The Anthropocene, Self-Cultivation, and Courage: The Jesuit François Noël as a Witness of Inter-Religious Dialogue between Aristotelian and Confucian Ethics

Abstract

This article explores the specific role of courage in the context of the Anthropocene’s moment; it first examines Aristotle’s conception of virtues, focusing on courage, before comparing it to Confucian thought and analyzing the historical dialogue between Western and Chinese traditions on ethics through the works of François Noël (1651–1729). Aristotle views moral cultivation as a social process wherein habits shape inner dispositions; in his view, courage is linked to other virtues, such as temperance and justice. For Aristotle, courage implies the appropriate balance between extremes and must be directed toward a worthy end, such as promoting positive change within a community. This Aristotelian perspective was later incorporated into a biblical framework by Aquinas and Suarez, emphasizing dichotomies between body and soul, as well as between humans and other living beings. These dichotomies must be challenged in the face of the Anthropocene’s emergencies. The second part of this contribution proceeds to a detour examining Confucian ethics, which rests on a different anthropology, emphasizing continuities rather than discontinuities. Like Aristotelian thought, Confucian thought also underscores moral education within a community; it prioritizes humanity, embodied through empathy and loyalty. In the Analects, courage is balanced by a sense of rituals and righteousness. Mencius further distinguishes several types of courage, stressing self-cultivation and the ruler’s responsibility to make empathetic, appropriate decisions for the community’s sake. From this perspective, courage is understood as the continuous perseverance in self-cultivation, coupled with a firm intention oriented toward the good of the community. Zhu Xi’s comments on Zilu’s courage in the Analects extend this Confucian tradition. Finally, this article highlights how a dialogue between Aristotelian and Confucian ethics began four centuries ago, particularly through Noël’s Philosophia Sinica, which combined these traditions. This inter-religious approach to ethics, enriched by figures such as Aquinas, Suarez, Zhu Xi, and neo-Confucian thinkers, requires re-evaluation because the understanding of personal ethics and nature has evolved. The modern naturalistic approach, with its emphasis on dichotomies, has contributed to a mechanistic view of nature, fostering its exploitation, and a devaluation of the body. This contrast highlights the urgent need for renewed dialogue between Western and Chinese ethical traditions to address contemporary challenges, with François Noël serving as a historical witness of these exchanges.

1. Introduction

In recent years, the concept of the Anthropocene has become increasingly employed in ethical reflections.1 This term was invented by Paul J. Crutzen in 2000 to describe the current geological epoch, where humans have had a significant impact on Earth’s geology and ecosystems. In a French-speaking context, some thinkers have published research analyzing the intellectual foundations of the Anthropocene era (Vioulac 2023). In contrast, others take a more concrete approach, exploring what kinds of ethical capacities would help to handle this moment.2 For example, Jean-Philippe Pierron, a follower of Pierre Hadot’s perspective on philosophy conceived as an effort both theoretical and ethical through the practice of “spiritual exercises” (Hadot 1995, 2004), explains that temperance, humility, and hospitality are the crucial virtues that must be developed in order to handle the Anthropocene’s challenges. These virtues are about living according to logical coherence, integrating ecological concerns and other constraints, such as—in some professions—necessary mobility.

According to Jean-Philippe Pierron, we are indeed in a phase where a new civilization is emerging where our behavior and how we reflect on it as human beings interacts with our natural context. Regarding ecology, scientific knowledge is not neutral; it also affects humans, psychologically and spiritually. “We” are actively involved as an agent and are passively affected by the challenges that “we”, as human beings, are trying to address when we think about the Anthropocene. For Pierron, spiritual exercises in Hadot’s sense—i.e., intellectual exercises—are a praxis that should be promoted, as they transform our perceptions of ourselves and of the world:

In the Anthropocene moment, the issue is to turn ecological information into ecobiographical events. Hadot put forward the idea of a kind of ecological and “ethical conversion” encouraged by new exercises of the self in support of social and ecological transition.

