Miracles Between Modern Science and Classical Thought: A Contemporary Perspective

Abstract

This paper explores the function of miracles in classical and modern Islamic theology, focusing particularly on Fethullah Gülen’s interpretation and its relevance to contemporary discussions on revelation, rationality, and science. Traditionally, miracles are viewed as divine signs confirming prophethood by surpassing natural laws and serving as challenges to disbelievers. While classical scholars upheld their evidentiary role, modern thinkers—under the influence of positivism and rationalism—have sought to reinterpret or dismiss their validity, particularly sensory or physical miracles. In this context, Gülen presents a distinctive perspective that reframes miracles not merely as supernatural phenomena, but as signs pointing to both spiritual truths and technological inspiration. Drawing from the insights of Said Nursi, Gülen highlights how prophetic miracles have anticipated and guided scientific advancements, thereby integrating material progress with spiritual wisdom. Gülen’s holistic understanding of human nature and prophetic guidance, rooted in the concept of human beings as the most refined creation (ahsani taqwīm), positions prophets as leaders of both spiritual and intellectual advancement. This dual role challenges the perceived conflict between revelation and reason, asserting that rationality reaches its full potential only when informed by prophetic insight. The paper also situates Gülen’s thought within broader modern theological discourses, particularly in response to critiques that Islam is incompatible with science. Gülen affirms the necessity of revelation not as a hindrance to rational inquiry but as its essential guide, likening prophets to expert physicians who administer the elixir of revelation to protect and elevate the human mind. By analysing Gülen’s approach to miracles and prophetic intellect (fatānah), this paper argues that his theology offers a balanced framework for reconciling religion and science, and contributes a meaningful response to contemporary debates surrounding the rationality of faith and the enduring relevance of prophethood.

1. Brief Overview of Miracles in Islamic Theology

In classical theological discourse, the miracles performed by prophets function as primary evidence validating their prophetic claims. Indeed, specific works, such as al-Bāqillānī’s (d. 403) al-Bayān, are devoted entirely to examining the nature of miracles and their role as proofs of prophethood. Muslim theologians have offered nuanced definitions of miracles that reveal subtle divergences in emphasis. al-Māturīdī (d. 333), for instance, defines a miracle as “an event that occurs at the hands of a prophet and cannot be produced through learning” (al-Māturīdī 2003, pp. 289–90). Renowned theologian of the Muʿtazilī school Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415) describes it as an extraordinary event, created by God, that demonstrates the veracity of a prophetic claimant and is, by its very nature, beyond human capacity to replicate (Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960–1965, XV, p. 199). Abū al-Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508), who is regarded as the theologian who advanced the sunnī kalām1 tradition of al-Māturīdī, for his part, emphasises the element of challenge (taḥaddī), defining a miracle as a wondrous event occurring in this world that is accompanied by an explicit prophetic challenge (al-Nasafī 1990, I, pp. 469, 473, 475). Synthesising these perspectives, a miracle is generally conceived as an extraordinary phenomenon (kharq al-ʿāda) brought about by God through the agency of a prophet to substantiate his claim to prophethood, to confront the obstinacy of disbelievers (taḥaddī), and to strengthen the faith of believers (al-Jurjānī 1983, p. 234). Essentially, a miracle should contravene natural laws, be impossible to imitate under normal circumstances and possess superiority to the extent that it challenges (tahaddī) any potential imitations.2 Furthermore, it must occur at the hands of a prophet. As these actions transcend human capability, they are rightly regarded as Divine actions.

Different and nuanced classifications of miracles have been proposed by Muslim scholars, based on how miracles are perceived and their intended purposes. For instance, theologians classify miracles into three distinct categories according to their mode of apprehension3: ḥissī/kawnī (sensory or physical), khabarī (narrative or informative), and maʿnawī/ʿaqlī (spiritual or rational) miracles (Bulut 2005, p. 349). This tripartite classification highlights the ways in which miracles engage human faculties through the senses, the intellect, or transmitted knowledge. It also remains highly relevant to contemporary discussions surrounding the miracles of the Prophet Muhammad.

Sensory (ḥissī/kawnī) miracles are understood as an extraordinary event that appeal directly to the senses and are sometimes called kawnī (existential) because of their connection to the natural world. As mentioned in the Qur’an, such miracles occurred in the hands of past prophets: for instance, the she-camel of Ṣāliḥ (Qur’an, Hūd 11:64–68; al-Shams 91:11–15), Moses’ staff turning into a serpent and his hand shining brightly (al-Aʿrāf 7: 107–108, 117–122; Ṭāhā 20: 19–22, 67–70), and Jesus animating a clay bird, raising the dead, and curing the blind and lepers (Āl ʿImrān 3:49; al-Māʾida 5:110). These acts transcend the laws of nature, manifest divine “intervention”, and serve to confirm the prophet’s truthfulness to their contemporaries. However, sensory miracles are limited to the time and place in which the prophet lived, and their verification by later generations depends on transmitted reports. Classical Muslim scholars affirm that the greatest miracle granted to Prophet Muhammad was the Qur’an itself, while also acknowledging that he was given sensory miracles. Nonetheless, apart from a few that are open to interpretation in the Qur’an, none of the sensory miracles attributed to the Prophet have been cited in the Qur’an and established through tawātur (mass-transmission). This, together with advancements in science and technology, has rendered the nature of miracles—and especially those of Prophet Muhammad—a subject of controversy in modern times, with some maintaining that the Qur’an alone constitutes his true miracle. To reconcile these views, some scholars argue that the reported sensory miracles are better understood as providing reassurance and consolation to believers rather than serving as decisive proofs for guidance. This issue will be discussed in detail later.

Narrative (khabarī) miracles on the other hand consist of reports of unseen or future events foretold by the prophets through divine revelation. These include predictions of disasters befalling rebellious peoples, Jesus informing his audience about what they ate and stored in their homes (Āl ʿImrān 3:49), the Prophet Muhammad’s prediction that the Byzantines would defeat the Persians (al-Rūm 30:1–4), the fall of the Persian empire (al-Bayhaqī 1985, VI, p. 325; Ibn Ḥajar 1379, XIV, p. 122), and the spread of Islam to the east and west (al-Bukhārī 2008, “Manāqib,” p. 25). These predictions, once fulfilled, served as confirmation of their divine source.

Rational (ʿaqlī) miracles, also referred to as “spiritual miracles” (mānavī) or “miracles of knowledge” (maʿrifa), comprise realities that appeal to human reason and confront individuals with rational evidence. These miracles are apprehended through reflection and are not confined to a specific time or place, unlike sensory miracles. They include the prophets’ trustworthiness, truthfulness, noble character, and compassion; their enjoining of good and forbidding of evil; their exemplary embodiment of the divine message; the indispensability of their teachings for the establishment of a virtuous society; and the unparalleled excellence of the revealed text they conveyed, both in form and content. Such attributes and evidences fall within this category of miracles (al-Iṣfahānī 1988, pp. 128–29; al-Nasafī 1990, vol. I, pp. 492–535; Topaloğlu 1998, pp. 176–80). This category became a central focus for many modern Muslim scholars as they sought to counter criticisms arising from positivist and materialist viewpoints. Most significantly, the Qur’an itself—both in its language and content—is regarded as an unparalleled and enduring miracle, accessible to all generations, and often classified within this rational category. The literary and rhetorical inimitability of the Qur’an (iʿjāz al-Qurʾān) gave rise to a rich scholarly tradition dedicated to examining this phenomenon, with seminal works such as al-Bāqillānī’s Iʿjāz al-Qurʾān representing major contributions to the field. Modern scholarship has also placed considerable emphasis on this aspect of the Qur’an to demonstrate the intellectual and spiritual superiority of the Islamic tradition in the face of scientific and technological advancements.

Muslim scholars have extensively debated the role of miracles in demonstrating prophethood and affirming the truthfulness of a prophetic claimant. Although philosophers have expressed doubts about the adequacy of miracles (particularly those of hissi miracles) as proofs of prophethood—primarily due to how they define and understand the concept—the majority of theologians regard miracles as essential evidence (Yavuz 2012, p. 209). According to Sunnī scholars, while reasonable and fair-minded individuals may discern a true prophet through his words, actions, and virtuous character, for obstinate and arrogant disbelievers, miracles become indispensable, as only through them can such individuals be held morally accountable. In contrast, Muʿtazilī theologians4 contend that miracles are necessary for everyone to recognise the authenticity of a prophet. The moral integrity, truthfulness, and trustworthiness of an individual appointed to divine messengership prior to his mission are not considered sufficient proof of prophethood; such qualities serve merely as supporting evidence after the occurrence of a miracle (al-Jāḥiẓ 1979, III, pp. 265–67). Within this framework, guidance-oriented miracles (hidayah), particularly when accompanied by taḥaddī (a prophetic challenge), constitute the principal evidence of a claimant’s truthfulness, while other signs and indicators function as supplementary proofs.

