Islamic Fundamentalism and the Political Systems of North African States Before the Arab Spring

Abstract

Before the Arab Spring erupted at the turn of 2010 and 2011, Islamic fundamentalism had long played a significant role in the political and social landscapes of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Often associated with groups advocating for a return to a strict and literal interpretation of Islamic principles, Islamic fundamentalism manifested in various movements, ideologies and violent insurgencies. These movements aimed to shape governance, challenge existing regimes and resist Western influence. The decades leading up to the Arab Spring saw a rise in both peaceful political Islamist movements and militant groups with more radical objectives. Islamic fundamentalist organisations have played varied and significant roles in the political systems of North African states. From the peaceful reformist agendas of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia to the radical insurgencies of the LIFG in Libya and the GIA in Algeria, these organisations have shaped political discourse, challenged authoritarian regimes and represented the discontent of marginalised populations. In some cases, such as in Morocco, Islamist groups have found ways to work within the political system, while in others, they have been pushed into violent opposition. The impact of Islamic fundamentalist organisations before and after the Arab Spring reveals their enduring influence on North Africa’s political landscape.

1. Introduction

Religious fundamentalism1 seems to be a political phenomenon mostly associated with Islam in the contemporary world. Especially in the Western mass media, the phenomenon of fundamentalism has been considered as a main feature of Islam, as well as strictly connected with politically motivated violence, especially after 9/112. It is impossible to question the existence of political movements in the Muslim world that refer to religion as the main factor mobilising their activity in the political field. The phenomenon of Muslim fundamentalism, in its modern form3, was born in Egypt at the end of the 1920s in ideological and institutional terms, but it has seen a rapid development since the 1970s. An important characteristic of this phenomenon is the process of institutionalisation, involving the creation of political, as well as armed, organisations and movements. Of particular concern to the phenomenon of fundamentalism is the use of violence by its adherents to achieve political goals. However, the use of violence in the form of terrorism is not the only field of activity of fundamentalists (Tibbi 1997, p. 88). In many cases, movements of a fundamentalist nature seek to insert themselves into the political and social life of their countries, gaining, in many cases, real supporters. This is mainly due to the fact that the political discourse refers to the real problems faced by the countries and societies of the region. Fundamentalists openly criticise secular governments, proclaiming slogans to repair the political, social and economic system, in many cases positioning themselves as the only political opposition able to challenge the ruling elites (Zając 2010, p. 91). Fundamentalist movements are most often associated with the threat they pose to the political order and security of countries in the Middle East and North Africa (Tibbi 1997). This is due, as mentioned earlier, to their use of violence as the only means of political action available, due to their exclusion from official political activities.

The purpose of this study is to analyse the political situation in the North African sub-region before the outbreak of the Arab Spring. The political situation in Egypt and in the Maghreb countries of Algeria, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco will be considered. The main research task is to establish the role that Muslim political groups played in the political systems of the North African countries before the outbreak of the Arab Spring4. The second goal is to examine government policies towards fundamentalist groups. An important assumption is that this analysis will not refer to organisations that have used armed violence as a tool for their political separation. Only organisations that have created formal structures for political activity will be considered.

The following research questions were formulated to achieve the research objectives:

(1)

What were the key characteristics of the political systems in the North African states prior to the outbreak of the Arab Spring?

(2)

What policies were implemented by the political authorities of individual countries towards fundamentalist groups?

(3)

To what extent were fundamentalist organisations, particularly those with party-like structures, able to engage in the official political life of their respective countries?

This article refers to the methodology adopted in social sciences and humanities, in particular in political science and history. First of all, this is a historical study. The main method that is used is comparative historical analysis. Its main aim is to identify the general historical patterns across the groups. In the case of this study, the main role of this method is to find the similarities or differences in the politics applied by the North African governments towards political fundamentalist organisations. The article also refers to political studies. In order to analyse the extent to which fundamentalist movements can have an impact, it is necessary to identify the characteristics of the political systems of Arab North African states.

