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Article

Rethinking the Complexities of the Body and Disability: Theological Account

by
Martina Vuk Grgic
1,2
1
Interdisciplinary Institute of Ethics and Human Rights, University of Fribourg, 1700 Fribourg, Switzerland
2
Institute of Moral Theology, KU Linz, 4020 Linz, Austria
Religions 2024, 15(9), 1113; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15091113
Submission received: 30 July 2024 / Revised: 5 September 2024 / Accepted: 11 September 2024 / Published: 14 September 2024
(This article belongs to the Section Religions and Theologies)

Abstract

:
The biological aspect of human embodiment frequently constitutes the primary basis for personal assessment, with an emphasis on rationality, free choice, material well-being, and happiness as fundamental attributes of worth. This perspective is also evident in cultural practices of body modification, which reflect societal standards and identity expression. The promotion of standards of bodily appearance that are often considered unrealistic within contemporary culture has the effect of creating a social environment in which those who do not conform to these standards are rejected and stigmatized. This can include individuals with disabilities, the elderly, or those with chronic illnesses and different bodily appearances. In the majority of cases, the so-called ‘body capital’ culture views the disabled body through the lens of a person’s physical appearance, which is, to a certain extent, associated with a biological dysfunction or reflects a kind of physical disability or vulnerable corporeality. This paper seeks to examine perspectives on the body through the lenses of major discourses surrounding disability, biblical anthropology, and disability theology. These perspectives advocate for the intrinsic dignity and value of the disabled body, challenging contemporary norms and projections upon the body, by underscoring the biographical, interdependent, and spiritual dimensions of human embodiment. This approach stands as an alternative to the reductionist view of the body, which prioritizes physical attributes over a comprehensive understanding of complete personhood.

1. Introduction

The pitfall of the mainstream contemporary position on the body is that the physical body often represents the totality of the human person. This, on the one hand, has been stimulated by the socio-biological tendencies toward the design of the perfectly shaped and healthy body (see Bennett 2016), evident in the biological determinism of liberal practical ethicists (Fletcher 1979; Singer 1997; McMahan 2002), social biologists (Dawkins 2006), and enhancement proponents (Bostrom 2002, 2005). Accordingly, the biological aspect of human beings is a dominant factor in assessing the human, which means that the fundamental worth of a person is constituted by a set of selected human characteristics, including rationality (as indicated by an intelligence quotient at an optimal level), the capacity for free choice, material well-being, and happiness. These are considered indispensable moral requirements for normal human functioning (Dawkins 2006; Singer 2009, pp. 571–74). Conversely, human suffering, pain, disability, and mental or cognitive impairment are regarded as undesirable and negative attributes within this ethical system; as such, they are deemed to possess no positive moral value. Similar tendencies are manifested in socio-cultural variations in body modification, including tattooing, piercing, and cosmetic surgery, which reflect the problem of the on the one hand present cultural tendencies, and on the other hand moral motivations behind these practices and their significance in expressing identity, reclaiming agency, and challenging societal norms as well as the cultural standards and expectations of the desired body (Kalb 1999, pp. 52–60; Featherstone 2000, pp. 1–14). The lack of certain characteristics of such a ‘body capital,’ in turn, creates rejection, shame, and stigma of those whose physical bodies or bodily appearances cannot reach such ‘standards’ (e.g., the sick, elderly, disabled). The perceptions of the body within the culture of body capital, on the one hand, encompass not only one’s self-image and physical well-being but additionally one’s perception of the other. On the other hand, the promotion of the ‘body capitals’ says little or places no significant emphasis on other aspects of human embodiment, such as our relationships with each other and with the world, respect for dignity and responsibility for the other, our inner and spiritual life, etc. Furthermore, the ‘body capital’ ideas frequently evince an aversion to the prospect of being constrained, rejected, exposed to vulnerability, or afflicted by illness, disability, or advanced age (Shildrick and Price 1996, pp. 93–113; Fineman 2020, pp. 17–34; Reynolds 2022). When a person is not considered holistically in her/his embodied totality (e.g., as a physical, socio-relational, and spiritual being), the anthropological gap between, for instance, disabled and non-disabled, or sick and healthy, capable and incapable individuals, becomes even greater. Furthermore, it engenders a heightened sense of division and inequality, while simultaneously fostering the exclusion of individuals whose bodily functions and physical characteristics fall below the established cultural norms and expectations.
This is particularly evident in encounters with a person with disability and impairment or those whose physical body is different from typical bodily appearances. What precisely are the standards of a typical body? How does the contemporary concept of body and personal identity feature the traditional version of the body? What is the disability theology response to such discourses?
The present paper will commence with a brief introduction to the meaning of disability and the perceptions of the disabled body within the mainstream socio-cultural context. This includes the outline of the socio-cultural representations and conceptual frameworks of disability discussed in major discourses on disability. It will move toward preliminary theoretical reflections on some of the key insights on the body from biblical anthropology as evidenced in the Old and New Testaments. The third section will discuss the theology of disability’s position on understanding the body of a person with a disability. The main authors whose work will be examined and presented in this regard include the perspectives of Pia Matthews (Matthews 2013), Thomas Reynolds (Reynolds 2008), Brian Brock (2011, 2019), and John Swinton (2000, 2015).

