Psychedelic Mystical Experiences Are Authentic

Abstract

The paper critically discusses whether mystical experiences induced by psychedelics should be considered inauthentic or counterfeit forms of mystical experiences. It examines three arguments against the authenticity of these experiences: pimes are too easy; pimes do not have lasting spiritual or moral effects; pimes do not involve divine grace. Positive arguments for the authenticity of pimes discussed are as follows: pimes rely on similar neural mechanisms as other mystical experiences; pimes are phenomenologically similar to other mystical experiences. The paper argues that the positive arguments are more convincing than the negative ones. It thereby presents a case in favor of the authenticity of psychedelically induced mystical experiences.

1. Introduction

Psychedelics are much more visible now than twenty years ago. In the past, psychedelics were mainly used and debated on the fringes of society. Now, psychedelic retreats are not hard to find, and people discuss their use openly.1 The openness also extends to the academic realm. The effects of psychedelics are increasingly discussed by neuroscientists, psychologists and philosophers.

Psychedelics have a long history, and their use has likely had a religious connotation since the dawn of humankind. In some contexts, psychedelics continue to be used for religious purposes. The use of Ayahuasca is an integral part of the Santo Daime tradition, and some Native American traditions have institutionalized the use of peyote. Recently, new churches have emerged in the United States where the use of psychedelics is encouraged (Steinhart 2025).

The enthusiasm about the religious or spiritual potential of psychedelics is shared by many scholars. Some have voiced hopes that psychedelics open up mysticism for many more people than before (Wildman and Stockly 2021). Some also expect that increased use of psychedelics will lead to new religious ideas that are more environment-friendly (Anderson et al. 2024; Kirkham and Letheby 2024).

Not everyone, however, is enthusiastic about the religious import of psychedelics. Warnings against the use of substances can be found in the Old Testament.2 Many contemporaries are also concerned. Tristan MacDonald writes on his blog:

I have read about the expanding acceptance of psychedelics (…). [T]he mysticism they promise is a mere counterfeit. People under their influence sometimes claim to have divine encounters equaling or surpassing Christian revelation, yet they lack compelling evidence that these are experiences of objective realities, not subjective illusions. Were these “trips” accompanied by bodily levitation, like Saint Joseph of Cupertino’s flights during his mystical raptures—flights seen by countless eyewitnesses, from the lowest to the highest levels of society, in numerous different contexts, over decades? Did the trips involve people speaking fluently in languages they had never mastered, as happened as a result of the Holy Spirit’s descent at the Duquesne Weekend, a catalyst for the Catholic Charismatic Renewal? No? Then I am not convinced.3

Doubts were also expressed from within religious communities (mostly Christian communities). Some point to the important role of suggestion in psychedelic experience and how psychedelics support religious beliefs different than Christian doctrines (e.g., Welker 2023). Some Christian churches (including the Roman Catholic Church) issued public statements against any use of drugs4. Thomas Carroll notes that the Roman Catholic Church has consistently taught that mystical experiences cannot be induced by any human action (including ingesting psychedelics) and are instead a free gift, initiated by God (Carroll 2025, note 3). Some Pentecostal or charismatic groups see psychedelics as doorways for deceptive evil spirits (Exline et al. 2023), see also: (Macallan 2023). Rick Strassmann encountered opposition to his experiments with DMT from his Buddhist community. He quotes a letter from a community official:

An attempt to induce enlightenment experiences by chemical means can never, will never, succeed. What it will do is badly confuse people and result in serious consequences for you. (…) That DMT might elicit enlightenment experiences is delusional and contrary to the teachings of the Buddha. Hallucinogens [cause] disorder and confuse the mind, impede religious training, and can be a cause of rebirth into realms of confusion and suffering (…).

(Strassman 2000, p. 304)

Concerns were also raised by other non-Christian authors. Indian guru Rajneesh Chandra Mohan, better known as Osho or The Bhagwan explicitly denies that experiences induced by LSD are genuine (Osho 2006). All share the idea that the religious or mystical states induced by psychedelics do not compare favorably to non-induced mystical states. Usually, no arguments are given about why this is the case.

The question of authenticity is not widely discussed in recent academic scholarship. With some exceptions (e.g., Mosurinjohn et al. 2023; Sanders and Zijlmans 2021), many people studying psychedelic experiences empirically, seem enthusiastic supporters (Griffiths et al. 2006). Most note deep similarities between mystical experiences induced by psychedelics and ‘ordinary’ mystical experiences. Apart from some exceptions (e.g., Cole-Turner 2025), psychedelics are rarely discussed by theologians and philosophers of religion. The few exceptions are usually favorable towards psychedelics. This may, however, mask a selection bias.5 Some scholars do make brief, derogatory remarks. Bernard McGinn expressed some skepticism that psychedelic mystical experiences would withstand the test of discernment (see below) (Burke 2023). Richard Swinburne quickly dismisses religious experiences induced by LSD as hallucinations (see below).

