Jewish Nationalism in Israel: A Measurement

Abstract

Since Israel’s founding, being a “Jewish state” has been central to its self-representation. However, Israel has struggled to identify what that means. This article examines the strength of Jewish nationalism in Jewish Israeli public opinion. It draws on a recent survey of 200 Jewish Israelis for a qualitative and quantitative investigation of public responses to religious nationalist statements. These findings offer a utilizable survey short scale for measuring Jewish nationalism and to understand how Jewish Israelis are interpreting these statements. This study is a necessary step to empirically evaluating religious nationalism in the “Jewish state”.

1. Introduction

A bourgeoning literature examines religious nationalism around the world (Grzymala-Busse 2019; Juergensmeyer 1993). Religious nationalism is the belief that a country belongs to a particular religious community within its population and that being part of that religion is part of being a member of the nation. Substantial work has examined the rise of Christian nationalism (Perry et al. 2018; McDaniel et al. 2011) and Hindu nationalism (Hansen and Roy 2022; Van der Veer 1994). This literature increasingly relies on quantitative survey studies. This article extends this work to examine Jewish nationalism (JN) in Israel.

That Israel is a Jewish state is “core” to the “Israeli ethos” (Oren 2019, p. 18). The Declaration of Independence and Basic Law of 2018 use the phrase, and the latter asserts a “religious” right to “self-determination” that “is unique to the Jewish people”. This suggests JN is prevalent among Jewish Israelis. However, although religious nationalist beliefs among Jewish Israelis is noted in prior scholarship (Juergensmeyer 1993; Rieffer 2003; Grzymala-Busse 2019), JN has not received similarly rigorous empirical attention as other religious nationalisms.

A necessary component for quantitative analyses of Jewish nationalism is a JN measure. This article draws on a recent survey of 200 Jewish Israelis for a qualitative and quantitative investigation of Jewish Israelis’ responses to religious nationalist statements. This survey included common questions in the religion and nationalism literature (Grzymala-Busse 2019; Whitehead and Perry 2020; Stewart et al. 2023; Karpov et al. 2012). In addition to the quantitative responses, the survey included open response options, which contextualize the interpretation of their close-ended responses. Using the quantitative and qualitative data, concise and conceptually valid scales for Jewish nationalism can be included in future surveys.

Researchers can use these statements to gauge religious nationalism in Israeli rhetoric and policy. Although the Jewish state label implies widespread religious nationalism, these surveys demonstrate that that is far from the case. Respondents diverge in their preferences and beliefs around key religio-nationalist tenets. As such, religious nationalism is a politically salient belief that presents to varying degrees within the Israeli public.

This study is part of a larger conversation on religious nationalism, including in Israeli politics. Here, the focus is on developing a survey-usable measurement tool for evaluating Jewish nationalism. This tool will facilitate future research on Jewish nationalism that can adapt and expand on the contemporary quantitative religious nationalism literature that is currently dominated by scholarship on Christian Nationalism. This will also facilitate empirical investigations of Israeli politics.

2. Religious Nationalism and Israel

Religious nationalism is the belief that a country was founded by and for a religious community (Broeren and Djupe 2023). The focus “religion” can be more conceptual than practical. For instance, “the ‘Christianity’ of Christian nationalism does not necessarily refer to orthodox theological beliefs as much as a conservative ethno-cultural and political orientation” (Perry et al. 2022, p. 8). Notably, the fusion of religious identity and nation is “conceptually and empirically distinct from religiosity, whether defined as religious observance, affiliation, or belief” (Grzymala-Busse 2015, p. 24). Thus, even non-religious individuals can endorse religious nationalism.

States can build on popular religious nationalism. They can also intentionally cultivate it. Israeli politicians and school curricula are designed to inculcate the “ethos” of a “Jewish state” as promoting a Jewish majority and promoting Jewish values (Oren 2019). These regimes can also incorporate religious symbols into state symbols and programs to create a mutually reinforcing paradigm (Grzymala-Busse 2015). Grzymala-Busse notes that states have adopted crosses and used religious occasions for state festivals to build up religious nationalism.

Religious nationalists are more likely to be conservative and authoritarian (Perry et al. 2022; Djupe et al. 2023). Religious nationalists assign increased moral authority to religious leaders’ policy pronouncements (Grzymala-Busse 2015) and are more likely to desire to enact religious precepts (McDaniel et al. 2011). It has also been linked to ethnoracial boundary enforcement (Djupe et al. 2023; Perry et al. 2018). This can link to anti-minority preferences (Van der Veer 1994; McDaniel et al. 2011). Religious nationalism is distinct from pride in one’s country, although religious nationalists may view themselves as more patriotic.

This study is not the first to identify religious nationalism in Israel. Appeals to Christian nationalism in the United States often draw on the idea of Jewish nationalism, even asserting that America is a new Jerusalem (Perry et al. 2018; Gorski 2019). Rieffer (2003) and Grzymala-Busse (2019) specifically namecheck Israel as a case of contemporary religious nationalism: “we see people not only demanding their own nation and sovereignty, but asserting that their nation is religiously based. They want political autonomy and recognition of their religion” (Rieffer 2003, p. 225).

Scholars have argued that “early Zionism was essentially a non-religious phenomenon”, so those figures were not engaging in religious nationalism (Chowers 2024, p. 10; see also Shumsky 2019; Graubert 2023). However, decades of debate and tension and shifting views have demonstrated that even if any number of the early figures were not actuated by religious nationalism—and some were—religious nationalism is now an accepted phenomenon (Oren 2019). Contemporary “Israel is a very different polity than was envisioned by any of the streams of Zionism”, including changes in “the meaning of what might be called Israeliness” (Kimmerling 2001, pp. 1–2). That includes seeing Judaism—or the idea of Judaism—as fundamental to Israel or Israeliness, at least for some people.

Religious nationalism in Israel builds on a concept of Judaism as a religion. In addition to asserting a “religious” right to the state—a sentiment echoed by many survey respondents—the Declaration references the “Rock of Israel”, a biblical reference for G-d and the “prophets of Israel”. Furthermore, Jewish Israelis may see Jewishness more religiously, despite the prevalence of secular identifiers. Della Pergola et al. (2019, p. 65) explain that “Israeli and American Jews diverge as well on their notions of Jewish peoplehood: Israelis perceive Jewish identification more often as religion and as feeling Jewish and belonging to the Jewish people, Americans more often as culture and responsibility to take care of other Jews”. A Pew Research Center survey in 2014 showed Israeli Jews were heavily divided about whether “being Jewish” is “mainly a matter of religion” (22%), “mainly a matter of ancestry” (35%), “mainly a matter of culture” (10%), or some combination thereof (32%) (Cooperman et al. 2016). Ultimately, it has not been entirely agreed upon whether the “Jewish” state is an ethnic or religious identity (Yadgar 2020; Hahn Tapper et al. 2023). Della Pergola et al. (2019, p. 68) anticipate “a gradual centrifugal move away from consensus across the Jewish population worldwide”. The term Jewish has variably been applied for religion, ethnicity, and race (Gonzalez-Lesser 2020). Thus, not all Jewish identifiers are actively religious; many even identify as secular (hiloni). There are substantial disagreements within the Israeli public on what role citizens want religion to play in the state.