For the purposes of this study, the political system will be understood as ‘the totality of state organs and social organisations and groups—formal and informal—participating in political activities, within a given state, as well as the totality of general rules and norms that regulate the mutual relations between them’ (Podolak and Żmigrodzki 2009, p. 12). It follows from the above definition that one of the essential elements of a state’s political system is the totality of organisations and institutions participating in the political process. It is worth emphasising that it is a prerequisite for an entity to conduct activities that produce effects for the political system as a whole, which does not necessarily imply the legitimacy of the functioning of political organisations. Even those groups that do not have official permission from the state authorities to operate openly are nevertheless participants in the institutional subsystem in the political system of a country. In this regard, political fundamentalist organisations are a crucial element shaping the political landscape of North African states and influencing regional dynamics.

2. Outline of the Political Systems of North African States

As Halliday claims (Halliday 2009), the emergence of North African states, as is the case with other areas of the Middle East, is the result of two overlapping processes. The first of these processes was long-term in nature and related to the centuries-long evolution of the region’s state and culture, which has been inextricably linked to Islam for several centuries. The second, conversely, addresses the influence of the European political and economic system over the last two hundred years. The latter process has seen a multifaceted interaction between the Middle East and Europe, resulting in the formation of the modern state system in the area. In the course of the nineteenth century, North African states came under the direct control of European colonial powers—France (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia), Italy (Libya), Britain (Egypt) and Spain (Morocco). In essence, it can be said that the system of modern territorial states in the Middle East and North Africa reflects the extent of influence and divisions between former European colonial empires. During the colonial period, the European political institutions and concepts of government were implemented in the newly established countries of the modern Arab world. Finally, they were adopted and transformed by traditional political and social structures after gaining independence. The result of this process is today’s regional state system (Mandaville 2018, p. 184).

The process of independence for North African states was marked by significant variation, particularly when examining the trajectory of decolonisation. The state that was the earliest to acquire the attributes of sovereignty and become a subject of international relations was Egypt. Egypt formally became independent from the Ottoman Empire under Muhammad Ali5. His successors, with the title of khedive, governed independently until the early 1880s, when Egypt came under direct British rule. Egypt once again gained independence in 1922. This process was linked to the emergence of an anti-colonial secular political movement in the form of the Wafd party. Egypt remained a kingdom until a coup d’état by a group of military officers in 1952. Since then, the country has had a republican character of government.

The remaining Arab states gained independence after the end of the Second World War. It should be mentioned here that the attainment of independence was linked to the achievement of a full international sovereignty. The Arab Maghreb states were not bound by the former colonial power by mutual aid treaties, as was the case with Egypt6. The state that gained independence first was Libya. The territory of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica came under Italian rule as a result of the war with the Ottoman Empire between 1911 and 1912 (Ostaszewski 1996, p. 105). After Italy’s defeat in World War II, the area came under British and French administration under the UN trusteeship system. In 1951, the UN decided to grant independence to Libya. The state functioned as a kingdom under Muhammad Idris al-Mahdi. Royal rule came to an end in 1969, when a group of military officers led by Muammar Gaddafi overthrew the monarchy and established republican rule.

Tunisia, which was formally part of the Ottoman Empire, became a French protectorate in the 1880s. The activities of the nationalist movement eventually led to the country’s independence, which was achieved in 1956. A year later, Tunisia adopted a republican form of government, and Habib Bourguiba became the first president of the republic. He ruled until 1987, when he was replaced by Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. The latter remained in power until 2010, when he was forced to resign following the ’Jasmine Revolution’.

Throughout the 19th century, the Sultanate of Morocco remained an area of competition for the influence of European colonial powers. This rivalry culminated in French success in 1912 with the establishment of a formal protectorate. As a result of the Franco–Spanish colonial arrangements, part of the Moroccan area also became a Spanish protectorate. France ruled there until 1956, when a nationalist movement demanded the reinstatement of the previously deposed Sultan Sidi Muhammad Ben Yusuf (Ferro 1997, p. 241). His return to Morocco in 1955 is considered the date of independence, although, formally, the Franco–Spanish protectorate ended a year later (Malinowski 2001, p. 15). Muhammad Ben Yusuf, as ruler of independent Morocco, took the name of Muhammad V and began the rule of a monarchy that has prevailed to the present day (Zając 2010, p. 73).

Algeria’s independence process was the most dramatic. It came under French occupation in the 1830s. In 1881, Algeria was incorporated into France as an overseas territory, accompanied by massive French settlement (Ferro 1997, p. 135). In 1954, there was an anti-French uprising led by the National Liberation Front. The war was brought to an end by the 1962 Evian Agreement, through which France granted Algeria independence. A republic was established with Ahmed Ben Bella as its first president (Modrzejewska-Leśniewska 1996, p. 278).

