1. Introduction
In the classical tafsīr tradition, only a limited number of exegetes referred to the Bible. It was previously assumed that only al-Biqā
ʿī had made use of the Bible. Walid Saleh argued that al-Biqā
ʿī’s method represented an innovation within the tradition, and that the whole tafsīr tradition had avoided this approach (
W. A. Saleh 2008, p. 23;
W. Saleh 2007, pp. 331, 333). Yousef Casewit, likewise, mentions only Ibn Barrajān (d. 536/1142), al-Daylamī (d. 593/1197), and al-Biqāʿī (d. 885/1480) as exegetes who engaged with the Bible (
Casewit 2017, p. 249). However, the publication of Yūsuf b. Hilāl al-Ṣafadī’s (d. 696/1296) tafsīr has revealed that he, too, made use of the Bible. Given that his approach differs from the general tafsīr tradition and exhibits certain original aspects in comparison to the aforementioned exegetes, his work deserves to be studied independently. Al-Ṣafadī, whose primary profession was medicine, was originally from Aleppo and lived in the Safad region of Palestine for a period of time. He commenced writing his tafsīr,
Kashf al-asrār wa hatk al-astār, in Damascus in 665/1267 and completed the manuscript of the tafsīr in 669/1271. However, a protracted process of revision ensued, and al-Ṣafadī ultimately relocated to Cairo in 686/1287 to finalize his tafsīr by utilizing the tafsīr sources available there (
al-Ṣafadī 2019, vol. 4, p. 654).
This article explores how al-Ṣafadī refers to the Bible, the contexts in which he employs it, the methodological framework underlying this engagement, and the original aspects that differentiate him from other exegetes. It seeks to assess whether al-Ṣafadī’s use of the Bible constitutes an original method within the classical exegetical tradition, and whether he carries out intertextual comparisons through a systematic and conscious interpretive strategy. In this context, “intertextual comparison” does not refer to a poststructuralist or purely literary-theoretical approach; rather, it denotes a theological and exegetical comparison between the Qurʾān and the Bible. The article adopts a descriptive and comparative methodology in analyzing al-Ṣafadī’s approach to the Bible. First, the descriptive method will be used to identify al-Ṣafadī’s methodological approach and interpretations; subsequently, the comparative method will be applied to determine the original aspects of his approach.
In order to demonstrate the originality of al-Ṣafadī’s approach to the Bible, three key dimensions will be taken into consideration. (1) Formal originality concerns the way al-Ṣafadī cites the Bible, the frequency of his references, and the contexts in which those references occur. (2) Methodological originality is structured around five subcategories: (a) in tafsīr, the necessity and epistemological value of the Bible, (b) its direct and systematic use, (c) the methodological purposes/types for which it is employed, (d) the reconciliation of differences between the two scriptures, and (e) the way the Bible itself is interpreted. (3) Interpretive originality refers to al-Ṣafadī’s distinctive interpretations of certain verses or narratives in the Qur
ʾān by referring to the Bible. In
Section 6 of the article, these dimensions will be used as criteria in comparative analyses with other exegetes to assess the extent of originality in al-Ṣafadī’s tafsīr. The findings presented in
Section 2,
Section 3,
Section 4 and
Section 5 will provide the necessary groundwork for identifying the formal, methodological, and interpretive aspects of originality in his exegetical work.
The analysis will concentrate on his Biblical references, since his references to non-Biblical sources are limited. In a few instances, he narrates Isrāʾīliyyāt traditions, mentioning the name of the first narrator or using the phrase “qīla” (
al-Ṣafadī 2019, vol. 1, pp. 155, 200; vol. 2, p. 121; vol. 3, pp. 42, 79; vol. 4, pp. 538, 557). He is also known to cite Jewish scholars (fī kalāmi ḥukamāʾihim-ẕakara ʿulamāʾuhum) (
al-Ṣafadī 2019, vol. 1, pp. 135, 282–83). In certain instances, he also cites information from written sources other than the canonical texts (fī kutubi banī isrāʾīl) (
al-Ṣafadī 2019, vol. 1, p. 285; vol. 2, p. 299). It is noteworthy that he provides information about Jewish history and tribes without referencing any specific source (
al-Ṣafadī 2019, vol. 3, p. 119). One of the challenges of the article is the comparison of al-Ṣafadī’s biblical references with the currently available versions of the Bible. As will be noted later, al-Ṣafadī may have used different versions of the Bible. Since the exact texts he used are unknown—and even if they were known, they would be difficult to access—it does not appear possible to verify the accuracy of his references.
