a person’s qi disperses without trace, and there are no ghosts or spirits, how do modern rituals seek connection through sacrifice?” Zhu Xi replies: “When you sacrifice to ancestors, you rely on resonance through qi affinity. By summoning with your own qi, you evoke the qi of your ancestors. This is why the saying ‘Sacrifice as if they were present’ holds—it is the principle of gantong (mental resonance 感格).” Weidao follows up: “This applies to ancestors, but what of sacrifices to other spirits? Do they truly partake in offerings?” Zhu Xi answers: “For ancestors, the principle is clear and unchanging. For other spirits, sacrifice only to those ought to sacrifice. ‘Sacrifice as if the spirits are present’. For example: The son of heaven sacrifices to heaven—this is proper, and through qi affinity, heaven responds. Feudal lords sacrifice to gods of sheji (soil and grain 社稷), and today’s community sacrifices operate similarly. Sacrifices to Confucius in schools follow the same logic of qi resonance.” Changru interjects: “Should we not use statues of Confucius in sacrifices, but wooden tablets instead?” Zhu Xi agrees: “At Bailudong academy, some proposed enshrining a Confucius statue. I argued against it—an empty hall with temporary offerings suffices. Alternatively, place a seated statue at ground level for proper ritual vessels (filling up cooked food and many beans). To elevate the statue high above while placing vessels on the ground violates yili (ritual propriety)”

(Li 2020, pp. 64–65).

The objects of sacrificial rites are not merely “as if present” but possess a form of reality within Zhu Xi’s naturalism. Traditional Chinese society views the bond between ancestors and descendants as an unbroken continuum—a concept easily grasped. However, this does not imply that each person physically harbors an ancestor within their body. Rather, after death, the ancestor’s qi disperses entirely. Yet when descendants perform sacrifices with utmost sincerity and reverence, they can resonate with their ancestors’ qi. Is this “resonance” accessing something real, or is it merely a psychological construct? From above passage, Zhu Xi asserts that the object of resonance is real—at least during the act of resonance itself. This explains his critique of Bailudong academy’s installation of a Confucius statue: when a genuine scholar sacrifices to Confucius with sincere reverence, Confucius becomes truly present through the resonance of qi. It is said that Zhu Xi engaged in daily acts of resonating with Confucius, likely achieving some measure of efficacy (Zhang 2020, pp. 75–76)—though no definitive historical records confirm his personal success. However, his description of descendants successfully resonating with ancestors offers insight: “Heaven, earth, and humanity are interwoven through the same qi. Hence the saying: ‘Vast and pervasive, as if above, as if beside!’. The void is saturated with this li, but one must perceive it dynamically—words falter where lived understanding prevails.” (通天地人只是这一气, 所以说: “洋洋然如在其上, 如在其左右!” 虚空逼塞, 无非此理, 自要人看得活, 难以言晓也) (Li 2020, p. 61). For Zhu Xi, “resonating with” is not about grasping the sacrificial object (e.g., Confucius or ancestors) as an independent entity. Rather, it is a hermeneutic practice to uncover the value of the world and one’s place within it. This communion is a private, ineffable experience, untransmittable through language or doctrine. It can only be realized through the subject’s sincere reverence. Thus, Zhu Xi invoked the perspectives of Cheng Hao and Xie Liangzuo (谢良佐) to address scholarly inquiries about ghosts and spirits:

明道答人鬼神之问云: “要与贤说无, 何故圣人却说有?要与贤说有, 贤又来问某讨。”说只说到这里, 要人自看得。孔子曰: “未能事人, 焉能事鬼!” 而今且去理会紧要道理。少间看得道理通时, 自然晓得。上蔡所说, 已是煞分晓了。

“When Master Mingdao (Cheng Hao) was asked about ghosts and spirits, he replied: ‘If I tell you there are none, why then did the sages speak of them? If I tell you there are, you will press me for proof.’ His words stop here, leaving the matter for the learner to discern. Confucius said: ‘If one cannot serve the living, how can one serve the spirits?’ For now, focus on apprehending essential principles. When your understanding of principles becomes comprehensive, clarity will follow naturally. What Xie Liangzuo elaborated is already profoundly lucid”

(Li 2020, p. 61).

