Right-Wing Populism, Religion, and Civilizational Identity

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

This manuscript is a valuable contribution to the literature that exploring religiosity and invoking of religion in rightwing populist mobilisation rhetoric. The research design allows an open-ended comparison between an RWP in a highly religious context of Italy (FdI) and distinctly low-religious context of Eastern Germany (AfD). The contextualization is done diligently and carefully, but still driving the main analytical narrative that disentangles cultural and transcendent references to Christianity and Islam.

The theoretical framework is largely informed by the voluminous body of literature that addresses the connection between RWP and religion, with an emphasis on the RWP literature. While the interplay between nativist and civilizational Christianity in RWP mobilization rhetoric is laudably covered, the implications concerning transcendent religiosity could still be sharpened. In particular, the discussion on “hijacking” religion would benefit from inclusion of Albertina Giorgi’s work, such “Hijack or release? On the heuristic limits of the frame of instrumentalization of religion for discussing the entanglements of populism, religion, and gender” (2022). This would allow the concluding discussions to address the question of whether the nature of religiosity may indeed be escaping the grasp of authorities of religious (transcendental) belief and reorganizing under political (and particularly RWP) authorities.

With a minor revision in this area of the manuscript, I am happy recommend it to be published as a journal article in Religions.

Comments on the Quality of English Language

The theoretical framework is largely informed by the voluminous body of literature that addresses the connection between RWP and religion, with an emphasis on the RWP literature. While the interplay between nativist and civilizational Christianity in RWP mobilization rhetoric is laudably covered, the implications concerning transcendent religiosity could still be sharpened. In particular, the discussion on “hijacking” religion would benefit from inclusion of Albertina Giorgi’s work, such “Hijack or release? On the heuristic limits of the frame of instrumentalization of religion for discussing the entanglements of populism, religion, and gender” (2022). This would allow the concluding discussions to address the question of whether the nature of religiosity may indeed be escaping the grasp of authorities of religious (transcendental) belief and reorganizing under political (and particularly RWP) authorities.

With a minor revision in this area of the manuscript, I am happy recommend it to be published as a journal article in Religions.

Author Response

I would like to thank the reviewer for providing helpful comments and suggestions.

Reviewer 1

1. This reviewer suggests that I reference Giorgi’s (2022) article “Hijack or release? On the heuristic limits of the frame of instrumentalization of religion for discussing the entanglements of populism, religion, and gender.” The reviewer believes that this would help clarify the way in which transcendental religiosity is reorganized under political authorities.

I have taken the reviewer’s advice by including this work in the section that refers to the “hijacking” frame (see page 12). I relegated engagement with this work to a footnote out of concerns for thematic uniformity and argumentative coherence. Although the argument put forth in this article relates to the hijacking frame, I believe that thoroughly unpacking this socio-constructivist perspective could possibly muddy the conceptual focus of the manuscript. As for the reorganization of transcendent religiosity, it is my view that this manuscript already discusses this matter in sufficient detail (see pages 9-12 and 17-18).

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

Strenghts:

Clarity of Argument:
The manuscript presents a logically structured and coherent analysis, effectively linking the concept of civilizational populism to the use of religious symbolism and identity politics. The argument is persuasively developed, demonstrating that religion functions primarily as a cultural marker rather than as a theological or doctrinal resource.

Methodological Transparency:
The study demonstrates commendable transparency in its research design. The use of manifestos, political speeches, and interviews as primary sources is clearly documented, allowing the reader to follow the analytical process and assess the evidentiary basis of the claims.

Excellent Case Selection and Comparative Design: The choice of Germany and Italy is solid. It provides a "most different systems" design on the key independent variable (national religious context). The highly secularized, post-Christian context of East Germany (AfD's heartland) stands in stark contrast to the culturally Catholic, "low-intensity" religious landscape of Italy. This sharp contrast makes the author's findings about how the rhetoric is tailored to each context particularly convincing.