The political systems of North African states in the pre-Arab Spring era exhibited both commonalities and distinctions. These systems were subject to considerable changes throughout the decades following independence. North African states, although described as Arab, are not monolithic in terms of nationality. In this respect, Egypt remains the most homogeneous. In the Maghreb countries, the ethnic situation is more complicated. In contrast, Sunni Islam remains the dominant religion.

If the type of political regime7 is taken into account, the North African states are seen as undemocratic and, with some simplification, can also be described as authoritarian see

Table 1. Basic political indicators of North African countries (up to 2010).

State	Head of State	Came to Power	Democracy Index (Place in the World)	Press Freedom Index (Place in the World)
Algeria	Abdul Aziz Buteflika	1999	125	105
Egypt	Hosni Mubarak	1981	138	98
Libya	Muammar Kaddafi	1969	158	146
Tunisia	Muhammad VI	1999	116	85
Morocco	Zin Al-Abidin Ben Ali	1987	144	59

(Author’s compilation based on Mapping the Arab World, 24 November 2011, http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/02/arab_league_map, accessed on 14 February 2025).

). However, numerous researchers emphasise that this type of typology does not reflect many important features of their political regimes. In particular, Szmolka and del-Moral (2019) emphasise that ‘pluralist authoritarianism’ may be used as more adequate term that applies to the countries in question. Their main argument is that inside those systems, the functioning of political parties other than the ruling one is allowed, and also that ‘it refers to the possibility of political confrontation by various political opponents’ (Szmolka and del-Moral 2019, p. 95). However, the political parties were deprived of real opportunities to participate in the exercise of political power. Nevertheless, this term could not be applied to Libya as the formation of political parties was not allowed during Muammar Gaddafi’s rule. In this case, it seems more appropriate to describe the Libyan system as a ‘consolidated authoritarianism’. At the other end of the spectrum was Morocco. The 1995 constitutional reforms led to the formal adoption of some elements characteristic of a democratic system. That is why the political system of Morocco may be characterised as ‘quasi democratic’ or ‘unconsolidated/flawed democracy’. It is important to emphasise that the Freedom Index of 2009 classified Morocco as a partly free country (Puddington 2009, p. 897).

Another factor that characterises the type of government system is the nature of the head of state. In this case, the monarchist or republican nature of the government is indicated. The countries of the region, with the exception of Morocco, have a republican form of government. They have written constitutions that define the basis of the political system, theoretically providing the norms on which the political system is to operate8. The head of state is the president (king, in Morocco) with almost unlimited powers9. Despite the constitutional arrangements, there is no real or operational system of control to hold the head of state politically or legally accountable. In the case of the republican form of government, the constitutions provide for the tenure of office of the head of state—the president. However, the combination of constitutional provisions and the practical modalities of selecting the head of state effectively institutionalised long-term personal rule as the prevailing pattern among the states under analysis.

In the North African states under consideration, the institutional framework included a head of government and a council of ministers; however, these bodies did not exercise an active or independent policymaking role, functioning instead in a predominantly administrative capacity, with their actions closely subordinated to the decisions of the head of state. The absolute subordination of the head of government to the head of state stemmed directly from the institutional mechanism governing the former’s appointment. The appointment of the head of government did not derive from parliamentary majority support but rather reflected the discretionary designation by the head of state. North African states had parliamentary assemblies, selected on the basis of elections. However, the way the electoral system was constructed meant that the majorities were nevertheless dominated by representatives of the ruling political elites. These parliaments did not perform many of the functions that characterise parliaments in democratic states. In terms of political functions, the function of legitimising the political system can be attributed to them to the greatest extent.

Another feature of the political systems of the North African states was the party system with limited competition. Political parties have, over the decades, become an important component of the political life of the countries. Nevertheless, the evolution of multi-party systems in the North African states has been marked by distinct and context-specific historical paths (see

Table 2. Historical trajectory of the multi-party systems prior to the Arab Spring.

State	Function Period	Number of Years
Algeria	1989–1991; 1997–2010	16
Egypt	1923–1952; 1971–2010	68
Libya	-	-
Tunisia	1983–2010	27
Morocco	1956–2010	54

(Author’s compilation based on Arab Political Systems: Baseline Information and Reforms, https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2008/03/arab-political-systems-baseline-information-and-reforms?lang=en; Szmolka and del-Moral (2019), acceded on 16 March 2025).