The Israeli government intentionally inserts religious symbols and language into state content. For instance, the state flag and the state seal include religious iconography. Religious holidays are treated as state holidays. Although the parliament is not modeled on the prophetic history, the name Knesset was chosen to invoke the religion. New IDF recruits are taken to Masada, where Jewish zealots seized a Roman garrison, and they are sworn in at the Western Wall. The state can then use religious history and iconography as self-justification.

While religious nationalists are more likely to be politically conservative, not all religious nationalism comes from the right wing. Mapai and Labor headed the Israeli government for decades. These governments, including the founding period, laid some of these foundations in drafting state documents, forming school curricula, and invoking religious symbols and language in political entities and processes (Oren 2019). It is not merely a function of contemporary politics or the political right.

This propensity does not mean that no other kind of nationalism exists in Israel. The 5th module of the Comparative Survey of Electoral Systems asked “how important do you think the following is for being truly Israeli … very important, fairly important, not very important, or not important at all?” Of the Jewish Israeli respondents, 50.3% saw ancestry as very/fairly important while 48.1% said not very/not at all (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems—Module 5 2023). This implies ethno-nationalist sentiments. A total of 41.8% said being born in Israel was important; 56.5% said not very/not important at all. These respondents seem to evince civic nationalism. A total of 61.3% saw observing local customs as important, while 36.5% did not see that as important. This could reflect a civic sensibility; however, if those customs are religion-based, like lighting candles on the Sabbath or fasting on Yom Kippur, then it may not be a civic nationalism indicator. Similarly, 85.9% saw speaking Hebrew as important. Only 13.5% did not assign it substantial importance. A national language is often a secular, civic indicator. However, the choice of Hebrew in Israel was religiously inflected, a fact which made the selection controversial among the early Zionists because of the religious impression it would impart for the state (Shumsky 2019; Graubert 2023). Unfortunately, the survey did not ask about the importance of religion to Israeliness, which would reflect Jewish nationalism. Thus, the rates cannot be compared directly. The CSES shows that other forms of nationalism exist in the public alongside the evident religious nationalism. In fact, they suggest that citizens even endorse multiple nationalisms simultaneously. It is nonetheless hard to separate religion. Ultimately, as Chowers (2024, p. 12) put it, “The politics of the Israeli state seems to be increasingly shaped by an exclusive, ethnic-religious nationalism”.

This study, in discussing Jewish nationalism, does not argue that all Israelis are Jewish—they are not, despite the “unique” rights in the Basic Law—or that all Jews are religiously observant. The public, though, may make assumptions about tacit religiosity. A Dati Mizrahi man (45–54) in the Center (#71) respondent in the survey even claimed, “In Israel, even the secular keep the Jewish tradition”. Furthermore, it does not argue that religious nationalism is singularly the province of religious Jews. Religiosity and religious nationalism are distinct belief systems, and the divergence between them is politically pertinent (Rieffer 2003; Whitehead and Perry 2020). These intersecting but not coterminous identities make understanding the scope of Jewish nationalism more, not less, important.

The idea that religious nationalism is widespread in Israel—as part of the “ethos”—poses an empirical challenge. To say that everyone is a religious nationalist is not to deny the phenomenon. However, without identifying variation, it is difficult to examine the predictors or socio-political outcomes of religious nationalism. Just because a belief is common—or because a belief is embedded in foundational texts of a country, like Israel’s Declaration of Independence—does not mean that everyone accepts it:

“within Israel itself a sizable contingent of politically active Jews regard their homeland, at best, as the expression of an incomplete form of religious nationalism. Although Israel is hospitable to Jewish refugees, it is essentially a secular state, one that follows the rules and mores of European and American society, and that leaves many Jewish religious nationalists deeply dissatisfied”.

(Juergensmeyer 1993, p. 63)

Being Jewish, being Israeli, and being religious nationalist are not co-extensive identities. In that case, the belief system can be socially and politically salient but far from politically neutral. A first step in such an evaluation is measuring JN beliefs.

3. Measuring Religious Nationalism

Many metrics have been proposed for assessing religious nationalism. Smith and Adler (2022, p. 2) assert that the quantitative religious nationalism literature “is simultaneously under- and overtheorized”. Researchers should consider both the dimensional properties of their survey components and their theoretical resonance with the underlying construct.

The Baylor six-item scale is ubiquitous (Perry et al. 2018; McDaniel et al. 2011; Broeren and Djupe 2023). Djupe et al. (2023, p. 13) argue that “Americans appear to know what the questions mean”. However, “the items used in this scale were not developed with the intention of measuring Christian nationalism but rather to capture views on the separation of church and state, a related but narrower topic” (Smith and Adler 2022, p. 6). Davis (2023, p. 7) argues the scale actually has two components: whether the US is a Christian nation for Christian people and “attitudes toward public displays of religion”. Another common tool asks about the extent to which “it is important to be [religion] to be [nationality]” (Grzymala-Busse 2019, 2015; Sherkat et al. 2023). This item targets, at a minimum, a role for religion in nationalism, if not singularly religious nationalism.

A few of these questions have analogs in existing survey studies in Israel. For instance, the Israel National Election Study in November 2022 asked respondents, “In your opinion, should the government of Israel see to it that public life in the country is conducted according to Jewish religious tradition or not?” A total of 31.3% of Jewish Israelis said the “government should definitely see to it”, and 15.7% said it should “probably see to it”. In 2020, the rates were 26.1% and 26.1%, respectively. The 2023 wave of the Israel Polarization Panel asked about support for the following statement: “Jewish interests must be promoted over any universal value”. A total of 17.3% “very much support” that idea, and 22.6% support it. When asked whether “The state ought to grant the Jewish population privileges over the Arab population”, 15.9% “very much support” that idea, and 19.6% support it. In their 1995 article, Shamir and Shamir (1995) (107) note that “the most basic notion of Zionism—Israel as a Jewish state with a Jewish majority” surpassed Jewish Israelis’ desire for peace or democracy; they also identified a 1988 survey showing 97% of Jewish Israelis prioritized maintaining “a Jewish majority” in the state (111). Oren (2019) reiterates this pattern in her historical analysis; “Israel as a Jewish state is a central theme of the [Israeli] ethos” and “the goal of maintaining a Jewish majority” is portrayed among Israel’s “sacred values”, even above peace or democracy (5). These responses indicate that, while many Jewish Israelis self-identify as secular, Jewish religious nationalist beliefs are common but not omnipresent in Israel.

However, the widespread use of certain measures in the religious nationalism literature does not guarantee their generalizability or theoretical certitude, as has been noted in the quantitative Christian nationalism literature. How do respondents address these questions? These elements should be considered when formulating metrics.

4. Materials and Methods

For researchers to study Jewish nationalism effectively, they require a JN metric. As a first step, a survey was taken of Jewish Israelis to identify their attitudes towards religious nationalist and ethnoreligious political tropes. The survey was fielded on iPanel, an Israeli online panel that follows ESOMAR guidelines. After demographic questions to ensure the sample was geographically, age-range, religiously, and ethnically diverse (

Table 1. Sample.

