Fanaticism and the Zhuangzi: The Discursive Conditions for Unhealthy Commitments

Abstract

This article utilizes the Zhuangzi’s critical approach to language to expand contemporary discourse on the philosophy of fanaticism beyond the conceptual categories derived from European Enlightenment-era critiques of religious and political fanaticism. Recognizing some of the problematic tendencies that stem from the method of comparison itself, an articulation of a post-comparative paradigm is proposed, which emphasizes approaches from non-Western sources that are not predicated upon the comparison of similarities or differences with Western sources. The main body of this article explicates the Zhuangzi’s critiques of a linguistically and discursively conditioned fanaticism. These critiques focus on the following: (1) the interdependence of binary linguistic terms that constitute shifei discourse; (2) semiotic chains of cascading distinctions that confound attempts to ground shifei judgements; and (3) the relationship between unhealthy forms of language, thought, and anxieties and a discursively conditioned fanaticism. This article concludes with a brief reflection on how the Zhuangzi’s critiques of a linguistically and discursively conditioned fanaticism might open discourse on the philosophy of fanaticism in more ways than by merely adding a token Chinese voice.

1. Introduction

Fanaticism is a specter that, even in times of stability, seems always to be lying just below the surface of our individual and collective engagements with the world. New religious movements, reactionary ideologies, or political resentments fuel passions that have the potential to become untethered from conventional modes of religious or political practice, propelling us beyond a healthy devotion to that which we hold to be good, true, and beautiful into a violent and destructive fervor. Indeed, fanaticism often arises precisely as a result of what we as individuals or as a community regard as most important, those values we hold as sacred and undeniable. Sacred values and the commitments they entail “often imbue our lives with a sense of purpose or direction, and thereby give us a way of attaining a form of contentment with life” (Katsafanas 2022, p. 18). Yet, because of the very peculiar type of commitment demanded by sacred values, being “incomparable and invulnerable to ordinary rational argumentation” (Katsafanas 2022, p. 18), they can likewise become sources of fanaticism. Despite terms like fanaticism and enthusiasm having roots in religious phenomena, this threat is not unique to religious faith, and the moralization and sanctification of otherwise merely civil or juridical matters can also foster forms of fanaticism that undermine the very commitments towards which such devotion is oriented. The sanctification of a set of ideals implies the demonization of those who reject or do not live up to them, thereby constructing boundaries between in-group and out-group along Manichean binaries—sinner–saint or civilized–barbarian—further justifying exclusion, persecution, wars, and all manner of brutality characteristic of fanaticism. While most definitions of fanaticism include its destructive consequences, such as excessive violence and political decay, what distinguishes fanaticism from bloodlust, sadism, or revenge culture is an excessive overcommitment to a value or vision of the world arrived at by a specific set of underlying causes. From the European Enlightenment to contemporary discourse, these causes have most commonly been characterized as epistemic, psychological, and moral in nature.

This paper will briefly outline the philosophical discourse on fanaticism from European Enlightenment thinkers to contemporary scholarship, and introduce depictions of what might be classified as fanaticism from classical Chinese literature. It is argued that the Zhuangzi, the Qiwu Lun chapter in particular, can help “open” or contribute to this discourse by diagnosing fanaticism as rooted in a problematic mode of discourse—one characterized by binary terms in dialectical opposition, semiotic chains of cascading distinctions and their knock-on effects, leading to pathological anxieties and destructive behavior. In the spirit of post-comparative philosophy, this analysis aims to engage and expand the contemporary philosophical discourse on fanaticism rather than remaining at the level of mere comparison. Firstly, in response to the growing body of literature on post-comparative philosophy and this Special Issue’s call for papers, some fundamental problems inherent to the field of traditional comparative philosophy will be addressed, along with an articulation of a possible post-comparative approach.

2. Reconsidering Comparative Philosophy

In keeping with the theme of this Special Issue on post-comparative philosophy, which the call for papers described as an attempt to “eschew chauvinistic or dogmatic adherence to a singular worldview or set of values,” attention is be brought to how the method of comparison itself often limits the contributions that non-Western traditions can make to contemporary philosophic discourse. One limiting tendency is evident in how an emphasis on comparison, combined with “the institutionalized parochialism of Western academic philosophy” (Silius 2020, p. 258), reinforces an unequal discursive power between Western philosophic tradition(s) and “other” (e.g., non-Western) traditions by establishing discursive frameworks which other traditions must conform to be considered “legitimate.” Prior to addressing the possible contribution of Chinese philosophy to the philosophic discourse on fanaticism, the following will problematize the method of comparison as it is commonly practiced in comparative philosophy and articulate an approach to add to the body of literature on post-comparative philosophy.

The discursive power imbalance between “the West and the rest” (Hall 2013) is reflected in “the domination of Western standards and norms of evaluation, which are—due to the colonial legacy of Europe—still prevailing in the field of intercultural methodologies” (Rošker 2024, p. 628). In traditional comparative philosophy, this has resulted in “other” traditions being made to conform to an already established structure of discourse from Western tradition(s). We thus see, in English language1 literature interpretations, the Mengzi presented according to virtue ethics more commonly than the more historically coherent framework of “names and actualities” (mingshi 名實). Non-Western approaches are less frequently allowed to meaningfully inform or shape the dominant Western discourses beyond adding a token “other” voice. This is a natural outgrowth of a method predicated on comparison, a sub-discipline characterized by “the struggle between difference and sameness” (Moeller 2022a, p. 203), and historically contingent factors that have led to overtly one-sided power dynamics. Traditional comparative philosophy is certainly not without its merits, and using comparison is unavoidable, as “all philosophy is comparative” (Allinson 2001) in a certain sense. Comparisons with Western notions of fanaticism are necessary in order for this very paper to establish fanaticism as a topic of discourse in classical Chinese thought. Problems arise, however, when Western frameworks become the only means of analysis recognized as legitimate.

