Is Divine Law Indispensable to Moral Obligation? A Reply to Elizabeth Anscombe

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

This is a good paper that offers interesting discussion and criticism of Anscombe’s arguments. I have several minor comments that the author should address before the paper is accepted.

1. When I first read the paragraph below, I was initially confused. I initially thought ‘A Hume’ was a typo for ‘A human’. Perhaps the author should say ‘A humean’ instead? More generally, I thought the author could be clearer in this paragraph.

“It is as if the notion “criminal” were to remain when criminal law and criminal courts had been abolished and forgotten. A Hume discovering this situation might conclude that there was a special sentiment, expressed by “criminal,” which alone gave the word its sense. So Hume discovered the situation which the notion “obligation” survived, and the notion “ought” was invested with that peculiar for having which it is said to be used in a “moral” sense, but in which the belief in divine law had long since been abandoned: for it was substantially given up among Protestants at the time of Reformation. The situation, if I am right, was the interesting one of the survival of a concept outside the framework of thought that made it a really intelligible one”

2. The author claims that hypothetical imperatives have the following grammatical form: “Given what we know about X, if you want Y, then you ought to Z.” But this doesn’t seem right. A hypothetical imperative/ought is one that applies to us only because of our desires/ends. (The qualification about “what we know about X” seems unnecessary to me.) As Joyce writes in his book the Myth of Morality (pg 35), “A hypothetical imperative depends for its legitimacy on the addressee having some end or desire: “Go to the cafe” is good advice if I want a coffee, but if I do not have that desire, the imperative is retracted (it “evaporates”).” In short, hypothetical imperatives don’t have much to do with knowledge, so I would remove the knowledge qualification.

3. The author writes that “Whether morality requires categorical imperatives is, after all, bound up with the theoretical definition of “morality” itself. As Paul Bloomfield notes, there are at least two major rival conceptions in play. On the “social” conception, morality is concerned with how one ought to behave toward others; on the “Socratic” conception, morality is concerned with how one ought to live in general. Each conception sets the stage differently for whether hypothetical or categorical imperatives are taken to be essential.”

This doesn’t seem right. Whether morality involves categorical imperatives depends on whether moral oughts apply to us independently of our desires. For example, consider ‘You ought to keep your promises’. If this ought applies to us only because of our desires, then it is hypothetical. If, however, it applies to us regardless of our desires, then it is categorical. This is a substantive debate that does not rest on our definition of ‘morality’. (An aside: the author references Foot 2001 when citing a proponent of hypothetical morality. However, I believe that Foot changed her mind in that book. She does, however, defend hypothetical morality in her famous 1972 paper, so I would just cite that paper instead.)

4. When discussing Wielenberg, the author claims that guilt is a sanction: “Likewise, this obligation contains a sanction: Wielenberg, like the vast majority of human beings who are not sociopaths, would feel an overwhelming demand to lift his finger to prevent the baby from being tortured. If he did not lift his finger, he would experience a sanction in the form of an overwhelming feeling of guilt.” I found this slightly odd. Sanctions are penalties, but the feeling of guilt doesn’t seem to me to be a penalty.

5. The author claims that natural law theory endorses a hypothetical conception of morality. It’s not clear to me that this is true. Surely I ought to pursue basic human goods in a manner consistent with principles of practical reasonableness, independently of my desires, on natural law theory?

6. In response to the intrinsic wrongness objection, the author describes moves that Adams and Craig might make in response. However, it seems to me that the responses the author describes are not relevant for the intrinsic wrongness worry. The point of the intrinsic worry objection is that DCT implies that the wrongness of say, murder, is extrinsic rather than intrinsic because it is explained not merely by the intrinsic properties of murder but rather by its extrinsic or relational properties to God’s commands (cf. Wielenberg 2014: 83–4). Whether God’s commands are necessary or contingent is of no relevance to this worry. I thus recommend cutting the 4 paragraphs after the one stating the intrinsic wrongness objection.

I would like to emphasise that this is a good paper that offers good discussion and criticism of Anscombe’s arguments. The above are just minor points that I think the author should address. 

Author Response

Please see the attachment

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

The essay was an interesting and thorough analysis of the topic. While there is no new ground covered in this essay, it is a thorough and clear analysis of Anscombe's argument in her "Modern Moral Philosophy," as well as a very good analysis of the various criticisms on her work.

Author Response

Thank you for your review.