Political Discourse and Theological Challenges of Korean Conservative Christianity

Abstract

This paper examines the political discourse of South Korean conservative Christianity, focusing on its alignment with far-right ideologies that undermine both democratic norms and the theological integrity of faith. Triggered by recent constitutional crises involving former President Suk-yeol Yoon, far-right Protestant groups have engaged in mobilisations marked by hate speech, disinformation, and theological politicisation. Drawing upon Heinrich Bedford-Strohm’s model of public theology, the study critiques this trend and argues for a reconfiguration of Christian public engagement toward justice, inclusion, and rational dialogue. It further explores the blurred boundaries between conservative and far-right Christian movements, the distortion of the public sphere, and the impact of digital misinformation. Ultimately, the paper proposes a theological and ethical roadmap for restoring the credibility of Christianity in South Korea’s pluralistic democracy.

1. Introduction

As South Korea approaches the year 2025, it is experiencing profound political and social turmoil. The declaration of martial law by former President Suk-yeol Yoon on 3 December 2024, has posed a fundamental threat to the democratic system, prompting ongoing legal and social responses. Yoon was removed from office by a unanimous decision of the Constitutional Court on 4 April 2025 and is undergoing criminal trial on charges of rebellion.1 This political crisis has exacerbated severe conflicts throughout South Korean society, particularly leading to sharp divisions within the Christian community.

The aftermath of this intense division has continued to ripple through Korean society even after the election results were announced, and the inauguration of new President Jae-myung Lee has not signaled a return to political normalcy. The presidential election, held on June 3 under extraordinary national crisis, was marked by escalating hatred and distrust, deepening skepticism about the prospects for social reconciliation. In particular, certain conservative Christian factions remain aligned with far-right politics and continue to engage in aggressive political intervention, further blurring the line between religion and politics.

Historically, Korean Christianity2 has been closely intertwined with politics. Since the opening up of the country, Christianity has disseminated modern thought, offering new ethical and political orientations for Korean society. During the Japanese occupation, it provided a critical intellectual and practical foundation for the independence movement. After liberation, Christianity deeply engaged with the political realm through cooperation with the Syng-man Rhee government, internalising anti-communism as a Christian value during the Korean War. Throughout the military dictatorship, it allied with the regime, reinforcing conservative political tendencies, and has maintained its status as a major political force in Korean society, upholding anti-communism and conservative values even after democratisation.

However, the recent political trajectory of Korean conservative Christianity is exhibiting a distinctly different aspect. While historical anti-communism has indeed served as a continuing factor in strengthening political conservatism within Christianity after democratisation, recent trends have revealed a more pronounced far-right inclination. In particular, extremist Christian factions have actively depended him during the impeachment trial, far-right Christian groups exerted violent pressure on judicial and constitutional institutions. They did so while simultaneously expressing intense hostility by labeling the Democratic Party and progressive politicians as ‘repeated communist’. This phenomenon transcends mere political differences, posing a risk of reducing Christian faith itself to a political tool.

The far-right shift in conservative Christianity possesses several defining characteristics. Firstly, conservative Christian leaders, particularly in megachurches, are actively engaging in political incitement. Sermons that support or oppose specific parties or politicians are frequently delivered from the church pulpit, often leading to a tendency to conflate faith with political stances. Secondly, the spread of fake news has reached a critical level. Political misinformation is rapidly disseminated through social media platforms such as YouTube and KakaoTalk3. Many Christians play a role in uncritically accepting and spreading such fake news. Consequently, within the Christian community, political polarisation has intensified, and the term “KakaoTalk church”, mocking Christians among non-Christians, has emerged.

There is a pressing need, then, for theological reflection on the public role of Korean Christianity. From the perspective of a public theology, Christianity should not represent the interests of specific political factions but rather fulfill its public responsibility in pursuing social justice and the common good. However, the behaviour of the current far-right Christianity in South Korea is far removed from these public theological principles. It rather threatens the foundations of democracy and results in the distortion of Christian faith into a tool of particular ideologies.

This study aims to examine critically the political actions of far-right Christianity4 from the perspective of public theology and propose an appropriate public role for Christianity. It will also illuminate the causes and dangers of recent Christian extremism and discuss potential alternatives offered by public theology. The key analytical framework of this study will be based on the characteristics of public theology as proposed by Heinrich Bedford-Strohm.5 The study seeks to articulate a theological direction that enables Christianity to fulfill its role in realising democracy, justice, and the common good in South Korean society.

2. The Public Role of Early Korean Christianity

Early Korean Christianity had a profoundly positive impact on the processes of social and political transformation. In 1885, the arrival of missionaries Henry Gerhard Appenzeller and Horace Grant Underwood marked the beginning of evangelistic activities in Korea. Alongside the proclamation of the Gospel, they established schools and hospitals, thereby stimulating and transforming traditional Korean society. From the outset, early Christianity proclaimed a mission to the people, engaging with those who were socially marginalised in the historical context of the Korean peninsula (National Council of Churches in Korea 2024, p. 42).

The modern medical institutions founded by Western missionaries had a multi-faceted impact on Korean society. These institutions provided free medical care to the impoverished, thus contributing to the universalisation of modern medical services. Notably, the educational efforts of the missionaries carried significant cultural implications. In a context where the use of the Korean language was devalued and Chinese was commonly used due to the influence of the ‘sadaejuui’,6 Christian educational institutions actively promoted Korean language education, contributing to the preservation and development of the national language. Furthermore, the establishment of Korea’s first school for the blind and the introduction of Braille education served as a challenge to the prevailing societal prejudices against individuals with disabilities. The activities of female medical missionaries also significantly impacted the advancement of women’s rights in Korea. Against a backdrop of extremely limited educational opportunities for women, the implementation of training programmes for female medical professionals presented new possibilities for women’s entry into professional fields and social participation.

Under Japanese colonial rule, Korean Christianity served as a crucial source of ideological and practical support for the independence movement by fostering democratic and nationalist values. The March 1st Movement, which began on 1 March 1919, was a nationwide campaign advocating for independence through non-violent peaceful protests, in which Christianity played a notable role. Among the 33 representatives of the national independence movement, 16 were Christians who played a pivotal role in drafting and distributing the Declaration of Independence.7 Influenced by their faith and a consciousness of human rights, they actively participated in the independence movement.