2. Emergence of Reformist Approach and Islamic Modernism

Throughout its history, the Islamic world has encountered foreign cultures and intellectual systems at various levels and responding to them in different ways. As Baljon (1968, p. 2) observes, none of the earlier difficult encounters with foreign cultures and philosophical systems that Islam had experienced could be compared to the crisis brought about by its confrontation with the “enlightened” and largely secularised Europe of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This encounter exposed significant differences between the two civilisations, rooted in divergent values, beliefs, symbols, and social structures, and generated internal tensions. Within Muslim societies, it produced a stark divide between administrative and intellectual elites—who embraced Western values and modern lifestyles—and the wider populace, who retained traditional religious and cultural orientations (Būtī 1999, pp. 9–11; Özervarlı 2008, pp. 43–50). By the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, this divide deepened, especially among intellectuals. Debates arose over how Islam should engage with modernity and whether its cultural values could or should be adapted to Western paradigms. While many resisted altering Islamic principles, ideologies rooted in secularism, positivism, and rationalism shaped by European humanism gained influence, often advocating reform through European intellectual frameworks rather than religious ones. In response, some Muslim thinkers sought a middle path: preserving Islamic identity while embracing renewal (tajdīd) and reform (iṣlāḥ) (Özervarlı 2008, p. 55). This approach emerged not only in Ottoman cities such as Istanbul but also in Damascus, Tunis, Iran, India, and Egypt. These figures resisted wholesale secularisation while striving to reconcile tradition with the demands of modernity.

Although it is difficult to determine a precise date for when modernism first began to exert its influence on the Islamic world, it is generally acknowledged that this began with the British occupation of the Indian subcontinent. Muslims in this region encountered Westerners earlier and more directly, particularly during the period of British expansion, which intensified as they sought to establish dominance and interfered in Muslim living spaces. In such an atmosphere, one of the foremost figures who chose to maintain good relations with the British, Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–1898), argued that unless Muslims adopted modern science and education and reconciled them with Islamic principles, they would fall irretrievably behind (Ahmad 1961, pp. 63–65). He initiated extensive educational and social reforms, seeking to instil new ways of reasoning in Muslim youth through Western-style education and advocating a synthesis of religion and science (Baljon 1968, p. 4). His writings aimed to align Islamic theology with the humanist, rationalist, and scientific worldview of his time.

The modernist approach exemplified by Sayyid Ahmad Khan in India was further developed by Jamal al-Din Afghani (1838–1897) and Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) in the Middle East. Afghani rejected Western imperialism but urged Muslims to align Islam with reason and science, warning against intellectual stagnation and calling for ijtihād and educational reform (Özervarlı 2008, pp. 45–46). He argued that Islam was not inherently opposed to science or philosophy, and encouraged Muslims to learn these disciplines, advocating for broad educational reform. He attributed the moral and intellectual decline of Muslims not to Islam itself but to their own failures, implicitly suggesting—as later Islamic reformers would explicitly state—that the deficiency lay with Muslims, not with Islam (Mardin 2017, p. 15). Muhammad Abduh, similarly, sought to overcome stagnation by promoting social transformation and education. He opposed the rigid sectarianism of the mutaʾakhkhirūn, insisting that Islamic texts be critically reassessed and adapted to modern conditions (Bahiy 1961, p. 93). Abduh attributed what he saw as the intellectual and spiritual stagnation of 19th-century Islam to the blind imitation (taqlīd) of earlier authorities and an inadequate educational system that rejected critical engagement and change. He also criticised the blind imitation of Western approaches, arguing that they were being adopted without critical awareness (Özervarlı 2008, p. 50). At the same time, he acknowledged that both religious and positive sciences come from the same source and maintained that religious sciences and positive sciences should proceed in parallel, complementing each other. He argued that revelation, reason, and God’s will are not separate but rather intertwined, and that there can be no contradiction between them. Any suggestion of contradiction, he asserted, would imply the absence of absolute perfection in the divine (Bayram 2021, pp. 19–20).

This reformist vision also inspired figures such as Ferid Wajdi (1878–1954), Musa Jarullah (1875–1949), and Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938), who continued to develop these ideas in their own contexts. Similar developments witnessed in Late Ottoman and early Turkish scholarship as well. For instance, İzmirli İsmail Hakkı (1868–1946) and M. Şemsettin Günaltay (1883–1961) sought to reconcile traditional madrasa education with modern mektep schooling. Others, such as Musa Kazım (1858–1920), attempted to reconcile modernism and tradition, while Mustafa Sabri Efendi (1869–1954) firmly opposed modernist reforms, advocating strict adherence to classical teachings. This broader intellectual ferment spurred a revival of theological inquiry in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as Muslim scholars recognised that traditional Islamic disciplines had become insufficient to meet the ideological and intellectual challenges of Western modernity. This recognition marked the advent of what is often termed Islamic Modernism: a movement of renewal (tajdīd) and reform (iṣlāḥ) aimed at revitalising Islamic thought.

3. Late Ottman Scholarship and New Ilm Kalām Movement

By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the limitations of traditional Islamic sciences in addressing modern challenges had become evident. Following the Renaissance, intellectual and scientific developments in Europe had eroded the prestige of ancient Greek philosophy, supplanting it with novel philosophical approaches that introduced fundamentally different perspectives and matured into enduring intellectual traditions. The emergence of new paradigms in science and philosophy, along with transformative shifts in conceptions of the universe, nature, and humanity, inevitably prompted Muslim theologians to reconsider the methodological and substantive foundations of their discipline. Against the backdrop of these rapid social, political, and intellectual transformations, including secularisation, positivism, rationalism, and the marginalisation of religion in public life, late Ottoman scholars became acutely aware of the need to reinterpret the fundamentals of faith in a way that could respond effectively to contemporary challenges (Özervarlı 2008, p. 55). Many observed that the methodologies of kalām, tafsīr, and fiqh had grown stagnant, rendering them ill-equipped to engage effectively with the pressing issues of the age.

This realisation fuelled a reformist impulse that first manifested in tafsīr through innovative hermeneutical approaches, then in fiqh through the revitalisation of ijtihād, and most decisively in kalām. It would not be an exaggeration to argue that at the centre of this reformist project stood the discipline of kalām, which became a focal point of debate and intellectual engagement. As Özervarlı observes (p. 56), the focus on kalām was inevitable given its foundational role in articulating and defending Islamic creed (ʿaqīdah). Theologians regarded it as the intellectual guardian of faith, charged with responding to the philosophical and ideological currents that threatened its integrity. The spread of secularist tendencies among the educated elite, coupled with the ascendancy of philosophies that dismissed religious truth, forced Muslim theologians to develop renewed modes of inquiry and methodological frameworks. Within this milieu, the new ʿilm al-kalām movement emerged and took shape in the late Ottoman period. It was characterised by a thorough reassessment of its content and methodology, aimed at enabling it to engage effectively with contemporary philosophical, scientific, and ideological challenges, while remaining faithful to the core principles of Islamic theology (Özervarlı 2008, p. 57).

A defining feature of the new ʿilm al-kalām was its reinvigorated treatment of the concept of prophethood, a subject that had been relatively marginalised in the late classical (mutaʾakhkhirūn) period. Seeking to safeguard the integrity of Islamic belief, modern scholars placed prophethood at the heart of theological inquiry, exploring its necessity, evidentiary basis, and essential nature. In this respect, prominent late Ottoman figures—such as Mustafa Sabri Efendi, Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, İzmirli İsmail Hakkı, and Harputī—paralleled the concerns of reformist thinkers like Muḥammad ʿAbduh, Rashīd Riḍā, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, and Mawlānā Shiblī. These scholars devoted substantial attention to examining the nature, relevance, and interpretation of miracles within the framework of prophethood, frequently engaging with the epistemological and apologetic dimensions of the subject.