This paper discusses several arguments against and for the epistemic authenticity of psychedelically induced mystical experiences (pimes). Most arguments are drawn from scholarly discussions, including personal discussions with colleagues. Most negative scholarly arguments are older dating back to the first psychedelic renaissance of the 1960s. The arguments can be transposed to the current discussion.

The arguments6 against the authenticity of pimes discussed here are:

• Pimes are too easy.
• Pimes do not have lasting spiritual or moral effects.
• Pimes do not involve divine grace.

Positive arguments for the authenticity of pimes discussed are:

• Pimes rely on the same neural mechanisms as other mystical experiences.
• Pimes are phenomenologically similar to other mystical experiences.

The paper argues that the positive arguments are more convincing than the negative ones.

2. Psychedelic Mystical Experiences

Much has been written about the effects of taking psychedelics. One salient effect of taking psychedelics is that they produce or facilitate mystical experiences. The term ‘mystical experience’ is subject to many interpretations.7 In this paper, the term designates experiences of spiritual and ultimate realities. The meaning of both ‘spiritual’ and ‘ultimate realities’ is controversial as well. The remainder of this paper relies on an intuitive understanding of the terms that includes clear examples like God, deities, orishas, spirits, Brahman and the Dao. It also includes experiences that are not unambiguously religious, like oneness with the universe or Platonist experiences (see also: Panikkar 1998). Mystical experiences have been reported across eras and cultures. Famous historical reports are self-reports by Theresa of Avila (Tyler and Howells 2016) and Julian of Norwich (Watson and Jenkins 2006), and reports of the experiences of Plotinus (Arp 2004).

Psychedelic substances reported to facilitate mystical experiences include psilocybin, LSD, DMT, 5-Meo-DMT, MDMA, and Mescaline. Unlike other (psychotropic) substances, like heroin, cocaine, caffeine or tobacco, psychedelics tend to produce alterations of consciousness and non-ordinary experiences. Not all experiences induced by psychedelics are mystical. They also facilitate intense introspective experiences and perceptions of ordinary reality in new ways.

The effects of psychedelics on mystical experience are well-known in multiple indigenous cultures like Native American shamanism, Indian traditions, and African religions. Use of psychedelics for religious purposes is commonly frowned upon in Western religious traditions.8

The effects of psychedelics on mystical experience are also well studied in academia. Academic study goes back to Walter Pahnke’s Good Friday Experiment or ‘Marsh Chapel Experiment’, where participants were administered psilocybin before a religious service.9 Almost all participants reported profound experiences during the service (Pahnke 1966). The number of studies on psychedelics and mysticism has increased enormously over the past two decades.10

3. Claims Against Authenticity

What sets psychedelically induced mystical experiences apart from other mystical experiences is of course the key role of psychedelic substances. Several authors, however, argue that the differences run deeper. Unlike (most) other mystical experiences, psychedelically induced mystical experiences (pimes) would not be authentic. Nobody argues that pimes are the only inauthentic mystical experiences. Pimes are, however, often portrayed as a prime example of inauthentic mystical experiences. Sometimes the inauthenticity of Pimes is assumed without argument.11

We again run into a vaguely defined term. The concept of ‘authenticity’ in mystical experiences can refer to various things. In most cases, a mystical experience is regarded as authentic when the subject is in genuine contact with the perceived spiritual or ultimate reality. The experience is inauthentic when she is having some sort of hallucination or misapprehension. Claims on authenticity are often made using terms like ‘truth’ or ‘real’.12 This meaning of authenticity is therefore epistemic.

The focus of the remainder of this paper will be on epistemic authenticity. Debating the epistemic authenticity of pimes assumes that genuine contact with a spiritual or transcendent reality by means of experience is possible. The claim has been defended and attacked in numerous ways.13 A thorough discussion of the arguments falls beyond the scope of this paper.

The aim of the paper is also not to address the general authenticity or reliability of all experiences induced by psychedelics. A dominant account in contemporary discussions is that while psychedelic experiences may lend some psychological benefits, they should not be considered truthful. The main reason is that they appear to bring subjects in contact with strange beings and worlds that are not in line with physicalist or materialist views of reality.14 Some note that the claim hinges on a commitment to physicalism (e.g., Jylkkä 2024). The claim would also rule against most non-psychedelically induced mystical experiences.