Christianity’s capacity to play a core role in the March 1st Movement can be attributed to its ability to effectively preserve institutional and network structures compared with other organisations during the Japanese colonial period (Yi 1991, p. 348). As a result of the March 1st Movement, Christianity was clearly recognised as a religion resisting Japanese imperialism and serving as a central axis of the national independence movement.

In this manner, early Korean Christianity can be viewed as fulfilling a public role by providing an ideological foundation and practical model for democracy and nationalism. According to Kwon-jung Kim, many Christian believers actively engaged in diverse practical movements under the awareness that issues within and outside their faith communities were closely connected to national, state, and social contexts. This background functioned as a fundamental factor in the simultaneous development of nationalist tendencies and democratic orientations within Korean Christianity. At the time, democracy was embraced as a reformist thought pursuing the values of freedom and equality for overcoming the feudal class system and achieving individual personhood. Meanwhile, nationalism solidified as an ideology aiming to establish sovereignty against foreign powers within the discourse of national revitalisation and restoration of rights. Consequently, “nationalist resistance” in the face of the suppression of national identity and uniqueness by colonial powers and “aspirations for democracy” in an environment where political and social rights were restricted became particularly strongly intertwined within the Christian community that maintained “relative autonomy”. This resulted in the concretisation of nationalist goals and values through democratic expressions, manifested in the extensive national and social movements of Christians (K.-j. Kim 2014, pp. 215–17).

The historical development of early Korean Christianity exhibits distinct characteristics compared with other non-Western countries. It is noteworthy that, unlike the perception of Christianity as a tool of Western imperialist invasion among indigenous peoples in Africa or South America, in Korea, Christianity functioned as a focal point for the nationalist movement opposing colonial rule. This historical specificity has positively influenced the formation of perceptions of Christianity in contemporary Korean society. Even non-Christians acknowledge the role of Christianity in nationalist movements and social reforms in Korea’s modern history, which has laid a foundation for forming a favourable attitude toward Christianity, regardless of the acceptance of religious beliefs.

3. The Rise and Risks of Far-Right Christianity

However, in contemporary Korean society, it has become increasingly difficult to observe such positive contributions from Christianity. In particular, the misconception that the actions of far-right Christian groups represent the entirety of Korean Christianity has further deteriorated the public perception of the faith. This is because the political activities of far-right Christianity have not promoted peace and unity but rather have provoked violence and division, exerting a profoundly negative impact on Korean society.

3.1. The Vigorous Public Square Politics of Far-Right Christianity

Thomas Grumke distinguishes far-right extremism from mere conservatism or traditional right-wing politics, defining it as a “counter-countermovement” (Gegengegenbewegung). That is, far-right ideology emerges in response to social transformation, perceiving the weakening and irreversible decline of established value systems. Yet, rather than adapting to such changes, far-right movements actively resist and vehemently oppose them. Grumke further argues that far-right extremism does not merely seek to preserve the traditional order; rather, it perceives social change as an existential threat and seeks to restore a past sociopolitical framework. This tendency is often coupled with authoritarian political ideologies, rejecting democratic pluralism and procedural consensus while advocating for strong, centralised leadership. Furthermore, far-right movements frequently frame themselves as the “victims of the existing social order”, constructing their legitimacy through conspiracy-driven narratives that depict particular groups, such as immigrants, LGBTQ+ communities, and leftist political factions, as forces seeking to dismantle society. When coupled with traditional religious beliefs, far-right extremism strategically mobilises religious doctrines for political purposes, theologising specific political actors or merging eschatological worldviews with sociopolitical anxieties to instigate societal unrest. According to Grumke, these characteristics indicate that far-right extremism transcends ideological conservatism, instead posing a substantial threat by exacerbating social polarisation and fostering political radicalisation (Backes and Grumke 2010).

Kwang-hoon Jun8’s rise to prominence is emblematic of the increasing radicalisation of far-right Christianity in South Korea. His discourse represents a fusion of religious fundamentalism and political extremism, characterised by strong anti-communist, anti-LGBTQ+, and Christian supremacist sentiments. His political activities extend beyond those of a conventional conservative religious leader, actively contributing to the ideological polarisation of South Korean society. The large-scale conservative rallies he has orchestrated exemplify the radical intertwining of religious convictions and political ideologies.

Since 2019, Jun has actively mobilised supporters through mass demonstrations, primarily held in Gwanghwamun Square.9 Jun’s rallies in this historically charged space have framed the progressive Jae-in Moon administration as a “leftist dictatorship”, demanding his impeachment. He has repeatedly accused Moon of being a “North Korean spy”, asserting that the administration was conspiring with North Korea to transform South Korea into a socialist state. Some prominent megachurch pastors actively encouraged their congregants to attend these protests, with some churches even arranging transportation to facilitate participation. In the aftermath of these rallies, far-right elements within conservative Christianity further intensified their radicalisation.

Jun’s rhetoric transcended mere opposition to the government, fostering closer alliances with specific political factions and accelerating the phenomenon of “politicised religion”. During the state of emergency, prominent figures from the ruling party were repeatedly observed attending mass religious rallies orchestrated by Jun, where denunciations of the opposition became a routine feature. These scenes have blurred the line between religious worship and political mobilisation, leading many to suspect a calculated attempt by political actors to harness religious authority for partisan purposes.

The response of far-right Christian groups to Yoon’s declaration of martial law on 3 December 2024, warrants significant attention. On 4 April 2025, Yoon was removed from office by a unanimous ruling of the Constitutional Court due to the unconstitutionality of his declaration of martial law. Furthermore, he became the first sitting president in South Korean history to be detained and investigated on charges of rebellion, marking an unprecedented and ignominious milestone. The live-streamed events of the declaration and its aftermath have left the South Korean public in a state of profound shock.

