On Responsibility: Islamic Ethical Thought Engages with Jewish Ethical Thought

Abstract

A remarkable amount of work on the study of Islamic ethical thought is published annually, covering an unprecedented variety of topics and themes. Yet despite the strides made, these debates have not addressed vital questions about how Islamic ethical thought can contribute to ongoing discourses that affect not only the Muslim community but society at large. In other words, how can we bring Islamic ethical thought into systematic engagement with modern philosophy? Specifically, how can Islamic ethical thought learn from contemporary philosophy, as it learned from Greek philosophy in the Middle Ages? And how might it be possible to develop Islamic ethical thought that can withstand both religious and rational scrutiny? In this programmatic overview, I respond to these questions by engaging with responsibility ethics within and beyond the Islamic tradition. As much as the debate about ethics has reached new heights in contemporary philosophical discourses, so too has the debate about responsibility re-emerged in theological discourses. In this paper, I bring into conversation the thought of Taha Abdurrahman on responsibility, which is nested within his larger paradigm of contemporary Islamic ethics, and Jewish thinker Hans Jonas’ concept of an ethics of responsibility. I argue that orchestrating this scholarly dialog between a 20th-century German Jewish thinker (Jonas) and a contemporary Muslim thinker (Abdurrahman) can lead to both a productive and constructive elaboration of Islamic ethical thought. Furthermore, I suggest that Habermas’ philosophy can serve as a bridge in this discussion, facilitating a comparative exploration of the ethical frameworks presented by both thinkers. By engaging with Habermas, we can highlight how Islamic thought can approach modernity, including philosophical debates, in a manner similar to that of 20th-century Jewish scholars like Jonas. This engagement not only enhances our understanding of responsibility within these traditions but also underscores the potential for interdisciplinary dialog in navigating contemporary ethical challenges.

1. Introduction

The theological history of Islam entails myriad debates that utilize Islamic ethical concepts that parallel or intersect with modern philosophical discourses. In this paper, I focus on discourses on responsibility ethics by at once drawing on debates from within Islamic thought and those from outside, specifically, from Jewish thought. To do so, I engage with the works of Taha Abdurrahman and Hans Jonas on moral agency and responsibility.

The specific term “Responsibility Ethics” originated in modern intellectual thought first in the social sciences and soon after in philosophy. Sociologist Max Weber spoke of responsibility ethics as a way in which to conceptualize the ethical obligations of humanistic and social scientific scholars (O’Donavan 2011). Hans Jonas has been acknowledged as the first thinker to conceptualize an ethics of responsibility as a philosophical response to the age of extremes experienced across Europe in the first half of the 20th century (Jonas 1984b). Interestingly, Jonas’ ideas were first and foremost adopted by the environmentalist movement, which has argued that one should think of responsibility not only in terms of intra-personal human relationships but rather expand the concept to account for our relationships with the environment and all living beings. Jonas argues that an individual cannot simply assume responsibility through an act of intellectual acknowledgment. Instead, responsibility is an essential part of the process through which an individual asserts their moral self-awareness in an encounter with the other. It is in this moment of interchange that the individual realizes their social interconnectedness and interdependence. To Jonas, encountering the other means understanding that one is directly addressed by them; that is, it requires that the individual hears the other, thereby manifesting something beyond simple communication—ultimately fostering a moral consciousness (Jonas 1974, p. 7).

Taha Abdurrahman, on the other hand, is increasingly acknowledged as an exemplar of a scholar who immerses himself in both Western and Islamic intellectual culture. He is depicted as critically engaging both cultures, thereby creating a conversation between them. According to Abdurrahman, “the renewal of the Islamic tradition within modernity can only be sought through a discourse of ethics” (Harvey 2020, p. 152). Ethics, therefore, plays a central role in Abdurrahman’s thought; he sees it as the point of departure for any human inquiry. Abdurrahman is keen to emphasize that ethics require praxis, and any theoretical reasoning without a transformation into praxis is rendered futile. In resembling the sense of obligation to act in certain ways, to impact the world in accordance with ethical convictions, responsibility plays a central role in his conception of ethics. At the same time, assuming responsibility corresponds with the divine revelation in which the individual is called upon to act righteously. The status and function of being God’s deputies on Earth is not so much understood as a privilege but more so as a responsibility and in some cases, even a burden (Hallaq 2019, p. 13).

This paper proceeds as follows: first, I will give a brief overview of the historical conceptualizations of responsibility in Islamic thought and locate the core features of the debates surrounding responsibility. Second, I will survey Hans’ Jonas discourse on responsibility embedded within the broader genre of modern Jewish thought. I will then engage with Abdurrahman Taha’s argument for a revival of Islamic ethics and the role of responsibility therein. Finally, I will conclude by developing an outlook regarding how Islamic ethical thought can benefit from interdisciplinary and interreligious discourse.

2. How to Approach Contemporary Islamic Ethical Thought?

Some scholars highlight that Islamic ethical thinking has never been systematized and writing about it therefore entails the impossible task of covering a vast field of thought. I consider this lack of systematization not as a deficiency but rather as an opportunity to embrace the depth and diversity of Islamic ethical thinking. Instead of attempting to canonize the oeuvre, I demonstrate that navigating the plurality and richness of Islamic thought is a means of learning itself.

This paper is guided by a number of basic assumptions about the nature of Islamic ethical thought. In what follows, I present these premises as theses and then contextualize them historically while also pointing to what I term a “contemporary” Islamic ethical thought. Historical contextualization should help to substantiate my particular understanding of Islamic ethical thought, which emerges from an emancipatory vision of contemporary Islamic thought.

I suggest that while Islamic ethics and Islamic ethical thought are interconnected concepts, they refer to different aspects of moral reasoning within the Islamic tradition. Islamic ethics refers to the established moral principles and guidelines derived from Islamic teachings, primarily found in the Qur’an, Hadith, and the interpretations of scholars. These ethics outline specific behaviors, virtues, and duties that Muslims are expected to follow, emphasizing concepts such as justice, compassion, honesty, and the importance of community. Islamic ethics serves as a normative framework that guides the behavior of individuals.

On the other hand, Islamic ethical thought represents a broader inquiry into the philosophical underpinnings and interpretations of Islamic ethics. This term encompasses the various schools of thought, debates, and discussions that have emerged over time regarding the application and understanding of Islamic ethical principles. Islamic ethical thought examines how these principles can be contextualized in relation to contemporary issues, philosophical inquiries, and interreligious discourses. It involves a critical reflection and analysis of ethical dilemmas faced by individuals and societies, engaging with both traditional teachings and modern challenges. While Islamic ethics provides the foundational moral guidelines derived from religious texts, Islamic ethical thought represents the ongoing discourse and interpretation of these guidelines within a dynamic and evolving context. The distinction allows for a deeper exploration of how these ethical principles are understood, debated, and applied in diverse settings (Rahman 1983; Hassan 1999).