	Percentage
Age	18–24: 13.5 25–34: 25.0 35–44: 22.0 45–54: 19.5 55–64: 12.0 65+: 8.0
Sex	Male: 47.5 Female: 52.5
Ethnicity	Ashkenazi: 36.0 Mizrahi: 34.0 Sephardi: 8.0 Mixed: 19.0 Other: 0.33
Religious Bloc4	Haredi: 2.5 Masorti: 16.5 Dati: 30.5 Hiloni: 50.5
Region	Jerusalem: 11.5 Center: 34.5 Northern: 12.0 Southern: 16.5 West Bank (Judea and Samaria): 3.5 Haifa: 14.0 Tel Aviv: 8.0

),1 respondents were asked about the extent of their agreement with 18 statements. These classifiers are used in empirical assessments of the survey results. The focus here, though, is on the qualitative responses to the survey statements.2 These perspectives provide a more holistic view of Jewish Israelis’ beliefs.

The respondents were regularly asked why they chose a particular answer or what the survey questions meant to them. Many respondents skipped the open-ended questions or stated they answered based on their opinion or by thinking. One respondent reported using “basic intelligence”. Many, though, took the opportunity to express themselves more completely. The average time spent on the survey was 9.4 min (median = 5.1 min).

The included statements (

Table 2. Survey Statements.

		Mean (SD)	% Agree
1	Israel is a Jewish state	3.38 (0.52)	98.48
2	It is important to be Jewish to be Israeli	2.53 (0.86)	47.24
3	A good Jew is a good Israeli	2.29 (0.80)	38.46
4	The government should promote Jewish values	2.90 (0.79)	74.62
5	Social morality in the country should draw from Jewish law	2.57 (0.92)	56.63
6	The government should enforce Jewish law in the civil law	1.97 (0.82)	24.10
7	The government is supposed to display religious symbols in public spaces	2.56 (0.78)	54.92
8	The government should allow prayer in all public schools	2.69 (0.92)	66.67
9	The prime minister of Israel should be a man of religious faith	2.28 (0.96)	36.22
10	Israelis are Jewish even if they do not go to the synagogue	3.15 (0.87)	78.28
11	Israel was founded to be religiously diverse	2.44 (0.76)	45.03
12	Israelis who convert to other religions (such as Christianity or Buddhism) are no longer real Israelis	2.28 (0.89)	37.00
13	The presence of other religions in Israel undermines the traditional faith of the Jewish community	2.16 (0.77)	31.34
14	Secular people in Israel undermine the traditional faith of the Jewish community	1.80 (0.74)	15.08
15	Israel’s success if part of G-d’s plan	2.59 (1.01)	54.92
16	There are Jews in other countries but only in Israel can true Judaism be found	2.04 (0.82)	23.62
17	The government should declare the separation of religion and the state	2.59 (0.96)	50.76
18	Israel must separate religion from the state	2.65 (0.90)	55.38

) are based on common questions used in prior studies of religious nationalism and ethnodoxy5 (Grzymala-Busse 2019; Whitehead and Perry 2020; McDaniel et al. 2011; Karpov et al. 2012; Ridge 2023; Stewart et al. 2023). As the goal is to tap into a specific larger construct, the interrelationship among the components is necessary and intentional. The inclusion in this developmental study is not an argument about these statements’ relative pertinence to Jewish nationalism or to Israeli identity or an endorsement of these statements. Rather, the effort was to cast a wide array of possible statements before the respondents.6 From a wide array, a scale can be developed.

No statement was universally endorsed. Because this is a small but diverse sample that does not claim to be nationally representative, the precise rates of agreement with these phrases are not taken for statements about national beliefs. However, one point jumps out. The statement “Israel is a Jewish state” was avowed by 98.48% of respondents. While this may seem like the definitive statement of Jewish nationalism, the extent of unflinching agreement with this phrase—especially despite the variation on the other statements—indicates that this is an article of national recitation and not a good measure of variable beliefs.

This article discusses the responses to these statements qualitatively before probing the numerical relationships. After all, empirical coherence among philosophically problematic concepts would reintroduce the concerns expressed in the Christian nationalism literature and not create a useful measurement index. Scholars seeking to use these statements to measure religious nationalism are encouraged to consider the popular responses they elicit.

4.1. #1 Israel Is a Jewish State

This assertion was pervasive. This statement even garnered agreement from a woman who wrote on the survey, “There should not be a connection between religion and the state” (#17, mixed Masorti woman from Central). These respondents took the statement at face value.

Because the unanimity on this point was so stark, the skeptics deserve particular attention. Of those few who disagreed, one expressed not an ideological disagreement but a positivist interpretation; a secular Ashkenazi man (65+) in the West Bank settlements (#218) stated, “Regarding the State of Israel, there must be a Jewish state and not a state of Jews. But that is not the reality”. He strongly supported separating religion from the state, although this language is more reflective of those who wish the state to have a religious valence. Another respondent who agreed ideologically was skeptical of the reality. The Masorti Mizrachi man (65+) in Haifa (#219) wrote that it was a “significant question. As a Jew I would like the state to be Jewish. Since there are also other religions, the answer is a problem. So, a certain separation between religion and state may be required”.

What do respondents think a religious state entails? Most were not specific. A Haredi Ashkenazi woman (35–44) in the Center (#139) thought a Jewish state could not have separation and required enforcing halakha: “The State of Israel must be a Jewish state as defined in the Declaration of Independence. Therefore, there are things that cannot be separated from the state as a state, such as kashrut, marriage, Shabbat, and more”. A Dati Mizrahi woman (25–34) from the Center (#40) expounded, “Israel is a Jewish state and should be exclusively Jewish. Religion and faith must be strengthened in order to maintain it”. Contrastingly, a Dati Ashkenazi woman (25–34) in the North (#75) wrote, “Yes, I believe in a Jewish majority here, but, as a people that has undergone many persecutions and antisemitism, I think that we should also accept those who are not Jewish here”. She added, “Religion belongs to everyone and any attempt to take control over it only drives people away from Judaism. May we be able to understand this as religious people, and may even secular people be able to enjoy it as they wish freely and not with the feeling of religion”. Nonetheless, she did not support the separation of religion from the state. A secular Ashkenazi woman (25–34) in the Center (#59) offered “There should be an Israeli state with Jewish values and not everything be based on religion or rather interpretations of religion according to rabbis”. Thus, the expressed “strong agreement” does not indicate a uniform understanding.

4.2. #2 It Is Important to Be Jewish to Be Israeli

This premise links the idea of Israel—apparently the Jewish state—with Jewish people. It is also a common method of measuring varieties of nationalism, as seen in the CSES data above. Some endorsed the statement at face value. A secular Mizrahi man (35–44) from the South agreed (#23): “It is indeed difficult to be Israeli without being Jewish”. One respondent, a Masorti Mizrahi woman (18–24) from Haifa (#166), linked them but prioritized religion: “For me, it is important to be Jewish first”.