).

The data presented above indicate that Egypt possesses the longest-standing tradition of a multi-party system among the North African states. In contrast, Algeria and Tunisia have the shortest histories of such political pluralism. It is noteworthy, however, that both Egypt and Algeria experienced significant institutional discontinuities—Egypt during the rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Algeria amid the civil war. Morocco is unique as as the only country in the region where a multi-party system has operated continuously since independence. Libya, by contrast, has not implemented a multi-party system at any point in its post-independence history.

Given the typology of party systems adopted by La Palombara and Weiner (1966), the party systems of the North African states can be classified as non-competitive systems. There was no real political competition manifested in electoral struggle and change in the exercise of power. On the other hand, adopting a classification based on the criterion of the real possibility of party rule, the party systems of North African states can be classified as hegemonic party systems and, therefore, characteristic of non-democratic states (Sobolewska-Myślik 2010, p. 108). It should be noted that within a hegemonic party system, the existence of other political groups is formally permitted; however, these entities are effectively deprived of any genuine opportunity to exercise power. In the context of the North African states, governance was typically characterised by the dominance of a single ruling party, with the participation of so-called ‘official opposition’ parties being both limited and largely symbolic:

Algeria—National Liberation Front remaining in coalition with the Democratic National Assembly and the Social Movement for Peace, formation of political parties allowed;

Egypt—National Democratic Party (party in power until 2011), the formation of political parties allowed;

Libya—Arab Socialist Union, political groups prohibited;

Morocco—constitutionally confirmed multiparty system10; no restrictions on the formation of political parties;

Tunisia—Constitutional Democratic Union (party in power until 2011); several political parties allowed to operate legally (Czajkowska and Diawoł-Sitko 2012).

An important feature of the party system in states allowing political groups other than the ruling party was the licensing of political activity. The laws on political parties introduced a number of conditions that largely limited the possibility of a real pluralistic multiparty system. Among the states in question, only Morocco constitutionally guaranteed the free formation of political parties (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2008d). An important element of the law on political parties was the introduction of restrictions that excluded the formation of certain political groups. The Algerian legislation on political parties contained explicit clauses that barred the establishment of parties founded on religious (particularly Islamic) or ethnic (such as Arab or Berber) identities or ideologies (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2008a). Similar arrangements have been put into practice in Egypt and Tunisia (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2008b; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2008e). The adoption of the exclusion clause can be argued in two ways. Firstly, its objective was to foster internal integration of the political system, with a focus on eradicating sectarian divisions. Secondly, it is impossible to overlook the presence of measures within such solutions designed to exclude potentially threatening political groups that could pose a genuine challenge to those in power, rather than merely serving as a façade of political opposition.

3. Fundamentalist Groups in the Political Systems of North African States

The political parties that exercised real power before the outbreak of the Arab Spring mostly originated from social and political movements of an anti-colonial and nationalist nature. The legitimacy of political power in this case was based not on the concept of political representation, but on the role they played in the process of gaining independence11. Both these movements and their leaders adopted the Western concept of executing political power based on the principle of constitutionalism, with the introduction of Western political institutions12. Here, a secular framework can be observed for the exercise of state power, which draws upon socialist ideology to shape the development of both the political and socio-economic systems (Hinnenbusch 2003, p. 83). This system of government was not exposed to real internal threats until the emergence of radical fundamentalist groups. Their destabilising effect on the political system of North African states is mainly due to their use of terror as a specific form of political struggle (Al-Azm 2015, p. 282).

Obviously, the development of the phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism is not only limited to the Maghreb and Egypt. It may be described as a dynamically developing phenomenon taking the form not only of internal organisational activity but also of transnational cooperation (Hinnenbusch 2003, p. 68). However, the reasons for such a development are multidimensional. Above all, it is a consequence of the crisis in which the nation-state, based on a nationalist ideology, found itself exemplified by phenomena such as economic underdevelopment, social exclusion, high youth unemployment, or the corruption of the political elite. The Arab–Israeli conflict, as well as accusations against the West of political and economic incapacitation, also had a significant impact on the public acclaim of fundamentalist views (Grabowski 2013, pp. 17–18). The strategic alliance of Arab leaders with the United States was not insignificant in this context (Zając 2010, p. 91). Although the phenomenon of ‘political Islam’13 is not new in the world of North African state politics; it has particularly intensified since the 1990s, when the activity of fundamentalist groups increased and imposed a threat to the stability of the political system of the North African states (Koehler and Warkotsch 2009, p. 18–19).

