Real Union in Leibniz’s Political Thought: The Role and Value of the Mystical Body in Civil Bodies
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- One that might be called ‘operational-functional’, arguing that a civil body is capable of a lasting political unity when its parts can function as one. This applies especially to those ‘irregular’ political bodies (Respublicae irregulares) which are not one—that is, ‘simple’—by ‘physical’ constitution, but are rather complex aggregates2;
- Another that might be called ‘spiritual’ or ‘substantial’, which allows for the possibility that the parts constituting a civil body can be united “more than mechanically”3 when they are also part of what is called the ‘mystical’ body of the Church.
- How partaking in the body of Christ through the Eucharist can pave the way for an ontological redefinition of civil bodies, attaching greater significance to the use of the term persona to refer to them;
- How this aggregating capacity of the Ecclesia is not considered adverse or rival (and thus dangerous) to the unity of individual states, but rather capable of indirectly strengthening it
I accord substantial forms to all bodily substances that are more than mechanically united. But in the fifth place, if I am asked for my views in particular on the sun, the globe of the earth, the moon, trees and similar bodies, and even on animals, I cannot declare with absolute certainty if they are animate, or at least if they are substances or even if they are simply machines or aggregates of many substances.(LA 95; A II.2, 121–122)
[T]his [corporeal] substance consists in that unifying reality, which adds something absolute (and therefore substantial), albeit impermanent (etsi fluxum), to the things to be unified.(LDB 226–27; GP II, 435)
But over and above these real relations [i.e., duration, position, interaction], a more perfect relation can be conceived through which a single new substance arises from many substances. And this will not be a simple result, that is, it will not consist in true or real relations alone; but, moreover, it will add some new substantiality, or substantial bond, and this will be an effect not only of the divine intellect but also of the divine will.(LDB 233; GP II, 438)
When it is said “This is [my] body” (“Hoc est corpus [meum]”), then, with composite substances admitted, we do not designate monads by either “this” or “body” (…), but the substantiated thing arising or composed through substantial bonds.(LDB 273; GP II, 459)
the reference is not to the monads that are the requisites for ‘hoc’ or ‘corpus’ but rather to the ‘substantiation’ that arose or was composed by the vinculum substantiale.
2. The ‘Substantiative’ Power of Christ’s Presence
the essence and perfection of natural bodies (corpora naturalia) consists in the union of the parts; once [the latter is] dissolved, not only the external form and beauty, but also the strength (vis) and life (vita), perish. The same is the case with societies of men (hominum societates), which are comparatively called bodies (corpora); since both the nature and the excellence of these depend on the union of the members of which they are composed.(A IV.6, 717)
The State (Der Staat) is not merely an assembly of people in a country, nor merely a connection or confederation subordinated to some purpose, but at the same time, a model person created by the composition of individuals, or a subject of rights and obligations.(A IV.6, 201)
It is commonly said that relations are most weak entities (debilissimae entitates); which is to be taken with caution. More correctly it should be said that they are most frequent and most efficacious entities (…): [T]he whole of Logic is nothing other than a mirror of relations. This variety takes on the wonderful connection of relations which the Greeks call circumincession, and which we are accustomed to call immeatio, which is nothing other than the varied concourse, combination and complication of relations. This governs both throughout the entire encyclopaedia and especially in the deeper anatomy of things. (…) But what is truly wonderful, is that both the variety and the connection of relations from beginning to end are founded in the venerable mystery of the most Holy Trinity.(A VI.1,159)10
26. Mind can think many things together.27. Therefore mind can by its action be in many places at once.28. Therefore the mind of Christ can impart operation, action, or subsistence both to the glorious body of Christ and to the species of consecrated bread and wine, at the same time, and in varying cases in various p laces on the earth.29. Hence the mind of Christ can be present everywhere in the species of consecrated bread and wine.30. The mind of Christ, concurring in his glorious body which suffered for us, is his Substance […].31. Therefore the substance of the glorious body of Christ can be present everywhere in the species of bread and wine.(L 117; A VI.1, 510)
