The Pursuit for Cosmic Wisdom and ‘Promethean’ Leadership in the Pythagorean and Al-Fārābīan Political Philosophy

Abstract

This study reflects on aspects of the Pythagorean political philosophy and compares them to those of Abu Nasr Muhammad al-Fārābī’s thought. Both share a key assumption: excellent rulers must be political scientists who seek divine guidance to ensure the prevalence of reason over passions in public life while reconciling society with the harmony and wisdom of the cosmos. By imitating God’s perfection and incorporating divine wisdom into governance, virtuous rulers promote felicity, prosperity and peace within a city. We highlight al-Fārābī’s emphasis on the role of religion in enabling citizens to internalize the wisdom of the cosmos, thereby minimising the need for coercion in the pursuit of order and social concord. In addition, the populace leverages the superior knowledge of each governor while observing their behaviour. Thus, the people have a share in the exercise of political power. This insistence on the involvement of the populace in politics aligns with the concept of ‘political Prometheism’.

1. Introduction

The main objective of this study is to discuss aspects of the Pythagorean philosophy and to compare them with that of the Arab philosopher Abu Nasr Muhammad al-Fārābī. We will identify in both schools of thought elements of ‘political Prometheism’, which advocates for the essential role of the ‘average person’ in political life (Theodosiadis 2025, p. 1). In short, Prometheism promotes greater engagement; it creates a more representative and responsive political landscape where citizens can have a voice in the political decision-making process. Furthermore, the concept of political Prometheism has been constructed by drawing on Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound. In this tragic play, the titan Prometheus is portrayed as the fire-bearer to the mortals («πυρός βροτοῖς δοτῆρ») (p. 4). The name ‘Prometheus’ derives from the Greek verb promethévein («προμηθεύειν»), that is, to supply, to diffuse and to disseminate (p. 4). Thus, the titan Prometheus supplies to human beings a fire that symbolizes political knowledge and human agency (according to Theodosiadis’ interpretation). The Promethean human must use this knowledge to achieve high ethical standards in society (p. 5). In light of this, political Prometheism despises forms of rule that banish citizens from the political sphere; it highlights the importance of creating conditions that enable meaningful interaction between the leader and the populace, thereby allowing the needs of the latter to be integrated into legislative processes (pp. 7–8). In this article, we identify arguments within the Pythagorean and al-Fārābīan political philosophies that encompass perspectives which provide crucial insights into the support for Promethean forms of leadership.

To begin with, the first section focuses on the broader intellectual connections at play, shedding light on the influences of Alexandria’s Greek Neoplatonic and Neopythagorean schools on al-Fārābī (Mahdi 2001, pp. 53–55).1 Section two details the core principles of each school of thought: both encourage rulers to internalise norms and values that promote divine harmony.2 By integrating divine wisdom into governance, such virtuous rulers promote felicity, prosperity and peace within a city. With this in mind, we proceed to section three, where we discuss how these key principles in both schools of philosophy can be approached from a standpoint that provides a basis for developing arguments in favour of a cooperative and mutually responsive relationship between rulers and citizens. We contend that in the Pythagorean political philosophy, harmony and political virtue are promoted through consensual forms of compromise, achieved when both the ruler/scientist and the multitude attain self-knowledge of cosmic wisdom and justice. And finally, we observe that the Promethean dimensions of al-Fārābī’s thought are vividly echoed in his discourse on the philosopher king and the role of religion. As the Arab thinker argued in his renowned treatise On The Perfect State,3 an excellent ruler must be a philosopher. His analysis in The Attainment of Happiness,4 shows that processes of acquiring knowledge in philosophy parallel the methods employed in scientific inquiry; philosophers strive to find ‘certain truths’ regarding the nature of existence among the multiplicity of cosmic beings; they speak of the purpose of life, the ideal society, and political regimes, relying on rational means of analysis and understanding. Thus, a philosopher possesses attributes akin to those of a practical scientist. However, scientific knowledge often requires a level of skill and education not attainable for the ‘average person’. Considering this, al-Fārābī in his work Enumeration of the Sciences,5 addresses the role of religion in social and political affairs; religion transcends mere scientific expertise; it cultivates an awareness of cosmic wisdom in the public consciousness and minimizes the need for state coercion and repression. In other words, it fosters a public sentiment of justice through symbolic/archetypal forms of language. This ‘public-spiritedness’ is essential for enhancing active citizenship, Burns (2016, p. 378) suggested. Ultimately, religion can promote a Promethean (participatory) approach to politics and government. This aspect of al-Fārābī’s thought has yet to receive the attention it deserves.

Finally, we recognize the enduring relevance of the Pythagorean and al-Fārābīan ideas in contemporary politics, particularly in studies revolving around leadership and ethics. In this context, we aim to encourage our readers to consider the significance of both schools of thought in modern leadership practices. At the same time, we argue that the inclusion of popular opinions and demands in politics is not exclusive to classical democratic Athens or Western modernity. In other words, political Prometheism is not a concept that exclusively pertains to Western systems of political thought. Therefore, we challenge Western exceptionalism, ‘which attributes the idea of political participation solely to philosophical systems of Western modernity, assuming that all other cultures and civilisations (Asian, Arabic, African, Eastern European and South American) are “despotic”, “primitive”, “cruel” and “violent”’ (Theodosiadis 2025, pp. 9, 269).

2. The Philosophical Background of Al-Fārābī’s Intellectual Synthesis: From Egypt to Iraq

The Pythagorean texts, although fragmentary in form (Guthrie 1994), are remarkably coherent in terms of content (Huffman 1999); they form a single line of political philosophy. What makes this robust thematic core of political thought even more remarkable is that neither Pythagoras himself nor his successors left any written text (Huffman 2008a). While in other philosophers of the same period, such as the pre-Socratics (Parmenides, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Democritus), we spot vast discrepancies in viewpoints revolving around similar topics (Huffman 2008b), in the Pythagorean texts we come across a surprising similarity, especially in the field of political focus. The Pythagorean pattern of political philosophy and the concepts that make it up are also evident in the works of Platonic and Neoplatonic philosophers (such as Iamblichus) (Barbera 1981; Macris 2021, p. 24). In texts, such as Plato’s Statesman, the Pythagorean thought is widely echoed (Kahn 2001, p. 57). Neoplatonic and Neopythagorean schools were significant philosophical movements in Alexandria, especially during the Hellenistic and Roman periods. Al-Fārābī’s connection with Alexandria is evident from the way through which he and his colleagues, students and successors interacted with each other. ‘One can see it, for instance, in the writing of so-called great, or large, commentaries (we have two of them by Alfarabi), in the care with which Aristotle’s text is analyzed and interpreted, and also in the continuity of the scholarly tradition’ (Mahdi 2001, p. 53).

Al-Fārābī is commonly associated with the Aristotelian philosophers of Bagdad, who follow the footsteps of al-Kindī (Adamson 2007, pp. 14–15). The latter suggested that a rational philosophical system could explain and understand ‘God’s nature at least in part’ (p. 5). Drawing on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, al-Kindī assumed that all creatures and existents are products of unity and multiplicity. For example, though an animal is one genus, this single genus is divided into multiple species (p. 48). A single individual is ‘one’ being, but this is certainly a wrong assumption; for the same animal has parts ‘that are united to one another’ (p. 48). ‘[T]hings do have distinct parts’ (p. 50). More importantly, the cause of this unity and multiplicity ‘cannot be internal’ (p. 51). In fact, ‘there is an external cause for the association of unity and multiplicity in the sensible world. And this, of course, is God, the true One’ (pp. 51–52). God ‘cannot be both one and many’ because God serves as the external cause ‘for the things that are both one and many’ (p. 52). Thus, God is ‘completely unaffected by multiplicity’ (p. 49). ‘[I]n every case other than the case of God, unity and multiplicity always co-exist’ (p. 51). Al-Fārābī’s philosophy faithfully reproduces this perspective, which emerged as a systematic methodology for substantiating the core tenets of Islamic theology (Adamson 2007, pp. 14–15; Steiris 2012, p. 258). On the other hand, it is difficult to explain al-Fārābī’s thought ‘as an extension or simple development of the thought of al-Kindī’, especially if we consider the former’s critical stance towards several claims (regarding science, logic, music and so on) made by the latter (Mahdi 2001, pp. 52, 55). Adamson and Pormann (2012) speak of the uninterrupted chain of philosophers who transferred knowledge from Egypt to Iraq; ‘schools of Alexandria, both medical and philosophical, had a tremendous impact on later developments in Bagdad’ (p. xxvii). Al-Kindī,al-Rāzī and other earlier philosophers of the Islamic world had minimal access to Alexandrian Neoplatonism (Mahdi 2001, pp. 53–54). Al-Kindī is connected with the Hellenistic-Roman Athenian schools of Platonism, ‘rather than the school of Alexandria’ (p. 54). It was al-Fārābī himself who attempted to adjust the Alexandrian Neoplatonic concepts to the world of his contemporaries (Strauss 1959, pp. 138, 143–45; Burns 2016, pp. 374–75). Moreover, the Alexandrian school is ‘crucial to everything that happened later on in science and philosophy in the Islamic world, in Byzantium, as well as in the Latin West’ (Mahdi 2001, p. 55). It is often claimed that the Alexandrian philosophers ‘handed down to the Muslims the books and the tradition of reading or studying; important books of science and philosophy’ (p. 55). In a similar vein, Vallat (2004) and Benmakhlouf (2007) connect al-Fārābī to the emergence of Alexandrian Neoplatonism in the Islamic world.

