Beyond Good or Evil: “Human Nature Is Good” Reinterpreted

Abstract

This paper discusses Dai Zhen’s 戴震 (1724–1777) interpretation of human nature against the backdrop of Mencius’s claim that human nature is good. I argue that Dai Zhen ingeniously reinterprets the “shan” 善 (good; goodness) in terms of “fen” 分 (allotments; distinction) to view the claimed “goodness” as the unique and finest physical makeup of human nature that possesses the potential ability to know moral goodness, viz. liyi 理義 (principle & righteousness). Nonetheless, rather than a transcendental principle or some heavenly endowed virtue, liyi is present in human relationships and everyday life. At the crux of the issue is how to activate the given ability and advance our intelligent mind for principle and righteousness. By ridding “xingshan” 性善 (human nature is good) of its inherent moral properties as Mencius posits in his theory of human nature, Dai Zhen, from a naturalistic and empirical stance, proposes an unconventional approach to the longstanding debate over whether human nature is good or evil in Confucian discourse. While his interpretation may unsettle us that are accustomed to the traditional view of the “goodness” of human nature as one’s innate moral feelings of ren yi li zhi 仁義禮智 (benevolence, righteousness, wisdom, and propriety), Dai Zhen’s reading has undoubtedly thrown a new light on this famed Mencian thesis.

1. Introduction

Dai Zhen 戴震 (1724–1777) is a great Confucian moral thinker and scholar of 18th century China. In his masterpiece Mengzi ziyi shuzheng 孟子字義疏證 (Evidential Commentary on the Meanings of Terms in the Mencius), he reexamines the age-old issue of human nature. He says, “Nature is a general term for birds, fish, animals, and plants, but nature that is good is about the nature of human beings.”1 Dai Zhen makes a distinction between “xing” 性 (nature) and “xingshan” 性善 (nature being good). What is “good” about human nature then? To address the issue, this paper first examines Dai Zhen’s conception of human nature in terms of xueqi xinzhi 血氣心知 (blood, breath, and the intelligent mind) and then investigates the meanings of “xingshan.” I argue that Dai Zhen unconventionally looks at the “goodness” of human nature in light of “fen” 分 (allotments; distinction) to see the “shan” 善 (goodness) as the physical makeup of human nature resulting from the movement of yin yang and wu xing 五行 (the five elements/phases) and allowing for continuous enlargement and advancement. With his naturalistic2 view of human nature, Dai Zhen greatly challenges our understanding of the notion “xingshan” that is deeply imbued with the influence of Mencius’s 孟子 (c. 372—289 B.C.E.) thought.

In Mencius’s theory of human nature, human nature is inherently good, possessing the seeds of the four ethical virtues of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom which all human beings are born with but require continuous nurturing and cultivation (See the Mencius 3:6; 11:6; & 13:21).3 According to Dai Zhen, however, human nature is good in the sense that human nature as the finest physically constituted substance possesses the capability, potentially to be further developed capability, of knowing the moral goodness, namely liyi 理義 (principle & righteousness). Yet, for Dai Zhen, the so-called goodness or liyi is not a heavenly endowed virtue or a transcendental principle residing within the human mind. Instead, principle and righteousness are the order and patterns present in things which Dai Zhen favorably phrases as renlun riyong 人倫日用 (human relationships and everyday life). “Where there is a thing, there is its norm” 有物有則 (youwu youze) (Wang 2015, p. 708), as Dai Zhen often cites the Shijing 詩經 (The Book of Poetry) (See Dai 1995a, No. 3, No. 8, No. 10 & No. 13). Accordingly, Dai Zhen states, “Desire is the thing and principle its norm” (欲, 其物; 理, 其則也. Dai 1995a, No. 10, p. 160). Specifically, human relationships and the daily human activities are the things, wherein lie humanity, righteousness, and propriety their norms.4 The so-called principle and righteousness do not exist outside human daily existence of drinking, eating, and having sex. Since human nature comprises xueqi 血氣 (blood and breath) as well as xinzhi心知 (the intelligent mind), from which both human desires and the capabilities of knowing are derived, not only do we have the inclinations of the ear, the eye, the nose, and the mouth towards sounds, colors, smells, and tastes, we also have the inclination of the mind towards the order and patterns. For Dai Zhen, the inclination of xueqi and xinzhi towards what is delightful to them from outside is what is natural about human nature.

As human desires arise in our physical contact with sounds, colors, smells, and tastes, I argue that with Dai Zhen the given knowing capability of human nature is activated in our encounters with other people with respect to the actual reality of renlun riyong. Because of our experiential knowledge of the most fundamental reality of human existence of “having drink, food, and sex,”5 we can understand not only our own desires but also other people’s desires. Therefore, Dai Zhen believes that human knowing awareness is greater than that of other animals. Yet, we need to further develop this innate knowing ability to bring what is natural to its full realization. As a result, we can not only fulfill our own desires but also help other people till all under heaven fulfill their desires. In this way, we will advance from what is (自然 ziran) to what ought to be (必然 biran) (See Dai 1995a, No. 15, No. 26, & No. 32, pp. 169–71, 188, 201). Dai Zhen interprets this “greater knowing awareness above things” (知覺大遠乎物 zhijue da yuanhu wu) as what Mencius means by “xingshan” (See Dai 1995a, No. 21 & No. 27, pp. 183, 191); he interprets this “contextual and situational knowledge” (隨在而知 suizai erzhi) as the meaning of the Mencian notion of “xingshan” (See Dai 1995a, No. 21, p. 183); and he takes “what ought to be—the complete realization of what is natural” (必然, 乃自然之極則. Dai 1995a, No. 26, p. 188) to be the goodness “shan” (善, 其必然也. See Dai 1995a, No. 32, p. 201).

For a tradition that is preoccupied with the question of whether human nature is good or evil, Dai Zhen’s innovative approach prompts our inquiries about the metaphysical take on the issue. Mencius not only proposes that human nature is endowed with the innate moral feelings of “siduan” 四端 (the heart of commiseration, the heart of shame and dislike, the heart of deference, and the heart of right and wrong) (See the Mencius 3:6), but also maintains that human beings have “liangneng” 良能 (innate ability) and “liangzhi” 良知 (innate awareness) so that people are born to know how to love their parents and respect their elder brothers (See the Mencius 13:15). In a similar way to Mencius, Dai Zhen holds that human nature possesses within itself the natural capability of knowing, but Dai Zhen insists that the so-called “shan” or “liyi” can only be found from without, namely from our interaction with other human beings as regards the basic human daily existence about the fulfillment of fundamental human necessities of food, drink, and sex. Dai Zhen identifies this natural ability of knowing as the Mencian “xingshan.”