In response to Yoon’s impeachment and sedition charges, Kwang-hoon Jun and other far-right Christian leaders have vehemently opposed the legal proceedings. Jun has framed the impeachment as a “premeditated leftist conspiracy”, asserting that it constitutes an orchestrated effort to transition South Korea into a socialist state. He has warned that if Yoon is removed from office, power will fall into the hands of former President Jae-in Moon and opposition leader Jae-myung Lee, ultimately leading to the country’s communist takeover. Furthermore, Jun has depicted Yoon as a “God-ordained leader”, arguing that his impeachment is tantamount to defying divine will. Consequently, he has called for mass resistance against Yoon’s removal, mobilising large-scale protests and encouraging widespread participation in demonstrations against the impeachment. Jun’s Sarang Jeil Church and his political organisation, the National Revolution Party, have actively organised rallies opposing Yoon’s impeachment, further exacerbating tensions in an already polarised political climate.

The recent riot at the Seoul Western District Court starkly illustrates the increasing propensity for violence among far-right groups in South Korea. Following the issuance of an arrest warrant for Yoon, hundreds of his supporters engaged in illegal demonstrations near the courthouse. At approximately 3:10 a.m., these demonstrators, asserting their supposed right to resist, stormed and occupied the court, vandalising its facilities and even attempting arson. Reports indicate that they physically attacked police officers, civilians, and journalists. Notably, among the perpetrators was a special evangelist10 affiliated with Pastor Kwang-hoon Jun’s Sarang Jeil Church. As one of the rally’s key organisers, Jun played a significant role in inciting the protestors. He made inflammatory remarks urging demonstrators to invoke their right to resist, even suggesting that they forcibly enter Seoul Detention Centre to free the president. His rhetoric further intensified the emotional fervour of his followers, encouraging direct confrontation with state institutions. Following the Constitutional Court’s ruling on April 4 to uphold Yoon’s impeachment, Jun urged increased public mobilisation in Gwanghwamun to overturn the decision. During this campaign, he made an unsubstantiated claim that Yoon’s approval rating was nearing 70%, a figure that lacked empirical support.

While Jun has long been considered the representative figure of far-right Christianity in South Korea, a new leader, Pastor Hyun-bo Son of Segero Church in Busan, has recently emerged. Initially, He appeared to support Jun’s agenda, yet tensions arose between the two figures, culminating in open mutual criticism.11 He has since founded an organisation called Save Korea, conducting nationwide rallies in opposition to Yoon’s impeachment. These rallies feature speakers primarily drawn from far-right YouTubers and political figures. He has emphasised that God’s word must be placed “above the judiciary” and has incorporated extreme political rhetoric into his regular church services. In a particularly controversial moment, he reportedly led his congregation in chanting, “Jae-myung Lee must die for South Korea to live,” a statement that has shocked even members of the Christian community. Furthermore, far-right Christian groups have openly advocated rejecting the authority of the Constitutional Court should it uphold Yoon’s impeachment, effectively endorsing the disruption of constitutional order in the name of religious conviction.

Jin-ho Kim classifies the participants in far-right Christian demonstrations into four main groups: (J.-h. Kim 2017, pp. 79–87)

• Congregants Mobilised by Church Leaders—This category primarily consists of elderly churchgoers who participate passively due to their deference to religious authority. Their engagement in protests is largely a reflection of their obedience to their spiritual leaders;
• North Korean Defectors—Among the approximately 30,000 North Korean defectors residing in South Korea, a significant portion is affiliated with conservative, fundamentalist Christianity groups. These connections are often fostered through financial assistance, employment opportunities, and social networks provided by churches. Some defectors are also linked to far-right defector organisations and have been observed participating in protests as “paid demonstrators”;
• Religious Fanatics—This group traces its origins to the prayer mountain movements of the 1960s, characterised by mass religious mysticism. Following the decline of prayer mountain retreats in the 1990s, many adherents found themselves without a religious community, leading them to seek alternative spiritual affiliations. These individuals are highly active in street evangelism and the dissemination of far-right ideological narratives. Many have transitioned from the periphery of institutional churches to become core activists within far-right organisations;
• Far-Right Christian NGOs—While the exact size and membership of these organisations remain unclear, they have been closely associated with religious extremism. These groups frequently engage in virulent hate speech targeting LGBTQ+ individuals, Islam, and perceived ideological adversaries. Furthermore, they are known to propagate disinformation and conduct cyber warfare, leading online campaigns of extreme hostility against their ideological opponents.

Jong-Kyunn Park analytically reconstructs the phenomenon of far-right Christianity in contemporary South Korea as follows. The rise of far-right Christianity is closely related to the structural crisis faced by Korean Christianity. As a response to the “period of deprivation”, characterised by the reduction in institutional support from the state, a decline in social credibility, stagnation in church growth, and cultural and ideological challenges, far-right Christianity has strategically adopted extreme nationalism. This can be interpreted as an attempt to restore sociopolitical influence, particularly by reaffirming their values through an active discourse of hatred against others. This phenomenon can be defined as “religious-political nationalism”. The nationalist imagination of far-right Christianity defines South Korea as an essentially Christian nation and constructs a historical perspective in which South Korea succeeds Israel and the United States as archetypal theocratic states. The frequent use of the American and Israeli flags at their rallies does not merely imply a political statement but also a nationalist religiosity. In this context, far-right Christianity identifies itself as a chosen people, thereby justifying various forms of exclusionary discourse, such as anti-communism, anti-Islam, and anti-LGBTQ rhetoric. As a result, the religious and political imagination of far-right Christianity converges into nationalist ideology (Park 2021, pp. 42–43).

It remains questionable whether such extreme strategies can effectively halt the decline of Christianity or catalyse a genuine revival. On the contrary, the public has increasingly experienced psychological distress in response to these actions, which has contributed to the growing resentment toward Christianity in South Korean society.

3.2. The Ambiguous Distinction Between Far-Right and Conservative Christian Movements

It would be inaccurate to claim that far-right Christianity, which promotes violence and hatred, represents the entirety of conservative Christianity in South Korea. Numerically, far-right Christians constitute a minority, and the majority of conservative Christians do not actively participate in violent political agitation. However, the distinction between the two remains blurred, primarily because conservative Christianity has failed to clearly voice opposition to the actions of far-right groups. While many conservative Christians may not engage directly in such radical behaviour, they often appear to perceive the far-right movement as ultimately beneficial to their own cause. This tacit alignment is largely rooted in the deep-seated anti-communist sentiment prevalent among conservative Christians. They tend to share the far-right belief that, if the president is impeached and the Democratic Party gains power, South Korea may become ‘communised’ and religious freedom would be endangered. This fear is historically grounded in the longstanding conflict between Christianity and communism in Korea.

