Psychedelic Churches Need Philosophy of Religion
Round 1
Reviewer 1 Report
Comments and Suggestions for AuthorsThe authors approach psychedelic religion/spirituality via a philosophical framework. That is: ideas, beliefs, thoughts, concepts, and words. However, entheogenic religion is best experienced and understood not as a system of thoughts/ideas but as personal subjective, primary religious experiences. Doctrines are derived from experiences, secondary phenomena.
See Ellens, JH Ed. Seeking the Sacred with Psychoactive Substances, Vol. 1, Chapter 1.
The literature on mysticism is more apt than the cognitive bias of philosophy.
A discussion of Plato and psychedelics needs go recognize that Plato was an psychedelic initiate in the Eleusinian Mysteries. In Google, search Plato psychedelics.
Cite: Richards, William. 2016. Sacred Knowledge, Columbia Uni Press. for, perhaps, the most thorough discussion of psychedelics and religion.
Author Response
Reviewer 1
I thank this Reviewer for these suggestions, which I have done.
Comment 1: The authors approach psychedelic religion/spirituality via a philosophical framework. That is: ideas, beliefs, thoughts, concepts, and words. However, entheogenic religion is best experienced and understood not as a system of thoughts/ideas but as personal subjective, primary religious experiences. Doctrines are derived from experiences, secondary phenomena.
See Ellens, JH Ed. Seeking the Sacred with Psychoactive Substances, Vol. 1, Chapter 1.
The literature on mysticism is more apt than the cognitive bias of philosophy.
Response 1: This is a good point, but here I am dealing with the law (the Meyers Test), which does require a philosophical framework. I added this note in the last para of section 1:
“It may be objected that psychedelic religions are primarily experiential; hence philosophical frameworks are at best irrelevant and may be distorting. However, the law, as articulated in the first three Meyers factors (see Section 2), requires those experiences to be situated in some philosophical framework.”
Comment 2: A discussion of Plato and psychedelics needs go recognize that Plato was an psychedelic initiate in the Eleusinian Mysteries. In Google, search Plato psychedelics.
Response 2: I agree with the Reviewer on these points. Of course, I’m sure the Reviewer is aware that most scholars are still pretty skeptical about these points. I added this note after sentence 1 of para 1 of section 5:
“It seems likely that Plato was initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries (Bremmer, 2017). And there is increasing evidence that psychedelics were used in those mysteries (Stang, 2024). These points suggest that psychedelic experiences are at the very root of Platonism. However, scholars have not reached any final consensus on these points.
Comment 3: Cite: Richards, William. 2016. Sacred Knowledge, Columbia Uni Press. for, perhaps, the most thorough discussion of psychedelics and religion.
Response 3: I apologize for not citing this – it’s a classic work! And for any Platonist, Richard’s work is crucial. I rewrote para 1 in section 5:
Interpretations of psychedelic experiences and practices often turn to Platonism (e.g. Pahnke & Richards, 1966; Luck, 2000; Shipley, 2015; Sjöstedt-Hughes, 2023; van der Braak, 2023). [Note on Eleusinian mysteries added here; see Response 2] Shanon indicates that the worldview inspired by taking ayahuasca closely resembles the Neoplatonic metaphysics of Plotinus (2010: 269). And Richards shows how psychedelics can lead to immersive experiences of Platonic metaphysics (2015: chs. 4 & 14). I aim to show here that Platonism, in a suitably modernized form, can satisfy the six criteria for religious legitimacy. Hence a modernized Platonism can support a psychedelic doctrine which satisfies the Meyers Test and related case law.
Reviewer 2 Report
Comments and Suggestions for AuthorsCool paper, cool idea, very ambitious. And lots of interesting points along the way. I think it’s on the way to being publishable, but there are several problems, some of which are easier to address than others. Here are the main ones:
- You say, “Here I focus on new psychedelic churches, that is, psychedelic churches which have not yet gained legal permission to use psychedelics. Some of these new psychedelic churches are emerging within established religions (like Christianity, Judaism, and Buddhism).” You then gloss the last sentence in this excerpt in a footnote: “Christianity has the Christian Psychedelic Society (ligare.org). Judaism has the Shefa organization (shefaflow.org). Buddhism has the Psychedelic Sangha (psychedelicsangha.org).” But Ligare and Shefa are not churches in any sense, let alone the legal sense. Given that this is a paper about legal definitions bearing on the mitigation of potential penal repercussions, it is especially crucial to correct this error. I can’t speak to this issue in relation to Psychedelic Sangha, but I’d double-check that too.