Zhu Xi affirms the reality of religious objects and posits that they coexist and have co-presence with the living in this world. There is no need for the living to fear or feel unsettled by such beings. While these entities elude direct comprehension through ordinary sensory perception, we may interact with them via the religious practice of “gange”. The practice of gange demands that the subject maintain a mental state of utmost sincerity and reverence toward the objects. As Zhu Xi explains,

故祭祀之礼尽其诚敬, 便可以致得祖考之魂魄。这个自是难说。看既散后, 一似都无了。能尽其诚敬, 便有感格, 亦缘是理常只在这里也。

“Thus, through the sacrificial rites performed with utmost sincerity and reverence, one may indeed summon ancestor’s qi. This is difficult to articulate. After dispersal, it seems as though nothing remains. Yet by utmost sincerity and reverence, resonance is achieved—for li eternally resides here”

(Li 2020, p. 57).

Sincerity and reverence are the prerequisite for mental resonance, “chengjing enables gange” (Yin 2019, p. 327). In ancestral sacrifices, while bloodline holds significance, such resonance emerges only under the condition of “utmost sincerity and reverence”. Zhu Xi clarifies:

毕竟子孙是祖先之气。他气虽散, 他根却在这里; 尽其诚敬, 则亦能呼召得他气聚在此。

“After all, descendants share their ancestors’ qi. Though the ancestors’ qi has dispersed, its root remains. Through utmost sincerity and reverence, their qi can be summoned and coalesced here”

(Li 2020, p. 59).

Crucially, even without bloodline, subjects outside the lineage may achieve resonance through utmost sincerity and reverence.

From an ontological perspective, Zhu Xi’s stance on religious objects presents a fundamental ambiguity: It oscillates between naturalism (where death signifies the exhaustion of qi and absolute negation) and realism (where sincere reverence enables communion with the deceased). When qi disperses, death follows. All beings—humans included—cease to exist. Though the process of qi’s dissipation may vary in duration, the finality of annihilation remains unchanged. Paradoxically, Zhu Xi insists that in religious rituals, “chengjing gange” (sincere reverence and mental resonance 诚敬感格) can facilitate genuine interaction with the deceased. Julia Ching believes that this is a residual issue in Zhu Xi’s philosophy—an inconsistency between traditional Chinese religious beliefs and rationalist philosophy. Therefore, she argues that Zhu Xi was not a complete rationalist. (Ching 2000, p. 71). Feng Youlan adopts an expressivist stance toward religious sacrificial rituals: He views them merely as subjective emotional expressions by the participants, devoid of any engagement with the reality of the religious objects. As he argues: “Confucian theories on mourning rites and sacrifices are founded entirely on subjective emotions. Rationally, we know the deceased are gone; there is nothing further to assert about the objective existence of the objects of sacrifice” (Feng 2001, p. 155). He further claims: “The essence of sacrificial rites, from the Confucian perspective, lies solely in seeking emotional consolation” (Feng 2001, p. 159). For Feng, religious rituals serve as means of emotional self-comfort and self-fulfillment, with no commitment to the reality of the religious entities. This view parallels modern practices during the Qingming Festival: nearly all participants do not believe deceased relatives or ancestors can literally partake in offerings, yet they continue to perform traditional rites. Here, Feng’s notion of “emotional consolation” plays a significant role.

However, “emotional consolation” falls short in Zhu Xi’s religious philosophy. From relevant passages in the Zhuzi Yulei, Zhu Xi’s explanations of ancestral sacrifices do not emphasize “emotion.” Instead, he maintains a realist commitment to the objects of sacrifice—that is, we cannot resolve the tension between these two “isms” (realism vs. naturalism) by adopting Feng Youlan’s expressivist approach. To address this contradiction, we propose a “constructive realism” based on Zhu Xi’s philosophy. We do not claim that constructive realism can resolve the conflict once for all, but rather that it offers a viable method for reconciliation.

5. Constructive Realism

Zhu Xi’s naturalistic understanding of things (including humans) stands as a luminous contribution to Confucian philosophy. First, Confucianism need not presuppose any peculiar form of innatism to establish human subjectivity. Second, chengjing, as an expression of human subjectivity, is a relational psychological activity that requires no a priori capacities like liangzhi (innate moral knowledge or conscience 良知) or benxin (original mind 本心). The subject can cultivate chengjing both through self-mastery and through external ritual contexts. Zhu Xi links the reality of religious objects (e.g., ancestors) to the psychological act of chengjing, grounding this connection in both xin and qi. While traditional realism posits objects existing independently of the mind, Zhu Xi does not fully endorse this view.