"Belonging without Believing": The application of this concept is a major strength. It perfectly captures the instrumental, identity-based use of Christianity by parties like the AfD, explaining how a secular constituency can be mobilized by religious symbols that function as cultural, rather than theological, markers.

Improvements:

1. The discussion of Marcinkiewicz and Dassonneville (2022) could be balanced by acknowledging the findings of Inglehart and Norris (2019, Cultural Backlash), who demonstrate that PRR support is often concentrated among older and more religious citizens who feel threatened by liberal, post-materialist cultural change. This perspective directly challenges the framing currently adopted in the manuscript and would enrich the analysis. Similarly, Bale and Rovira Kaltwasser (2021, Riding the Populist Wave) highlight how the PRR has capitalized on the mainstream center-right’s adoption of more progressive values—on gender, sexuality, and multiculturalism—by positioning themselves as the “true defenders” of conservative Christian identity. These perspectives, along with the longer intellectual tradition linking PRR success to cultural conflict (e.g., Inglehart 1977; Ignazi 1992; Betz 1994), are essential for providing a more complete account of the religion–PRR nexus. Their absence leaves the theoretical framework somewhat underdeveloped.

2. The distinction drawn between the AfD’s relatively secular orientation and the Fratelli d’Italia’s more explicitly religious rhetoric is a valuable observation. However, the causal mechanisms underlying this divergence remain underspecified. The manuscript would benefit from theorizing (or testing) why such differences emerge. For instance, from a demand-side perspective, politicians often adapt their rhetoric to reflect prevailing societal norms: in Italy, Catholic identity retains cultural legitimacy, encouraging FdI leaders to invoke doctrinal references, whereas in East Germany, one of the most secular regions in Europe, religious appeals would resonate less due to both low religiosity and the historical legacy of Soviet-imposed atheism. In addition, supply-side factors should also be considered. Party leaders may instrumentalize religion strategically, not to mobilize religious voters per se, but to bolster anti-Islamic narratives in which Christianity functions primarily as a symbolic counterpoint. This interpretation could be explicitly linked to Marcinkiewicz and Dassonneville’s (2022) finding that religion per se is not a central motivator for PRR supporters, reinforcing the argument that religious references often serve as cultural markers rather than expressions of faith.

3. Deeper Engagement with the Concept of "Secularization": The paper uses the religious/secular context as its primary explanatory variable, but the concept of "secularization" itself is treated a bit monolithically. The author notes Italy's "low-intensity Catholicism" and Germany's atheism, but could benefit from explicitly engaging with different theories of secularization. For instance, referencing José Casanova's distinction between secularization as (1) differentiation of spheres (accepted everywhere), (2) decline of belief (true in East Germany), and (3) privatization of religion (contested everywhere) could add precision. The FdI's rhetoric is a perfect example of religion's de-privatization, even as belief may be waning. Explicitly framing the analysis this way would strengthen the theoretical underpinnings.

4. The article posits that religion functions primarily as a marker of civilizational identity rather than as a vehicle for doctrinal or theological engagement. While this argument is compelling, it may benefit from anticipating potential counterpoints regarding the instrumentalization of religion for political strategy. Empirically, various contemporary political actors—such as Bolsonaro in Brazil, Meloni in Italy, Ventura in Portugal, Abascal in Spain, the PiS party in Poland, and Putin in Russia—have invoked Christianity (as a component of ethno-nationalist identity). For instance, Viktor Orbán has previously articulated a political strategy oriented toward fostering a form evangelization the population, which might be interesting here. 

Author Response

I would like to thank the reviewer for providing helpful comments and suggestions.

Reviewer 2

1. Reviewer 2 writes that my mention of Marcinkiewicz and Dassonneville (2022) could be balanced with findings from Inglehart and Norris (2019). The reviewer also mentions an important nuance in Bale and Kaltwasser (2021), which he or she believes can improve the manuscript. Other references that the reviewer briefly mentions as works that could be relied upon include Inglehart (1977), Ignazi (1992), and Betz (1994).