- You appeal to Tillich’s notion of “ultimate concern” in specifying what makes a metaphysical belief-system count as religious, but you don’t explain what you understand him to mean by this term apart from, “your ultimate purpose for living, your ultimate goal or end,” which is largely an exchange of approximate synonyms. Necessary here is a discussion of excerpts from Tillich to show you’re talking about the same thing he is, since it seems like you aren’t: At one point, he makes a distinction between religion as ultimate concern and “the narrower and customary sense of the word, be it institutional religion or the religion of personal piety […] in myth, cult, devotion, and ecclesiastical institutions.” Then, he says the reason the latter exists is “because of the tragic estrangement of man’s spiritual life from its own ground and depth.” But you’re specifying that psychedelic churches need a philosophy that, among other things, arises from “some historical religion” and has a set of attending practices. If that’s what you mean by religion, that’s not Tillich’s ultimate concern; it’s the thing he says arose because of our “tragic estrangement.”
- You raise “ontological shock” from psychedelic experiences as an ethical problem and therefore a religious problem. But giving up a false and harmful worldview might also lead to ontological shock; it’s not clear that catalyzing such change would thereby be immoral. Pointing this out would save you the trouble of arguing that Platonism (or whatever) still counts as moral and therefore religious because it doesn’t cause ontological shock by conflicting with modern science, a case I didn’t find convincing anyway.
- You say, “it is beside the point to defend any version of Platonism here. It is not my intention to convince you that any Platonism is true.” But earlier, you said that, to be ethical, a religion can’t lead to comforting delusions and must, therefore, demonstrate it’s not doing so in employing psychedelics. But if a religion is proffering modern Platotism and the latter is false, then the religion is leading to a [perhaps comforting] delusion in a different way. That means the truth of Platonism is not “beside the point” here.
- You say, “But if theurgy includes the ritual use of plant substances, and if theurgical rituals induce hallucinatory visions, then the category of theurgy includes the use of plant-derived psychedelics.” This is only true if the plant is what’s causing the vision. The argument you’ve given here is not technically valid, since it’s possible that they’re having visions because of drumming, dancing, sleep deprivation, fasting, a full moon—whatever—and just happen to be using aromatic plants because they smell nice or remind theurgists of the afterlife. Since you, afterwards, cite several authors who also link theurgy and psychedelics, it might serve you better if you simply summarized their reasonings (assuming they’re not likewise invalid).
- You say, “The art of using physical symbols in rituals, as ladders to ascend to the deities (and ultimately to the Good), was known as theurgy.” And later: “Psychedelics are symbols of the deities. Hence theurgy requires the use of psychedelics. Psychedelics are not illegitimate shortcuts; on the contrary, they are necessary ladders.” This is only true if there are no non-psychedelic symbols of the deities. Perhaps you meant to imply this (I don’t see it explicitly stated anywhere), but, either way, it would need an argument since it’s far from obvious.
- You never actually argue that psychedelics aren’t shortcuts, apart from your argument that since psychedelics are required for theurgy, they can’t be shortcuts to its object. But that makes your case about their not being shortcuts dependent upon your case for their being required. It’s always better not to make one case depend on another anyway, but, more importantly, as I said in the previous point, the latter case is not very strong.
There are some other things, but addressing the above may change the paper enough that some of them don’t make the next draft anyway.
Author Response
Reviewer 2
Comment 0: Cool paper, cool idea, very ambitious. And lots of interesting points along the way. I think it’s on the way to being publishable, but there are several problems, some of which are easier to address than others. Here are the main ones:
Response 0: I thank this Reviewer very much for pointing out some serious errors and suggesting helpful ways to repair them. Some of these errors were subtle, and I appreciate the Reviewer’s sharp eyes.