A number of academic studies have been conducted on al-Ṣafadī’s exegesis method, including doctoral-level research and article-level studies on his use of the Bible. In both dissertations, al-Ṣafadī’s relationship with the Bible has been presented in a superficial and descriptive manner. They have not placed significant emphasis on the relationship between his approach to the Bible and the general theory of exegesis. Furthermore, there has been a lack of comparison with other exegetes to highlight his originality (
Adam 2021, pp. 115–26;
Yürekli 2023, pp. 79–85). In the article titled “Manhaju Jamāl al-Dīn al-Ṣafadī fī al-ta
ʿāmul ma
ʿa al-Tawrāt wa al-Injīl fī tafsīrihī
Kashf al-Asrār wa Hatk al-Astār”, which focuses directly on this issue, al-Ṣafadī’s life, the concept and definition of Isrā
ʾīliyyāt are mentioned, and al-Ṣafadī’s biblical narrations are evaluated within the scope of Isrā
ʾīliyyāt (
Farījāt and Shiṭnāwī 2022, pp. 1049–54). Then, al-Ṣafadī’s use of the Bible and his intentions are revealed through examples. The information here is presented almost entirely in a descriptive manner (
Farījāt and Shiṭnāwī 2022, pp. 1054–68). The article does not delve into al-Ṣafadī’s notable remarks concerning the distinctions between the Bible and the Qur
ʾān, nor does it address his unique interpretations of specific biblical narratives. Additionally, a lack of comparison between al-Ṣafadī’s approach and that of other prominent commentators, such as Ibn Barrajān, al-Daylamī, and al-Biqā
ʿī, is evident. However, a fruitful avenue for illuminating his distinctiveness lies in a comparative analysis with other commentators. In this study, al-Ṣafadī’s approach to the Bible will first be identified, and a comparative analysis with other exegetes will subsequently be conducted.
3. Al-Ṣafadī’s Interpretation of the Bible
One of the most striking aspects of al-Ṣafadī’s tafsīr is that he occasionally interprets certain narratives from the Bible. These interpretations show that al-Ṣafadī did not merely instrumentalize the Bible within the context of tafsīr, but rather approached it from a broader perspective, revealing the various dimensions of his engagement with the text. The examples in the previous section were primarily concerned with the interpretation of Qurʾānic verses through the use of data from the Bible. The examples to be presented here, however, relate to al-Ṣafadī’s direct interpretation of certain narratives and information found in the Bible. All four of the following examples offer sufficient variety to demonstrate how al-Ṣafadī interprets the Bible and to provide insight into his overall method.
The first example deals with the question of whether God resembles His creation, as reflected in verses from the Qur
ʾān and the Torah. While the Qur
ʾān states “There is no likeness to Him” (al-Shūrā 42/11), the Torah asserts that Adam was created in the image of God. Before examining al-Ṣafadī’s interpretations of the expressions in the Torah, it is necessary to first consider how he interprets the aforementioned Qur
ʾānic verse. Al-Ṣafadī states that the pronoun in the verse refers to God, and interprets the word “likeness” (
مِثْل) as resemblance in essence, attributes, and actions. Although nothing resembles God in His essence, creatures resemble Him in certain attributes and actions. This is because God possesses all the attributes found in creation, which results in a degree of similarity between God and His creation in some aspects of attributes and actions. On the other hand, there are also attributes and actions unique to God that do not exist in creation. The verse means that there is nothing like God in terms of His essence and His exclusive attributes and actions. (
al-Ṣafadī 2019, vol. 4, pp. 13–15).
According to al-Ṣafadī, the statement in the Torah that Adam was created in the image of God must also be understood in this context. This statement appears in three places in the Torah: before, after and during creation. Before creation, “God said: Let us create Adam in our image, in our likeness” (
قال الله نصنع آدم بصورتنا كشبهنا) (Genesis 1/26), and during creation, “Allāh created Adam in His own image” (
وبَرَأَ الله آدم بصورته) (Genesis 1/27). Al-Ṣafadī states that the meanings of the words “image” (
صُورَة) and “likeness” (
شِبْه) are not very clear here, and in order to eliminate any ambiguity, the same meaning is repeated in different words in the following situation after creation: “On that day Allāh created Adam like His attribute” (
يوم برأ الله آدم كصفة الله) (Genesis 5/1). The explicit use of the word “attribute” (
صِفَة) here determines the meaning of the words “image” (
صُورَة) and “likeness” (
شِبْه) in the previous statements. In other words, Allāh did not create Adam in the likeness of His essence, but in the likeness of some of His attributes (
al-Ṣafadī 2019, vol. 4, pp. 16–17, 21). Accordingly, as the Qur
ʾān states, nothing can be similar to Allāh’s essence, while His creatures can have some similar attributes. In this context, it is understood that al-Ṣafadī both analyzes the discrepancy between the Qur
ʾān and the Torah and interprets the statements in the Torah in a way that is compatible with the Qur
ʾān.