It is also essential to recognize that any religious ethics must distinguish itself from philosophical ethical thinking; otherwise, it would raise questions about the rationale for having a religious stream of ethics in contrast to philosophical ethics. The key issue at hand is to explore how religious ethical thought, particularly Islamic ethical thought, differentiates itself from philosophical ethics.

I propose that Islamic ethical thought fundamentally evokes a call to respond to divine revelation, framing the individual as intertwined within a web of relations and responsibilities—not only towards the divine but also towards the created world. This relational understanding emphasizes the importance of duties that transcend mere individualistic perspectives, prioritizing the notion of interconnectedness in moral reasoning.

However, this brings forth the following vital question: how can one properly respond to these multiple responsibilities? I suggest that the answer lies in the concept of continuous learning through engagement with others.

To clarify my understanding of the term “ethics”, I define it as a system that elaborates on how humans ought to act. Ethical reasoning is closely linked to normative judgments about what is considered good and bad or evil. Islamic ethical thought, like other systematized ethical orientations, involves striving for the good while remaining anchored in a shared understanding of moral values. The concept of the good, however, is not solely derived from philosophical traditions; it also fundamentally relies on divine revelation. This dual foundation emphasizes that ethical understanding is enriched by both human reasoning and divine revelation.

In many religious traditions, including Islam and Judaism, the notion of the good is closely intertwined with divine revelation, articulating principles of justice, compassion, and righteousness, offering believers clear directions on how to conduct their lives in alignment with what is considered good.

Philosophical ethics, on the other hand, often seeks to define the good through reasoned argumentation, experiential understanding, and societal consensus. Philosophers grapple with questions about morality, the nature of human flourishing, and the criteria for ethical behavior. The interplay between philosophical inquiry and divine revelation creates a rich discourse in the quest for understanding the good. Philosophical traditions can critically engage with religious teachings, challenging adherents to reflect on the reasons behind their beliefs and the implications of their actions. This interaction can lead to a more profound comprehension of ethical principles, as individuals synthesize insights from both realms.

Ultimately, deriving the good from both philosophical thought and divine revelation allows for a more holistic understanding of ethics. It acknowledges that while human reasoning is crucial in exploring moral questions, divine revelation provides a foundation that can inspire individuals to navigate complex ethical landscapes. This commitment to learning and relational engagement serves as a hallmark of Islamic ethical thought, distinguishing it from philosophical ethics while addressing the complexities of modern moral challenges.

Contemporary Islamic ethical thought, on the other hand, should not be understood as an exclusively intellectual endeavor. Instead, it should be developed in close observation of the various socio-political challenges and conflicts that we are confronted with, such as inequality, violence, poverty, climate change, environmental pollution, and so forth.

While considering both the diversity and the philosophical nature of Islamic debates, this paper is based on an understanding of Islamic thought that is derived from an emancipatory shift. This demarcation is directed against a historical understanding based on the claim of only preserving the tradition. Instead, Islamic thought should be conceived in a relationship of tension, between the claim of preservation on the one hand and the innovative, progressive, and emancipatory access to scripture and tradition on the other. Framed in this way, Islamic thought entails the negotiation between the present and the past (Benzine 2012). The dynamic relationship between secular philosophy and religious thought operates as a crucial interplay that has shaped ethical discourse throughout history. This relationship is characterized by a continual discourse where each realm influences the other, often leading to the evolution of ideas that challenge and enrich both perspectives. One guiding assumption behind this work is that Islamic ethical thought has always developed interdependently with prevailing philosophical ideas, engaging critically with these ideas while also contributing its own unique perspectives. This reciprocal relationship allows Islamic ethics to grapple with the philosophical questions of its time—questions surrounding morality, justice, the nature of good and evil, and human responsibility—while also serving to articulate and enhance the Islamic tradition.

This process of dynamic interaction facilitates the ongoing development of interpretations within Islamic thought. As new philosophical currents emerge, they prompt Islamic scholars to revisit classical ethical frameworks, leading to re-evaluations and expansions of existing interpretations. Conversely, Islamic ethical thought itself offers significant contributions to philosophical debates, particularly in areas of responsibility, community, and justice. By articulating a vision of ethics that emphasizes the importance of societal obligations and the sanctity of human life, Islamic thought can influence secular philosophical discourse, encouraging a more integrated approach that values both individual rights and communal responsibilities.

In this paper, I take responsibility ethics as an example of this intricate process. The notion of responsibility within Islamic ethical thought can be enriched by incorporating philosophical insights, particularly from Jewish ethical thought. By analyzing how both traditions approach the concept of responsibility, we can uncover deeper insights into the moral obligations individuals owe to themselves, to each other, and to the broader community. The dynamic relationship between Islamic ethics and secular philosophy is not merely a one-way street; it is characterized by discourse, debate, and mutual influence. This interplay functions as a catalyst for new interpretations, allowing both Islamic and secular moral frameworks to evolve and respond to contemporary challenges. By situating responsibility ethics within this broader context, we can create a more nuanced understanding of how ethical thought operates at the intersection of religion and philosophy, contributing to the richness of the Islamic tradition while addressing pressing moral questions of our time.

While often conceived of as a threat to the boundedness of a distinct religious tradition, such as Islam, this case shows how such a process strengthens the religious tradition by allowing for new roads of reflection, critique, and exchange. That is, it illuminates how Islam can contribute to broader societal debates on responsibility and what it can learn from co-constituents of the plural societies. Finally, in the case of responsibility ethics, this process not only bolsters the relevance of Islamic ethical thought for and beyond Muslim communities but also reinvigorates the long-standing tradition of Muslim–Jewish exchange that has become clouded by global political developments, specifically the conflict over Israel and Palestine; historically speaking, the Jewish–Muslim conversation has been a cornerstone of monotheistic culture across various time periods and loci, from the inception of Islam until today.

3. Islamic Ethical Thought as an Entangled Tradition

Responsibility appears as a concept in multiple arenas of Islamic thought. There is an ethical dimension to it, which will be differentiated in this paper from the legal dimension. Responsibility debates can also be found in theological (kalām) and mystical (sūfī) discourses, albeit to a much lesser degree.