Immediately after liberation, various provincial committees for nation-building were organised by Christian leaders in North Korea to prepare for the establishment of a new state. However, as Christians began to be politically marginalised following the occupation of the northern region by Soviet forces, they responded by forming the Christian Social Democratic Party in Shinuiju in September 1945 and the Korean Democratic Party in Pyongyang in November 1945. The conflict between the North Korean communist forces and Christians became evident during the Shinuiju Student Incident in November 1945, which led to the arrest or migration of many Christian leaders. The “land reform” implemented in March 1946 inflicted significant economic damage on Christians, who were often small landowners and small businesspeople. This ideological and economic pressure triggered a mass migration of North Korean Christians, during which a strong anti-communist ideology emerged, becoming a core political orientation for the Christian migrants (Yoon 2018, p. 139).

Eun-Soon Yoon identifies these tendencies in the sermons of Pastor Kyung-jik Han and summarises his argument as follows. Prominent migrant pastor Han argued in a sermon in 1947 that the spiritual foundation of the new nation must be rooted in Christianity, emphasising its necessity for the establishment of a true democratic state. He believed that the core values of democracy—respect for individual dignity, personal freedom, and equality for all—were based on the Bible, asserting that democracy could only develop properly within the soil of Christian culture. He particularly highlighted that the operating procedures of the Presbytery and General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church were based on democratic principles, thereby emphasising that Christians were the only group to have received democratic political training. For him, the church and state were not separate domains; he believed that the construction of a new nation and the realisation of social ideals should take place through legitimate democratic procedures via the parliament. Amid concerns that social turmoil during the period of nation-building and the aftermath of war could provoke North Korean aggression, he prioritised the realisation of democracy and social stability. He posited that personal salvation and rebirth would lead to social transformation and reform, asserting the church’s central role in the construction of the new nation. In this context, Han rejected materialism and communism and expressed hope for the emergence of political leaders who revered God, presenting the United States—a nation that he described as “the most blessed and peaceful country in the world since its founding”—as a model for a Christian democratic state. This perception of America was widely shared among Christian migrants from the northwest region. Many viewed the United States as a Christian nation blessed by God, characterised by freedom and peace, equating their own escape from North Korea with the pursuit of religious liberty by the Puritans at the beginning of American history (Yoon 2018, pp. 143–47).

The outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950 played a decisive role in shaping anti-communism within the Korean Christian community, as the North Korean communist regime systematically persecuted Christians. During the period of North Korean occupation, Christian leaders became prime targets for special investigations, leading to the execution or abduction of numerous pastors and church leaders, as well as the destruction of many church facilities. These experiences of direct persecution served as a mechanism for forming structural and psychological anti-communist sentiments within the Christian community.

Throughout the Korean War and the ensuing Cold War period, a specific framework of perception emerged within the South Korean Christian community. According to Jin-kwan Kwon, this framework comprised three main elements: first, a theological discourse emphasising material prosperity and blessings; second, a tendency toward political conservatism; and third, a dichotomous worldview based on black-and-white reasoning. This mental structure served as a critical factor in defining the social position and role of Korean Christianity during the Cold War period (Kwon 2017, p. 12).

The Korean War was experienced by Korean Christians as an existential threat that transcended mere ideological conflict, serving as a historical turning point that elevated anti-communism within Korean Christianity to the level of religious doctrine. Subsequently, anti-communism became a core component of the identity of conservative Korean Christianity, and this historical context provides an essential analytical framework for understanding the political orientation of contemporary Korean Christianity.

One additional adversary commonly identified by both conservative and far-right Christians is ‘homosexuality’. There is a prevailing belief among these groups that, should the opposition party assume power, the legalisation of homosexuality would follow, thereby undermining their ability to critique it on theological grounds and ultimately impeding their capacity to proclaim what they understand as doctrinal truth. Through the presidential elections of 2002 and 2007, conservative Christian forces in South Korea became increasingly consolidated, forming a strong alliance with specific right-wing political parties. During the progressive Moo-hyun Roh administration (2003–2008), conservative Christians actively mobilised around issues such as anti-homosexuality campaigns and pro-American rhetoric in an effort to reestablish conservative political dominance. During this period, conservative Christian organisations sought to reinforce their ties with right-wing political forces by promoting agendas centred on opposition to homosexuality, anti-communism, and traditional family values. A prominent example of this political alignment was the 2007 presidential election, in which conservative Christian groups, including the CCK, strongly endorsed the right-wing candidate Myung-bak Lee. Following his election, the influence of conservative Christianity in politics expanded significantly under the Lee administration.

Recent large-scale Christian gatherings, especially those led by pastors exhibiting far-right tendencies, have been consistently marked by anti-homosexual rhetoric. This dynamic creates a setting in which even moderately conservative Christians feel compelled to attend, as abstaining from participation frequently results in their being stigmatised as ‘pro-homosexuality’.

3.3. YouTube as a Public Sphere and the Spread of Fake News

Most participants in far-right rallies acquire their information from YouTube channels hosted by far-right influencers. Yet, there is little to no critical engagement with the validity of this information. Even a cursory examination would suffice to expose the misinformation underlying many of these narratives, but such evaluative efforts are largely absent. Moreover, the algorithmic structure of YouTube contributes to the reinforcement of confirmation bias by continuously exposing users to ideologically homogeneous content.

A case in point is a well-known lecturer who frequently appears at far-right Christian rallies and claims that recent elections were fraudulent. He contends that the opposition party, in collaboration with the National Election Commission, tampered with electronic ballot counting machines to manipulate the vote tallies and change the election outcome. Based on this allegation, he calls for a complete manual recount. However, South Korea already employs manual counting for both early and general ballots. When confronted with this fact, he modified his narrative, asserting that only early ballots are subject to electronic counting—a claim that is equally inaccurate. Nevertheless, he remains a prominent figure in far-right Christian public events, continuing to disseminate misinformation.

