Political Grief and the South Korean Church

Abstract

On the morning of 16 April 2014, the passenger ship Sewol capsized off the coast of Jindo, South Korea. The sinking caused three hundred four deaths, including five missing persons, and one hundred seventy-two survivors. The tragedy triggered tremendous grief and loss for the entire nation. Amid national mourning, the politically and ideologically biased discourses of several church leaders exacerbated the sorrow during this challenging period. This study argues that anti-communism is the primary source of their perspective. This study analyzed the anti-communism perspectives of the two churches with political grief. It concluded that the South Korean church has two distinct perspectives on anti-communism that have been consistently reinforced or challenged within their historical, theological, and socio-political aspects. These differences have influenced the formation of the new assumptive worlds of the two churches.

1. Introduction: The Sewol Ferry Tragedy and the South Korean Church’s Responses

On the morning of 16 April 2014, all South Korean media disseminated urgent breaking news. The passenger ship Sewol was capsizing off the coast of Jindo, South Korea. The announcement astonished the entire nation. At the time, the Sewol ferry carried four hundred forty-three passengers and thirty-three crew members, totaling four hundred seventy-six individuals. South Koreans hoped for the rescue of many more people; however, contrary to these genuine hopes, the inadequacy of the early rescue operations and the government’s inaction resulted in the loss of many lives (Moon 2022). The sinking caused three hundred four deaths, which included five missing persons, and one hundred seventy-two survived (“ibid.”, p. 10). The majority of the deceased, a total of two hundred fifty, were young students. The individuals were from Danwon High School in Ansan, participating in a school excursion to Jeju Island. The tragedy triggered tremendous grief and loss for the entire nation. It represented collective grief, affecting both communities and individuals, and “this preventable tragedy caused national trauma and ongoing political upheaval” (Kim 2020).

The government’s attitude during the rescue operation caused enormous public outrage and resulted in even deeper grief. President Park Geun-hye (2013–2017), who the public expected to take control of the tragedy, was inactive for seven hours on that day. The seven hours spanned from 10:20 a.m., when she was initially debriefed, until 5:15 p.m., when she visited the Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters in Seoul. The absence of leadership of the president in the rescue mission squandered the critical moment for rescue. The absence resulted in the government’s rescue response failing at the beginning of the disaster, which led to even greater casualties. The rescue operation at the location was also inadequately executed. A multitude of individuals sought clarification over the president’s mysterious seven-hour absence.

A particular moment painfully exemplifies this tragedy. The captain and certain crew members, who were responsible for saving the passengers, failed to implement basic rescue protocols, such as wearing life jackets, and merely instructed passengers: “Do not move. Just stay where you are.” (“가만히 있으라”). Most students followed the announcement and remained in place. This resulted in a significant percentage of victims being students. However, shortly after making the announcement, these staff members hurriedly left the vessel and were rescued. They prioritized their rescue over the safety of their passengers. This overlapped with the irresponsibility of the government, highlighting the situation on that day. “The hope that the state would mobilize all its forces to save its citizens sank with the Sewol. On the day of the Sewol ferry disaster, the pan-government response failed, and the control tower was completely absent.” (Moon 2022).

Amid national mourning, all religious groups in South Korea, including the South Korean church, collectively articulated a desire for the safe rescue of all missing individuals, along with the entire people of the country. They provided support and solace to the victims and the bereaved families experiencing grief. Nonetheless, harsh remarks from several church leaders exacerbated the sorrow during this challenging period. Instead of genuinely mourning the vulnerable individuals, they deliberately provoked political and ideological discourses.

A megachurch pastor commented on the Sewol disaster during his Sunday sermon. “God did not sink the Sewol without a reason. The nation is about to sink, but God is trying to stop it. By sinking these young students, these beautiful children, God is giving the people a chance” (Jung 2014). His sermon could be interpreted as saying that God caused the Sewol ferry disaster to give the Korean people a chance to redeem their country. Regardless of his intentions, the sermon implied that God used the Sewol disaster as a “scapegoat” to achieve a higher goal, namely, the redemption of the nation in this context.

