Philosophizing Movement, Mobilizing Philosophers: Rausyan Fikr Institute and the Dissent Narratives of the Shia Islam Community in Indonesia

Abstract

This article explores the Rausyan Fikr Institute as a distinctive intellectual and philosophical movement within Indonesia’s Shia Muslim community, focusing on its role in mobilizing dissent narratives and fostering intellectual activism. Within the broader historical trajectory of Shi’ism in Indonesia—from its early cultural impact and political mobilization during the Iranian Revolution to its institutional development in the Reformasi era —the Rausyan Fikr Institute represents a unique approach to implementing Shia philosophical thought through grassroots mobilization. Using the framework of ideologically structured action (ISA), this article highlights how Rausyan Fikr articulates its identity through the transmission of philosophical frameworks, critical discourse on current social-political issues, and inclusive educational initiatives. It explores three elements: (i) the dissemination of Shia Islam-inspired thought through translation, publishing, and education, (ii) the development of dissent narratives on capitalism, feminism, and dominant political structure, and (iii) the engagement with wider communities and mobilization strategies for its members, which involve students, women, and families alike in establishing space for intellectual development. The article concludes by reflecting on the Rausyan Fikr Institute’s resilience in sustaining philosophical activism under sectarian pressures, its contribution to Indonesia’s broader intellectual and religious discourse, and the challenges it encounters in preserving both ideological identity and relevance in a contested socio-political landscape.

1. Introduction

As one of the primary sects in Islam, the Shia community has existed since its early inception in the initial years of the ascension of Islam in Indonesia. According to Jalaluddin Rakhmat, as quoted by M. Hasyim, there are at least three waves of Shia Islam’s ascendancy in Indonesia (Hasyim 2012). The first wave marked the arrival of Shia influence in Indonesia, although there were few Shia followers there (previously known as Nusantara). Some findings indicate that the Islamic tradition, which closely resembles the current Shia stream, entered Indonesia as early as the 10th or 11th century AD, possibly brought directly by Persian or Indian merchants. Traces of Shia heritage in Indonesia could be seen through the existing cultural traditions, which have been ongoing until today, such as widespread acceptance of the month of Muharram as the month of sorrow and tragedy, symbolization of Karbala and the Holy Family (Ahl-ul Bayt) in the local and indigenous culture, and respect for the Holy Family in weekly salawat (supplication for the Prophet Muhammad) recital congregation (Rofiq 2024; Jubaidi and Khoirunnisa 2024). In this first wave, Shiite cultural influences were very evident and left their mark on Indonesian Islamic heritage to this day. During the first wave, Shia footprints in Indonesia were not primarily about politics. During that time, Shia Islam was primarily a religious and socio-cultural marker of communities with a strong affinity for the cause of Husayn ibn Ali. Acehnese communities in these centuries have been known for their tradition of making memorials and matam (eulogy) based on the Karbala tragedy, which was imprinted in the Hikayah Hasan Husein (Fakhriati 2017). These cultural imprints persisted until at least the early 17th century, when the Safavid dynasty officially sanctioned Shia Islam as the state religion and thus became more eager to spread its own version of Islam (Arif 2018). Until the eve of the Islamic Rev, Shia Islam was mostly maintained exclusively as a familial tradition passed from generation to generation, especially amongst families coming from the Alawi clan and Hadramaut communities in general (Alatas 1999).

Thus, from the second wave onward, Indonesia began to witness a more politicized form of Shia Islam, as comprehensively developed by Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini, who is famous for his work on Islamic governance (also known in Persian as vilayat-e faqih). Since the eve of the Revolution, the thought of Ruhullah Khomeini, along with that of revolutionary Shia intellectuals of his time, such as Ali Shariati and Ayatollah Mortadha Motahhari, was introduced through translation projects conducted by Indonesian Muslim intellectuals from the 1970s to the 1980s (Syahnan et al. 2023). Works by Ali Shariati and Ruhullah Khomeini were particularly influential, as some were translated and endorsed by prominent intellectuals such as Amien Rais, a Sunni Muslim intellectual from the Muhammadiyah organization who would become one of the proponents of the Reformasi movement. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 reinvigorated the spirits of Islamic movements from all sects. It even inspired a wave of high school and university students to wear hijab in public as a form of public piety. It was noted that during the early days of the Islamic Revolution, Abu Bakar Ba’ashir, one of the leading ideologues of Jamaah Islamiyah, even proudly displayed the picture of Ruhullah Khomeini in his home, even though he is a Salafi Muslim (Safwan 2025a). During this second wave, the Iranian Embassy in Indonesia was taken over by a new Islamic government and thus had a crucial role in ensuring the growth of the local Shia Islam community in Indonesia as a way to ‘export’ the Revolution to the biggest Muslim country in the World (Utama et al. 2019).

Starting from the year 2000s, Indonesian Shia communities started their institutionalization to ensure the continuity of Shia propagation in Indonesia and to localize the existing ‘transnational’ Shia narratives in the Indonesian context. Currently, there are two institutionalized Shia organizations acknowledged as legal bodies in Indonesia: IJABI (Ikatan Jamaah Ahlulbait Indonesia) and ABI (Ahlulbait Indonesia). Dr. Jalaluddin Rakhmat founded IJABI as a cross-sectarian organization that could also include Sunni Muslims as active members (Rismawati 2016). In terms of allegiance of marja-e taqlid (referent scholar in Islamic Law) and spiritual genealogy, IJABI was more closely aligned with Qom intellectuals, Lebanese and Iraqi Shia clerics, such as Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah and Muqtada al-Sadr. IJABI also sees itself as the progenitor of Sufi heritage traditions in Indonesia and contextualizes Sufi heritage with Shia influences to suit Indonesia’s diverse cultural contexts (SH Munarman 2013; Latief 2008).