2. The Context of Socio-Cultural Perceptions of Disability

Over the past four decades, there have been significant developments in the inclusion and empowerment of individuals with disabilities in society. The integration of individuals with disabilities into society has been facilitated by the political activism of people with disabilities, as well as by the multitude of initiatives that have prioritized accessibility, rights, and representation. This progress has also been driven by improvements in accessibility in public spaces, transportation, and practical advancements in rehabilitation therapy, medical engineering, and pharmacology. Besides such insights, the history of disability and contemporary images and reflections associated with disability have demonstrated the rejection, stigma, or lack of representation of the disabled person because of their physical body appearance. This has been evident in many areas, particularly in arts, literature, culture, and society (Snyder and Mitchell 1997; Thomson 1997; Davis 1995).
If we ask an ordinary person what he or she means by disability, probably one of the most common images associated with disability will be the person in a wheelchair, a person with some slow body movement, a person with physical deformity, a person lacking limbs, or a person with a slow intellectual capacity. In a similar tone, the entry of most English dictionaries for disability, such as the Cambridge Online Dictionary (Cambridge University Press n.d.), defines disability as ’illness, injury, or a condition that makes it difficult for a person to perform everyday tasks and activities typical for most people (Cambridge Online Dictionary 2024, s.v. ‘disability’). The Merriam–Webster Dictionary (Merriam–Webster Online Dictionary 2024, s.v. ‘disability’; ‘disabled’) defines a disability as a ‘physical, mental, or cognitive condition that may impair, interfere with, or limit a person’s ability to perform activities or participate in everyday interactions.’ In most frequent comprehension, the person with a disability is viewed through the representation of his/her physical body appearance, which is to a certain extent associated with a biological dysfunction or reflects a kind of physical disability or vulnerable corporeality. Although disability includes a material component inherently tied to individual bodies—for example, the absence of vision, hearing, or mobility—the implications of these biophysical aspects for the individual are largely influenced by socio-political dynamics. Moreover, the social projections on people with disabilities convey a particular status associated with the depicted body, such as dependency, neediness, stigma, or poverty. Such social images and perceptions partially arrived from the biomedical model of disability, where disability for a long time has been understood as illness and pathology (Marks 1999) and a person with a disability as a tragic dependent individual who needs a cure (Rioux 1997, pp. 102–11). According to this model, the cause of disability or intellectual incapacity lies in biological and genetic causes that prevent normal functioning. Disability is a pathology, malformation, or deformation and therefore seeks medical expertise, treatment, or prevention. The most appropriate modern response to invalidity in medical practice is prevention using prenatal diagnostic tests of so-called genetic screening.1
Related to the medical model is a terminology that has been used for people with disabilities, projecting their bodies as unusual, deformed, and atypical. In addition to shaping discriminatory attitudes towards individuals with disabilities, cultural and social perspectives on disability, coupled with the specific usage of the term, have also shaped the mainstream negative attitudes towards disabled people’s bodies. In such regard, persons with disabilities were addressed by the etiology, which categorizes them as unreasonable, deformed, dysfunctional, and crippled creatures (biological etiology); poor and beggars (socio-economic etiology); demonized or paranormal (supernatural etiology); and idiots, mentally ill, lunatics, freaks, weak-minded, and retarded (intellectual etiology) (Braddock and Parish 2001, pp. 11–69; Stiker 1999, pp. 11–121).
What about health issues associated with back pain, high blood pressure, depression, or post-traumatic stress disorder? In what way does disability, on the one hand, differ from other bodily limitations and, on the other hand, the so-called standardized bodies?