Manastırlı İsmail Hakkı (d. 1912), though less radical in methodological reform, can be regarded as both a contributor to and a product of the intellectual climate that gave rise to the new ʿilm al-kalām movement. His Telhîsü’l-kelām fî berâhîni akâidü’l-İslâm is an apologetic work intended to reassure Muslims in the face of growing scepticism and to refute the claims of naturalist and materialist thinkers. As Bayram (2021, p. 41) notes, the period immediately following Manastırlı’s work witnessed the crystallisation of two distinct approaches within the movement. The first, championed by Abdullatif Harputî (d. 1916) and İzmirli İsmail Hakkı (d. 1946), became known as Yeni ʿIlm-i Kelām (New Theology) and sought to modernise kalām without compromising its traditional foundations. This approach emphasised the integration of insights from modern science and philosophy, as well as the adoption of new logical and methodological tools, while remaining firmly rooted in an intellectual tradition that retained broad acceptance among late Ottoman scholars. The second, developed by Şerafeddin Yaltkaya, was termed İctimāʿī ʿIlm-i Kelām (Sociological Theology) and aimed to align kalām more closely with Western philosophy, the natural sciences, and particularly the theories of the social sciences. However, its ultimately positivist orientation significantly altered the classical identity of kalām and, as a result, it failed to attract substantial support (Özervarlı 2008, pp. 57, 68).

Harputî, one of the earliest theorists of the Yeni ʿIlm-i Kalām, recognised that while the classical kalām corpus had effectively met the intellectual needs of its own era, it lacked the capacity to address the modern ideological currents confronting Muslims in his time. When tasked with teaching kalām, he found existing works inadequate for refuting contemporary heresies and the claims of modern deniers, which prompted him to compose Tenkīhu’l-Kalām (Harputî 1330, pp. 3–4). The title itself signalled his aim: not to transform kalām into a wholly new discipline, but to “purify” it of elements that no longer resonated with contemporary concerns, thereby reorienting it toward the intellectual and cultural conditions of the time (Özervarlı 2008, p. 58). His approach sought to adapt the discipline to modern challenges while preserving its essential nature and maintaining a critical stance toward what he perceived as modernist excesses. Nevertheless, despite his reformist intent, Harputî did not fully realise his own theoretical vision; his arguments often remained within the framework of classical kalām and did not advance beyond the parameters already set by responses to materialist philosophers (Bayram 2021, pp. 41–42).

Among the leading figures of the new ʿilm al-kalām, İzmirli İsmail Hakkı stands out as its most prominent representative. He envisioned kalām not merely as a defensive bulwark against the detractors of Islam, but also as a discipline capable of guiding sincere seekers of truth. For İzmirli, theology must inevitably evolve in response to the intellectual and cultural transformations of each age (İzmirli 1339–1341, I/10). Drawing a parallel with earlier theologians who had critically engaged with Greek philosophy, he argued that modern Muslim scholars should similarly interact with contemporary English, French, and German philosophical thought—adopting what was beneficial while rejecting what conflicted with Islamic belief. He observed that the ancient philosophy which had shaped Muslim intellectual engagement for centuries had eventually yielded to Western philosophical traditions; as these new currents penetrated Ottoman intellectual life, the inadequacy of a kalām oriented solely toward Greek frameworks became increasingly apparent, necessitating a redefined path. In this regard, İzmirli invoked the precedent of scholars such as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1209) and al-Bāqillānī (d. 1013), who had deemed the kalām of their predecessors insufficient for the needs of their time (İzmirli 1336, pp. 12–13). Just as Rāzī benefited from the tools of Greek philosophy, İzmirli urged contemporary theologians to draw selectively on modern Western philosophical ideas to inspire and engage particularly the inquisitive minds of the younger generation. He advocated for a kalām that integrates modern scientific findings, employs new logical and methodological tools, and remains firmly grounded in the Qurʾān, sunnah, and the practices of the early Muslim community as the foundation for social life. Such a renewed kalām should not simply reassert classical theological positions through traditional proofs, but should engage in sustained dialogue with, and critical comparison of, both medieval and modern Western philosophical arguments (Bayram 2021, p. 43; Özervarlı 2008, pp. 60–61). In this spirit, İzmirli enriched his theological discourse with insights from figures such as David Hume, Henri Poincaré, and Émile Boutroux, integrating their critiques into his discussions on miracles and natural laws (Bayram 2021, p. 49).

Mustafa Sabri Efendi (d. 1954), although often associated with the defence of classical kalām, openly acknowledged the necessity of renewal in light of the scientific and philosophical developments (Mustafa Sabri 2007, II/109). He argued that, given the increasing prominence of modern intellectual currents, Muslims could not afford to remain indifferent to them, and he urged contemporary scholars to equip themselves for sustained engagement with these challenges (Mustafa Sabri 1994, pp. 52–53). Upholding the appropriateness of the mutaʾakhkhirūn (later kalām scholars) method for its historical context, Mustafa Sabri nonetheless insisted that today’s theologians must develop a kalām suited to the epistemic and ideological demands of the modern age. He lamented that Muslims familiar with Western philosophy and intellectual movements had failed to construct a coherent theological framework to defend the faith against these ideologies. Acknowledging that certain natural sciences discussed in later kalām works no longer aligned with contemporary knowledge, he stressed that this was not a failing of the earlier scholars, who had incorporated non-Islamic sciences into kalām by Islamising them—a practice largely abandoned by subsequent generations. Sabri was critical of those who dismissed the classical tradition without offering viable alternatives and warned against disparaging the earlier corpus unnecessarily (Bayram 2021, pp. 44–45). While generally conservative in orientation, he was open to updating kalām and, at times, even drew on modern Western philosophical critiques to strengthen Islamic arguments. For Sabri, no Islamic discipline, including kalām, could remain detached from the prevailing scientific understanding without risking irrelevance, and just as earlier scholars had benefited from the sciences of their eras, modern students and scholars were obliged to master the scientific and intellectual resources of their own time (Mustafa Sabri 1325, II (33), p. 765).

Taken together, the positions of these scholars reveal a shared recognition of the need for kalām to adapt to the intellectual conditions of the modern era, even as they diverged in their methodological emphases and in their levels of receptivity to modernist currents. Although they stood at different points along the reformist spectrum—and at times even at opposing ends, particularly in the case of Mustafa Sabri—Harputî, Mustafa Sabri Efendi, and İzmirli İsmail Hakkı nonetheless shared a fundamental conviction that ʿilm al-kalām could not remain static in the face of contemporary scientific and philosophical developments. They agreed that each era brings forth its own intellectual and ideological challenges, requiring theology to adapt both methodologically and substantively in order to respond effectively. As these prominent representatives demonstrate, despite their varying degrees of openness to reform, many late Ottoman theologians affirmed the necessity of revitalising kalām so that it could engage meaningfully with the epistemic, scientific, and philosophical challenges of the modern age.

Before turning to modern scholars’ perceptions of miracles, it is important to highlight another significant development in recent scholarship—what I term the kalāmisation of sīrah, an approach increasingly evident in contemporary biographical studies of the Prophet. Recognising this trend is particularly useful for situating Gülen’s views, as he stands at the crossroads of three intersecting trajectories: the broader framework of Islamic modernist thought, the late Ottoman renewal of ʿilm al-kalām, and, more specifically, modern sīrah scholarship. Within this trend of kalāmisation of sīrah, scholars draw extensively on theological themes in their examination of different aspects of the Prophet’s life. In this regard, Birişik draws attention to a thesis that engages with topics central to kalām which have gradually permeated sīrah literature, offering a comparative analysis of Manṣūrpūrī’s Raḥmatan li al-ʿĀlamīn alongside Shiblī Nuʿmānī and Sayyid Sulaymān Nadwī’s Sīrat al-Nabī. According to Birişik, Western scholarship on Islam—and particularly on sīrah—has undergone a marked shift towards foundational theological concerns such as divinity, prophethood, and miracles, subjects traditionally situated within the domain of ʿilm al-kalām (Birişik 2012, pp. 579–80). He attributes this thematic reorientation to the Western perception of the life of Jesus as primarily a manifestation of divinity, in contrast to the Islamic view which frames it through the lens of prophethood. Consequently, comparative treatments of Prophet Muhammad and Jesus in Western scholarship inevitably address questions of prophethood, while also incorporating discussions of miracles as phenomena intrinsically linked to both divinity and prophetic mission. This perception, coupled with the influence of Western scholarship, has made it inevitable for Muslim sīrah scholars to engage in a more rigorous examination of theological concepts as they are articulated within the interpretive frameworks of sīrah literature.