The tendency to narrow discourse, resulting from a power imbalance in modern academia paired with the limitations of the method of comparison itself, is reflected in Eirik Lang Harris’ “Fanaticism in Classical Chinese Philosophy.” While his response to the question of fanaticism within Chinese philosophy provides edifying insights concerning classical Chinese political thought, its adherence to the already established discourse on the philosophy of fanaticism restricts the investigation considerably. An emphasis on the epistemic sources of fanaticism as established by contemporary discourse and summarized by John Passmore frames its approach to fanaticism, resulting in the conclusion that although “we often see that thinkers have a startling certitude of the correctness of their views,” (Harris 2024, p. 51), ultimately “fanaticism is not a category of activity that concerned classical Chinese philosophers” (Harris 2024, p. 61). If the analysis is restricted to the parameters established by European Enlightenment thinkers and inherited by contemporary scholars, then this conclusion is not incorrect. Indeed, it shows admirable scholarly restraint by resisting the temptation to read into Chinese thought “a set of concerns and ways of thinking about issues that did not exist in that tradition” (Harris 2024, p. 51). While Harris’ response is the correct, or at least conventional way to address this topic according to the prevailing norms of contemporary academic discourse and methods of traditional comparative philosophy, it also forecloses significant insights from Chinese thought. A post-comparative approach, however, may reveal significant potential for classical Chinese thought to meaningfully contribute to, expand, and open existing philosophical discourses, including the discourse surrounding the philosophy of fanaticism.

Comparative philosophy makes contributions through “questioning such systematic approaches in order to open philosophy up to what is traditionally considered its outside, its other” (Burik 2022, p. 205). Paradoxically, however, it often appears to confine explorations within the parameters already established by Western discourse, undermining the very intention of comparative philosophy itself. The critical space provided by a post-comparative approach offers an opportunity to reflect on the limitations inherent in the comparative method itself, not so that we may discard it altogether, but so that we might practice comparative philosophy better. Contemporary Chinese scholars, such as Li Zehou and Yang Guorong, for example, might be considered post-comparative insofar as they use the Chinese philosophical tradition along with Western and Marxist traditions, not merely in comparison with one another, but together as resources in the service of addressing philosophical problems with which to “just do philosophy” (Kahteran and Weber 2021, p. 214). The post-comparative orientation used in this article is firstly characterized by engaging with Chinese thought “on its own terms” (Ames 2011, p. 35), by “using Chinese philosophy to explain Chinese philosophy” (Zhang 2003, p. 2) rather than defining Chinese thought according to its similarities or differences (i.e., comparison) with Western thought or using non-native approaches to interpret Chinese texts. The second defining characteristic is the application of Chinese approaches to contemporary philosophical discourse, in this case that of fanaticism, in order to reconsider, challenge, and ultimately open the discourse itself to novel ways of thinking in a more meaningful way than merely adding a token Chinese voice.

With this general post-comparative orientation in mind, the following will articulate an approach found in the Zhuangzi addressing the linguistic and discursive conditions for individually and socio-politically destructive forms of fanaticism. It is argued that this Zhuangzian approach can to contribute to contemporary literature on the philosophy of fanaticism in a way that is not primarily predicated on comparisons between Chinese and Western traditions, in order to open new dimensions beyond the discourse’s self-imposed epistemic, psychological, and moral boundaries. Seeking to shift the emphasis from comparison to engagement with contemporary philosophic discourse, however, does not entail a complete rejection of comparisons altogether, as a precondition for such engagement is establishing fanaticism as a common philosophical concern, which does require comparison.

3. Fanaticism in European Enlightenment and Classical Chinese Literature

Animated by a fervor that only dogmatic certainty could inspire, rebellion, massacres, civil wars, witch hunts, persecution, severe theocratic rule, and all manner of extremism characterized the period following the Protestant Reformation and the ensuing Wars of Religion, which devastated Europe. While it would be misleading to attribute this social and political chaos solely to the belief in direct communication with God, the many prophetic figures who claimed to speak the Word of God, and their zealous followers, certainly represented a crisis to which theologians and philosophers of that time responded. Derived from the Greek enthousiasmos, meaning to be possessed or inhabited by God, the term “enthusiasm” developed conflicting connotations in philosophic discourse. Early thinkers like Hobbes, for example, expressed concern insofar as he regarded “both enthusiasm and superstition as pathologies” (Steinberg 2024, p. 73), yet recognized the former as the lesser of the two evils. Indeed, many thinkers referred to the salutary effects that enthusiasm has on “the weakness, fear, melancholy, together with ignorance” (Hume 2021, p. 77) that superstition breeds, as well as its role in combatting “the greatest threat to civil life: clerical power” (Steinberg 2024, p. 74). By the late Enlightenment, the more decidedly pernicious elements of enthusiasm were disambiguated with the term fanaticism.2 Enlightenment thinkers like Kant explicitly condemned the epistemic malfeasance of fanaticism as belonging to “a deranged person with presumed immediate inspiration and a great familiarity with the powers of the heavens. Human nature knows no more dangerous illusion” (Kant 2012, p. 213). Others described “the conceits of a warmed or overweening brain” (Locke 2011, p. 699) as a “psychological malady” (Casson 2024, p. 92). Finer conceptual distinctions certainly existed between enthusiasm and fanaticism,3 but Enlightenment-era philosophers treated both in terms of their consequences—”sectarian violence, persecution, torture, and war” (Zuckert 2010, p. 314)—and their causes, rooted in either epistemic or psychological/medical defects.

Fanaticism’s appeals to transcendence, perfection, or utopianism exhibit an inherently religious nature, but the phenomena associated with fanaticism are not exclusive to religion. Despite efforts to eradicate religion’s intoxicating allure to extremes while preserving its morally fortifying and politically stabilizing benefits—such as through Rousseau’s notion of a “civil religion” (Rousseau 2008, p. 166)—fanatical tendencies persisted in ostensibly secular political contexts. Ironically, it was a form of “civil religion” that contributed to the sanctification of reason and democracy, ultimately fueling the fanatical political fervor of the French Revolution. In response to phenomena once characteristic of cultic and religious practices becoming more evident in the political realm, the concept of fanaticism was expanded to encompass political manifestations while retaining its original religious undertones:

After the French Revolution, fanaticism could still be seen as referring to a certain type of religious engagement; thus one might encounter the use of the phrase religious fanaticism despite the primary sense of the concept now referring to political activity.

(Goldsmith 2022, p. 17)

Contemporary discourse on fanaticism within the political realm, or “Political Enthusiasm” (Poe 2022), remains deeply informed, implicitly or explicitly, by Enlightenment critiques of religious excess. Enlightenment thinkers primarily discussed the dimensions of “religious enthusiasm, enthusiasm as disease, and moral enthusiasm” (Poe 2022, p. 30), and contemporary scholars likewise frequently identify the causes of fanaticism “as primarily an epistemological error” (Goldsmith 2022, p. 64), the medical/psychological dimension of “fanaticism as a pathology” (Katsafanas 2022, p.157), or “morally perverted ideals” (Cassam 2022, p. 122).