The feminist disability writer Susan Wendell, who embodies the experience of chronic pain issues, sets the roots of such a problem in, on the one hand, the objectification and glorification of the perfect body in commercial media and, on the other hand, the rejection, shame, and fear of a deviation from body ideals or from power and control over one’s body (Wendell 1996, pp. 85–116). In her book Rejected Body (1996), she contrasts independence, the ideal of the body, and the demand to control the body with dependency, the rejected and negative body of someone with a disability. The rejected or negative body refers to those aspects of bodily life (e.g., disability), physical appearance (e.g., deviations from the cultural ideals of the body), and bodily experience (e.g., forms of bodily suffering) that cannot be controlled and that are deviating from the norm (Wendell 1996, p. 85). As she puts it:
if the cultural concept of the ‘normal’ body is a young, healthy, energetic, pain-free body with all parts present and a maximum range of graceful movement, then experiences of the negative body need not be confronted and understood. They belong to those with disabilities and illnesses, who are marginalized, not ordinary people, not us.
Similarly, disability studies scholar, Lennard J. Davis posits that the issue of disability is situated not within the person’s body but, rather, within the very construct of normalcy itself, which ultimately creates a problematic situation for the disabled individual (Davis 1995, p. 24). The issue arises from the overemphasis on the concept of “normal” as an ideal and a socio-cultural imperative, which is applied to the majority of the population (Davis 1995, pp. 23–24).
This means that not only does human embodiment surpass merely its biological component, but disability, as a concept, is a broad term and a more complex phenomenon that includes various approaches and models of disability. A more balanced view on understanding disability arrives from a bio-psycho-social model of disability incorporated in the WHO definition and academic field of Disability Studies. According to the World Report on Disability (WHO 2011), disability signifies a complex, dynamic, and multidimensional condition or phenomenon. In such regard, disability is not only a physical but also a bio-psycho-social phenomenon, as well as a human rights issue. (Barnes 2016; Garland-Thomson 2017). It results from interaction between individual, personal, environmental, cultural, and social factors. Other approaches to disability, such as the major discourses within the academic field of Disability Studies, perceive disability as the lens through which the human condition can be fully understood (Shakespeare 2014; Titchkosky and Michalko 2009; Oliver 1990). Disability is seen as an avenue for social research and a catalyst for political action promoting inclusion (Linton 1998). This makes it clear that a person with a disability is not just an imprisoned individual with a corrupt body. Instead, disability and disabled body appearance are also a challenge to contemporary culture and education curricula regarding perceptions of the meaning of the human body, ideas of normality, and the realities of socio-political inclusion. Contrariwise, in a culture where the perfectly shaped body and physical appearance are set as a standard or an average, individuals with disabilities or impairments are frequently perceived as deviants, strangers with corrupted or grotesque bodies. This also entails that the lack of representation of disabled bodies in theater, literature, and the arts is a consequence of the prevailing hegemony of constructing and implicating normalcy as presented in the literature, language, and culture at large, as well as a lack of efforts to rethink the disabled body in the same areas as desired and operational (Davis 1995, pp. 158–59).
This paragraph attempts to argue that disability and a person with impairment cannot be reduced to merely a person’s physical dysfunction. The approach to the theme of disability and the notion of the disabled body demonstrated that its main idea revolves around the concept of the physical body appearance and the related socio-cultural prejudices in understanding disability (Titchkosky and Michalko 2009; Wendell 1996; Davis 1995). The socio-cultural perception of disability and persons with disability, despite the effort of many disability studies scholars and the emergence of social and human rights models in understanding disability, is often associated with the physical appearance of persons with disabled bodies. This is also the reason for the present dichotomy between normal and deviant bodies, rejected and accepted, disabled and abled (Garland-Thomson 2017). Besides the physical appearance of a disabled person’s body, little has been said about the traditional manifestation of the physical body, as well as the body’s spiritual, moral, or personal dimensions. Searching for a more integrated view of the body, the following section aims to outline the main aspects of the body from a Christian perspective.