This paper has a more modest aim: to compare induced and non-induced mystical experiences. Most religious traditions have always distinguished genuine or authentic mystical experiences from non-genuine ones. The practice of distinguishing both is part of discernment. While the practice is broader, a key element is providing criteria for knowing when an experience or vision is really from God (Sluhovsky 2019). The discussion below aims to show that the reasons given for treating psychedelically induced mystical experiences (pimes) as less authentic are unconvincing. The central claim is that there is no good basis for affirming the authenticity of non-induced mystical experiences while denying that of pimes. Therefore, if a strong case can be made for the epistemic authenticity of mystical experiences in general, that case must also extend to pimes.15

Apart from epistemic authenticity, a mystical experience can be called authentic when the experience is in line with the subject’s (spiritual) life, values or goals. A subject who enjoys a mystical encounter with the Christian God, yet continues to live a life of sin or disregard for God, can properly be called inauthentic. We will call this kind of authenticity ‘value authenticity’.

Another kind of authenticity relevant for mystical experiences is ‘cultural authenticity’. Sometimes westerners who partake in Ayahuasca ceremonies to enjoy mystical experiences are accused of not doing justice to the cultural significance of plant medicines in native American traditions. Accusers of ‘Ayahuasca tourism’ take offence when subjects seek such experiences without properly being embedded in the metaphysical and ethical system that surrounds traditional ceremonies (Mahdavi 2024).

Another kind of authenticity is ‘unmediated authenticity’. Sometimes experiences are deemed authentic if they are pure or unfiltered. They are deemed less authentic when mediated or manipulated. Examples of such mediated or manipulated experiences might be experiences in cults where adherents are overloaded with sensory stimuli, like social pressure, visual imagery or others, to increase the odds of having a specific experience.16

Most claims discussed below pertain to the first kind, i.e., epistemic inauthenticity. Below I discuss three claims against the epistemic authenticity of pimes and argue that they are not convincing. Some arguments can establish that pimes fall short of one of the other types of authenticity. The next section discusses positive claims for the epistemic authenticity of pimes.

3.1. Pimes Are Too Easy

A first argument departs from the observation that psychedelics make it considerably easier to have mystical experiences. Without resorting to psychedelics, mystical experiences usually require long, arduous preparation. Medieval mystics spent months or even years preparing or purifying before they were able to have such experiences.17

The ease with which mystical experiences can be induced is sometimes put forth as a virtue of psychedelics (e.g., Wildman and Stockly 2021). Others are less enthusiastic and see easy mystical experiences as unearned. Walter Pahnke writes “To many theists, drug-enabled mystical experiences seem unearned and undeserved (Pahnke 1966, pp. 309–10). Similar claims were suggested by Robert Zaehner (Zaehner 1961). Richard Jones suggests that the ease by which psychedelics can trigger mystical experiences makes it easier to brush them aside (Jones 2019). Similar claims have been made in related discussions. Frederic Aquino notes that an important feature of Christian spiritual life has commonly been practices to achieve the right kind of mindset for mystical experiences (Aquino 2017). Mystical experience requires that persons be taught to open themselves up cognitively, volitionally and affectionally. John Cottingham also points to the importance of spiritual practice to bring about interior change or receptivity. Such practices are prerequisites to receive God’s grace (Cottingham 2005). The claims do not directly address the role of psychedelics. They do cast doubt over mystical experiences that arrive without preparatory, spiritual practice.

What are we to make of this claim? Zaehner’s argument was directly attacked by Huston Smith. Smith himself participated in one of the first studies on the effects of psilocybin (see also below), and reports that there is little reason to think that pimes are in any relevant way different than other mystical experiences. The ease by which pimes occur is no reason to think so (Smith 1964). Although Smith does not go along with Zaehner’s arguments, he does raise a new point. Easy mystical experiences may be worrying for adherents of religious traditions because they are highly similar to psychotic episodes or other experiences connected to psychological pathologies (Smith 1964). Psychotic episodes indeed tend to come easy for subjects suffering from psychopathologies as well. Given that psychotic episodes are often recognized as hallucinatory, an adherent has a strong motivation to discard pimes as not authentic.

Smith’s argument relies on deep similarities between pimes and psychotic episodes (or other experiences caused by psychopathologies). It also relies on the (often tacit) assumption that psycho-pathological experiences are hallucinatory in nature. Both assumptions can be contended. Psychotic episodes tend to involve confused, disordered thinking and language. Patients are talking and moving quickly or violently. Furthermore, psychosis tends to involve delusional ideas like the sense that others are out to harm you.18 All are far less prevalent in pimes. Psychotic episodes are defined as losing touch with reality and therefore as inauthentic.19 However, the hallucinatory aspect of psychotic episodes is often defined as seeing or hearing things that others do not (e.g., NHS 2023). This suggests that calling psychotic episodes hallucinatory is more a diagnostic tool than an epistemic claim. Hallucination thusly used primarily refers to their private nature. Mystical experiences often involve private perceptions that are not publicly available. The privacy of such experiences is usually not regarded as problematic (e.g., Swinburne 2004) and does not rule out epistemic authenticity. Mark Webb notes that other epistemically respectable methods, like rational intuition are also not public (Webb 2011).