As Dwight M. Donaldson once poignantly remarked, the ethical literature in Islam covers an exceedingly wide field (Donaldson 1953, p. ix). This field has only grown over time. Even a cursory survey of the classical Qurʾanic tafsīr literature—or philosophico-ethical works for that matter—indicates that neither the exegets have been concerned with crafting a systematic body of ethical thought based on the Qurʾan nor have Muslim scholars in general (Hashas and al-Khatib 2020, p. 1). While several attempts have been made in recent scholarship to construct or extrapolate a system of ethics in Islam (Izutsu 2002a; Fakhry 1994; Rahman 2009; ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2000, 2015), we are still far from drawing upon a systematic body. Instead, the contemporary Islamic ethical literature consists either of summaries of historical ethical writings compiled into an anthology (Fakhry 1994) or discusses the work of single authors and their contribution to the field (Meisami 2018; Hashas and al-Khatib 2020; Topkara 2022). A third and rather recent genre is single-topic investigations that elucidate the importance of single-issue concepts, such as justice or trusteeship (Hashas 2015; Harvey 2018) and so do not necessarily attempt to develop a grand theory of ethics in Islam. While this paper will not attempt to lay out such a theory, it will still nevertheless point to and employ one aspect of Islamic ethical writings that should be considered a cornerstone of any possible systematization effort, namely the willingness to learn from other traditions. This is by no means a novel mechanism but one deeply embedded in the Islamic ethical tradition; I would even go so far as to call the culture of interdisciplinarity a trademark of the intellectual history of Islam, a culture that can be showcased across multiple historical loci and time periods (Endress 2003; Kurt 2020).

Regarding the various methodological approaches and sources, G. F. Hourani differentiated between two sets of two criteria to classify types of Islamic ethical writings (Hourani 1985, pp. 15–22). The two criteria based on methods specify whether ethical positions are developed through reference to a higher authority or through analytical thinking. The two criteria based on the sources of ethical knowledge, on the other hand, determine whether it comes from religious or secular sources. This classification provided the basis for some to argue for a clear-cut separation between religious and secular methods, assuming that these different types are not compatible with one another (Antes 1982; Arkoun 1986; Höffe 2018). Either one refers to higher authorities—the revelation of the Qur’an and the Sunna of the prophet in the case of Islamic ethical thought—or one pursues analytical thinking, in which human reasoning is the sole source of reference. It remains highly disputed whether such a clear distinction between philosophical and religious/theological thinking can be assessed and historically validated. Assuming philosophy and theological or religious thought to be two entirely separate disciplines would not only deny the various interdependencies that can be traced throughout intellectual history; it also undermines the importance of the idea of God for philosophers (Weischedel 2013, p. 37).

This classification further seems to implicitly assume a hierarchy between the two disciplines, suggesting that philosophy reached a higher ground in modern times by successfully emancipating itself from religious thought in the process of enlightenment. Neither modern philosophy nor religious thought, however, resemble monolithic entities and therefore, they cannot be neatly separated from one another (Habermas 1988, p. 7). This is not only true historically but also for the intellectual terrain of the post-enlightenment era. To the contrary, in accordance with this historical experience, philosophy and religious thought always have been and remain very much dependent on each other.1 Ignoring the intertwined insights that these thought traditions have created and are still capable of creating would not only be inaccurate but could diminish the relevance of both disciplines (Habermas 2013, pp. 22f). Habermas in fact argues that these disciplines may become illegible to and impenetrable by one another. By applying his framework, we can better understand the evolving relationship between religious ethics and secular values, revealing the challenges and opportunities that arise in this discourse. He argues that secularization transforms religious authority while simultaneously reshaping the public sphere, leading to new dynamics in ethical considerations. Instead of creating intersecting discourses, they are at risk of creating parallel discourses that can no longer speak to one another. While I would argue that the relationship between the sciences and religious knowledge is horizontal rather than hierarchical, if Islamic thought wants to be taken seriously, it must grapple with the questions raised by the concepts of human self-confidence, self-determination, and self-realization (Habermas 1992, p. 19). Undoubtedly, this catalog of questions represents an intellectual challenge, especially since it describes not only the contours but also the material content of a new discourse.

Without this impetus for reflection, Habermas fears that monotheistic thought could develop a destructive potential (Habermas 2001, p. 14). To prevent such a scenario from happening, Habermas demands that theologians seriously engage in translating the religious content of their tradition into secular contexts such that the discursive content of religion becomes accessible for society at large, thereby assigning religious thought a legible and functional role in modern society (Habermas 2002).

A guiding assumption of this paper is that Islamic thought, at least in certain lines of tradition, always developed in an entwined way with prevailing philosophical ideas, both providing answers to those philosophical inquiries as well as making an independent contribution to the corresponding debates (Daiber 2012, pp. 65–67). Consequently, the division can hardly be adapted for the intellectual history of Islam either, where religious thought was not only intrinsically connected with secular thought,2 but the latter is also a continuous source for the appropriation of knowledge and wisdom (Sabra 1987, pp. 224f). In this context, we cannot even speak of a mere adoption of philosophical thought but rather a gradual appropriation into Islamic thought, which spurred creativity and innovation within Islamic thought. Thus, Islamic thought should continue to open itself to the insights of all sciences, emphasizing not only its willingness to learn but also an openness to critique. The best way to describe this positionality is by employing a metaphor introduced by Habermas. Analyzing the dynamics of secularization, Habermas speaks of a state of equal distance to one’s own tradition as to all other sciences. While not giving up the independence of one’s own tradition, Habermas identifies a willingness to learn through being osmotically open to both sides (Habermas 2001, p. 15).

I argue that this willingness to embrace other knowledge traditions and critically engage them, as well as to think with and through them, is an integral part of Muslim weltanschauung—a habitus that has been practiced throughout the intellectual history of Islam. This is derived from the unique nature of the Qur’an. Appealing more to a general audience than to a group of trained specialists, researchers point to a specific Qur’anic character as follows: “The Qur’an is not cast as a theoretical epistle that employs rational arguments, but it is full of figurative language, parables, metaphors, and visual descriptions.” (Griffel 2013, p. 167). This framing required further elaboration and supplementation with knowledge—knowledge sought outside of the Qur’an.3 Accordingly, trying to excavate, for instance, an ethical system from the Qur’an alone was never intended. Reinhart proposes instead that the Qur’an urges us to look for ethical knowledge wherever it may be found to “assume that some part of the good enjoined by the Qur’ān is known without revelational stipulation. It is ordinary knowledge to which the Qur’ān refers.” (Reinhart 2017, p. 61). The ethics of responsibility is such a concept that ought to be supplemented by employing other traditions of learning and reasoning. But before exploring the possible contribution other intellectual traditions can offer, first, it is necessary to briefly survey which concepts of responsibility have been developed in Islamic thought.