We propose “constructive realism” to interpret Zhu Xi’s understanding of religious objects, grounded in his naturalistic belief. How, then, does Zhu Xi reconcile the tension between naturalism and realism from his naturalistic standpoint? The critical question is: How can we account for the reality of mental resonance with ancestors within a naturalism? Why do uncanny phenomena possess such reality?

Japanese scholar Aizawa Shiji, in addressing this theoretical issue, argues that no inherent contradiction exists between Zhu Xi’s naturalism and realism, as ancestors are merely objects of descendants’ remembrance, not a substantial entity. (Aizawa 2017, p. 155) Aizawa Shiji’s interpretation is psychologistic: the object lacks reality, and thus he insists that “we should not interpret qi relations solely through an ontological lens” (Aizawa 2017, p. 155). This stance resembles Feng Youlan’s expressivism, where mental resonance operates on descendants’ memory of ancestors—not as an emotional act but a psychological one. However, as we have previously argued, expressivism is incompatible with Zhu Xi’s philosophy.

For Zhu Xi, religious objects possess reality, a claim unaffected by modern skepticism toward the uncanny.2 To deeply understand Zhu Xi, we must not stand in opposition to his philosophical framework. Acknowledging the reality of the uncanny is a secondary yet crucial stance, under which we must explain: How does Zhu Xi achieve a naturalistic constructive realism? To resolve this, we must return to ontological assertion about qi in the first section: “Qi is the actualizing face of existence, while li is its normative face.” All existence involves qi, whether tangible or intangible. The dissipation of qi merely signifies the end of concrete qi, but universal qi persists. Universal qi is what all things between heaven and earth possess—whether living descendants or ancestors who once lived (Adler 2014, p. 10). The universal qi is ontological, not generative. The ontological interpretation is put forward by the critique toward Zhang Zai (Li 2020, p. 3702).

Zhang Zai’s assertion that “‘taixu’ (the supreme void 太虚) is qi” is framed from a generative perspective, where qi returns to great origin after the dissolution of all things, only to regenerate new beings. Zhu Xi, however, rejects this notion. He redefines taixu as li, arguing: “Zhang Zai also refers to li, but his explanation lacks clarity.” Zhu Xi’s critique focuses on the universality of concrete existence.

Returning to the topic of gange, when ancestors pass away, their qi dissipates entirely and does not linger in the natural world for descendants to retrieve. Zhu Xi states the following:

祭祀之感格, 或求之阴, 或求之阳, 各从其类, 来则俱来。然非有一物积于空虚之中, 以待子孙之求也。但主祭祀者既是他一气之流传, 则尽其诚敬感格之时, 此气固寓此也。

In sacrificial rites, gange may be sought through yin or yang, each according to its kind—when summoned, both arrive together. However, there is no tangible entity stored in the void, awaiting descendants’ invocation. Rather, the presiding descendant shares the same qi as the ancestors—a continuum of this universal qi. Thus, when the descendant performs the rites with utmost chengjing, this qi naturally resides within the ritual space.

(Li 2020, p. 62)

However, when descendants engage in chengjing and gange, the qi of their ancestors re-emerges. This demonstrates the reality of the objects of gange. Although the particular qi of ancestors dissipates entirely, universal qi remains substantively present throughout all things. Through gange, the subject reconstructs the particular qi of ancestors by grounding it in the universal qi. As long as descendants practice chengjing, the universality “inherent” in ancestor’s qi can be discerned in all phenomena, for “it is the continuous flow of this universal qi”. The ancient tradition of “establishing a ritual effigy” illustrates this principle. During sacrifices, a symbolic seat was arranged to ritually guide the ancestors’ presence into the ceremonial space. As recorded in Zhuzi Yulei:

问: “死者魂气既散, 而立主以主之, 亦须聚得些子气在这里否?”曰: “古人自始死, 吊魂复魄, 立重设主, 便是常要接续他些子精神在这里。古者衅龟用牲血, 便是觉见那龟久后不灵了, 又用些子生气去接续他。《史记》上《龟筴传》, 占春, 将鸡子就上面开卦, 便也是将生气去接他, 便是衅龟之意。”又曰: “古人立尸, 也是将生人生气去接他。”

Someone asks, “If the qi of the deceased’s spirit has already dispersed, why do we establish a ritual effigy to host them? Does this require gathering some residual qi here?” Zhu Xi responds, “From ancient times, when a person died, rituals like ‘summoning the hun (soul 魂) and restoring the po (spirit 魄)’, setting up a memorial effigy, and erecting a ceremonial post were performed. These acts aimed to perpetually reconnect and sustain a thread of their spirit here. Consider the ancient practice of anointing ritual tortoise shells with animal blood: this was done because people sensed the tortoise shell’s spiritual efficacy waning over time, so they used fresh qi from a sacrificial animal to renew its potency. The Records of the Grand Historian (史记) describes diviners cracking eggshells atop tortoise shells during spring rituals—this too was a way to channel living qi into the divination process, mirroring the logic of anointing the tortoise. Similarly, the ancient practice of ‘establishing a ritual effigy’ involved channeling qi of the living into the effigy to commune with ancestral spirits.”

(Li 2020, p. 63)

The practice of “establishing a ritual effigy”—whether using a living person or another symbolic object—serves to reconstruct the ancestor’s qi through the universal qi embodied by the effigy during acts of a mental of chengjing gange. Once ancestor’s qi is ritually reconstituted, the spirit of ancestor emerges, enabling genuine interaction between the ancestor and the descendant performing the rites. As recorded in Zhuzi Yulei:

问: “祭天地山川, 而用牲币酒醴者, 只是表吾心之诚耶?抑真有气来格也?” 曰: “若道无物来享时, 自家祭甚底?肃然在上, 令人奉承敬畏, 是甚物?若道真有云车拥从而来, 又妄诞。”

Someone asks, “When sacrificing to heaven, earth, mountains, and rivers with offerings like animals, silk, wine, and ceremonial cakes—is this merely to express the sincerity of our hearts, or does some actual qi truly come to commune with us?” Zhu Xi responds, “If you claim there is nothing to receive the offerings, then what exactly are we sacrificing to? That which inspires solemn awe, hovering above us, compelling us to serve with reverence—what is this if not a presence? Yet if you insist on envisioning chariots of clouds descending with retinues, that too is absurd superstition.”

(Li 2020, p. 63)

Within the ritually constructed coexistence forged through chengjing gange, the offerings employed by descendants—such as sacrificial animals, silk, wine, and ceremonial cakes—are real. These items are physically arrayed on the altar, exuding fragrant aromas. Simultaneously, they are symbolically partaken by the ancestors through chengjing gange, their presence ritually actualized rather than merely imagined. (Li 2020, p. 62)

Of course, when Zhu Xi speaks of ancestors “partaking in offerings”, he does not refer to spirit possession. Instead, the ritual effigy channels ancestor’s qi, so that when the effigy partakes of the offerings, it is the ancestor who partake. Zhu Xi explains: “The ancients used the effigy because it shared the same qi as the deceased. By channeling the living’s spirit to resonate with the ancestor’s spirit, the effigy became a vessel for their reverent participation.” (古人用尸, 本与死者是一气, 又以生人精神去交感他那精神, 是会附着歆享) (Li 2020, p. 2816) The reality of ancestor’s qi arises not from the effigy itself but from the universal qi it embodies. Through gange, descendants ritually reconstruct ancestors as participatory presences—real not because of supernatural intervention, but because of universal qi.

In Zhu Xi’s philosophy, universal qi is a central and crucial concept. Across all levels of existence—from the cosmic to the particle—though each phenomenon exhibits unique particularities, universal qi permeates through all of them. Zhu Xi says:

要知道理只有一个, 道理, 中间句句段段, 只说事亲事天。自一家言之, 父母是一家之父母; 自天下言之, 天地是天下之父母; 通是一气, 初无间隔。

“It is essential to understand that li is singular and universal—the ultimate truth. Throughout the teachings, every passage and phrase speak of serving one’s parents and serving heaven. From the perspective of a single household, parents are the parents of that family; from the perspective of the cosmos, heaven and earth are the parents of all under heaven. All are unified through the same qi, which flows without interruption or division.”