The next section will shed light on the Pythagorean mindset about the human and the divine governor. First, we acknowledge the ontological differences between these two entities. The Creator and humans do not belong to the same hierarchy; God exists on a higher ontological level than human beings; God exercises ontological superiority over His creations, akin to a shepherd over his sheep or a queen bee over her workers (Plato 1925, Statesman, 268d-274d). God, like the shepherd or the queen, differs in terms of substance and being from the governed parts; God is naturally superior to them; and this superiority is manifest and emphatic. In other words, the command-obedience relationship in divine governance is grounded on the profound ontological differences between beings and existents. However, human rulers and subjects are not defined by any ontological difference; rulers are humans and their subjects are humans as well. Thus, how is a similar command-obedience relationship justified in human societies, where both the ruler and the subject belong to the same ontological hierarchy?

3. Eucosmia and the Affinity of Humans with Their Creator

In the Pythagorean mindset, the relationship between human and divine Creator is subject to congruence and purposefulness. The world is a product of deliberate design; it is the produce of the divine intellect, which imposed order on formless matter, shaping the world as the most beautiful and perfect creation (Horky 2019a). Thus, the world obeys the design of a supremely wise and intelligent being (Philip 1966, pp. 60–75; Woolf 2000). Put otherwise, the world is made with orderliness and eucosmia. The word ‘eucosmia’ derives from the word cosmos; the prefix ‘eu-’ stands for ‘the good’ and/or ‘the beautiful’. Cosmos or κοσμῶ (in Greek), is literally translated as ‘beautifying’, that is, shaping an order filled with ornaments of extraordinary beauty (Horky 2019b, p. 24). The term cosmos implies ‘ornament’; it encapsulates the exceptional beauty of the world arising from its structured order and purposeful design. Moreover, Pythagoras called the universe cosmos ‘because of the order inherent in it’ (Aetius 1929, De Placita Philosophorum, II 1, 1, D. 327, 8).6 As Ecphantus the Crotonian argued, the universe is ‘held together by eucosmia and with due order; without mind (reasonable planning) these could not be done. Not even a king could exist without wisdom’ («ὅτι δ΄ ἁ τῶ κόσμω … συνέχεται γὰρ εὐκοσμίᾳ τε καὶ τάξει τᾷ δεούσᾳ· νόω δὲ χωρὶς οὐκ ἂν αὐτὰ γενοίατο. οὐδ΄ ὁ βασιλεὺς δὴ χωρὶς φρονάσιος») (Ecphantus the Crotonian, On Kings, 4.7.66.18-21). In Plato’s (1959) mind, ‘[H]eaven and earth and gods and humans are held together by communication, friendship, order, prudence and justice, and that because of these bonds, they call it universe “cosmos”’ (Gorgias, 507e-508a).7

The organization of a ‘perfect’ political community must resemble the eucosmia of the universe (Pello 2018); that is, every member must serve a common purpose, the common interest of the city. In such cities order, reason and justice prevail. On the contrary, a political society of disorder is far from being a product of political science, as long as it is not dominated by orderly reason, but by chaotic raw passions (Vavouras 2022, p. 90). Additionally, a political community, much like the cosmos as a whole, comprises various components (or parts) that together create a unified entity. However, each part serves a distinct role. Every part must perform a task that is proper to its nature. Multitasking (πολυπραγμοσύνη) is overwhelmingly discouraged, as it distracts persons from their assigned roles. In effect, this could create dynamics that undermine the order and stability of the political community as such. Thus, all political parts must focus on their appointed tasks.8 As also Aristotle (2013) argued, ‘[t]hose which are composed of several parts resulting in a unity, whether these parts are united or separated, in all of them the governing and the governed part are distinguished, and this relation of power exists in all living beings of the whole natural order; even in beings that do not participate in life there is some form of authoritative relation of order, as is the case with harmony’ («ὅσα γὰρ ἐκ πλειόνων συνέστηκε καὶ γίνεται ἕν τι κοινόν͵ εἴτε ἐκ συνεχῶν εἴτε ἐκ διῃρημένων͵ ἐν ἅπασιν ἐμφαίνεται τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον͵ καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς ἁπάσης φύσεως ἐνυπάρχει τοῖς ἐμψύχοις· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ μετέχουσι ζωῆς ἔστι τις ἀρχή͵ οἷον ἁρμονίας») (Politics, 1254a). Thus, the political science connoisseur must be in a position of authority; in turn, non-connoisseurs execute the orders of the former. Additionally, to impose order is to ensure that the lower parts will not rebel against the high authorities. The ruler must ‘[i]mmediately put an end to every political rebellion, discord, or mere dissent’ («: ἀνεῖλε δὲ ἄρδην στάσιν καὶ διχοφωνίαν καὶ ἁπλῶς ἑτεροφροσύνην») (Iamblichus 1991, Life of Pythagoras, 7.34). The removal of political scientists from positions of power could allow subjective opinions to dominate the public realm. Such opinions are driven by passion rather than cosmic and scientific knowledge. This shift could quickly lead to political chaos and uncertainty (Life of Pythagoras, 7.34.13).9

In the Pythagorean mindset, the practice of politics is often identified with the practice of medicine. Like the doctor, who holds medical expertise, and can treat the diseased parts of the human body, the political governor, armed with the knowledge of political science, must intervene in society, imposing the appropriate policies to restore a ‘healthy’ order. Conflict, disorder and division, these grave political diseases, must be predicted and uprooted before their catastrophic manifestation (Plato 1959, Gorgias. 464b-465b). Similarly, al-Fārābī links the first ruler, the most virtuous king, with the medical professional, who relies on his/her knowledge to maintain health in persons, protecting them from all potential illnesses (Al-Fārābī 2001, Book of Religion, 14b; 14c; 14d; cf. ES, 1).10 A physician ‘cures the bodies of individuals and of single beings’ by examining illnesses and prescribing the appropriate remedy (BR, 14c). However, physicians go beyond textbook learning; they rely on long experience and observation to tailor treatments to the particular needs of each patient (BR, 14c). Likewise, the first king understands universal principles but at the same time acquires practical experience in order to make specific decisions tailored to each situation (BR, 14d). The first king must go beyond theoretical knowledge to determine actions regarding the quantity, quality, timing, and other specifics, tailored to individual cities, nations, or persons (BR, 14d).

For the Pythagoreans, the ruler must know how to cut off ‘with fire and iron [«πυρὶ καὶ σιδήρῳ»] from the body the disease, from the soul the ignorance, from the belly the luxury, from the city the political strife-rebellion, from the family the discord, and from all altogether the lack of measure’ («παντοίαις ἀπὸ μὲν σώματος νόσον͵ ἀπὸ δὲ ψυχῆς ἀμαθίαν͵ κοιλίας δὲ πολυτέλειαν͵ πόλεως δὲ στάσιν͵ οἴκου δὲ διχοφροσύνην͵ ὁμοῦ δὲ πάντων ἀμετρίαν») (Iamblichus 1991, Life of Pythagoras, 7.34.13). Justice is conceivable only when order prevails, which, as previously noted, requires each part to fulfil its assigned responsibilities according to its specific expertise. However, these differentiated parts must cooperate harmoniously. To achieve this goal, the Creator must open pathways for all these parts to communicate. In turn, communication requires friendship,11 which (in the Pythagorean mindset) ultimately aims for prudence and cohesion. Similarly, al-Fārābī asserts that all excellent cities replicate the divine harmony and purpose of the universe, as instituted and sustained by the First Existent (sometimes translated as the ‘First Cause’ or the ‘First Principle’). In short, the First Existent is the Creator and master of the structure of the universe; the First Existent is not created by anything of higher or lower rank; it is an eternal and intelligent being; it serves as the cause of the creation of all intelligible and intelligized things. The First Existent has wisdom; it can think of ‘the most excellent thing through the most excellent knowledge’ (Al-Fārābī 1998, OPS, 1.8). This knowledge is permanent, eternal, and of its essence (OPS, 1.8). However, the human mind is weak to understand it; this is because human beings are mixed with matter remote from the First Existent (OPS, 1.11).