4. Responsibility in Islamic Law Discourses

The most elaborate discussions on responsibility can be found in the Islamic law tradition, followed by philosophico-ethical treatises. In Arabic, responsibility is expressed using various roots. The closest Arabic word for responsibility, however, is masʾūliyya, derived from the root verb s-ʾ-l (Lane [1362] 1863, p. 1362). As with any ethical topic in Islamic intellectual history, readers look first to the Qur’an for guidance. However, as with many other concepts, the Qur’an does not provide a systematic elaboration of responsibility.4 While derivatives of the root s-ʾ-l, meaning inquiry or posing a question, appear in numerous accounts throughout the Qur’an, masʾūl (Wehr 1979, p. 455), the notion of being accountable for something or bearing responsibility, appears less frequently (Q 17:35–36, 37:25). Still, masʾūliyya itself, however, does not even appear in the Qur’an (Nadwī 1986, pp. 251–53).

Responsibility is also expressed using the root k-l-f. The most notable derivation of that root in Islamic law is taklīf, denoting the divine obligations of humanity. Taklīf claims “normativity” in the sense of behavior-regulative guidelines (Weiss 2010, p. 1) demand the individual to comply with them. Divine obligations are not exclusively derived from revelation (bi-l sharʿ) but can also be deduced through reason (bi-l ʿaql).

Most scholars discern five different categories of legal responsibility. These ahkām al-taklīfiyya are ḥaram (prohibited), makrūh (reprehensible), mubāḥ (neutral), mandūb (recommended), and wājib/fard (obligatory) (Kozali 2011, pp. 2–3). While the two opposite poles of ḥaram on the one hand, and wājib/fard, on the other, claim normativity, the human agent enjoys a high degree of choice regarding actions within the remaining categories (Ahmad 2006, p. 76). When it comes to elaborating the normative nature of the ahkām al-taklīfiyya and thus its inherent claim to be obligatory, recent scholarship has focused on analyzing the various epistemological methods that are employed to derive normative determinations (Kurnaz 2017). In light of this research, we are inclined to acknowledge that human (legal) reasoning unfolds along communicative discursive models and cannot be reduced to adapting obligations that are set forth in the Qur’an and Sunna (Kurnaz 2017, p. 348). In other words, the various categorizations of ahkām al-taklīfiyya are continuously negotiated, reformulated, at times modified, or even omitted in favor of other solutions. It is important to understand this dynamic interplay between Islamic legal thought and the challenges that are brought forward throughout time and space. Aside from the specific context in which Qur’an and Sunna are understood and implemented, human agency in particular is critical to conceptualizing human responsibility (Ahmad 2006, p. 73).

For scholars of usūl al-fiqh, humans are endowed with both rights and responsibility. They are eligible to receive and claim personal rights (sg. ḥaqq, pl. ḥuqūq) but at the same time also obliged to bear responsibility for their actions (Khalfaoui 2021, pp. 14–17). This awareness of being entitled to certain rights but at the same time holding responsibilities resembles the nexus in which human agency is grounded. Some even argue for a hierarchal relationship in which responsibility precedes entitlement, since entitlement is intrinsically dependent on humans fulfilling their responsibilities. If the normative nature of responsibility is compromised, therefore, rights are in danger of being violated. The idea of responsibility being imperative is a key distinction in Islamic thought and is expressed in a twofold paradigm—a responsibility towards God and a responsibility towards other human beings and the created world. The Qur’an can be seen in this context as a constant reminder that invokes but also calls upon human beings to assume these responsibilities.

Not surprisingly, Muslim scholars underwent a great deal of effort to systematically conceptualize the necessary requirements that ought to be in place in order to hold someone accountable. Islamic law, for instance, distinguishes between the capacity to receive rights and obligations ahliyyah al-wujūb, on the one hand, and the capacity to actively exercise rights and obligations, rendered as ahliyyah al adā’ on the other. While the former emphasizes the innate capacity of every human being to be endowed with rights, active legal capacity, on the other hand, highlights the importance that responsibilities ought to be fulfilled or implemented (Kamali 2003, p. 450).

According to the fuqahā’, active legal capacity foregrounds that every individual bears full responsibility towards God and other human beings (Kamali 2003, p. 451). The same legal treatises, however, also state that an individual ought to possess a certain level of maturity and intellectual prowess to be considered mukallaf (a person endowed with responsibility).

The obligations that originate through the employment of reason, however, are dynamic, as they are bound to specific contexts and times. These obligations are always negotiated in relation to the specific challenges that individuals, communities, and societies face (Haji 2019, p. 140). The relationship of divine obligation to the always-changing social world at once draws from within the Islamic thought tradition—pursuing the good through responsibility—and turns outwards, seeking inspiration and knowledge from interdisciplinary exchange (Reinhart 2017, p. 61). By expanding our knowledge through this engagement, we not only highlight the importance of responsibility in contemporary Islamic ethical thought discourses but expand and proliferate our conceptual understanding of the good.

5. Learning from Other Traditions

The central question with which I am concerned in this paper is whether we can imagine contemporary Islamic thought that oscillates between its own tradition, the other monotheistic traditions, and secular knowledge, that is, independent while remaining open to engaging with and even incorporating elements of discourses outside of itself. Without subjecting Islamic thought to a critical examination by modern discourses, it runs the risk of becoming an impenetrable tradition for insiders and outsiders alike. Discursively engaging beyond its own boundaries therefore offers potential for the development of Islamic thought. It creates the framework for articulating one’s own faith claims not only within one’s own faith community but also by participating in public discourse. The concern of contemporary research should therefore not be to only talk about Islamic thought. It is necessary to demonstrate it—to not only refer to it but apply it.

I propose approaching this learning through engagement with modern philosophy as accomplished through modern (20th century) Jewish thought as a model for the development of contemporary Islamic ethical thought. This approach is not merely comparative. Rather, it assumes a correlative relationship, allowing us to learn with each other. A close examination of Jewish ethical thought offers several possibilities that can decisively advance Islamic thought. On the one hand, Jewish ethical thought has developed in close connection with modern philosophical discourses that shaped Western civilization.5 The West is not only a geography in which many Muslims today live, but it is also a cultural world that many Muslims consider their intellectual homeland (geistige Heimat). Not only do Muslims today face similar challenges as Jews did in the past, such as marginalization and securitization, but they also hold a similar positionality in which they are considered insiders and outsiders at the same time (Becker and Topkara 2022). By focusing on how German–Jewish thinkers engaged at once with modern philosophy and Jewish ethical thought, we can learn how Jewish intellectuals negotiated the relationship between these traditions. Muslim scholars today must similarly navigate how to preserve religious tradition while acknowledging modern philosophical knowledge. Just like Jews a century earlier, Muslims today too employ their religious tradition to make sense of their place in Western society.