On the other hand, ABI was founded by a group and networks of Shia educators from across Indonesia who were exclusively trained in Qom and Shia hawza (seminaries) throughout Iran. ABI’s focus was on constructing religiously conscious Shia communities in Indonesia, who are educated adequately within the Shia educational ecosystem with a deep understanding of Ja’fari fiqh, and propagate Shia Islam to the general Indonesian public (Ahlul Bait Indonesia 2025; Reza 2020). Between these two legal organizations, which are also experiencing difficulties due to sectarian-based structural discrimination, one organization is actively mobilizing grassroots activism among university students and the public alike through dissident philosophical narratives of Shia intellectuals, particularly Mortadha Motahhari, Ali Shariati, and Baqir as-Sadr. This group organized itself as an institute and named it the Rausyan Fikr Institute. This term, Rausyan Fikr, or, in Persian transliteration, ‘roshanfikr’, was taken from a term coined by Ali Shariati in Persian, meaning ‘cleared, bright mind’ (Tamam 2017). This term is closely related to the ‘organic intellectual’, which was coined by Antonio Gramsci. In the context of Shariati’s thought, roshanfikr is an entity of enlightened intellectuals who are willing to change society by engaging with ordinary people and working with them to develop alternative solutions to existing problems (Milani and Cottle 2018; Tayob 1995).

This paper examines the mobilization strategies employed by the Rausyan Fikr Institute and its network of activists, the Network of Islamic Philosophy Activists in Nusantara (Jaringan Aktivis Filsafat Islam—JAKFI Nusantara). This paper aims to expand the analysis initially written by Al Makin’s research on the persecution of Rausyan Fikr Institute in Yogyakarta (Makin 2017). While Al Makin’s research focused more on the evolving narratives of persecution, this paper explores how the movement uses and engages with Shia Islamic narratives to mobilize change by Indonesia. This paper engages with the conceptual framework on the role of ideology in mobilizing social movements, particularly focusing on the influence of Shia Islamic ideology in mobilizing student and youth activists. This paper argues that the Rausyan Fikr Institute and its activist network, JAKFI, are attempting to mobilize their movement around a strong philosophical and ideological framework to strengthen their followers’ loyalty in their criticism of the current socio-political structure and mode of production. It was evident in the works, projects, discussions, and actions undertaken by the Rausyan Fikr Institute and JAKFI that their solid implementation of Shia Islam’s philosophical values among members influenced their strategies in attracting the public.

2. Conceptual Framework

This paper employs ideologically structured action (ISA) as a conceptual framework to deepen understanding of student activists in Indonesia and students’ mobilization based on an ideological framework. It aims to build a grassroots network of philosopher-activists. As a conceptual framework, ideologically structured action was initially proposed by Zald (2000) to address the question of how members of social movement organizations (SMOs) might not share similar ways and visions in their allegiance to ideological values (Zald 2000). Often, ideological factors were neglected in social movement organization (SMO) analysis issues. Research is focused on more practical factors that play a decisive role in shaping the actions and mobilizations of SMOs. ISA examines aspects of social movements that are often overlooked—culture, ideological systems, and symbols—which are frequently dismissed as having a negligible impact on the action and mobilization. While many SMO analyses separate mass actions and mobilization from their ideological and cultural contexts, the ISA bridges these factors for analysis in tandem. This analysis helps to further develop like-minded sympathizers into cadres and devoted members for the cause propagated by SMO.

Yet, as Diani (2000) has observed, ISA’s approaches to ideology risk overlooking the relational and dynamic aspects of identity formation, through which identities are constructed and strengthened within social movements. From this case, Diani further argued that situating ‘ideologically structured action’ as a pivot in the conceptualization of SMO might abandon the importance of relations between actors in a movement and the formation of collective identities through networks and ties between activists (Diani 2000). Klandermans (2000) also criticized Zald’s attempt to redefine social movements by bringing ideology back into the equation. Zald believes that the concept of contentious collective action remains crucial, and gives a clear analysis compared to the ISA model that raises uncertainty in distinguishing between individual and collective levels of ideology and action (Klandermans 2000).

In his effort to better understand social movements, Zald designed the ISA model to provide an analytical scope in defining social movements by integrating culture, belief, and meaning. This was done to acknowledge the role of social movement that is not limited only to its terms as a challenger within the political system (Zald 2000). Zald argued that movement behaviors are being shaped by ideology, and through ideological concerns and tenets, the movement eventually took its own shape and values. Accordingly, Zald attempted to expand social movement analysis beyond existing formalized SMO mechanisms to also include institutional arenas (such as bureaucracies, religious institutions, and families), where ideologically driven action could be present as well (Zald 2000). Zald argues that three issues should be addressed while engaging with ISA as a conceptual framework. First, ISA helps distinguish between identity transmission and ideology transmission to see whether personal identity is reflected in ideological affinity and policy choices that result from that affinity (Zald 2000). Second, ISA also provides a way to understand the ideological commitment of SMO’s loyal members (Zald 2000). Various examples show that Converse’s model can be used to identify consistency in members’ ideological alignment (Zald 2000). Since Converse’s model focused more on the party’s ideological alignment, Zald sought to reformulate it within the ISA by emphasizing ideological socialization within familial relationships and school education (Zald 2000). Zald observes that both spaces offered ample opportunities for ideologies to be propagated and integrated in shaping actions in both domestic and school settings. Schools are noted for amplifying hegemonic ideologies, but these frameworks were not established without the mobilized and structured efforts of previous social movements that advocated for their integration into the system (Zald 2000).

This ISA model offered by Zald (2000) is relevant as a conceptual lens in identifying the role of religious social movement in mobilizing masses especially to the Rausyan Fikr case in particular which provided through the relations between these aspects: (1) The ISA model emphasizes the central role of ideology not only just an outcome—aligning with how religious movement using religion as its ideological framework rather than just a belief system; (2) The model engages on how structure of ideas shape the movement as this is considered not incidental but reflects the movement’s attempt to consolidate actions and mobilization relevant to its ideological framework; (3) The ISA model draws attention to the persistence of ideological commitment, as it is what applied by religious movement through maintain commitment to the religion and religious thought for the movement’s sustainability whether by the collective behavior, a shared ideological mission, and continual reaffirmation.