3. The Preliminary Theoretical Insights on the Body from Scripture and Theology

The theme of the body plays an important role in the biblical anthropology of the Old and New Testaments.2 For instance, in the Oxford Encyclopedia of Bible and Theology, the theme of the body in the Hebrew Bible and related literature is defined as “an anthropology,” rather than as a specific notion. This means that the Hebrew Bible employs descriptive terminology to elucidate the significance of the human body as a living entity. In the absence of a fixed terminology specific to Hebrew anthropology relating to the notion of body, most Old Testament scholars agree that the term best associated with the meaning of man’s earthly bodily presence understood as flesh is the Hebrew word basar (Davidson 1904, p. 188). Basar represents something of man’s earthy presence, which means that in some translations exegetes correlate its meaning with the notion of bone or womb (see Bible works 10; Ex 24:10 in the King James Version; Lam 4:7; Lev 21:11; Nu 6:6,7,11; 19:11,13,16; Hag 2:13; Dt 28:4,11,18,53; 30:9; Job 19:17 in the King James Version; Ps 132:11; Mic 6:7). By using the specific terminology (womb, bone, kidney, and heart), the biblical translator seeks to underline the fleshly meaning of the term basar and associated terminology, rather than the explicit term for the complete body of man. Since there is no explicit word for the “body” in the Old Testament, some bible dictionaries (Alexander and Rosner 2012) point out the intertwined usage of basar (physical body) and nephesh (representing the “living being,” with the corresponding meaning of “soul” in Greek). Additionally, the Anchor Bible Dictionary (Freedman 1992, p. 768) specifically states that what man is, according to Old Testament anthropology, can only be understood holistically. In other words, the Old Testament shows little interest in distinguishing the body (as one part of man) from the soul (Freedman 1992, p. 768). This means that according to Old Testament anthropology, man does not possess a soul and a body, rather, he is both, soul and flesh, full of life and potential activity, while at the same time threatened by illness, transitoriness, and death (Freedman 1992, p. 768).
In biblical anthropology, the concept of the body receives a superior and interior dignity, a perspective that finds its origin in Genesis 1–2. This was subsequently validated and further elaborated upon in St. Paul’s New Testament theology (1 Cor. 12:14–27). In contrast to the holistic body terminology employed in the Old Testament, the New Testament reflects the influence of a Hellenistic worldview, which exhibits slight differences. The significant distinction of this innovation is the differentiation between the terms “body” (soma in Greek) and “flesh” (sarx in Greek). The former is used in the New Testament to refer to the physical form of a human being (Mt 5:29, 30; 6:22, 23, 25; 26:26; Jn 2:21; Acts 9:40; 1 Cor 15:35, 37, 38, 44; Eph 1:23; 2:16; 4:4, 12, 16), while the latter is used to denote the physical existence of human beings (1 Cor 15:39; 2 Cor 7:1). In 1 Corinthians 4:4, 12, 16; 5:23, 30; the term “flesh” (sarx) is used interchangeably with “body” (soma) to denote the physical existence of human beings. Further differentiation includes the dichotomy between the physical body (soma) and the immaterial soul (psyche), a distinction that had significant implications in the New Testament, leading to a range of interpretations concerning the nature of humanity. Accordingly, the body sometimes indicates the whole man (Rom 6:12; Heb 10:5), and sometimes it is considered a morally corrupted instrument of evil (Rom 8:13). Even so, in the Pauline corpus, the same body is not only corrupt but is also incorrupt, spiritual, resurrected; or means the body of Christ (1 Cor 12:13) and the temple of the Holy Spirit (1 Cor 3:16). According to the Anchor Bible Dictionary explanation (Freedman 1992, p. 768), the “body” designates in the same way the whole man who can be raised after death (Matt 27:52; Acts 9:40; John 2:21; Rom 8:11; 1 Cor 6:14); and the soul is its life-power, continually renewed by eating and drinking (Matt 6:25). The New Testament not only speaks of a distinction between body and soul, soma and sarx, but what is of more importance, the notion of the body is given a new meaning. This includes the body as the temple, the body of Christ, the Eucharistic Body, the resurrection of the body, and the church as the body of Christ in Colossians and Ephesians. Furthermore, New Testament anthropology associates the concept of the body with both literal and metaphorical interpretations (for example, the body as the Church) as well as theological interpretations (such as the Eucharistic body) (Balentine 2015, pp. 89–91). Despite, on the one hand, the distinction between spiritual body and natural body (soma and sarx) known to Paul, and on the other hand, the Old Testament body as the physical wholeness of a living organism, biblical anthropology demonstrates that body, even as a merely human (physical) natural entity, has dignity, originality, conferred upon it by the Creator, who shaped it out of earth and glorified it by the incarnation of Christ, the sinless One, though born of a woman. In Christendom, the divine body besides being the totality of beautiful and beneficial forces, embodies cruelty and destruction (Jesus on the Cross) in the body of Christ. In giving his earthly body to many, Christ’s body became a source of unity for all individuals, who were helped, loved, and approached by Jesus (Eph 2:16; 3:6; 4.4 and 1 Cor, 6:15). As stated earlier, the biblical anthropology of the body was in most cases constitutive of the development of theological anthropology. Systematic development of the notions of body and soul in later periods influenced the development of moral theology’s view of the body, with certain interpretations remaining common in our day. The modern period has been influenced by a scientific method and empiricism, and the physical body separated from the soul became an object of scientific research. The view of the body as a spiritual entity was pushed to the margins. As a reaction to these forces, which continue to influence modern thinking on body-soul dualism, the modern theological discourses became particularly interested in remedying such a situation. The integral anthropology that implies a view of the body as a physical and spiritual whole emerged with personalism. The body within such a view represents embodiment, spatial-time expression of oneself, the presence of the other, and the possibility of sharing (mutual dependence) a relationship with the world and society. But also, the body is the limit, a sign of spatial time constraint that implies pain, disease, and death. In addition to the abovementioned, little concern within the theological and biblical discourse, as we can see, has been given to the systematic approach of the disabled body, physical deformity, representation of the body in the wheelchair, etc. For this reason, research within theological ethics and anthropology demands the inclusion of discourse on the disabled body.