Moreover, all existents derive from the First, which ascribes to them a precise meaning (OPS, 2.1). Every existent emanates from the First; the Second existent comes from the First. This existent has no matter; such as the First, it is incorporeal. However, it ‘thinks of the First’ (OPS, 3.1). Like the First and Second Existents, the Third existent is an immaterial substance and ‘thinks of the First’ (OPS, 3.2). The Fourth existent is Saturn, the Fifth is Jupiter, the Sixth is Mars, the Seventh is the Sun, the Eighth is planet Venus, the Ninth is Mercury, and the Tenth is the Moon (OPS, 3.2). Their excellence and perfection are acquired by thinking of the essence of the First (OPS, 6.2); they are created as a result of thinking of the First (OPS, 3.2). However, their numerical order signifies a descending excellence (OPS, 3.2).

Moving forward, we will elucidate how (in al-Fārābī’s mind) this hierarchical relationship among these existents plays a pivotal role in the realm of political governance. Initially, we will have to explore the five faculties through which intelligence and wisdom are given to human beings. These are the nutritive faculty, the faculty of representation, the faculty of reason and, finally, the appetitive faculty and the faculty of sense perception. Each of them serves multiple purposes. The main goal of the nutritive faculty is to serve the body, to which it always remains attached (OPS, 13.7). The faculty of sense perceives tangible objects of taste, scent, sound, touch, and shape or color (OPS, 10.1). Next comes the faculty of representation, which retains the imprints of all the physical (and memorable) objects our faculty of sense perception has brought to our attention; the same faculty often connects or disconnects these imprints to or from each other (OPS, 10.1; 10.5; 14.1; 14.3). At the same time, the appetitive faculty, which depends on the faculty of sense (OPS, 11.9), produces human will by evoking the faculty of representation and/or the faculty of reason (OPS, 10.6; 10.9). The ultimate purpose of the faculty of reason is to allow humans to distinguish right from wrong (OPS, 10.1). All these faculties communicate with each other in order to fulfil the highest human objective: to achieve felicity by allowing the human soul to reach a degree of perfection (OPS, 13.5).

The same purposefulness can be found in the bodily structure of the human. The heart is the ruling organ (OPS, 11.1 15.5), where the faculty of sense is also located (OPS, 10.9). In the same way, all perfect existents are created by thinking of the power and glory of the First Existent, every organ of the human body performs tasks by thinking of the needs of the heart to play the most important role: to sustain life. The brain is another ruling organ, which is also ruled by the heart itself (OPS, 11.1). The heart produces innate heat; the heart regulates that heat (OPS, 11.2). The nutritive faculty resides in the heart, to which all other organs are subordinate (OPS, 10.2); they rule and they are ruled at the same time (OPS, 10.2). The faculty of reason and representation can function only when the levels of heat are maintained at a certain temperature (OPS, 11.2; 11.4). The nerves are instruments of the auxiliaries of the faculty of sense, which resides in the heart, such as the appetitive faculty (OPS, 11.2; 11.4). The nerves enable ‘each sense to perform its special function’ (OPS, 11.3). They are also instruments of the limbs, ‘which are subordinate to the appetitive faculty’ itself (OPS, 11.3); they enable the limbs to ‘be moved by will’ (OPS, 11.3). Both the brain and the heart contribute to the functioning of the nerves. And finally, the lungs bring air to the heart from the outside (OPS, 11.7). The natural aim of each organ is to function in such a way as to contribute to the well-being of the body in general; to do so, they have to perform their functions according to their aims, supporting all other organs, including the heart, which is the ruling organ of the body (OPS, 15.4; 15.5). Analogous to the cosmos and the human body is a human politeia, which also consists of distinct components, each of which exhibits varying degrees of excellence and natural disposition (OPS, 15.4). Such as the heart resembles the excellence and perfection of the First Cause and, for this reason, is considered the most perfect organ of the human body, the ruler of a human politeia is the most perfect and excellent of all and beneath him/her are people who are ruled (by him/her) and who in return rule others (OPS, 15.5; 15.6). In the same way heavenly and material bodies conform to the First Cause (which is located in the highest ranks of immaterial existents) (OPS, 15.6), virtuous rulers (the heart of the politeia) are located in the first rank (OPS, 15.4) and beneath below them, in the second rank, one finds people who perform actions according to their orders; individuals who are in the second rank act according to mandates issued by the people of the second rank (OPS, 15.5). Thus, an excellent city is made up of different parts/ranks, each of which is subordinated to another (OPS, 15.5). The natural aim of every rank is to respect each other and to obey their leader, the heart of the political community (OPS, 15.5). In different terms, ‘[t]he Governor of the world places natural traits in the parts of the world by means of which they are made harmonious, organized, linked together, and mutually supportive in actions in such a way that, despite their multiplicity and the multiplicity of their actions, they become like a single thing performing a single action for a single purpose’ (Al-Fārābī 2001, BR, 27). In much the same manner, human governors must ‘prescribe voluntary traits and dispositions for the souls in the divisions of the nation and city’ (BR, 27, emphasis added) in order to bring harmony; they must link together all different parts, so that the city becomes a homogenized body ‘performing a single action by which a single purpose is obtained. What corresponds to that becomes clear to anyone who contemplates the organs of the human body’ (BR, 27). Only those living in ‘ignorant cities’ do not actively respond to the demands of universal eucosmia. The rulers of such cities are not people of excellence (OPS, 15.20). Quite often, they bring misery, poverty and oppression (OPS, 15.16). Citizens of ‘ignorant cities’ often strive for the so-called ‘ignorant goods’, that is, extreme individual material pleasure; they seek wealth and riches, neglecting the common interest (OPS, 15.16). Thus, they produce evil dispositions, which corrupt the human soul (OPS, 16.6), and force it to remain in a permanent state of imperfection (OPS, 16.7).

Hence, in the Pythagorean as well as in the al-Fārābīan philosophy, all entities must serve a common objective; they must conform to the divine harmony and purposefulness of the Creator. The universe, therefore, functions like a well-tuned instrument. The same must happen in political society: all political tendencies must consent to serve an ultimate objective, which is clearly defined by political science. As explained by Diotogenes (1994), ‘a city with right laws, just as it is with a well-tuned lyre, must be in harmony with the will of the king’ who rules according to the demands of divine eucosmia and imposes a just order («ὅθεν ὡς λύραν καὶ πόλιν εὐνομουμέναν δεῖ συναρμόσασθαι βασιλέα ὅρον δικαιότατον καὶ νόμω τάξιν ἐν αὐτῷ πρᾶτον καταστησάμενον») (Concerning a Kingdom, 4.7.62.29-33).12 ‘The king is the most just citizen; the king knows ‘well that the assembly of the multitude, whose hegemony was attributed to him by God, must be carried out according to the model of the divine assembly of the universe’ («εἰδότα διότι τῶ πλάθεος͵ ὧ δέδωκεν ὁ θεὸς αὐτῷ τὰν ἁγεμονίαν͵ ἁ συναρμογὰ ποτ΄ αὐτὸν ὀφείλει συναρμοσθῆμεν») (Concerning a Kingdom, 4.7.62.29-33). As also explained by Ecphantus the Crotonian, ‘On the earth and in the natural world human has the most perfect natural constitution among living beings, and the most divine characteristics are possessed by the king, who excels and is more powerful among the common nature of humans, certainly similar to other humans in body, since it is composed of the same corporal matter, but made by an excellent craftsman (the god), who crafted him using his own being as an archetype; […] the king is a unique creation, an approximation in type of the supreme divine king, always familiar to his creator’ («ἐν δὲ τᾷ γᾷ καὶ παρ΄ ἁμῖν ἀριστοφυέστατον μὲν ἄνθρωπος͵ θειότερον δ΄ ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐν τᾷ κοινᾷ φύσει πλεονεκτῶν τῶ κρέσσονος͵ τὸ μὲν σκᾶνος τοῖς λοιποῖς ὅμοιος͵ οἷα γεγονὼς ἐκ τᾶς αὐτᾶς ὕλας͵ ὑπὸ τεχνίτα δ΄ εἰργασμένος λῴστω͵ ὃς ἐτεχνίτευσεν αὐτὸν ἀρχετύπῳ χρώμενος ἑαυτῷ· […] 4.7.64.21-23: κατασκεύασμα δὴ ὦν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἓν καὶ μόνον ἐντὶ οἷα τύπος τῶ ἀνωτέρω βασιλέως͵ τῷ μὲν πεποιηκότι γνώριμον ἀεί») (On Kings, 4.6.22.7-12).13 The next section discusses the role a ruler must play within a politeia instituted according to the eucosmic principles of the universe. This analysis will lay the necessary groundwork for us to understand that such types of rule are not inherently predisposed towards autocracy or tyranny. Rather, they may embody Promethean attributes.