Within the framework, the Rausyan Fikr Institute is situated as an organic network of intellectuals whose collective action is structured by a shared belief system, symbolic practices, and interdependent relations where ideology is treated as an organizing logic that shapes meaning, guides social practices, and sustains commitment. In reply to Klandermans (2000)’s concern about ISA’s blurring analytical boundaries between individual and collective scope, the Rausyan Fikr case that will be explained in this paper displays how shared ideological commitment would be enacted in the personal and collective levels, within specific relational networks. Rausyan Fikr exemplifies how the ideology functions relationally, illustrating that the belief system is not an abstract doctrine, rather a lived framework embedded in networks of interaction, showing that social movements are the most enduring when meaning and structure evolve, transforming into a distinct form of social movement that advances intellectual and ethical renewal through the intertwined dynamics of belief, relations, and practice.

This paper engages with Zald (2000)’s concept of ideologically structured action (ISA), in addition to Diani and Klandermans’s comments on the concept. Referring to Zald, this conceptual framework would be helpful in identifying the ideological structure of Rausyan Fikr by looking into its core values and philosophical ideas that have been implemented within the educational system. This paper investigates the socialization process, especially through Rausyan Fikr’s organic networks, which involved students and alumni to promote Rausyan Fikr’s idea to the public through courses and publications. Diani’s perspective would also be considered a key to understanding the relational network between alumni through the network that they have established to sustain the movement. The collective identity element would also be investigated through the usage of similar references and literature used in the workshops and trainings of Rausyan Fikr’s affiliates.

Using this ISA model, this paper examines the works and activities of the Rausyan Fikr Institute and its activist network throughout Indonesia. This paper examines the historical origins of the Rausyan Fikr Institute by situating it within the contemporary context of Shi’ism (Shia Islam) in Indonesia. This discussion continues with further explanations of the Rausyan Fikr Institute’s activities and its branch organizations’ engagement with society, as well as their strategies to mobilize the masses, spread their ideology, and maintain their members’ adherence to it. This paper examines the engagement strategies employed by the Rausyan Fikr Institute and JAKFI Nusantara with at least three distinct segments of their target communities in Indonesia: youth, university students, and mothers and women in families.

3. Contemporary Reading on Shi’ism in Indonesia

With the constant development of the Shia in their culture and teaching, the Shia have a significant impact on Indonesia, especially by enriching the Islamic treasury. Shia has engaged by providing an alternative framework for interpreting theology and spiritual practices, as well as religious and cultural expressions in the education field (Imran et al. 2023).

In contrast to the Sunni theological perspective, the Shia emphasize the integration of two distinctive elements: the Ahl al-Bayt, which plays a central role, and Ilm al-batin, referring to the inner knowledge of Quranic teachings. These emphases complement the five fundamental principles, such as monotheism (tawhid), prophethood, resurrection, imamate, and divine justice (Zulkifli 2013). While the first three principles closely align with the values of the predominantly Sunni Indonesian Islamic society, the other two principles reflect the distinct identity of the Shia. Within these two principles, Shia introduces an alternative conception of authority rooted in the infallible leadership of the Prophet’s family and offers a rational-ethical framework that emphasizes accountability, human responsibility, and fairness, engaging with current problems regarding inequality and injustice. This tendency to respect and follow the Prophet’s family, and especially the ‘Alid lineage, was labeled with the terminology of ‘Alid piety by Hodgson (1955). This exact terminology was used again by Formichi (2014) to describe the historical development of Shia Islam in Indonesia. For this research, the authors preferred to use the terminology of Shia Islam instead of ‘Alid piety. Authors argue that ‘Alid piety terminology has a historical and temporal value in its definition, while Shia Islam is a more universally accepted and historically accurate way to portray the development of this movement, which defended the leadership of the Prophet’s family in the wider global Muslim community.

In the educational field, the Shia network in Indonesia has evolved from an informal community and familial networks to institutional establishment initiatives, spreading to several areas, including Java and Sumatra (Suhendri et al. 2024; Musa 2013b). Primarily, their efforts resulted in the provision of structured platforms for Shia teachings that broaden religious discourse in Indonesia and improve the pluralistic religious landscape. For example, the Shia community in Bandung is actively engaged in a translation and publishing initiative led by Shia intellectuals, such as Mortadha Motahhari, that provides access to diverse interpretations critically examined, significantly broadening the epistemological and curricular landscape of Islamic education in Indonesia (IPAC 2016). Through their educational institutions (pesantren), Shia play an essential social role by initiating outreach programs that provide charity and health assistance in local communities (BRIN 2024). In several provinces, Shia educational institutions have been playing significant roles in giving education to children from various economic backgrounds, including underprivileged families. Institutions such as YAPI Bangil are also widely known for their social work and intensive engagement with local communities. In the early 2000s, Shia communities in Gegerkalong, Bandung, used to have a good relationship with the Sunni-affiliated pesantren, Darut Tauhid, which was led by a renowned Sunni Muslim preacher. This grassroots engagement helped Shia communities in Bandung gain acceptance and integration into society, but this would not be a long-lasting situation (Khalikin 2019).

The influence of the Iranian Revolution and the spread of Salafism in Indonesia brought forward the narratives of Anti-Shi’ism in Indonesia. The Shia community has experienced various dynamics with inevitable discrimination due to the prejudice and black campaigns promoted by Saudi-funded and some Pakistani-funded institutions, which promoted not only anti-Shi’a, but also heavily anti-Iranian discourses. This would eventually fuel feelings of hatred towards Shia communities in Indonesia, especially those who are publicly displaying their allegiance to Shia through symbols and participation in rituals such as Ashura. During the New Order, Shia was also put under scrutiny by religious institutions, such as the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Indonesian Ulama Council (Suhendri et al. 2024; Navvab 2018; Syarif et al. 2017).

Due to the strong discourse of Islamic resistance propagated by Shia preachers in Indonesia, the Indonesian Ulama Council distributed circulars in the years following the 1980s. Based on its religious legal edict (fatwa) issued in 1984, the Indonesian Ulama Council launched several campaigns to remind Muslim communities to remain steadfast in their Sunni (Ahl-us Sunnah wal-Jama’ah) identity and anticipate any attempt that would allow the introduction of teachings related to Shia Islam (Amin et al. 2020). During these times, Shia’s revolutionary appeals invited students to join their cause, partly because of the progressive message that Iranian Shia revolutionaries promised to fight against Western domination and build an alternative outside the Soviet bloc, which they believed would be possible under an Islamic system. This was noted as one of the potential threats by the Indonesian government (MC Nieke Indrietta Baiduri 2012).