The ideas of God and the substances of things are the same in fact (in re), different in relation; they are, moreover, as action and passion. However, since the substances of things are the act of God on species, we must think of how it can come about that his act upon one species is numerically the same as his act upon another. But the substance of the body of Christ is its union with Christ, for the substance of everything is its union with mind. Now it is asked how it is possible that the mind of Christ acts in another body than that upon which it ordinarily acts. I reply that God can bring it about that one mind shall be in two bodies when he thinks that the same mind (…) acts immediately and simultaneously upon two bodies. For whatever God can think, that he can also do—at least if he wishes and holds it for the best.(L 119, translation modified; A VI.I, p. 513)
And since, by the same order and inflexible command of nature, more quantities require more places, the body of Christ can be in any number of places, and, by very natural consequence, perform the functions of any number of loaves at the same time in the same way as any number of loaves would do. Hence, quite evidently, the only thing to be added is the will of God and the voice of Christ pronouncing: this is my body; therefore, all things which—regarding this mystery—are seen to be so foreign to the guidance of nature, are themselves derived and established in act by the very necessity of nature. From this it clearly follows that the glorious body of Christ is not altered, nor does it undergo anything unworthy of his glory, since his body remains whole and intact in heaven; neither were any of its dispositions changed, or any other incompossible things made connatural to it. […] [S]o that (…) [the divine dispositions] admirably unite and bind the invisible head [of Christ] to his visible mystical body by a mixed union partaking of both [his] natures.(A VI.1, 506–7)
The Church is like a sacred State (Respublica sacra)14. For it to appear in what the nature of the Catholic Church consists, and for the ever-present darkness [arising] from errors to be dispersed by the light brought upon it, it is necessary to recognise that the Church must be conceived by the mind not as a disjointed multitude (dissoluta multitudo), but as a sacred State, or as a kind of moral body, or a mystical body, if you will, which is held together by a Hierarchy as by a common spirit: because it has been given a spiritual jurisdiction, which obviously does not belong to a multitude but, as it were, to a person or body.(A IV.3, 287–88)
It is well known that the sacrament of the true body of Christ has always been of fundamental importance to make people recognise the unity of the mystical body of the Catholic Church.(A IV.6, 719)
Nothing is more contrary to charity than schism, which dissolves the unity of the body of Christ, extinguishes brotherly love, and attacks the fundamental laws of divine government. (…) And it can rightly be said that neither plague, nor famine, nor war […], nor other public evils, have harmed (nocere) Europe as much.(A IV.6, 722)15
[a]ccording to many other opinions, particularly recent ones, body would be “that which has longitude, latitude and depth”, which is not false in itself. If, however, the Essentia corporis were to consist of this only, it would be certain that no other praesentia et participatio other than local and delimited—and bound to these three dimensions—would be possible.(A IV.7, 578)
Moreover, since the Church is a mystical body, which is to be heard by all, to which the sins of men are to be declared, which has the power to retain and forgive them, and has the keys to bind and loose[,] it is not a disjointed multitude, but is comparable to a certain State (Civitas), whereof it is, in some sense, a person or will, and has a spiritual jurisdiction whose efficacy and execution God himself has promised to guarantee in heavens; and this power of the Ecclesiastic State (Ecclesiastica Respublica) is contained in two sacraments, one of the order and the other of the keys.(A IV.6, 736)
3. The Distinctive Features of European/Christian States
the divine positive law contained in the sacred Scriptures. To these can be added the sacred canons accepted in the whole Church and, later, in the West, the pontifical legislation, to which kings and peoples submit themselves. And in general before the schism of the last century, it seems to have been accepted for a long time (and not without reason) that a kind of common republic (Respublica) of Christian nations must be thought of, the heads of which were the Pope in sacred matters, and the Emperor in temporal matters, who preserved as much of the power of the ancient Roman emperors as was necessary for the common good of Christendom, saving (without prejudicing) the rights of kings and the liberty of princes.(R 174–75; A IV.5, 64–65)