Mencius does not deny human physical desires, but he is highly appreciative of people’s love for virtues 故好是懿德 (See the Mencius 11:6) and advocates that we should nurture and follow our “dati” 大體 (great body) to become “daren” 大人 (great persons) (See the Mencius 11: 14 & 15). Likewise, Dai Zhen points out, “Desire is the naturalness of blood and breath; and the enjoyment of virtue is the naturalness of the intelligent mind. This is why Mencius says that nature is good.”6 While Dai Zhen earnestly defends human desires, he persuades people not to be selfish by only focusing on their own desires and needs (See Dai 1995a, No. 10 & No. 30). He points out, the full realization of desire means the fulfillment of not just jizhiyu 己之欲 (the desire of one’s own) but renzhiyu 人之欲 (the desire of the others) as well. Mencius encourages us to extend our heart-and-mind (心 xin) to lead our innate moral sprouts to the fully grown virtues of ren yi li zhi 仁義禮智 (benevolence, righteousness, wisdom, and propriety). As a result, our virtues will shine brightly like fire and suffuse the world as the spring water does (See the Mencius 3:6). Nevertheless, for Dai Zhen, the journey of self-cultivation does not start with the inborn moral feelings or senses as the word “goodness” presumably indicates but rather begins with unlocking our physically well-constituted mind by birth through thinking and self-reflection. To further the process, we need to constantly advance our mind to godlike illumination so that we can fully comprehend principles and righteousness in our relationships with people and daily activities.

In his preface to the Shu Zheng, Dai Zhen exclaims, “Learning the way of the sages must begin with Mencius. Alas! We cannot make any change!”7 Dai Zhen sees himself as an adherent to Mencius, his defender and custodian (See Dai 1995a, “Preface,” p. 148). Through closely reading Dai Zhen’s two philosophical works of Shu Zheng and Yuan Shan 原善 (Inquiry into Goodness) along with Mencius’s work, I carefully examine Dai Zhen’s reading of Mencius on the latter’s famous claim that human nature is good. This paper argues that Dai Zhen has made a bold move to depart from the influential and commonly held Mencian position that has often been deemed orthodox in the Confucian tradition. As a great exegetist of the Qing dynasty, Dai Zhen’s philosophy is built on his critical interpretation of the classics. With his very novel interpretation of “xingshan,” Dai Zhen sheds new light on this well-established thesis that human nature is good.

2. Xueqi Xinzhi: The Makeup of Human Nature

2.1. Xueqi Xinzhi: Natural Allotments from the Material Force of Yin Yang and Wu Xing

Dai Zhen formulates his theory on human nature in terms of xueqi xinzhi, a term he has adopted from the Confucian classic of the Liji 禮記 (The Book of Rites). He says,

Owing to the allotments from yin yang and wu xing, there are human beings and things. Restricted by each their own allotments, humans and things form their different natures. Yin yang and the five elements are the substantial embodiment of Dao; blood, breath, and the intelligent mind are the substantial embodiment of nature. Being actual substances, they can be allotted; because they are allotted, they are uneven.8

In Dai Zhen’s formulation, human nature comprises xueqi (血氣 blood and breath) and xinzhi (心知 the intelligent mind). Xinzhi is the knowing faculty of the mind and xueqi the physical construct of the body that has the sensory functions of hearing, seeing, touching, smelling, tasting and the like. Yet, xueqi and xinzhi both have their origins in the material force of yin yang and wu xing and are thereby both physical and inseparable from each other. As the interactive activities of the yin yang force and the five elements give rise to myriad things including humankind, human beings and all other living creatures receive their respective allotments to form each their own distinct natures fitting for their different species and kinds. Therefore, human nature is none other than what has naturally come along with its given physical substance.

Dai Zhen’s naturalistic take on human nature sets him apart from Zhang Zai 張載 (1020–1077 C.E.), Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200 C.E.), and other Neo-Confucian thinkers, who contrarily hold that human nature consists of the nature of heaven and earth 天地之性 (tiandi zhixing) and the nature of physical temperament 氣質之性 (qizhi zhi xing) that are in opposition to each other. Of a dualistic worldview, the Song Neo-Confucians attribute the nature of physical temperament to qi 氣 (material force), to the human physical body but ascribe the nature of heaven and earth to heaven, to li 理 (principle). Due to their different origins, only the heavenly endowment is the true nature while the physical temperament is merely desire. By drawing a line between the nature of physical temperament and the nature of heavenly endowment, the Song Confucians set up an abstract principle li that overrides all that is physical. In Dai Zhen’s view, human nature that is made up of xueqi xinzhi correlates with Dao that is composed of yin yang and wu xing. Whether they are the constituent substance of the human nature or Dao, xueqi xinzhi and yin yang wu xing are all derived from the transformation of heaven and earth. Henceforth, human nature is physical in the same way as Dao is material. With an emphasis on one same root in the material force of yin and yang, Dai Zhen maintains that both xueqi and xinzhi are physically constituted and thus inseparable from each other. Human nature comprises at once the faculty of knowing and the natural propensities for favorable flavors, sounds, smells, and other physical comforts.

In contrast, from Dai Zhen’s point of view, the Song Confucians mistakenly propose a heavenly principle as if it were something real (以理為如有物焉) (See Dai 1995a, No. 5 & No. 41, pp. 154, 212) and thereby attach an alleged heavenly nature to human natural endowments (Dai 1995a, No. 7, p. 184). For Dai Zhen, there does not exist a so-called metaphysical principle li or tianli, which is nothing but the order and patterns present in the things of the world. With respect to physical things, li is their physical patterning or structure visible as “fenli” 分理 (division and patterning), “jili” 肌理 (skin texture), “couli” 腠理 (skin texture or the natural fiber under skin), “wenli” 文理, 紋縷 (veins, structural pattern), and “tiaoli” 條理 (orderly pattern) (See Dai 1995a, No. 1, p. 151). Regarding human beings, Dai Zhen claims that the so-called heavenly principle resides in human desire. If we can discern and follow these patterns and order, we will be able to well grasp the reality wherein we are situated and properly conduct ourselves among other human beings. As Ying-Shih Yu has observed, “Thus, he transformed li from a Neo-Confucian idea of a priori moral principles to something like ‘laws’ or ‘patterns,’ which are inherent in things and thereby constitute the very object of knowledge on the part of man” (Yu 2016, p. 120).

2.2. Xueqi Xinzhi: Commonality and Distinction Between Humankind and Animals

Dai Zhen brings into sharp focus the material nature of both xueqi and xinzhi, which, paradoxically, make human beings and other animals resemble each other on the one hand, and on the other set them apart. In particular, he points to the intelligent mind wherein lie both their similitude and distinction. Mencius believes that the distinction between humans and beasts is very slight, but he does not elaborate on the “slight difference.” Instead, Mencius only states that the ordinary people lose it while the sages preserve it and that people are not far away from becoming beasts if they fail to retain their original nature.