4. Modern Approaches to Miracles

Despite alternative classifications, classical Muslim theologians generally approached miracles within a framework that distinguished three main types: ḥissī/kawnī (sensory or physical), khabarī (narrative or informative), and maʿnawī/ʿaqlī (spiritual or rational). These categories were embedded within broader discussions on the nature, purpose, and proofs of prophethood, with miracles serving as a central means of validating a prophet’s claim. Classical kalām works examined such miracles in depth, aiming to demonstrate their coherence with divine wisdom and their role in confirming revelation. In the modern period, however, the topic of miracles came under serious scrutiny. Influenced by changing epistemological frameworks, scientific rationalism, and Western intellectual currents, many modern Muslim scholars shifted emphasis away from ḥissī/kawnī and khabarī miracles toward the Qurʾān and the Prophet’s moral and intellectual excellence as expressions of maʿnawī/ʿaqlī miracles. For some like Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida, the Qurʾān became the Prophet’s primary miracle and in certain cases, i.e., Husayn Haykal, it was considered his sole miracle (Terzić 2009, pp. 5–33). Some modern thinkers denied the occurrence of physical or existential miracles altogether, while others allowed for their possibility in the case of earlier prophets but argued that Muḥammad’s proof lay exclusively in the Qurʾān. This represented a shift from the classical focus on extraordinary physical occurrences to an emphasis on enduring spiritual, intellectual, and ethical signs.

Indian scholar Shiblī Nuʿmānī, in his ʿIlm-i Kalām Jadīd, treated miracles extensively, arguing that they are not necessarily beyond natural laws and may be interpreted in light of scientific discoveries that operate within natural causes. While he held that miracles were not indispensable for proving prophethood, he criticised attempts by what he termed the “new group” to deny the presence of miracles in the Qurʾān (Özervarlı 2008, p. 119). As Özervarlı notes, the feasibility of miracles became a focal point of debate among modern theologians. Under the sway of scientific and rationalist ideologies, adherence to natural laws gained prominence within Islamic discourse, leading to efforts to rationalise miracles. In this intellectual climate, the conviction grew that physical miracles—traditionally central to classical proofs of prophethood—should no longer occupy a primary place in modern theological reasoning (Özervarlı 2008, pp. 123–24).

These modern shifts in the understanding of miracles reflect the broader intellectual reorientation that underpinned the Yeni ʿIlm al-Kalām movement in the late Ottoman and early Republican periods. Just as proponents of the movement—figures such as İzmirli İsmail Hakkı, Mustafa Sabri Efendi, and Abdullatif Harputî—sought to adapt kalām to the epistemological demands of their age, contemporary debates on miracles reveal a similar impulse to reconcile theological discourse with the prevailing scientific and philosophical paradigms. In both cases, the aim was not merely to preserve the integrity of Islamic belief, but to reframe its presentation in a manner intelligible and persuasive to modern audiences. The reinterpretation of miracles, especially the privileging of the Qurʾān’s inimitability and the Prophet’s moral-intellectual excellence over physical signs, thus serves as a reflection of the larger methodological recalibration within modern Muslim theology.

As noted earlier, one of the earliest figures of modernist thought was Sayyid Ahmad Khan, whose intellectual identity was shaped almost explicitly by his views on the question of miracles. Identifying himself as a “naturalist” (ṭabīʿī), he rejected physical miracles—particularly those transmitted through ḥadīth literature—and exerted great efforts to reinterpret the prophetic miracles mentioned in the Qurʾān through what may be regarded as forced or highly speculative readings (Bahiy 1961, p. 29). For Ahmad Khan, prophethood was an attained (kasbī) status rather than a divinely conferred office, and miracles, in their traditionally understood supernatural sense, could not serve as decisive evidence for establishing prophethood (Hussain 1970, p. 193). He approached the extraordinary acts attributed to certain prophets in the Qurʾān through the same naturalistic lens, often with little regard for the conventions of language and logic as understood in the exegetical tradition. While affirming the necessity of causality and the coherence of nature, he insisted that these principles did not entirely preclude miracles, yet redefined them strictly within a natural framework (Khan 1979, ix–x; Troll 1978, p. 193). Thus, he construed Qurʾānic miracles as extensions of natural phenomena and interpreted them accordingly. For example, he explained the Qurʾānic account of the parting of the sea for Moses and his people (Qurʾān 26:63) as a natural tidal phenomenon (mad–jazr), whereby the sea receded at low tide and returned at high tide, rather than as a supernatural intervention (Bayram 2021, p. 26). In a similar vein, he dismissed as unreliable the reports describing miraculous events at the Prophet Muḥammad’s birth, considering them poetic embellishments lacking a sound historical foundation (Khan 1870, 12/2). His treatment of the miʿrāj (the Prophet’s ascension) followed the same rationale: he denied its bodily occurrence, interpreting it instead as a visionary or dream experience (Khan 1870, 12/15). In each case, Ahmad Khan either rejected miracle accounts outright or reinterpreted them in a way that stripped them of their supernatural dimension, a stance fully consistent with his broader intellectual orientation and his commitment to reconciling Islamic belief with a naturalist worldview.

Given his significance within Islamic modernism, Muḥammad ʿAbduh’s position on miracles merits particular attention. He maintained that an event contrary to the usual natural order cannot be deemed impossible, since the Creator, who established the order of the universe through His will and power, possesses the capacity to bring about extraordinary occurrences beyond it. Building on this premise, ʿAbduh outlined the conditions under which a miracle should be recognised, arguing that if such an extraordinary event occurs at the hands of a prophetic claimant, meets these conditions, and is witnessed accordingly, it warrants affirmation of his truthfulness (ʿAbduh 1994, pp. 142–43). In his Risālat al-Tawḥīd, ʿAbduh’s views largely align with the traditional understanding of the possibility of miracles. However, in his tafsīr, he interestingly adopts a more selective and revisionist stance: while not denying the possibility of miracles in principle, he questions whether they occurred as traditionally narrated, reinterpreting certain well-known reports. For example, he explains the event of the Elephant (mentioned in sūrat al-Fīl) not as a supernatural intervention but as an outbreak resembling the transmission of a microbe or virus (ʿAbduh 1341, pp. 156–58). Similarly, his reading of the Qurʾānic account of angels strengthening the believers (Āl ʿImrān 3:123–124) sees it not as the literal descent of angels but as a metaphor for heightened determination and resolve among the believers (Riḍā 1948, IV, p. 112).

In assessing the proofs of prophethood, ʿAbduh departs from the classical emphasis on sensory miracles, arguing instead that the Qurʾān’s enduring power lies in its capacity to address human reason and intellect. He maintained that the Prophet’s mission was advanced not through miraculous spectacles designed to astonish and dazzle people, but through a rational and ethical appeal that engaged people’s faculties in accordance with their divinely ordained purpose (ʿAbduh 1994, p. 194). Employing an analogy of human development from childhood and youth to maturity, ʿAbduh suggested that with Islam humanity had reached an age of intellectual and moral maturity in which guidance through sensory miracles was no longer necessary (Riḍā 1948, I/135). Consequently, he accorded particular significance to the Qurʾān as the Prophet’s enduring miracle—revealed to a people at the height of eloquence and rhetoric, yet unmatched despite the Qurʾān’s challenge to produce its like. For ʿAbduh, this inimitability represented the most compelling proof of the Prophet’s mission, and a more enduring and persuasive sign than any physical miracle.

Farīd Wajdī appears to have held a broadly similar position, operating within Abduh’s intellectual orbit. Like ʿAbduh, Wajdī accepted the possibility of miracles but regarded them as a particular divine custom (sunnah) that confirmed the Prophet’s mission. Responding to materialist critiques that miracles could not be explained scientifically, he pointed to the then-accepted phenomenon of spiritism (séances and the summoning of spirits) as evidence that extraordinary phenomena—once dismissed—were increasingly acknowledged by science. In discussing Qurʾānic miracle accounts, Wajdī refrained from affirming their literal dimensions and instead stressed their rational plausibility, highlighting their spiritual significance. For him, miracles served to liberate the soul from its bodily and material constraints, enabling it to act upon the cosmos. Even phenomena such as spirit summoning, now perceptible to the senses, demonstrated that miracles should not be deemed impossible (Bayram 2021, p. 29). Nonetheless, Wajdī often adopted a cautious tone, sometimes classifying miracle-related verses as allegorical (mutashābih) (Yavuz 1995, XII, p. 393). For example, like ʿAbduh, he interpreted the destruction of the people of the elephant not as a supernatural event but as the spread of a plague or disease (microbes). He further argued that in an age when reason had reached maturity, cosmological miracles were no longer necessary—and indeed superfluous—at the hands of the Prophet (Bayram 2021, p. 29).