These forms of misinformation are predominantly disseminated through KakaoTalk, a popular messaging application in South Korea. The scale and velocity of information circulation via online messengers far exceed those of previous communication modes. Given that messengers and social networking services are rapidly supplanting offline public spheres, a rigorous examination of their socio-political implications is now indispensable.

Jürgen Habermas introduced the concept of the “public sphere” in his seminal work, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962). He defines the public sphere as a space where citizens freely gather to discuss public issues and form rational opinions, considering it a core element of democracy. According to Habermas, the public sphere must be open to all, allowing free participation and discussions within it should be logical and based on evidence. Moreover, it must remain independent of state power and capital influence, with the opinions formed within it contributing to policymaking and democratic progress. He analysed 18th-century European coffeehouses and salons as early forms of the public sphere, where citizens engaged in discussions based on newspapers and political pamphlets, shaping social agendas. However, he later criticised the commercialisation of the modern public sphere, arguing that its original function had been weakened by distortions caused by state and corporate power (Habermas 1989).

In this context, YouTube has the potential to function as a new digital public sphere. Unlike traditional media, YouTube facilitates the production and dissemination of political discourse through a decentralised and interactive format. The widespread adoption of smartphones and the normalisation of video content consumption have further reinforced its influence as a platform for political discussion. However, when compared with Habermas’s ideal conditions for a public sphere, YouTube simultaneously fulfills and distorts its intended role.

As an open-access platform, YouTube allows users to produce and consume information freely, contributing to the diversification of political discourse. It also provides opportunities for citizens to express their political opinions directly and serves as a counterbalance to mainstream media coverage. In the South Korean context, where distrust in traditional media has been increasing, YouTube has emerged as an alternative source of information.12

Despite its role in diversifying public discourse, YouTube also poses significant challenges to the integrity of the public sphere. The platform’s algorithm-driven recommendation system fosters the “filter bubble” phenomenon, which confines users to specific political perspectives and selective information. Eli Pariser describes the filter bubble phenomenon, stating that “the Internet is like a reflective funhouse mirror, showing us only what we want to see”. He warns that “personalised algorithms manipulate our information environment, gradually trapping us in an increasingly narrow world of information”. According to him, such filtering “prevents us from encountering unexpected information, challenging ideas, and diverse perspectives”. Furthermore, he emphasises that “democracy functions properly when citizens are exposed to a variety of viewpoints and share common facts, but the filter bubble undermines this foundation and intensifies social polarisation”. Ultimately, Pariser cautions that “rather than broadening our world, the Internet is creating an informational bubble that isolates us”, stressing the need for algorithmic transparency and greater diversity in information exposure (Pariser 2011).

The commercial operation of YouTube is increasingly distorting the functionality of the public sphere. Operating on an advertising revenue model, YouTube prioritises content with high view counts, creating an environment conducive to the dissemination of sensational material and conspiracy theories over in-depth, logical discussions. This has led to an increase in cases where corporations or political entities manipulate public opinion through YouTube channels. Particularly in the 2020s, YouTube has been utilised as a direct communication platform for politicians, enabling them to engage with voters without the mediation of traditional media. This shift has established a new form of political communication; however, concerns have been raised regarding the potential lack of professional verification and critical analysis of political statements.

While YouTube performs certain functions of the public sphere by providing an open space and diversity of information, the pervasive influence of commercial algorithms and irrational discourse strongly distorts these functions. YouTube plays a crucial role in shaping political discourse but is burdened by structural issues that facilitate opinion manipulation and information distortion. For the democratic public sphere to function effectively, enhanced algorithm transparency, measures to combat fake news, and digital media literacy education are essential. Thus, YouTube holds the potential to function as a public sphere in Korean society, yet its current state is significantly limited in fulfilling the ideals of the public sphere as presented by Habermas.

KakaoTalk, the most widely used mobile messenger in South Korea, serves as a primary channel for sharing news and information. However, concerns are growing that KakaoTalk is also acting as a conduit for the spread of fake news and disinformation. Particularly in relation to political and religious issues, it has been used to reinforce confirmation bias, exacerbating conflicts within Korean society. Notably, there has been a discernible trend among elderly users to indiscriminately share political and social misinformation through KakaoTalk (E.-j. Kim 2019, pp. 188–239). This phenomenon is similarly manifested within faith communities. The private messaging format of KakaoTalk complicates the public verification of facts, as seen with platforms like Facebook or YouTube. Consequently, misinformation grounded in specific religious and political beliefs proliferates without being filtered.

Importantly, the tendency to share unverified YouTube videos through KakaoTalk, thereby spreading misinformation and fostering hatred toward certain targets, is not confined to extreme right-wing Christians but is also observed among ordinary conservative Christians. The underlying reasons for this phenomenon can be traced to a lack of media literacy combined with a distorted integration of religious beliefs. These individuals often lack critical thinking skills necessary to discern the veracity of information and tend to perceive the indiscriminate spread of such information as an essential religious practice for safeguarding Christian identity and faith. This can be interpreted as a scenario in which religious beliefs overshadow rational judgment processes related to information verification.

The spread of fake news through KakaoTalk is negatively impacting Korean Christianity. First, there is a decline in the social trustworthiness of Christianity. As fake news spreads repeatedly by Christians, the general public increasingly perceives Christianity as an irrational and biased group. This behaviour has led to derogatory terms like ‘Kakao church’ being used to mock Christianity. Particularly among younger populations, skepticism toward news related to Christianity circulating on KakaoTalk is growing, leading to a decline in the church’s credibility. Second, there is an intensification of divisions within Christianity. Serious conflicts are arising between congregants who disseminate fake news and those who criticise it, weakening the cohesion of church communities.

4. Public Theology as a Framework for Christian Engagement in a Pluralistic Society

Due to the extreme and overtly political actions of the far-right Christian groups, public criticism of Christianity has intensified, and significant internal conflict has emerged within the Christian community itself. On one side, some argue that Christianity should refrain from overt political involvement. On the other hand, there are those who emphasise that it is the Christian’s duty to actively engage in politics to transform South Korea into a nation governed by God. Advocates of the latter view often invoke figures such as Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Abraham Kuyper as theological models to support their position. Some even appear to suggest that recent Christian rallies organised by Kwang-hoon Jun and Hyun-bo Son may serve as examples of public theology in practice, as these gatherings seek to express and implement religious convictions within the public sphere of contemporary Korean society.