Comment 1. You say, “Here I focus on new psychedelic churches, that is, psychedelic churches which have not yet gained legal permission to use psychedelics. Some of these new psychedelic churches are emerging within established religions (like Christianity, Judaism, and Buddhism).” You then gloss the last sentence in this excerpt in a footnote: “Christianity has the Christian Psychedelic Society (ligare.org). Judaism has the Shefa organization (shefaflow.org). Buddhism has the Psychedelic Sangha (psychedelicsangha.org).” But Ligare and Shefa are not churches in any sense, let alone the legal sense. Given that this is a paper about legal definitions bearing on the mitigation of potential penal repercussions, it is especially crucial to correct this error. I can’t speak to this issue in relation to Psychedelic Sangha, but I’d double-check that too.
Response 1: Excellent point.
I deleted the offending sentence (in section 1 para 1): “Some of these new psychedelic churches are emerging within established religions (like Christianity, Judaism, and Buddhism). Many others are emerging outside of established religions.”
And I deleted the footnote referencing Ligare, Shefa, and Sangha.
Comment 2. You appeal to Tillich’s notion of “ultimate concern” in specifying what makes a metaphysical belief-system count as religious, but you don’t explain what you understand him to mean by this term apart from, “your ultimate purpose for living, your ultimate goal or end,” which is largely an exchange of approximate synonyms. Necessary here is a discussion of excerpts from Tillich to show you’re talking about the same thing he is, since it seems like you aren’t: At one point, he makes a distinction between religion as ultimate concern and “the narrower and customary sense of the word, be it institutional religion or the religion of personal piety […] in myth, cult, devotion, and ecclesiastical institutions.” Then, he says the reason the latter exists is “because of the tragic estrangement of man’s spiritual life from its own ground and depth.” But you’re specifying that psychedelic churches need a philosophy that, among other things, arises from “some historical religion” and has a set of attending practices. If that’s what you mean by religion, that’s not Tillich’s ultimate concern; it’s the thing he says arose because of our “tragic estrangement.”
Response 2: This is a very important objection, which indicates that my treatment of “ultimate concern” was seriously incomplete. Since I’m focusing on how philosophy of religion helps to satisfy legal demands, all that matters here is how Tillich’s notion enters the case law. The relevant case law takes only one phrase from Tillich, which it operationalizes. The case law is not interested in Tillich’s larger views of religion. Still, the Reviewer is right that I need to clarify the relevant legal meaning of ultimate concern.
To address this point, I extensively rewrote section 2 paragraph 5.
And I added Notes 13, 14, 15, and 16 dealing in detail with the case law.
Comment 3. You raise “ontological shock” from psychedelic experiences as an ethical problem and therefore a religious problem. But giving up a false and harmful worldview might also lead to ontological shock; it’s not clear that catalyzing such change would thereby be immoral. Pointing this out would save you the trouble of arguing that Platonism (or whatever) still counts as moral and therefore religious because it doesn’t cause ontological shock by conflicting with modern science, a case I didn’t find convincing anyway.
Response 3: Excellent points. The new section 3 addresses this comment. I added some material to show why ontological shock is ethically problematic and how it differs from ordinary worldview-change. I fortified my case with additional references.
The point about giving up a false and harmful worldview is addressed in section 3 para 2.
Talking about “consistency with modern science” probably wasn’t the right requirement. Instead, I talk about requiring rational justification in section 3 para 4.
Comment 4. You say, “it is beside the point to defend any version of Platonism here. It is not my intention to convince you that any Platonism is true.” But earlier, you said that, to be ethical, a religion can’t lead to comforting delusions and must, therefore, demonstrate it’s not doing so in employing psychedelics. But if a religion is proffering modern Platotism [sic.] and the latter is false, then the religion is leading to a [perhaps comforting] delusion in a different way. That means the truth of Platonism is not “beside the point” here.
Response 4: A subtle and excellent objection. I’m glad the Reviewer caught this. We can’t know the truth of any ultimate metaphysical position. So the best we can do is to minimize epistemic harms by using positions which are rationally justified. (See new section 3).
I deleted the offending sentence which said “Consequently, it is not my intention here to convince anybody that Platonism is true.”
I point out that Platonism is rationally justified in section 6 para 1.