From this standpoint, Wajdī concluded that Islam’s call should rest not on sensory miracles but on appeals to reason and knowledge. The Prophet’s moral excellence, wisdom, and ability to influence minds and hearts, he argued, constituted a far greater miracle than any physical wonder granted to earlier prophets. In line with this perspective, he presented the Prophet’s miracles through the Qurʾān and, in some cases, through significant political and social events. For instance, he described the Prophet’s conduct during the Treaty of Ḥudaybiyya as itself miraculous, given its extraordinary outcomes (Bayram 2021, p. 30). Wajdī’s approach did not go unnoticed in intellectual circles and provoked strong criticism from Mustafa Sabri Efendi in particular. Sabri objected to Wajdī’s tendency to frame miracles within rational limits and to classify them among the allegorical verses of the Qurʾān, viewing this as a serious departure from the traditional understanding.

Having reviewed the key approaches to miracles advanced by prominent modernist figures from the Indian subcontinent and Egypt, it is also pertinent to briefly consider the position of Mūsā Jārullāh Bigiev (d. 1949), a leading figure of the Jadid Movement. Although an advocate of renewal, a proponent of ijtihād, and a critic of blind imitation (taqlīd), Jārullāh emphasised that Islam itself required no reform. He argued that, while Islam encourages belief in miracles, they do not constitute the primary proof of prophethood. Even though miracles occurred at the Prophet’s hands, they were not the essential evidence of his mission. The Qurʾān, he maintained, does not offer an unequivocal response to demands for miracles and is itself the Prophet’s greatest miracle, with its iʿjāz (inimitability) lying not only in its eloquence and disclosure of the unseen, but also in the spiritual truths it conveys and the transformative spirit it inspires (Jarullah 1914, pp. 76–77). In this respect, Jārullāh cited verses describing the Prophet as a mercy to the worlds (al-Anbiyāʾ 21:107) and as one who teaches the Book and wisdom and purifies believers (Āl ʿImrān 3:164), arguing that such qualities should themselves be understood as miracles in their own right. While acknowledging sensory miracles, such as water flowing from the Prophet’s fingers or the immobilisation of Surāqah’s horse, he regarded these as incidental acts serving immediate practical needs rather than as evidentiary proofs. Similarly, he recognised the Isrāʾ (night journey) as an extraordinary, bodily event, yet denied that it functioned as evidence of prophethood (Jarullah 1914, pp. 77–79). Clarifying that this denial of their evidentiary role did not imply purposelessness, he supplemented his argument with further explanations. Overall, Jārullāh’s perspective placed emphasis on the spiritual and intellectual dimensions of the Prophet’s mission rather than on sensory miracles.

At the forefront of the secularist movement in the late Ottoman period was Abdullah Cevdet (d. 1932), known for his materialist writings in the journal İçtihad. One of his most controversial undertakings was the Turkish translation of Reinhart Pieter Anne Dozy’s (1820–1883) provocative Essai sur l’histoire de l’Islamisme, published as Tarih-i İslâmiyet. This work, which portrayed the life of Prophet Muḥammad through a psychological lens and included sharp criticisms of Islamic history and miracles, provoked fierce backlash among Ottoman scholars, including theologians such as Manastırlı İsmail Hakkı and Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi, all of whom explicitly refuted it in their writings. The criticism directed at Abdullah Cevdet for translating the book was, in some cases, even more intense than that aimed at Dozy himself (Bayram 2021, p. 32). Cevdet’s translations of provocative works were not limited to Dozy’s book. He also translated Jean Meslier’s (1664–1729) Le bon sens (Akl-ı Selîm), which contained chapter titles such as “Miracles Never Prove Anything,” “The Dark Origins of Miracles,” and “The Absurdity of So-Called Miracles.” While a translator is not automatically assumed to endorse the views of the works they render, the absence of critical distance combined with an intellectual orientation consistent with the source material suggests a degree of sympathy. Indeed, in one of his own articles, Cevdet described Meslier as someone who “demolished false ideas with sound reason and replaced them with a system of beliefs founded on clear and rational principles,” (Cevdet 1330, IV (127), p. 468) leaving little doubt that his choice of translation reflected his own scepticism toward miracles and his broader critique of traditional religious understandings. Although Abdullah Cevdet did not author any standalone treatise on miracles, certain remarks in his theological discussions provide insight into his perspective. In addressing questions of divine decree and causation, he argued that all actions and events occur necessarily in accordance with specific natural conditions and unfold according to immutable laws. Poisons, for example, inevitably destroy the body they enter, and fire inevitably burns whatever it touches unless counteracted by an antidote—phenomena he described in theological terms as sunnatullāh or ʿādatullāh (Cevdet 1922, pp. 16–17). From this standpoint, his view does not amount to an explicit denial of miracles; rather, it reveals a strong attachment to natural laws as intrinsic elements of the divine order, leaving little conceptual space for supernatural intervention as traditionally conceived.

Another prominent proponent of materialist and secularist thought in the late Ottoman period was Celāl Nūrī (1882–1936), who also addressed the subject of miracles. In his work Hātemü’l-Enbiyāʾ, he argued that prophethood is essentially an office or function, not something that requires miraculous confirmation. Anticipating the question of how one can ascertain that a person is truly a prophet, Celāl Nūrī maintained that a prophet’s truthfulness is as self-evident as the existence of God. For this reason, he contended, those who encounter a prophet cannot legitimately demand miracles or supernatural signs from him. In his view, the fact that God addresses the prophet directly, speaks to him in His own language, and grants him success in his mission is itself sufficient to establish prophetic status (Celāl Nūrī 1332, pp. 31–32). Celāl Nūrī further asserted that a person created with such a natural disposition (fiṭrah) is, by that very nature, a prophet. Later, he expressed this view even more explicitly, describing prophets as extraordinary souls created in perfect harmony with the laws of nature and endowed with the most complete spiritual and natural faculties, to the extent that no one could surpass them in these qualities (pp. 37–39). Citing ʿUmar al-Nasafī’s (d. 537/1142) statement that prophets are affirmed and supported through miracles, Celāl Nūrī reinterpreted it according to his own framework: prophetic affirmation should be understood in terms of the prophets’ success in guiding people to the truth, with their “miracles” understood in this sense rather than as supernatural phenomena. From this perspective, he argued that throughout history both prophetic missions and miracles have often been interpreted in material terms, which he regarded as a sign of naivety. Such individuals—whom he characterised as ʿawām (common people)—insist on perceiving miracles as violations of natural laws, a view that, in his assessment, reflects a simplistic and limited understanding (Celāl Nūrī 1332, pp. 35–36).

One of the most prominent figures of this period was Kılıçzāde Hakkı (d. 1960), who wrote two articles specifically focusing on Celāl Nūrī’s work. In the first, Kılıçzāde critiques the tendency to embellish the Prophet’s life with fabricated stories, attributing improbable feats to him in an attempt to exalt his status—an approach that, in his view, undermines a reasoned understanding of miracles. He argues that even in the twentieth century it is problematic that actions contrary to nature remain objects of belief, asserting that clinging to such notions yields no practical benefit. He further maintains that Qurʾānic verses implying cosmological irregularities—and the miracle accounts associated with them—should be interpreted in ways consistent with reason and science, calling for bold and courageous steps to address the issue (Bayram 2021, p. 35). In his second article, Kılıçzāde adopts the same critical tone, presenting the Prophet as a human being rather than as someone who resolves all matters through supernatural intervention. He insists that the sunnat Allāh (God’s universal law) described in the Qurʾān is immutable and never suspended for anyone, including prophets, and that no one is granted special status to transcend these laws. For example, he interprets the angels’ assistance at Badr not as literal intervention but as psychological support—instilling fear in the enemy, a phenomenon well attested in human experience. This, he contends, is both more realistic and more beneficial, while still accommodating the emotional needs of those who prefer miraculous narratives (Bayram 2021, p. 35).

Kılıçzāde warns that portraying natural events as supernatural miracles fosters passivity, encouraging Muslims to await divine intervention rather than actively striving for solutions. He argues that if the Prophet Muhammad were presented not through miracles but through his extraordinary intellect, moral excellence, and leadership, Muslims would better appreciate the virtues he sought to instil. While stressing that he does not deny miracles outright, describing them as “the most cherished child of prophethood”, he contends there is no longer any benefit in reviving or insisting upon miracles from the earliest Islamic period. Instead, he urges attention toward the outcomes of the “miracle of the contemporary age,” namely, human reason. Drawing modern parallels, he notes that historical figures like Bismarck accomplished extraordinary feats without violating natural laws, and he redefines miracles as acts that surpass ordinary human capability, bestowed by God upon select individuals (Bayram 2021, p. 35).