Accordingly, this article aims to explore public theology as a viable framework for Christian engagement in contemporary Korean society. Given its emphasis on rational discourse and democratic values, public theology is especially well-suited to pluralistic contexts. Rather than pursuing revolutionary change through violence, it promotes constructive social contribution through reasoned dialogue and persuasive communication.

4.1. Christian Witness in a Pluralistic Society: Moving Beyond Exclusion and Hatred Toward Inclusion and Love

Contemporary South Korea is not a Christian society but a pluralistic society in which diverse religions and worldviews coexist. In such a context, for Christianity to fulfill its true public role, it must shift away from a defensive stance focused solely on preserving its own beliefs and instead embrace its mission as a religion that fosters peace within a pluralistic society. This necessitates an approach centred on understanding and dialogue rather than exclusion and on love and action rather than hatred.

The frames of anti-communism and homosexuality act as black holes within Korean Christianity, absorbing all agendas. The extent of the conservative Christian community’s strong aversion to communism and homosexuality can be gauged through the recent presidential election. During the 2022 presidential election, candidate Suk-yeol Yoon gained support from conservative Christians by receiving prayers of anointment from various megachurch pastors. However, he was also embroiled in controversy over his connections to shamanistic beliefs, with ongoing allegations regarding his ties to specific shaman figures throughout the election process. Additionally, significant illegal circumstances involving his spouse, Geon-hee Kim, and her mother were revealed. Despite this, the conservative Christian faction strongly supported Yoon for several reasons. First, his fierce attacks on the Democratic Party and candidate Jae-myung Lee highlighted his anti-communist stance, leading conservative Christians to perceive him as the candidate capable of protecting South Korea from communism. Second, there was an expectation that Yoon would support conservative Christian positions on key issues such as opposition to anti-discrimination laws and the anti-homosexual movement. Third, despite the controversy surrounding his shamanistic beliefs, conservative Christian groups coalesced in support of his candidacy, adhering to the rationale that he was a preferable alternative to a left-wing administration. Rather than being driven by Yoon’s strengths or positive attributes, conservative Christianity support for his candidacy was largely a reactionary stance, shaped by opposition to Jae-myung Lee and negative perceptions of his leadership. Traditionally, Korean conservative Christianity tends to vote for candidates from conservative parties rather than evaluate an individual candidate’s abilities.

Another indication of this phenomenon is the frequent use of the term “Pro-north Korean gay [Jongbuk gay]”. According to Jie Sung Lee, this phrase, employed by far-right Christians, serves as a derogatory expression for both pro-North Korea and homosexuals. It illustrates a process by which traditionally hated subjects categorised as “pinko” in Korean society have now evolved into a new form by merging seemingly unrelated conservative ideologies. Even when the conceptual targets can be distinctly differentiated, at the moment they combine, the concept of “‘Pro-north Korean gay” is formed, rendering its essence ambiguous while simultaneously amplifying the disgust and fear toward it. This process reinforces negative perceptions of specific social groups and generates an unclear logic that threatens social order, thereby effectively mobilising emotions and ideologically excluding others (Lee 2018, p. 226).

The frames of anti-communism and homosexuality are being exploited as powerful rhetorical weapons by far-right Christians amid the highly polarised conflict surrounding the presidential impeachment. For conservative Christians, communism is viewed as a system that suppresses religious freedom, while homosexuality is seen as a threat to biblical family structures. While it is understandable that such perceptions can lead to a rejection of certain groups, can the essence of Christian faith justify exclusion and hatred?

The Bible declares that all humans are created in the image of God (Imago Dei) (Genesis 1:27), emphasising that every human possesses equal dignity. The fundamental principle of Christian ethics is to practice love and justice, and excluding or hating specific groups fundamentally contradicts these biblical teachings. The ministry of Jesus Christ was characterised by solidarity with the marginalised and socially vulnerable, demonstrating that God’s love is not confined to a specific group through his associations with tax collectors, prostitutes, and Samaritans, who were society’s outcasts (Luke 19:1–10; John 4:7–26). This ministry suggests that the Christian community should invite rather than exclude those who exist outside social boundaries. However, the hostile attitude of far-right Christians toward specific social groups stands in stark opposition to this faith tradition and cannot be theologically justified. From a theological standpoint, attitudes of hatred and exclusion are not merely personal sentiments; they are problems that distort the values of the Kingdom of God and the essence of the Gospel. The mission of Christianity is to realise reconciliation and peace in the world (2 Corinthians 5:18), and the church must actively engage in this public role. However, a hate-filled attitude toward certain groups not only distorts the church’s role politically and ideologically but it also weakens the liberating message inherent in Christianity. Therefore, the Christian community must undergo rigorous reflection on hate-filled attitudes that distort the essence of faith and restore a faith perspective that respects the dignity of all humans. This is not merely an issue of value judgment but a critical theological task for Christianity to establish itself as a trusted religion within society.

South Korea is not a Christian society but rather a pluralistic one. In such a context, how many citizens would genuinely sympathise with a Christian stance that overtly expresses hatred or exclusion toward individuals simply because their beliefs do not align with Christian doctrine? Such an attitude is likely to alienate even more members of society. To maintain a constructive and mature relationship with civil society, Christianity must pay close attention to the three principles proposed by Robert Wuthnow. First, Christians should be willing to participate actively in public discourse, either as individual citizens or as representatives of their respective communities, especially in discussions concerning shared social concerns. Second, they must acknowledge that when such engagement occurs in a civic and respectful manner, it can contribute positively to the democratic process. Third, in the context of public discourse, Christians should clearly support core democratic values such as civility, the prohibition of personal attacks, the protection of religious freedom, and adherence to democratic procedures (Wuthnow 1996, p. 68).