The existence of Shia Islam and its communities was primarily seen as a political issue, not so much a religious concern, by the government. Such a thought provided Shia communities in Indonesia ample space to develop their narratives through religious discourses and philosophical discussions, without necessarily being seen publicly during the New Order era. During this timeframe, Shia Islam communities in Indonesia began developing their own publishing house, known as Mizan Publishing House (Peeters 1998; Farida 2014). It is through this publishing house that they started disseminating works by Shia scholars and creating materials that promote Shia Islam teaching to the public, such as their comic series on the Prophet Muhammad (Wahidin 2000).

On the onset of Reformasi, Shia Islamic identity was being weaponized as a tool to delegitimize confident leaders, as in the case of Abdurrahman Wahid and Amien Rais. Shia Islam was seen as something alien to Indonesia’s predominantly Sunni tradition, which does not acknowledge Shia Islam’s concerns on the issue of social justice and Ahl-ul Bayt leadership for the Muslim ummah. This blackmail, however, did not really affect the standpoint and existence of Shia communities until after Reformasi. During the early years of Reformasi, several peculiar dynamics emerged as necessary for the development of Shia communities’ standings in Indonesia. As the United States and its allies are waging the Global War on Terror, there is intense criticism against the Western entities and their Muslim allies in the Middle East. This feeling of animosity against Western entities propelled support for Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Ahmadinejad’s stance against America and Israel, combined with his simple lifestyle and message of Islamic unity, drew many people to sympathize with him and Iran (Labib 2007). Ahmadinejad’s fame was skyrocketing during that time, as evidenced by books about his life and his biography being in high demand (Latief 2008). However, then again, this momentum would not last for too long, as anti-Shia movements in Indonesia were jeopardizing Ahmadinejad’s fame in Indonesia.

As Ahmadinejad’s fame falters in Indonesia, discrimination against Shia has become more prevalent than ever. Starting from the mid-2000s, several Muslim organizations in Indonesia began to direct harsh criticism towards the Shia communities. One of the most well-known examples was the persecution of Tajul Muluk’s congregation in Sampang. Tajul Muluk built his pesantren based on Shia teachings and developed a distinct culture of Shia Islam that successfully lured Madurese people to attend his speeches and gatherings. This alerted local religious authorities, who reported the incident to the local government and began mobilizing the masses to confront Tajul Muluk’s congregation (Miichi and Kayane 2020). Although the problem is largely solved by now, it should be noted that even after Tajul Muluk’s public conversion to Sunni Islam, his community and especially himself are still experiencing uneasy discrimination while trying to reintegrate himself into society (BBC News Indonesia 2023). Farabi also noted that peacebuilding programs that were focusing on reconversion efforts hampered the destigmatization of the former victims of persecution towards Shia and Ahmadiyyah (Farabi 2025). Fahadayna, Ubaid, and Effendi further strengthened this point by arguing that it is governmental institutions and religious actors who played an enormous role in allowing illiberal peacebuilding to take place. This illiberal peacebuilding, as explored by Fahadayna et al., usually ended up in relocation of the Shia community as a measured, practical approach to solve the problem (Fahadayna et al. 2025).

The eventual moment where anti-Shia narratives became much stronger is the period following the Arab Spring. With the intensifying civil war in Syria and uncertainty surrounding the sectarian conflicts between Sunnis and Shiites in several parts of the Arab world, several Muslim scholars in Indonesia decided to form an Anti-Shia National Alliance (Aliansi Nasional Anti Syi’ah or known by its abbreviation as ANNAS) to particularly promote anti-Shia narratives in Indonesia and act as pressure group to push forward with the agenda to ban the existence of Shia Islam in Indonesia (IPAC 2016). While ANNAS’s activity was not effectively working nationwide, Shia Islamic communities during this time were facing a hard time due to the anti-Shia narrative being pushed by the media throughout the course of the Syrian Civil War. Shia Islam, as represented in Iranian forces and Lebanese militia like Hezbollah, was portrayed as the perpetrator of violence in wars, and a group of militias that significantly threaten the existence of the Sunni Muslim population in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon (Ida 2016). Thus, in this context, Shia communities were under immense threat due to this stigmatization, which continued well into today. Similar cases of persecution could also be seen in Malaysia, where Malaysian Shia communities endured legal persecution and their followers were imprisoned. These crackdowns imposed by state authorities were done to protect the state-approved religious teaching of Ahlu Sunnah wal Jama’ah (Musa 2013a, 2013b; Musa and Tan 2017).

Facing this discrimination, the Shia community largely maintained a low-profile identity, while continuing their social and religious commitment hidden from public scrutiny. Among the two majority Shia organizations in Indonesia, IJABI and ABI, one organization, the Rausyan Fikr Institute, attempted to position itself as an open and inclusive organization in its approach to propagate Shia philosophy through the mobilization of students, women, and families, and to build its momentum through systemic education and cadre recruitment. This effort is often overshadowed by external pressure despite its own ideological self-conviction, leaving dual, contradictory pressures: to sustain itself through the transmission of ideas and critical discourse, yet, on the other hand, simultaneously with externally imposed identity boundaries that restrict its autonomy within Indonesia’s social-political landscape.

4. Rausyan Fikr Institute as a Distinctive, Ideologized Philosophical Movement

From the concept of ideological structured action analysis, ideology plays a significant role in determining an SMO’s identity and defining how it reflects its activities. It emphasizes that social movement organizations are not solely about material interests and resources, but also about ideology as a philosophical factor to reduce the risk of being identified solely as a pragmatic interest group (Zald 2000).

In contrast to popular social movement organizations that prioritize practical activism, the Rausyan Fikr Institute situates its work within a discursive framework. It engages in multilayered forms of discussion, fostering more critical reflection. In explaining his movement, Rausyan Fikr Institute director, Andi Muhammad Safwan (also known as AM Safwan or Ustaz Safwan), explained Rausyan Fikr’s distinctive identity since its establishment is to be a movement that is based on the betterment of way of thinking, and to initiate socio-political activism with a correct purpose and correct epistemological foundation. The Rausyan Fikr Institute articulates its identity as an epistemic movement oriented toward enlightenment, not simply as symbolic but as the foundation of collective action.