Besides these observations, the key point is that there is no logical connection between the apparent ease of pimes and their (lack of) epistemic authenticity. Experiences which are easy to obtain may afford genuine contact with parts of reality. This is tacitly recognized in most religious traditions. Many religious traditions contain examples of spontaneous mystical experiences that do not require thorough practice. Spontaneous mystical experiences are not at all a rare phenomenon.20 Historically, spontaneity is also rarely seen as a reason to doubt their authenticity. For example, Catherine of Genoa experienced a profound mystical experience during confession. The experience led her to devote her life to religious contemplation. She did not follow monastic practice or go through practices common for the preparation of mystical experiences. Her mystical experiences were deemed authentic by church officials and she was later canonized (Jones 1999). Other non-western traditions know spontaneous mystical experiences as well. Some traditions like Zen Buddhism even forego describing fixed practices and value spontaneous mystical experiences more highly. Most traditions also value conversion experiences, which can come unexpectedly.

While the argument fails to support the conclusion that pimes are epistemically inauthentic, it may support a case against another form of authenticity. The ease by which pimes may be obtained makes it less likely that pimes will lead to radical (moral) transformation or reversal of values. Therefore, the experience is likely to be less in line with the subject’s guiding values or life goals. Congruence between mystical experience, values and life goals is much more to be expected if the experience is embedded in thorough practice that consumes a lot of the subject’s life. Medieval mystics who enjoyed an experience after an arduous process of contemplation and prayer are more likely to integrate mystical experiences of God in their life.

Some empirical results do challenge this claim against the value authenticity of pimes. Griffith et al. note that a lot of subjects see pimes as one of the most meaningful and significant experiences of their lives (Griffiths et al. 2006). Pimes are also associated with a change in beliefs (Nayak et al. 2023), and changes in lifestyle like overcoming addiction (Zafar et al. 2023), or a reduction in heavy drinking (Bogenschutz et al. 2022). However, most studies were not longitudinal and therefore do not show if the effects last.

The argument may also be recanvased as an argument for cultural inauthenticity. Mystical experiences embedded in thorough practice require a long process of familiarizing yourself with that practice and (metaphysical) ideas associated with it. For example, Christian mystical practices involve contemplation of Christian religious symbols and prayer, or devotion to the Christian God. Doing so for years will automatically produce some familiarity with Christian metaphysical ideas at minimum and likely some reverence. All this is less likely if the mystical experience is not embedded in a practice of this kind. Psychedelics can afford mystical experience to subjects without being familiarized with any tradition. They also afford subjects to go through a culturally specific ritual without any familiarity and still have a mystical experience. All this can be perceived as culturally inauthentic.

3.2. Pimes Do Not Have Lasting Effects

A next argument against the authenticity of pimes focuses on their effects. Pimes would often have only fleeting effects. Subjects may have brief, profound experiences but often continue as before afterwards. Other mystical experiences, by contrast, regularly lead to life-transformations or insights that change people’s lives.

The alleged lack of lasting effects may correlate with the ease with which pimes are induced. If pimes are easier to obtain, they require less effort or investment on behalf of the subject. Lack of effort or investment may make subjects less committed to following up on profound experiences or to have them change their lives.

The argument seems open for an easy response as well. There is no pressing logical connection between a lack of enduring effects and epistemic authenticity. This reply is, however, too easy. Effects of mystical experiences have always been considered an important indicator of epistemic authenticity. Most (scholars and others) acknowledge the existence of non-genuine mystical experiences. One way to distinguish genuine from non-genuine is looking at their effects. Examining long-term effects or their spiritual fruits on the subject’s life is a key element of the Christian practice of discernment. Catholic Church authorities include “Healthy devotion and abundant and constant spiritual fruit (for example, spirit of prayer, conversion, testimonies of charity, etc.)” as one of the positive criteria for the discernment of private revelations: (Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 1978). The importance of effects is also noted by several prominent mystics, like Theresa of Avila. Others, like William James (James 1902), emphasize the moral effects of mystical experiences as a criterion for authenticity. Discernment (or lack thereof) is a reason why Bernard McGinn expresses doubts regarding the authenticity of pimes (Burke 2023).21

To my knowledge, few (if any) authors claim that spiritual or moral fruits are the only criterion to distinguish authentic from non-authentic mystical experiences. As a result, other criteria (e.g., congruence with doctrine) could support the epistemic authenticity of pimes. Furthermore, some research suggests that pimes can have (moral) effects on subjects (e.g., Olteanu and Moreton 2025), but few longitudinal studies on these effects have been conducted. In any case, lack of enduring effects of pimes can make one less certain about their epistemic authenticity but by no means show that they are epistemically inauthentic.