Another pastor stated, “Who likes the Sewol ferry accident? Only Jwapa (좌파, the leftists) and Jongbuk (종북, pro-North Korean) are happy about the Sewol ferry disaster. They are jumping up and down with joy as they attend a memorial service” (Hankyoreh 2014). He asserted that Jwapa and Jongbuk were not grieving over the Sewol ferry tragedy. Instead, he framed them as rejoicing, even as they held funerals for the deceased. He purposely distorted the Sewol disaster politically by employing ideological terms such as Jwapa and Jongbuk in his discourse. These two terms in Korean imply an anti-communist perspective. Jwapa signifies that a leftist belongs to a progressive or radical faction within a group or political party; Jongbuk denotes a follower of North Korea’s ruling party, the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), and its leader’s policies and ideology.

A missionary and his members, opposing the enactment of a special law, “Special Act on Investigating the Truth of the April 16 Sewol Ferry Disaster and Building a Safe Society”, stated, “The Sewol Special Law is nonsense; the entire nation is against it. Return to North Korea, Jongbuk factions” (Jang 2014). They intentionally ignored the purpose of the Sewol Special Act. They adhered to the same reasoning as a former pastor’s anti-communist perspective. This framing was politically motivated and characterized supporters of the Special Law as anti-communist opponents of the government (E. H. Lee 2014). However, contrary to their claim, the enactment of a special law was an essential step to facilitate further investigation into the Sewol tragedy. Article I of the special law (“Purpose”) explicitly states the purposes of this Act: “to ascertain the truth concerning the causes of the disaster, the procedures followed to manage the disaster, follow-up measures, etc.; to identify the locus of responsibility; to provide support to victims; and to build and establish a safe society by formulating measures for preventing and responding to further accidents and disasters” (KLRI 2014).

Although not directly associated with these above discourses, the severity of the wounds can be gauged through an interview with bereaved families of the Sewol ferry disaster in a newspaper article one year after the tragedy.

76 parents in the families of the Sewol ferry victims were Christians. But I think 80% of them have left the church they used to attend. The remaining 20% of the parents are still going to church, trudging along, holding onto their wounds…. Deacon Choi, the mother of Lee Chang-hyun, a victim of the Sewol ferry tragedy, said, “During their sermons, pastors sometimes talk about the government’s announcement or inaccurate information known to the public. We, the victims, are deeply hurt in these situations” and “The pastor often makes public statements based solely on information from other sources, like the government, rather than the stories of the bereaved families, which makes many parents reluctant to go to church”.

(PCKWorld 2015)

The actions of bereaved parents in leaving the church demonstrated their understanding that both the government and the churches had prioritized the same ideological value over the grief of the bereaved families.

The politically and ideologically biased discourses of these church leaders, along with the pain of bereaved families, served as the foundation for this study. This study raises two questions: Why are they unable to mourn the grief as it is? What is the reasoning behind their ideological and political interpretation of this tragedy? With these questions, this study argues that anti-communism is the primary source of their perspective on this phenomenon. This study aims to investigate anti-communism, the primary cause of political grief in the South Korean church. It examines the South Korean church’s stance on anti-communism through the lens of political grief, with a particular emphasis on the notions of the assumptive world and shattered assumptions. For this purpose, this study will clarify the concept of political grief with these two notions and analyze historical, theological, and socio-political aspects of anti-communism in the South Korean church. Subsequently, it will examine and compare theological differences between South Korean churches based on Harris’ three core concepts of the assumptive world to elucidate the influence of anti-communism in the South Korean church.

2. Political Grief and Anti-Communism in the South Korean Church

This section of the study initially defines the concept of political grief and two related notions: the assumptive world and shattered assumptions. It serves as the theoretical basis for explaining anti-communism within the South Korean church. Additionally, this study investigates significant aspects that impact anti-communism within the South Korean church. It is crucial to define the meaning of the “South Korean church” as employed in this study for a comprehensive discussion. The South Korean church in this study is the Protestant church in South Korea. The latest statistics indicate that the overall population of Protestant churches is almost 20% (KOSIS 2015). The South Korean church comprises 374 Protestant denominations and 286 denominations under the umbrella of the “Presbyterian Church of Korea” (MCST 2018). Due to time constraints and physical limitations, it is difficult to compare and analyze the perceptions of all denominations. This study focuses on two organizations in the South Korean church: the National Council of Churches in Korea (NCCK, 1924–), which challenges anti-communism, and the Christian Council of Korea (CCK, 1989–), which reinforces it. The establishment of the CCK was in strong opposition to the NCCK’s 88 Declaration (1988), which included a confession of guilt for division and anti-communism. However, the history of the CCK does not encompass the entire development of anti-communism in South Korea (1948–), and within a particular denomination or religion, individuals exhibit diverse tendencies: they are joined and organized based on their stances of opposition to or support for anti-communism. Thus, this study classifies two contrasting perspectives on anti-communism: the conservative church, which reinforces anti-communism, and the progressive church, which challenges it.