Among the countries in the region, Egypt stands as having the most prolonged experience with the phenomenon of ‘political Islam’. For the functioning of the fundamentalist movement, the Egyptian case is important insofar as the first modern fundamentalist grouping took shape there, in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood (hereafter—MB), whose activities overflowed to other Arab states and provided a model and inspiration for subsequent political groups that began to emerge in the Middle East and North Africa. The Brotherhood was founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna (Dziekan 2007, p. 108). Initially, its activities were primarily socio-educational in nature, but over time, his ideology was filled with political references. Both Banna and subsequent ideologues of the Brotherhood referred to Islam as the source of the construction of the political system of the state (Khadduri 1972, p. 76). By the outbreak of the World War II, the organisation was already consolidated and, because of its charitable activities, enjoyed a high degree of social acceptance. The Brotherhood developed its political activities in the second half of the 1940s, standing in opposition to the Egyptian authorities of the time. During this period, due to its inability to participate in the political system, the Brotherhood resorted to violence as a means of political struggle. Its members were responsible for the assassination of the Egyptian Prime Minister. As a repressive measure, Egyptian security forces assassinated the movement’s founder Hassan al-Banna. The Brotherhood supported the coup organised by the Free Officers movement in 1952. However, there was soon a conflict between the secular regime of Gamal Abdel Nasser and the MB. Nasser saw the Brotherhood’s activities as a fundamental internal threat to his power (Grabowski 2013, p. 127). The organisation, as other political groups, was outlawed and its activists subjected to repression that included prison terms as well as death sentences. Although the repression limited the MB’s ability to function, its structures were not destroyed. During the period of Anwar as-Sadat’s rule, it was given the opportunity to operate fairly freely, officially directing its activities to the spheres of social welfare and education. This process continued under Egypt’s next president, Hosni Mubarak. During the tenure of Nasser’s successors, the Muslim Brotherhood (hereafter-MB) implemented a notable transformation in its approach to political activism. The use of violence was disavowed, while a strategic acceptance of constrained involvement within the established political framework was adopted. The Brotherhood, despite not being officially recognised as a political party, became involved in the Egyptian political process, through participation in the National Assembly elections. It is worth noting here that the lack of legalisation as a political group, as well as the imprisonment of the organisation’s activists, which usually happens before the upcoming elections, did not result in a return to the use of terror (Grabowski 2013, pp. 129–32).

The evolution of the MB towards activity within the existing political system brought the emergence of several new radical groups using violence in political activity. Among the most active fundamentalist organisations were groups such as Jund Allah, Jaysh al-Tahrir al-Islami, Jama’at Islamiyya, and Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami. Members of these groups have been responsible for numerous terrorist attacks directed not only against representatives of the Egyptian authorities, but also against foreign tourists visiting Egypt (Human Rights Watch World Report 1994). The highest number of such attacks occurred in the second half of the 1990s. The most tragic was an attack on tourists in Luxor on 17 November 1997, which killed 62 people, including 58 foreign tourists (Patterns of Global Terrorism 1997). This blow to the foundations of the Egyptian economy prompted an immediate and ruthless response from the Egyptian authorities, as a result of which the organisations were eliminated, although this success was not complete. One of the instruments for combating radical Muslim groups was the state of emergency, maintained throughout Mubarak’s rule, which allowed for the suspension of constitutional freedoms and the use of extraordinary justice against those accused of terrorist activities. This was also made possible by the anti-terrorism legislation in force since 1992 (Human Rights Watch World Report 1994).

The tactic of non-violence proved to be the most advantageous for the Brotherhood in the political situation at that time. It brought tangible success in the form of winning the 2005 National Assembly elections, when members of the Brotherhood, running as independent candidates, won 88 seats in parliament, becoming the most serious opposition force to the ruling National Democratic Party (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2005). The success was all the more remarkable considering that in the 2000 elections, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) had secured only 17 seats. With regard to the Muslim Brotherhood, it is possible to identify an effective long-term political strategy. The vast majority of Egyptians, although they emphasise their relationship with religion in terms of orthodoxy and orthopraxy, reject violence and acts of terror as means of political struggle. Public opinion polls conducted in Egypt in early 2011 showed that at the time, the Brotherhood, as a religious political group, had a strong capacity to gain public acceptance, and thus become a significant and fully legitimate force in Egypt’s new political system (Ryan 2011).