Recent publications, such as Fanaticism and the History of Philosophy (Katsafanas 2024) and Political Enthusiasm (Poe 2022), have continued this expansionary conceptual development, seeking to make the concept of fanaticism more dynamic, including a more robust account of fanaticism’s conceptual origins, expanding its scope, and even accounting for a diverse pool of intellectual traditions. However, the epistemic, psychological, and moral dimensions of fanaticism, the three primary concerns established by Enlightenment-era thinkers’ diagnoses of unregulated religious and political zeal, remain the primary themes according to which fanaticism is defined in contemporary literature. These three dimensions, having their roots in early Enlightenment critiques of religious enthusiasm and fanaticism, frame contemporary discourse to such a degree that “most accounts of fanaticism agree that the fanatic displays psychological peculiarities, epistemic vices, and potentially problematic behaviors” (Katsafanas 2024, p. 6). As discussed previously, an insistence on Western philosophic approaches, in this case the conceptual framework for the analysis of fanaticism, can significantly limit discourse, both in the practice of comparative philosophy as well as in the literature on fanaticism. Reassessing how classical Chinese thought might have addressed fanaticism in ways that do not necessarily conform to Enlightenment-era or contemporary framworks provides unique approaches that can open the discourse itself.

In terms of the consequences of fanaticism, classical Chinese literature includes accounts of social and political events that bear striking resemblance to the episodes of fanaticism to which European Enlightenment thinkers reacted. Notably, two of the most important historical narratives informing classical Chinese thought—the fall of the Shang and Western Zhou dynasties—both involved rulers and their coteries exhibiting dogmatic, violent, and pathological behavior. According to histories describing the rise and fall of the Zhou, a narrative imprinted into the hearts of all government ministers and literati for millennia to come, the last king of the Shang, King Zhou, was portrayed as uncontrollably violent toward those who questioned his methods of governance. In addition to corruption and depravity, his behavior corresponded to a few of the core attributes of fanaticism, such as “an opposition to limits, an embrace of violence, absolute certitude, excessive passion” (Goldsmith 2022, p. 3). He had the heart of his uncle, Bi Gan, cut out of his chest, and one of his highest-ranking ministers, Mei Bo, burned to death in a bronze pillar torture device, both in response to their loyal remonstrations with the king. The Records of History (shiji 史記) recalls that when warned by his minister (a minister who, by some accounts, would later die alongside his king in collective self-immolation) of the impending downfall of the Shang dynasty, King Zhou dismissed the warnings, responding “is not my life protected by the Mandate from Heaven?” (Han 2010, p. 187). Atrocities and dogmatic resistance to good counsel were thus further justified by appeals to a transcendent authority, another common characteristic of fanaticism (Martinich 2000, p. 419). Apart from exhibiting devotion to an objective to which “all other ends must be subordinated” (Passmore 2003, p. 221), the accounts of King Zhou by later dynastic histories would qualify him and his followers as fanatical by many of the definitions of fanaticism in Western discourse.

If we are to establish a common ground for discussing depictions of fanaticism in Enlightenment-era/contemporary Western and pre-Qin Chinese discourse, a disjunction between the two becomes apparent. While the destruction caused by a brutally violent and dogmatically recalcitrant political faction does thematically relate to fanaticism, classical Chinese discourse does not address this issue in such a way that it can be appropriately put in dialogue with Western discourse on fanaticism. Rather than analyzing the epistemological, psychological, or moral causes of King Zhou “embracing violence” or acting with “absolute certitude,” philosophical discussions about King Zhou and the fall of the Shang or King You and the fall of the Zhou largely focus on broader themes of political transformation—namely, the rise and fall of virtuous or unvirtuous rulers. Based on these considerations, one might conclude, as does Harris, that the problem of fanaticism is simply non-existent in classical Chinese philosophy, and thus the possibility for any meaningful dialogue is negligible. Yet, there is one classical Chinese text—the Zhuangzi 莊子—that, in its signature manner of satire, parody, and caricature of conventional Confucian themes, does present those sectarian or violent tendencies as dogmatic and pathological, and thus perhaps is appropriate to categorize as examples of fanaticism.

4. The Zhuangzi and Fanaticism

4.1. Fanaticism in the Zhuangzi

The Zhuangzi—one of the foundational texts of philosophical Daoism—takes an approach to behavior characteristic of fanaticism that is markedly different from the more conventional classical literature of its time. Examples of what Hushi 胡適 (d. 1962) described as “concern for the times” (youshi 憂時), or Xu Fuguan 徐復觀 (d. 1982) called “concerned consciousness” (youhuan yishi 憂患意識) (Xu 2001), are generally portrayed with approbation in classical Chinese literature as the burden of duty felt by the ideal minister serving the state. The Zhuangzi, however, turns this trope on its head and links anxiety to the sort of pathologically destructive and politically deleterious phenomena found in narratives like those of King Zhou. Indeed, the anxieties associated with fanaticism, both on the level of the individual and the wider political community, are a central theme of the text, and “the celebration of [madness] and the elevation of the [mad] person is a particular feature of the Zhuangzi” (McLeod 2021, p. 24). Characters within the text are described as being overcome with neuroses and fears injurious to body, mind, and spirit, even leading to gruesome deaths. Elsewhere, interrelated anxieties blindly impel others to behavior more traditionally associated with fanaticism, like ideologically entrenched dogmatism, the persecution of “deviant” or “heretic” members of the in-group, or violent crusades against out-group communities.

One of the common characteristics traditionally associated with fanaticism is a collective fervor targeting individuals that deviate from in-group orthodoxy and transgress sacred values that define in-group identity. Fanatical certainty (or need for certainty) belies fragile individual and group identities (Katsafanas 2022, p. 191), and these insecurities have been directed against, for example, heretics during the Spanish Inquisition, counter-revolutionaries during Mao’s Cultural Revolution, and apostates within modern Jihadism. Examples of intolerant demonization and even violent persecution of deviant members of in-group “heretics” appear in consecutive passages in the fifth chapter. In one passage, Confucius, paragon of the dominant socio-political ethos of the Spring and Autumn period, self-righteously admonishes Shushan, a pariah whose punitive foot amputation served as a “scarlet letter,” stigmatizing him as a social reprobate. Consistent with the Zhuangzi’s critical strategy, this character, who has been violently ostracized from civil society, possesses a perspicacity lacking in the sages of the Zhou tradition, and thus serves as a “barbarian sage” (Sarafinas 2020, p. 101). Conversely, Confucius reflects an ideological blindness, unable to interpret Shushan’s brutal punishment as anything but a justified moral consequence of “the ugliness of his past behavior” (Ziporyn 2020, p. 48). Despite Shushan describing his punishment as the result of “not understanding affairs of the socio-political world” (Cao 2023, p. 94), Confucius re-affirms his dogmatic insistence that, whereas his students “still have [their] intrinsic virtuosities whole and intact,” Shushan’s incomplete body equates to a corrupted virtue. Trying to reason with the ideologically dogmatic Confucius is futile, as “Heaven itself has inflicted this punishment” (Ziporyn 2020, p. 48). Contributing to the image of Confucius as intransigent and “dialectically invulnerable” (Katsafanas 2022, p. 77), Tang dynasty commentator Cheng Xuanying 成玄英 pointed out his hypocrisy insofar as the historical Confucius, like Shushan, was himself politically disgraced when he “suffered hardship in Chen and Cai, was besieged in Shang and Zhou… thus, punishment by Heaven is inescapable” (Cheng 2011, p.109). Adversarial dogmatism masquerading as self-righteousness emerges when a fanatical over-commitment to in-group identity confronts deviants from orthodoxy like Shushan. Similar to the sort of “dialectically invulnerable” belief perseverance exhibited by Confucius confronting in-group heretics, anxiety and unease is likewise generated when confronted with the out-group “barbarian”.