4. The Ruler and the Ideal City

For the Pythagoreans, every aspect of all existents is purposeful; only the Creator can determine the meaning of this purposefulness (Schofield 2019). In turn, only humans can perceive this meaning, which embodies the wisdom of the cosmos (Sorabji 1993, pp. 65–77). Wisdom and intelligence are crucial in forming a relationship between the Creator and other beings; they can illuminate the creative plan of God as well as the purpose of God’s creation (Huffman 2013). Therefore, the human political governor, although ontologically different from the divine, is the absolute recipient of the governing wisdom of the universe; the political governor can transfer this knowledge to the field of secular political government. Even though human statesmen are ontologically distinct from the divine ruler and inferior in capacity, they can attain substantial power through a clear communication strategy (Plato 1925, Statesman, 274e-275c).

First of all, the eucosmia of the political community is maintained when its ruler is wise and, thus, an earthly miniature of God (Horky 2013), ‘a worthy imitator and zealot of the supreme god’ («Χρὴ τὸν βασιλέα σοφὸν ἦμεν· οὕτω γὰρ ἐσσεῖται ἀντίμιμος καὶ ζηλωτὰς τῶ πράτω θεῶ»), in Sthenidas’ words (1994, On a Kingdom, 4.7.63.1-8).14 Al-Fārābī’s political philosophy follows a line of thought. A virtuous way consists in performing actions conducive to felicity, or ‘ultimate happiness’ (Al-Fārābī 2001, BR, 11). Felicity ‘is the good which is pursued for its own sake and it is never at any time pursued obtaining something else through it, and there is nothing greater beyond it for a man to obtain’ (Al-Fārābī OPS, 13.6). Felicity ‘does not come about in this life, but rather in the next life which is after this one’ (BR, 11; cf. Mahdi 2001, p. 173). It is not about ‘affluence, pleasures, honour and being glorified, or anything else sought and acquired in this life that the multitude calls goods’ (Mahdi 2001, p. 173). However, the attainment of felicity presupposes a standard of excellence on the part of human rulers. In turn, excellence is characterised by the emulation of God’s wisdom and obedience to divine laws (Adamson 2007, pp. 16–17; Strauss 1959, p. 139). Thus, rulers know how to exercise power by imitating the perfection of the First Existent (as noted earlier). To do so, they must activate their actual intellect (Al-Fārābī 1998, OPS, 15.8); that is, their ‘representative faculty must reach its utmost natural perfection, to receive, either in walking life or in sleep, ‘from the Active Intellect the particulars, either as they are or by imitating them’ (15.8). Echoing Aristotle, al-Fārābī’s conceptualizes the Active Intellect as an immaterial existent, emanated indirectly by the First Existent (that is, by God) (Fakhry 2002, pp. 73–75); it is the agent that bridges the realm of the divine with that of the human and ‘causes the potential intellect, as well as the potential intelligibles, to become actual’ (p. 73). In other words, the human faculty of reason can transform into intellect what is provided in human beings. The faculty of representation only preserves in our mind objects we sense through the faculty of our senses (Al-Fārābī 1998, OPS, 13.2; 14.2); the faculty of reason considers these objects inteligibles (OPS, 13.2). Both faculties receive only the ‘matter’ (OPS, 14.4), that is, natural objects, which are intellect in potentiality (or Passive Intellect); in order to be transformed into intellects of actuality, the Active Intellect (which is the Tenth existent below the First Cause) must play its part (OPS, 13.2). More to the point: the faculty of representation is in direct communication with the appetitive faculty; it imitates the latter’s tendency to create emotions, such as wrath and anger (OPS, 14.5). For example, the representative faculty creates in the mind the image of a man in action under the possession of the emotion of anger. This image is perceived (and imprinted to memory) by the faculty of sense; it is revoked and depicted in such a way that would suit the will of the appetitive faculty. However, the faculty of representation can also imitate inteligibles that stand in absolute perfection and dwell in the faculty of reason (like the First Cause). These inteligibles become actual intellect through the Active Intellect (OPS, 15.6). Any human being whose Passive Intellect has been perfected ‘by [having apprehended] all the intelligibles and has become actually intellect and actually being thought, so that the intelligible in him has become identical with that which thinks in him, acquires an actual intellect which is superior to Passive Intellect’ (OPS, 15.8). This intellect is called ‘Acquired Intellect’ and occupies a middle position between the Active and the Passive (OPS, 15.8).15 However, when persons are exclusively focused on their material world, their soul is swamped by distress, for which their faculty of reason remains unaware (OPS, 16.7). The Active Intellect guides the human soul towards perfection (that is, towards wisdom), establishing the supremacy of reason over unbridled passions. The Pythagorean emphasis on eucosmic leadership is not different in this regard: to embody divine wisdom in order to promote harmony in society rulers must also acquire self-discipline; they must regulate their desires and passions. Persons cannot become legitimate rulers without becoming virtuous themselves (Thom 2013, pp. 12–16; Gemelli 2014, pp. 145–47), without becoming aware of their essence (Giangiulio 2016, pp. 121–22), which leads them to moral rightness. As Sthenidas the Locrian (1994) claimed, ‘god is by nature supreme king and sovereign, while the human king belongs to the divine generation’ and (as mentioned earlier) imitates the cosmic sovereignty and wisdom («οὗτος γὰρ καὶ φύσει ἐστὶ καὶ πρᾶτος βασιλεύς τε καὶ δυνάστας͵ ὁ δὲ γενέσει καὶ μιμάσει»); for ‘god is sovereign of the universe, while the king is sovereign of human things’ («. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐν τῷ παντὶ καὶ ὅλῳ͵ ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ γᾶς»). However, ‘god lives eternally and governs everything possessing wisdom within himself, the king is the possessor of the science he acquired within a certain time and can imitate in an excellent way the divine kingdom’ («καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀεὶ τὰ πάντα διοικεῖ τε καὶ ζώει αὐτὸς ἐν αὑτῷ κεκταμένος τὰν σοφίαν͵ ὁ δ΄ ἐν χρόνῳ ἐπιστάμαν. ἄριστα δέ κα μιμέοιτο τοῦτον») (On a Kingdom, 4.7.63.1-8).16

The analogy drawn between the ruler and God is not grounded in abstract religious superstitions. The Pythagoreans never claimed that priests should be involved in government affairs; the aim of a philosophical government is truth; instead, the central aim of theocracy is blind faith (Betegh 2014). In short, legitimate rulers must be excellent scientists (Platο, Politics. 266e, 258b); their main goal is to implement policies based on natural right by relying solely on reason (Vavouras 2021). Only those who have acquired concrete knowledge of the essence of beings can sense the eucosmia of nature and transfer it to the political field. Thus, rulers are intellectually superior to all other human beings. This superiority is predicated on the singular trait that distinguishes the human species from all other organisms: the ability to pass sound judgments (Broadie 1999, pp. 208–9). This ability is more developed in political scientists compared to the broader population; and hence, the political scientists is elevated to a position akin to ‘gods’ among humans (Cornford 1922; Flinterman 1996). Their knowledge of human nature allows them to make any legislative and political interventions to benefit society. The laws enacted by such rulers are considered reflections of the divine; however, this does not render the same laws immune to questioning. Civil laws must promote harmony and justice; hence, laws are not ends in themselves. Rulers must observe that all the laws of the politeia lead to the predominance of reason over passion (Lloyd 1990); however, they must be able to understand when imposed laws must be altered (Plato 1925, Statesman, 294a). When doctors apply their medical knowledge to treat patients, they consider the specific nature of each individual’s illness. The medications prescribed may be adjusted to reflect the needs determined by the progression of the condition. Likewise, civil laws should not be always followed rigidly; rulers must acknowledge the complex interplay of factors that often require recognition of the necessity to enact new laws (Statesman, 295c-e). In short, positive law, regardless of how well is structured, cannot replace the personal administration of the political scientist (Rowett 2014). As Plato (1921) argued, ‘the wise man replaces corrupt laws with right ones in every case, which laws not only seem right but are really right’ («ὁ σοφὸς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν ὄντων αὐτοῖς ἑκάστων χρηστὰ ἐποίησεν εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν») (Theaetetus, 167c). According to, Diotogenes (1994), ‘the right is in the law’, ‘the law is the cause of the right’ and the king ‘a living law’ («τὸ μὲν γὰρ δίκαιον ἐν τῷ νόμῳ ἐντί͵ ὁ δέ γε νόμος αἴτιος τῶ δικαίω … δὲ βασιλεὺς ἤτοι νόμος ἔμψυχός») (Concerning a Kingdom, 4.7.61.4-6). To suggest that the law is associated with the concept of justice and that the king/scientist is ‘a living law’, implies that the king/scientist him/herself (as an ideal ruler) is an ever-evolving (rather than a static) wise and fair human, who is always capable of advancing justice and fairness thanks to his/her capacity to continuously adjust his/her knowledge of power and legislation to the pressing demands of newly emerging circumstances.