The phenomenon of selective moral critique among far-right Christian groups in South Korea is a subject worthy of critical analysis. Traditionally, the church has adopted an inclusive stance even toward individuals who have committed serious crimes such as murder, robbery, adultery, or embezzlement. The long-standing Christian practice has been to accept these individuals as members of Christianity and support their spiritual growth. However, this inclusive attitude is conspicuously absent when it comes to communists (or socialists) and LGBTQ+ individuals, a discrepancy that appears to stem more from political and cultural biases than from theological principles. A particularly noteworthy aspect of this phenomenon is the nature of the actual threats facing contemporary Korean Christianity. While moral lapses such as adultery, sexual misconduct, and embezzlement within the church have significantly undermined its credibility and influence, criticisms of these internal issues remain relatively muted. In contrast, critiques of communism and homosexuality are disproportionately emphasised. The psychological mechanism behind this selective critique can be understood through the concept of “moral distancing”. That is, while individuals may recognise that they themselves could be potential perpetrators of sexual abuse or financial crimes, communism and homosexuality are perceived as problems belonging to the “other”, thereby becoming targets of intensified criticism and exclusion. This phenomenon exemplifies the arbitrary and selective application of moral standards, rather than the consistent and universal application of Christian ethics.

When exclusion and hatred toward specific groups become socially legitimised, they create a dangerous precedent for the justification of physical violence. The recent riot at the Seoul Western District Court can be understood within this broader framework. The act of storming a courthouse is not merely a form of protest or political expression but constitutes a serious criminal offence aimed at undermining the constitutional order of the state. However, certain extremist factions operate under the belief that violence can be justified in the name of opposing communism, a perspective that poses a direct threat to the fundamental principles of democracy and the rule of law. Notably, among those who participated in or defended the riot, some Christians justified their actions as a means of upholding biblical values and protecting their faith. Historically, such tendencies have emerged when religious fundamentalism converges with political extremism, a combination that has often led to violence and authoritarianism. However, such attitudes are fundamentally at odds with biblical teachings. In the Gospels, Jesus Christ explicitly rejects violence, instead emphasising love for one’s enemies and the pursuit of peace as central to Christian identity (Matt. 5:44; John 18:36). Thus, the justification of violence under the pretext of faith contradicts biblical values and Christian ethical principles, representing a critical issue that the church must address. The church must underscore that faith should be upheld not through acts of violence but through peaceful dialogue and the practice of social responsibility. To prevent the spread of such extremist ideologies within Christianity, it is imperative to strengthen theological reflection and education. Particularly in a democratic society such as contemporary South Korea, it is unacceptable for Christianity to engage in or condone unlawful acts of violence. The church must remain steadfast in its commitment to peace and justice, ensuring that its faith tradition does not become a vehicle for political extremism or social division.

4.2. Reasoned Discourse in Public Deliberation

The role of the public theologian is to articulate how the Christian faith may contribute to public life and the common good, employing methods and discourse that are intelligible and open to evaluation by all members of society. Through this approach, the theologian seeks to encourage both Christians and non-Christians to act responsibly in the public sphere (Breitenberg 2003, p. 66). When such an approach is adopted, it may prompt atheists and adherents of other faiths to reconsider the assumption that theology is inherently irrational and therefore unworthy of serious attention. Ultimately, public theology seeks to emphasise the values of the Christian tradition in ways that are intelligible to all participants in today’s pluralistic public sphere. As Bedford-Strohm rightly stresses, biblical sources must not be used as ‘conversation stoppers’. That is, biblical themes should not be introduced into public discourse in their raw form, without providing adequate explanation of their philosophical and ethical validity (Bedford-Strohm 2018c, p. 17). Public theology requires a form of theological bilingualism: the capacity to express, in secular and accessible terms, how the Christian tradition can provide valuable guidance to all people of goodwill, and to demonstrate its rationality through both logical argumentation and experiential evidence (Bedford-Strohm 2012b, pp. 57–58). This approach enables Christians to engage in cooperative efforts not only with civil society actors but also with diverse social groups (Bedford-Strohm 2018a, p. 149), thereby affirming that faith and reason are not in opposition but are instead mutually reinforcing dimensions of public engagement (Bedford-Strohm 2018b, p. 177).

By refusing to engage in rational deliberation and by deploying unmediated religious language in the public sphere, far-right activism undermines the ethos of public theology. Jun’s Gwanghwamun rallies typify this tendency, as they conflate religious worship with political mobilisation. Although the gatherings include Christians and non-Christians alike, Jun frequently appeals to divine authority and, on occasion, solicits offerings during the events. This mode of political-religious expression stands in direct opposition to the public theological vision of inclusive, rational, and ethically grounded civic engagement.

In The Far Right Today, Cas Mudde analyses how contemporary far-right movements utilise media and social networking services (SNSs) to propagate their discourse within democratic systems. He argues that far-right actors construct their ideological foundation upon anti-elitism, authoritarianism, and exclusionary nationalism, employing misinformation, conspiracy theories, and mass mobilisation strategies to disseminate their views to the public (Mudde 2019). Far-right Christianity in South Korea similarly employs SNS and alternative media platforms, such as YouTube and KakaoTalk, to disseminate misinformation, including fake news about Chinese interference in elections and preferential economic treatment for Chinese nationals. These narratives align closely with Mudde’s characterisation of far-right discourse, particularly in its emphasis on exclusionary nationalism and xenophobia.

Christian communities must cultivate a discerning approach to information. Scripture teaches “Examine everything carefully; hold fast to that which is good” (1 Thess. 5:21), a principle that has become increasingly relevant in the digital age. In an era saturated with misinformation and conspiracy theories, believers must rigorously assess the authenticity and intent of any information before accepting or sharing it. This is not merely a matter of responsible information consumption but is directly tied to the Christian community’s ethical obligation to pursue truth and justice. In a sociopolitical environment where unethical actors deliberately spread fake news for political gain, critical thinking and information verification constitute an essential ethical responsibility for Christians.

4.3. Providing Political Direction

The ability of public theology to provide political direction is not merely an optional function but constitutes a central aspect of the Gospel itself and lies at the heart of the church’s mission (Smit 2017, p. 82). The pluralistic society in which we live is often directionless, and as such, is in constant search of orientation.13 When rooted in the knowledge and wisdom derived from Scripture and the theological tradition, Christians are equipped to engage in and contribute to public deliberations—alongside civil society and political actors—on the path society should pursue (Bedford-Strohm 2018e, p. 107). The church must distinguish itself from other political interest groups operating in the political sphere, and its political actions should be recognised as spiritually grounded expressions of the Gospel, even without the overt proclamation of Jesus’ name (Bedford-Strohm 2018d, p. 18).