(Li 2020, p. 3070)

Though heaven, earth and parents are naturally distinct, they are “All are unified through the same qi, which flows without interruption or division.”. This is how Zhu Xi interprets Zhang Zai’s concept of “all people are my siblings, all things my companions”. Unlike Zhang Zai’s generativism, which emphasizes qi’s cyclical generation and dissolution, Zhu Xi provides an ontological explanation. If all things are indeed interconnected through the universal qi, then the ritual actualization of ancestral presence—constructed by descendants through gange—gains validation.

We propose “constructive realism” to explain the relationship between factual subject and religious object in Zhu Xi’s ritual practices:

(1)

Religious object is real;

(2)

Factual space and religious spaces are interwoven;

(3)

When X enters a state of gange, he perceives (1) and (2);

(4)

If X maintains chengjing, he will enter the state of gange.

Points (1) to (4) align with Zhu Xi’s understanding of religious activities, objects, and subjects. Points (1) and (2) uphold a realist stance. The claim that “religious objects is real” does not mean these objects are perpetually present before us; rather, their reality is activated solely within religious practice. Only when X enters the state of gange can (1) and (2) be validated. However, not everyone can attain this state—thus, (1) and (2) are not universally demonstrable. For instance, while people in southern China annually visit ancestral graves during the Qingming Festival, few enters the state of gange, as most engage in rituals for utilitarian purposes (e.g., petitioning ancestors for blessings). Zhu Xi explicitly rejects such instrumentalized religiosity, arguing that gange arises exclusively from inner chengjing toward ancestors or deities—a disposition rooted in genuine moral intentionality.

Realism asserts the reality of things (or events), but this does not imply their independence from the subject. “Constructive realism” demonstrates the possibility of intertwining reality with subjectivity. In a broader philosophical discourse, Zhu Xi further argues that the reality of things is inseparable from the subjectivity of chengjing:

问: “尽己之谓忠, 以实之谓信。’信既是实, 先生前又说道忠是实心, 不知如何分别。”曰: “忠是就心上说, 信是指事上说。如今人要做一件事, 是忠; 做出在外, 是信。如今人问火之性是如何, 向他说热, 便是忠。火性是热, 便是信。心之所发既实, 则见于事上皆是实。若中心不实, 则见于事上便不实, 所谓 ‘不诚无物’。若心不实, 发出来更有甚么物事!”

Someone asks:, “‘Exhausting oneself is called zhong (loyalty); acting truthfully is called xin (trustworthiness 信).’ Since xin already denotes truthfulness, why did you earlier describe zhong as ‘a sincere heart’? How are they distinguished?” Zhu Xi responds, “Zhong pertains to the xin (心), while xin pertains to shi (affair 事). For instance, when a person resolves to perform a task, that resolve is zhong; carrying it out outwardly is xin. If someone asks about the nature of fire and you answer ‘heat,’ your truthful intent is zhong. The fact that fire’s nature is heat is xin. When the heart’s expressions are cheng, their manifestation in action will likewise be truthful. If the heart lacks cheng, actions become hollow—this is the meaning of ‘without cheng, there is nothing’. If the heart is insincere, what substance could possibly emerge from it?”

(Li 2020, p. 597)

The phrase “Without cheng, there is nothing” originates from the Confucian classic The Doctrine of the Mean, where it is stated that “cheng is the beginning and end of all things; without cheng, there is nothing. Thus, the noble person regards cheng as preeminent.” (诚者物之终始, 不诚无物。是故君子诚之为贵) Zhu Xi interprets this passage as follows: “If a person’s heart—mind lacks cheng, even their actions amount to nothingness. Hence, the noble person esteems cheng above all.” (故人之心一有不实, 则虽有所为亦如无有, 而君子必以诚为贵也) (Zhu 2012, p. 34) This explanation aligns with the cited text. In Zhu Xi’s philosophy, the reality of the “thing” engaged in practice is intrinsically tied to whether the subject’s “heart—mind” holds genuine cheng toward it.