The second example is as follows: al-Ṣafadī claims that the Jews also misunderstood the prohibition of interest. In the context of the verse “The Jews took interest even though it was forbidden to them…” (al-Nisā
ʾ 4/161), he states that this is written in the Torah: “You may take interest from a stranger, but not from your brother.” (Deut. 23:20) According to al-Ṣafadī’s interpretation, at the time of the commandment, there was no one who served God except the Children of Israel. The blood of the infidels was lawful for the Children of Israel, and their property was also lawful for them. Over time, the Jews have restricted the term “brothers” in this commandment to themselves alone, excluding Christians and Muslims, thinking that it is permissible to take interest from them. Yet, due to the genealogical bond resulting from the brotherhood of Ishmael and Isaac, Christians and Muslims are the brothers of the Jews (
al-Ṣafadī 2019, vol. 1, p. 563).
The third example is as follows: al-Ṣafadī relates the verse that contains Abraham’s supplication, “My Lord, grant me [a child] from among the righteous!” (al-Ṣāffāt 37/100), to certain narratives in the Torah. He draws attention to the moral lessons and wisdom in the information he transmits. He mentions that in Egypt, Abraham introduced his wife as his sister and that Pharaoh first took her and then released her (cf. Genesis 12/10–20). He also mentions a similar incident with Abimelech, king of the Philistines. Abraham introduced his wife to Abimelech as his sister, and he took Sarah to the palace, but by a sign of God, he did not touch her and handed her over to Abraham (cf. Genesis 20/1–18).
Al-Ṣafadī goes on to mention a similar incident that happened to Isaac. Isaac introduced his wife Rebekah to the Philistines as his sister, but somehow Abimelech realized that Rebekah was his wife and ordered the people not to approach her (cf. Genesis 26/1–11). Al-Ṣafadī goes on to mention the rape of Dina, the daughter of Jacob. The son of the king of Palestine rapes Dina. The king’s son wants to marry Dina, but Dina’s brothers demand that she and all the Palestinians be circumcised. Although everyone is circumcised, Dina’s brothers slaughter all the Philistines (cf. Genesis 34/1–31). Al-Ṣafadī says that the Torah also tells the story of Judah, one of Jacob’s sons, sleeping with his own bride (cf. Genesis 38/1–18), Joseph’s narrative with Zulayha, and Lot’s story of sleeping with his own daughters (cf. Genesis 19/30–38), and then makes the following assessment:
Understand the warning and think: How many examples are given and how clearly explained! Remember that even the kings of the heathen did not tolerate this act, and those who committed it were destroyed, both themselves and their entire male progeny. Understand the wisdom to be drawn from each story, and I have not elaborated on these details, because they are all meant to warn against this lust. And this warning is only due to the fact that lust is the source of existence. Whoever is able to abandon this lust is able to abandon existence. When this body acts in accordance with the divine command, it becomes the field where light is born and flourishes, and when it acts otherwise, it becomes the domain of Iblis. Since the prophets know this better than others, their inclination towards bodily pleasures is not for the sake of the body, but for the wisdom for which the body was created. This is why Abraham did not aim to merely enjoy his wife, but to fulfill Allāh’s wisdom in creating a wife. Allāh has taught us through the story of Ibrahim’s monotheism, emigration, and the purpose of his relationship with his wife that the emigrant is not only one who leaves his homeland, but also one who leaves his lusts, even if they are lawful. That is why Ibrahim prayed, “Give me a son from the righteous!”.
Al-Ṣafadī points out that these stories are narrated after the story of Adam in the Torah and that there is a common theme between the incident of lust in the story of Adam and the other stories. According to him, the tree that Adam and Eve were forbidden to approach was a tree that informed them about lust.
The final example that can be mentioned in this section is al-Ṣafadī’s interpretation of the tree of knowledge and the tree of life in the Torah. Al-Ṣafadī argues that the Qur
ʾān mentions a single tree, while the Torah mentions two trees, and that these two trees are in fact one tree. According to him, the Torah is actually talking about one tree. The tree of knowledge and the tree of life represent different aspects of the same tree (
al-Ṣafadī 2019, vol. 1, p. 114). According to the narrative in the Torah, God created in Paradise the tree of life and the tree of knowledge, which contains the knowledge of good and evil, and forbade Adam and his wife to approach the tree of knowledge. After they ate from it, God said, “Adam has become like one of us in the knowledge of good and evil. He should no longer be allowed to reach out to the tree of life and take its fruit, eat from it and become immortal” (Genesis 2/9, 17; 3/22). In the Qur
ʾān, on the other hand, only “tree” is mentioned, and only in one place is it called the tree of eternity (Ṭāhā 20/120).