The Zhuangzi explores the psychological insecurity caused by the other and the potential for fanatical violence and destruction it might instigate in a passage featuring Emperors Yao and Shun, mythical sages vaunted for their wisdom. The Zhuangzi satirizes Yao as being overcome with anxiety because of the mere presence of political communities over which he does not rule, telling Shun “I want to attack Zong, Kuai, and Xu’ao, for though I sit facing south on the throne, still I am not at ease. Why is this?” (Ziporyn 2020, p. 18). “Not at ease” is one of the many expressions of anxiety used throughout the Zhuangzi, interpreted by Chen Guying 陳鼓應 as “a seething mood obstructing his heart” (Chen 2016, p. 96), and further described by Wang Bo:

Perhaps Yao felt that with his sagely virtue there should not be any place that is not transformed by his virtue in tianxia, but there are those outside [of tianxia]. This is something that the “self” cannot accept, and thus he wants to attack them.

(B. Wang 2004, p. 85)

Yao’s interlocutor, Shun, responds to his monomaniacal fixation on unifying all communities under one form of rule by referencing the mythical Archer Yi, who shot nine of the ten suns out of the sky. Shun urges him to consider “how much better are multiple virtuosities than multiple suns” (Ziporyn 2020, p. 18). Shun’s advice does not seem to have much traction with Yao, and in chapter four Confucius tells his disciple Yan Hui that “Yao attacked Cong Zhi and Xun Ao, and Yu invaded You Hu. Their nations were laid to waste and their bodies slaughtered. They were incessant in their use of force and insatiable in their quest for substantial goods” (Ziporyn 2020, p.35).

Examples of fanatical zeal directed toward both in-group “heretics” and out-group “barbarians” include the epistemic, psychological, and moral dimensions that frame Western discourse on fanaticism. Confucius might be said to exhibit “epistemic overconfidence” (Reginster 2024, p. 180), and Yao’s unease may be the product of resentment toward the out-group, a resentment according to which “it makes sense to demonize them, to hate them, even in the extreme case to destroy them” (Katsafanas 2024, p. 10). What prevents a simplistic interpretation of the Zhuangzi through this framework, however, is that these epistemic, psychological, and moral maladies are not presented as the causes of fanaticism, but as symptoms of it. The Zhuangzi identifies a distinct root cause that might contribute to expanding contemporary discourse on the philosophy of fanaticism, that is, the linguistic and discursive causes of fanaticism.

One of the primary objects of the Zhuangzi’s critical gaze is the fundamentally problematic nature of language itself and the destructive consequences it can lead to when not carefully attended. A form of speech frequently taken as an object of critique is shifei 是非 discourse, a type of political speech problematic insofar as it has the tendency to ossify responses to political problems in a constantly transforming world and moralize them such that they evoke strong emotional responses. Shifei carries many semantic implications in classical Chinese literature, reflected in the variety of its English translations, including right–wrong, true–false, and that is it–that is not it (Ma and Van Brakel 2019, p. 31). As contrasted with more conventional classical literature, the term in the Zhuangzi is overwhelmingly used critically in reference to the battles incited by moral discourse, such as those of the “Confucian and Mohist shifei” or debates over what constitutes “humaneness and righteousness,” and thus is more accurately understood as “right and wrong.” The role that language and shifei discourse plays in representing the world, naturalizing socio-political norms, and sacralizing ideologies is depicted as a condition for fanaticism, including but not limited to it various problematic psychological, epistemic, and behavioral symptoms.

The following addresses the Zhuangzi’s three primary critiques of the structure of language and discourse, particularly how they contribute to fanatical neuroses and pathologies within the individual and extremism and decay within the state. These critiques focus on the following: (1) the interdependence of binary linguistic terms that constitute shifei discourse; (2) the semiotic chains of cascading distinctions that confound attempts to ground shifei judgements; and (3) the relationship between unhealthy forms of language, thought, and anxieties, insofar as they are the products of a discursively conditioned fanaticism. The Qiwu Lun (齊物論 Equalizing Assessments of Things) chapter provides the most comprehensive critique of the structure of shifei language and discourse, and as such, will serve as the primary content of analysis.

4.2. Binary Terms of Dialectical Opposition

One of the fundamental characteristics of shifei discourse subject to the Zhuangzi’s critique is its valuation of terms within binary relationships of dialectical opposition, elevating one and condemning the other. This critique draws on similar insights from the Laozi, a text with which the Zhuangzi shares many themes, approaches, and language. The first chapter of the Laozi establishes the theme of oppositional terms in the form of presence and non-presence, and the second chapter conceptually explores the relationship between these pairs as one characterized by “interdependence and mutual generation” (Liu 2006, p. 382). Moreover, terms like “beautiful” and “good” are also moral evaluations, and thus not only necessarily imply their conceptual opposites “ugly” and “not good,” but frame these pairs such that one is socially, politically, and morally affirmed while the other is demonized.

The first chapter of the Zhuangzi likewise establishes the theme of binary opposite terms, using the giant Peng and smaller creatures below him, and further extending it to “large” and “small” consciousness (zhi 知). The large–small distinction is repeated throughout the text, and while some have interpreted it as conveying a spiritual hierarchy of different daos or levels of wisdom (Van Norden 1996, p. 258), it can be, and in the commentarial tradition has been read much like chapter two of the Laozi, as a critique of the hierarchical structure of binaries. A non-hierarchical interpretation of the text’s treatment of these opposites is supported by the text’s first commentator, Guo Xiang:

Everything is sufficient to its nature. The giant Peng does not take himself to be more noble than the small birds and the small birds do not envy going to the Heavenly Pool, but are thriving in abundance. The small and the great each have their own particularity, and this is Wandering.