Among the North African states, Algeria encountered the most profound challenge posed by political Islam. During the 1990s, Algeria was an area of fierce civil war between radical groups and government forces. The immediate cause of the conflict was the parliamentary elections won by the fundamentalist opposition in December 1991, which were the first real free elections held in Algeria after independence. The ruling FLN were defeated, with the groups forming the Muslim Salvation Front (FIS) winning a majority In January 1992, there was a military coup d’état with the primary aim of keeping the fundamentalists out of power. The cancellation of the elections led to the outbreak of a civil war. Armed action against the Algerian authorities was mainly conducted by the Muslim Armed Movement and the Muslim Armed Groups, which constituted the radical wing of the FIS. The activities of the military groups and the reprisals against them resulted in the deaths of more than 200,000 people during the decade-long conflict (Gołota 2007). The conflict came to an end in 1999, when fundamentalist groups ended their armed operations in exchange for an amnesty. Despite the conclusion of the civil war, there was no subsequent transformation of the political system in Algeria. The activities of religious groups continued to be prohibited, and the state of emergency was also maintained. In the first decade of the 21st century, new armed groups became active, but the extent of their activities was not universal (Deadly Algiers Bombings Reawaken Old Fears 2007).

In addition, both Libya and Tunisia implemented a range of restrictions to limit the operation of political parties and groups. In Libya, a traditional one-party system was firmly entrenched (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2008c). The Arab Socialist Union remained the only legitimate political entity. Until the mid-1970s, Muhammad Gaddafi referred to Islam in political rhetoric. After the publication of the Green Book and the establishment of the Jumhuriya, a conflict with traditional Islamic elites began. The reaction to the Libyan leader’s political actions was the formation of, among others, local branches of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Hizb al-Tahrir al Islami grouping. These were disbanded by the security services. In the 1990s, new fundamentalist groups emerged—the Islamic Martyrs Movement and the Libyan Islamic Group. In the second half of the 1990s, they began fighting against military and police forces. Their members also conducted an assassination attempt against Gaddafi in 1995, which left him slightly injured (BBC News 2018).

In the case of Tunisia, any activity related to religion was strictly controlled by the state. The extent of the control is evidenced, for example, by the 1988 law on mosques, as a result of which religious positions could only be filled by persons with the approval of the authorities. An essential element in combating fundamentalist groups was the legal ban on the establishment of political parties based on religious ideology. The best-known Islamist group in Tunisia was Ennahda, founded in the early 1980s by Rachid Ghannouchi (Kessler 2012, p. 11). Ennahda promoted a moderate political Islam, advocating an Islamic society governed on democratic principles. However, the Ben Ali regime brutally repressed Ennahda, banning the party, imprisoning its leaders, and forcing many to emigrate (Gafar and Hess 2018, p. 9). Ennahda was non-violent, seeking reform through political engagement rather than radical jihad. Due to severe repression, Islamist groups in Tunisia had limited space for political action, although their influence remained significant in informal religious and social spheres. The government’s tight control over political Islam fuelled discontent, leading many Tunisians to view Ennahda as a legitimate alternative to the corrupt regime (Meddeb 2019).

Compared to other Maghreb countries, the situation in Morocco was different. This country was most open to the operation of a multi-party system. A strong political position was held by the royal court, whose actions were able to be directed against specific political parties, but in this case, the mono-party system characteristic of authoritarian states did not develop. The Moroccan Constitution provided for the free formation of political parties. At the turn of the 20th and the 21st century, there were approximately 40 political parties in the Moroccan political system, almost two-thirds of which were represented in the Chamber of Deputies (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2008d). After 1996, the parties with a religious orientation were allowed to participate in official political activity.