Comment 5. You say, “But if theurgy includes the ritual use of plant substances, and if theurgical rituals induce hallucinatory visions, then the category of theurgy includes the use of plant-derived psychedelics.” This is only true if the plant is what’s causing the vision. The argument you’ve given here is not technically valid, since it’s possible that they’re having visions because of drumming, dancing, sleep deprivation, fasting, a full moon—whatever—and just happen to be using aromatic plants because they smell nice or remind theurgists of the afterlife. Since you, afterwards, cite several authors who also link theurgy and psychedelics, it might serve you better if you simply summarized their reasonings (assuming they’re not likewise invalid).
Response 5: Right. An embarrassing error on my part. I rewrote section 8 para 3 as instructed by the Reviewer, and added another point from Iamblichus.
- You say, “The art of using physical symbols in rituals, as ladders to ascend to the deities (and ultimately to the Good), was known as theurgy.” And later: “Psychedelics are symbols of the deities. Hence theurgy requires the use of psychedelics. Psychedelics are not illegitimate shortcuts; on the contrary, they are necessary ladders.” This is only true if there are no non-psychedelic symbols of the deities. Perhaps you meant to imply this (I don’t see it explicitly stated anywhere), but, either way, it would need an argument since it’s far from obvious.
>>>> This mistake compounds the previous mistake, and I’m very grateful that the Reviewer caught both mistakes. Thank you. I rewrote section 8, paras 5, 7, and 8.
Comment 7.You never actually argue that psychedelics aren’t shortcuts, apart from your argument that since psychedelics are required for theurgy, they can’t be shortcuts to its object. But that makes your case about their not being shortcuts dependent upon your case for their being required. It’s always better not to make one case depend on another anyway, but, more importantly, as I said in the previous point, the latter case is not very strong.
Response 8: Agreed. This problem has been fixed by addressing the Reviewer’s points 5 and 6.
Comment 8: There are some other things, but addressing the above may change the paper enough that some of them don’t make the next draft anyway.
Response 8: Of course, I’m not sure what these other things might be, but I believe that repairing the errors pointed out by the Reviewer has made the paper much stronger. I thank the Reviewer for their hard work making suggestions for revising this paper.
Reviewer 3 Report
Comments and Suggestions for AuthorsMDPI response
I found this paper offered some key points that are helpful, but overall I found it to be very confusing because it tries to do too much. The valuable material is inadequately developed, mainly I suppose to allow space for material that is not helpful to the core argument.
More specifically, from the top:
I found the title itself to be misleading: “Psychedelic Churches Legally Need Philosophy of Religion.” Legally need? Meaning that there is some law that requires these churches to hire philosophers?
Or lines 42-43: “The legal structures which define religiosity explicitly seek inputs from philosophy.” Explicitly? That’s a big claim without any documentation. I would be very surprised to learn that this claim can be supported. Or line 46: “require.” What does that mean, and how is it backed up with any evidence? I think what the authors want to say is that new psychedelic churches face challenges that require careful thought, which may benefit from insights from those trained in philosophical analysis.
Line 52: What are “psychedelic doctrines”? I assume it’s an explanation of why the use of psychedelics is central to the practices of a religious community, but it’s an odd phrase.
Line 52: “six criteria for the religious legitimacy…”---This seems very promising. I suggest that the authors make this claim central to the whole paper, perhaps reorganizing the paper so that it is a well-developed explanation of these six criteria. I can even imagine that the six criteria become the paper’s main six sections.
Lines 60-61: “ First Amendment to the US Constitution prohibits the government from defining religion….? No…it is prohibited from establishing.
Lines 62ff introduce the Meyers test. This is central. It needs more attention and careful explanation. The article is at its strongest in this section. What is the relationship between the Meyers’ factors and the authors’ six criteria? Not exactly clear, but key to the development. I can imagine this paper offering a sophisticated philosophical analysis of Meyers, with practical suggestions for new psychedelic churches.
Lines 79ff: “All these points can be summarized in the first criterion for religious legitimacy: (1) a psychedelic doctrine must include a metaphysical belief system which is also religious (and not merely a philosophy or way of life).” Is “must” the right word here? The authors quote from the Meyers decision: “Religious beliefs often address fundamental questions.” That doesn’t say must.
Line 96ff: I found this paragraph unhelpful and a diversion from the main argument.