(Guo 2011, p. 5)

Dissolving any perceived value-laden distinction between large and small, Guo Xiang exhibits a recognition of differences devoid of a hierarchical evaluation, not preferentially weighing either side of the binary. Guo’s interpretation is consistent throughout the passage, with the line “what do these two creatures know” in reference to the large Peng and small Cicada, thus emphasizing that both large and small are equally ignorant, eradicating any perceived hierarchy.

The critique of binary relationships between large and small is fully developed in the second chapter, Qiwu Lun, expanding from consciousness (zhi 知) to language (yan 言). The application of this critique to language in chapter two is foreshadowed in the first sentence. Nan Guozi “releases his breath into the heavens above” and describes to his disciple the piping of heaven, earth, and man. Breath is here both symbolic of and literally a condition for speech, and the piping of earth is described as “tempered attunements, all their cunning contentions” (Ziporyn 2020, p. 12), representing the “arguments over shifei by the mundane people. The producer of the noises has already left, but all the people emotionally grasp onto their own shifei perspective.” (Shi Deqing in Chen 2016, p. 49). Following this metaphorical illustration of speech and contentious discourse, the topic of language and discourse is made explicit, with large and small consciousness described as “idle and spacey” and “cramped and circumspect,” followed by large and small talk described as “bland and flavorless” and “detailed and fragmented.”

The semantics describing “large” and “small” language reaffirms the first chapter’s critique of hierarchically ranking large over small. Chen Guying interprets large and small talk as the speech of “arrogant people” and “those who ceaselessly argue” (Chen 2016, pp. 53–54), respectively. Cao Chuji 曹礎基 describes the tone the text takes towards shifei discourse along similar lines, arguing that

Large and small consciousness, large and small talk, and large and small fears in this section refer to the things said by people in argumentative debate about shifei, and thus should be considered derogatory… These two sentences mean: Those clever folk who think they are correct and fundamentally will not listen to the opinions of others, as well as those people with low and shallow intelligence and ability who are only able to haggle with others over minor peripheral problems.

(Cao 2023, p. 22)

The foolish arrogance and shallow intelligence of those who ceaselessly argue refers to the way in which people often speak past one another when engaged in various forms of emotionally charged debate. The Zhuangzi suggests that this is a result of shi and fei being binary opposites and thus are “interdependent and mutually generating” in the same way that the beautiful and ugly are described in the Laozi.

Extending this insight to the realm of language and discourse, the text shifts to the use of indexical pronouns, “this and that” (bishi 彼是). Within such a linguistic relationship, either side not only always refers to its opposite, but is entirely predicated on it for any meaning whatsoever, and thus “‘thatness’ emerges from ‘thisness,’ and ‘thisness’ follows from ‘thatness.’ This is its theory of the simultaneous generation of the ‘this’ and the ‘that.’” (14). Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 likewise notes the linguistic absurdities that result when hierarchically prioritizing one side of interdependent binaries, particularly when applied to the antagonistic realm of moral discourse and debate:

The small is not independently small- it appears small only in contrast to the large. But likewise, the large cannot be large on its own- it appears large only when set against the small. So the idle and spacey is also cramped and circumspect; the bland and flavorless is also detailed and fragmented. The idle and spacey is used to criticize the small consciousness, ridiculing its narrowness. Conversely, the cramped and circumspect is used to interrogate the vast consciousness, exposing how much it leaves out. The bland and flavorless is used to catch what small speech fails to grasp. Conversely, the detailed and fragmented is used to accentuate the insubstantiality of large talk. Thus, words arise competitively on all sides, taking shape as theories.

(Ziporyn 2009, p. 141)

With a critical awareness that any affirmation of the large implies, is conditioned upon, and even generates the small, it becomes obvious that “ridiculing its narrowness” and “exposing how much it leaves out” are equally absurd. This is no mere accident or the product of an unhealthy culture particular to shifei discourse, but is a function of the very structure of a language and discourse predicated on binaries.

4.3. Semiotic Chains of Cascading Distinctions

According to the first level of the Qiwu Lun’s critique of language, shifei discourse is informed by a preconditioned linguistic structure of oppositional binaries, like right and wrong or acceptable and unacceptable. The inflammatory, yet fundamentally paradoxical language is such that “one side is acceptable and the other side is unacceptable, one side is unacceptable and the other side is acceptable. The cause for [believing] something is right is the cause for [believing] something is wrong. The cause for [believing] something is wrong is the cause for [believing] something is right” (Chen 2016, p. 70). The Zhuangzi’s critique builds on this insight, further problematizing the arbitrary nature of standards by which shifei judgements are made in the first place, a complexity exacerbated by the strong emotional dispositions they evoke. The text introduces this line of argument with Nan Guozi expressing uncertainty about the origins of the perpetually transforming emotional states of “joy and anger, sorrow and happiness, plans and regrets, transformations and stagnations, unguarded abandonment and deliberate posturing” (Ziporyn 2020, p. 12). These mercurial moods, “the emotional responses of those engaged in debate” (Chen 2016, p. 56), both serve as the objects of shifei debates and are the byproduct of this discursive wrangling.

Beyond causing emotional distress, the text further complicates matters, describing these emotional transformations as

something that is always very close to me indeed, and yet still I can never know what is doing the causing here. If there is in fact something in control of causing all this to happen, it is peculiarly devoid of any sign that could identify what it is.

(Ziporyn 2020, p. 12)

What is hypothetically raised as that which is “in control” (zhenzai 真宰) is interpreted as a “natural ruler” (Cao 2023, p. 24) or one’s “genuine heart-mind” (Chen 2016, p. 58). The uncertainty surrounding a final and ultimate “ruler,” or a standard according to which these emotional states and realities (qing 情) might be judged as either shi or fei is continued in the next few lines:

The hundred bones, the nine openings, the six internal organs are all present here as my body. Which one is most dear to me?... If there is a genuine ruler among them, its genuineness would have to be of some kind that is the same whether any definite reality could ever be found for it or not.