Another great Confucian thinker Xunzi 荀子 (c. 314—c. 217 B.C.E.) on the other hand says vividly that humans are human not because human beings are biped and not hairy so that they are distinguished from beasts for their physical appearance, but rather because humans know rituals (See Xunzi, Chapter 5 “Feixiang” 非相 Contra Physiognomy). In chapter 9 “Wangzhi” 王制 (The Regulations of Kings), we read,

Fire and water have qi [氣] but are without life [生 sheng]. Grass and trees have life but are without awareness [知 zhi]. Birds and beasts have awareness but are without yi [義]. Humans have qi and life and awareness and, moreover they have yi [義]. And so they are the most precious [貴 gui] things under Heaven [天 Tian]. [Humans] are not as strong as oxen or as fast as horses, but oxen and horses are used by them. How is this so? I say it is because humans are able to form communities while the animals cannot. Why are humans able to form communities? It is because of social divisions. [分 fen] How can social divisions be put into practice? I say it is because of yi. And so if they use yi in order to make social divisions, then they will be harmonized. If they are harmonious, then they will be unified. If they are unified, then they will have more force. If they have more force, then they will be strong. If they are strong, then they will be able to overcome the animals. And so they can get to live in homes and palaces. 9

In this text Xunzi offers a hierarchical view on the existence in the world to differentiate human beings from other living beings and physical things. Even though animals possess vital energy and certain degree of awareness, Xunzi asserts that humans are the noblest beings because they alone can make distinction and form social communities through rituals li and righteousness yi. The human capability for liyi enables human beings to stand above animals, despite being physically weaker. Elsewhere in Chapter 1 of “Quanxue” 勸學 (Encouraging Learning), a similar idea is found in Xunzi’s discussion on the difference between a bird called the meng dove and a gentleman.10 The latter knows how to select a fitting community while the former cannot. In so doing the man is likely to come closer to fairness and right. In Xunzi’s philosophy, nonetheless, liyi is not something human beings are born with. Rather, human nature is inherently evil because man is born with passions, desires for beautiful sights and sounds, and fondness for profit (See Xunzi: Chapter 23 “Xinge” 性惡 Human Nature is Evil). Therefore, people need to learn principles and rituals that were established by the ancient sages to transform their original bad nature, the base and raw material, into good nature (See Xunzi: Chapter 19 “Lilun” 禮論 Discussion on Rites). In this view, yi or liyi is what distinguishes human beings from other animals, but humans do not possess liyi at birth. The human capability for rituals and righteousness is an acquired ability, and the goodness of human nature is the result of the conscious activities of diligent learning and education (See Xunzi: Chapter 23 “Xinge”).

In like manner, Dai Zhen treats the subject of renqin zhibian 人禽之辨 (distinctions between humanity and beasts) as an ethical issue as the two Confucians do. Following Mencius, Dai Zhen also states that talking about the distinctions between human nature and the nature of other animals solely in terms of their biological characteristics is “like grouping humans together with dogs and cattle without noticing their differences.”11 Other than the external physical features and functions of xueqi, it is the intelligent mind xinzhi that separates humans from beasts.

Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that Dai Zhen both pinpoints and rules out the intelligent mind as the locus of the divergence. For him not only do human beings and other animals both have xueqi and hence a similar liking for the appetitive and physical satisfaction, but they also both possess xinzhi. Like Xunzi, Dai Zhen believes that animals have the ability of knowing as humans do. The knowing faculty of the mind is not unique to humankind alone. In the above-mentioned hierarchical structure Xunzi presents in his writing, “zhi”—the innate ability common to birds, beasts, and humans is put in a lower order below “yi”—the human acquired morality. Xunzi identifies yi as the determining factor that distinguishes humans from animals to stress the importance of learning rituals and moral standards from the sages. By contrast, Dai Zhen’s focus falls on the human intelligent mind.

Dai Zhen takes special notice of two salient features that he believes both humankind and all other living creatures have in common, namely loving life and fearing death that lead to the utilitarian pursuit of profit and avoidance of harm. He says,

All those who have blood and breath know loving life and fearing death and consequently they seek profit and avoid harm. Despite the difference in being clear or obscure, their knowing does not go beyond cherishing life and fearing death. The distinction between human beings and birds and beasts does not reside here. Birds and beasts know their mothers but not their fathers. This is due to the limitations of their awareness. Yet, they love the ones who have given them life and the ones whom they have given life to; the females love the males and the males love the females; Members of the same species do not bite one another, and the different species do not gnaw at one another with their teeth once they get used to staying together. This is also out of love for life and fear of death. Being concerned about oneself, one is concerned about those who are close. This is the characteristic of kindness; caring about oneself, one is kind to oneself and further extends this kindness to those who are close. The intelligent mind arising from nature is just like this. The distinction between human beings and birds and beasts do not reside here either.12

According to Dai Zhen, the so-called “xinzhi” is but a crude sense of “huaisheng weisi” 懷生畏死 (cherishing life and fearing death) that is shared by both humankind and all animals. Moreover, owing to their intelligent mind, animals can extend their care for themselves to those that are close as well. What is more, we could even observe from the behavioral patterns of some living creatures the seemingly Confucian virtues of ren 仁 (goodness, humanity) and yi 義 (righteousness). On this Dai Zhen strikingly comments, “As regards the birds feeding the elderly in return, the water pigeons retaining female and male distinction, the bees and ants knowing to be ruler and subject, and the wolves sacrificing their preys and the otters offering up their caught fish, their behaviors comply with what we humans call humanity and righteousness, but they each just follow their own animal’s nature.”13 When the other living creatures are brought into view in comparison with us, it seems that the human intelligent mind is not that distinct anymore.

If that is the case, how does human nature differ from the natures of other living beings then? Simply, what is human nature? In my view, “fen” 分 (allotments; distinction) holds the key to the question. By fen, Dai Zhen makes it very clear that xing 性 (nature) and hence renxing 人性 (human nature) are just natural physical allotments of distinguishable characteristics so that they not only distinguish humankind from other creatures but also make human beings different among themselves. Dai Zhen does not explain how the physical substance of human nature is uniquely formed compared with that of other living beings. However, he believes that the human mind has greater knowing capability than that of other animals and claims that this greater awareness is what Mencius means by “xingshan.”14 Further, even more importantly, he holds that this capability could and must be further developed. In Dai Zhen’s view, the intelligent mind of human beings greatly differs from the intelligent mind of other creatures in that only the former is able to “kaitong” 開通 (be open, connected, comprehending, discerning & penetrating) and “zhi shenming” 致神明 (attain godlike illumination), whereas the latter cannot. As he explicitly puts, “The distinction between humankind and beasts lies in the fact that only human beings can attain godlike illumination although they both have the incipient luminosity.”15

Why only humans can extend their mind while other living beings cannot? What makes the human intelligent mind distinct since human nature and the nature of other living creatures are both materially constituted from the same material force of yin yang and wuxing? Again, Dai Zhen does not provide us with an answer. Obviously, he is not interested in a scientific investigation of the issue as scientists do today to study the anatomy, physiology, and the neurological systems of animals and humans to understand their physiological structures and functions. Rather, Dai Zhen simply concludes that it has been always so from time immemorial.16

It is rather fascinating to see how Dai Zhen dialectically negotiates between human physical allotments and the possibility to further develop and enhance their natural endowments. The corporality of xueqi xinzhi does not limit human beings from advancing their intelligent mind to reach godlike illumination; but on the other hand, the pursuit of godlike illumination does not dismiss the physical features of their intelligent mind. No matter how great is jingshuang 精爽 (incipient luminosity) of the human mind, humankind still largely bear resemblance to other animals, of which the desire to preserve life and fear about death is the most prominent. As long as human incipient luminosity remains unaltered, it is merely the intelligent mind in its original natural state.

As such, we should look at the incipient luminosity of the human mind in two ways. On the one hand, the jingshuang manifests the basic feeling of loving life and fearing death that human beings share with all those who have xueqi xinzhi, but on the other, the human incipient luminosity has within itself the possibility of being further developed and advanced to go beyond their instinctive feeling of loving life and fearing death to be able to comprehend principle and righteousness. For this reason, while Dai Zhen overtly argues for human physical and biological needs as a necessary part of human nature, he insists that we should extend our mind to know the principle and righteousness. In this way, not only can we take care of our own needs and desires but can also attend to other people’s needs and desires; not only can we extend our kindness to the ones that are close but also to those who are distant, and finally to all under heaven. I argue that the intelligent mind that is capable of being opened and further developed is exactly what the “goodness” of human nature means for Dai Zhen. It is the goodness in this sense that fundamentally marks human nature off from the natures of all other living beings and makes humans human.