In the research literature, “Jewish thought” is a very controversial topic that is numerous and takes diverse forms (Morgan and Gordon 2007, pp. 1–13). The arguments against the use of the term itself are often similar to those that are also used when Islamic thought is referenced. Where does such religious thinking begin and end? Can we reduce authors, sometimes against their will, to their affiliation with a plural religious tradition and thus turn them into Jewish or Muslim thinkers? What exactly does it mean when a thought is identified as Jewish or Muslim? Is there not rather universal access underlying the thinking that goes beyond these attributions?

I would like to use the term “Jewish thought” to describe a discursive space that is characterized by a thematic reference and/or methodological approach. Daniel Boyarin approaches the definition of Jewish thought from a perspective that emphasizes its complexity and dynamism. He argues that Jewish thought is not monolithic but rather consists of a rich tapestry of ideas and interpretations that have evolved over time through dialog with various cultural and intellectual currents (Boyarin 2020).

Boyarin often highlights the interplay between Jewish thought and other philosophical traditions, especially Hellenistic and Christian ideas. He asserts that Jewish thought is shaped by its historical contexts and that it engages deeply with issues of language, identity, and the interpretation of texts, particularly the Hebrew Bible and Talmud (Boyarin 2007). He proposes that Jewish thought can be defined by its distinctive emphasis on textuality and interpretation, as well as its focus on the relationship between the divine and the human. He also stresses the importance of lived experience and communal practices in shaping Jewish thought, suggesting that it is rooted in the realities of Jewish life rather than confined to abstract philosophical arguments. Overall, Boyarin’s definition of Jewish thought encompasses the richness of its historical development, its engagement with other traditions, and its grounding in communal and textual practices, thereby allowing for a multifaceted understanding of what constitutes Jewish intellectual and spiritual life.

Hence, Jewish thought is characterized by a specific thematic reference, which on the one hand is fueled by the theological/religious thinking of Judaism and on the other hand has a supra-temporal relevance. Theological themes, such as freedom, justice, humanity, reconciliation, or messianism, are therefore not only taken up again and again by different thinkers in different contexts but are also always expanded and supplemented by interpretations. It is therefore necessary to ask how modern questions have influenced Jewish thought and how Jewish thought has reacted to and addressed these questions. This dual observation could then be used to identify hermeneutical tools that in turn could guide Muslim engagement with these questions.

It is important to keep in mind another similarity between Jewish und Islamic thought. Asher Biemann points out that the experiential space of modern Jewish thought since the Enlightenment has been that of a minority position. It is the experience of otherness but also the conscious attempt to present itself as European which gives Jewish thought its modern character. It is not only a discourse of thought but also a discourse of experience. I think this description perfectly describes the positionality of Muslims in the West today, who are shaped by their own minority experience of othering, which in turn shapes Islamic thought.

Thus, a multi-layered discourse could be pursued in this way, which would meet the demands of the oscillation between religious and secular knowledge outlined above. By expanding our knowledge through this engagement, I will not only help in fostering the importance of Islamic theology and thought in contemporary discourses, but I will also expand and proliferate our understanding of Islamic intellectual heritage.

Within the scope of this paper, the fact that both Jewish and Islamic thought are multilayered concepts—just as Jewish and Muslim experiences are manifold—means that each must be reduced to one functional category without negating their inherent complexities. This endeavor cannot be achieved in a global perspective; rather, it is a matter of using a concrete, narrowly defined individual case study to demonstrate one possible iteration of this conversation. After all, there is no one single engagement with Jewish thought that could be paradigmatic. However, since the conversation between Jewish and Islamic thought is not new or original, we should bear in mind that we could draw on a rich and diverse history in which multiple forms of cooperation and co-production emerged which in turn could serve as a model for a contemporary examination.6 Cooperation and co-production between Jewish and Muslim subjects should not be deemed a historical phenomenon either. In The Burdens of Brotherhood, for instance, Ethan Katz pushes back against widely held assumptions of difference to demonstrate the complex entwinement of Muslims and Jews from the end of the First World War until today in France. Historians like Katz have shown how the Jewish and Muslim experience in Europe, both on the continent and in the colonies, has intersected—that is, European Muslims and Jews have always been and remain in conversation with one another (Katz 2015).

A contemporary inquiry will naturally differ from those in the past, but the way in which the discourse between Jewish and Muslim intellectuals emerged can nevertheless help us to develop criteria which can do justice to my claim to preserve our own traditions and enable us at the same time to address new questions through deep engagement with thought traditions outside of our own. In the following sections, I exemplify this process by turning to Hans Jonas’ conceptualization of responsibility and critically engaging with Taha Abdurrahman’s Islamic ethical thought.

6. Hans Jonas and the Reconceptualization of Responsibility

Hans Jonas employed his marginal position as an opportunity—a lens through which to make sense of, critique, and induce a new understanding of how to pursue ethics. While he was working in the early stages of his career, predominantly on historical religious sources, he turned his attention to practical philosophy, namely to the societal and individual challenges that manifested themselves in contemporary times. His Imperative of Responsibility, first published in 1979, was partially written in response to Ernst Bloch’s Principle of Hope, in which Bloch had interpreted technical progress as a positive evolution in human history. Jonas, on the other hand, is not only skeptical regarding the overall enthusiasm with which technological breakthroughs are met but he critiques the seemingly unrestricted confidence that technological progression will resolve society’s problems. Moreover, Jonas highlights that technological advancement has critically altered humanity’s behavioral patterns and possibilities (Jonas 1984a, p. 15)—specifically mentioning dangers which can accompany technological innovations and to which humans all too often remain ignorant. Jonas exemplifies his concern for these repressed dangers by raising awareness of the ongoing destruction of the natural environment. His analysis of the world to come, paired with the burdens for the natural resources of the world, leads Jonas to formulate a new imperative that demands a sense of responsibility for the future of both humanity and the natural world. Jonas is convinced that humanity has lost in modernity a sense for equilibrium (Jonas 1984a, p. 20); at the same time, humanity’s power over the natural world has risen abundantly (Jonas 1984a, p. 27) and, finally, humanity remains too ignorant about the various consequences of its behavior (Jonas 1984a, p. 28). Jonas’ analysis raises an important observation that remains true to this day. It has become virtually impossible, even more so than in the past, to gauge the far-lasting consequences of our behavior and to maintain a grasp on the multiple variables that shape the growing complexity of our lived reality. Equally true is that technological developments have significantly increased the exploitation of our planet, fueling a lifestyle that exploits and ultimately destroys its natural resources. The massive pollution of our environment and the undeniable effects this has on the global climate requires an immediate and enduring response.