For instance, the establishment of the intellectual network JAKFI (Jaringan Aktivis Filsafat Islam) reflects their commitment to translating ideology into a broader movement space. It is not associated with sectarianism or identity-based politics; however, it serves as an inclusive platform for society, mainly students, to directly engage with Islamic philosophy, critical epistemology, and religious thought that encourage the pluralism of ideas (I’bad 2024). The activities of this institute, led by AM Safwan, with 30 santri (students) who had graduated from his institute working as his assistants, help in organizing networks and preparing works for the continuity of the institute and research centers established within the Rausyan Fikr Institute (Safwan 2025b). Since its inception on 14 May 1995, both Rausyan Fikr Institute and its affiliates have not limited their membership only to Shia Muslims, but also to Muslims coming from different backgrounds, including Sunni Muslims who are living in an urban societal setting (Karya Alam 2014; Safwan 2025b). Safwan commented that urban Muslims are living in a religiously void environment, which could be easily filled by either radical or liberalist ideas (Safwan 2025b). As such, Rausyan Fikr Institute provided its educational program mostly for university students in the process of forming and maturing their religious and political identities through their late adolescent years. The educational program is usually done based on courses and explanations in books by Shia scholars (Safwan 2025b). Some programs have shorter terms for orientation purposes, and some others were given in longer periods (around 20–25,100 sessions in 2–5 months) for students who are dedicating more time to understand Islamic philosophy and mysticism in a deeper way (JakfiMajene 2025; Safwan 2025b; Ulya and Abdullah 2025). While there are no obligations for students to stay in the institution, some students decided to stay as residential students (santri mukim) to help organize the activities in the institute and engage with the local community (Safwan 2025b). For other students, many are attending online educational programs in the form of various activities, such as Islamic Philosophy School (Sekolah Filsafat Islam), Epistomology Tour (Wisata Epistemologi), short course, and online public lecture (Ulya and Abdullah 2025).

In terms of its allegiance to marja-e taqlid (referent scholar of Islamic law in Shia Islam), AM Safwan explained that the institution does not tie itself to a specific marja-e taqlid. Moreover, AM Safwan clarified that his students, activists who were referring to different marja’, depend on their social and educational background. Included in the lists of marja-e taqlid are Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Ayatollah Wahid Khorasani, Ayatollah Ali Sistani, and Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli (Safwan 2025b). While AM Safwan individually follows Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as his marja-e taqlid, he never imposes Khameini’s thought on fiqh and Islamic law on his students. For Safwan, the educational process at his institution focuses more on providing methodological and philosophical guidance for understanding reality and current socio-political problems, drawing on the thought of Motahhari, Shari’ati, Taqi Misbah, and Baqir Sadr (Safwan 2025b). The diversity of marja references from the body of students could provide a rich perspective on the discussions throughout the educational process in the institute.

Although Rausyan Fikr Institute primarily uses references from Shia Muslim scholars to strengthen its educational paradigm, it also engages with references from other Islamic schools of thought, mainly from Indonesian Sunni Muslim scholars. Safwan argued that the usage of Indonesian Sunni resources would help students to situate Shia Islam better in the Indonesian context. Explanations on tasawuf and ideas on Sufism are often coupled with readings from Haji Muhammad Abdul Karim Amrullah (or widely known as Hamka), a widely known modernist Muslim scholar educated in the Muhammadiyah educational system. Hamka was known for his groundbreaking work on interpreting Sufism in the modern context through his magnum opus, Tasawuf Modern (Modern Tasawuf). As one of the primary sources for students of Rausyan Fikr, Hamka was taught alongside Motahhari’s Falsafatuna (Our Philosophy) to contextualize the Shia’s way of sufism in Indonesian society. Works by Abdurrahman Wahid (also known as Gus Dur), former chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama, were also included as materials for the educational process in Rausyan Fikr Institute. Safwan explained that works by Gus Dur played a crucial role in helping Rausyan Fikr to localize Shia Islam within Indonesian society.

Such efforts to situate Shia Islam within local Indonesian heritage were done by Jalaluddin Rakhmat, who had integrated his intellectual learnings from Qom with the experiences of Indonesian Muslims. Safwan argued that such efforts to localize Shia Islam in the Indonesian context stopped with the demise of Jalaluddin Rakhmat. Rausyan Fikr Institute attempted to fill this gap of localizing Shia Islam values by finding the connection with philosophical frameworks established by Indonesian Muslim scholars. To help with the propagation of this idea, Rausyan Fikr Institute has created its own imprint named Rausyan Fikr Publishing, which helped transmit works by Shia scholars, such as Mortadha Motahhari, Baqir Sadr, and various Shia intellectuals from Indonesia to reach public readers (RausyanFikr Institute 2022). During the early 2010s, Rausyan Fikr Institute used to publish a journal on Islamic mysticism and philosophy, entitled Mulla Shadra. Nevertheless, this journal was short-lived and mostly consisted of old articles and translated old works on Shia’s mysticism and Sufism (Perpustakaan STAI Sadra 2025). Through this systematic educational paradigm, Rausyan Fikr has built a foundation and framework that would help its alumni to continue their activities outside of the school walls and to propagate the thought through the networks that they establish across Indonesia.

To establish networks and foster the teaching of a localized understanding of Shia Islam, Rausyan Fikr also established a network called JAKFI. JAKFI members consisted of students finishing a series of studies at Rausyan Fikr Institute. Through a series of dialogs, JAKFI represents the institution’s ideas in fostering a society of thoughtful thinkers with ideological commitments beyond communal identity. Despite being explicit in its philosophical orientation, Rausyan Fikr experiences the entanglement of ideology and identity, risking discrimination due to its resemblance to the Shia, as happened in 2013, when they faced direct attacks for the accusation of spreading deviant teachings (Tempo 2013). These discriminations do not instantly arise from their religious orientation, nor from external pressure that would force them to follow an orthodox version of Islamic belief. As a result, Rausyan Fikr’s ideological agenda is carefully framed to adapt to this situation. JAKFI also did not attempt to formalize itself as a legal body. JAKFI maintained itself as an organic network for students who have graduated from Rausyan Fikr Institute. JAKFI’s aim is mainly to continue intellectual mobilization after the students have finished their educational process.