The argument can again be put forth as an argument against value- or cultural authenticity. Some studies do note that pimes often have enduring effects (see above). However, anecdotal evidence does suggest that the effects of pimes on lifestyle are more fleeting than the effects of mystical experiences embedded in (religious) practice. Engaging in a practice requires substantial sacrifice and effort and may therefore make subjects more dedicated. If pimes do not produce lasting effects (or less enduring effects than other mystical experiences), it gives an indication that the experience is not well aligned with subject’s values or life goals. Values and life goals are reflected in how humans conduct their lives. If a subject’s life reflects values or goals that do not fit with her mystical experience, we can safely conclude that her mystical experience lacks value authenticity.

A similar argument can be made against cultural authenticity. A subject may enjoy a pime after engaging in a culturally specific ritual (e.g., a Native American shamanic ritual). If she makes no changes and continues her life in a way that is disrespectful to that culture, for example, by supporting colonial policies, her experience will lack cultural authenticity.

3.3. Pimes Do Not Involve Divine Grace

A next argument relies more heavily on theological claims. A genuine encounter with God (through a mystical experience) requires God’s grace. God needs to reach out to human subjects in order to be experienced. Without a movement from God, no genuine experience from God is possible. The idea is found in Roman Catholic responses to the use of drugs for mystical purposes (see: Carroll 2025). The idea was also a concern for monk Thomas Merton. He writes:

“It seems to me that a fully mystical experience [is] a direct spiritual contact of two liberties… One liberty is the personality of the spiritual aspirant, and the second is God, not as an ‘object’ or as…‘Him in everything’ nor as ‘the All’ but as…I AM”. (Merton 1985).

Quoted by (O’Shea 2024)

The argument was not defended at length but suggested by several authors. Robert Zaehner argues that psychedelics at best may induce states of unity with nature or the universe, but not encounters with God since these require God’s grace (Zaehner 1961). Martin Buber argues that drugs induce at best a strictly private sphere of experience. Induced states miss the communal and dialogical aspects of authentic religious experiences. For Buber, true mysticism involves a relational encounter with God that cannot be achieved through artificial means (Buber 1988).

The claim hinges on the idea that God’s presence is hidden under normal conditions. Humans may infer God’s existence or plan from creation or other sensible signs without much difficulty. They cannot have a direct experience of God through their own efforts alone, nor can they force God to reveal himself. This makes any experience of God different from experiences of objects or subjects that are not hidden. Having an experience of the Eiffel tower merely requires that subjects are in the right location with functioning senses. The same holds for experiences of public figures. For authentic experiences of God, putting oneself in the right position does not suffice.

According to many traditions, God wants to make himself known to humans. Therefore, God can reach out and allow humans to meet him directly. Some accounts add that God refrains from doing so too often or too readily because it would impinge on human freedom and agency.22 If and when God chooses to reach out, it is due to his will and goodness alone. Humans cannot force God to reveal himself. On stricter accounts, God’s self-revelation cannot even be facilitated by human activity (e.g., ritual or monastic activities) because there is little (if anything) humans have to offer God.23 Any direct experience of God therefore requires a graceful act of God. God does not have to show himself. He chooses to do so because of his will alone. The need for divine grace is also connected to God’s sovereignty. God’s absolute sovereignty implies that all events, including all mystical experiences, are under God’s control alone.24

A requirement of grace could be problematic for pimes. Psychedelics make it easier to have mystical experiences. Experiences of a transcendent reality are commonly reported by psychonauts. This does not chime well with the idea that God is normally hidden and only reveals himself out of grace. Psychedelics seem to make mystical experience similar to experiences of things or persons that are not hidden. If pimes can be authentic, all subjects have to do to achieve a mystical experience is put themselves in the right position; in this case by ingesting a psychedelic.

The argument from grace has some appeal, be it mostly for adherents of Abrahamic religions. Buddhists, Hindu’s, Daoists or adherents of other religions without a belief in a God who usually remains hidden will see no problems. Mystical experiences of a non-personal ultimate reality fall beyond the argument’s scope as well. A non-personal ultimate reality, like the Brahman or the Dao does not act out of will and therefore does not act from a similar form of grace. Experiences of deities or spirits that are not perfectly sovereign also fall beyond the argument’s scope. In many religious traditions (e.g., African-Diaspora and Indian traditions), deities or spirits can be swayed or even forced to reveal themselves by offerings or incantations.

For adherents of Abrahamic religions, the argument can again be construed as a way to distinguish genuine from non-genuine or counterfeit mystical experiences. Since genuine mystical experiences require a gracious act from God, experiences that circumvent this should be regarded as experiences where God did not truly show himself.