3. Xingshan: Human Nature Is Good

Dai Zhen makes the same claim as Mencius does that human nature is good. Yet, Dai Zhen’s assertion brings up two questions for us to think. First, to state that “human nature is good,” is “xingshan” a statement about the inborn moral property of human nature? Second, to state that “human nature is good,” is “xingshan” a claim about a universally identical human nature? I argue that Dai Zhen’s notion of xingshan is not a reiteration of the innate moral traits or siduan 四端 (the four beginnings; four sprouts) inherent in the human mind as what Mencius has held. Rather, Dai Zhen’s take on “xingshan” is an affirmation of the physicality of human nature on the one hand and on the other an argument for enhancing our intelligent mind to fully comprehend principles and righteousness, which do not reside within our mind but lie in human relationships and daily activities. To be sure, Dai Zhen has greatly departed from Mencius with his very original interpretation of this well-established thesis.

3.1. “Xingshan”: The Unique Physical Makeup of Human Nature

To begin with, I maintain that the concept of xingshan is a biological or generic definition that Dai Zhen employs to specify the human species.17 By xingshan, Dai Zhen refers to that which differentiates humankind from other living creatures. In this sense, “xingshan” is the characteristic of “renxing” 人性 (human nature). Although both humans and other animals have xueqi xinzhi, “shan” tells them apart. As cited earlier, “Nature is a general term for birds, fish, animals, and plants, but nature that is good is about the nature of human beings.”18 In Dai Zhen’s explanation, this is the reason that “Mencius did not say ‘There is no nature that is not good’ but instead said that ‘There is no one that is not good.’”19 Why? Dai Zhen’s two statements cited above make a circular argument: This is because nature “xing” 性 regards plants and other animals, whereas “xingshan” 性善 refers to human nature alone. In other words, “There is no one that is not good” is an absolute claim about the status of humans, whereas, speaking of the non-human beings, Mencius did not say that “There is no nature that is not good.” This is because shan is not applicable to all living beings but only relevant to humankind. It means that humans are so well constituted that they all have this deemed “goodness” of substance. As such, to say “one is good” is equivalent to saying “one is a human” because there is no person who has not received this superior makeup; and to say “one is not good” is the same as saying “one is not a human” because non-human beings do not have the same good makeup as humans do. Dai Zhen uses the word “shan” to specify the special physical construct that only humans have. As the very defining quality of the human natural construct, shan physically singles out human beings from other living creatures and things.

In the Confucian discourse on human nature, people have talked about the goodness of human nature in respect of its intrinsic moral attributes ever since Mencius. However, it is worth iterating that Dai Zhen here is not speaking about the moral virtues that humans possess but refers the goodness of human nature to the physical entities that are characteristic of humankind. For Dai Zhen, all humans are good in the sense that they are all of the good or fine physical substance. As opposed to the commonly held view, this good human nature does not possess any innate moral attributes. Thus, Dai Zhen remarks: “Therefore, although (human) nature is good, there are no fewer petty persons.”20 He also questions, “How can humans be human if rid of their physical endowments?”21

Here, as in many other places throughout his writing, Dai Zhen demonstrates his great exegetical skills in drawing meanings out of his readings. Sometimes we may say that he has read into the texts. In support of his own position, Dai Zhen quotes and expounds his views on Mencius to show that he is in line with this great Confucian master, only the latter has been misread by Xunzi, by Zhu Xi, by “Songru” 宋儒 (Song Confucians), by “Houru” 後儒 (later Confucians), by Mohists, Buddhists, and Daoists. In Dai Zhen’s criticism, Xunzi does not trust the ordinary people’s own ability to know rituals and morality if they do not have the guidance from the sages, whereas the Song Confucians make up two conflicting natures with the nature of heaven and earth opposed to the nature of the physical temperament (See Dai 1995a, No. 27). Nevertheless, it remains a question to ask: Does Dai Zhen really align himself with Mencius in his reading of this patriarch of the Confucian tradition?

While Mencius leaves scholars to speculate whether human nature is physical or moral or both, Dai Zhen explicitly insists on the physical “goodness” of human nature, that is, the natural endowment par excellence, the superlative physical composition among all creatures.22 “Goodness” indicates the very uniqueness and supremacy of this natural construct without implying anything antithetical to what is morally bad or evil within the human mind. In other words, human nature is good in the sense that they have the most exquisite physical substance appropriate for responding to moral goodness which Dai Zhen defines as ren 仁 (humanity), li 禮 (propriety), and yi 義 (righteousness).23

It is interesting to see how Dai Zhen appropriates the Mencian statement to posit quite a different notion of goodness about human nature. If “shan” is not a moral property but the physical characteristic of human nature as Dai Zhen poses, to say “human nature is good” does not mean that human beings are already good morally or have the incipient moral seeds sown at birth. Rather, in Dai Zhen’s philosophy, what the physical makeup of human nature possesses is the capability of knowing alongside other faculties of seeing, hearing, and the like owing to its blood, breath, and the intelligent mind. And what genuinely matters to Dai Zhen is that the human intelligent mind can be further developed.

3.2. “Xingshan”: The Distinctive Knowing Faculty of the Mind

Dai Zhen rejects ascribing the “goodness” of human nature to the innate moral feelings of the Mencian siduan or to the Song Confucian li; he speaks up for the “xueqi” aspect of human nature to defend human physical desires and needs. Does Dai Zhen’s approval of the physicality of human nature make him side with Gaozi? Master Gao holds that human nature is neither good nor evil but contingent on the external environments and circumstances. The well-known debate between Gaozi and Mencius well reflects Gaozi’s view on human nature. Master Gao said, “A person’s nature is like whirling water, so it will flow to the east at an opening towards the east and flow to the west at an opening towards the west. Human nature does not distinguish between good and not good just in the same way as water does not distinguish between the east and the west” (The Mencius 11.2). To continue, the Mencius 11. 6 cites what Gongduzi has heard from Gaozi saying that “human nature is neither good nor not good” or “human nature can be good as well as can be not good” or “some human nature is good and some human nature is not good.” In brief, from Gaozi’s perspective, whether human nature is good or not good is determined by external factors.

Before proceeding to compare Dai Zhen with Gaozi, I want to first clarify that the term “xingshan” carries different meanings for Gaozi and Dai Zhen. With Master Gao the term “xingshan” refers to the virtuous quality of human nature, while with Dai Zhen “xingshan” means the good physical substance of human nature. In view of Gaozi’s several statements cited above, human nature to Gaozi is neutral or amoral, lacking inner virtuous quality and utterly subject to the influences from the outside environments. Dai Zhen also holds that there are no moral virtues inherent in human nature. In this respect, it seems that these two philosophers have something in common. Nevertheless, it is hard to put Dai Zhen and Gaozi in the same camp. Gaozi sees human nature in its likes for sex and food (see The Mencius 11.4). He uses the metaphor of swirling water to characterize human nature that has no moral direction. As a result, good time forms good nature and bad time shapes evil character (see The Mencius 11.6). By contrast, while Dai Zhen firmly defends human desire as an indispensable part of human nature, he also draws our attention to the intelligent mind of human nature to highly regard its capability of knowing and potential for advancement. For Dai Zhen, besides shise 食色 (food and sex) human nature also has the capability for liyi.