In summary, Kılıçzāde, much like Celāl Nūrī, presents a rationalist and humanist conception of the Prophet and miracles. He refrains from grounding prophetic mission in supernatural proofs, framing the Prophet’s uniqueness as a product of intellect, moral excellence, and human achievement. This perspective rejects the traditional understanding of miracles as suspensions of natural laws, offering instead a relatively accessible interpretation aligned with reason and empirical experience. Yet, this approach, shaped by a materialist mindset and an excessive attachment to the constancy of natural laws, ultimately strips miracles of their intended theological meaning. While not an explicit denial, it effectively empties the concept of miracles of any substantive religious content. This reconceptualisation appears driven less by the intrinsic significance of miracles and more by the perceived social and theological benefits of distancing the Prophet from supernatural associations. In this light, miracles are reframed through rhetorical manoeuvring, with emphasis placed on the supposed advantages of rejecting them—such as safeguarding a certain theological identity and appealing to segments of society sceptical of supernatural claims—rather than on their religious value. Such an approach, rooted in an overemphasis on natural law, did not gain acceptance among mainstream theologians of the time who committed to the classical view.

In light of the above discussion, it becomes evident that modernist and late Ottoman engagements with the concept of miracles were far from monolithic. From Ahmad Khan’s overt naturalism to ʿAbduh’s rationalist reformulation, from Wajdī’s cautious reinterpretations to the more secularist readings of Abdullah Cevdet, Celāl Nūrī, and Kılıçzāde, we find a spectrum of positions shaped by the intellectual and socio-political conditions of their respective contexts. While some sought to reconcile miracles with modern scientific thought, others reframed them in moral, intellectual, or socio-political terms, and a few approached them with open scepticism. Even among late Ottoman theologians whose positions were less explicitly stated, responses—whether affirming, nuancing, or resisting such reinterpretations—were inevitably conditioned by the dominant intellectual currents of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

It is therefore neither accurate to present these figures as unified in their acceptance or rejection of miracles, nor to assume they operated under identical historical pressures. Variations in language, tone, and theological emphasis over just a few decades reveal profound shifts in religious sensibilities, shaped by political upheavals, cultural transformations, and the pressures of secularisation. Nevertheless, certain broad tendencies emerge: a movement away from grounding prophetic truth solely in supernatural proofs; a heightened emphasis on the Qurʾān as the central and enduring miracle; and a readiness, to varying degrees, to reframe miraculous narratives in terms more palatable to contemporary rationalist sensibilities.

Against this complex backdrop, Fethullah Gülen’s perspective offers a distinctive synthesis. While affirming the reality of miracles, Gülen, like Shiblī and Riḍā, cautions against making them the primary proof of prophethood, situating them instead within the broader framework of prophetic guidance. His approach retains their religious significance while reframing their function in a manner that speaks to modern believers—an approach that, as will be seen, both resonates with and diverges from earlier reformist and late Ottoman tendencies.

5. Fethullah Gülen’s Perception of Miracles

Gülen devotes considerable attention to miracles across his works on Qur’ānic exegesis, faith essentials, and sīrah. His approach to miracles span theological, spiritual, and scientific dimensions, presenting a nuanced synthesis that avoids both outright denial and naïve literalism.5 He firmly rejects the view that miracles should be dismissed simply because they defy current human understanding, arguing that such denial is both irrational and premature given the evolving nature of scientific discovery. While affirming that miracles align with the divine order—governing both natural laws and their occasional suspension—Gülen emphasises their primary purpose as signs that strengthen faith, manifest divine power, and direct believers toward higher spiritual truths, rather than serving merely as distinct proofs of prophethood. He situates miracles within a broader spectrum: they are consistent with the miracles of earlier prophets, mirrored in the everyday marvels of creation that habit renders mundane, and transmitted through reliable reports that call for faith where reason reaches its limits. Moreover, Gülen highlights their future-oriented dimension, asserting that many prophetic miracles anticipated scientific and technological developments, thereby inspiring human advancement. In his hermeneutics, Gülen places miracles within the Qur’an’s engagement with natural phenomena, noting that although the Qur’an is not a science textbook, it alludes to universal scientific truths in a timeless manner. For Gülen, the Qur’an, the cosmos, and the human beings constitute three interrelated “books” of God, each revealing His will and artistry. This integrated vision enables him to affirm the reality of miracles while preserving their theological depth, presenting them as significant intersections between divine wisdom, human reason, and spiritual ascent.

According to Gülen, the guidance provided by prophets extends beyond religious or spiritual domains to encompass worldly realms as well. This stands at the core of his arguments concerning the role of the Prophets; from this perception, one can also discern his understanding of the relationship between intellect and revelation, as well as his approach to miracles. He posits that prophets serve as “masters of material and spiritual progress, leaders of mental/intellectual and inner growth, and architects of worldly and heavenly lives” (Gülen 2008, p. 133). Through this leadership, humanity gains insight into its essence and realises its unique status. This perception is rooted in his holistic treatment of humanity highlighted in the Qur’an (Q 95:4), viewing humans not merely as biological beings but as perfect patterns of creation (ahsan taqwīm) in every aspect, and as integral pillars of the God–universe–human convergence. It can be argued that this holistic approach to prophets’ guidance holds significance in influencing modern paradigms, whether addressing the perceived conflict between religion and science or the tension between rationality and revelation.

Drawing on Nursi’s view that miracles contain signs for scientific and technological progress (Nursi 2007, pp. 268–84), he presents prophets as guides for both spiritual refinement and material development, as reflected in the following passage:

… in addition to granting them the privilege of delving into their spiritual depths and benefiting from this blessed source, by instructing humans to emulate prophets, God has illuminated the path of material advancement, and at the very least, paved the way for receptive souls to contemplate and pursue technological advancements through the provided signs and clues, as an outcome of the diverse manifestations of miracles, which serve as conclusive evidence of their prophethood (Gülen 2007a, pp. 101–5, 212–14; 2007b, I/pp. 176–78; 2007c, pp. 523–37; 2008, p. 134; 2013, p. 219).

One important approach taken by Muslim theologians toward the Qur’an is to regard it as a book of wisdom, and therefore to hold that nothing within it is without purpose or meaning. This raises a significant interpretive question: What is the wisdom behind the Qur’an narrating the miracles of earlier prophets and reporting past events that have already occurred? Throughout Islamic intellectual history, scholars—especially exegetes—have reflected on this question. In doing so, they have often interpreted such verses in dialogue with the scientific knowledge and technological realities of their own age. Said Nursi is among the scholars who approached prophetic miracles through this lens in modern times. He contends that certain verses describing the miracles of the prophets allude to scientific and technological advancements that humanity would eventually achieve. In his view, these miracles symbolically point to the furthest horizons of human scientific progress. Accordingly, the miracles mentioned in the Qur’an function as encouragements and indicators for human advancement. For Nursi, they contain foundational hints (ishārāt) of the scientific principles and technologies that later emerge through human thought, cooperation, and cumulative knowledge. As Nursi expresses it, the Qur’an, through the miracles of the prophets, effectively proclaims: “O humanity! These miracles you see are samples and prototypes. Through your collective effort and the accumulation of your ideas, knowledge, and shared intellectual labour, you will produce their counterparts. In this sense, past events serve as a mirror of the future; the inventions that emerge in later periods are built upon the principles and foundations established in earlier times.” (Nursi 2007, p. 254) In Nursi’s formulation, many modern technological developments are built upon the conceptual seeds already embedded in earlier divine teachings and the examples set by the prophets.