According to al-Ṣafadī, all things in Paradise, including the tree of life, were lawful for Adam. The only exception was the tree of knowledge, which contained the knowledge of good and evil and was explicitly forbidden to eat from. When Adam ate from the tree of knowledge, through it he had the knowledge to recognize the tree of life, because it represented good. The fruit Adam ate from the tree of knowledge was the knowledge of evil. With this knowledge, he attained the knowledge of good. Adam’s returning to his knowledge that was contrary to God’s command, i.e., doing what was forbidden to him, represents the forbidden tree and Adam rebelled for this reason. On the contrary, Adam’s turning away from the knowledge of eating from the forbidden tree, as shown by his own will and intellect, and turning directly to the commandment, that is, the knowledge of not eating, represents the tree of life. In this case, the tree in question is a single tree. If one refrains from eating from it in obedience to the command, it becomes the Tree of Life. However, if one disobeys and eats from it, it becomes the tree of death, the forbidden tree that contains the knowledge of evil. Because Adam turned away from Allāh’s command and turned to his own knowledge, to what seemed better to him, he was brought down to the earth and became spiritually dead. However, if he abandons this knowledge and obeys the command, he will return to life (
al-Ṣafadī 2019, vol. 1, pp. 113–14).
Al-Ṣafadī also interprets the passage in the Torah where the tree of life is mentioned as a separate tree in this framework. In the Torah, it is said “Adam became like one of us in knowing good and evil. He should no longer be allowed to reach out to the tree of life and take its fruit and eat it and become immortal. (So the Lord) placed a flaming sword that turns every which way to guard the path of the tree of life.” (Genesis 3/23–24). On the surface, this statement implies that the tree of knowledge and the tree of life are separate trees. After Adam had eaten from the tree of knowledge, he was asked not to eat from the tree of life. However, since al-Ṣafadī thinks that they are one tree, this statement, i.e., the protection of the tree of life with a flaming sword, means that the person who wants to reach it can only do so by going through the same process. In other words, Allāh assigned some angels to guard the path of the tree of life so that Adam would not gain eternal life by eating from it contrary to the command. Because eternal life can only be attained by acting in accordance with the commandment (
al-Ṣafadī 2019, vol. 1, pp. 113–14).
1As in other examples, al-Ṣafadī interprets the Torah’s information on the forbidden tree, knowledge, and the tree of life. This interpretation places him in a unique position in the tradition of Torah exegesis. Most Torah commentators recognize that these are two separate trees and provide information about their physical characteristics (
Ibn Ezra 1988, pp. 67–68;
Neusner 1985, vol. 1, pp. 165–67;
Sarna 1989, p. 18;
Farsi 2010, vol. 1, pp. 17, 25). Others have made different interpretations based on the statement that these two trees were “in the middle or center of the garden” (Genesis 2/9). The fact that both trees are in the center of the garden raises the question of which tree is in the center. For this reason, some Torah commentators found it difficult to explain how the two trees could be in the exact same place and put forward different views. In response to this concern, Rabbi Moses ben Nahman (d. 669/1270) stated that the two trees were side by side in the center of the garden. Rabbenu Bahya ben Asher (d. 741/1340) interpreted the trees as two branches emerging from a common trunk in the center of the garden. Rabbenu Asher ben Yehiel (Rosh) (d. 727/1327) argued that the tree of life is surrounded by the tree of knowledge, so that both trees stand together in the center of the garden, one within the other (
Becker 2013, p. 2). Apart from these, R. Joseph Kimhi of South France (5th/11th century), known for his exegetical works on the Tanakh, offers an alternative interpretation. According to him, both trees stood in the same place because they were actually one and the same tree (
Becker 2013, p. 2, ff.). In the modern period, Westermann lists several scholarly studies that argue the two trees were, in fact, one and the same (
Westermann 1987, pp. 211–12).
4. Al-Ṣafadī’s Reconciliation of the Differences Between the Two Texts
When al-Ṣafadī reads the Qurʾān together with the Bible, he compares the narratives in both and tries to analyze them by pointing out the discrepancies or differences between them. This will be illustrated with three key examples that best reflect the approach.