Jonas is convinced that traditional ethical conceptions will not be able to provide tangible solutions to this looming problem. He thinks that traditional ethical reasoning assumes a neutral viewpoint towards technology; remains highly anthropocentric, which means that they only focus on interpersonal relationships and carry a rather stagnant understanding of human beings; and finally, they center on a limited sphere of human influence regarding both time and space (Jonas 1984a, p. 22). Instead, he thinks that the new set of challenges necessitates new approaches. In contrast to traditional ethical thinking, Jonas advocates an awareness for the present and the future alike. He critiques the all-too-optimistic embrace of technological developments and insists on a critical evaluation. He further insists on expanding our understanding of human interaction from micro-circumstances to a global scale. And finally, he asserts that humanity must think beyond the limitations of interpersonal conduct and include not only other human beings but also all other living beings and the planet as a whole (Jonas 1984a, p. 29).

The last point elucidates a focal feature of Jonas’ thought, namely his concern for others—not just other human beings but wholistically speaking—for all of the world and everything within it. Being concerned about or feeling the need to care for others (Sorge) is, according to Jonas, intrinsically linked to the process of the self-realization of the individual. Every inquiry, be it philosophically or otherwise inspired, starts with recognizing the difference between oneself and the world. Questions that arise from this acknowledgment pave the path to human understanding (Jonas 1964, p. 14). The “self” and the corresponding “world” thereby form a correlative relationship, which is essentially the basic theme of all self-interpretations (Bongardt 2014, p. 110). Self-interpretations, on the other hand, are according to Jonas heavily influenced by religion (Jonas 1965, pp. 80–89). Before turning to practical philosophy, Jonas conducted in depth research regarding religious motifs—investigating not only the testimonies of Paul and Augustine but also Gnostic sources. He was particularly interested in identifying “a spirit speaking through these voices.” (Jonas 1992, p. xvii). Jonas believes that there is an existential principle underlying religious interpretations of the world (Bongardt 2014, p. 112). The question than arises regarding what Judaism’s might be, and as an extension of that, what the monotheistic existential principle might be. Jonas seems to assume a deeply rooted correlation between human beings and God, foregrounding not only human freedom but also its inevitable destination—a sense of concern/care and ultimately a sense of responsibility resulting from that. “Jonas sees man as part of the world willed by God. He has emerged from it and can even understand himself as its purpose. and yet he differs from everything else in the world through his spirit and freedom. This is why he can and must bear responsibility for this world.” (Bongardt 2014, p. 122).

Jonas is not only convinced that religion plays an integral role for ethics but also underlines the particular significance Judaism holds for the evolution of ethical thought (Jonas 1974, pp. 21–44, 165–82). Judaism essentially carries the same kind of concern for the created world, which Jonas places in the center of his conception of responsibility. Judaism is merely an ally though; it is one of the earliest and most powerful manifestations of that concern. It therefore not only deserves recognition, but it is also incorporated into Jonas’ attempt to reconfigure ethical thought in the 20th century (Bongardt 2014, p. 123). Reminding us of the important insights a religious tradition can provide, Jonas implicitly critiques the unjustifiable exclusion of such teachings from the debate. Jonas appears to have successfully carved out a space for religious thought in modern philosophy, claiming that the former can speak with authority and legitimately about the human experience.

Jonas is far from being concerned only theoretically with the idea of responsibility. Contrary to his own claim stated in the preface of the Imperative of Responsibility, he is not a thinker committed to a strict systematic profile but rather someone who wants to convince through language and metaphors (Buddeberg 2011, p. 48). The concept of fear that Jonas evokes should be understood in this sense as a means to discompose his audience in order to initiate the critical process outlined earlier.7 This could be one reason why his work has found so much resonance outside of philosophy, while the current philosophical discussions only rarely deal with his writings in detail despite the timeliness of his theses (Buddeberg 2011, p. 48).

Jonas is keen to initiate agency among his audience. He insists that each generation must intellectually acknowledge its responsibility through diligent interdisciplinary study and historical analysis. Thinking about responsibility means in this context first and foremost undergoing a process of critical evaluation of the self, one’s relationships with others, and the created world altogether. This process is concluded with identifying a leitmotif, giving way to specific attainable objectives (Böhler 2008, p. 22).

Certainly, there is an abundance of challenges, both on a micro and macro level, that one could direct their attention to and ultimately derive responsibilities from. However, since no one on their own could even potentially cover the vast field of possible tasks, the question remains as to how we can determine priorities. Jonas does not offer at this point a method to differentiate between the objects of responsibility. He seems to think that as long as someone assumes responsibility, it does not have to necessarily align with a set of responsibilities someone else chooses to follow. More importantly, he emphasizes that each individual must assume some kind of responsibility and not evade it. It is necessary for each and every one of us to not only participate in the process of identifying responsibilities but to actively shoulder them (Böhler 2008, p. 23). Having said that, Jonas vehemently advocates for the goals that he has come to identify as the most urgent ones—a responsibility to the planet, future generations, and the idea of humanity.

To be held accountable, there must be a sanctioning authority. Jonas is keenly aware that philosophy and theology divert at this point, which is why he gives only a vague nod to this authority. While Jonas refuses to name the all too obvious reference, that is, God as sanctioning authority, he denominates human conscience as a possible source. However, Jonas continues to argue that human conscience is not detached; it is embedded into a larger ontological context and would therefore require a more concrete framing (Buddeberg 2011, p. 86).

Among the issues that Jonas raises here, the capacity to critique not only appears in multiple forms throughout but is central to his understanding of responsibility. It is evident that Jonas is influenced by both modern philosophy and the way it impacted religious thought in the West. Not only is critique a landmark feature of modern philosophy, it also has come to identify, shape, and develop Jewish thought in modernity in a particular way. Some even argue that philosophy—emphasizing the paradigmatic shift in modern philosophy in the West—should cease to identify itself as it was conceptualized in the centuries before. Instead, it should render itself as critique (Habermas 1991, p. 31). This transformation is exactly what shaped modern philosophy as the age of critique (Fassin 2017).

It is important to note at this point that critique should not be understood as a destructive tool that is employed to undermine and ultimately abolish any kind of authority, whether it relies on religious revelation or human reasoning. Critique is foremost a tool to question authority and give authority a chance to assess its relevance in face of a challenging, demanding, and dynamic world. Essentially—and this is how I understand critique—it is entering a discourse. At the same time, however, critique is also a technique to investigate the good and separate it from the bad. Critique can enable the individual to gauge the validity of a judgment or decision that is deemed good. Learning how to critique and evaluate moral judgments that are conducted by others can authorize the individual to execute their human agency. Not only would that be an expression of human agency but also a sign of following the Qur’anic call for engaging with the world, for commanding the right and preventing the wrong. Acknowledging the history of critique in Western civilization could prove invaluable for Islamic thought. Some scholars have already pointed to the potential such a debate would provide for Islamic thought (Kassab 2010, pp. 173–220). Understanding the historical significance of critique for the development of Jewish thought in the West might shed some light onto this potential.