Outside of the Rausyan Fikr Institute, students have affiliated themselves with various student political organizations, such as the Indonesian Muslim Student Association (Himpunan Muslim Indonesia, known by its abbreviation HMI) (Safwan 2025b). While JAKFI does not aim to directly mobilize students to achieve political change, JAKFI always equipped its members and networks with continuous discussions and deliberations that are coordinated by the Rausyan Fikr Institute. Through these discussions, students who are active in political organizations could formulate their action and advocacy plan to criticize public policy and mobilize protests on socio-political issues based on the framework given by the Institute. According to Safwan, this model of intellectual mobilization was modeled after Shariati’s way of educating and mobilizing his students (Safwan 2025b). As moallem-e enqelab (teacher of the revolution), Shariati did not witness the success of the revolution, but the revolutions were made possible through his constant teaching to his students. With the usage of similar references and ideological frameworks, JAKFI affiliates and Rausyan Fikr affiliates are committed to sharing a collective identity in their movement.

Alongside JAKFI, the Rausyan Fikr Institute also launched several initiatives that supported its central vision of mainstreaming philosophy-based activism and the Shia school of philosophy. One of the most interesting initiatives developed within the auspices of Rausyan Fikr Institute is the women-based RCF (Rumah Cinta Fatimah/Fatimah’s Love House). This organization is explicitly led and coordinated by female students, homemakers, and other women interested in studying Islamic feminism from a Shia Islamic epistemological perspective. RCF’s activities focus on empowering female students, homemakers, and women from various professions to work in their respective fields, drawing on the epistemological foundations they have gained from RCF through the works of Mortadha Motahhari (Sanger 2024). RCF organizational stock was mainly based on its existing members who have been partaking in a series of educations from Rausyan Fikr Institute, which ended up marrying each other and building families of their own (Safwan 2025b).

RCF regularly discusses the ideas of Mortadha Motahhari, which focus on giving Muslim women greater space in Muslim society. Motahhari was one of the Shia Islam scholars known for advocating for women’s empowerment under a sharia-governed system (Tavana and Kamkari 2017; Larijany 2021). By infusing Western, modern, and Islamic philosophy, Motahhari was synthesizing an idea that would later be known as “Islamic feminism”. By centering on the figure of Fatimah Az-Zahra, the Prophet’s daughter, as a role model for Islamic feminism, RCF emphasizes replicating Fatimah’s education and educational model through Motahhari’s guideline (Seknas Rumah Cinta Fatimah 2025). It is through this mode of education that RCF gained audiences who were curious about Islamic approach to the complex debate on women’s rights and feminism, which often were imbued with Marxist or liberalist ideological influence. RCF also advocates for the rights of underprivileged, discriminated women and families through the ‘Sedekah Fatimah (Fatimah’s Charity)’ activity. Under this program, many disadvantaged women and families were financially assisted to continue with their livelihood (Seknas Rumah Cinta Fatimah 2025). Safwan explained the RCF initiative in Sedekah Fatimah by illustrating a movement model rooted in family-based philanthropy and family-based intellectual formation (Safwan 2025b). Safwan added that RCF encourages families to practice charity from their own home, linking acts of care, learning, and spirituality into a household-centered social ethic that is seen as a sustained, non-hierarchical, and effectively producing moral and intellectual commitment across generations (Safwan 2025b). This family-centric model of RCF represents how ideological commitment could shape mobilization and sustain the engagement of the movement. Through this approach, ideological entrenchment and relational network could continue for generations while at the same time ensuring the wide geographical reach for the movement.

In the field of strengthening intellectualism among the philosopher-activists, the Rausyan Fikr Institute also established different platforms, which consist of Al-Husseini, MEI, and PPM. Al-Husseini’s organizational platform dedicated its focus to advancing religious deliberation on Shia Islam, and the Indonesian Epistemological Society (Masyarakat Epistemik Indonesia, or MEI) focused its work more on promoting Shia epistemological thinking to the public through non-sectarian research, which would include intellectuals from various backgrounds. In this aspect, MEI would be the research engine and think-tank for future works of the Institute. MEI’s works concentrate on synthesizing Western and Islamic philosophical visions, drawing on Mortadha Motahhari’s efforts to incorporate both Western and Islamic philosophers into shaping his philosophical thought, and publishing their findings in a scientific journal (Musakal et al. 2023; Rausyan Fikr and Islamic College n.d.). Nonetheless, these efforts made the Rausyan Fikr Institute able to create its own model of ideologically networked mobilization.

At a more intensive level, Rausyan Fikr Institute also established a semi-boarding institution, Pondok Pesantren Mahasiswa (PPM) Mutahhari (Mutahhari Islamic Boarding School for University Students). Residing students taking long courses in the Institute automatically become students at the PPM Mutahhari. It is in this exact institution that Rausyan Fikr Institute truly nurtures its future cadre and enhances its educational capacity in Shia philosophical values (Agung and Sari 2023). Oftentimes, PPM Mutahhari also conducts Shia religious traditions and rituals, such as celebrating the birthday and martyrdom of the Imam, as well as specific ceremonies such as the jausyan prayer, Ashura commemoration, and Laylat-ul Qadar (PPM Madrasah Muthahhari Yogyakarta 2022). In the early 2010s, PPM conducted a series of discussions and lectures involving foreign professors and graduate students from Qom Shia seminaries. All these activities are conducted intensively to instill the spirit of Shia Islam values among participating students in the Rausyan Fikr Institute (Rausyan Fikr 2020).