A next point to note is that the grace required for theistic mystical experiences is special, non-general grace. Karl Rahner makes a distinction between a broader notion of grace and special, additional forms of grace. All possibilities of experiencing God (including having a human perceptual system and possibilities to seek God) involve a general kind of grace. On many Christian accounts, all of creation is a gracious act by God. Therefore, in a sense everything in creation depends on God’s grace. On top of general grace, Rahner distinguishes a special, additional grace. This kind of grace is not universally bestowed on all creation. The special grace is only given to a select number of humans and enables mystical experiences (Rahner 1975).25 The grace that is seemingly lacking in pimes is not the general ordinary grace, but the special kind of grace.

Is the argument nonetheless convincing if limited to theistic mystical experiences? A theist psychonaut could respond in a number of ways. She can argue that pimes also involve grace. Taking psychedelics by no means guarantees that a subject will have a theistic pime. In many cases, subjects merely have a pleasurable experience or a profound introspective experience without any awareness of God. God can still graciously choose to reveal himself during a pime or refrain from doing so.

Psychedelics do make having a mystical experience easier. The theist psychonaut can claim that this is in line with God’s plan. God, who is responsible for all creation, may have created psychedelics to make him known to people in an easier way. Aldous Huxley called his experience induced by mescaline an example of ‘gratuitous grace’ (Huxley 1968); a potentially helpful experience that can be accepted thankfully. God may have created psychedelics to allow people, for whom thorough religious practice is impossible, to experience God nonetheless. Psychedelics may also afford mystical experience to people who lack personality traits that enable mystical experiences. Some scholars have suggested that mystical experiences require absorption personality traits, traits that allow subjects to become taken over or fully invested in some stimulus (Tellegen and Atkinson 1974). Psychedelics may allow subjects who lack such traits to enjoy mystical experiences nonetheless.

The replies from the theistic psychonaut remain speculative. Irrespective though, the function of psychedelics in theistic pimes does not show that divine grace is absent. Theistic pimes still require an act from God even though the reply may be received easier. Furthermore, it is worth noting that several theistic traditions do not see a conflict between use of psychedelics and divine grace. For example, ingestion of ayahuasca is regarded as sacramental by adherents of Santo Daime. Adherents make use of ayahuasca to achieve mystical experiences during religious services. The services also include prayers and petitions for God to become present (see: Barnard 2014).

Noting the seeming absence of grace may provide an argument against cultural authenticity for at least some pimes. In most Christian traditions, mystical experiences are regarded as reciprocal encounters with God that requires proper conduct. Encounters with God in Christian traditions tend to involve benedictions, prayers, bodily postures and traditional rites. While these have multiple functions, one key function is showing respect for God and inviting God’s response. The absence of these in pimes may be perceived as an indication of lack of respect for God or not going through the proper modes of communication with God. Subjects who experienced pimes are usually less mindful of these cultural sensitivities.

4. Claims for Authenticity

Is there a positive case for the authenticity of pimes? The main argument is that pimes are highly similar to other mystical experiences.26 The argument can be articulated in two ways: pimes rely on the same neural mechanisms and pimes are phenomenologically similar.

4.1. Pimes Are Produced by the Same Neural Mechanisms as Other Mystical Experiences

This argument is the most technical of the two. It draws on insights from the neuroscientific study of mysticism and psychedelics. While the number of studies on the neural underpinnings of psychedelic experiences is increasing, studies on other mystical experiences remain limited. Most mystical experiences occur spontaneously or are embedded in settings that are hard to imitate during studies (e.g., ritual settings). Non-induced mystical experiences are usually recreated in experimental settings by use of meditation or studying the effects of long-term meditation. As a result, the argument is speculative to some extent. New data may alter what we know and have ramifications for this argument.

Noting that the same or similar neural mechanisms underlie ‘regular’ mystical experiences and pimes gives some indication that both are similar. It also anticipates and counters claim that pimes may result from distorted cognition while other mystical experiences are not. If pimes were produced by other neural mechanisms, the mechanisms may be less reliable or more subject to error. Closer investigation of the mechanisms could reveal that they are prone to misprocessing (sensory) information or that they are highly malleable by suggestion.27 If pimes are not governed by other neural mechanisms, such an investigation will harm all mystical experiences alike.

Much remains unknown about the neural mechanisms that underlie mystical experiences. One reason is that mystical experiences are diverse (see also: Yaden and Newberg 2022). Experiences of visions likely involve mechanisms that also operate during visual perception; auditory experiences where people hear transcendent voices likely involve mechanisms at work during auditory perception; experiences of ego dissolution involve mechanisms responsible for the sense of self. Nonetheless, some mechanisms can be identified that have an important role during many mystical experiences. Some are: reduced activity in the default-mode-network (DMN), increased connectivity between brain regions, the parietal frontal cortex (PFC), and the limbic system.