Conversely, others rejected it on those lines. A Dati Ashkenazi man (55–64) in the Center said (#56), “You don’t have to be Jewish to be a good Israeli”. A few cited religious minority communities. A secular Other woman (45–54) from the North (#101) noted, “The nature of Israel is the Jewish state, but it must be remembered that there are a variety of streams of Judaism alongside other religions that require equal obligations and rights for every citizen”. A mixed secular woman (45–54) in Tel Aviv (#112) disagreed: “Israel has a diverse population, despite the Jewish majority, but the rest of the population cannot be ignored, and therefore a certain religious character cannot be imposed on it”.

Some respondents were fine with variety as long as it was variety within Judaism. A secular mixed-ethnicity woman (18–24) in Haifa (#11) wrote, “I am a proud Jew who does not observe mitzvot. Therefore, in my opinion there is no need for every place in Israel to be completely religious, and there is also a need for a certain separation”. While a secular mixed woman (18–24) from the Center (#14) stated, “Israeliness has a broad spectrum”, she denied that Israel was meant to be diverse, but rather asserted “whoever is Jewish is Israeli”. This is clarified by her later statement that “Judaism has many shades”. That broad spectrum may only pertain to shades of Judaism, including the secular.

Other disagreements took aim at the principle, but not from a diversity perspective. A secular Ashkenazi woman (35–44) in Tel Aviv (#123) strongly disagreed, and stated, “Just because you’re Jewish doesn’t mean you’re Israeli”. Her statement puts her at odds with Israel’s Right of Return principle, which treats all Jews as proto-Israelis (Abramson 2023) and encourages all Jews to make Aliyah.

4.3. #3 A Good Jew Is a Good Israeli

This statement triggered similar responses to the point below about secular Jews. Some thought Israeliness and Jewishness were linked. A secular Mizrahi woman (25–34) in the Center (#134) agreed strongly but thought “Sometimes you have to separate religion from nationality. Our country has a Jewish character, but, when it comes to making decisions, you must not always act according to a religious character”. Still, she only sometimes distinguishes them. Others saw them as distinct. A secular Ashkenazi woman (45–54) in the North (#151) asserted, “There is no connection between the degree of faith and Judaism and Israeliness”.

A few respondents invoked irreligious Jews and religious minorities as full Israelis. A secular Mizrahi woman (55–64) in the North (#74) said, “Judaism does not belong to Israeliness. It is possible to be completely Israeli without being Jewish”. She also did not endorse making social values depend on Jewish morality. A secular Other woman (45–54) from the North (#101) countered, “One should be a good and valuable person and contribute to the country we live in regardless of religion or level of religiosity”. A secular Ashkenazi woman (35–44) in Tel Aviv (#123) strongly disagreed: “A good citizen does not have to be a religious citizen. Yigal Amir was religious”.7

Some zeroed in on the word good. A Masorti Sephardi woman (45–54) in Jerusalem (#99) wrote, “There is no connection between a good Jew and a good person”. A secular mixed woman (25–34) in the North (#116) strongly disagreed: “A good Jew is a subjective definition”. Scholars may be wary of that ambiguity in future surveys.

4.4. #4 The Government Should Promote Jewish Values

Some saw this principle as a way the government would uphold heritage. Not all of these respondents, though, wanted the state to enforce Jewish law. Several specified the values they had in mind. A secular Mizrahi man (35–44) from the South agreed (#23): “There are beautiful values in Judaism—and above all, loving your neighbor as yourself”. A secular Ashkenazi man (45–54) in the Center province (#33) agreed: “I wrote that the government was supposed to promote Jewish values—I meant values such as respect for your father and your mother, etc. (The Ten Commandments). I did not mean to keep kosher, Shabbat, etc. Every citizen can do and behave as he believes”. The government currently enforces some of the listed items, such as pork regulations and Sabbath closing laws. A Masorti Mizrahi man (18–24) in the South (#121) said, “Religious things must indeed be observed in the country, but not forced”. He thought, in the end, “if the State of Israel experienced more ‘religion’ it could be beneficial”.

Others disagreed. A secular Other (wrote in Israeli) woman (45–54) from the North (#101) disagreed with statements 4 and 6: “The State of Israel is supposed to be a state for all citizens and not a halakhic state. What is also true is that there is not equality in the burden”. Those who would not otherwise comply—whether a religious minority or a non-observant Jew—would face a higher burden, as would those on whom the law falls heaviest.8

4.5. #5 Social Morality in the Country Should Draw from Jewish Law

Many respondents saw this as a requirement of a Jewish state. A Masorti Mizrahi man (35–44) in the South (#177) averred, “There is no legitimacy for the State of Israel without the Jewish religion”. A Masorti Mizrachi (65+) man in Haifa strongly agreed: “The Jewish religion in all its aspects is the strength of the Jewish self. Without it we would not be who we are, united and strong”. Others saw it as a requirement of persons. A Masorti Sephardi man (18–24) in the South (#133) strongly agreed: “In the Jewish religion there are instructions on how to behave as a person”. Even some secularists took this stance. A secular Mizrahi woman (45–54) in the South (#7) indicated that “Since Israel is the state of the Jews and a significant part of the population is religious, it should have an affinity to religion”.

Others, especially secular respondents, were opposed. A secular Mizrahi woman (55–64) in the North (#74) strongly disagreed: “Morality does not belong to religion. It belongs to proper education”. While people wanted Jewish values promoted, they could separate those values from morality. Even then, the opposition might be frayed. A secular Ashkenazi woman (25–34) in the North (#52) disagreed: “I am debating because in my eyes the liberal world is largely built on Jewish and Christian foundations and values. But in running a country, I think that liberalism itself should guide us”. This statement encapsulates the tension between religious nationalism, liberalism, and democracy. However, exploring that relationship is beyond the scope of this project.

4.6. #6 The Government Should Enforce Jewish Law in the Civil Law

Enforcement was less popular than upholding Jewish values. Still, some respondents endorsed it. Respondents were not always explicit about the laws in mind. Others referenced specific points. A Masorti Ashkenazi man (18–24) from the Center (#38) who agreed about promoting Jewish values but strongly disagreed about Jewish law wrote, “For example, public transportation on Shabbat is very important”. Restricted public transit was mentioned by multiple respondents. This is a reference to the fact that the state observes the religious day of rest. It is not merely the start of the weekend. The public services, including public transport systems, shut down. Businesses are required to give workers the day off in the absence of government permission (Levush 2018). However, many businesses now flout the closing mandates (TOI Staff 2022). This reflects the lower popularity of that provision.

The Haredi respondents were in great agreement. A Haredi Ashkenazi (65+) man in Jerusalem (#223) strongly agreed with statements 4 and 6: “Israel and Jews are one. Halacha in civil law is better than Mandatory or Ottoman law. There is nothing to separate religion and state because Judaism is the essence of Israel”. After the survey, a Haredi Ashkenazi man (18–24) in the South (#192) wrote, “The State of Israel is the State of the Jews, and it cannot be denied that Halacha and religion should be given more of a platform”. He motivated his answer with one word: “Jewish”. Others concurred. A Dati Mizrahi woman (25–34) from the Center region (#40) agreed: “Israel is a Jewish state, and it should behave like a Halacha-ly Jewish state”.