Regarding their external outreach and alliance-building, the Rausyan Fikr Institute has collaborated with organizations outside the madhhab boundaries of Shia Islam. At one point, Rausyan Fikr collaborated with one of the leading progressive NGOs in Yogyakarta, Social Movement Institute, to conduct a series of discussions and seminars to enlighten the public on pressing issues. At one point, the Social Movement Institute, which aligns itself with non-denominational teaching of Islam, also invited AM Safwan to speak in its course program (Social Movement Institute 2017). This existing engagement demonstrates that the Rausyan Fikr Institute has endeavored beyond its exclusive boundaries as a Shia Islamic organization. Besides that, Rausyan Fikr Institute often conducted joint events and discussions with various interfaith platforms within the vicinity of Yogyakarta, such as Gusdurian and Interfidei (Safwan 2025b). Rausyan Fikr Institute has even hosted Catholic friars from the Major Seminary of Saint Paul, Kentungan, for live-in education, where these friars are living together with students of Rausyan Fikr in close quarters to understand Shia Islam better (Safwan 2025b). These forms of intra-faith and inter-faith engagements also serve as their strategy to maintain their existence and gain public acceptance (Safwan 2025b).

5. Dissent Narratives of Rausyan Fikr Institute

As an ideologized philosophical movement, the Rausyan Fikr Institute is known for its distinctive dissent narrative on socio-political problems in Indonesia. Employing its ideological framework in its organizational network activities, Rausyan Fikr Institute worked to propagate its dissent narratives through three discourses: criticism of the capitalist economic system, criticism of Western-centered feminism, and the articulation of state and social reform in contemporary Indonesia. All these efforts, according to Safwan, are intended to find an indigenized, decentered, Indonesian-centric formulation of Shia Islamic thought.

While undertaking these efforts, Rausyan Fikr Institute reinforced its position as an independent movement outside the influences of the prominent Shia Islam organizations in Indonesia, that is, IJABI and ABI. These organizations emphasized that this effort was intended to ensure the independence and intellectual integrity of Rausyan Fikr Institute as a philosophical movement. Given the universal nature of thought and philosophy, it is essential to understand how different organizations interpret and apply specific teachings. In this context, the cases of IJABI, ABI, and Rausyan Fikr are examined with respect to their engagement with Shia thought. While IJABI and ABI primarily adopt Shia teaching in the theological domain, Rausyan Fikr focuses on developing and studying thought within the broader, universal field of philosophy, not limited to Shia. However, many of its literature references written by Shia thinkers, Rausyan Fikr’s approaches remain more inclusive and open (Taufik 2020).

Rausyan Fikr’s inclusive approach to knowledge is a key factor that distinguishes them from JABI, ABI, or other organizations that tend to be more exclusive. Within the broader philosophical realm, its engagement with Shia thinkers is not based on a dogmatic framework but rather on an intellectual exploration of universal philosophical questions, including metaphysics, ethics, and social criticism. Moreover, their educational activities reflect intellectual curiosity by ten incorporating Western philosophical texts or theories into their discussions (Abidin et al. 2021). This shows how Rausyan Fikr, as a movement, does not position itself as a specific religious identity representative but as a platform for critical and interdisciplinary thought. As such, Rausyan Fikr can be seen as an intellectual movement that rethinks Islamic thought through a pluralistic perspective rather than limiting itself to sectarian boundaries.

There are at least three main issues that the Rausyan Fikr Institute closely advocates and publicly propagates. The first is their critical note on capitalism. Based on their views, primarily focused on social inequality and injustice, the Rausyan Fikr Institute observes that mainstream Muslim society is easily swayed by the economic promises of oligarchs within the neoliberal capitalist system. As the founder and principal ideologue of the Institute, Andi Muhammad Safwan argued that the ongoing problem of social and political inequality stems from the lack of awareness and the inability of mainstream Muslim organizations to provide alternative solutions that will empower the poor and underprivileged sections of society (SIPACCARITA 2019). Capitalism was seen as a root of the existing problem in modern Indonesian society, which continuously impoverishes the public and further widens inequality and poverty in Indonesia. Thus, by utilizing Baqir Sadr’s conceptual framework on Indonesian political economy, Safwan evaluated the systemic nature of Indonesia’s economic problem.

One of the key reasons Safwan often cites in explaining the state of capitalism in Indonesia is the extensive role of oligarchs in state development projects. The extent of oligarchical practices, according to Safwan, should be addressed by implementing the Islamic political-economic paradigm outlined by Baqir Sadr (SIPACCARITA 2019). Drawing on Baqir Sadr’s magnum opus, Iqtishaduna, Safwan emphasized that the government should exercise greater control over economic development to advance public welfare. According to this paradigm, the government should play two leading roles in advancing the general public’s welfare: ensuring a safety net and social equality for all. Thus, according to Safwan, Muslim countries must emulate welfare-state models, since such a system is in line with the Islamic political economy (SIPACCARITA 2019). This thinking would eventually inspire Rausyan Fikr Institute’s own RCF to conduct activities aimed at establishing a micro safety net for the underprivileged. Safwan also mentioned Iran as an example, noting that it can withstand continuous embargoes from Western countries without necessarily sacrificing its public interest. Safwan argued that the Iranian model for sustaining people’s welfare amid the ongoing crises Iran faced could serve as a lesson for Indonesia and other Muslim countries alike (SIPACCARITA 2019).

Rausyan Fikr Institute has also actively advocated for equal rights for males and females. In this aspect, Rausyan Fikr Institute’s director, AM Safwan, often engages with Mortadha Motahhari’s work on women’s rights in Islam. Motahhari was well-known for his idea of reinterpreting women’s rights, distinguishing the moral foundation and legal framework of hijab (Sadeghi 2007). Hijab, according to Safwan’s explanation, should not be seen as a physical veil (Safwan 2018). It should not be seen only in its literal sense, but also in a more substantive and philosophical meaning (Safwan 2018) If hijab is understood in a proper way philosophically, people would not have further debate on how to regulate the interaction between males and females. Legally, women, especially those of Ahlul Bayt, are obliged to wear the jilbab (veil) as a sign of purity and personal devotion to God and should confine themselves to their own homes. Safwan argued that this legal regulation should be understood in its moral context, that the ruling on hijab was actually intended to establish a precise regulation on how males and females should respect each other (Safwan 2018)

In this sense, hijab serves as an invisible guideline on how to properly conduct the relationship between male and female in private and public settings. Safwan thought that hijab should not be used as a ‘legalistic’ framework that would prohibit women from conducting public activities in accordance with their traditional traditions (Safwan 2018). Hijab is a moral code that helps males and females respect each other and maintain each other’s dignity, regardless of how people interpret hijab and the use of jilbab in legal terms (Safwan 2018). As it concerns the appropriateness and protection of human dignity, it could be implemented by any person, regardless of whether the person is wearing a hijab or not (Safwan 2018). While interpreting the works of Motahhari, Safwan argued that the lack of epistemological understanding of male-female relations has led to a crisis of morality and sexual issues, which eventually leads to the banalization of sexuality in contemporary society (Safwan 2018). In an effort to reorder society during this time of crisis, prioritizing the role of women should be emphasized (Safwan 2018). As the cornerstone of family, a strong woman’s role in both the private and public realms will build stronger families and stronger societies (Safwan 2018).