102-103: Once again, the word must--too strong, not warranted.
112f: “(3) the psychedelic doctrine must both support psychedelic religiosity and be consistent with modern science.” “Must” is a problem, but even more is the idea that a religion must be consistent with modern science---what does this even mean, and how can this be a criterion for religion when so many of them would fail? And what happens when “modern science” changes its view on something? Put another way, does this require a religion to be secular in order to be a religion?
129-160: good material. Needs further development, expansion, clarification. Core to the paper, in my view.
161-481: I found these sections unhelpful and confusing. They do not advance the argument or contribute to a clear development of what I see as the core strength of the paper. A portion of this part of the paper (293ff) is on Plotinus, and this is interesting material that may be the core of another paper, but trying to connect that discussion with today’s legal challenges is a bit too much, I think, to try to take on in one paper.
482: The conclusion is helpful as far as it goes.
Author Response
Reviewer 3
Comment 0: I found this paper offered some key points that are helpful, but overall I found it to be very confusing because it tries to do too much. The valuable material is inadequately developed, mainly I suppose to allow space for material that is not helpful to the core argument.
Response 0: I apologize for the unclarity. Thanks to revisions suggested by this Reviewer, and other Reviewers, the paper now has more signposting and a clearer structure.
Comment 1: I found the title itself to be misleading: “Psychedelic Churches Legally Need Philosophy of Religion.” Legally need? Meaning that there is some law that requires these churches to hire philosophers?
Response 1: I agree that this might be misconstrued, so I deleted “Legally”. The previous title of section 2 was “Psychedelic Churches Legally Need Metaphysical Doctrines”; the Reviewer’s point entails weakening this to “Psychedelic Churches Need Metaphysical Doctrines”.
Comment 2: Or lines 42-43: “The legal structures which define religiosity explicitly seek inputs from philosophy.” Explicitly? That’s a big claim without any documentation. I would be very surprised to learn that this claim can be supported.
Response 2: Agreed. In section 1, para 3, I changed “explicitly seek inputs from philosophy” to “explicitly refer to philosophical topics”. For instance, the Meyers case, and the cases on which it was based, do explicitly refer to metaphysics, to ethics, and to other philosophical topics.
Comment 3: Or line 46: “require.” What does that mean, and how is it backed up with any evidence? I think what the authors want to say is that new psychedelic churches face challenges that require careful thought, which may benefit from insights from those trained in philosophical analysis.
Response 3: Agreed. I changed the first sentence of para 4 in section 1 to: “Since new psychedelic churches face challenges that require philosophically-informed thinking, they may benefit from philosophers of religion.”
Comment 4: Line 52: What are “psychedelic doctrines”? I assume it’s an explanation of why the use of psychedelics is central to the practices of a religious community, but it’s an odd phrase.
Response 4: I apologize for the unclarity. The term “doctrine” comes from the IRS characteristics referenced in Note 7. But to make this clearer, I rewrote the offending sentence in para 4 of section 1 like this:
“Specifically, a new psychedelic church needs a psychedelic doctrine, that is, a creed or statement of faith, ideally stated in written documents, which shows that their uses of psychedelics are legitimately religious, and so deserve a religious exemption under the RFRA.[Note 7]”. Note 7 remains the same as it was in the previous version.
Comment 5: Line 52: “six criteria for the religious legitimacy…”---This seems very promising. I suggest that the authors make this claim central to the whole paper, perhaps reorganizing the paper so that it is a well-developed explanation of these six criteria. I can even imagine that the six criteria become the paper’s main six sections.
Response 5: I’m glad the Reviewer likes the six criteria. And the Reviewer’s point is correct that the paper should be organized around those criteria. Sections 5 through 9 follow the six criteria in order. I added some signposting at the starts and ends of these sections to make this clear. I also now italicize the key references to the criteria, so they are easier to see.
Comment 6: Lines 60-61: “ First Amendment to the US Constitution prohibits the government from defining religion….? No…it is prohibited from establishing.