4. The Perspective of the Body in Selected Disability Theology Discourses

Theological discourse on disability has emerged as an area of interest, with scholars seeking to perceive the disability, not only as a material and anthropological entity but also as a spiritual and eschatological one (Brock and Swinton 2012). In such a regard, the theological approach has been particularly important in emphasizing the personal aspects and intrinsic dignity of the disabled body. This does not mean that implications of theological discussion on the disabled body represent the rescue of a deformed and limited body within the contemporary context. Rather, it offers an alternative perspective on the subject, providing a corrective and an extension of existing views. The body puts us into a relationship with others but also reflects our image of ourselves and ultimately—of God. In light of such a perspective, the following section will consider three selected approaches to the notion of the body within disability theology: Pia Matthews’s (2013) reflection on John Paul II’s personalism; Thomas Reynolds’s approach to the cult of normalcy (2008) and culture of the body; and Brian Brock (2011, 2019) and John Swinton’s (2000, 2015) integration of the body reflected within 1 Cor 12:12-30.

4.1. Pia Matthews’s Biographical and Biological Aspects of the (Disabled) Body

Pia Matthews, in her book on profound intellectual disability, explores the status of people with profound disabilities addressed as “apparently non-acting persons” (Matthews 2013).3 Among other themes, within a book, Matthew’s inquiry brought a closer look at the contemporary perception of people with disabled bodies and is critical towards streams within liberal bioethics that reduce all of the human to biology.4 This according to Matthews, leads to the problem of the two quite opposite views on the body: the distinction between biological and biographical, which reflects the impact of Cartesian dualism of res cogitans—res extensa and Manichean myth integrated into a contemporary mentality regarding people with disability. Matthews addresses that very often are people with disability or profound intellectual disability seen through the perspective of their physiology, which simultaneously reduces all of their personhood to a pure biological material (Matthews 2013). In such a perspective, a disabled person is seen through his/her body, almost as imprisoned in the body or identified with a physical impairment. In another perspective from a similar ground, people with disabilities are often associated with angelic images, which detach them from their earthly bodily existence and place them into a realm of transcendence. Matthews highlights such a problem arguing that the biographical is replaced by the biological and the biological becomes the main orientation when discussing the status of a person. Both views are problematic as they disembody a person from his/her dignity and integration. This means that the encounter with a person with disability seen through the lens of, on the one hand, embodied dualism (res cogitans vs. res extensa) or complete disembodiment (Manichean mentality) produced a problematic view of the body reduced to the biological and detaching a person from a fully integrated subjectivity and intrinsic dignity. Persons with a disability, particularly with a profound intellectual disability, not only fail to fulfill the criteria of personhood proposed by modern liberal bioethics (cognitive capacities, self-determination, and self-consciousness of an individual), but such a view reduces a person with a disability to his/her biological life and detaches the person from biographical life (Matthews 2013, p. 82). Accordingly, not only is the person reduced to materialism (perceived as flesh, physical material) and division (res cogitans and res extensa), but the historicity, dignity, and narrative or biography of a person are lost. To reduce all of the personal to biological for Matthews means that a person is reduced to materialistic qualification and gradually deprived of his/her status as the person and instead described with the status of merely a physical being (biological material) that ultimately results in a status of a self-imprisoned individual. Or, as otherwise stated by Matthews:
The person with a disability is often seen as a self-imprisoned individual in a broken body, or as in the case of profound intellectual disability, as merely a human body, lacking the component of “person”.
Matthews’s suggestion of a holistic evaluation of the body that includes biological and biographical aspects of a person can potentially propose a solution to overcoming Cartesian dualism and Manichean myth intertwined in the contemporary approach to disability. Accordingly, no human individual should be subordinated as a pure means or pure instrument, as each has a value and each human being is a person in intersubjective communion with others and an active agent, due to his/her intrinsic dignity (Matthews 2013, p. 55). As a corrective, she suggested that seeing the body through a biographical perspective means that the body asserts the definition of its historicity, including being created in God’s image. This perception not only transcends a materialistic view of the body and combats its objectification but re-establishes the truth of the body as the Temple of the Holy Spirit (1 Cor 6:19). Historicity invokes awareness of the “possession” of the body, participation, and engagement with the world, with common brothers and sisters, and ultimately with God. This way of communication, as Matthews shows, includes a person’s dignity, sensory experience, interdependency, and body language, which are profoundly human activities (Matthews 2013, p. 90). Moreover, the biographical detaches a person with a disability from the medical model of disability that reduces persons with disabilities to the subject of disease or physical deformity. Rethinking the human person in the light of his/her biological and biographical life not only underlines the person’s embodiment (physical appearance) but also sees the person from the perspective of his/her historicity, narrative, dignity, value, and agency. The integration of biological and biographical combats an image of the physically disabled as imprisoned individuals. Such thinking could be a significant contribution towards understanding the person with a profound disability as a complete agent with an integration of a biological and biographical lifeline.