As we see, the point of contact of the divine governor with the human is knowledge about politics. The statesman is a scientist of the nature and aim of human and political society, and this special knowledge harmonizes with the rule of the divine governor. The difference between the statesman and his/her subjects lies not in conventional characteristics, such as wealth, military power, or social origin, but in his natural superiority through knowledge of political science. Statesmen are capable of imposing dominion of reason over passions. Ant thus, they excel in wisdom and knowledge of the essence and the purpose of the political community as well as of the people who make it up (Plato 1959, Gorgias, 491c). The fundamental difference between a statesman and the ‘average person’ rests in the possession of the knowledge of political science (Huffman 2009; Vavouras 2020, p. 128; Horky 2021). In the Pythagorean mindset, ‘average persons’ cannot always understand (or critically evaluate) complex views about ethics and government.

In other words, the likeness of the ruler to the Creator consists of the right reason, which makes humans part of the eucosmia of the universe. Furthermore, the preservation of the eucosmia of the city entails the establishment of concord.17 In turn, this presupposes the aptitude to engender the appropriate conditions for the homogenisation of political society. Coherency, harmony and friendship are of utmost significance in the Pythagorean philosophy (Diogenes Laertius 1925, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, 8.33; cf. Barker 2014). According to Ecphantus the Crotonian, ‘[t]he friendship that governs the city aims at a common final purpose and imitates the concord that governs the universe’ («ἁ δ΄ ἐν τᾷ πόλει φιλία κοινῶ τινος τέλεος ἐχομένα τὰν τοῦ παντὸς ὁμόνοιαν μιμᾶται») (On Kings, 4.7.64.75-76). Thus, friendship and concord render the city immune to any internal division, the par excellence source of conflict (in the Pythagorean mindset). In different terms, a political society is made up of parts that rule and parts that are ruled, parts that give orders and parts that carry them out. Harmony denotes the smooth fit between political tendencies, i.e., the excellent functioning of the political organization. Concord also implies that most parts of the political organisation have unleashed their (Promethean) agency and potential to cultivate within themselves the ability to establish dominion over passions. Moreover, individuals subjected to the power of a ruler acknowledge a phenomenon akin to the evolutionary processes observed in the broader realm of nature, characterized by the duality of dominance and subservience. It is within the harmonious interplay of these two seemingly conflicting forces that the fundamental operations of nature find their grounding, as indicated by references to Aristotelian political philosophy (Aristotle 2013, Politics, 1253a; 1254a). In other words, the ‘dominated’ parts of a politeia are self-aware of their nature and the functional role they shoulder within a political organism. In that sense, they demand their city to be ruled according to the harmony and purposefulness that governs the cosmos. We understand, then, that the power of legitimate rulers/political scientists is not despotic; they do (and must) not act as if the politeia is their property, dictating rules arbitrarily in order to force every person to obey their subjective judgment. Obedience to the power of rulers/human governors is an important prerequisite, provided that legitimacy underpins such authority, provided that rule must align with the eucosmic order (to use different terms).

Likewise, in al-Fārābī’s political philosophy wicked—or ignorant—cities are inhabited by persons devoid of the capability to create conditions conducive to the promotion of felicity and harmony. The rulers of such cities are ‘errant’, ‘deceptive’, or ‘non-virtuous’. They strive solely for material pleasure and wealth (the so-called ‘ignorant goods’) for themselves (Al-Fārābī 2001, ES, 93-4; 77; BR, 1). While the ‘errant’ ruler believes—albeit mistakenly—that he leads his city to ultimate happiness, ‘deceptive’ leaders deliberately use lies and pursue ‘ignorant goods’ for themselves, at the expense of the felicity of the people (ES, 93); they are not guided by the Active Intellect (Al-Fārābī 1998, OPS, 15.19). The first stage through which humans develop the capacity to restrain the rule of passions is by ‘coming to be of the receptive of their natural disposition which is ready to become actually intellect’ (OPS, 15.9). As noted earlier, such humans can become excellent persons, and therefore rulers. In turn, excellent rulers create regimes that bring felicity (ultimate happiness); this is a ‘virtuous regime’ and ‘[t]he city or nation subject to this regime is the virtuous city and the virtuous nation’ respectively (Al-Fārābī 2001, BR, 14a).

In both cases, we find that obedience to the ruler is necessary and useful for the existence and perfection of political society. This is also supported by Dillon (2014), who argues that within the Pythagorean framework, individuals must first learn to be governed before they can assume the role of rulers; before they ascend to power, they must subordinate themselves to something functionally superior. Political governors and every member of the community gain knowledge about human nature and purpose when they perform different socio-political roles. Even political scientists submit to the superiority of divine purposefulness and the wondrous eucosmia that they strive to comprehend and infuse into the human world. Iamblichus claimed that rulers must take drastic steps to eradicate the disease of dissent with ‘fire and iron’. However, Iamblichus does not allude to the exchange of opinion and mere disagreement but rather to tumultuous divisions («διχοφωνίαν καὶ ἑτεροφροσύνην») that incite mass violence (stasis-«στάσις»). Such cases of dissent turn citizens against each other and, in turn, lead the whole society towards dissolution. Consensus on behalf of all political parts in the common reason of governance promotes concord and unity (oneness of mind or thought, ὁμόνοια/homónoia from ὁμόνους, ὁμοῦ + νόος-νοῦς); it creates the appropriate conditions for ‘average persons’ and political scientists/human governors to arrive at a common understanding of how the city should be ruled. As Plato (Burnet 1907) explained, concord implies the agreement of the statesman and the populace in terms of how to rule and be ruled («Ὁμόνοια ὁμοδοξία ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων ὡς δεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι») (Definitions, 413e).18 To avoid misunderstandings, this agreement does not resemble the ‘social contract’ political model, proposed by influential thinkers of modernity, such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, who supported the transfer of rights and natural liberties to a sovereign leader, in the pursuit of order and security.19 In the Pythagorean political philosophy, harmony and political virtue are safeguarded through consensual types of compromise, made because each political part acquires self-knowledge, which prompts them to act in such a way as to complete their role in society. Thus, consensus is not built on convention and relativity; the inhabitants of a city seek to leverage the superior knowledge of the political scientist for their collective welfare. In the following section, we will explain that such types of political agreements (also endorsed by al-Fārābī) are compatible with the principles of political Prometheism.

5. The Quest for Promethean Leadership

To begin with, let us focus on Plato’s examination of the two types of equality within Pythagorean political thought: arithmetical and geometrical equality. Each of them is characterized by unique attributes. Yet they converge towards a unified aim.