It is rather evident that Dai Zhen does not accept the Mencian view of innate moral feelings inherent in human nature, but he does believe in the inborn capability of the human intelligent mind to know moral goodness or liyi. For him, the functions of the four limbs and other bodily organs and the faculty of the mind are both essential to human beings. In the same way as pleasant sounds, colors, and tastes are appealing to the ear, the eye, and the mouth, the mind is attracted to patterns and order. Through the organ of the heart and mind, the most refined substance allotted from heaven, human beings are capable of knowing principles and righteousness besides food and sex. Dai Zhen’s comment on the Mencius 14: 24 is very revealing in this regard. He says,

We should understand that how patterns and order are delightful to the heart and mind is just like how tastes are delightful to the mouth, sounds are delightful to the ear, and colors are delightful to the eye. They are all pertinent to nature. Tastes, sounds, and colors reside in things but are received by my blood and breath; patterns and order reside in things and affairs but are received by my intelligent mind. Blood, breath and the intelligent mind have their own inherent capacities: The mouth is able to distinguish flavors, the ear to distinguish sounds, the eye to distinguish colors, and the heart and mind to distinguish patterns and order. Tastes, sounds, and colors reside in things and not in me, but when they are received by my blood and breath and the faculties of my blood and breath can distinguish and take delight in them; what delights me must be something that is extremely good. Principle and righteousness reside in the patterns and order of the things and affairs, but when they are received by my intelligent mind, the faculties of my heart and mind can distinguish and take delight in them. What delights me must be what is the utmost upright.24

From a naturalistic stand, Dai Zhen attributes one’s liking for principle and righteousness to the natural faculty of the intelligent mind comparable to those of the ear, the eye, and the mouth in their desire for sounds, colors, and tastes. Mencius says, “The fact that my heart takes delight in principle and righteousness is like how my mouth takes delight in the meat of grass and grain-fed animals.”25 We may consider Mencius’s words a figure of speech for moral persuasion, but Dai Zhen emphasizes that this is not an analogy.26 For Dai Zhen, whether one’s want comes from the intelligent mind or from the mouth, the eye, and so forth, the inclinations are just the natural functions of human xueqi and xinzhi. As he says elsewhere, “Desire is the naturalness of blood and breath; and the enjoyment of virtue is the naturalness of the intelligent mind. This is why Mencius says that nature is good.”27

In Dai Zhen’s theory of human nature, the Mencian xingshan is translated into this naturalness of the intelligent mind. The goodness of human nature turns out to be the distinct knowing capability of the mind or its inclination toward good rather than a person’s moral property. As Dai Zhen astonishingly identifies the goodness of human nature with its physical makeup, it is likewise striking that he locates principles in things and affairs rather than in the human mind. Since the likes and dislikes of the eye, the ear and other physical organs are but the spontaneous reaction of the bodily organs to the physical presence of the colors, sounds, and tastes in the things, similarly, the likes and dislikes of the mind are but the spontaneous reaction of the mind to the actual presence of the order and patterns in things. For this reason, although the human mind has the capability to take delight in principles and righteousness, this inborn capability for liyi should not be mistaken for liyi itself. To Dai Zhen, principles and righteousness are but the patterns and order present in things. Furthermore, if humans do not use and develop their given ability to comprehend liyi, it is also impossible that they will become virtuous. That is why Dai Zhen states as well that there are no fewer petty persons even though they have the “goodness” of human nature. For Mencius, one is evil due to the loss of the original goodness of human nature, namely the heart of commiseration, the heart of shame, and so forth. To Dai Zhen, there are petty persons because these people do not avail themselves of their given capability to pursue good, what is morally good. People may refute Dai Zhen’s argument in holding that the ability of opting for liyi as such is already an ethical matter and the human natural propensity towards liyi is truly a moral disposition.

As is discussed earlier, in my view, xingshan for Dai Zhen only indicates that human nature is physically constituted with such a unique capability that it is ready to respond to what is morally good, be it “yide” 懿德 (virtue; moral excellence) or “liyi.” Of course, there are different levels of readiness as far as human nature is concerned. The sages are completely ready while the common people are ready partially, but there is no one that is unable to get prepared.

3.3. “Xingshan”: Individually Distinct Human Nature

Not only does Dai Zhen decline to accept a human nature that is morally good at birth but also denies a human nature that is universally good without distinction. Whereas xingshan is universal in the sense that every human being is apportioned from heaven “shan”—the goodness of fine physical substance, people do not have a unanimous goodness due to the differences in their received allotments, complete or partial, thick or thin, bright or murky. Dai Zhen makes it clear that each person’s allotment is different hence the person’s renxing.28 Contrary to an abstract and transcendental heavenly human nature as proposed by Zhu Xi, Zhang Zai, and other Neo-Confucian thinkers, in Dai Zhen’s writing, human nature is made of the material substance and hence inevitably marked with irregularities and unevenness. So to speak, whereas “human nature is good” is universal, applying to every human being, the “goodness” of human nature is individual, varying from person to person.

To compare Dai Zhen with Mencius, it is intriguing to see how Dai Zhen is both in line with and stands apart from this Confucian patriarch. Dai Zhen’s belief in the goodness of human nature aligns him with Mencius, but the manifestation of the goodness tells them apart. While Mencius, as A. C. Graham and Irene Bloom have remarked, posits a universal renxing (Graham 2002, p. 20; Bloom 2002b, pp. 65, 96). Dai Zhen believes that each individual has distinct human nature because the human xueqi xinzhi as actual substance is unevenly allocated. As a result, human natural endowments not only differ from those of other living creatures but also vary among human beings themselves. Although xingshan applies to every human being to make humans human, their allocated goodness varies with different people. Unlike Mencius who believes that every human being has the inbuilt “four beginnings,” namely the four intrinsic moral senses of commiseration, shame and dislike, propriety, and right and wrong,29 Dai Zhen upholds a physical goodness that is not without disparity from beginning. According to Mencius, if people differ from one another, their differences are not due to what they were originally given but because of the later nourishment 養 (yang) or lack of nourishment 失養 (yang), self-damage 自賊 (zizei), self-harm 自暴 (zibao), and self-abandonment 自棄 (ziqi) regarding their inherent goodness (See the Mencius 11:7; 3:6; & 7:10).

Therefore, while the Mencian “xingshan” implies a universal or even a transcendental “goodness” bestowed to every human being by birth, Dai Zhen’s “xingshan” is physical and specific with each individual. Considering the great divergence in their opinions of the goodness of human nature, it is intriguing to see how Dai Zhen draws on Mencius to make his own argument. For instance, Dai Zhen states, “Whenever Mencius speaks of the goodness of human nature, he always talks about Yao and Shun. This does not mean that all people are born to be Yao and Shun. After Yao and Shun, how great have been the differences among people?”30 Interestingly enough, Dai Zhen is suggesting that Mencius actually does not believe that the so-called “goodness” is generally found in all people because Mencius only attributes “shan” to the sages whenever he uses the word. Yet, whereas Dai Zhen is very skeptical about a universal human nature that erases the differences between people, he is likewise suspicious of any ineradicable distinction between the sages and the ordinary people. Therefore, even though people all have the goodness of nature, they are not all sages. Conversely, Yao and Shun’s human nature may be perfect and flawless whereas the ordinary people’s human nature is irregular and uneven, but there is no insurmountable gulf between the common people and the sages. What really matters is that the gap between the common people and the sages necessitates human efforts to further develop their mind. For Dai Zhen, the journey towards sagehood does not start with the inborn four beginnings but rather with their inbuilt capabilities that is uneven, irregular, varying from person to person.