Many still oppose the enforcement of the religion they would promote. A secular mixed-ethnicity woman (18–24) in Haifa (#11) agreed with promoting Jewish values but disagreed with establishing religious law: “The situation in the country now is that there is no religious majority, so the secular side of the country must also be taken into account”. Similarly, a Masorti Ashkenazi woman (45–54) from the Center (#13) indicated, “Things related to religion should not be forced because coercion will take away from religion”. A secular Ashkenazi woman (45–54) in the North (#151) strongly disagreed: “The state of the Jews, not the state of Halacha”.

A secular Ashkenazi woman (35–44) from the Center (#27) tried having it both ways in her disagreement: “Because there is more than one religion in Israel. Once the Jewish religion is put above all, we are committing a racist act, but we must take into account that, despite everything, we need the Jewish state. However, that does not mean that we are preferred over other religions that are here”. A mixed-ethnicity secular woman (45–54) in Jerusalem (#9) also tried: “Again, Israel is the home of the Jewish people. It must include Jewish symbols and be conducted within the values of Judaism but must allow freedom of religion and rights of non-Jewish citizens, therefore the legislation should be equal”. She (#9) added, “In recent times, the feeling that Israel is the home of the Jewish people has grown stronger. Anti-Semitism is rampant in the world and here there is a feeling of unity by the fact that we are Jews. However, it is important to me that every citizen of this country feels they belong, regardless of their religion”.

4.7. #7 The Government Is Supposed to Display Religious Symbols in Public Spaces

Israel regularly displays religious symbols. For instance, the Magen David appears on the flag and a menorah appears on the state seal. However, not all Israelis recognize that these elements are religious. A secular Mizrahi woman (25–34) in the Center (#73), who wanted them displayed, wrote, “The State of Israel was established as a Jewish state in the Land of Israel; the religious symbols are not only religious but also cultural, and I, as a secularist, also identify with them”.

Some respondents wanted the state to highlight religious markers. A Masorti man (25–34) in Haifa (#213) wrote, “It is important to remember that the State of Israel is the State of the Jews, and therefore all Jewish markers are very relevant”. A secular Ashkenazi woman (25–34) in the Center (#59) argued, “We have a (safe)guard, and there is no problem displaying symbols as long as it does not disturb anyone”. She did not seem to realize that others already were disturbed.

Some were not assured that it was appropriate. For instance, a secular mixed man (35–44) in the West Bank settlements (#170) agreed with statement 7 but disagreed with statement 15. He proposed, “A distinction must be made between Jewish symbols that indicate belonging and spirituality and dependence on G-d”. A secular Mizrahi man from the North (18–24) (#12) disagreed with the premise: “I don’t believe that Jewishness goes hand in hand with Halacha and Jewish symbols”.

A secular Ashkenazi man (45–54) in the Center (#33) disagreed out of deference to religious minorities but emphasized Judaism as a priority:

“The State of Israel is first and foremost a Jewish state. We are the majority, and that is how it should be.

But we must respect the other religions, and not, for example, forbid placing a model fir tree in a store or somewhere”.9

Respondents were mixed, then, both on the religiosity of the extant public symbols and on whether such symbols should be displayed.

4.8. #8 The Government Should Allow Prayer in All Public Schools

While religious public schools facilitate prayer, there have been debates about the accommodation of prayer in the other public schools. Both religious and secular respondents were open to it under conditions. A Masorti Sephardi woman (45–54) in Jerusalem (#99) proposed “return[ing] to allowing prayers to be held where desired but not under coercion”. A secular Other (wrote in Israeli) woman (45–54) from the North (#101) agreed: “The ideal situation is to allow but not to force; this is the meaning of the policy that I would like to have in the country”.

However, secular respondents were also prone to object. A secular mixed woman (25–34) in the North (#116) strongly disagreed; at the end of the survey, she wrote, “It is clear that the majority of the public is secular and there is difficulty in continuing life like this in the country”. This is consistent with the other comments about the enlarging religious population and an uneasy balance between the religious and non-religious populations.

4.9. #9 The Prime Minister of Israel Should Be a Man of Religious Faith

Secular respondents were quick to combat this notion. A secular Mizrahi woman (55–64) in Jerusalem (#171) disagreed: “The Prime Minister could be a non-believing secular”. A secular Ashkenazi woman (35–44) in the North (#125) strongly disagreed: “I am secular and believe that every person and public figure can be secular or religious and it shouldn’t affect anything”.

Religious respondents also disputed it. A Dati Ashkenazi man (55–64) in the settlements (#185) disagreed: “The head of government can be either a believer or a non-believer”. A Masorti Mizrahi man (55–64) in Jerusalem (#189) disagree strongly: “There were patriotic Israeli leaders here who gave their lives for the rise of the people and the state in our country, and they had nothing to do with religion and were secular”.

Some respondents emphasized other qualities. A mixed Masorti woman (45–54) in the Center (#120) disagreed: “A prime minister should be a strong, smart, assertive person and does not have to be a believer”. A mixed secular (45–54) woman from the Center (#18) emphasized that “a prime minister should take care of his people whether they believe or not”. A secular Ashkenazi woman (18–24) (#103) in the South disagreed but noted that “The prime minister of Israel should recognize and respect Judaism but also act for the majority of the people”. A Mizrahi Masorti woman (25–34) in Center (#97) strongly agreed but also indicated that “The people’s elected representatives are often elected based on promises to their voters. Therefore, they must be reliable and do their best to fulfill these promises”.

Several religious respondents, though, thought religiosity was necessary for effective leadership, especially of a Jewish state. A Dati Mizrahi woman (45–54) from the Center agreed (#142): “If he doesn’t believe how will he succeed”. A Haredi Ashkenazi woman (35–44) in the Center (#139) stated, “I hope that a believer will lead the country in a more moral way”.

Some tied a PM’s Jewishness to the Jewish quality of the state. A Dati Mizrahi man (25–34) in the Center (#199) argued, “The prime minister has to be a real Jew to run a Jewish state”. A Dati Mizrahi man (25–34) in Jerusalem (#154) strongly agreed: “The Prime Minister of the State of Israel needs to understand where the justification for the state comes from”. Again, respondents invoked the idea that religiosity justified the state.

Even some secular respondents agreed. A secular Ashkenazi man (65+) in the West Bank settlements (#218) opined, “If the US president is a man of faith and does not hide it, why is it so difficult here?” It is worth noting that the US does not legally require the president to be a believer. A secular Ashkenazi woman (55–64) in the Center (#34) wrote, “It is important that the Prime Minister be Jewish and a believer”.

However, respondents emphasized belonging over religiosity. A secular mixed-ethnicity woman (18–24) in Haifa (#11) explained, “Not all Jews are good people. There is extremism and abnormal behavior in every community and group of people. Our Prime Minister does not have to be a believer, but a Jew yes”. Her statement about political leadership is in keeping with her opposition to religious diversity. A Masorti Sephardi man (25–34) in Jerusalem (#221) wrote, “The Prime Minister is allowed to be secular, but he must recognize the Israeli tradition”. This harkens back to the above question of how much Israeli “custom” can be separated from religion in Israeli nationalism.