(Ziporyn 2020, p. 12)

Proposing and then problematizing the notion of an organ in the body being a “genuine ruler” puts this description in dialogue with one of the mainstream ideas from the Warring States period regarding the origins of moral predispositions, and thus a dependable standard according to which shifei judgements can be made. The most well-known representative of the idea that human beings have an innate emotional predisposition that develops out of the heart is Mencius. Utilizing a number of rhetorical techniques, the Zhuangzi “challenges Mencius’ assumption that one organ naturally deserves to rule the others” (Hansen 1992, p. 278). The most damning and far-reaching critique of shifei disputes, however, revolves around the notion of a “completed mind,” or chengxin 成心.

The usage of chengxin within the Zhuangzi subverts the conventional understanding of cheng 成, an important concept within Confucian moral and political cultivation. The term is conventionally used to mean people or events being accomplished or brought to completion, or as the Analects records, “an exemplary person helps others to accomplish what is good and does not help them to accomplish what is bad.” (Ni 2017, p. 292). The Zhuangzi plays upon the internal paradoxes of this notion to problematize the presumption of any ultimate standard for shifei judgement, the heart–mind in this case:

if we just follow whatever completed form of our minds (chengxin 成心) has so far taken shape, making that our master and teacher, who could ever be without a teacher? That is something even the most ignorant are always doing without fail. It is not as if the mind is first required to know all the alternating states and then actively selects for itself from among them the one to be taken as master and teacher. For the mind to be able to do that before any completed form has already taken shape in it, to make such an affirmation or negation about which form it will regard as right and which as wrong without already having taken some shape-that would be like leaving for Yue today and arriving there yesterday.

(Ziporyn 2020, p. 13)

A chengxin may very well provide a standard for judgement, but the Zhuangzi brings attention to the paradoxical relationship between that which it judges and that on which it is predicated. A “completed mind” is employed to make distinctions between shi and fei, right and wrong, but being “completed” implies already having made a shifei judgement, and thus any chengxin is contingent on prior shifei distinctions. Consequently, the very condition for establishing a standard for shifei distinctions is yet another shifei distinction, and thus “attempting to resolve disagreements over shifei by judging them only introduces new issues of shifei” (Yang 2020, p. 57). Attachment to one amongst many equally arbitrary distinctions suggests that chengxin entails “one who clings to the prejudice of a single view” (Cheng 2011, p. 31) and “a biased mind” (Chen 2016, p. 63). With any shifei distinction being predicated upon prior shifei distinctions, this process gives rise to semiotic chains of cascading distinctions—biased distinctions all the way down—or what the text refers to as the “peculiarly unfixed” (te weiding 特未定) nature of language.

While the text does reference epistemic and psychological dimensions, the “biased minds” of debaters, and “peculiarly unfixed” language, the resulting dogmatic and violent struggles within shifei debate are not primarily attributed to psychological defects, epistemic flaws, or moral failures. The Zhuangzi, and the Qiwu Lun chapter in particular, directly relates a biased mind to discourse and language. Language is affirmed as having “something of which it speaks,” (Ziporyn 2020, p. 13); yet, without a solid foundational standard on which these endless semiotic chains of cascading distinctions can be anchored, language remains “peculiarly unfixed.” Based on the relativistic insight that “there are no objective criteria for right and wrong” (Feng 2024, p. 82), individual partiality obscures dialogue, such that the words of others sound like “the chirping of baby birds” (Ziporyn 2020, p. 13). The issues that arise from the very structure inherent to discourse are not limited to mere linguistic paradoxes and miscommunications, however. Rather, the Qiwu Lun chapter describes the enthusiastic and fanatical consequences of shifei debate resulting from the problematic nature of discourse and language itself.

4.4. Discourse and Fanaticism

The dogmatism with which the Zhuangzi characterizes shifei discourse is associated with more than mere dialectical intransigence, and its moralistic and political connotations can lead to individually, socially, and politically destructive tendencies. As discussed above, arguing for any particular proposition as “right” simultaneously defines that which conflicts with it as “wrong,” paradoxically creating precisely that which one negates, and “hence we have the rights and wrongs of the Confucians and Mohists, each affirming what the other denies and denying what the other affirms” (Ziporyn 2020, p. 14). Compounding the problematic nature of shifei discourse, those affirmations and negations are conveyed with moralistic political language, and thus one not only creates that which they negate, but must also regard it as loathsome, detestable, and an imminent threat to moral and political order. Moral discourse becomes saddled with strong negative emotional attachments that can foster hostile, aggressive, and emotionally charged rhetoric. This element of language reinforces a stubborn allegiance to one’s own position and provokes reactionary opposition toward one’s adversary insofar as “moral language is combative and it serves to justify one’s self, condemn others, or both. It is always rhetorical and acts as a semantics that exploits facts or deeds in order to put oneself in a better light” (Moeller 2009, p. 35). Moralistic shifei discourse, moreover, served a political function in pre-Qin China, informing socio-political norms and state policy, and thus was an arena for officials to advance their reputation and career, or to win the “garlands of honor it itself brings on” (Ziporyn 2020, p. 14). Practical and professional concerns motivated moral posturing and the weaponization of righteousness to defeat one’s enemies and benefit oneself, exacerbating dogmatic intransigence in discourse. As a result of the paradoxical nature of language, and the strong emotional prejudices engendered through moralistic political speech and its socio-political institutionalization, the Zhuangzi presents the contentions over shifei as resulting in a range of psychological maladies that undermine the very socio-political commitments it purports to defend, harming the individual, community, and state.

The intimate relationship between consciousness 知 and talk 言 is expanded beyond the epistemic limitations of discursive structures to a third category, psychologically harmful anxieties, or “fears” (kong 恐). Like consciousness and talk, the text describes them according to a large–small binary, such that “the small fears leave us nervous and depleted, the large fears leave us stunned and blank.” (Ziporyn 2020, p. 12). Small and large fears have been interpreted by contemporary scholars as “the condition of being apprehensive” and “lost in the haze without spirit, driven to distraction” (Chen 2016, p. 54), respectively, or as “terrified and on edge” and “dejected, down and out” (Cao 2023, p. 22). Following the text’s initial characterization of small and large fears, they are further described as having an effect quite different from the apprehension and ennui associated with a “concerned consciousness.” The anxieties that emerge from a language of oppositional binaries and “peculiarly unfixed” standards derived from a biased mind likewise give rise to behaviors more traditionally associated with fanaticism:

Shooting forth like an arrow from a bowstring: thus is our presumption as we arbitrate right and wrong. Holding fast as if to sworn oaths: thus is our defense of our victories. Worn away as if by autumn and winter: such is our daily dwindle.