The extraordinary achievements of human art and science, such as the aeroplane, electricity, the railway, and the telegraph, are the direct outcomes of humanity’s technological and industrial progress, and they have come to occupy a central place in modern material life. For Said Nursi, it is inconceivable that the wise Qur’an, which speaks to all of humanity across time, would remain silent regarding phenomena of such transformative significance. Indeed, he argues that the Qur’an has not overlooked them; rather, it alludes to these developments in two distinct ways: first, by presenting the miracles of the prophets, which symbolically prefigure later scientific and technological advancements; and second, by referencing certain historical events that implicitly gesture toward future discoveries (Nursi 2007, pp. 252–53). For example, the ship that was the miracle of Prophet Noah represents, in Nursi’s reading, the earliest prototype of maritime technology. Humanity’s later development of sailing vessels and modern ships can be viewed as unfolding the foundational principle first manifested in that miracle (Nursi 2007, p. 254). These miracles are not mere extraordinary events isolated in sacred history; they are, in his interpretation, archetypal demonstrations of capacities that God ultimately enables humanity to realise through accumulated knowledge, collective effort, and technological advancement. Thus, prophetic miracles function as both spiritual signs and material cues—signs of divine power, and cues for human creativity. By situating miracles at the intersection of revelation and civilisation, Nursi argues that the Qur’an does not simply recount sacred history; it gestures toward humanity’s future horizons. In this way, the miracles narrated in the Qur’an are woven into the broader fabric of human progress, serving as beacons that illuminate the potential trajectory of scientific discovery and technological innovation. It is important to note that Nursi’s interpretation is not motivated by admiration for Western scientific civilisation or a sense of inferiority in the face of its progress. His life story and spiritual mission demonstrate otherwise. His approach is rooted in a firm conviction about the Qur’an’s miraculous nature. He repeatedly affirms that the Qur’an is an “unextinguishable spiritual sun.” Responding to the British Colonial Secretary’s claim that Muslims could only be subdued by severing their connection to the Qur’an, Nursi famously declared: “I will show the world that the Qur’an is a spiritual sun that cannot be extinguished.” (Nursi 2010, p. 51). Thus, Nursi’s attempt to relate prophetic miracles to modern science could be understood as an effort to highlight the Qur’an’s relevance, its miraculous depth, and its role in inspiring human progress—not as an apologetic response to Western advancement.

Similar to Nursi Gülen explores, with illustrative examples, how miracles, and by extension prophets, serve as guiding forces in scientific and technological progress. Some of the noteworthy examples he provides include:

The miraculous ship constructed by Prophet Noah within the shipyard of prophethood… the garments of Prophet Abraham, rendered fireproof through reliance on God, enduring the fiercest flames, hinting at the fire-resistant qualities of asbestos and potentially more resilient materials… the mysteriously granted clock to Prophet Joseph, addressing his agony and need for a sense of time… the remarkable staff of Prophet Moses, resembling modern drilling equipment and centrifuge machines… the miracle of Prophet David, laying the groundwork for iron and steelworks and their production… the extraordinary feat of Prophet Solomon in transporting Bilqis’ throne, incorporating imagery, sound, and possibly even its surroundings, foreshadowing technologies like television, the internet, and other marvels of the modern age… the astonishing journey of several months covered in a single day by this esteemed Prophet, anticipating advancements in aviation, airplane technology… his endeavours indicating interaction with the metaphysical realm, influencing its constituents (jinn, devils, etc.), and paving the way for extensive research transcending both material and metaphysical domains… furthermore, the instance of animal training or communication with animals (mantiq al-hayawanat), showcasing techniques for engaging with birds, ants, and other creatures… the remarkable medical interventions of Prophet Jesus, surpassing the genetics of modern time and encompassing the restoration of life to inanimate objects, healing the blind, and resurrecting the dead… all these Divine decrees concerning creation serve as signs, implications, and reminders, while also inviting further exploration and research into the diverse domains illuminated by these chosen individuals (Gülen 2008, pp. 134–35).

The above depiction highlights humanity’s inherent limitations in surpassing the miracles demonstrated by prophets centuries ago, even in an age of unprecedented scientific and technological advancement that penetrates the mysteries of the cosmos and the natural order. Yet this recognition does not amount to a dismissal of scientific inquiry or innovation. Rather, it frames such pursuits as endeavours that must be situated within the horizon of prophetic guidance and teaching, thereby aligning modern progress with the objectives exemplified through prophetic miracles.

Meanwhile, Gülen remains cautious, noting: “It is not the duty of prophets to transform mountains and stones into gold, alter the currents of rivers, transform barren deserts into lush valleys, part rivers to pass through, or bring sustenance from the heavens.” (Gülen 2008, p. 138). As previously indicated, such a statement does not entail a denial of miracles, particularly those of a physical or existential nature. Rather, it shows his conviction that the primary responsibility of prophets lies in offering guidance and serving as exemplars and witnesses to God. The significance of miracles, in Gülen’s view, is demonstrated through his frequent use of them as evidence of prophethood, his responses to critiques from those who deny their reality, his exploration of their scientific dimensions, and his recognition of the Qur’ān’s abundant references to miraculous events. Ultimately, his emphasis on wisdom is central to grasping the purpose of miracles, highlighting the necessity of acknowledging both their function and their enduring relevance. In his view, these extraordinary occurrences function not only as rewards and special blessings for the sincere devotion of those chosen individuals who remain ever mindful of their responsibilities and position in the path of God, but also as divine favours, granted by the Divine will, to meet the needs and aspirations of their communities (Gülen 2008, p. 138).

Overall, Gülen’s reflections on miracles within the framework of prophetic duties, reflect a balanced response rooted in the mainstream sunni theology. This perspective engages with those who influenced by positivist, materialist ideologies and the challenges of rational explanation, deny the existence of miracles and restrict them exclusively to the Qur’an. His position is articulated clearly when he asserts that, “while divine power has, through the hands of prophets, transformed stones and earth into gold, coal into diamonds, and even restored life to the dead, none of these occurrences surpasses the significance of instilling faith in resistant souls, softening hearts hardened by disbelief, and reviving spiritual maladies.” (Gülen 2008, p. 138). Such acts exemplify divine blessings that not only affirm prophethood but also transform uncertainty into conviction. In essence, miracles are regarded as secondary occurrences, created by God—not ends in themselves, but instruments to confirm the prophet’s truthfulness, reassure him in his mission, and invite his audience toward belief.

6. Science vs. Religion Discourse and Gülen’s Views

In the post-Enlightenment era, shaped by positivist and materialist currents, science and rationality emerged as the dominant paradigms of inquiry, relegating alternative worldviews to scepticism or derision. The Islamic world was similarly affected, giving rise to debates on reconciling revelation with reason and on the plausibility of miracles. These debates centred on the necessity, nature, and epistemic possibility of revelation, and on whether miracles could be understood in harmony with rationality and natural law. At the same time, Muslim scholars were also compelled to confront accusations that Islam’s inadequate engagement with science and technology had led to civilisational decline, in contrast to the West’s ascendancy through its embrace of scientific and technological advancement.

In response to such criticisms, modern Muslim scholars have consistently emphasised that Islam, in its essence, is not opposed to science but rather affirms it as a positive and integral pursuit. They have demonstrated Islam’s high regard for scientific inquiry by contrasting the conditions of societies before and after the rise of Islam, noting that Muslims carried knowledge, science, and civilisation wherever they went (Özervarlı 2008, p. 124). Furthermore, scholars have highlighted that Islam’s rejection of idolatry and superstitious beliefs, together with its affirmation of intellect and rationality, marked a decisive shift from worship based on superstition to the worship of the One Creator (ʿAbduh 1994, pp. 136–39). By abolishing all forms of imitation except the emulation of prophets—on account of their infallibility and immunity from sin (ʿiṣmah)—Islam promoted reflection, deliberation, and reasoning, thereby laying the foundations for the development of scientific and philosophical thought (Farid Wajdi in Özervarlı 2008, p. 124). Wajdi further links Islam’s universality and enduring relevance to its association with science and knowledge, outlining five core principles: (1) upholding reason and science; (2) prioritising knowledge; (3) rejecting hereditary or elitist privilege while fostering openness to research and renewal; (4) systematising the revival of religious thought; and (5) discouraging idle speculation and fruitless disputation (qīl wa-qāl) (Özervarlı 2008, pp. 130–31).

On the question of rationality and revelation, Muḥammad ʿAbduh argues that the modern individual accepts as true only what can be apprehended through the senses and human faculties. He regards this distanced stance towards revelation as a mark of ignorance, rooted in a desire to evade responsibility. For ʿAbduh, just as ordinary people possess different levels of understanding and comprehension, it is unreasonable to view God’s selection of prophets—who are vastly superior to other humans in every respect—as favouritism rather than absolute justice. To reject this, he contends, is ultimately an attempt to deny the truths of revelation, since acceptance of revelation entails responsibilities, including the renunciation of selfish desires (ʿAbduh 1994, pp. 102–4).

In this regard, Muslim scholars maintain that once the authenticity of a prophet’s mission has been established, all that he conveys must be accepted. The central question debated in the modern period, however, concerns what should be done when, as classical works describe, a seeming conflict arises between reason and revelation. The dominant view holds that if certain matters appear inconceivable to the intellect or seem at first to contradict it, they should either be interpreted allegorically or their ultimate meaning entrusted to God (ʿAbduh 1994, pp. 117–18). According to Rashīd Riḍā, in cases of such contradictions, conclusions derived from absolute reason are to be preferred over the outward sense of tradition and narration, which should then either be interpreted or referred to God (ʿAbduh 1948, p. 73). While ʿAbduh accepts the interpretation of revelation in light of reason, he does not elevate reason above revelation. In this way, he distinguishes himself from the Muʿtazila, as his position is not aimed at defending the ideology of any particular sect (see Badawi 1976, pp. 24–25).