4.2. Cult of Normalcy and the Body Capital—Thomas Reynolds’s Perspective

In the first part of the discussion, we have already noticed that the perfectly shaped body within Western societies often sets the standard values and the set of body functions as a normal way of being (Wendell 1996; Davis 1995). This impacts not only desires for a particular body shape, maintained through the gym and other un-realistic images, but also excludes persons with disabilities or a non-typical body who cannot compete with such a standard. In this section, I will expand the argument by looking at Thomas Reynolds’s critique of the so-called body capital and the cult of normalcy within his book Vulnerable Communion (Reynolds 2008). In Reynolds’s view, the “cult of normalcy and body capital” represents the idealized standard of the perfectly shaped body, which conforms to prevailing social and cultural norms. Body capital, according to Reynolds, addresses the value of the body and its material abilities, related to the purchases of recognition by others or acquiring worth in the presence of others. Therefore, body capital is a value engineered by dominant social institutions governed by disciplinary technologies such as education, medicine, social policy, and culture (Reynolds 2008, p. 58). Bodily features such as beauty, productivity, and performance are in such realms highly accepted, desired, and valued, becoming standardized. Therefore, Reynolds is critical towards such situating them under the umbrella of a cult of normalcy (Reynolds 2008, p. 179). The cult of normalcy, first of all, is an attribute related to the previously mentioned body capital. Secondly, normalcy does not only include a perfectly shaped body, but also a standardized equivalent for the criterion of reason or, put differently, a desired cognitive efficiency (Reynolds 2008, pp. 179–83). The cult of normalcy as socially constructed includes social control by “mainstreaming body capital and at the same time exclusion of those who lack desired” body capital (Reynolds 2008, p. 179). What is frequently assumed as normal according to this strategy depends on able-bodied or non-disabled body functions. People with disabilities whose cognitive capacities or whose physical body form is often perceived as deformed, do not correspond to these requirements and are frequently at the bottom of this body normality scale as they do not fit into the body capital scheme. The cult of normalcy, on the one hand, represents an ideal or, on the other hand, an antithesis to a dysfunctional body. In other words, the body represents the person. Problems arise when the cult of normalcy as a social construct represents what it means to be a person, feel good, or flourish. On the contrary, the encounter with differently shaped bodies and intellectual functions for such a socio-anthropological system produces fear, insecurity, and inconsistency. The body of the disabled person is considered abnormal and deformed, as personal wholeness is often qualified according to his/her physical appearances. The cult of normalcy not only represents a closed system of arbitrary and biased norms and ideals but is unable to see a person beyond her/his disability. The management of body capital is not only exclusive of weakness and vulnerability as well as impairment or disability but also individual distinctiveness and particularities. Besides acknowledging body capital and the cult of normalcy as a contemporary problem of the denial of, on the one hand, disability and, on the other, vulnerability, it also makes it impossible to encounter a disabled person as a person with gifts and qualities, or as a possible friend or different other. The problem with the cult of normalcy or body capital anthropology has its consequences in the way we understand the dignity of those humans who are more vulnerable or disabled. The enforcement of a sense of normalcy engenders a perception of fear about the constraints of one’s capabilities and the possibility of rejection or non-acceptance.
As a reaction to the cult of normalcy and body capital, Reynolds echoes anthropology in which the categories of dysfunctional, disabled, and vulnerable bodies become fundamental (Reynolds 2008, p. 80). This anthropology includes the categories of differently shaped bodies or atypical bodies when considering the dysfunctional, disabled, and vulnerable. Reynolds contrasts the able-body capital and rational autonomy with considerations of disability and body, independence, and self-sufficiency with dependency. His critique of body capital and the cult of normalcy indicates the necessity of acknowledging the dignity of each person, particularly a person with impairment or disability, as worthy and desired.

4.3. “Body Matters”—Brian Brock’s and John Swinton’s Reading of the Body from a Perspective of 1 Cor 12:12–30