2.1. Definition of Political Grief and the South Korean Church’s Political Grief

Grief is closely associated with “the personal response to loss” (Harris 2022). Generally, grief is defined as the emotional reaction to the personal loss of a loved one. Recent research suggests there can be a political form of grief. Harries identifies two distinct dimensions of political grief (“ibid.”): 1. A poignant sense of assault to the assumptive world of those who struggle with the ideology and practices of their governing bodies and those who hold political power. 2. Direct losses that are experienced by individuals as a result of political policies, ideologies, and oppression enacted and/or empowered at the socio-political levels. According to these perspectives, political grief refers to losses due to political reasons (“ibid.”).

A further study suggests that the contexts in which political grief arises and is experienced have become increasingly varied at “micro, mezzo, and macro levels” (Winokuer and Harris 2012, p. 225). These levels precisely refer to layers of human experience (Harris 2022). The micro level is the personal level; the mezzo level is the larger social community; and the macro level is the structural and political level of experience. Political grief might be characterized as collective grief on a macro level. Collective grief occurs when significant societal events cause emotional distress for a significant number of people (Ken 2024). Political grief cannot be confined to a singular domain. This phenomenon, while observed at the collective macro level, directly affects individual lives; both individuals and collectives experience grief.

This research also examines two concepts relevant to political grief. The first is the assumptive world. This is the inherent cognitive framework that understands and interprets the self and the world around us. Bowlby (1969) defines the cognitive framework as “working models of the self and of the world”, while Parkes (1975) expands the internal working model to encompass the assumptive world. Harris (2022) delineates three core concepts that comprise the assumptive world: 1. How we find safety in the world. 2. How we believe things work and why events happen. 3. Our view of ourselves and how we fit into our social spheres. When these three concepts are fulfilled, our assumptive world remains complete and unbroken. However, Janoff-Bulman (1992) argues that our assumptive world might be challenged and shattered by life events that contradict our self-perception and understanding of the world around us; consequently, we reconstruct a new assumptive world.

The political grief of the South Korean church can be understood through these theoretical frameworks.

The South Korean church lost its political/ideological world (“the assumptive world”) due to ideological conflicts caused by the Cold War, including the Korean War (1950–1953) (Figure 1). These conflicts shattered the assumptive worldview and generated “political grief” within the South Korean church. The grief constituted a traumatic experience. The two churches rebuilt their new assumptive worlds. This study asserts that the conservative church’s new assumptive world aims to construct and reinforce anti-communism, and it is perceived that the trauma remains unresolved and has been exacerbated negatively. In contrast, the progressive church’s new assumptive world seeks to deconstruct and transcend the ideology. This study assumes that their traumatic experience has been resolved and constructed positively. This study analyzes the implications of the two assumptions by comparing the perspectives of the two churches on anti-communism. However, this process did not happen all at once but rather through a historical process. Thus, it is crucial to recognize the historical, theological, and socio-political aspects that have influenced the emergence of anti-communism in the South Korean church.

2.2. The Two Churches’ Views on Anti-Communism

Political grief resulting from traumatic experiences has influenced the conservative and progressive churches’ perceptions of anti-communism. The perception shapes the view of North Korea as either an enemy or a friend. To examine the new assumptive worlds of the two churches concerning anti-communism, it is essential to investigate the meaning of anti-communism that they uphold. This study examines three aspects: historical, theological, and socio-political aspects. This study explores these three aspects because anti-communism has changed over time and continues in both churches (“historical aspect”). The two churches have responded to these changes (“theological aspect”). For the socio-political aspect, the South Korean church’s anti-communist perspective is influenced by the political orientation of the government, predominantly conservative and progressive governments. However, this study cannot encompass all elements at the same time; therefore, it focuses on the significant anti-communist features of both conservative and progressive churches in each aspect.

• Historical aspect

Conservative and progressive churches in South Korea hold divergent stances on anti-communism. However, the two churches did not initially have opposing views on it; they had the same stance on anti-communism and North Korea. Their identification of North Korea as the enemy stems from their own experiences of loss. The conservative church has maintained and reinforced this viewpoint since independence from Japan in 1945, but the progressive church has altered and deconstructed it since the 1970s.