Given the socio-cultural othering that European Jews were confronted with, modern philosophy’s humanism resembled an opportunity to reframe and recode not just their status as European Jews but the state of mind of society as a whole. Critique, and more precisely self-critique, showcased the capacity to reread and possibly re-evaluate conveyed traditional teachings, to initiate renewal where necessary, and finally, to preserve and continue the essential wisdom of religious traditions. Critiquing oneself does not only resonate inwards, addressing one’s own community, but it also communicates outwardly the willingness to engage in open, transparent, and sincere discourse. Ideally—and this is far from being too optimistic—this generates a lively and dynamic discursive culture that is both inclusive and open to learning from the other.8

Notwithstanding their intellectual differences, almost all modern Jewish thinkers came to share an unbending commitment to critique (Habermas 1991, p. 46). This would not have been possible if the above-mentioned objectives were entirely unattainable. Just like many other Jewish thinkers in his generation, Jonas used critique to spur and engage theological, philosophical, literary, and historical debates, as it becomes clear in his writings on responsibility. Jonas’ dedication to this method of critique reaches its pinnacle in the establishment of responsibility as the key element of his ethical thought. Responsibility is, to Jonas, at once the core component of both constituting and preserving an ethical life.

7. Taha Abdurrahman and the (New) Dimension of Islamic Ethics

The role of Islam and, in particular, Islamic thought today lies at the center of many debates in the Western world, as the role of Judaism and Jewish thought lay at the center of debates in 19th–20th century Europe. Many similar questions are being asked (Morgan and Gordon 2007). Does Islamic thought recognize the methodological autonomy of the other sciences? Is Islamic thought compatible with the categories of freedom as an indispensable right of every individual? Scholars in the West claim that these criteria would have to be confronted by any system of thought in order to legitimately claim its place within the framework of modern debates (Gardner and Grist 2015; Pippin 2016). The Muslim reactions to these kinds of claims range from seriously engaging them to outright negating any validity.

These debates date back to the first encounter of the Muslim world with colonialism and modernity, spurring far-reaching discussions since. Certainly, the Muslim encounter with the West is entrenched in violence, exploitation, and many other experiences which were nothing short of traumatic and debilitating (Hallaq 2019, pp. 3–11; El Shamsy 2020). At the same time, however, the Western world is also associated with scientific progress, technological advancement, political freedom, justice, and equality. Additionally, millions of Muslims live today in the West, urging us all to reconceptualize the dynamics of past and present relationships. In other words, the Muslim perception of the Western civilization is ambivalent, resulting in ambivalent responses to its intellectual challenges. Since the onset of these discussions, many Muslim scholars have attempted to respond to the various questions modernity has confronted them with—at times implicitly following its intellectual trajectory (Bauer 2021), at other times casting Western thought as role model for reform (Arkoun 1986), sometimes acknowledging at least partial validity of its claims (Rahman 1983), and finally, resisting any kind of influence at all.

Puritanical movements, for instance, have been propagating an uncompromising understanding of Islam for the last two centuries, one that alienates both adherents and non-Muslims alike (El Fadl 2009). As a result, modern times have witnessed a severing of the linkages between Muslims and the discursive nature of Islamic thought. A misperception or rather misconception of this severing as a “natural” divorce has been further promulgated by Islamist political movements, leaving us with the following question: how can we successfully rebuild these linkages?

We need both a genuine contribution of Islamic thought to ongoing debates that goes beyond the historic confinements and also the inclination to understand Western thought through its own paradigms by addressing the questions raised by modern philosophy.

According to a rising number of scholars, Taha Abdurrahman should be acknowledged as a Muslim scholar of modern times who has not only provided a theoretical framework to address this conundrum (Harvey 2020, p. 150) but who is also regarded as able to translate ideas from one cultural context to another, someone who feels comfortable both with modern discourses as much as the intellectual tradition of Islam (Hallaq 2019, pp. 1–2; Hashas and al-Khatib 2020). While it is simply impossible to cover the wide-ranging work of Abdurrahman within the scope of this paper, I will here engage with his ethical thought and more precisely his ideas on responsibility to showcase the consequences of drawing hard boundaries between Islamic thought and modern philosophical thought.

Any ethical investigation starts for Abdurrahman with the divine revelation. Rooting ethics in the values of revelation is crucially important to him, and he is adamant to defend this core understanding against any reading that seeks to deny that the Qur’an came with established rulings. His criticism reaches further, since he accuses “modern conformist readers” of relativizing Qur’anic values by attesting to them a historical contingency, by going beyond the established limits of interpretation and exegesis, and by applying criticism to issues of belief and worship (Abdurrahman 2006, pp. 184–86). Instead, he conceptualizes ethical values as extra-historical, rendering them as “innate and lofty meanings that guide Man to righteousness.” (Abderrahmane 2014, p. 111). Abdurrahman does not seem to make a case for concrete values that arise from Qur’anic revelation but is much more occupied with establishing its epistemological status (Harvey 2020, p. 154). His thought seems to be more concerned with corroborating the Qur’an as a source of timeless and ultimate values than to specifically elaborate how these Qur’anic values can be applied to contemporary challenges. When he speaks of ethical dimensions within the Qur’an, the readers find themselves longing to know how these dimensions can be extrapolated into concrete ethical teachings. The confusion is further substantiated with references to yet another school of thought and practice in Islam. Admitting to a distinct influence of sūfī virtue ethics on his thought—a point for which he was both criticized and celebrated—Abdurrahman suggests an openness towards to the “infinite inspiration from the unknown world(s).” (Hashas and al-Khatib 2020, p. 42). Abdurrahman’s thought remains at times painfully opaque, making it difficult to comprehend how theoretical reasoning can be translated into practical action. It is also quite puzzling to see that, time and again, he falls short of delivering what he critiques in Western thought—a practical relevance and a concrete application.

At the heart of Abdurrahman’s ethical reconfiguration of Islamic thought lies the so-called trusteeship paradigm. It can be aptly described as follows:

“Trusteeship is therefore a relationship existing between and among three elements: the thing (res) making up the trust (wadīʿa), the subject that entrusts (mūdiʿ = God), and the object who is trusted, namely, humankind. The subject places in the hands of the object a thing that he, the subject, owns, for the purposes of custody and care, for he is ultimately its true owner. He is the true owner because he also owns the trustee, the real object. The latter therefore cannot, in the true and full meaning of the term, own anything. Earthly ownership is not just derivative and metaphorical; it is also tentative.” (Hallaq 2019, p. 254).