Arithmetical equality is applied in the awarding process by every political community and every legislator; and it is determined by quantitative alternations of units of measure, size, and numerical values, which one can confer by shifting the responsibility (of its results) to the drawing of lots (Plato 1926, Laws, 757b-c; Plato 1959, Gorgias, 507e-508a). It advocates that all political parts are considered equal, without any qualitative or aretaic differentiation. Thus, offices and honours are distributed equally to everyone (Laws, 757b-c). Moreover, the governor does not require specialised knowledge. Anyone can be placed in a government position, as long as he/she can make simple numerical measurements (Laws, 757b-c). Here there is no reference to the value and importance of the task performed by each political part or to their natural individual abilities. All political arrangements apply impersonally to everyone without exception. In other words, political governance operates like an individual engaged in training and practising gymnastics. The trainer instructs everyone to execute similar exercises, regardless of their individual (physical) abilities. Thus, they do not acknowledge the varying capacities of each person in training and their struggle to maintain the gymnastic rhythm; this could effectively contribute to stagnation among those who find the tasks too facile for their capabilities (Plato 1925, Statesman, 294d-295b). Similarly, one can draw a parallel with a doctor who indiscriminately dispenses food to patients, regardless of the specific nature of their illnesses and requirements (Plato 1959, Gorgias, 490b-d). The epitome of arithmetical equality manifests in the democratic system, which is built upon the ideals of direct involvement through public referenda and drawing lots (random selection methods), enabling every individual, regardless of qualifications, to attain positions of power. However, when observers examine the universe and the natural world, quickly discover that the components cannot be entirely equal in terms of the functions they fulfil within the organism; the function of a star in the cosmic order varies greatly from that of a planet or an asteroid. Thus comes the so-called geometrical equality, whose principles must be incorporated into the structure of civil society.

In short, geometrical equality grants awards or inflicts punishments to each political part by evaluating its individual role and merit (Plato 1926, Laws, 757b-c). Its implementation is a demanding political process. It requires a capacity to rigorously evaluate each part to ensure appropriate rewards; that is, geometrical equality acknowledges the special nature of each political factor and proceeds with a just reward based on merit (Laws, 757b-c). Additionally, it underscores the importance of political science, since not every person possesses the cognitive competence required to execute these specialized political tasks (Laws, 757b-c). The input of political science at the highest government level is necessary for the just evaluation of each political part. Geometrical equality is the ultimate expression of reason and order in politics, based on the eucosmia of the universe; geometrical equality expresses the maximum possible understanding of the functioning of the parts of the universe and their differentiation based on their value. Political positions are not trophies of material wealth, but duties of appropriate human natures to achieve a common political purpose (Laws, 757b-c).20 By following the principles of geometrical equality, the human governor ensures fairness and justice according to individual merit. In al-Fārābī’s discussion of the most virtuous/excellent king, a similar view (briefly mentioned in the previous section) is observed; like a medical scientist, the excellent ruler must make decisions tailored to the individual merit/virtue of each person as well as to specific needs of situations arising (Al-Fārābī 2001, BR, 14d). Above all, the virtuous ruler (according to the Pythagoreans) must ensure that the most excellent citizens can take up leadership positions; in turn, the less competent must receive support and guidance (in the same way those who are ill require treatment).

Let us also consider that Archytas’ reflection on natural right in positive right involves the application of geometrical equality, which entails rendering to each individual what he/she deserves according to the degree of integration of his/her nature (Barker 2006). ‘To follow the dictates of nature is to imitate natural right; this is the right, which bestows upon each one according to his own nature and value (=geometrical equality). The law is powerful, to the extent that it achieves the harmonization of the positive right with the natural right. The many humans, however, are not able to accept the accord with natural right, which is the summum bonum, but prefer the uncertain, that is, that which benefits them according to the alternation of circumstances. Therefore, citizens, just like the sick and the weak, need political care’ («ἀκόλουθος μὲν ὦν κα εἴη τᾷ φύσει͵ μιμεόμενος τὸ τᾶς φύσιος δίκαιον· τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν τὸ ἀνάλογον καὶ τὸ ἐπιβάλλον ἑκάστῳ κατὰ τὰν ἑκάστω ἀξίαν. δυνατὸς δέ͵ αἰ ποτὶ τὼς νομοθετουμένως ἔχει τὰν συναρμογάν· πολλοὶ γὰρ τὸ τᾷ φύσει καὶ πρᾶτον ἀγαθὸν οὐχ ἱκανοὶ δέξασθαι͵ τὸ δὲ ποθ΄ αὑτὼς καὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τοὶ νοσέοντες καὶ τοὶ κάμνοντες τυγχάνοντι ἐπιμελείας». (Archytas, On Law and Justice, 4.1.136.2-13). Moreover, if a virtuous ruler aims to be an imitator of the divine eucosmia, and if his/her laws must respect the natural right, we understand natural right itself is in line with eucosmia. Or, to be more precise, natural right is the cornerstone of harmony and concord in society. In this regard, if the laws imposed by the human governor do not follow the principles of natural right they are not right laws. Hence, if rulers fail to ensure that the laws of the politeia are founded on the notion of natural right, they are considered illegitimate. According to Archytas, ‘[t]he law must follow the orders of nature, its application to political matters must be possible and beneficial for the political society; because if one of these parameters, or some or all of them are not achievable, neither law exists, nor perfect law can exist’ («Δεῖ δὲ τὸν νόμον ἀκόλουθον ἦμεν τᾷ φύσει͵ δυνατὸν τοῖς πράγμασι͵ συμφέροντα τᾷ πολιτικᾷ κοινωνίᾳ· αἴτε γὰρ ἑνὸς τούτων αἴτε πλῃόνων αἴτε πάντων ἀπο λείπεται͵ ἤτοι οὐ νόμος ἢ οὐ τέλῃος νόμος ἐσεῖται») (On Law and Justice, 4.1.136.2-13).

The preference for geometrical over arithmetical equality highlights the Pythagoreans’ strong skepticism toward democracy. In their mindset, politics deal with complex issues, which often require expertise to avoid myopic decisions that do not consider all the relevant factors in the process of judgment (Plato 2013, Republic, 487e–489d). Thus, they seek the intelligence and knowledge of a political scientist to pass judgment on areas where knowledge and expertise are essential. But if the inhabitants of a city understand their individual roles, and if the purpose of these roles is to allow an excellent ruler (a political scientist) to advance natural right, we understand that the inhabitants themselves share a degree of knowledge about natural right as well. Such a consensual arrangement in cities inhabited by ignorant persons would be deemed impossible. The multitude confers its trust in political scientists due to their superior knowledge and proficiency in advancing natural right. However, the multitude does not permit a political scientist to assume unlimited power. In fact, a populace that has not cultivated the ability to understand what natural right is about, cannot properly identify (and appreciate) the individual with superior knowledge, making him/her the head of their politeia. Thus, this ignorance serves as an obstacle to the creation of the conditions within which such mutual accords are established and come into effect. It is, therefore, clear that in the Pythagorean political philosophy, the ‘dominated’ parts are not completely subordinate to the authority of the human governor; the course and direction of their political community remain under their own free choices. Moreover, the Pythagoreans abhor coercive modes of rule; despotism and tyranny, they assume, are contrary to the principles of concord and friendship. Political governors are not despots; their primary concern is 1) to make the application of (legitimate) laws feasible in every political part, and 2) to ensure that laws are in harmony with the ultimate goal of political society, which is happiness and peace (Balch 1992).

We can see that the political thought of the Pythagoreans, despite its fierce opposition to democracy, can be interpreted from a perspective that permits us to identify Promethean elements within it. Can we also approach al-Fārābī’s political philosophy through this same lens, discovering Promethean themes and concepts? As the Arab philosopher argued, excellence cannot be achieved by everyone (Al-Fārābī 1998, OPS, 15.7). More importantly, such as the First Cause, the most superior Existent, is not ruled by another, and the heart, the central mechanism of the human body, is not subordinated to the authority of another human organ, a ruler, the most perfect individual in society, is not ruled by less perfect human beings. A ruler is a person ‘over whom nobody has any sovereignty whatsoever’ and who has ‘reached perfection by becoming actually intellect’ (OPS, 15.8). This position is reiterated by subsequent Islamic philosophers, notably al-Ghazālī, who also claimed that only certain individuals possess the capacity to govern others; this capacity equips them with the requisite skills for wielding political power (Syros 2023). Such persons, al-Ghazālī claimed, know how to appoint the most excellent government officials, judges and chiefs of marketplaces. More importantly, they suppress dissension while demanding that all members of society obey civil laws (Syros 2023). How does this conception of political rule align with the principles of political Prometheism? In al-Fārābī’s mind, virtuous leaders are not self-created, as the First Cause. Much like the Pythagorean political governors, they declare their superiority because of their knowledge and philosophy. However, this superiority (as we have already seen) stems from their Acquired Intellect, enabled by the Active Intellect (which derives from the First Cause). Therefore, their scientific knowledge and wisdom are not simply the effects of their faculty of reason and re-presentation; they originate in the Creator of the cosmos. Furthermore, ‘perfect’ rulers learn how to defeat their passions; they know how to avoid the excesses of the flesh, inspiring those under their rule to adhere to these standards of modesty. This capacity stems from their wisdom and knowledge about the Great Creator and Defender of order and harmony. Hence, virtuous rulers are also ‘ruled’ by extrasocial powers; their political science and philosophy must be in line with the divine eucosmia. In other words, the truths of the universe that should guide the opinions and actions of rulers, are disclosed ‘by means of revelation’ from God. ‘This occurs in one or both of two ways: one is that they are all revealed to him as determined; the second is that he determines them by means of the faculty he acquires from revelation and from the Revealer, may He be exalted, so that the stipulations with which he determines the virtuous opinions and actions are disclosed to him by means of it’ (Al-Fārābī 2001, BR, 1; ES, 1).