Response 6: Good point. From sent 1 in para 1 in section 2, I deleted this opening clause: “Although the First Amendment to the US Constitution prohibits the government from defining religion,”
Comment 7: Lines 62ff introduce the Meyers test. This is central. It needs more attention and careful explanation. The article is at its strongest in this section. What is the relationship between the Meyers’ factors and the authors’ six criteria? Not exactly clear, but key to the development. I can imagine this paper offering a sophisticated philosophical analysis of Meyers, with practical suggestions for new psychedelic churches.
Response 7: Thank you, this is a really helpful suggestion. To help highlight the Meyers Test, I broke up the single big section in the previous version into several titled sections 2 through 4. I now cite many points from Meyers. And I have cited additional supporting case law.
I’m grateful that the Reviewer can imagine a “paper offering a sophisticated philosophical analysis of Meyers, with practical suggestions for new psychedelic churches.” This is a fantastic idea. It will be a paper focused on different aspects of the law (e.g. on Meyers’ “Accoutrements of Religion”, sincerity, substantial burden, etc.). Given that this is a religion journal, and that the special issue demands focusing on philosophy of religion, I am obligated by the editorial constraints to do philosophy of religion here. I hope to write that up as a second paper for a law journal (or religion and law journal). I appreciate the Reviewer’s encouragement!
Comment 8: Lines 79ff: “All these points can be summarized in the first criterion for religious legitimacy: (1) a psychedelic doctrine must include a metaphysical belief system which is also religious (and not merely a philosophy or way of life).” Is “must” the right word here? The authors quote from the Meyers decision: “Religious beliefs often address fundamental questions.” That doesn’t say must.
Response 8: Right. I changed “must” to “should” in sent 3 of para 3 of section 2.
Comment 9: Line 96ff: I found this paragraph unhelpful and a diversion from the main argument.
Response 9: Agreed. I deleted the paragraph.
Comment 10: [lines] 102-103: Once again, the word must--too strong, not warranted.
Response 10: Good point. I changed “must” to “should” in para 1 of section 3.
Comment 11: [lines] 112f: “(3) the psychedelic doctrine must both support psychedelic religiosity and be consistent with modern science.” “Must” is a problem, but even more is the idea that a religion must be consistent with modern science---what does this even mean, and how can this be a criterion for religion when so many of them would fail? And what happens when “modern science” changes its view on something? Put another way, does this require a religion to be secular in order to be a religion?
Response 11: An excellent objection. Again, I changed the “must” to “should”.
The Reviewer raises an excellent points about “consistency with modern science”. Based on those points, and some related concerns from another Reviewer, I replaced consistency with modern science with rational justification. I expanded the ethical discussion. The new section 3 was extensively revised to address these points.
Comment 12: [lines] 129-160: good material. Needs further development, expansion, clarification. Core to the paper, in my view.
Response 12: Thank you. This is further developed in the rewritten section 8.
Comment 13: [lines] 161-481: I found these sections unhelpful and confusing. They do not advance the argument or contribute to a clear development of what I see as the core strength of the paper. A portion of this part of the paper (293ff) is on Plotinus, and this is interesting material that may be the core of another paper, but trying to connect that discussion with today’s legal challenges is a bit too much, I think, to try to take on in one paper.
Response 13: I apologize for any confusions; I hope some of them are cleared up by the signposting and rewriting suggested by this Reviewer and others.
Given the editorial scope of the journal, and especially the editorial scope of the special issue, it would be inappropriate to omit these philosophy of religion sections. The call for papers demands some serious philosophy of religion, and it seems fitting to answer with Plotinus, Iamblichus, and others. I agree with the Reviewer that another paper, focusing more on the law and practical issues, is warranted. But that’s more law, and less philosophy of religion. This is philosophy of religion.
Comment 14: [line] 482: The conclusion is helpful as far as it goes.
Response 14: Thank you! I have tried to address all the Reviewer’s specific concerns; they were all good suggestions.
Round 2
Reviewer 1 Report
Comments and Suggestions for AuthorsThank you for the edits and rewtites
Author Response
I thank the Reviewer for their hard work!
Reviewer 2 Report
Comments and Suggestions for AuthorsYou fixed all of mine.
Author Response
I thank the Reviewer for their hard work!
Reviewer 3 Report
Comments and Suggestions for AuthorsThe author should be congratulated on making so many helpful changes. Hard work, well done.
Author Response
I thank the Reviewer for their hard work!