After Korea’s liberation from Japan in 1945, the US–Soviet Joint Committee established a trusteeship over the Korean Peninsula from 1945 to 1948, leading to a political and ideological division: the United States governed the South, while the Soviet Union administered the North. The committee drew the 38th parallel as a physical demarcation to define the limits of each side’s jurisdiction. Following the trusteeship, the two Koreas established their own leadership in 1948: the Rhee Syng-man government in the South was founded on American capitalism, whereas the Kim Il-sung regime in the North was initially built on Soviet communism. In this context, the physical and ideological division, along with the painful experience of the Korean War (1950–1953), strengthened anti-communism, which in turn solidified a negative attitude toward North Korea. In addition, Christians who fled North Korea significantly contributed to this. A considerable number of Christians from the North relocated to the South to escape communism (Kang 2008). They exhibited a vehemently antagonistic attitude toward communism and North Korea. Their relocation exacerbated ideological disputes throughout South Korean society and the church.

Despite these experiences of loss, however, since the 1970s, the progressive church has offered a different perspective on North Korea and anti-communism. The progressives regard North Korea as a friend and have exerted significant efforts to transcend the prevailing ideology. The experience of the May 18 Democratic Uprising (1980) inspired the progressives to overcome the division of the Korean Peninsula. Before the tragedy, the progressive church mainly focused on the democratization and human rights movements in the 1970s. However, the prospect of democratization following Park’s authoritarian regime (1963–1979) was curtailed by the resurgence of Chun’s military dictatorship. According to Lee Sam-yeol, with the May 18 Democratic Uprising, the progressive “became acutely aware that overcoming national divisions and achieving reunification is essential for true democracy.” (S.-y. Lee 1988). Consequently, the emphasis on democratization shifted to resolving the division of the Korean Peninsula. This movement compelled the South Korean progressive church to confront the division and reunification of the Korean Peninsula, and they invested significant effort to achieve this objective.

The National Council of Churches in Korea (NCCK), presented as the progressive ecumenical organization in South Korea, conducted multiple international consultations supported by the World Council of Churches (WCC) and international churches: the Tozanso Consultation (1984), the Glion Conferences (1986, 1988, 1990, and 1995), and the WCC’s World Convocation on Justice, Peace, and the Integrity of Creation (JPIC, 1990). The main aim of the consultations was to establish an environment for church leaders from North Korea and South Korea to discuss peace and reunification on the Korean Peninsula and to develop guiding principles on this matter. During these solidarity endeavors, leaders from South and North Korean churches convened for historic talks, promoting continuous interaction between the two congregations. Ultimately, the NCCK promulgated the 88 Declaration regarding the division and reunification of the Korean Peninsula, which incorporated a unique theological perspective on structural sin and a confession of the peninsula’s division and anti-communism.

However, while the NCCK’s 88 Declaration introduced a new alternative theology for the division of the Korean Peninsula, it also fueled the conservative churches’ sense of crisis. The Christian Council of Korea (CCK) was established in staunch opposition to the declaration. Since then, the two church organizations have been the representative positions of the South Korean church in relation to anti-communism.

B.

Theological aspect

Both churches expressed their theological positions on anti-communism. The conservative church developed a theological justification that unequivocally designated communism and North Korea as enemies, based on their historical experiences of loss; in contrast, the progressive church dismantled the conservative church’s framework and presented an alternative theological perspective on the division of the Korean Peninsula like the 88 Declaration.

The conservative church’s theological view of anti-communism defines communism as atheism. North Korea, which is based on anti-communism, is an atheist state. In contrast, Christianity becomes theism. This difference soon forms a tense relationship between atheism and theism. From their standpoint, all those who do not believe in God become “God’s enemies”. Subsequently, the church characterizes this atheistic state as an enemy of God. This tension is strengthened by their eschatological interpretation. They interpret the apocalypse as the end of the world, and they interpret this world as a spiritual war between good and evil, like the war of Armageddon in the Book of Revelation. Therefore, this eschatological interpretation is that North and South Korea will become atheistic and theistic countries, and this will be a battle between evil and good in terms of a spiritual war. The employment of violence and curses against them is hence theologically legitimized. Many pastors have had this perception, and sermons based on this viewpoint can be used to promote persistent hostility and demonization of North Korea within the South Korean church.