It is worth noting that Dai Zhen also attempts to explain the distinctions in human nature through his interpretation of Confucius’s claim about “xingxiangjin” 性相近 (human nature is similar).31 He comments, “The so-called goodness is not the goodness without original graduation of differences. This is what Confucius means when he talks about ‘being close.’”32 To look at “shan” in terms of “jin” 近, Dai Zhen intently disproves a metaphysical take on human nature that proposes a unified intrinsic moral goodness as opposed to evil. He says, “If it is not good, opposite to good, then it is already greatly different from good, how can there be any closeness?”33 Elsewhere, he remarks, “Good and evil are the names of the opposites not the names for being far or being close.”34 In Dai Zhen’s interpretations, I see two points he wants to make: First, Confucius also acknowledges the differences in human nature; second, “not good” or “evil” is not the right concept to characterize human nature simply because “not good” or “evil” does not apply to human nature or human beings. For “not good” means the lack of the physical entities that feature humans as humans.

In light of Dai Zhen’s philosophy, as far as xingshan is concerned, human nature that is good is the absolute divide between human beings and non-human beings rather than the opposition of the good and evil. Put differently, being not good is about non-human species, whereas being different yet close is regarding human beings. On this account, when it comes to the distinction between human nature and the natures of non-human beings, xingshan sets human beings apart from plants, birds, and beasts; but as for the distinction in human nature, xingshan indicates that their differences can be overcome since human nature is essentially similar or close. In Dai Zhen’s words, “Having no human nature is what is meant by saying that one shows oneself to be a beast, whereas having human nature means being close, namely being good.”35

In his reading of “xingxiangjin,” Dai Zhen interpretively equates Confucius’s saying “nature is close” with Mencius’s statement that “there is no one that is not good.” Yet, the analogy drawn between Mencius’s “xingshan” and Confucius’s “xingxiangjin” reads to me less a defense of the Mencian thesis about the goodness of human nature or an argument for the closeness of human nature than an exegetical strategy Dai Zhen employs to refute a transcendental notion of human nature. As opposed to applying the metaphysical and abstract principle to human nature as favored by Zhang Zai, Zhu Xi, and other Neo-Confucians, Dai Zhen’s theory of human nature refers to the distinctive makeup of human nature that sets humans apart from non-human beings on the one hand and on the other features the distinctions among humans. From his theory of human nature, we draw an important moral significance regarding self-cultivation. As what Ying-Shih Yu remarks, in Dai’s theory, “moral character can be achieved by man only through a gradual development (kuochong 擴充) of his intellect (zhi 智) by which he is essentially distinguished from animals” (Yu 2016, p. 44).

Speaking of the distinction between humans and animals, “xingshan” serves as a moral admonition to warn people against living like animals. Because of human nature comprised in both xueqi and xinzhi, people are entitled to their physical needs and desires. However, if we only know how to satisfy our own needs and desire without thinking of other people, we are not different from birds and beast. When it comes to the distinctions among humans, “xingshan” provides people with a great prospect for bettering themselves. By birth, people are not the same, but through later efforts we can push the limits we are born with. By bringing these distinctions to light, Dai Zhen urges us to extend our received goodness to turn ourselves from physical existence into moral beings. As he has well put, “What distinguishes human beings from other animals lie in the fact that human beings can comprehend what ought to be, whereas hundreds of living beings only each fulfill what is natural.”36

We are not just what we were born to be, but, more importantly, we are what we ought to be. Only through expanding our mind can we rise above our natural animal state to become true human beings that know liyi (See Dai 1995a, No. 21 & No. 28 for instance, pp. 183–84, 194). Although we are born with uneven capabilities of knowing, we can advance our mind to fully realize its potentials through later efforts. If we can extend our intelligent mind, even the dullest persons can become sages to attain godlike illumination.

3.4. “Xingshan”: Human Nature Open to Advancement

Dai Zhen compellingly convinces people of the necessity to advance the mind. He says,

The blood and breath rely on drink and food for nourishment. After being digested, the drink and food have become my blood and breath and they are no longer the things eaten and drunk. The same is true with the reliance of the intelligent mind on questioning and learning, from which the intelligent mind has been nurtured in the same way. Speaking of the blood and breath, it used to be weak but now has become stronger. This is owing to the nourishment of the blood and breath. Speaking of the intelligent mind, it used to be narrow and small but now has grown broader and larger; it used to be obscure and dark but now has become clear and discerning. This is owing to the fact that the intelligent mind has received nourishment. Therefore, we say that one will be illuminated despite one’s dullness. Although human blood, breath, and intelligent mind are allotted from heaven unevenly, nourishment or lacking nourishment makes big differences.37

In his writing, literally, in a biological sense, the process of extending the intelligent mind involves the same dynamism required for the growth of the physical body. Without doubt, the Mencian ideas of “yang xin” 養心 (nourishing the heart-and-mind) (The Mencius 11.8) and “kuo chong” 擴充 (extension) (The Mencius 3.6) have left an indelible mark on Dai Zhen’s thought.38 Nevertheless, for Dai Zhen, to nourish and enlarge the mind is not to cultivate the inborn sprouts of virtue to augment our innate moral senses as Mencius proposes but to expand and enhance the capability of knowing of our mind for principles and righteousness. Given its naturally endowed physical goodness, human nature is capable of undergoing the perpetual self-transforming process to advance from its incipient luminosity “jingshuang” to godlike illumination “shenming.”

Speaking of “jingshuang,” the Zuozhuan thus defines: “The incipient luminosity of the mind is what is called by the spiritual soul and the bodily soul.”39 Dai Zhen explains, “All that are living have incipient luminosity. Those going along with the fusion (rong 融) of the vital force (qi 氣) are pneuma (ling 靈) and henceforth differentiated as ‘bodily soul’ (po魄); and those going along with the continuum (tong通) of the vital force qi are spirit (shen 神) and henceforth identified as ‘spiritual soul’ (hun魂).”40 In Dai Zhen’s interpretation, “hun” distinguishes itself by being “tong” 通 (open, connected, comprehending) and hence marvelously perceptive and intelligent while “po” by “rong” 融 (in fusion and harmony) and hence marvelously receptive. For him, hun and po are the manifestation of the creative creativity of the transformation of heaven and earth in human nature. Hun and po work differently in accord with the virtues of heaven and earth, respectively. The abilities of the ear to hear, of the eye to see, the nose to smell, and the mouth to taste are all the working of po or ling whose function is to receive. But as regards making decision or passing judgment, it is the function of hun. In Dai Zhen’s words, “That which is in charge of giving adjudicates and that which conducts receiving listens.”41 Consequently, hun that adjudicates is to preside over po that listens. It is interesting to see how Dai Zhen interprets the Zuozhuan’s brief definition of “jingshuang” with an elaborate discussion on the functions of the mind. By drawing on the two concepts of “hun” and “po,” Dai Zhen subtly differentiates the different functions of the intelligent mind that is deemed to hold two counterparts: the bodily soul and the spiritual soul.