Wisdom is both the beginning and [that which lies] at the bottom of the analysis of all goods; there is no State happier and more akin to divine government than a monarchy under a wise King (…). Wherefore, since it shall be so easy for the Most Christian King, being wise, to hold and retain the greatest power that can reasonably be desired over such a powerful nation, I repeat what I have said: no prince in the world is more of a monarch than the Most Christian King. (…) The Janissaries needed only one night to remove [their] lord, not by tumult and assassination, but by a forced council, as if it were a rightful sentence. They did the same, under the eyes of St Louis—prisoner of the Prefect of Egypt—against the Sultan, daring to impose themselves more on their own prince than on a captured enemy: from this it appears how different is the veneration of Christian princes even among Barbarians. (…) [W]henever negotiations need to be conducted with Christians or between Christians, the area of half a foot will be disputed over the years. (…) [The] great barbarian empires (…) can be overthrown in an instant: for they are sand without lime, (…) because they are held together […] without any internal bond of the minds/souls (nullis animorum intus vinculis).(A IV.1, 259–60)
- The passage begins with a reference to mathematical analysis. By perfecting this method, Leibniz later became convinced that the true elements of reality possess a spiritual nature. At the time of this writing, however, his knowledge led him to believe that “at the bottom of all goods”—that is, at the root of the well-functioning of every structure or aggregate of parts (including political ones) in the universe ordered by God—there is a wisdom that mimics the divine. This means that when a Christian King, placed at the head of a Christian state, is wise, he can transform his state into a happy ‘person’ and thus constitutionally eliminate the risk of dissolution from internal causes;
- In perfect alignment with the previous point and with the general hypothesis of this research, the quoted excerpt allows us to infer—by contrast with what is stated about barbarian kingdoms—that Christian kingdoms can be said to be “held together by an internal bond of the minds”—which acts as a “lime”;
- In the final part, Leibniz presents a historical argument that the Janissaries removed their lord “with a forced council” as if it were “a rightful sentence”. In this regard, it is important to recall his observation about the positive divine law under which Christian peoples were believed to have lived until the previous century. Indeed, a “rightful sentence” or a rightful judgment seems to be a prerogative of Christians and Christianity.
Since one cannot conveniently establish entirely new laws, with no relation to Roman law, without the greatest disturbance (perturbatione) of affairs; (…) and since it is certain that, if the new laws are established wisely, they will not deviate so much from Roman laws to the point of requiring a general renewal and complete replacement; and since, moreover, if Roman law is well-ordered, it will be possible to assist all the State of Europe (Europa Respublicae) and to preserve the bond (vinculum) between nations (gentium) in a stable manner (non leve), (…) it is clear that, to return to the fundamentals, we must begin by reorganising Roman laws and by connecting them with natural law (…).(A II.1, 85)
nothing belongs more to the common law of the peoples of Europe than that which extends from the Church to the State (Respublica); with it, the strongest bond (vinculo) of Europe, and even of the entire universe, is that the Christian Princes or peoples are bound together and, as it were, compose a certain body.(A IV.8, 66)
Wisdom orders that this benevolence should have degrees, just as the air, though it extends all around our globe to a great height, has greater weight and density near us than it has in the higher atmospheric regions. In the same way, one can say that the charity which bears upon those who touch us most nearly should have the greater intensity and force.(L 633; G III, 428–29)
4. Last Difficulties and Conclusions
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1 | Cf., for example, Leibniz’s 1685 writing On Schism, Catholic Faith, and the Catholic Church: “The Church (…) is to be compared not to a disjointed multitude, but to a certain State, of which it is, in a way, a person or will” (A IV.6, 736). |