 

I agree with the reviewer that these works can provide the manuscript with analytic texture. In connection to Marcinkiewicz and Dassonneville (2022), I have now included findings from Inglehart and Norris (2019), as well as from Bale and Kaltwasser (2021). I have decided to refer to these complications in the discussion (see page 18) rather than in the introduction. In my view, these findings cannot be neatly incorporated into the theoretical framework without disrupting the flow and clarity of the argument. However, I still agree with the reviewer that including these works provides the article with a more complete account of the relation between religion and RWP. To avoid oversimplifying the subject and overstating my contribution, I make it clear that my article does not provide an all-encompassing account of the subject, and refer to findings from these works to point to complications that may be important for future research to pursue. I did not include the works of Inglehart (1977), Ignazi (1992), and Betz (1994) because it is my view that the references to Inglehart and Norris (2019) as well as to Bale and Kaltwasser (2021) were more applicable and better suited to achieve the level of nuance asked for.

 

 

2. In respect to the divergence between the AfD and FdI, the reviewer mentions some lines of theoretical inquiry worth considering, such as politicians using rhetoric to reflect demand-side societal norms. The reviewer also mentions that politicians may use religion strategically not necessarily to mobilize religious voters, but rather to bolster anti-Muslim sentiment and emphasize cultural identity markers. This detail, he or she writes, can be linked to findings in Marcinkiewicz and Dassonneville (2022).

In this revision, I follow the reviewer’s suggestion by making it clear that other potentially catalytic factors are worth considering in light of the examined rhetorical divergence. I also write that political actors may adopt rhetoric that corresponds to certain societal norms of their target audience. Moreover, I include the detail concerning the instrumentalization of religion. I write that this instrumentalization may not necessarily be oriented toward the mobilization of religious voters, but rather to support feelings of anti-Muslim sentiment that links with a sense of cultural identity more so than with faithful conviction. These revisions can be found on page 18. 

3. The reviewer suggests that the concept of secularization could be given more treatment. The reviewer recognizes that I discuss certain facets of religion, such as religious intensity and religious identification, but wonders if I could engage explicitly with Casanova’s distinctions between secularization such as the differentiation between spheres, decline in belief, and privatization.

This article reaches its religious designations (i.e., religious and secular) with a number of religion’s facets in mind, such as religious belief, religious identification, religious practice, religious decline, and religious intensity. However, I agree that the discussion in this article does not thoroughly cover how each distinction within the concept of secularization uniquely relates to the civilizationist frame. This would be a very interesting conceptual detail to pursue; however, I see this line of theorizing as being better suited for a different project. The issue with its incorporation in this paper rests in the fact that each of the overarching themes identified would have to circle back to the number of distinctions within secularization. Doing so effectively would require a great deal of tangential discussion and ultimately distract from the central objective of the paper. Although I do not see this as an unimportant detail, I do not think that a thorough discussion can be neatly incorporated into the paper without hindering the conceptual focus.

However, I do agree that this is a conceptually interesting aspect of the topic to acknowledge. For this reason, I provide a caveat on this point, stating that I do not have space to thoroughly unpack the distinct relation that each dimension of secularization has with the civilizationist frames examined. I take the reviewer’s advice by referencing Casanova, specifically mentioning the differentiation between secular spheres, decline in religious belief, and the privatization of religion (see footnote 4 on page 5).

4. In respect to my assertions concerning civilizational identity, the reviewer states that my argument is compelling, and wonders if it could be enhanced by considering certain counterarguments. Specifically, the reviewer mentions a number of examples in other countries, where religion is instrumentalized for political strategy. The examples the reviewer provides are of politic actors who invoke Christianity as a component of ethnic identity.

 

My argument concerning civilizational identity is not incompatible with the use of Christianity for political strategy/reinforcing identity. I am concerned that it may not be clear to readers how these examples would serve as a counterargument because I do not see much of a logical or conceptual separation between my argument and these examples. For this reason, I have decided to omit this detail.