The concept “shenming” appears in many early Confucian, Daoist, and Mohist texts. It has two basic meanings: (1) deity or gods; and (2) godlike intelligence and brilliance (Machle 2003, pp. 701–3; Knoblock 1988, vol. 1, pp. 252–255). Dai Zhen’s use of the term apparently reveals much of Xunzi’s influence.42 In particular, in agreement with Xunzi, Dai Zhen maintains that this godlike intelligence of our intelligent mind can only come from the constant efforts of learning.43 John Knoblock, a translator and interpreter of Xunzi, makes a comment on shengming saying, “It suggests a ‘divine’ or ‘magical’ clarity and sharpness of awareness, unmediated by conscious effort, which enable those who possess it to discern subtle and minute distinctions that others miss” (Knoblock 1988, vol. 1, p. 255). For both Xunzi and Dai Zhen, the godlike intelligence will never be “unmediated by conscious effort” but can only arise from the deliberate activities of learning and practice.44 The chapter of “Quanxue” (Encouraging Learning) well conveys Xunzi’s idea that only through the accumulation of human conscious efforts can people attain godlike illumination. Notwithstanding Dai Zhen’s strong disapproval of Xunzi’s negative view of human nature and condemnation of human desires, Dai Zhen speaks highly of Xunzi’s exhortation to learning.45

Dai Zhen’s reading of the Zuozhuan’s definition of “jingshuang” offers a perspective on the working of our mind and its advancement from an incipient luminosity jingshuang to godlike illumination shenming. Much has been said in this paper about the physical makeup of human nature in xueqi and xinzhi. Dai Zhen has kept us wondering how the intelligent mind viewed as a physical substance is capable of “knowing” liyi. Dai Zhen’s exegetical commentary on hun and po sheds some light. As part of human nature, the intelligent mind is endowed with the capability of knowing. Nonetheless, Dai Zhen argues that it is only though the faculty of the spiritual soul “si” 思 (thinking, self-reflection) that the jingshuang of the human intelligent mind is kindled and enabled to comprehend liyi. He states, “Regarding the incipient luminosity of the mind, once thinking takes place, it will be unlocked, opened, and perceptive. This is the work of the spiritual soul, the so-called spirit that governs the act of performance.”46 In view of Dai Zhen’s comment, the process of the development of the intelligent mind starts with this moment of si, which unlocks our mind, activates its ability, and opens us to the world.

Mencius has made a well-known claim: “The organ of the mind is thinking.”47 It seems that Dai Zhen follows Mencius to identify the function of the mind, but Dai Zhen goes further to pinpoint the spiritual soul hun, instead of the mind in general, as the agent of thinking. In my opinion, for Dai Zhen, what is special about human nature is not just that we have an intelligent mind inbuilt with the ability of knowing but that the mind holds its own key to open itself and activate its capability for liyi. That key is “si”—thinking or self-reflection. Thus, what matters to Dai Zhen is whether we can resort to our mind to utilize its function of thinking to unlock our mind and continue to have it developed. Here thinking and knowing are intertwined and mutually reinforcing.

Without the innate faculty of thinking, jingshuang or xinzhi is just some raw physical stuff or some finest material at most. If xinzhi is not opened, our mind will remain blocked, which Dai Zhen describes as “bige” 蔽隔 (blocked and disconnected). From Dai Zhen’s point of view, the ear, the eye, the nose, and the mouth as the apertures of the body are open so that they are receptive to the world they encounter.48 Likewise, jingshuang or xinzhi must be opened so that our intelligent mind can take in and comprehend what are present in things, namely the order and patterns. Once the obstruction is removed, there is nothing that the mind is unable to comprehend. Dai Zhen calls this unblocked and discerning mind godlike illumination.49

What is “si” and how does it work then? Dai Zhen makes use of the two concepts hun and po to explain the mechanism of xinzhi that manifests both the physical and the spiritual aspects of the mind. In view of Dai Zhen’s interpretation, the human intelligent mind comprises the bodily soul and the spiritual soul. The major function of the bodily soul is receiving, whereas the function of the spiritual soul is making choices and judgement. As such, because of its bodily soul, the human mind is likewise susceptible to external things and shows its natural tendencies towards what are pleasing to the senses. In other words, the human intelligent mind, in particular, the bodily soul of the human mind bears resemblance to the jingshuang of animals and reveals its animality in instinctively adhering to life and fearing death.

On the other hand, Dai Zhen also tries to explain that the bodily soul and other bodily organs alike are receptive to things fitting to them each, hence, the mind to patterns and order, the eye to colors, and the ear to sounds. In this manner, to Dai Zhen, human propensity towards liyi or the order and patterns is the naturalness of the mind just as the human inclinations towards sounds, colors, and tastes are the naturalness of the ear, the eye, and the mouth. Dai Zhen calls this naturalness “ziran” 自然 (natural; naturalness; what is natural). Therefore, the ear takes delight in beautiful sounds, the mouth takes delight in delicious food, and the mind takes delight in patterns and order. The inclination of xueqi and xinzhi towards what is delightful to them from outside is what is natural about human nature. Their natural tendencies are what they are. Nevertheless, only after the intelligent mind is opened, will the capability of knowing of xinzhi be activated to know liyi. For Dai Zhen, the key lies with the spiritual soul of the intelligent mind.

Apart from the bodily soul, the human intelligent mind has the spiritual soul as well. Therefore, xinzhi has the faculty of thinking, the ability of making choices and judgement that characterizes the spiritual soul hun. For this reason, not only can the mind make choices and judgement about its own likes and dislikes, given the governing role of hun, but it can also evaluate the likes and dislikes of the other organs of the human body. As such, the faculty of thinking presides over the overall functions of xueqi and xinzhi. To “think” is to judge the right or wrong of all human activities. To cite Dai Zhen, “The organs of the ear, the nose, and the mouth are the way of the subject and the organ of the mind the way of the sovereign. The subject utilizes his capacities whereas the sovereign approves or disapproves.”50

Whereas Dai Zhen asserts that the physical properties are common to both xueqi and xinzhi and henceforth the natural inclinations of xueqi and xinzhi are inseparable from each other, he takes special heed of the faculty of si—thinking and self-reflection, the major function assigned to the spiritual soul of xinzhi, and its sovereign role. According to Dai Zhen, si unlocks our mind in the actual reality of “renlun riyong”— the human relationships and everyday life. “Thinking” thus means that we can make choices and judgment about our own natural preferences with regard to other human beings. On account of xueqi as part of human nature, we are entitled to eating, drinking, and having sex. Yet, owing to the spiritual soul of our xinzhi, we have the faculty of thinking, through which we are able to know principle and righteousness in our daily activities. This is what Dai Zhen means by “suizai erzhi” 隨在而知 (situational and contextual knowledge).51

On this point, I disagree on the view to see Dai Zhen’s “knowing” zhi as an intellectual knowledge.52 In my view, with Dai Zhen, people’s moral knowledge about shan, about liyi can only be acquired in their concrete life experience. Rather than an intellectual inquiry, we appeal to empathetic understanding. Dai Zhen distinctively defines this way of moral reasoning as “yiqing xieqing” (以情絜情 to gauge my feelings/desires/needs and situation with other people’s feelings/desires/needs and situations. Conversely, to understand other people’s feelings/desires/needs and situation with my own feelings/desires/needs and situations. Or simply, to put myself in another’s place to understand his or her feelings/desires/needs and situation. Dai 1995a, No. 2, No. 3, No. 5, pp. 152–53, 155). When we can take other people into consideration in pursuing the satisfaction of our own desires, we are applying our given capability of thinking. As we unlock the mind through self-reflection, we perceive principle and righteousness in food, drink, and sex. As such, for Dai Zhen, “xingshan” is our experiential knowledge of ren yi li zhi in our concrete daily existence. To obtain this knowledge, “yiqing xieqing” provides us an ethical path of empathy and reciprocity.