The first example is as follows: al-Ṣafadī highlights the difference between the verse “(Moses) said, ‘My Lord, show Yourself to me so that I may look at You.’ He said, ‘You will never see Me.’” (al-A
ʿrāf 7/143) and the Torah’s account. According to his translation from the Torah, “Moses, Aaron, Nadab, Abihu and seventy elders saw the God of Israel. Under His feet was a floor like a white agate stone, clear as the clearness of the sky. They looked at Him, ate and drank” (Exodus 24/9–11). Al-Ṣafadī points out the difference between the narratives of the two texts, and notes that the Torah also says, “Man cannot see me and survive (by seeing) me” (Exodus 33/20). According to him, the Qur
ʾān makes this second statement. However, the problem that still needs to be solved is that God is mentioned to be seen in one place and not seen in another. According to al-Ṣafadī, the answer to this is as follows: The servant is incapable of seeing God as God, but it is possible for the servant to see God in terms of being a servant. If Allāh appears to the servant in terms of being Himself, the servant cannot see Him in his humanity and cannot live by seeing Him. For this to be possible, he must leave the state of humanity. However, the servant can see Allāh with an image appropriate to the state of humanity (
al-Ṣafadī 2019, vol. 2, p. 213).
The second example concerns the tablets that were given to Moses and contained the commandments of God. Al-Ṣafadī also draws attention to the difference between the plural form of the word “tablets” in the verse “We wrote for him on the tablets…” (al-A
ʿrāf 7/145) and the fact that Moses was given only two tablets in the Torah. The first time Moses was given the tablet and the second time he was given them after he became angry with his people and broke them, two tablets are always mentioned (Exodus 31/18; 32/15–16; 34/1). According to al-Ṣafadī, since the Qur
ʾān’s main purpose is to express that the tablets were given and that they contained advice, the details of how many times the tablets were given and how many of them were given are not mentioned. The Qur
ʾān only states that “tablets” were given. However, according to al-Ṣafadī, this plural usage is not contrary to the information in the Torah. For each side of the tablets is called a tablet, so that the two tablets given to Moses actually mean four tablets. This is also a plural number (
al-Ṣafadī 2019, vol. 2, p. 214).
As a final example, al-Ṣafadī’s interpretation of the verse “(We gave) good news of Isaac to his (Abraham’s) wife” (Hūd 11/71) may be cited. Al-Ṣafadī states that according to the Torah, the good news of a child was originally given to Abraham, whereas in the Qur
ʾān it is given to Sarah, and that the two are inconsistent. He then points out that there are two narratives in the Torah. According to this, the good news was given to Abraham first, and Sarah heard it from behind the door and laughed. Hearing her laughter, the Lord then addressed Sarah and gave her the good news, saying, “I will return next year and you will have a son” (cf. Genesis 10, 14–15). According to al-Ṣafadī, the good news given to Sarah in the Qur
ʾān is not the first good news, but the second after the good news given to Abraham. Al-Ṣafadī claims that he has never seen anyone resolve this contradiction before him (
al-Ṣafadī 2019, vol. 2, p. 396). In this context, he says the following about the explanation of the differences between the Qur
ʾān and the Bible: “It is not necessary to make such explanations everywhere” (
al-Ṣafadī 2019, vol. 2, pp. 395–96). This statement means that al-Ṣafadī did not consider it necessary to systematically follow and analyze the differences or contradictions between the Qur
ʾān and the Bible. Al-Ṣafadī compares the two texts and seeks to reconcile them, whether or not there is an explicit difference or contradiction between them (
al-Ṣafadī 2019, vol. 2, pp. 121, 126, 136–37, 282, 428, 587; vol. 3, pp. 273, 534).
In the previous sections (
Section 2,
Section 3 and
Section 4), the question of how al-Ṣafadī engages with the Bible has been addressed by following a descriptive method. The (1) formal aspects of his approach have been identified. Within the (2) methodological framework, the following points have been demonstrated: (c) the purposes/types for which he uses the Bible, (d) his reconciliation of the differences between the two texts, and (e) the way he interprets the Bible. His references to the Bible also indicate (b) the systematic nature of these references and (a) his view that the Bible is a valuable source for tafsīr. All of these points have been confirmed through (3) interpretive examples drawn from al-Ṣafadī’s tafsīr.
5. Evaluation of al-Ṣafadī’s Approach to the Bible
This section will examine the relationship between al-Ṣafadī’s approach to the Bible and the general theory of tafsīr, including whether he viewed a necessary connection between the Qurʾān and the Bible. The significance of the approach outlined in the previous sections will be assessed, and it will be compared with the classical exegetical tradition.