All these discussions on capitalism and feminism eventually led to a debate about how Rausyan Fikr Institute views the relations between state and society within the Shia Islamic perspective (Safwan 2025a). Safwan argued that the organization he leads is looking at Iran as an ‘interesting experimentation’ to build a system that would work with both religious and worldly/secular leadership (Safwan 2025a). Iran, according to Safwan, is a process of continuous experiment and rediscovery of ideas. While many experts view Iran as a theocracy, Safwan argues that this characterization misrepresents its political system. While the rule of clerics is often perceived as theocracy by many, Safwan disagreed with such a perception. Instead, Safwan further argues that Iran is an actual theo-democracy (Safwan 2025a).

The theo-democracy system, implemented in Iran under the system of velayat-e faqih, allows checks between secular and religious authority (Safwan 2025a). Elected parliamentarians would still have their policies being implemented after being thoroughly checked by groups of competent and professional marja’. In the context of Indonesia, Safwan argued that Indonesia should begin recognizing the importance of recruiting capable ulama to issue fatwas that help formulate public policy, thereby ensuring policy aligns with worldly needs and religious teachings (SIPACCARITA 2019; Safwan 2025a). While advocating these ideas, the Rausyan Fikr Institute always aligns itself with the basic principles of Pancasila. This is why Rausyan Fikr Institute and its affiliate, JAKFI, stated their vision as “Preserving the Tradition of Islam, Keeping Families Together, and Protecting the Unitary Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila” (Safwan 2025a; SIPACCARITA 2019; Ardaus 2023).

Safwan’s idea on synthesizing Shia Islam within the Indonesian context deserves specific explanation in this part. As an institution that is based on the propagation of Shia Islam philosophy, it is quite peculiar to look at Rausyan Fikr Institute as independent and unaffiliated from marja’ and hawza. This was done for two reasons. First, localization matters. Safwan provided an auto-criticism to Indonesian Shia Muslims. Safwan said that the Shia community in Indonesia is still quite detached from their identity as Indonesian citizens (Safwan 2025b). By keeping a delicate balance between the universal aspect of Shia Islam and the practical, local aspect of being an Indonesian Muslim, Rausyan Fikr would provide its students with how to be committed as both an Indonesian citizen and a Shia Muslim. For Safwan, Iran is a showcase of the implementation of Shia Islam in practice and a motivating model to be used as an inspiration for many Muslim countries (Safwan 2025b). Nevertheless, Safwan saw that the Islamic Republic of Iran is never a perfect model to begin with, and implementing philosophical and political grounds for Shia Islam for political transformations will depend on the local socio-political structure as well (Safwan 2025b).

Aside from concerns for the localization of Shia Islam values, Rausyan Fikr Institute’s founder, Safwan, considered that an established tie with a certain hawza or marja would be risky for their survival (Safwan 2025b). A formalized tie with a foreign Shia institution would be taught as something that would be considered as bringing ‘foreign elements’ that would risk societal harmony and stability in Indonesia (Safwan 2025b). Thus, the path to maintain Rausyan Fikr as an informal, network-based organization was taken to anticipate further threats to the institution (Safwan 2025b). Safwan maintained that this approach would also help Rausyan Fikr to withstand any societal and political pressure that would otherwise enable them to continue their activity (Safwan 2025b). For the continuity of students’ educational processes, Safwan argued that Rausyan Fikr would be an entry point for anyone who would like to have a solid foundation in Shia Islam with a strong Indonesian context (Safwan 2025b). Through this introductory program, Safwan also said that those who aspire to deepen their understanding of Shia Islam could continue their education in hawza in Shia’s intellectual centers in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon, and learning directly from marja’ of their own choice (Safwan 2025b).

6. Conclusions

Rausyan Fikr Institute follows the model of ideologically structured action, strictly adhering to Shia Islamic teaching, while at the same time adjusting to the complex situation in Indonesia. As Shia Islam identity is still regarded as a potential threat to majoritarian Sunni Islam identity, the Rausyan Fikr Institute made necessary efforts to adjust its Shia Islam identity to be more acceptable to the public and design their programs to suit the needs of the potential audience and students who might want to seek a better understanding of Shia Islam philosophy. This adjustment helped Rausyan Fikr not only to propagate and communicate their ideology more effectively to the public but also to survive persecution over the years by aligning themselves with the existing narratives of Pancasila and their efforts in utilizing works written by Indonesian Muslim intellectuals from various backgrounds. Rausyan Fikr’s collaborations with interfaith and intra-faith platforms helped them to gain wider recognition in Indonesia.

Empirical findings provided that the Rausyan Fikr mobilization process has been built through two processes, which are made possible through ideological socialization and relational linkage. Ideological socialization, which happened within and outside the institute, ensures the continuity of student recruitment, which is ideologically and intellectually committed to expanding its networks through JAKFI. In terms of relational linkage, Rumah Cinta Fatimah (RCF) and its flagship activity of Fatimah Charity helped sustain engagement beyond the educational process within the institution and ensured the continuity of the movement through a family-based educational model. Theoretically, this research enriches social movement studies by bridging cultural and relational paradigms. This research reconfirms Zald’s argument, which argued for the necessity of an ideological framework to strengthen the structure of modern social movements, while providing additional insights into Diani’s comments on the urgency of considering relational linkage within a social movement. The existence of Rausyan Fikr Institute is a case that is rarely found in minority religious communities, in which this institution highlighted the potential for ideologically committed members to develop a solid network of social activists that would make change possible in the society they are living in.