3.5. “Xingshan”: From What Is to What Ought to Be

Physical substance constitutes our human nature in blood, breath, and the intelligent mind. In this light, the “goodness” of our human nature appears to be material as well. However, as a great moral thinker, Dai Zhen will not look at human beings just as what they are (naturally are) but what they ought to be. The dialectic of “ziran” 自然 (what is) and “biran” 必然 (what ought to be) captures Dai Zhen’s theory of human nature. He uses the concepts “xing” and “shan” to explain the relationship between what is and what ought to be. He says, “‘Goodness’ is what ought to be and ‘nature’ is what is. The full realization of what is is the utmost of what is, wherein lie the ways of heaven, earth, humans, and things.”53 To Dai Zhen, what ought to be is not the negation of what is. As far as human nature is concerned, desire that is often blamably attributed to our xueqi or our physical body is not something to be overcome for higher values. Rather, shan or goodness, principles and righteousness, patterns and order reside in things, in our physical, material, and mundane existence. Undoubtedly, Dai Zhen gives us fresh insight into a morality that is hinged on the most basic and the most ordinary daily activities.

In this regard, in Dai Zhen’s writing, the sages set up the perfect exemplary models for people to emulate. Dai Zhen says, “In governing the world under heaven, the sage experientially understood the people’s feelings and helped them fulfill their desires, and the kingly way was completed” (聖人治天下, 體民之情, 遂民之欲, 而王道備. Dai 1995a, No. 10, p. 161). Because the sages have the first-hand experiential knowledge of human existence, they can sympathetically understand people’s feelings and desires and thereby help them fulfill their needs. In Dai Zhen’s view, the great virtue of the sages just lies in the fact that the sages have the extraordinary capabilities to “thoroughly understand the feelings of all under heaven and help people all fulfill their desires” (通天下之情, 遂天下之欲. Dai 1995a, No. 40, p. 211).

Being humans of blood, breath, and the intelligent mind, we are born with desires, passion, and needs. As Dai Zhen cites the Shijing, “The nature of the common folks lies in daily drink and food” (民之質矣, 日用飲食, Dai 1995a, No. 36, p. 205). However, the physicality of human nature is not the obstacle to morality but our means to pursue principle and righteousness. The recognition of the physicality of human nature by no means will hinder people pursuing virtues to become morally good. We are not endowed with inborn moral virtues. Instead, Dai Zhen urges people to discover principle and righteousness from without in our daily life of renlun riyong. In my view, at the heart of Dai Zhen’s ethical concern is that we should situate ourselves in the concrete reality we are living in to cultivate our morality in the human relationships and everyday life rather than adhering to an abstract principle or some fixed moral norms and ideas. We are entitled to food, drink, and sex because we are born what we are. Nevertheless, as we pursue our own life, we can extend our pursuits to help other people till all under heaven fulfill their desires, we embody humanity.54 Then, like the sages, we will advance ourselves from what we are to what we ought to be.

4. Conclusions

Dai Zhen offers a very innovative reading of the most celebrated doctrine in Confucian thought: “Human nature is good” from a naturalistic standpoint. A revolt against the Neo-Confucian metaphysical discourse on the principle and its identification of the genuine human nature with the heavenly principle, Dai Zhen unconventionally identifies the goodness of human nature with the physical substance of its makeup of xueqi and xinzhi. Xingshan, deprived of its inherent moral properties as upheld in the Mencian theory, comes to refer to the physical allotments of the physically constituted substance of human nature. Thus, rather than being unanimously bestowed with the moral senses, or the four virtuous sprouts, in Dai Zhen’s theory of human nature, the goodness of human nature is physical, graded, and uneven, being complete or partial, thick or thin, bright or murky depending on each person’s received allotments of the makeup.

Dai Zhen does not believe that human nature has innate moral properties as Mencius does. However, like Mencius, who maintains that human beings have “liang neng” 良能 (innate ability) and “liang zhi” 良知 (innate awareness),55 Dai Zhen maintains as well that the human mind possesses an innate ability of knowing, a natural capability to recognize liyi and to fully comprehend principle and righteousness as long as the mind is opened via thinking and constantly developed and extended.56 Yet, it is crucial to Dai Zhen that the alleged shan or liyi, principle and righteousness, or the order and patterns reside in things rather than within the mind. However, inasmuch as the physical substance of human nature contains within itself such capability or potential to know or incline towards principle and righteousness, we may wonder whether this goodness of human nature is physical only without implying already something metaphysical. For we may ask how the human intelligent mind has the natural inclination towards principle and righteousness, or the order and patterns without an initial moral awareness of what is good. If this natural propensity towards liyi is conceived to be inherently inbuilt in human nature, it may be said that Dai Zhen’s naturalistic theory of “xingshan” has indeed a metaphysical implication. We would not expect Dai Zhen to conduct a scientific probe into the issue as is expected of neuroscience, cognitive science, and psychology nowadays to provide us empirical data on the functions of the mind. Dai Zhen has no interest in a scientifical examination of the subject. Rather, his philosophical inquiry about human nature is based on a premise that human mind is capable of knowing liyi, and of being further advanced. He claims that it has been always so from the ancient time just as human beings have been thereby different from birds and beasts since time immemorial. As such, we may say that human beings are destined to pursue good no matter whether because they are endowed with innate capacities as Dai Zhen posits to know liyi or because they are bestowed with moral goodness itself to have innate four virtuous seeds of ren yi li zhi at birth.

As two foundational figures of the Confucian tradition, both Mencius and Xunzi have developed their distinct theories of human nature that have henceforth set the tone for the later ongoing Confucian discourse on the subject. Deeply indebted to both Mencius and Xunzi, Dai Zhen nonetheless proposes an alternative approach to the subject of human nature. The innovativeness of his thought is well reflected in his fresh interpretation of the “goodness” of human nature. For Dai Zhen, the claimed moral goodness is not an inborn moral property of human nature. Rather, “Where there is a thing, there is its norm,” as Dai Zhen often cites the Shijing. With Dai Zhen, human relationships and everyday life are the things, wherein lie humanity, righteousness, and propriety their norms.57 The so-called principle and righteousness do not exist outside human daily existence of drinking, eating, and having sex. Nevertheless, owing to our distinct intelligent mind endowed with the distinctive capability or potential to know, we could make choices and judgment about our needs and desires against other people’s needs and desires to evaluate whether our desires and needs are appropriate. Once we can take other people into our consideration, we are pursuing good. We may agree or disagree on Dai Zhen’s interpretation of the goodness of human nature, but it is unquestionable that Dai Zhen has stood with both Mencius and Xunzi in his promotion of human efforts to continuously better themselves.