The process of the formation of Muslim political groups began in Morocco, when Al-Shabiba al-Islamija (Islamic Youth Association) was formed in 1969. Its political programme included the renewal of social life and the introduction of the principles of Islamic law (Glennie and Mepham 2007, p. 7). In the 1970s, it split into several separate factions. In the following years, various fundamentalist organisations were active. The mid-1990s saw the formation of a unified party called the People’s Movement for Democracy and the Constitution; in 1998, it changed its name to Hizb al-Adala wa-Tanmiya—Party of Justice and Development. The establishment of the movement coincided with the political reforms introduced by Hassan II, which, among other provisions, allowed for the official activities of fundamentalist groups that refrained from challenging the state’s political structure and the monarch’s preeminent role within the Moroccan political system (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2008d). In the 1996 elections, the grouping won nine seats in parliament. In the following years, the PJD adopted a pragmatic approach to participating in the political process, working within the existing system and accepting the institution of the monarchy as the highest political authority and in the state (Wegner 2011). The above approach brought real success, in terms of becoming one of the largest parties in the Chamber of Deputies. The PJD was not, however, the only fundamentalist organisation that functioned officially in Morocco’s political system. Other fundamentalist parties that have been formed in 90’s include: The Civilisation Alternative Party and the New Left Islamic Party. At the same time, they constituted political opposition not only to the court but also competed with the PJD (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2008d).

4. Conclusions

Under the political systems operating in North African states prior to the outbreak of the Arab Spring, the legal functioning of fundamentalist organisations or parties was not possible in most states outside Morocco. This was primarily due to the very design of the systems of governance, which were undemocratic and even authoritarian in nature. The party systems of the countries in the region did not provide for free competition between political groups, both in terms of competition for, and exercise of, power. Under such a system, fundamentalist groups and organisations received special treatment, given that where there were limited opportunities for the formation of political parties outside the ruling camp, there was a ban on the formation of political entities based on religious ideology. Thus, the fundamentalist groups were prevented from conducting legitimate political activity, which was due to two circumstances. Firstly, these groups, by integrating their members and supporters around a religious factor, could constitute a political force capable of threatening the exercise of power by the existing ruling elites. Fundamentalist groups, although accentuating hostility to the West in their political ideology, accusing it of incapacitating the Islamic world, primarily took the secular political systems of their own countries as the main target of their attacks (Danecki 1998, p. 124). Secondly, some Islamic groups have adopted terror as a method of political struggle. The use of violence was the main reason why their activities were described as destabilising the political situation in the countries of the region (Tibbi 1998, pp. xxvii–iii). It should be emphasised, however, that the concept of stability is inherently ambiguous and subject to interpretation. In the case of the countries of the region, stability meant, above all, the petrification of the existing political system, based on the exclusion of those political options that could provide any alternative to the ruling camp. At the same time, the violence used by jihadist organisations was a factor counted by the ruling elites as a justification for a system of political repression. They were able to present themselves as the only force capable preventing the terrorist threat, which also had an international dimension (Zając 2010, pp. 92–94). As a result, international opinion was inclined to accept the persistence of the authoritarian regimes of the countries of the region, considering their existence necessary to combat political extremism, which posed a real threat to the security of Western countries (Dziekan 2011b)

In response to the phenomenon of religious fundamentalism, the authorities in the region adopted a two-pronged strategy. It resulted not only from the perception of the activity of Muslim groups, but also from the perception of the growth of religious sentiment in the communities of the countries of the region. Firstly, the principles of Islam were incorporated into the functioning of the political system by recognising it as the dominant religion and recognising the principles of Shariah in terms of personal law. In this respect, at least some of the fundamentalist demands have been incorporated into the political systems of the states of the region. Secondly, the authorities took repressive measures, which was possible by the continuing state of emergency and special anti-terrorism legislation, which introduced a system of special courts that targeted political extremists. However, this did not mean that fundamentalist and jihadist ideology did not find adherents in North African states. In most cases, the repression of Islamist groups by authoritarian regimes only increased their popularity, as these groups were often seen as the main opponents of corrupt, authoritarian governments. Growing frustration with economic hardship, political exclusion, and government repression provided fertile ground for popular acceptance during the civil unrest provoked by the Arab Spring14. This situation was capitalised upon by the Muslim organisations after the change of the political system caused by the riots of 2010 and 2011. The Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt, and Ennahda in Tunisia, were the main beneficiaries of the first real free and competitive electoral process. However, they were ultimately unable to consolidate their power and gain real social support to ensure the sustainability of their rule.