(Ziporyn 2020, p. 12)

Anxiety underpins the passive despondency of the timid and hopeless, but it also animates the daring of the zealot and obstinacy of the dogmatist, resulting in individually destructive and socially disruptive uncritical over-commitments. The pathological anxiety expressed here parallels the enthusiasm and fanaticism critiqued by European Enlightenment thinkers. In contrast to Hobbes, Hume, and Kant, the Zhuangzi subordinates the epistemic and psychological dimensions—represented by small and large consciousness (zhi 知) and fears (kong 恐)—to the domain of language and discourse, problematizing the discursively conditioned nature of dogmatic pathologies found within the contentions over shifei.

Rather than sourcing fanaticism in epistemic, psychological, or moral failings, they are contextualized in the Zhuangzi as originating from shifei language and discourse. Cheng Xuanying, for example, commented on the three clauses above: “words arise as the mind follows external circumstances, swift as an arrow … words manipulate intentions of right and wrong, like oaths and vows… The ignorant only fight over the empty falsehoods of shi and fei” (Cheng 2011, p. 26). The emphasis is not on language directing us to make the wrong distinction, as this would simply be an argument for an alternative standard for right–wrong, but on the harmful pathologies that inevitably emerge from a fanatical over-commitment to any moralistic/political form of discourse. Linguistically conditioned fanaticism can undermine those very moral and political commitments shifei judgements are meant to affirm, or, as Liu Xiaogan wrote,

Confucianism and other religions or political factions emphasize the distinction between right and wrong, good and evil. This can inspire people to elevate their moral standards and maintain social harmony. However, overemphasizing the principles of right and wrong, good and evil may lead to the suppression of dissent, intensification of conflicts, division of communities, and the destructive consequences of hostility—sometimes even resulting in religious wars and international conflicts.

(Liu 2006, p. 492)

The Zhuangzi’s problematization of an uncritical relationship with language indicates that it is not necessarily notions of right and wrong that lead to fanaticism, but an “overemphasis” on these distinctions. Yang Lihua 楊立華 likewise clarified that the “Zhuangzi wants to eliminate the contentions over shifei, not shifei itself” (Yang 2022). Those who fail to recognize the mutually generating nature of shifei binaries, the arbitrary and biased chengxin on which shifei judgements are made, and the dogmatic and overzealous tendencies produced by such contentions over shifei, exhibit the sort of dogmatic and pathological characteristics commonly associated with fanaticism. Such examples of blind and chauvinistic dogmatism, as well as its noxious effects on both individuals and the political community, are exhibited throughout the Zhuangzi.

4.5. Examples of Discursively Conditioned Fanaticism

The Zhuangzi is replete with stories depicting pathological anxieties elicited by paradoxical and problematic forms of discourse. These discursively conditioned anxieties do not merely cause intense emotional stress for the individual, but also lead to untimely deaths, intractable political conflicts, and even genocidal tendencies. A direct association between language, anxious pathologies, and their fanatical consequences is articulated in chapter four by Confucius instructing Zigao, who, after having been tasked with acting as an envoy to the state of Qi, is riddled with anxiety and “sucking on ice chunks this evening, as if my insides were on fire!” (Ziporyn 2020, p. 38) Confucius warns Zigao of the reckless misuse of language, using imagery resembling that of Nan Guozi’s piping of earth metaphor for shifei debate:

Words are like winds and waves… the rage comes forth for no apparent reason and the cunning words fly off on a tangent like the panicked cries of a dying animal with no time to choose. The breath and vital energy come to a boil and with that everyone becomes bloody-minded. As the feeling of being threatened reaches its zenith, the more unlovely states of mind come with it and nobody even notices it-and if they don’t realize what is happening to them, there is no saying where it will all end!

(Ziporyn 2020, p. 39)

Communication between states, conveyed through envoys like Zigao, can lead to a destructive frenzy described according to characteristics commonly associated with fanaticism, like fragility of self, violent tendencies, and “another notable aspect of fanaticism: it seems to be contagious” (Katsafanas 2024, p. 10). This last characteristic of fanaticism, its contagious nature, is also illustrated in the passages preceding and following the passage featuring Zigao.

Like Zigao, Yan Hui and Yan He are scholar-officials seeking guidance on advising rulers with violently fanatical tendencies. Yan Hui is preparing to serve the ruler of Wei, who “thinks nothing of the death of his people-nationfuls of corpses fill the marshes, clumped in piles like bunches of plantains” (Ziporyn 2020, p. 34). Yan He similarly describes the prince of Wei as one whose “virtue has been made murderous by Heaven.” These passages encapsulate the dilemma for officials trying to mitigate the destructive consequences of fanaticism: “if I find no way to contain him, he will endanger my state, but if I do try to contain him, he will endanger my life.” (Ziporyn 2020, p. 40). Regarding the danger to their lives, their mentors both warn that the logomachy of moralistic shifei is “a way for people to one-up each other” and “a weapon of war” (Ziporyn 2020, p. 35). Yet, avoiding conflict through appeasement is equally dangerous as it risks ideological capture due to the contagious nature of discourse, thereby committing them to the very fanaticism destroying their state. They are cautioned: “if you let the external compromise get inside you, it will topple you, destroy you, collapse you, cripple you” (Ziporyn 2020, p. 40) until “finally your heart and mind will be completely formed by it” (Ziporyn 2020, p. 35). Ancient and contemporary scholars have recognized the danger of becoming entangled within a contagiously fanatical court. Guo Xiang commented that “if it gets inside you, you will be like all the others” (Guo 2011, p. 87), and Wang Bo wrote “if going along turns into ‘entering inside’ then you will be wallowing in the mire with him” (B. Wang 2004, p. 35). Wang Fuzhi similarly used language applicable to mass fanaticism:

The mind is singular, what disturbs it is shifei… the ignorant refuse to yield to the equally ignorant, leading to resentment and inflamed qi. One offends another’s mind and provokes another’s qi… The turmoil escalates until both sides bring disaster upon themselves, leading to death of the self and destruction of states, yet they still claim that their righteous indignation has been vindicated for eternity.

(F. Wang 1976, p. 42)

Thus, Yan Hui’s “anxiety cannot save” him (Ziporyn 2020, p. 34). Rather than freeing the court from its ideological frenzy, he risks either his own death or becoming a fanatic himself and contributing to the destruction of Wei.