One respondent answered the question by saying how he interpreted the phrase. A secular Ashkenazi man (45–54) in the Center province (#33) asked the following: “Should the heads of state and all citizens believe, and should all conduct revolve around the laws of religion[?]”.

4.10. #10 Israelis Are Jewish Even If They Do Not Go to the Synagogue

This statement had the second highest agreement, even though it contradicts assertions that not all Israelis are Jewish, let alone observant. Some respondents remembered that. A mixed Masorti woman from the Center (#17) disagreed, noting “Not all Israelis are Jews and not all Jews are Israelis”. A secular Ashkenazi man (65+) in the West Bank settlements (#218) strongly disagreed: “There are Muslim Israelis, Christians. They don’t go to synagogue either, and if they do, it doesn’t make them Jews”. A secular Ashkenazi woman (65+) in the North (#169) disagreed with both components: “I don’t agree that Judaism equals Israeliness. Judaism does not depend on a place or an institution, and its existence should not be forced or depend on location and application”. A Masorti Mizrahi man (18–24) in the South (#184), on the other hand, strongly agreed: “There are Jews all over the world whether they go to synagogue or not”. He implicates the diaspora in this, which is consistent with the Right of Return philosophy. He also dragoons the minorities.

4.11. #11 Israel Was Founded to Be Religiously Diverse

Responses were divided on this point. There have been non-Jewish inhabitants of Israel since its founding, but not all respondents accepted them as part of Israel. A secular Ashkenazi woman (18–24) (#103) in the South, who disagreed, wrote, “I believe that there is something very special about the Jewish people, something that no other people in the world has”.

Others appeared to accept the diversity. An Ashkenazi secular woman (45–54) in the North (#47) agreed: “Israel was founded as the land of all of us. You have to deal with the various religions, different mentalities, and different levels of immigrants here”. She did, however, say that other religions undermine Israel’s Jewish character (statement 13). Respondents may have been focusing on strands of Judaism, rather than religious diversity. That is a limitation on the question.

A mixed-ethnicity secular woman (45–54) in Jerusalem (#9) tried to take both views: “Israel is the home of the Jewish people, but every citizen is part of the state, regardless of religion, race, or gender. The very fact that it is Jewish includes signs of Judaism”. A secular Ashkenazi woman (35–44) from the Center (#27) strongly agreed but wrote, “Israel is important to the Jewish people, but at the same time we need to respect other nationalities that live here”. A secular Other woman (45–54) from the North (#101) disagreed but still replied, “In the Declaration of Independence, Israel was established as a home for the Jewish people, but, on the other hand, the members of the different religions who live there must be allowed and respected”. Again, respondents wanted it both ways.

4.12. #12 Israelis Who Convert to Other Religions Are No Longer Real Israelis

This statement appealed to the principle that being Jewish and being Israeli are linked.10 Jewish law does not recognize out-conversion due to matrilineal heritability—except for denying Right of Return. One respondent even noted this in her answer. A Dati Mizrahi woman (25–34) in Haifa (#216) wrote, “There is a difference between an Israeli and a Jew, and I could not explain it in my answers. Whoever converts his religion to something else is still a Jew. It is not certain that he is an Israeli. It is really not the same thing, and I was missing this clarification”. Similarly, a Haredi Ashkenazi (65+) man in Jerusalem (#223) denied conversion’s threat to the Jewish community because “a Jew cannot change his religion”.

Some respondents disagreed because they saw the community as unshakeable. A secular Ashkenazi man (45–54) in the Center (#33) explained, “Every Jew who believes, it is between himself and his own personal faith. If I decide not to follow the laws of the Torah or even convert to Christianity, it should not affect the faith of the other. Everyone and their faith”. At the very least, the onus would be on the individual.

Others put the onus particularly on minorities. A Masorti Ashkenazi man (18–24) from the Center (#38) accepted secular Jews but did not accept religious minorities, no matter their origin: “I think that anyone who gives up being Jewish will find it difficult to be part of Israeli society”. Similarly, a Masorti mixed man (35–44) from Jerusalem (#193) opposed minorities and out-converts, but he was fine with hilonim. Then, he called that perspective “an egalitarian state”:

“There is only a state for the Jewish people in the Land of Israel, minority groups who wish to live in peace and brotherhood are welcome to stay.

There is no separation on this matter from the right to exist”.

He did not clarify why it is egalitarian.

4.13. #13 The Presence of Other Religions in Israel Undermines the Traditional Faith of the Jewish Community

Since its founding, Israel has had non-Jewish inhabitants. However, they receive unequal treatment. Some respondents appealed to the history of the diaspora in defending toleration. A secular mixed man (35–44) in the West Bank settlements (#170) disagreed with statements 12–14: “Jews lived for many years among different peoples and religions. As it has maintained its existence until now, so with its strength it will continue to exist”. A mixed Masorti woman (55–64) from the Center (#39) disagreed: “Judaism can exist even among people who are not of the same religion, see the Jews in the Diaspora”.

Evidently, respondents were more tolerant toward diversity within Judaism or ethnic Jews rather than diversity across lines. A Masorti Mizrahi man (35–44) in the South (#177) strongly agreed that religious minorities are a problem while disagreeing with the idea that Jews who convert out or do not practice undermine the Jewish community. Then, he wrote “In Israel there is a place to respect every person of every religion”. Between this and his other statements, it sounds like he only means types of Jews but not the minorities. A Masorti Sephardi man (18–24) in the South (#133) saw minorities, including out-converts, as a threat but not secularists: “We should be a Jewish state”. Thus, because he counts them as Jews, they are tolerable.

Others saw out-groups as a threat. A Masorti Mizrahi woman (25–34) in Jerusalem treated converts, minorities, and secularists as threats because of the “last Kippur events, events that took place over the years regarding religions, and the Jewish religion”. A Dati Mizrahi woman (25–34) from the Center (#40) did not see converts as a threat, but she expressed that sentiment towards minorities and seculars: “When the values are different it is easy to deteriorate”. It is not evident how this caused her to distinguish among minorities. A Dati Ashkenazi man in Jerusalem (65+) (#167) blamed all Arab Israelis for the current war. He attributed his opposition to minorities “According to what happened in the country before the 7.10 [attack]”. This is despite the attack having been by external forces and despite non-Jews serving in the military. This line of reasoning leads to discrimination against these co-nationals.

4.14. #14 Secular People in Israel Undermine the Traditional Faith of the Jewish Community

This statement had the lowest level of agreement. That finding is consistent with the large number of Israeli Jews who identify as secular. An Ashkenazi secular man (35–44) in the North (#53) highlighted that point by writing simply “secular majority”. However, this point was not uncontested.

The secular respondents were quick to defend themselves. They did not always extend that latitude to minorities. A secular Other man (55–64) in the South (#122) said, “I am secular, and I do not undermine the traditional Jewish faith”. A secular Ashkenazi man (25–34) in Haifa (#172)—who said religious minorities and out-converts are a threat—rebutted the statement with “I believe in G-d even though I am secular”. A secular mixed-ethnicity woman (18–24) in Haifa (#11) disagreed with this point—“I am a secularist who respects the religious in the country, a proud Jew but not observant”—but she did agree that converts and other religions were undermining the Jewish faith and opposed the idea of religious diversity.