Holding a similar view, İzmirli İsmail Hakkı argues that while certain aspects of religious knowledge may be beyond human comprehension or empirical proof, none stand in outright opposition to it (İzmirli 1339–1341, p. 52). Modern scholars, particularly those associated with the new ʿilm al-kalām movement have similarly maintained that Islamic teachings cannot conflict with rational or scientific findings, thereby rendering Islam more receptive to reason and reform than other religions and civilisations (İzmirli 1339–1341, pp. 14–15; ʿAbduh 1994, pp. 13–14). At the same time, these scholars have avoided privileging rationality over revelation, stressing instead that reason divorced from revelation cannot ultimately serve humanity. From this standpoint, the social decline and pervasive materialism observed in the West are seen as consequences of the marginalisation of religion, reinforcing the conviction that while scientific advancement is valuable and should be embraced, it must be integrated with religious principles to achieve a balanced and ideal framework (Riḍā 1948, pp. 252–55; İzmirli 1339–1341, pp. 47–50).

Building on this discourse, Muhammad Iqbal stands out among the scholars who observe and emphasise the limitations of human intellect in the modern period. As Özervarlı notes, Iqbal expresses this idea with striking eloquence in his poetry: “Our intellect cannot comprehend eternity/It transforms one into a thousand through countless struggles/It is crippled, loves tranquillity/Cannot perceive the inner side but is enamored with the superficial” (quoted from Iqbal, Gulshan Rāz, 15 as cited in Özervarlı 2008, p. 126).

In addition to defending the possibility and necessity of revelation, theologians of this era also grappled with the implications of modern science and technology. They sought to reinterpret Qur’ānic verses in light of contemporary discoveries, offering explanations not found in classical works. Shiblī is a notable example in this regard, suggesting that certain Qur’ānic expressions may contain deeper layers of meaning, the uncovering of which could help address modern objections (Özervarlı 2008, p. 127). Yet, a major concern arises from the tendency of some modern scholars to interpret the Qur’ān in ways that reduce its scope to the sensory world, reflecting the influence of the positivist conception of science prevalent at the time. A frequently cited example is ʿAbduh’s interpretation of jinn as a possible reference to microbes (Riḍā 1948, III/96, VII/319).

There have also been figures in the modern period, such as Sayyid Ahmad Khan, who exhibited an excessive reliance on rationality and modern science, elevating them above all other measures. For Khan, the authenticity of religion was to be judged by its conformity to the realities and principles of nature—or, more specifically, to those principles as established by modern science (Khan 1870, IX–X). On this basis, he dismissed the possibility of supernatural intervention and maintained that all phenomena unfold strictly within the domain of natural laws accessible to human reason (Troll 1978, pp. 183–84).

Given the ongoing debates on the relationship between rationality and revelation and the perceived stagnation of the Islamic world, Gülen’s position is of considerable importance. His reflections on rational and scientific developments, together with his analysis of prophetic guidance, offer insights that speak directly to the challenges of the revelation–rationality discourse. In particular, his emphasis on the indispensability of revelation for the flourishing of both rationality and spirituality embodies the essence of mainstream Muslim thought.

Essentially, as long as the human mind, logic, and reasoning (which can all be considered synonymous) recognise and fully benefit from the rich source of prophethood, they will have the opportunity to reach the highest potential of their sphere and avoid becoming instruments of deceit for others. At its core, this acceptance involves submitting to an Eternal Power and Comprehensive Knowledge that governs all of creation and the material world. This can be seen as either the exaltation of all worldly outcomes—including intellectual products, logical projects, investigations from various fields, and experiences—or as examining everything through revelation to illuminate the true nature of all consequential matters, thereby transforming the terrestrial (ardī) celestial (samavī). Indeed, God is the creator of the mind and has guided its development through revelation. By opening the eyes of human beings through the mind and allowing it to reason accurately and think appropriately through revelation, God has enabled them to perceive His comprehensive Speech (revelation) as His most binding sign over humanity. In other words, God has turned the encompassing and unifying institute of revelation into a laboratory that connects the scattered and disorderly situations produced by the mind and reasoning, and tests their comparative outcomes (Gülen 2008, pp. 140–414).

Using this argument, Gülen persistently emphasises that humanity cannot successfully navigate the complex journey of material and spiritual life without the guidance of prophets. He asserts that revelation acts as an elixir, protecting the human mind from various delusions, with prophets serving as expert physicians who administer this elixir in the most effective manner. Consequently, those who follow prophets will be safeguarded from mental deviations and develop robust understanding of the metaphysical realms beyond the physical world. As a result, they will reach the furthest boundaries attainable by humanity in these domains. In this regard, Gülen firmly believes, just as the mind, logic and their outcomes cannot replace revelation, no one can substitute the invaluable role of the impeccable communicators of Divine revelation (prophets) (Gülen 2008, p. 141).

Gülen’s perspective offers significant insights into his understanding of the life (sīrah) of the final Prophet, as well as other prophets, and helps explain why he regards the sīrah as a framework for addressing numerous contemporary issues. In this respect, his approach also clarifies why he and more broadly many modern sīrah scholars, have tended to kalāmise the sīrah, rendering it a more meaningful site for theological engagement. It further illuminates how he conceptualises prophetic intelligence (fatānah), a key attribute in his analysis of the Prophet’s life in his major sīrah work, Sonsuz Nur.6 In Gülen’s interpretation, fatānah or “prophetic intellect” embodies the capacity for “overcoming the mind with the mind,”7 a phrase whose meaning, I believe, is elucidated in the previous quote.

Additionally, Gülen’s approach highlights the relative limitations of scientific inquiry when compared to prophetic knowledge. In light of the preceding discussion, the question of whether rationality can conflict with revelation reveals the inherent impossibility of such a clash. It is fitting to close this section with Gülen’s own words: “For this reason, the responsibility and authority for teaching about humanity, creation, and the Creator, and the right to speak on the meaning and essence of the material and unseen worlds, should be entrusted to those specially equipped individuals (prophets) who have strong connections with God Almighty” (Gülen 2008, p. 145).

7. Conclusions

Fethullah Gülen’s perception of miracles and revelation can be situated within the spectrum of Islamic modernism, late Ottoman scholarship of the new ʿilm al-kalām, and the kalāmisation of sīrah discourse in biographical works on the life of Prophet Muhammad. Given the context and milieu in which he was born and raised, he deliberately and meaningfully engaged with the debates of Muslim modernists as well as with the inescapable questions of science, rationality, and theology. His thought offers a distinctive synthesis across these multiple contexts. Against the backdrop of modernist tendencies to reduce or reinterpret miracles, whether by privileging the Qurʾān alone, reframing miracles as natural phenomena, or downplaying their evidentiary role, Gülen reaffirms their critical theological and spiritual significance. Yet, like many modern scholars such as Mawlana Shiblī, Abduh and others, he avoids making miracles the sole proof of prophethood, instead integrating them into a holistic vision of prophetic guidance.

Central to this vision is his understanding of prophets as masters of both spiritual and material advancement, whose miracles not only inspire faith but also serve as signs pointing toward future scientific and technological progress. In contrast to thinkers who rejected sensory miracles as obsolete, Gülen interprets them as relevant for modern and future generations, functioning as encouragements that spur human inquiry and development. His reading thus bridges the classical affirmation of miracles with a n innovative appreciation of their role in motivating scientific exploration.

Equally important is his conceptualisation of fatānah (prophetic intellect), which he defines as the capacity to “overcome the mind with the mind.” In Gülen’s hermeneutic, this attribute of prophetic intellect harmonises revelation with reason, ensuring that the intellect achieves its highest purpose and potential without falling prey to delusion or reductionism. Revelation, in this sense, does not constrain the mind but elevates it, protecting it from error and guiding it toward ultimate truth.

Finally, Gülen directly engages with the modern science vs. religion discourse. He rejects the claim that religion obstructs progress or should be relegated to the private sphere, insisting instead on the indispensability of revelation for both rational and spiritual flourishing. By framing prophets as the true guides of humanity, physicians of the soul and architects of civilisation, he presents revelation as an “elixir” that safeguards intellectual integrity while fostering material and spiritual progress. In doing so, Gülen not only addresses modern critiques shaped by positivist and materialist ideologies but also reasserts the mainstream Islamic conviction that revelation and rationality, far from being in conflict, are mutually reinforcing foundations for human advancement.