A full range of the paradoxical, pathological, and otherwise problematic characteristics of fanaticism and its discursive conditions, as illustrated in the Zhuangzi, can be found in the text’s most comprehensive critique of the conventional socio-political ethos of its time, as articulated in the twenty-ninth chapter featuring Robber Zhi and Confucius. Confucius travels to see the infamous warlord Robber Zhi with the intention of morally rehabilitating him. Rather than repent, however, he rebukes Confucius, whose “crimes are the heaviest of anyone’s” (Ziporyn 2020, p. 239), for his hypocrisy and his role in perpetuating a harmful fanaticism. The consequences of a fanatical commitment to the ethos Confucius champions includes suicides, interstate wars and genocides, and institutional disorder. A number of historical figures whose moral zeal led to their own brutal deaths are listed, according to which “it is inferred that benevolence, righteousness, and ritual teachings are not only useless but also detrimental to human life, contrary to human nature, harmful to the people, and disruptive to society” (D. Wang 2010, p. 131). Beyond self-inflicted harm, Robber Zhi points to the wide-scale destruction and genocide caused by the very sages sanctified by the hegemonic ethos. The Yellow Emperor, for example,

went to war with Chi You in the wilds of Zhuolu, until blood was flowing for a hundred miles around. Then Yao and Shun arose, setting up their throng of ministers. Thereafter Tang banished his own lord, and King Wu murdered Zhou. From that point onward, the strong have oppressed the weak and the many have violently imposed themselves on the few. Everyone from Tang and Wu onward has been just another disrupter of the people.

(Ziporyn 2020, p. 241)

This insidiously destructive fanaticism is described as penetrating the institutions of socio-political order, such that it “confuses the world’s rulers and prevents the world’s scholars from ever returning to their root” (Ziporyn 2020, p. 239). The “disease” of fanaticism, the cause of its violence, destruction, and general disorder, is not presented as belonging to those dimensions that characterize European Enlightenment or contemporary discourse on fanaticism. Rather than laying the blame on epistemically, psychologically, or morally “bad apples,” Robber Zhi describes this fanaticism as stemming directly from an uncritical and excessively moralistic use of a paradoxical form of language and discourse.

In keeping with the critique of language and discourse that runs throughout the text, Robber Zhi specifically accuses Confucius of contributing to this violent and destructive fanaticism with his instrumentalization of language, weaponization of an arbitrary shifei discourse, and exploitation of historical narratives. Upon first hearing that Confucius has come to visit him, he refers to him as “that crafty hypocrite from Lu,” criticizing him for “making up phrases and inventing terms, absurdly singing his panegyrics to King Wu and King Wen” and his “abundance of pretty phrases and ridiculous theories” (Ziporyn 2020, p. 239). Beyond being a mere charlatan, his crimes are much more insidious insofar as he has strategically appropriated moral discourse by “flapping his lips and clicking your tongue, monopolizing the production of judgments of right and wrong” (Ziporyn 2020, p. 239). By “ironically reversing the standard historical narrative of the great Confucian-minded sages who civilized the world into a tale of continuous warfare, slaughter and corruption” (Moeller 2022b, p. 297), Robber Zhi exposes how Confucius molded the hegemonic narrative to not only advance his own particular shifei perspective, but furthermore sanctify and promote a zealous, fanatical commitment to it. Within the historical context of the text, the argument put in the mouth of Robber Zhi is perhaps indicative of the “increasing dissatisfaction with the moralizers’ utilization of history” in pre-Qin texts, and thus “Zhuangzi undermines the validity of the appeals to history as a whole” (Pines 2022, p. 350). As is consistent throughout the text, the Robber Zhi passage does not necessarily criticize devotion to values like “filiality and brotherliness.” Rather, he critiques Confucius’ “insane fixation,” his paradoxical, absurd, and otherwise problematic use of language and moral discourse, which not only represents “a mass of deceitful, crafty, vain, hypocritical hooey” (Ziporyn 2020, pp. 242–43), but leads to the individual pathologies, genocidal wars, and social decay characteristic of fanaticism.

5. Conclusions

Recent years have seen a resurgence of philosophic research on fanaticism and enthusiasm. Paul Katsafanas, a representative figure of this revival, noted the value of continuing and expanding philosophic explorations of the subject as follows:

Precisely because analyzing fanaticism requires integrating epistemic, moral, and agential or psychological concerns, it promises to shed new light not just on fanaticism itself, and not just on the cluster of related states (extremism, zealotry, enthusiasm, dogmatism), but on broader issues in philosophy. To name just a few: the nature of commitment and devotion; the status of ideals; tolerance and intolerance; practical identity or self-conception and its relation to groups and ideals; political psychology; moral agency and responsibility; social pathology.

(Katsafanas 2024, p. 12)

While the Zhuangzi may provide an ancient Chinese response to fanaticism according to some of the categories outlined above, I argue that its contribution extends beyond serving as a mere comparative example, but can meaningfully open discourse on the philosophy of fanaticism. One dimension explored by the Zhuangzi that can contribute to literature on the philosophy of fanaticism—the linguistic and discursive conditions underlying destructive and unhealthy commitments—has not gone unrecognized. Its approach to moralistic speech was explored in Hans-Georg Moeller’s reading of the Zhuangzi as a critique of “moral vigor”, insofar as it is “dangerous and potentially harmful” (Moeller 2009, p.32). Thorsten Botz-Bornstein likewise interpreted the text as a critique of the ethicization of language, drawing parallels to the extremes of “political correctness”, insofar as it “changes names in order to change reality” (Botz-Bornstein 2023, p. 17). In addition to its insights into specific features of language and discourse, however, the Zhuangzi also offers a conceptual vocabulary and framework for critique that can be utilized to explore the linguistic conditions of fanaticism.

The application of the Zhuangzi’s approach to this philosophic problem can be adopted and applied within contemporary academic discourse in the same way that scholars like Michael Sandel have used an Aristotelian approach (see D’Ambrosio and Sarafinas 2024) or Axel Honneth has drawn on Hegel’s approach. We might also imagine a more practical application by adopting methods from the field of Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 1995) to analyze language used in media according to the three elements of the Zhuangzi’s critique outlined above. This is just one way to think about a post-comparative perspective. Here, post-comparative refers not so much to a specific methodology, but simply to a critical recognition of the potential pitfalls of comparative philosophy and an intention to engage in contemporary discourse using non-Western traditions in a way that takes their approaches seriously. While the ideas, methods, and aims of initiatives like post-comparative or trans-cultural philosophy are still evolving, their emergence reflects both a recognition of the limitations of traditional comparative philosophy and a commitment to advance the current state of Chinese philosophy in English-language scholarship. What has been offered here is one way to reflect on how we might make Chinese philosophy no longer merely a curious object of comparison with Western traditions, but how it might engage in philosophic discourse as an equal partner to interaction.