To begin with, attention may be drawn to al-Ṣafadī’s preference for the Bible over Isrā
ʾīliyyāt reports. In particular, with regard to narratives related to the history of the People of the Book, al-Ṣafadī, with only a few exceptions, avoids the systematic use of Isrā
ʾīliyyāt found in the classical tafsīr tradition. Although he does not explicitly state the reason for this preference, it may be explained by the fact that the People of the Book regard the Bible as a canonical source. This choice may also reflect a broader skepticism toward the reliability of Isrā
ʾīliyyāt reports found in tafsīr literature. Indeed, although mufassirūn have taken these reports into account since the early period, they have often acknowledged their questionable authenticity (
Büyük 2019, pp. 774–78).
A more significant reason, however, may lie in al-Ṣafadī’s attribution of greater authority to the Bible compared to Isrā
ʾīliyyāt. He likewise assigns a high level of epistemic authority to the Qur
ʾān itself as a source of tafsīr. In his view, the Qur
ʾān’s capacity to interpret itself carries far greater weight. For this reason, al-Ṣafadī generally avoids relying on transmitted reports in tafsīr, particularly Isrā
ʾīliyyāt (
Büyük 2020, p. 53). From his perspective, both the Qur
ʾān and the Bible possess a higher degree of authority than other sources of information.
Within this framework, two questions are of particular importance: First, if both sacred texts possess authority according to al-Ṣafadī, is there a hierarchy of authority between them? Second, what is the nature of the relationship between these two texts? According to al-Ṣafadī, one of the relationships between the Qur
ʾān and the Bible is the relationship between the majmal–mufaṣṣal (summarized–elaborated). The Qur
ʾān may summarize (ijmāl) certain details mentioned in the Bible for various purposes. Al-Ṣafadī does not see this as unilateral; on the contrary, sometimes, the Qur
ʾān elaborates (tafṣīl) on the information that the Bible presents in a summarized form (ijmāl) (
al-Ṣafadī 2019, vol. 1, pp. 126, 136–37; vol. 3, pp. 364–65). The summary–detail relationship that al-Ṣafadī establishes between the Qur
ʾān and the Bible constitutes the primary reason for his use of biblical material in the interpretation of certain verses. Al-Ṣafadī explicitly states both that the Bible has a function of tafsīr and istishhād in relation to the Qur
ʾān, and that the Qur
ʾān possesses the highest level of authority. He puts it as follows:
You should know that any knowledge that is not found in the Book of Allāh, but is found in the previous holy books… falls into one of two situations: Either there is a statement in the Qurʾān that clearly contradicts it, or there is no statement in the Qurʾān that contradicts it, even if there is no identical statement to Qurʾān. In the latter case [i.e., not contradicting the Qurʾān], we accept that knowledge and act upon it. But if the Qurʾān contains something contrary to it, then we act on the knowledge that is in the Qurʾān. And the other one, if it cannot be abandoned intellectually or by tradition, we interpret it. Of course, this is only valid after we understand the Qurʾān properly. …because the Qurʾān is the guide and the leader. This advice is especially addressed to those who are capable of deep thinking, such as the mujtahids.
We should know that it is not permissible to subordinate the Qurʾān to the Torah, for Allāh has said: “Verily, we have sent down the Zikr (the Qurʾān) and We are its guardian” (al-Ḥijr, 15/9). On the other hand, it is said about the Torah: “They were asked to guard what was entrusted to them from the Book of Allāh.” (al-Māʾidah, 5/44). There is a difference between “guarded” and “asked to guard.” Therefore, those provisions of the Torah that are in accordance with the Qurʾān are those that the Qurʾān confirms and can be used as evidence or explanation. However, those that are contrary to the Qurʾān are considered to have either been abrogated, altered, or otherwise lost their validity.
In both quotations, al-Ṣafadī accepts that the Bible can be quoted for various purposes and that it can serve as a source for exegesis. The only condition for this is that the information contained therein must not contradict the Qur
ʾān and that the Qur
ʾān must be accepted as authoritative. He bases this on the fact that the Qur
ʾān is protected by Allāh Himself, while the Bible has no such guarantee. But is this approach compatible with al-Ṣafadī’s general theory of exegesis? As a previous study has shown, al-Ṣafadī assigns a central position to the Qur
ʾān itself as a source of tafsīr (
Büyük 2020, p. 46, ff.). In the introduction of his tafsīr, he states: “I have exegeted the Qur
ʾān with the Qur
ʾān, because I could not find anything lacking in it, so that I could complete it with something other than the Qur
ʾān itself” (
al-Ṣafadī 2019, vol. 1, p. 37). In another context, al-Ṣafadī emphasizes that the Qur
ʾān is sufficient for anyone who carefully reflects on the meanings of its words. When facing a problematic issue, he advises seeking out another verse that may provide clarification. He also notes that one part of the Qur
ʾān explains another, and that the best method for understanding the Qur
ʾān is to interpret it in light of itself (
al-Ṣafadī 2019, vol. 1, pp. 262, 264; vol. 2, pp. 443–44; vol. 3, p. 549). These statements, according to him, indicate that only the Qur
ʾān itself should be taken as the basis in tafsīr. In that case, how can al-Ṣafadī’s approach be explained, where he places the Qur
ʾān at the center of exegesis and affirms the possibility of drawing on the Bible, and even puts this into practice?