But unlike al-Ghazālī’s anti-Promethean stance, echoed in his belief that meritorious leadership is a matter of virtue bestowed (by God) upon a chosen few (Syros 2023), in al-Fārābī’s philosophy, the Acquired Intellect can be activated by everyone. In other words, al-Fārābī does not consider the virtues of rulers as ‘natural qualifications’; instead, he speaks only of their ‘qualifications’ (Burns 2016, p. 379) (the reasons for this will be explained later on). This qualification (to embody the Acquired Intellect), ‘this disposition’, is ‘common to all men’ (Al-Fārābī 1998, OPS, 15.9). In that stage, the Passive Intellect and the natural disposition become one thing, one matter (OPS, 15.9). ‘And when the natural disposition is made the matter of the Passive Intellect which has become actually intellect, and the Passive Intellect the matter of the Acquired Intellect, and the Acquired Intellect the matter of the Active Intellect, and when all this is taken as one and the same thing, then this man is the man on whom the Active Intellect has descended’ (OPS, 15.9). Under the sway of the Acquired Intellect, individuals attain wisdom and ascend to the ranks of philosophers, leaders, and prophets, exhibiting exceptional prowess in the realm of divination (OPS, 15.10). Philosophers excel in using their knowledge and wisdom to promote justice (OPS, 17.2). Philosophy relies on logic, which corrects or verifies opinions through reasoning and syllogism (qiyās). Therefore, logic leads to the ‘development of the innate power that distinguishes man as man, so that this power may perform its activity (inner thought and the expression of thought) in the most correct manner possible’ (Mahdi 2001, p. 72). Moreover, a philosopher leader is the Imam, ‘the first sovereign of the excellent city’ (Al-Fārābī 1998, OPS, 15.11); a philosopher king exhibits at least six of the following qualities: (1) strong and good health, (2) clarity of mind and understanding, (3) good memory and ability to predict future developments, (4) bright intelligence, (5) eloquence and ability to explain well, (6) devotion to learning, (7) truthfulness, (8) modesty (ability to avoid the excesses of the flesh), (9) fondness of honor, (10) ability to resist avarice, (11) fondness of justice and hatred for oppression (as mentioned earlier), (12) willingness to fulfil complicated tasks and obligations (OPS, 15.12). The second Sovereign, apart from being a philosopher, must exhibit the above twelve qualities in addition to the following six. In short, the second Sovereign must (1) have knowledge of customs and laws, (2) excel in deducing a new law by considering the Imams, (3) ‘be good at deliberating and be powerful in his deductions to meet the new situations for which the first sovereigns could not have laid down any law’ and ‘when doing this he must have in mind the good of the city’, (4) be capable of guiding the people, and (5) be of a good physique (OPS, 15.13). At the same time, al-Fārābī’s view that the ruler ‘is not ruled’ does not automatically imply the absence of any limitations on the ruler’s authority; it does not advocate anti-Prometheism (that is, opposition to active citizenship) nor does it negate the right of the people to impose checks and balances on the ruler’s authority. As noted earlier, zulm (oppression, cruelty and injustice) in al-Fārābī’s political philosophy is typically associated with ignorant cities (OPS, 15.13), or with ‘errant’ and ‘deceptive’ communities’, to use Burns’s (2016, p. 378) terms. An ‘errant’ community (or politeia) is ruled by kings who mistakenly believe that they are guiding the populace towards felicity, but fail to apply appropriate methods of discipline and control, often resorting to excessive, harsh, and unnecessary coercion that sows discontent among the people; in a ‘deceptive’ community/politeia, rulers employ extreme and arbitrary repressive measures, supposedly in the name of the ‘common good’, yet in truth, such tactics are incited by a desire for ‘ignorant goods’, prioritising personal gain above all else and ‘bodily well-being’ (Al-Fārābī 2001, BR, 1).

Furthermore, powerful states and prosperous societies ‘must be ruled by an unbroken succession of equally competent kings adept in both “theoretical” and practical “philosophy”’ (Burns 2016, pp. 369–70). Additionally, religions should be involved in the application of political power (Steiris 2012, p. 260). He assumed that philosophy and sciences lead humans to the truth, just as religion does. While the disposition to become a philosopher is ‘common to all men’ (Al-Fārābī 1998, OPS, 15.9), there is no guarantee that all persons in the city will reach the intellectual excellence and wisdom through which they can identify the most effective means to safeguard felicity. While humans can activate their actual intellect, it remains uncertain whether they will utilize this capacity in order to unpack the rich and complex meanings embedded in philosophical texts that all virtuous leaders must strive to understand. Thus, philosophy always ‘addresses the selected few’ (p. 259), that is, the educated noblemen (Fakhry 2002, p. 12). However, ‘[j]ust as philosophy is partly theoretical and partly practical, so it is with religion: the calculative theoretical part is what a human being is not able to do when he knows it, whereas the practical part is what a human being is able to do when he knows it’ (Al-Fārābī 2001, BR, 5). That is, practical matters in religion align with the universals in practical philosophy, specified by constraints, making them more specific (BR, 5). In addition, virtuous laws are derived from the universals of practical philosophy, which relies on logic and offers demonstrative proofs concerning opinions and assumptions; in contrast, religion does not provide demonstrative proofs; it is rooted in theoretical philosophy (BR, 5). Demonstrative proofs are the basis of the rational methods of science (epistēmē or technē), Theodosiadis (2025, p. 16) argues (while discussing Aristotle). Science employs methodologies that lead to certain truths (Mahdi 2001, pp. 174, 176), by (1) unveiling ‘the main causes of an effect or problem’, and (2) identifying ‘potential solutions, either by eliminating the causes or by repairing and rectifying the resulting damages (the effect)’ (Theodosiadis 2025, p. 119). Demonstrative proofs (or evidence) unveil the cause of a particular effect (p. 120). As noted earlier, philosophy (in al-Fārābī’s thought) follows a similar rational method of analysis. Or as Burns (2016) argued, the term ‘philosophy’ is linked to ‘political science’, that, is to ‘a normative science, aimed at distinguishing the “virtuous” arrangements of “cities and nations” (mudun, umam) from their defective arrangements’ (p. 369). Drawing on Aristotle, al-Fārābī assumed that a philosophical pursuit of truth must involve different methods of rational inquiry in order to identify the reason for the existence of beings, as well as their origins and essence (what it is, for and from what it is, and how it is) (Al-Fārābī 1962, AH, 3; 5; 9-13). However, since religion does not rely on demonstrative proofs in truth-seeking, it deviates from conventional rational methodologies. After all, it was al-Fārābī himself who juxtaposes theology/religion and jurisprudence from political science; the latter is a practical science, which encompasses ‘the entire range of the human ends in this and the other life’, explaining what human beings must do to achieve these ends (Mahdi 2001, p. 92). Religion is a different type of ‘science’; it moves beyond mere rationalism, referring to prophecy and divination, which are attributes of the most virtuous kings, the most righteous rulers (Al-Fārābī 2001, BR, 3). A ‘human being is such that by revelation religions provide him with what he is not wont to perceive by his intellect and what his intellect is too languid [to grasp]’ (Al-Fārābī 2001, ES, 5). If revelation offered what a person can comprehend through rational methods of analysis, it would lack purpose or utility; and thus, individuals would rely solely on their faculty of reason, making prophecy and revelation irrelevant (ES, 5). In addition, religion provides what ‘our intellects object to; for whatever we more strongly object to is more likely to be of greater benefit. That is because what religions bring forth that intellects object to and fancies find repugnant is not objectionable or absurd in truth, but is valid according to the divine intellects’ (ES, 5). Moreover, rational education and scientific training, al-Fārābī claimed, has led individuals to dismiss non-rational or unconventional ideas. ‘Before being educated and trained, a human being objects to many things, finds them repugnant, and imagines that they are impossible. When he is educated by means of the sciences and given training in experiments, those presumptions disappear: the things that were impossible for him are transformed and become necessary, and he now comes to wonder about the opposite of what he formerly used to wonder about’ (ES, 5).