Paul’s text in 1 Cor 12:12–30 provides many insights into the notion of the body and serves many purposes within theological reasoning (Thiselton 2000; Hays 2011; Wright 2004). In addition to employing pneumatologically, eschatological, Christological, and ecclesiological perspectives on the body, the text itself has been the subject of scholarly disputes and disagreements and has a prominent place in disability theology reflection on the body (Yong 2010, pp. 76–93; Swinton 2000, 2015; Brock 2011, 2019). The 1 Cor 12:12–30 passage, according to Brock and Swinton’s interpretation, aims to give a theological account of social inclusion and interdependency of all its members. It is often presented as a tool for working towards social inclusion, where the body is presented as a social and spiritual reality.
Beyond the many reflections on the discourse on the body within 1 Cor 12:12–30, less adequate attention has been given to such topics as disability, Alzheimer’s disease, dementia, or any other sort of visible physical difference. I believe that an analysis of 1 Cor 12:12–30 can provide valuable insights into the discourse on the relationship between the body and disability. Not only does the human body become a visible spiritual reality, but within the perspective of the body of Christ, 1 Cor 12:12–30 offers a reconstructed pneumatology of the subject of the disabled body (Brock 2011, pp. 351–76). The concept of “spiritual bodies” in 1 Cor 12:12–30 within disability theology becomes a remarkable statement. The 1 Cor 12:12–30 passage, in the light of disability theology, sees within a body not only biological material but a spiritual dimension that exceeds merely material and physical understandings and conceptions of it. In developing a theology of the body from the perspective of 1 Cor 12, Brock (2011, pp. 351–76) and Swinton (2015) confront the reader with the experience of people whose bodies are considered genetically or physically different. The argument put forth by Brock (2011) involves a critique of the Western tradition, which places a greater emphasis on the material and the intellectual aspects of the body in comparison to the spiritual dimension. Swinton (2015) asserts that a body is not merely an organic entity; it also has a spiritual dimension.
Accordingly, the first reason the body matters is because the body of Christ is not a metaphor; it is a physical reality, whose essence is its diversity and unification in Christ (Swinton 2015, p. 230). Second, it matters because of our mutual interdependence as creatures; and third, it matters as an occasion for friendship, since friendship is something we do with our bodies (Swinton 2000, 2015, p. 228). Speaking about the body of Christ, Swinton highlights the integrity and importance of every member, and in terms of the social perspective, he emphasizes that from the viewpoint of the Body of Christ, there is no I, only we (Swinton 2015, p. 230). “I becoming we” and “we becoming part of I” show how those who are baptized are interconnected. Because we are in Christ, we are who we are not as individuals, but as Christians (Swinton 2015, pp. 230–31), and we are not who we may think we are, or we choose to be, but who we are in Christ. How does a person with a disabled body matter to the community of Christians? In his emphasis on the importance of the “body”, Swinton explains that the body matters, based on the fact that we are all Christ’s body, and for this reason, our body, viewed from a Christlike perspective, matters more than it matters individually. This emphasizes the corporate dimension in reading 1 Cor 12:12–27; the body of Christ is a place to belong because diversity is formed in unity with Christ and so is in unity with Christ’s body. Participation in and belonging to the Body of Christ through baptism means, as already stated, we do not own our bodies, but we belong to the Body of Christ as Christians and are therefore interconnected (Swinton 2015). In the Christian context, an encounter with a body that differs from the norm is not a significant issue, as the individual is accepted equally as a member of the body of Christ, despite the differences in bodily form. Brock confronts the reality of the social world with the reality of the work of the Spirit as a stimulus to rethinking this challenging difference that disability places in front of us (Brock 2011, pp. 351–76). And this difference is celebrated within 1 Cor 12:12–30. Therefore, for Brock, the idea is to refocus attention upon inward realities as a work of the Spirit, while also emphasizing that the difference made by 1 Cor 12:12–30 is not something negative but something extraordinary. Related to that is the assumption that a person with a disability is a gift and that s/he possesses a gift to offer to humanity (Brock 2011, pp. 351–76). A person with a disability, therefore, with the help of the Holy Spirit can communicate with God as his/her Creator, despite cognitive incapacities or physical deformities. God does not look at what is outside, but what is within the person. Brock’s reading of 1 Cor 12:12–13 presents a theological account of Paul’s critical polemic with the members of the Church in Corinth. Brock sees Paul’s 1 Cor 12:13 polemic on the body “as an entity, like the political community, in which discrete entities must be kept talking to one another and working to support one another.” This further leads to his theological argument for raising awareness of the “mental bridge” that in 1 Cor 12:13 Paul makes between the physical body and the community—the body of Christ. (Brock 2011, p. 362). In this context, Brock underscores the significance of communication within the Christian community, emphasizing the importance of inclusivity for all members. This notion aligns with Paul’s teachings for the early Christians in Corinth and should remain a crucial aspect of the modern Church as a representation of the body of Christ. All the body is connected as a nexus, so distancing any member does not make for completeness. In light of this, it can be argued that each member is of equal value and irreplaceable for the optimal functioning of the entire body. This means that a person with a disability is not a burden or an abnormal individual but, first of all, a gift. The body is presented as a work of the Holy Spirit, and the parts of the body are perceived as interdependent gifts. These gifts are not the possession or capacities of one individual alone. They are freely given, and their purpose is achieved when the common good within the body, that is, the Church, is exemplified. Every person is a bearer of these spiritual gifts, whatever their visible and physical appearance. Every person is, above all, marked by purpose, as the gifts have teleological implications. Highlighting the importance of the body within 1 Cor 12:12–30 not only as a physical entity but by recalling its spiritual and socio-relational components, Swinton and Brock counterbalance the neo-liberal premises, which see disability and physical deformity as failures and tragedies. Their interpretation is also a reminder of the often-forgotten fact of the place that people with disabilities have within the Church (Swinton 2015, p. 229). 1 Cor 12:12–30, concerning disability, offers a countercultural conception of the spiritual body, contrasted with modern social and biological body theories. Intertwined with the idea of interdependency, the body does matter for the common belonging (Swinton 2015) and as a distribution of the gifts of the Spirit (Brock 2011).