Public theology, insofar as it is not a direct expression of faith, should be differentiated from homiletic proclamation, which serves as the public witness of the faith community (Dreyer 2018, p. 1). Caution must be taken to distinguish public theology from political theology, which tends to conceive of the ‘political order’ as the primary framework through which society is structured and interpreted, often subordinating religion under this political system (Stackhouse 2008, pp. 83–87). Public theology demonstrates, more clearly than political theology, that the witness of the Gospel within the political realm can never be simply reduced to any particular political programme (Bedford-Strohm 2018d, p. 21). Thus, instead of intervening directly in political affairs, public theology aspires to shape political choices indirectly by providing normative ethical frameworks through which decisions can be evaluated and informed.

Given these circumstances, the role and responsibility of pastors are of paramount importance. Pastors exert a profound influence on the values and behavioural patterns of their congregants, and their messages from the pulpit carry significant authority and credibility. Thus, they must refrain from exploiting their spiritual authority to propagate unverified information or from politicising the church by endorsing specific political positions. Additionally, pastors must avoid using extreme rhetoric or hostile language that theologically legitimises particular political ideologies. Such discourse risks exacerbating unnecessary divisions within the Christian community while undermining both the church’s publicity and the integrity of the gospel message. Aggressive rhetoric and inflammatory discourse targeting specific political ideologies or individuals do not serve to guide believers toward spiritual maturity; rather, they incite anger and hostility, ultimately fragmenting the Christian community. Therefore, pastors must approach political issues with discernment through a biblical lens while remaining vigilant to ensure that the church does not become a mouthpiece for any political faction. As Rowan Williams asserts, the church should not seek to directly shape public policy or impose the gospel onto the public sphere; rather, it should indirectly communicate the vision of Christian faith through a God-centred communal life (Williams 2012). The church must always recognise that, while it is called to provide ethical guidance, it is not a political party advocating for specific policy agendas. Instead, it should serve as a platform for social responsibility, engaging with local communities and stakeholders to develop strategies that benefit all members of society. The church’s role is not to pursue political power but to bear witness to God’s love for all of creation (Bedford-Strohm 2018d, pp. 18–19). As the public role of the church becomes increasingly significant in contemporary society, Christian communities must remain vigilant against the proliferation of misinformation and extremist discourse. Instead, they must actively pursue faith-based practices rooted in love, justice, and truth.

Pastors and congregants from Kosin, one of South Korea’s major conservative Presbyterian denominations, have recently begun to publicly criticise Hyun-bo Son, a fellow pastor affiliated with their denomination, for his far-right political stance. They argue that Son’s extremism has damaged the historical legacy of Korean Protestantism, which had once contributed to national independence and democratisation, and have formally requested disciplinary action against him. These critics further contend that today’s far-right Christianity demonises its opponents, divides society into enemies and allies, and instrumentalises faith as a tool of fascist political agitation—practices which, they argue, Korean Christianity must unequivocally reject. Prominent pastors and theologians within conservative evangelism have also begun voicing concerns about the far-right radicalisation of Korean Christianity. Their efforts are significant, as they offer a critical alternative for how centrist conservative Christians can distance themselves from the far-right and respond in principled and constructive ways.

5. Conclusions

In contemporary South Korean society, the political engagement of conservative Christianity has moved beyond mere social advocacy to a concerning entanglement with far-right ideologies and tactics. While Christianity historically played a vital role in Korea’s democratisation and anti-colonial resistance, the current trajectory, marked by ideological extremism and political mobilisation, reflects a distortion of that legacy. The far-right Christian movement’s response to the constitutional crisis surrounding former President Yoon illustrates a dangerous fusion of faith with populist aggression, undermining the foundational principles of democratic discourse, procedural legitimacy, and peaceful conflict resolution.

The theological implications of this phenomenon are deeply troubling. By mobilising religious language to justify hostility against political opponents, sexual minorities, and perceived ideological threats, far-right Christian leaders have deviated from the core tenets of the Gospel—love, justice, and compassion. This study critiques such movements through the framework of public theology, particularly the model articulated by Heinrich Bedford-Strohm, which emphasises rational, inclusive dialogue over religious absolutism in public life.

Public theology demands that Christian witness in pluralistic societies be translated into ethical principles that are intelligible and persuasive beyond the church. It resists the reduction in faith to partisan rhetoric and instead seeks to contribute to democratic discourse through a shared commitment to the common good. This approach not only affirms the legitimacy of faith in public life but also establishes boundaries that protect democratic processes from theological manipulation.

The current silence or tacit complicity of many within the conservative Christian camp further aggravates the situation. While numerically marginal, the far-right Christian movement has succeeded in shaping public perceptions of Christianity, largely due to the failure of mainstream religious leaders to denounce extremism. This absence of critical internal reflection undermines the credibility of the Christian faith and fosters an environment of unchecked ideological radicalisation.

Moreover, the proliferation of misinformation via digital platforms such as YouTube and KakaoTalk plays a central role in reinforcing conspiracy theories and divisive rhetoric within Christian communities. This paper emphasises the urgent need for digital literacy, theological integrity, and critical engagement with media sources, highlighting the ethical responsibility of faith communities to resist the spread of disinformation and the instrumentalisation of religious belief for political ends.

Ultimately, Korean conservative Christianity must undergo a thorough re-evaluation of its theological identity and public role. Rather than aligning with exclusionary politics and apocalyptic rhetoric, the church must reclaim its prophetic vocation as a voice for justice, reconciliation, and peace. Public theology provides a compelling paradigm for this transformation, equipping Christians to act not as agents of division but as partners in building a just and inclusive society.

At this historical juncture, Korean Christianity faces a critical choice: continue down a path of ideological co-optation and diminishing public trust or return to a theological vision grounded in the Gospel’s call to love, truth, and communal responsibility. The future of Christianity’s relevance in Korea may well depend on its willingness to embrace the latter path.