The progressive church, however, considers North Korea as a friend. The church provides alternate perspectives on North Korea and the North–South divide. In 1988, the NCCK issued the 88 Declaration. The declaration refers to the division of the Korean Peninsula as “the result of the structural sins of the Cold War system, and the cause of structural sins within North and South Korean society” (NCCK 2000, p. 104). Lee Sam-yeol, one of the authors of the 88 Declaration, explains why the NCCK needs to see structural evil as such: “When we fail to see the division itself as an evil and try to see the cause of the tragedy in the consequences of the division, we will not be able to understand the problems of the divided system, nor will we be able to grasp the way to overcome the division” (S.-y. Lee 2019, pp. 21–22). His remarks provide insights into the perception of structural evil in the 88 Declaration. At the same time, it demonstrates the perspective of the South Korean progressive church on the underlying causes and solutions to the Korean peninsula’s division and the problems that result from it.

C.

Socio-political aspect

The social dimension is inherently political, as the Peninsula’s divide is intricately connected to governmental policies. In particular, the discussion of unification of the divided Korean Peninsula has been strongly driven by the government. The government’s policies influenced the church in this context. Given this political context, starting with the Kim Dae-jung government (1998–2003), there have been changes in the church in relation to politics. The Kim administration was the first progressive government in South Korea’s modern history to successfully implement a regime change. This administration’s perspective on North Korea and its actions markedly diverged from those of preceding administrations. This change has brought about unprecedented transformations in relations with North Korea and anti-communism. Therefore, this study analyzes the role of the church and the governments prior to (1948–1998) and since (1998–present) Kim’s government.

Successive governments propagated anti-communism for an extended period prior to Kim’s government. The conservative church strongly supported the policies of these previous governments because of their strong anti-communist stance. In particular, the first South Korean government, led by Rhee Syng-man (1948–1960), envisioned building a Christian nation based on staunch anti-communism. In this regard, the church became a strong supporter. Despite the fact that Park Chung-hee’s regime (1963–1979) was a military dictatorship, he was in favor of the ideology, given its relationship with North Korea. After Park’s regime, the governments of Chun Doo-hwan (1980–1988), Roh Tae-woo (1988–1993), and Kim Young-sam (1993–1998) also maintained anti-communism.

Since Kim’s administration, progressive and conservative governments have alternated in power, and churches have aligned themselves with these governments’ political tendencies. The political stances of the regime, primarily based on conservative and progressive views, have profoundly influenced North Korea’s cooperative initiatives, as per the policies of the governments. The progressive governments, led by Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003), Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008), and Moon Jae-in (2017–2022), stressed the improvement of relations with North Korea and engaged in various political initiatives for better relations. However, the conservative governments, led by Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013), Park Geun-hye (2013–2017), and Yoon Suk-yeol (2022–2025), employed a passive strategy toward mending relations, prioritizing South Korea’s national security. The absence of trust between the conservative administrations and the North Korean leadership hindered any possible transition between North and South Korea. As a result, the progressive church has supported progressive governments and criticized conservative ones. Conversely, the conservative church has been strongly supportive of the conservative governments and strongly critical of the progressive ones. This environment intensified deep divisions and political polarization between advocates of anti-communism and those aiming to overcome them (“ibid.”, Harris 2022, p. 586).

3. The Two Churches’ New Assumptive Worlds

This section presents a comparison between the conservatives and the progressives, focusing on new assumptive worlds after experiencing political grief. It examines and compares the distinctions between the two churches, focusing on three core concepts that form the assumptive world: 1. How we find safety in the world. 2. How we believe things work and why events happen. 3. Our view of ourselves and how we fit into our social spheres. Specifically, this study examines these three perspectives with a focus on the theological characteristics of the two churches.

3.1. How We Find Safety in the World

The first core concept is safety. The conservative and progressive churches experienced significant losses as a result of ideological conflicts caused by the Cold War. The experience of loss challenged and shattered the assumptive world that there is safety in the world. The circumstances intensified the need for protection. To address the first subject between the two churches, we must focus on two primary aspects: the definition of safety and how to find (or view) it.