Psilocybin and LSD affect the default-mode-network28. The DMN has an important role in the sense of self.29 Alteration of neural activity in the DMN is theorized to be associated with dissolution of the sense of self and probably with experiences of unity. Changes in neural activity in the DMN are also consistent with spacelessness and timelessness. Ingestion of LSD and psilocybin bring about such changes in the DMN. Mindfulness meditation is also shown to lead to changes in the same brain region (Chiesa and Serretti 2010). In both cases, activity in the DMN is generally decreased. Another noteworthy parallel between alterations because of meditation practices and ingestion of psychedelics are changes to the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC). The PCC is implicated in getting the sense of being caught up in an experience (Barrett and Griffiths 2018).30

Pimes and non-psychedelically induced mystical experiences are likely both accompanied by altered connectivity between brain regions. Several studies note increased sensory and thalamocortical connectivity and decreased connectivity within the DMN (Yu et al. 2024). Tagliazucchi et al. reported higher connectivity after ingestion of psilocybin, especially in the hippocampi (Tagliazucchi et al. 2014). Barrett and Griffiths report that connectivity between the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and parahippocampal cortex (PHC) are also altered by acute and long-term meditation practice. The changes could again be associated with changes in the sense of self (Barrett and Griffiths 2018). A study by Brewer et al. reported that experienced meditators exhibited increased functional connectivity between the posterior cingulate, dorsal anterior cingulate, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices (Brewer et al. 2011).

Finally, studies suggest that lesions in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and temporal lobe are linked to an increased proneness for mystical experiences (Cristofori et al. 2016). We noted the effects of psychedelics on the PFC above. Some studies also note effects on the temporal lobes by psychedelics (Winkelman 2017; Dos Santos et al. 2016). The temporal lobes are connected more closely to visual experiences.

The findings jointly strengthen the case that pimes are not different from non-psychedelically induced mystical experiences. Claiming that one is epistemically inauthentic while the other is not cannot rely on pointing to differences in the neural mechanisms that underlie them.

The argument does not support value or cultural authenticity. Noting that pimes rely on similar neural underpinnings than other mystical experiences does not show (or deny) that pimes are in line with a subject’s values or goals. It also does not show that pimes do justice to the cultural context in which it is embedded. Both aspects of experiences (alignment with values and culture) are outside the purview of neuroscientific study. The same holds for mediated authenticity. Noting the same neural underpinnings reveals nothing about whether the experience was subject to manipulation or another form of mediation.

4.2. Pimes Are Phenomenologically Similar

A straightforward reason to think that pimes are as authentic as other mystical experiences is noting their phenomenological similarities. In most cases, there are few differences. Some reports even explicitly liken the experience to a famous mystical experience. For example, Aldous Huxley compares his experience induced by mescaline to Meister Eckhart’s mystical experiences (Huxley 1968). Since there is no apparent reason to think that pimes stand out among the mystical experiences, there is no apparent reason to deny that they can be as authentic.31

An opposing argument was defended by Robert Zaehner (Zaehner 1961). He does not argue that pimes are different from all mystical experiences, but argues for a more limited claim. Pimes would be different than Christian, and especially Catholic, mystical experiences. Although Zaehner does not draw epistemic conclusions, his claim may imply that both (pimes and Christian mystical experiences) should be evaluated differently.

Zaehner acknowledges that pimes are similar to some mystical experiences. His example is Aldous Huxley’s self-reported experience under the influence of mescalin (Huxley 1968). Zaehner notes similarities to experiences where subjects feel unity with the universe or all of reality. Such experiences are more common in Indian traditions, but Zaehner also notes examples in western nature mysticism or esotericism (Zaehner 1961).32 If the latter can be regarded as authentic, Zaehner’s claim does not infringe on the authenticity of pimes. Zaehner sees problems when the focus is placed on Christian mystical experiences, the beatific vision in particular (Zaehner 1961). This experience would be vastly different.

The details on the beatific vision are contested. The core element is seeing or beholding the face of God. Clear examples are the vision described in Ezechiel 1: 4–28. Catholic teaching holds that the beatific vision is only possible after physical death (Pace 1907). The belief that a beatific vision is possible before death is more common in Eastern Orthodoxy (e.g., Romanides 2007).33 Comparing pimes to experiences only achievable after death will, of course, reveal great differences. Psychedelics act on receptors in the brain that are no longer in function after biological death.

If we accept that beatific visions (or experiences that resemble them closely) are possible during one’s lifetime, are these profoundly different to pimes? Zaehner mainly compares Christian mysticism to Huxley’s experience triggered by mescaline and concludes they are different. Luckily, we now have much more data on the phenomenology of pimes than Zaehner did. One relevant report was obtained just one year after Zaehner published his argument. During the Marsh Chapel Experiment (better known as the Good Friday Experiment), ten graduate students34 were administered psilocybin before a religious service. Almost all reported profound religious experiences. One participant, Huston Smith, recounts his experience:

[W]hat [the] (…) experiment did for me was to round out my experience of the holy by enabling me to experience it in a personal mode, not just abstractly (…) in music and nature and (more rarely) in the clear light of the void. Because Good Friday centers in God incarnated in a person, Christ, In that setting I experienced (…) the divine in that mode. Spirit responding to Spirit, deep to deep, in the classic, dualist mode of the bhakti yogis. This permanently enlarged my experiential toolbox. My first psychedelic experience was neoplatonically monistic; this [second] one was personal and relational. So ever since then I have been able to understand experientially that classic mode of mysticism.