In addition, religion replaces ‘philosophy’s theoretical concepts with purely “imaginative representations”, more readily accessible to the public’ (Fakhry 2002, p. 12); it simplifies complex universal meanings through imagery and symbols (Steiris 2012, p. 259). Thus, moral principles taught by religion echo genuine ‘philosophical principles or maxims’, of which human beings have no knowledge at all (Fakhry 2002, p. 14). In other words, God (in al-Fārābī’s mind) is a divine lawgiver and ‘a kind of ruler or king’, who ‘defines and determines particular actions that he asks a particular nation to perform in common so as to attain a certain end’ (Mahdi 2001, p. 93). God decides what lawgivers must do, and ‘possesses what Alfarabi called the experiential faculty (or prudence)’ (p. 93). In addition, ‘[t]he art of lawmaking’ is a prerogative of the prophets and requires a superior ‘gift of representing “theoretical intelligibles”, as well as “civil activities” in concrete or imaginative ways, as a means of attaining happiness’ (Fakhry 2002, p. 13). In turn, this requires ‘the power of effective persuasion in matters both theoretical and practical’; that is, ‘[w]hen the laws in both these spheres were promulgated, coupled with the knowledge of the means of teaching the public, religion arose as a means of giving guidance to the public in its search for happiness [or felicity]’ (p. 13). Religion leads to a recognition of these laws as ‘divinely revealed’ standard of practice within a community; and thus, those who criticize that law on the basis of a merely human ‘political science’ are considered blasphemous (Burns 2016, p. 370).

In simple terms, religion serves as the conduit through which the laws of cosmic harmony and peace (that must be mirrored in the laws of the politeia) are revealed to citizens (Al-Fārābī 2001, BR, 2). Hence, religion possesses the potential to cultivate order and concord in society through public persuasion, rather than force. As opposed to rational methods of inquiry, religion opens pathways for persons to discover their (Promethean) innate capacity for intellectual perfection. In other words, religion is a schism of light, whose rays touch, first and foremost, the soul and the mind of the people, prompting them to conceive meaning beyond simple matter, making each inteligible of the cosmos actually intellect. Simply put, religion brings persons closer to the First Existent (or First Cause). Thus, the people feel and understand the purposefulness and wisdom of the cosmos; they sense the importance of upholding these principles in their individual and social lives. We see how religion contributes to establishing a consensual agreement between subjects and rulers, without the need for coercive measures. When Sovereign rulers succumb to corruption fueled by personal ‘ignorant desires’, and their Passive Intellect becomes detached from the Acquired Intellect as well as from the eucosmia of the universe; they do not merely descend several steps from the ladder of perfection; they also move beyond the established consensus. In this context, the people of the city exhibit more wisdom and intelligence than the rulers themselves. To cut a long story short, Promethean rulers/leaders should communicate with the citizens while striving towards felicity. Nonetheless, al-Fārābī was clear from the beginning: the citizens are not as rational and intelligent as the (excellent and virtuous) ruler; this, on the other hand, does not imply that they are ignorant of the wisdom of the cosmos. Rulers can understand complex philosophical matters; they must apply them whilst in power. However, the citizens can interpret the same wisdom in a different way, namely, through symbols and archetypes included in religious concepts, practices and representations. Religion can disseminate to the ‘average person’ the same messages moral philosophy attempts to convey; religion defuses and distributes (promethévein—«προμηθεύειν») to the people sufficient knowledge about cosmic harmony and justice. We understand, then, that a Promethean politeia is built upon consensual, harmonious and collaborative agreements between citizens and rulers. In virtuous cities, this agreement is preserved as both the rulers and the people uphold the standards of divine justice. However, in ignorant and errant cities, either the ruler or the people deviate from this established consensus.

However, while religion encourages ‘public-spiritedness’ (Burns 2016, p. 378), by raising awareness about the importance of applying in society the principles that maintain eucosmia, it also has ‘the potential also to undermine it: it may encourage believers to concentrate on private self-improvement rather than active citizenship in their community’ (p. 378). For this reason, al-Fārābī advocated for a new political science, which explains the reasons political communities are important; this ‘new science’ ‘encourages citizens of a “virtuous” community to work toward building up that community, rather than withdrawing into a state of apolitical religiosity’ (p. 378).

To recapitulate, the Pythagorean political philosophy assumes a combination of popular involvement in government with top-down decision-making procedures based on expertise. We have previously observed that the ruler’s actions should align with the public consensus. To achieve this, effective communication between the different parts is necessary. Essentially, strife is the outcome of the absence of cooperation and communication between the parts for the common purpose of the political community. The communication of the parts and their agreement on a common goal is the greatest cause of cohesion and maintenance of the healthy political order. In this regard, the absence of communication is the greatest political disease. And this leads us to the following conclusion: such as the Creator of the universe, the political scientist in order to protect the eucosmia of the political community must open pathways through which the members will communicate. Al-Fārābī argued that philosophy and science are indispensable for wise rulers; the capacity for rational thought, facilitated by the Active Intellect, holds immense significance. Nevertheless, this alone is insufficient. Legitimate (or Promethean) rulers must create the appropriate social environments through which a consensual agreement between themselves and the citizens could come into force. To do so, religion must play its part; religion can create public-spiritedness; religion speaks directly to the soul and allows the dissemination of knowledge about the wisdom of the universe in a manner readily comprehensible to the general populace. In short, the philosophy of the Pythagoreans and al-Fārābī’s political thought allow us to understand the reasons excellent cities, in which citizens and rulers acquire Promethean capabilities, should rely not only rely on rational means of wisdom (science and philosophy); non-rational means of conveying the principles that promote eucosmia in public life (such as religion) must be employed accordingly.

6. Conclusions

This study highlighted the convergences between al-Fārābī’s political philosophy with the Pythagorean worldview. The latter proposes a political society closely related to the order of the universe (Atack 2019). The interpretation of the orderly arrangement of the universe has no meaning if it is not reflected in the political organisation of a human community. Almost all cosmological terms have political connotations. The Creator of the universe is likened to the wise governor of the state; the harmony of the celestial spheres is understood politically as a constructive relationship of dominion. Geometrical equality applies to both the cosmic and the political organization; concord is understood as agreement with order and rationality of nature in both the macrocosm and the political microcosm. There is a clear philosophical obsession of the Pythagoreans to reduce the purposefulness and order of the universe to political rightness and integration (Zhmud 2012, pp. 135–40). This fact holds immense significance as it highlights the dual nature of their worldview, where events occurring in the larger universe mirror those in the smaller human realm. In other words, the natural correctness observed in the macrocosm must also be extended to the moral and political aspects of human existence, creating a harmonious alignment.21 Humans cannot be separated from the universe; they play an active part in this enormous organism. A similar type of political Prometheism could be identified in al-Fārābī’s thought, which (in the same way as the Pythagorean political mindset) advocates the construction of a political order that follows the purposefulness, harmony, and hierarchy of the universe. We have seen that al-Fārābī’s philosophy can be interpreted in a way that challenges autocracy; the inhabitants of the excellent city demand a political organisation that resembles the eucosmia of the universe, created by the First Existent. In excellent cities, rulers must either exercise power by adhering to these demands or by persuading each inhabitant to modify their standards of living so that felicity and freedom will be preserved. Ẓulm is the consequences of ignorance and excessive devotion to passions, which excellent leaders must know how to restrict. Religion, as we have observed, plays a crucial role in this pursuit by fostering an understanding of the principles that individuals must adhere to. In this context, religion exerts persuasive influence on persons, guiding them towards virtuous deeds, eliminating the need for state coercion in return.

Undoubtedly, Pythagorean and (more importantly) al-Fārābīan ideas lie at the crossroads of politics and religion. These ideas possess a distinct theological underpinning and extend into the realm of political rule. For example, notions such as the ‘Creator’, the ‘First Existent’, the ‘providence for human salvation and integration’, and the ‘statesman as a divine resemblance’ retain an indelible connection to their theological origins. Nonetheless, we have clarified that these cosmological approaches are based on philosophy, science, and logic, rather than on abstract and rigid religious injunctions. Religion holds significance, yet its primary objective is to align individuals with the wisdom of the cosmos, with the so-called ‘natural right’ (according to the Pythagoreans), a concept that science and logic seek to explain. In this way, religion can support political Prometheism, as long as it avoids being exploited as a means to enforce unthinking conformity and rigid adherence to abstract principles.