Some secularists blamed the religious Jews for social problems in Israel. A secular Ashkenazi woman (35–44) in the North (#125) strongly disagreed: “In my eyes this is complete nonsense, and the religious are appropriating religion and Judaism”. An Ashkenazi secular woman (45–54) in the North (#47) wrote, “There is a constant debate between the religious and the secular—the debate about control and money”. The level of subsidy for and contribution from the religious community, particularly the Haredi, and public religious enforcement have been an increasing area of debate. Still, she thought minorities undermined the Jewish community. A secular Ashkenazi woman (45–54) in the North (#151) disagreed with statements 12–14: “There is no connection between religiosity and belonging to a religion”.

Some of the religious Jews defended the seculars. A Haredi Ashkenazi woman (35–44) in the Center (#139) stated the following: “There are secularists who challenge the traditional belief, but it is impossible to include all secularists in this definition”. A Masorti Ashkenazi woman (45–54) from the Center (#13) stated, “Seculars are also Jews. And faith will not be shaken for those who believe because of others”. Notably, she disagreed for converts (statement 12) but agreed for minorities (statement 13), so she is not fully committing to what she is saying when it comes to Arab Israelis.

Respondents imagined them returning to the fold. A Dati Mizrahi woman (45–54) from the Center disagreed (#142) for the seculars, but saw the minorities, including out-converts, as a problem: “They are still Jews, and every Jew has a Jewish spark that awakens at some point”. A Masorti Mizrahi man (45–54) in the Center (#48) disagreed (conditionally): “A secular Jew is a Jew who can correct things, like me. I too was secular”.

Not all religious respondents shared these optimistic views. A Dati Mizrahi man (25–34) in the Center (#199) agreed with statements 13 and 14 but disagreed with statement 12: “To desecrate Judaism openly leads to the waning of Judaism”. They also argued the secularists could be more harmful than minorities because they challenged the religious Jews. A Mizrahi Masorti woman (25–34) in the Center (#97) agreed with statement 14 but not the others: “The liberality that secularists claim to promote manifests itself in a lack of liberality and failure to accept the other many times. There are raised eyebrows and judgment towards people of faith (at all levels) and this many times can create shame in that a person has faith at one level or another”. Similarly, a mixed Masorti woman (45–54) in the Center (#120) wrote, “I can’t find a connection... but a secular person will undermine tradition”. She said the same of out-converts but not of minorities. This thinking implies a large segment of the population could undermine the national identity.

4.15. #15 Israel’s Success Is Part of G-d’s Plan

This proposition triggered many and varied responses. Some respondents took the religious angle. This is consistent with the above statements that Jewish nationalism is part and parcel of the land claim. A Masorti Mizrahi man (18–24) in the South (#121) agreed, “because in the end G-d wanted the establishment of a Jewish state”. A Masorti Ashkenazi woman (45–54) from the Center (#13) thought, “If G-d has a plan, the Land of Israel is its place. This is our historical homeland, the place of the Temple and the land that was promised to Abraham and the people of Israel in the Torah”.

They even saw it as fundamental to the religion itself. A Masorti Mizrahi man (55–64) in Jerusalem (#189) wrote, “This is the basis of the Jewish faith”. A Dati Mizrahi woman (45–54) from the Center agreed (#142): “The Torah of Israel, the people of Israel, and the Land of Israel belong to the chosen people of Israel from the time of the Tanakh”. A secular mixed woman (18–24) from the Center (#14)—despite being secular and agreeing that Israel was founded to be religiously diverse—wrote simply that “It is written in the Torah”.

Others—especially but not only secular-identifiers—denied a religious basis for Israel’s circumstances. A mixed secular woman (45–54) in the South (#21) bluntly summarized this stance: “It has nothing to do with G-d”. Respondents specifically mentioned political leaders and soldiers as sources of Israel’s success.

A few even saw this belief as threatening. A secular Ashkenazi woman (35–44) from the Center (#27) strongly disagreed: “I don’t think there is a big plan that is G-d’s plan, and we have to stop thinking like that as a country”. One even denied a religious land claim. A mixed secular (45–54) woman from the Center (#18) wrote, “With all due respect and much respect to G-d, Israel was founded as a solution for the Holocaust survivors”.

4.16. #16 There Are Jews in Other Countries but Only in Israel Can True Judaism Be Found

Responses were skewed toward disagreement. Many highlighted the diaspora history and community. An Ashkenazi secular woman (45–54) in the North (#47) recognized the relative proportions: “The largest community is out of the country”. A Masorti Mizrahi woman (35–44) in Jerusalem (#182) explained, “In the Diaspora, the giants of the Jewish people grew up”.

Some noted that the diaspora Jews could be quite devout. A secular Sephardi woman (55–64) from the Center (#16) invoked diverse experiences: “There are religious Jews and there are secular Jews who live abroad and observe the prayers and holidays more than they would if they lived in Israel”. A secular Ashkenazi man (65+) in the West Bank settlements (#218) strongly disagreed; despite living in the settlements, he valorized foreign residence: “It is possible to be Jewish abroad and sometimes even better and without anyone interfering with one’s Judaism”. This is a rather common thought about the diaspora.

Others, though, endorsed this belief. A secular Ashkenazi man (55–64) in Haifa (#210) agreed: “Other countries are not the State of Israel. That is the state of the Jewish people”. A Masorti Ashkenazi woman (25–34) in Haifa (#102) strongly agreed: “The State of Israel exists for all the Jews of the world. Those who choose not to live here is their decision”. It sounds open-minded, but she apparently is judging their choices.

Several respondents went further and pushed for the diaspora to move to Israel. A secular (atheist) Mizrahi man (45–54) from the North (#43) expounded, “Jews should be in Israel”. A Dati Mizrahi woman (25–34) in Jerusalem (#44) tried having it both ways: “Judaism is within the person himself. Of course, there is meaning to living in the Holy Land”. A Masorti mixed man (35–44) from Jerusalem (#193) saw it as a political problem. Jews living abroad implied “a kind of doubt in the reliability of our existence in the land”. This is another strategic assertion about land claims.

Some responses overtly criticized this belief. A mixed secular (45–54) woman from the Center (#18) called the statement “Arrogance… a Jew is what you feel in your heart and not your residence”. A secular Mizrahi man (35–44) from the South strongly disagreed (#23): “A somewhat defiant question. The Jewish people existed even without the State of Israel”. A secular Ashkenazi woman (25–34) in the North (#52) strongly disagreed with criticizing the diaspora but understood the claim’s premise: “very strange[.] It seems clear to me that faith is a personal and communal thing. Although I can understand people who would argue that it gives them additional meaning to live in the land [of Israel]”. This tries to include both sides. Negative thoughts about the question itself, above disagreement, suggest this is a less useful survey item.

4.17. #17 The Government Should Declare the Separation of Religion and the State

This assertion was not popular. Some called it impossible, either because of the regime or the nature of the state. A Dati Mizrahi man (45–54) in the Center (#71) strongly disagreed: “The government can’t do that either because it is made up of Datim and Masortim”. A mixed secular man (25–34) in the Center (#143) also strongly disagreed, even with the premise of the question: “Very offensive. Israel is the state of the Jews; therefore, it is impossible to separate religion and state”. A mixed-ethnicity secular woman (45–54) in Jerusalem (#9) said, “In the past I thought that religion could not be part of the state, but Israel is the native state where Jews can live without being persecuted”.