Two possibilities may be considered as an answer to this question. First, his attribution of a central value to the Qur
ʾān in tafsīr is an exaggeration and not absolute. As a confirmation of this possibility, it can be said that al-Ṣafadī acknowledged the role of the Sunnah, in addition to the Qur
ʾān, in explaining the Qur
ʾān (
Büyük 2020, pp. 49–53). Al-Ṣafadī’s citations from the Bible made for exegetical purposes also support this view. However, the second possibility is also valid: according to al-Ṣafadī, although the Bible has a function of explanation and elaboration with regard to the Qur
ʾān, this relationship between the two sacred texts is not obligatory. In other words, the relevant Qur
ʾānic verses can be understood without referring to the Bible. All of al-Ṣafadī’s citations can be considered as additional evidence or elaboration of meaning. In this case, the understanding of the Qur
ʾān does not necessarily depend on the Bible. Al-Ṣafadī’s general exegetical tendency and the examples he provides appear to support this view. For instance, after interpreting the verse concerning the command to slaughter a cow given to the Israelites in light of the Torah, al-Ṣafadī remarks that there is no need to know the details of the story (al-Ṣafadī 2019, vol. 1, p. 135). Al-Ṣafadī also quotes an opinion that there is no need to know the type of tree forbidden to Adam, which he finds beautiful/appropriate (
al-Ṣafadī 2019, vol. 1, p. 111).
However, there are a few examples that suggest that the tafsīr–tafṣīl relationship between the two texts is obligatory. One of these is verse Ṭāḥā 20/89. It is unclear whether the “statement” in this verse belongs to Allāh—i.e., whether it is a parenthetical remark inserted by God into the dialogue—or whether it narrates the words spoken by the people at that time. Al-Ṣafadī interpreted it as the word of the interlocutors and said: “I understood this only after I had read and understood the Torah, the Gospel, the Psalms and the Qur
ʾān, after I had learned and comprehended the language of the Torah in a sound manner and understood what it and the other prophets had said in the holy books” (
al-Ṣafadī 2019, vol. 3, p. 114). This statement of his indicates a tight relationship between the Bible and the Qur
ʾān in terms of interpretation.
The fact that al-Ṣafadī’s general tendency in exegesis is not to attribute a decisive and central role to the Bible requires that the above examples be considered exceptional. Al-Ṣafadī’s view that the Qur
ʾān is the primary source is also consistent with his views on the corruption of the Bible. Al-Ṣafadī thinks that some parts of Torah have been preserved intact, some of its meanings have been distorted by Jewish scholars (taḥrīf), and some of its words have been removed from the text (tabdīl), and that the Torah is incomplete, especially in terms of tabdīl (
al-Ṣafadī 2019, vol. 1, pp. 141–42). Al-Ṣafadī’s view aligns with the position held by some Muslim scholars regarding the alteration (taḥrīf) of the Torah. While some scholars maintain that the wording of the Torah has been preserved but its meaning distorted, others believe that both its wording and meaning have been altered in certain parts (
Adang 1996, p. 251, ff.). It is also emphasized in contemporary research that parts of the Old Testament have undergone changes and that its original form has not been entirely preserved (
Tov 2001, pp. 166–67, ff.).
While explaining the differences between the Qur
ʾān and the Torah, al-Ṣafadī occasionally mentions that the Torah has been modified (
al-Ṣafadī 2019, vol. 1, p. 134; vol. 2, p. 587). The fact that he knows this and expresses it clearly requires that he does not attribute a mandatory value to the Bible in exegesis. For it would be a clear contradiction to ascribe such a value to it and at the same time say that it had been corrupted. Nevertheless, there are examples of al-Ṣafadī’s occasional disregard of this point. For example, in the context of verse 148 of al-Baqarah, which states that every nation has a direction to which it turns its face, al-Ṣafadī argues that there is no commandment in the Torah regarding the qiblah for the Jews and that the Qur
ʾānic commandment regarding the qiblah privileges Muslims (
al-Ṣafadī 2019, vol. 1, p. 194). According to him, the fact that part of the Torah has not survived does not allow him to make such an interpretation.