2 | The Empire, for example, is a ‘union’ of civitates: something more than a mere ‘confederation’ and something less than a ‘regular’ or ‘simple’ State (Civitas), such as England or France (see Caesarinus Fürstenerius, 1677, chap. XI; A IV.2, 57–58; English translation of this chapter is found in R 117–18. See also a late German text on imperial legislation written against a jurist who used to criticise the imperial constitution, whose pseudonym was Cesare Turriani, whom we know to be Leopold Albert von Schoppe, Defense of the Great States of the Empire… Against the Severe Accusations of a So-Called Caesar Turriani, 1696, A IV.6, 205–206). The broad Latin term Leibniz most frequently employs to refer to irregular civil bodies is Respublicae, which is better translated as ‘political communities’, for it also applies to civil bodies which are not ‘Republics’ in the strict sense (it is in fact the only translation that can account for expressions like ‘la Republique de l’Empire’, cf. Conversation of Philarète and Ariste, October 1677, revised and corrected edition 1682, A IV.2, 291). The Empire, Poland, and the Republic of United Provinces are bright examples of the fact that complex civil aggregates are capable—despite all difficulties—of functioning as one, thereby preserving political unity and a common identity. The main consequence of their complex physical constitution, which accounts for their ‘irregularity’, is that the decision-making process is more elaborate than in ‘simple’ States, and more frequently confronted with obstacles, but nonetheless possible and effective. Leibniz clearly saw that, in the Empire, “if the Councils do not reach agreement or if the Emperor and the classes do not reach agreement there is no possible legitimate decision” (In Severinum de Mozambano, 1668–1672, A IV.1, 501), but he firmly believed that the difficulty could be overcome—at least to some extent—via an internal reform that would ease, smoothen and standardise procedures, and the very purpose of his 1677 Caesarinus was in fact to address this issue. It is also worth noting that, all things considered, Leibniz regarded the internal structure of complex civil bodies as generally preferable to that of ‘simple’ or ‘regular’ ones, because he was convinced that the presence of a greater number of authorities could better safeguard the rights of individuals: in fact, in the presence of a single (and thus ‘absolute’) authority, “the complaints of the subjects against the sovereign would have no one who could accept them” (Observations on the Abbé de St Pierre’s Project for Perpetual Peace, 1715, FC 4, 333; a slightly different English translation is found in R, 181). This should not come as a surprise, as it is perfectly consistent with the logical-metaphysical principle of the goodness of variety as an essential condition for harmony, which can be found in Leibniz’s writings ever since 1671 (cf. Leibniz to Magnus Wedderkopf, May 1671, A II.12, 187, and Leibniz to Arnauld, November 1671, A II.12, 280). For an in-depth account of Leibniz’s view of Respublicae irregulares, see (Piro 2011; Basso 2011). For the purpose of this paper, it is particularly noteworthy what Piro suggested about the structure of the Empire: “it may be asked whether in fact the themes touched on in the Caesarinus [the matters of the internal union of the Empire and its ability to function and last] did not contribute towards teaching Leibniz that between the mere aggregate (…) and perfect unity, intermediate realities may exist” (Piro 2011, pp. 50–51). |
3 | This is expression is found, in the context of a reflection on ‘bodily substances’, in Leibniz’s letter to Arnauld of 28 November/8 December 1686: “I accord substantial forms to all bodily substances that are more than mechanically united” (LA 95; A II.2, 121). |
4 | The difference between “natural and artificial machines” is clearly outlined in Leibniz’s letter to Johann Christoph Sturm of 5 July 1697, A II.3, 341. |
5 | Cf. (Look 2000, in which are also discussed the views expressed in (Blondel 1930; Robinet 1986; Adams 1994; Rutherford 1995)). |
6 | The theme of the civil person’s ability to express a will and act is addressed in a variety of texts of very different nature and from various periods, scattered throughout Leibniz’s work: see, for example, his 1668–69 Plan of the Catholic Demonstrations (A VI.1, 499–450), the Preface to the 1693 Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus (A IV.5, 75) and the key German text from 1696 already mentioned at note 2 (which will be further analysed), entitled Defense of the Great States of the Empire… Against the Severe Accusations of a So-Called Caesar Turriani (A IV.6, 201, 203). |