(Roberts and Jesse 1997)

Some of Smith’s remarks fit well with how the beatific vision is portrayed. Smith does not only report an experience of unity with reality but also of encountering a transcendent reality ‘Spirit to Spirit’.

In a larger study that looked at multiple psychedelically induced experiences, 75% reported that the visual senses were involved in the experience; 49% reported that auditory senses were involved and 48% tactile senses. Most reported communication (i.e., an exchange of information with the entity) (Griffiths et al. 2019). The involvement of senses fits better with an experience of ‘seeing’ or ‘beholding’ a transcendent entity than a unitive experience.

Other reports also include pimes that resemble the beatific vision of beholding God more closely. After a therapeutic session with LSD to treat the effects of childhood schizophrenia, a 10 year old participant was reported whispering “I saw God” (Fisher 1997).

Sometimes the experience is more unitive but a clear idea of sensing or being in close contact to God, remains. An anonymous participant at an LSD-session reports:

People came out of these sessions reeling with awe, overwhelmed by experiences of oneness with God and all other beings, shaken to the depths of their nature by the grandeur and power of the divine life-energy processes going on within their own consciousness. Slowly, I felt the physical and energetic resistance between us give way. There was still a solid form, but it was now somewhat fluid, like mercury. Then I felt the boundary between what was me and what was him dissipate, and I merged totally into him. I felt a complete oneness with him and his spirit, as though I’d gone right into his body. There was unity and life and the exquisite love that filled my being was unbounded. My awareness was acute and complete. I saw God and all the saints and I knew the truth. I felt myself flowing into the cosmos, levitated beyond all restraint, liberated to swim in the blissful radiance of the heavenly visions.35

It therefore seems as if Zaehner’s claim (pimes are phenomenologically only similar to experiences of unity with the universe) is not warranted by the evidence available. Zaehner’s claim appears to draw on a limited number of examples of pimes. Looking more broadly reveals that pimes are much more diverse and some are at least similar to the way beatific visions are described.

Moving beyond Christian mystical experiences, many have noted profound similarities between pimes and other mystical experiences (see for example: Smith 1964, 2000; Strassman 2000). Both often involve ego dissolution, where the ordinary sense of self loses strength or disappears altogether (Letheby and Gerrans 2017). Both often involve entity encounters where subjects see or hear non-ordinary living beings or find themselves in other spiritual realms (Luke and Spowers 2021). Details differ, but this is also the case for any comparison between non-psychedelically induced mystical experiences.

Pimes also include the classical PINT properties of mystical experiences (James 1902). James notes that many religious experiences are passive (the subject is not in control), ineffable (hard or impossible to put into words), noetic (they afford knowledge or new insights), and transient (the experience does not endure). Pimes are described with the same properties (e.g., Neitzke-Spruill 2019).

The phenomenal similarities do not support a case for value or cultural authenticity. The difference between mystical experiences that are in line with values and goals are likely not noticeable during the experience itself. The differences only come to the fore in the integration of the experience with a subject’s life and/or in subsequent behavior. Differences between mystical experiences that are culturally authentic or not are mainly noticeable in the context and setting of the experience (e.g., a church setting or temple setting). These do not show up in the phenomenology of the experience itself or, at most, to a very limited degree.

5. Concluding Remarks

The paper critically investigated five arguments regarding the epistemic authenticity of psychedelically induced mystical experiences. Three arguments (pimes are too easy; pimes do not involve divine grace; and pimes do not have lasting effects) were found to be unconvincing. Some of these arguments do support a case against the value- or cultural authenticity of pimes.

Two arguments in favor of the authenticity of pimes were found to be more convincing. The available evidence indicates that pimes are produced by the same neural mechanisms that produce other mystical experiences. Pimes also share a lot of phenomenological similarities with other mystical experiences. While these arguments support a case for epistemic authenticity, they do not support a case for other kinds of authenticity.

The discussion supports the idea that pimes should not be singled out as epistemically inauthentic or counterfeit mystical experiences. Pimes may therefore merit the same theological and philosophical attention given to other mystical experiences. A case for the epistemic authenticity of pimes may also support the use of psychedelics as part of a religious practice. The use of psychedelics may allow more people to have a mystical experience that is (likely) as epistemically authentic than mystical experiences that are reserved for a limited few.