Briefly, al-Ṣafadī acknowledges that the Bible has been altered. Nevertheless, he uses the absence of the qiblah command in the Bible as evidence of the superiority of Muslims. He also maintains that the Bible is not necessary for tafsīr. However, he states that some verses can only be correctly understood by reading it. This suggests that there is not a complete consistency between al-Ṣafadī’s theoretical assumptions and his exegetical practice.
As demonstrated in the examples provided in the previous sections (
Section 3 and
Section 4), it is significant that al-Ṣafadī explains (tafsīr) certain Qur
ʾānic verses with reference to the Bible, that he interprets on some of the Bible’s narratives, and even attempts to reconcile the Bible with the Qur
ʾān. He adopts this approach despite acknowledging that the Bible has been altered (taḥrīf). One would not expect someone who acknowledges its distortion to use it for exegetical purposes, interpret it, or seek harmony between it and the Qur
ʾān. Indeed, the dominant stance within the classical tafsīr tradition toward the Bible has generally reflected this expectation. In contrast, al-Ṣafadī’s direct engagement with the Bible may be interpreted as an effort to establish common ground with Jews and Christians and to cultivate a more sustainable dialogue. Furthermore, his interpretive approach to the Bible and his effort to reconcile it with the Qur
ʾān suggest that he is not entirely governed by the dominant, rigid concept of taḥrīf, and that he may even be attempting to soften or reinterpret that view. His approach—interpreting the Bible and reconciling it with the Qur
ʾān—ultimately contributes to elevating the Bible’s authority both within tafsīr tradition and Muslim scholarly circles.
Al-Ṣafadī’s views, as identified, share some similarities with the tafsīr tradition, but also exhibit distinctive elements. For instance, al-Ṣafadī’s view that “there is no need for Isrā
ʾīliyyāt or the Bible in tafsīr, as the Qur
ʾān is sufficient on its own” reflects a position that has been known since the very early period of tafsīr (
Büyük 2023, p. 79;
2019, pp. 776–78). Similarly, his view that information from Isrā
ʾīliyyāt or the Bible that contradicts the Qur
ʾān must be rejected, while information that is neutral—i.e., about which the Qur
ʾān remains silent, neither affirming nor rejecting it—may be used, is also a well-established position in the history of tafsīr. Earlier than al-Ṣafadī, Ibn al-ʿArabī (d. 543/1148) uses the word “düstūr” (rule) to refer to the exegesis of narratives with Isrā
ʾīliyyāt, saying: “That which is in accord with the Qur
ʾān is authentic. That which is contrary to it is false. Those about which there is no information in the Qur
ʾān are probable” (
İbn al-ʿArabī 2002, vol. 3, p. 265). Al-Ṣafadī’s use of the Bible for purposes/types such as tafsīr, tafṣīl, istishhād, and targhīb-tarhīb mirrors the ways in which Isrā
ʾīliyyāt were employed in classical tafsīr. Given that similar approaches existed earlier (
Büyük 2019, pp. 773–74), his method aligns with the tafsīr tradition. Namely, when viewed in terms of (c) the types of use of the Bible identified in sub-criteria of (2) methodological originality, it is not possible to speak of any originality in al-Ṣafadī’s approach.
The other sub-criteria of methodological originality, namely in tafsīr, (a) the necessity of the Bible, (b) its direct and systematic use, (d) the reconciliation of differences between the two texts, and (e) the interpretation of the Bible itself are not found in traditional tafsīr. In these respects, al-Ṣafadī departs from the exegetical tradition. While classical exegetes made use of Isrā
ʾīliyyāt, al-Ṣafadī does not rely on such reports; instead, he directly refers to the Bible and systematically cites it. In several contexts, he interprets the Bible itself and attempts to reconcile the differences between the two scriptures. From the perspective of (3) interpretive originality, many of al-Ṣafadī’s interpretations based on the Bible are also original. For example, as quoted above, while he interprets the plaintiffs who came to David with the narrative of Uriah, prominent classical commentators such as al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944), al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067), Ibn ʿAtiyya (d. 541/1147), and al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) reject this interpretation as contrary to the doctrine of ‘ismat al-anbiyā’ (
al-Māturīdī 2007, vol. 12, p. 233;
al-Ṭūsī n.d., vol. 8, p. 554;
İbn ʿAtiyya 2001, vol. 4, p. 499;
al-Rāzī 1981, vol. 26, p. 189). According to this doctrine, prophets cannot commit sins. Since David is considered a prophet, he cannot have acted immorally.
If al-Ṣafadī’s position vis-à-vis classical exegetes is as described, does his approach exhibit originality when compared to other exegetes who also directly used the Bible?