5. Conclusions

Looking at the body, and specifically at the disabled body from different perspectives such as mainstream socio-cultural disability discourses, biblical theology, and disability theology—expands and at the same time challenges the socio-cultural stereotyping images and prejudices of the disabled body and persons with disability physical appearance.
The first part of the article emphasized that despite many efforts of socio-cultural tendencies and inclusion policies for people with disabilities in the last four decades, the identity of a person with a disability for a mainstream population is still perceived according to disabled people’s mental and physical abilities. Their embodied physical differences are seen as undesirable and often reduced to an object of fear, rejection, or abnormality (Wendell 1996; Davis 1995). Given the interpretation of the body from another perspective, the article draws attention to the awareness that the identity of a person with a disability is not necessarily linked to mere physical identity. Whereas the contemporary ideas surrounding the body include social and cultural perceptions, the human body in a biblical sense, is perceived from a more holistic perspective that often goes beyond material appearances. This, in a nutshell, means that besides the biological structure, the person is understood as (a) biographical, which more than anything includes history, but also the integrity of the body (sarx, soma) and psyche/soul; (b) the human body is also a sign of vulnerable interdependency and limit; and (c) as a part (member) of Christ’s body that is the Church, an indispensable and irreplaceable member of this belonging. The value that derives from this articulation overpasses the biologically determined nature of a person and moves towards a more personalistic view. Similarly, the concept of disability encompasses more than merely the physical form. While biological factors undoubtedly contribute to impairment, and in some cases, the impairment may be a defining feature of disability, the human being is a transcendental, interdependent, and limited entity. Consequently, this is a reminder that individuals with disabilities, like all others, must be regarded in their bodily integrity and in a holistic manner, rather than being viewed as determined by their physical bodily appearance.
Following such a perspective, the discussion of the body emphasizes the importance of the anthropological aspect and personal identity. This identity is not defined solely in terms of the physical appearance. Rather than regarding the body as a mere biological entity, the relation to the body can be understood to be more complex. It encompasses history, relationships with others, and the person’s identity as well as its metaphysical orientation. In other words, the body can be defined as a “complex integrity”, which encompasses personal authenticity. In contrast to the view of the body as a mere capital or part of the cult of normality, theological emphasis on the body implies a sign of vulnerable interdependence and reciprocity.
Additionally, in the context of religious communities and the Church, which may be conceived as the Body of Christ, a person with a disability occupies (or should) a unique and indispensable position. This example invites us to view the body, including the body with disabilities, not merely as an object of compassion and assistance, but as a member of the Body of Christ and, indeed, as the temple of the Holy Spirit. Such an understanding challenges the conventional wisdom and practices of not only popular culture but also pastoral care alike, which not so rarely reduces persons with disabilities to objects of pity and charity. Overall, the article attempts to contribute to a better understanding of the issues of disability and disabled person embodiment. The argument can be made that theology tends to reframe the perception of the disabled body as a form of originality and value. Furthermore, theological analysis of the body and disability can be seen as a means of challenging and rectifying the prevailing cultural attitudes on the matter. Yet, this cannot be done without conjunction with other social and cultural institutions that are striving to enhance the quality of life for individuals with disabilities and to foster their integration and visibility within the contemporary Church and society.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Data Availability Statement

No new data were created or analyzed in this study. Data sharing is not applicable to this article.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflict of interest.

Notes

1
The medical model has been contrasted with the social model which remedies the overall approach to disability and allows better inclusion of people with disability into society. In contrast to the medical model, the social model of disability asserts that disability is not a personal pathology. Rather, it is a societal problem, perpetuated by a system that degrades, excludes, and marginalizes people with disabilities. The social model of disability distinguishes between impairment (the physical condition) and disability (the societal barriers faced by individuals). The social model is critical of social and cultural prejudice towards people with disabilities. It views disability as a social barrier and not as an individual problem or tragedy as the medical model does. The social model starts from the position of social activism and an appeal for equality.
2
As engagement with a profound exegetical and contextual analysis is beyond the scope of this discussion, I will only provide a few key insights into the general understanding of the body within biblical anthropology, to grasp its fuller meaning from the perspective of the disabled body, and in contrast with the modern idea of the body.
3
Matthews’s argument relies on a variety of John Paul II’s theological and ethical writings; it is beyond the scope of this article to present all possible particularities of the book, and I only extricate those that, in my opinion, speak most profoundly and contribute to the overall discourse on body and disability.
4
This discussion for instance includes a reference to (McMahan 2002; Singer 2009; Fletcher 1979; Engelhard 1986; Rachels 1986).

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Vuk Grgic, M. (2024). Rethinking the Complexities of the Body and Disability: Theological Account. Religions, 15(9), 1113. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15091113

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