Placing the human being in this kind of paradigm substantiates a dynamic relationship between the individual and the surrounding world. It instigates a whole set of important questions that the individual needs to raise in order to find their place in society and beyond. Thinking about the world in terms of a duty of trusteeship invigorates a sense of belonging and interconnectivity (Hallaq 2019, p. 270). This sense of belonging certainly carries the potential to be translated into a deeply felt concern and care for everything that the individual is asked to feel responsibility for. Reminding us that human beings are asked to position themselves in this world and relate to it through a sense of caring is a fundamentally important insight that we need to bear in mind.

There is a certain zeal in Abdurrahman’s quest for a renewal of Islamic thought through ethical thinking, and it is almost impossible not to succumb to the energy it brings forward. Ethical thinking is not placed only at the core of Islam; it is also directed towards pursuing human well-being.

Abdurrahman keenly appropriates the modern call for critical scrutiny, critiquing both modernity and Islamic tradition alike (Hashas and al-Khatib 2020, p. 37). But he seems to lack a basic appreciation of what modernity can offer. While he is very eager to challenge the Western hegemony of modernity, he seems less inclined to see the potential for Islamic thought that could arise from accepting that modernity too could produce valuable and legitimate insights (Harvey 2020, p. 152). Abdurrahman’s critical lens is one-dimensional, as he almost always critiques Western thought as “embedded in conventional morality of dominant discourse and thought” (Hallaq 2019, p. 197). He also fails to see that Western thought is intrinsically connected to self-criticism, a process that defies linearity, instead creating a multiplicity of critical discourses that unfold sometimes simultaneously or at other times extending over longer periods of time. Western thought has not been stagnant since the emancipation. One can legitimately critique its blind spots or its tendency to create hierarchies, but one also should be able to acknowledge its contributions to our understanding of the individual and the world.

8. Conclusions

Aside from Abdurrahman’s staunch critique of Western thought in general, this investigation has shown a great deal of similar intentions that lay at the heart of both his and Jonas’ work. Abdurrahman, as much as Jonas, describes a sense of care and concern for humanity and for the world—a sense of responsibility, which is depicted as a core feeling of any ethical thought. Unlike Abdurrahman, however, Jonas must be credited with not only describing this feeling but also vehemently advocating for a concrete application and transformation in the world. Jonas shows that concern can transcend a local confinement and include not just a specific culture or geography. Abdurrahman, on the other hand, seems to be more concerned with reawakening ethical thought that is designed to attract a specifically defined audience. Emancipating Islamic thought from the hegemony of Western thought seems a larger concern for Abdurrahman than participating in an ethical debate that can cut across cultural and religious boundaries.

While Abdurrahman’s thought is important to understanding how Islamic thought can create human ethical agency, a source of active participation in this life, a habitus that transcends indifference towards the world, and an interest in the well-being of creation, Jonas goes one step further. Specifically, he supplements this outlook not only with concretization but also reminds us of the importance that the dimension of responsibility has to explored through interdisciplinary learning.

What Jonas accomplishes in his ethics of responsibility is not the abandonment of the Jewish thought tradition but rather its strengthening through engagement with modern philosophy. Interrogating responsibility at once through his own Jewish experience—witnessing the destruction of democratic order and human life firsthand and fleeing abroad—while moving beyond it to think about human responsibility, more broadly, allowed Jonas to make ethical claims that transcend any single thought tradition. The power in his theory lies in the power of this act, which was for him an act in response to the contemporary challenges that humanity faces, such as environmental degradation. Jonas begins from within contemporary philosophical thought; at the same time—as I have traced in this article—he employs a framework of critique, not only criticizing another philosopher in Bloch but also offering a constructive alternative that is infused by Jewish thought. This incorporation of modern philosophical ideas into 20th century Jewish thought not only deepens it but shows how Jewish thought can be responsive—and thus relevant—to contemporary challenges. That is, Jonas orients his critique both outwards, at modern secular society and its violence, and inwards, aiming to revitalize the Jewish tradition such that it confronts the ethical conundrums of the modern age.

On the other hand, by refusing to engage with Western thought, what Abdurrahman accomplishes remains contained within the Islamic thought tradition. Like Jonas, he emphasizes human responsibility for the natural world. And yet his work on ethics remains largely illegible to those outside of the Islamic thought tradition. His willingness to critique is one-sided, critical of that which lies outside of Islamic thought, and in this way, it reifies essentialist boundaries of distinction between “the West” and “Islam”. What Abdurrahman fails to recognize is that the emancipation from social hierarchies, including hierarchies of knowledge, requires deep, if uncomfortable, engagement, involving a reshaping of and through plural discourses. A contemporary Islamic ethicist like Abdurrahman can thus learn from the work of Hans Jonas, not only by engaging with their overlaps and intersections in thought on responsibility but also by recognizing the value in a critique that is oriented both outwards—towards the “Other”—and inwards, towards one’s own self/thought tradition. Such an act would facilitate the dismantling of these hierarchies, as well as demonstrate and make legible the relevance of Islamic ethical thought not only to Muslims but humanity at large.

Muslims today face a tension between the dimensions of ethical thinking in the Islamic tradition and the growing need to address contemporary challenges. While Islamic ethical thought can contribute to these efforts, engaging with the work of Abdurrahman showcases that it requires interdisciplinary exchange and cultural translation. Two mutually dependent concepts seem to hold a particularly important role in this process, namely human ethical agency and determining concrete ethical teachings. While reminding everyone to take an active role in becoming ethical agents is less controversial, deriving a concrete ethical code of conduct presents more of a challenge in our modern plural societies that are shaped by multiple thought traditions.

Abdurrahman deserves credit for emphasizing the timeless importance of the Qur’anic revelation, helping us to study the Qur’anic verses within the context of the world we live in by “making their divine guidance relevant to the present and future” (Harvey 2020, p. 159). In doing so, he reminds the Muslim individual to break through the habitus of imitating conveyed understandings, instead forging a strong and powerful relationship with the revelation and thus turning into an active ethical agent. And yet he ultimately falls short in showcasing how such ethical agency, rooted in the Islamic tradition, is relevant to non-Muslims as well. That is, by asserting a hard boundary between Islamic and Western thought traditions, he overlooks the potentiality for Islam to speak for and with humanity to foster an ethical responsibility not only for Muslims but for the world.