7 | Unless otherwise stated, translations are my own. |
8 | See above, notes 2 and 6. |
9 | For accuracy, it should be mentioned that Gerhardt transcribed “inviolabilem” (inviolable) instead of “inevitabilem” (inevitable); however, the term “inevitabilem” is found in the Vorausedition recently made available by the Akademie (A I VE 1713, 109) and is confirmed by the collection Allgemeine Monatsschrift für Wissenschaft und Literatur (Braunschweig: Schwetschke, 1854), p. 225. |
10 | The English translation of this excerpt was provided by Maria Rosa Antognazza, (cf. Antognazza 1999, p. 50; 2001, p. 2). |
11 | Ibid. |
12 | On the importance that Maria Rosa Antognazza assigned to the Demonstrationes Catholicae, (cf. Antognazza 2007, pp. 3–15; 2009, pp. 90–100). |
13 | This title was assigned by the Akademie editors. However, in his contribution to this special issue, Lloyd Strickland argued that it is unsuitable to describe the content of the text, as the latter does not address the issue of Church reunion but rather “tries to clear obstacles to some individual Protestants joining the Catholic Church” (Strickland 2024, p. 19). According to Strickland, a more suitable title would be: ‘The One Catholic Church’. Moreover, he also provided textual evidence that allows us to date the text to 1685 instead of 1683 (pp. 5–6). |
14 | On Leibniz’s use of the term Respublica, cf. (Basso 2011). |
15 | For a different purpose, in his contribution to this special issue, Lloyd Strickland also pointed out that similar remarks are made “near verbatim” in a letter written at the end of May 1685 to Veit Ludwig von Seckendorff (A I 4, 508) as well as in many other texts from that same year, such as The One Catholic Church (A IV 3, 286), On Schism, Faith, and the Catholic Church (A IV 6, 716–717), Discussion about an Apology of Catholic Truth (A VI 4, 2343); see (Strickland 2024, p. 6). |
16 | On the nature of “substantial bond”, (cf. Look 2000). |
17 | On the difference between “confederation” and “union”, see note 2. The difference is clearly drawn in his 1677 Caesarinus Fürstenerius, chap. XI, A IV.2, 57–58; R 117–18. |
18 | On Leibniz’s criticism of Hobbes’s political approach, see (Basso 2017; Manzo 2020). |
19 | For example, he speaks of a “Caution bourgeoise” (Dutens V, 64–66), i.e., a ‘money deposit’ that all members should pay, so as to keep a common treasury that could enable the establishment of a central administration above the parties. On the embryonic idea of a ‘European central bank’ in Leibniz, cf. (Lærke 2021). In this regard, it is worth noting that in his important letter to Arnauld from 1687, Leibniz defined the “citizens’ right” as the right (still to be established) of aggregates of physical parts to be defined as “substances” (Leibniz to Arnauld, 30 April 1687, LA 128; A II.2, 192–93). The French expression “droit de bourgeoisie” refers to a set of statutes that, between the late Middle Ages and the early modern age, defined the privileges of a restricted group of individuals, observable primarily in those contexts in which the bourgeois class was most represented, such as in the Helvetic Confederation and in Flanders. |
20 | The term ‘consistentia’ is recurrently assigned to bodies; its usage is documented continuously from The Confession of Nature against Atheists (cf. A VI.1, 491–92) to the New Essays on Human Understanding (cf. A VI.6, 124) and beyond. The verb ‘constare’, on the other hand, is typically assigned to souls, cf. On the Radical Origination of Things, 1697, G VII, 306. |
21 | Cf. Phoranomus or the Power and Laws of Nature, 1689, DFS, 718–19. |
22 | See above, notes 2, 6 and 8. |
23 | |
24 | |
25 | For Leibniz’s discussion of the notion of superioritas territorialis, see his Caesarinus Fürstenerius, chap. X, A IV.2, 54, 57; R 114–17. |
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Manzo, F. Real Union in Leibniz’s Political Thought: The Role and Value of the Mystical Body in Civil Bodies. Religions 2024, 15, 1270. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15101270
Manzo F. Real Union in Leibniz’s Political Thought: The Role and Value of the Mystical Body in Civil Bodies. Religions. 2024; 15(10):1270. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15101270
Chicago/Turabian StyleManzo, Fiorenza. 2024. "Real Union in Leibniz’s Political Thought: The Role and Value of the Mystical Body in Civil Bodies" Religions 15, no. 10: 1270. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15101270
APA StyleManzo, F. (2024). Real Union in Leibniz’s Political Thought: The Role and Value of the Mystical Body in Civil Bodies. Religions, 15(10), 1270. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15101270