We can further extend the application of “constructive realism” within Zhu Xi’s philosophy as follows:

(a)

Y is real;

(b)

Factual scene of Y intertwines with the scene of “X’s engagement with Y”;

(c)

When X enters a state of “engaging with Y”, (a) and (b) become justified;

(d)

If X maintains chengjing, X will enter the state of “engaging with Y.”

We can analyze the reality of books in the scene of reading activities from a passage in Zhuzi Yulei using principles (a)–(d):

问 “人道惟在忠信, 不诚无物”。曰: “凡应接事物之来, 皆当尽吾诚心以应之, 方始是有这个物事。且干一件事, 自家心不在这上, 这一事便不成, 便是没了这事。如读书, 自家心不在此, 便是没这书。”

Someone asks, “It is said, ‘Human virtue lies solely in zhongxin (loyalty and trustworthiness); without cheng, there is nothing.’” How does this apply?” Zhu Xi responds, “In all interactions with things and affairs, one must exert one’s chengxin (sincere heart—mind) to engage with them. Only then can these things attain substantive existence. For instance, if you undertake a task but your heart—mind is not fully present, the task becomes hollow—it is as if the task itself ceases to exist. Take reading: if your heart—mind is not truly engaged with the text, it is as if the book itself ceases to exist.”

(Li 2020, p. 616)

From a common-sense perspective, the reality of “books” seems unquestionable. However, propositions (a)–(d) remind us that this commonsense assumption requires philosophical justification:

(a’)

Books is real;

(b’)

The factual scene of books intertwines with the scene of reading;

(c’)

When Zhu Xi enters the “state of reading”, propositions (a’) and (b’) become justified;

(d’)

If Zhu Xi maintains chengjing, he will enter the “state of reading.”

Assuming Zhu Xi approached all matters with chengjing, he would naturally focus on reading, thereby entering the “state of reading”. In this state, the factual scene of the book and the scene of reading intertwined, justifying the reality of the book. This reasoning parallels a common societal scenario: parents chastising their child, “How can you read with such a distracted mind?” Similarly, when encountering a stranger on the street, constructive realism suggests that without chengjing—here, the focused attention directed toward the stranger—we fail to activate the “scene of engagement,” rendering the reality of the stranger questionable. Just as we later recall no trace of this stranger in our lives, the absence of intentional engagement negates their substantive presence.

Zhu Xi’s constructive realism reminds us that the reality of a thing cannot be divorced from the subject’s engaged presence. Reality, in itself, holds no intrinsic meaning for the object; to question an object’s reality without relational subjectivity is nonsensical. This explains Zhu Xi’s meticulous focus on ritual practices like ancestral sacrifices: to debate the existence of religious objects without chengjing is irrational.

6. Conclusions

Zhu Xi’s discussion on the reality of religious objects (e.g., ancestors) offers a profound critique of traditional realism. To debate the reality of religious objects apart from their ritual scene and subjective engagement is fundamentally misguided. The significance of religious practices lies not in the objects themselves—ancestors are neither objects of worship, veneration, nor supplication—but in how gange enables the subject to recognize their own moral role within the cosmos, thereby discovering their intrinsic value. In this sense, religious objects function as vehicles of moral value rather than independent entities. Consequently, the reality of religious objects must be justified, for purely psychological constructs cannot bear such moral weight.

Upholding a naturalistic stance to justify this reality is fraught with challenges, as naturalism typically rejects the independence of religious objects. However, this paper argues that independence and reality are distinct. Zhu Xi’s constructive realism affirms the latter while rejecting the former. To posit independence risks veering into theism—a position Zhu Xi explicitly dismisses. In contrast, affirming reality requires grounding it in the subject’s intentionality and the relational scene of engagement. Zhu Xi’s dictum, “Without cheng, there is nothing”, redefines ontological inquiry: the question of an object’s reality arises only when the subject approaches it with chengjing. Absent this stance and its contextual scaffolding, the object’s reality is suspended—neither affirmed nor denied but rendered moot.

Constructive realism resolves apparent contradictions in Zhu Xi’s philosophy, particularly regarding religious practices. Statements that seem to clash with his naturalistic commitments are reinterpreted as ritually enacted realities rather than supernatural claims. By insisting that reality is co-constituted through engagement, Zhu Xi retains his naturalistic grounding while offering a framework that remains compelling even from a modern perspective.