First of all, the question of how to define safety is closely associated with how the two churches perceive anti-communism and, more specifically, North Korea. As we have seen, the conservative church views North Korea as an enemy, and the progressive church regards them as a friend. With this perspective, the conservatives regard safety as protecting them from their enemies, while the progressives interpret safety as being with those they consider friends. Therefore, the conservatives value national security by force because they need to protect themselves from enemies. Recognizing that national safety corresponds to individual safety, it is asserted that national security should be founded on strength, particularly the nation’s military and economic capabilities. The pursuit of strong security has manifested as formidable security, especially in the domain of national security. The division framework designates North Korea as the main enemy of national security. The conservative church has historically regarded North Korea as the primary antagonist and has prioritized national security for its protection. As a result, they continue to ideologically and theologically justify their anti-communist ideology and arms race with North Korea.

The progressive church, however, differs from the conservative church in its interpretation of safety and security. Initially, the progressives sided with the conservatives over communism and North Korea. However, influenced by Minjung theology and the human rights and democratization movements of the 1970s, the emphasis shifted from a state-centric perspective to one centered on the individual, particularly the public. Minjung theology demonstrated a keen awareness of the socio-economic structure that oppressed the Minjung (ordinary people in Korean, “민중”) and resisted social injustice to address their grievances and suffering. The division of the Korean Peninsula emerged as a critical issue for the progressive church after the May 18 Democratic Uprising in 1980. These efforts prompted the progressive church to develop a new perspective on security in collaboration with the World Council of Churches (WCC) and international churches in the 1980s. The WCC organized the Consultation on Peace and Justice in Northeast Asia in 1984 (Tozanso International Consultation). For the first time, the consultation addressed the division of the Korean Peninsula, peace in Northeast Asia, and the arms race. It was specifically stated in the final statement that “military spending, which accounts for 30–40% of national budgets and 6–10% of GDP, bears the economic burden on both sides. This is a massive sum of money that has the potential to seriously stymie or even halt national development.” (NCCK 2000, p. 39). The progressive church identified all of these problems as an outcome of the division structure, the resulting arms race and conflict, and the legitimacy of the dictatorial ruling system.

Another dimension is how to realize this safety. The first premise is to strengthen national security, and the second is to mitigate it. However, this study considers this at a theological level. This is associated with the next two topics. The conservative church sees the elimination of its enemies as promoting its own safety and thus justifies it theologically. The progressive church, on the other hand, deconstructs the concept of the enemy used by the conservatives. This can be seen specifically in their theology of sin. The conservatives, under the division structure, constantly make enemies on the basis of anti-communism: Yonggong and Jongbuk Jwapa (“the Red Scare”, a pro-North Korean organization or government) and Jonguk Gay (“the Red Scare” and “homophobia”, a pro-North Korean gay person) (J. S. Lee 2018). Their enemies are ideological, particularly from an anti-communist standpoint since 1948. The conservative church designates those with differing ideas as sinners and exhibits profound animosity toward them through the doctrines of original sin and total depravity. The conservative church is skillfully utilizing the theological concept of sin to rationalize its political goal. The concept serves as a crucial instrument for recognizing and mitigating threats to their religious ideals.

The progressive church, however, challenges the conservative’s understanding. The progressives portray individuals denounced by conservatives not as sinners but as socially marginalized individuals. The significant difference in perception is evident in the doctrine of sin between the two churches. The conservative underscores human depravity and focuses on the individual dimensions of the relationship with God. In contrast, the progressive church emphasizes human avarice as a prevailing type of sin rather than human depravity, incorporating both social and structural aspects of sin. In this regard, the progressive church’s perspective is completely different. Yonggong and Jongbuk Jwapa are an organization or a government that works to overcome the division of the Korean Peninsula, and a Jonguk gay person is LGBTQ, who is an outcast in the South Korean society and the church (S. Park 2025).

3.2. How We Believe Things Work and Why Events Happen

The second core concept concerns an individual’s or an organization’s views and interpretations of the experience of loss. In the case of both conservative and progressive churches, their working principles are based on their theology. This approach provides a deeper understanding of their circumstances. In this core concept, their perspectives on salvation have a profound impact on the understanding of loss caused by anti-communism.

Initially, the conservative church conceptualizes salvation as a theological justification for interpreting their circumstances. Their salvation provides an important foundation for understanding the difficulties one faces through a theological and teleological interpretation of their situation. Like the first pastor’s sermon in the introduction of this study, the conservative church perceives the nation’s difficulties, including the Japanese occupation, the Korean War, and the Sewol tragedy, as God’s dispensation and a means to attain salvation. They believe that God allows the nation’s sufferings to convert South Korea to a Christian nation and subsequently spread the gospel throughout Southeast Asia.