Some respondents again expressly linked religiosity with the land claim, so secularism would threaten that agenda. A Masorti Mizrahi man (25–34) in Haifa (#213) averred, “As soon as we separate religion from state we will lose the right to our land”. A Dati Sephardi man (35–44) in Haifa (#104) asserted, “The State of Israel cannot detach itself from its Jewish identity, since that is one of the main reasons for its establishment”.

Both secular and religious-identifying respondents supported separating religion and the government. A Mizrahi Masorti woman from the Center (55–64) (#8) wrote, “As a Masorti, I do not believe in religious coercion. A person will live by his faith, and throughout history, conflicts have arisen that stem from the non-separation between religion and the state”. An Ashkenazi secular woman (45–54) in the North (#47) strongly agreed: “Law should not rely on religion. There should be a constitution”. Israel does not have a constitution. Instead, it uses a series of Basic Laws to structure the government. The 2018 Basic Law expressly claims Israel as a nation-state for Jews ‘uniquely.’ Maybe she believes a constitution would be more inclusive. Many secularists noted, in particular, their objection to conservative interpretations of religious law being foisted on the public.

One respondent answered the question by saying how he interpreted the phrase. A secular Ashkenazi man (45–54) in the Center (#33) described it as follows: “Should the State of Israel be exclusively of Jews or of all religions or should the State of Israel be run according to the Orthodox Jewish religion?”

4.18. #18 Israel Must Separate Religion from the State

The responses here were similar to #17. For concision, selections appear in Appendix C.

5. Empirical Models

These results can also be evaluated empirically. Drawing on all 18 questions, the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin factor adequacy score is 0.91 and the raw Cronbach’s alpha (with reverse coding) is 0.91. A scree plot identifies one factor. This could suggest a simple average or additive scale.

Extracting the factor suggests that summation is not optimal (

Table 3. Factor loadings.

		Loading
1	Israel is a Jewish state	0.390
2	It is important to be Jewish to be Israeli	0.625
3	A good Jew is a good Israeli	0.420
4	The government should promote Jewish values	0.817
5	Social morality in the country should draw from Jewish law	0.759
6	The government should enforce Jewish law in the civil law	0.677
7	The government is supposed to display religious symbols in public spaces	0.589
8	The government should allow prayer in all public schools	0.712
9	The prime minister of Israel should be a man of religious faith	0.772
10	Israelis are Jewish even if they do not go to the synagogue	0.223
11	Israel was founded to be religiously diverse	−0.143
12	Israelis who convert to other religions (such as Christianity or Buddhism) are no longer real Israelis	0.558
13	The presence of other religions in Israel undermines the traditional faith of the Jewish community	0.560
14	Secular people in Israel undermine the traditional faith of the Jewish community	0.684
15	Israel’s success is part of G-d’s plan	0.790
16	There are Jews in other countries but only in Israel can true Judaism be found	0.485
17	The government should declare the separation of religion and the state	−0.669
18	Israel must separate religion from the state	−0.733
	SS Loadings Proportion Variation Explained	6.879 0.382

). Several of these items could be used to measure Jewish Nationalism. Others load weakly. Statement #1 should be excluded due to the lack of variation in responses.

Scholars may create a scale based on their particular view of religious nationalism. They should also ensure they are not incorporating any would-be dependent variable into their JN measure. For instance, a subscale could be created from statements 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, and 15 (Appendix B). These items load well, with good face validity and interpretability, while maintaining variation in responses. This would incorporate items akin to those in the Baylor index as well as the metrics employed by Stewart et al. and Grzymala-Busse. This subscale would have a KMO score of 0.88 and a raw Cronbach’s alpha of 0.88. The particular choices would somewhat influence the scores. However, the scores would likely be very similar. This proposed scale correlates strongly and significantly with the full list (r = 0.97).

Given the small sample size, limited conclusions can be drawn about the demographic patterns. Each of these statements were endorsed by both religious and secular-identifying respondents; this is evident in the above discussion. However, on the whole, the regression results show that more religious respondents are more likely to evince JN. Mizrahim, compared to Ashkenazim, are more likely to be Jewish nationalists. This is consistent with prior research (Ridge 2024). Age, sex, and region of residence are not significant predictors. Despite the low N and limited number of variables, the OLS regression has good explanatory power (Adj. R² = 0.40; Appendix D).

6. Conclusions

Israel’s Declaration identifies it as the Jewish state. However, the prevalence of that statement, and even the agreement it finds in this survey, belie the complexity of public opinion about what that concept should mean for Judaism or for Israel. It relies on a clarity of concept that does not exist for either. In the words of a secular Ashkenazi man (45–54) in Haifa (#115), “Is there a unified coherent Jewish identity, or, as I think, is there a very broad Jewish identity?” This unclarity is magnified by adding the relationship of that—or those—thing(s) to the state.

This study has used quantitative and qualitative evidence to measure Jewish nationalist sentiment in Israel. These commentaries demonstrate how citizens interpret researchers’ questions and what they think about religion, the state, and the society. It also suggests a coherent Jewish Nationalism Scale that can be employed in future studies. Currently, quantitative religious nationalism research is the province of Christian Nationalism research. Designing and utilizing appropriate scales for other religious groups will diversify the literature and demonstrate the (non)generalizability of the findings across contexts.

These results show that there is a wide variation in public opinion about linking Judaism with the Israeli state. However, several themes recurred in respondents’ statements. Respondents greatly favored asserting “Israel is a Jewish state” even without a specific meaning. Judaism apparently should be prioritized, but there is less agreement on enforcement. Respondents were also divided about the position of religious minorities, politicians’ obligations, and the role of G-d. Several respondents expressed self-contradictory sentiments or tried to have things two ways. Both highly religious and less religious Jewish Israelis endorsed (and sometimes rejected) these premises.

With this variation in Jewish nationalist belief, it is overly simplistic to assume that all Jewish Israelis agree on Jewish nationalism or the identity of the Jewish state. In that sense, the results are more consistent with historiographic work on Israel than with most (religio-)nationalist rhetoric (Oren 2019; Yadgar 2020). Religious nationalism is not the only kind of nationalism operating in Israel; as noted, Israelis seem to endorse multiple potentially competing nationalisms. However, civic and ethnic nationalisms, for instance, will have to contend with the prevalent Jewish nationalism (Kimmerling 2001; Chowers 2024).

Future research should account for the diversity of this opinion, both its causes and consequences. While some work will extend the research on Christian and Hindu Nationalism, certain questions will be particular to the Israeli case. Scholars may also consider how these multiple nationalisms interface with each other. In future research, scholars should carefully consider their conception of religious nationalism. This survey, particularly the discursive responses, offers insight into how Jewish Israelis evaluate these propositions. At present, the domain is filled with strong feelings and little agreement. Given these varied beliefs, it is incumbent to consider their implications for Israel’s future.