However, this teleological interpretation of the conservatives offers a destructive theological justification. In the context of North Korea and anti-communism, salvation could potentially serve as a theological rationale for the destruction of the country and its ideology. The path to salvation from these threats requires their exclusion or elimination. They perceive this as an act of salvation. This viewpoint maintained the dichotomous worldviews of North versus South, evil versus good, and atheism versus theism. The objective of salvation is to perpetuate the framework of separation and to safeguard oneself against the obstacles to redemption. Most importantly, the conservative church regards the war against communism as unavoidable because it is a battle of ideas, a clash between theism and atheism. The church did highlight the role of Christians in this battle and God’s plan for it.

However, the progressive church contests this perspective on salvation. The objective of salvation is to transcend the grief and separation caused by the division of the Korean Peninsula by endeavoring to surmount challenging reality rather than acquiescing to it. Salvation entails the pursuit of peace and the resolution of the division. To achieve this, the progressive church needs to alter the perception of North Korea. The progressives promote overcoming animosity toward North Korea. This acknowledgment emphasizes that our Christian vocation is to serve as peacemakers and apostles in this challenging reality, necessitating our efforts to transcend the ideological conflict. This specifically entails addressing and altering both overt conflicts and covert institutional violence. For them, salvation signifies the achievement of liberation from the oppression of individuals and communities. As all these realities emerge from a structure of division, transcending our losses necessitates dismantling the institutions of separation and the anti-communism that theoretically underpins them.

Christians who confess structural sins like the division of the Korean Peninsula are given new visions and opportunities to overcome the harsh realities of oppression. The new vision motivates the progressive church to create new solutions to the problem. They are more concerned with the root cause of the division and define overcoming it as a new vision: liberation, a new heaven, and a new earth (NRSV, Revelation 21:1). This new vision is based on harsh realities: the liberation of the Exodus is based on the harsh realities of the enslavement (=sin) (W. Park 2019, p. 151) of the Israelites in Egypt, and the Revelation to John is based on the harsh realities of the oppression of the Roman Empire at that time (=suffering, crying, and being killed) (“ibid., p. 191”). However, in the midst of these harsh realities, God provided the liberation of the Exodus and the promise of a new heaven and a new earth. Similarly, in the face of the harsh reality of the division and the many social injustices that have resulted from it, the NCCK urges people to remember the vision that God has given us. In the end, this vision of liberation and a new heaven and a new earth becomes the theological motivation to overcome the unjust reality.

3.3. Our View of Ourselves and How We Fit into Our Social Sphere

The final concept involves fitting into our social spheres. Regarding anti-communism, the two churches’ interpretations of social reality simultaneously reinforce anti-communism in certain aspects while undermining it in others. Their eschatological interpretations illustrate these differing perspectives.

The conservative church interprets the battle between communism and anti-communism through an eschatological lens. An essential element of this eschatology is the perception of a battle between good and evil. The apocalyptic perspective is understood as the end of the world. This dichotomous approach views the world as a battleground between good and evil, with a perception of constant spiritual warfare. Therefore, on their side, Christianity, which is absolute good, and communism, which is absolute evil, are also constantly at war, and victory in this war is perceived as the destruction of communism. The dichotomy adds a militant element to this ideological confrontation. In this way, communism is associated with apocalyptic views and dualism, and it is positioned as an absolute evil because anti-communism is atheism. Thus, Christianity’s theism should triumph. The conservative church recognizes this victory as God’s salvation.

However, the progressive church possesses a distinct perspective on eschatology compared to the conservative church. Instead of perceiving life as a spiritual warfare between good and evil, it interprets the fundamental significance of the conclusion as a new hope capable of transcending the grim realities of the current circumstances. Consequently, the authentic meaning of the end is to realize the vision of a new heaven and a new earth. The 88 Declaration articulates the division of the Korean Peninsula effectively. The progressive Church asserts that it embodies Christ’s apostles of peace, striving to realize this vision. It aims to transcend reality and foster renewed optimism.

The gospel of liberation identified the end times in a different way. It has the vision of a new heaven and a new earth. This is specifically related to apocalyptic literature, especially the Revelation to John. Previously, apocalyptic literature was interpreted as the end times, and the most important thing in these end times was the victory over Armageddon. However, the progressive church’s interpretation of the end times is different. This is basically a divergence in the interpretation of the apocalypse. The apocalypse is not perceived as a time of end but as a time of new beginnings to overcome the dark manifestation (“restoration and reversal”) (Hellholm 1983). This is why the meaning of this new beginning is expressed as a new heaven and a new earth. This new apocalypse is not an apocalypse of destruction but of life. The end is a force of new creation and change, rather than a destructive force. Just as Jesus Christ’s crucifixion and resurrection gave the church and Christians the vision of a new heaven and new earth, this apocalypse gives them the strength and courage to overcome difficult situations. It becomes the force that allows for new vision and change. This eschatology is referred to as “transformative eschatology” (Moltmann 2012, pp. 35–43).

4. Conclusions

This study was reinstated in response to the ideologically and politically biased discourses of church leaders and the pain of bereaved families during the Sewol ferry tragedy. This study argued that anti-communism is the primary source of their perspective on this phenomenon. It aimed to investigate anti-communism, the primary cause of political grief in the South Korean church. Thus, based on this scholarly content, it was argued that the political grief that the South Korean churches experienced shattered their existing assumptive world due to the ideological conflict caused by the Cold War, and they subsequently formed new assumptive worlds.

In particular, this study examined anti-communism in the South Korean church based on historical, theological, and socio-political aspects. Historically, the conservative church has upheld and strengthened this perspective since independence from Japan in 1945, whereas the progressive church has modified and deconstructed it since the 1970s. Since the formation of the CCK in 1989, the NCCK and the CCK have served as the representative entities of the South Korean church concerning anti-communism. Theologically, the two churches articulated their theological stances on anti-communism. The conservative church formulated a theological rationale that distinctly identified communism and North Korea as enemies, grounded in their past experiences of loss. Conversely, the progressive church deconstructed the conservative church’s framework and offered an alternative theological viewpoint about the division of the Korean Peninsula, exemplified by the 88 Declaration. Socio-politically, the government’s policies impact the church. Since the Kim Dae-jung administration (1998–2003), progressive and conservative governments have cycled in power. The progressive church has endorsed progressive governments and condemned conservative ones. The conservative church has consistently supported conservative governments such as that of President Park Geun-hye at the time of the Sewol tragedy, while vehemently opposing progressive ones.

Based on these aspects, this study compared the two churches’ new assumptive worlds. This difference in perception is associated with the interpretation of traumatic experiences. Due to the experience of loss, the conservative church viewed North Korea as an enemy, while the progressive church regarded them as a friend. This difference in perception naturally affected the new assumptions. The new assumptive world of the conservative church has constructed and reinforced anti-communism. However, the progressive church has deconstructed and transcended anti-communism. Their perspective was articulated by their interpretations of sin, salvation, and eschatology in Harris’ three core concepts of the assumptive world.

The conservative church finds safety in protecting itself from enemies and, therefore, values strong national security. In order to eliminate these enemies, the conservatives theologically identify them as sinners. This aligns with their understanding of salvation. Their salvation is a perspective that enabled them to overcome the difficult reality they faced, but on the other hand, it is interpreted as winning the battle against those whom they defined as enemies or sinners. How this salvation is practiced in this world, which is related to eschatology, affects its perception. They understand the conflict between communism and anti-communism from an eschatological perspective. Victory over them constitutes salvation, and the strategies employed to attain this goal are theologically justifiable.

The progressive church, however, challenges the conservative’s understanding. The progressives portray individuals denounced by conservatives not as sinners but as socially marginalized individuals, incorporating both social and structural aspects of sin. The progressives interpret God’s salvation as transcending the division of the Korean Peninsula based on mutual trust, achieved by restoring relations with North Korea and alleviating the political grief stemming from the division. Their understanding of the apocalypse is not a time of end but a time of a “new hope” for a “new heaven and a new earth”.

This research has analyzed the anti-communism perspectives of these two churches with political grief. This study concludes that the South Korean church has two distinct perspectives on anti-communism that have been consistently reinforced or challenged based on their historical, theological, and socio-political aspects. These differences have influenced the formation of the new assumptive worlds of the two churches. This suggests that the ideologically and politically biased discourses of certain church leaders during the Sewol ferry tragedy were feasible. This action was executed with the political aim of endorsing the conservative government at that time. Consequently, they disregarded the grief of the bereaved families who were enduring the sorrow of the tragedy.