(Pierron 2024, p. 2)

This represents a change in how and to what we direct our attention: from caring about the environment to caring for it. This is also a reorganization of a hierarchy of values: how do we prioritize the objects, relationships, and activities to which we pay attention? In the West, this issue occurs in pluralist and post-modern societies that are mentally and naturally “exhausting”—“mentally” because many agents are in between different communities and traditions; it is up to each individual to determine what kind of human being they want to be (Bauman 2000). “Naturally” because this is a burnout culture that exhausts natural, linguistic, and emotional resources:

The subjects, uprooted from their desire for a good life, anaesthetized by technical mediations (from screens to the various ways of controlling and directing the world and living beings), reify their relationship with themselves, others and the environment, and find themselves alienated.

(Pierron 2024, p. 4)

According to Pierron and similar thinkers, modern interpretations that disconnect the soul from the body and humanity from “nature” have become an inadequate answer to Anthropocene’s challenges: deontological and consequentialist perspectives tend to hide the fact that the reprogramming of our inner dispositions in daily life is at stake. Modern perspectives also divide ethics and spirituality too stiffly into anthropocentric and ecocentric reflections.

Recovering a desire for the good life and freeing it from contemporary obstacles implies a detour in exploring non-modern European resources to find the capacities and inner dispositions that can help in the current situation.3 This detour will help to contrast perspectives that separate body from soul and human beings from nature. In doing so, it will be possible to reorganize ends and desires when the relation to the self is driven by the market forces that always find new ways to turn them to their use and advantage (Pierron 2024, p. 5). Going back to working on one’s inner consistency, thanks to an inter-religious virtue ethics perspective, it helps to recover the idea that human beings can shape their dispositions through practices in harmony with a local society, a natural environment, and a global community. This was the purpose of Aristotle and Confucius, who both wanted to explore the habits and rituals that humans create to build their character in a political context (the polis and tianxia 天下).4

This dialogue between the Aristotelian and Confucian perspectives has become one of the key axes in the development of virtue ethics.5 In fact, this exchange began four centuries ago, at the end of the 17th century, when Jesuit missionaries arrived in China and translated Aristotle’s works into Chinese and the Confucian Classics into Latin, in collaboration with the Chinese literati.6 In particular, in a treatise entitled Philosophia Sinica, published in 1711 in Prague, François Noël s.j. (1651–1729) presents Confucian ethical perspectives in an Aristotelian framework, giving space to the Confucian self-cultivation perspective. Although Noël’s approach must today be criticized considering contemporary sinological, comparative, and transcultural reflections (four centuries of exchange and evolution between China and the West make it impossible to read Noël’s texts in a “flat” manner, without a hermeneutical effort), still, Noël offers a historical example of someone surpassing dichotomies between soul and body or human beings and nature thanks to an inter-religious approach to constructing the character.7 Noël’s ethics, therefore, provides early testimony to how fostering courage and empathy (shu 恕) in response to injustices arising from a lack of connection with others and nature may be an appropriate virtue to cultivate in daily life, complementing Pierron’s emphasis on temperance, humility, and hospitality. By cultivating these virtues, an agent is better equipped to make choices and decisions aligned with their ultimate goals. From this perspective, revisiting the movement that led to the interweaving of these two traditions, as embodied by Noël, can help rediscover what makes its construction original—neither purely Confucian nor purely Aristotelian, but a valuable contribution to an ongoing conversation. In doing so, we will not delve deeply into the metaphysical dimension of the inter-religious dialogue in Noël’s works but, rather, focus on its ethical aspect.8

Therefore, in this paper, I will first explore how the Aristotelian tradition addresses courage and lays the foundations for a virtue ethics approach. In this first section, I will primarily rely on Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics and briefly describe how it gave rise to a scholastic tradition that formed the framework of François Noël’s training. However, this Aristotelian perspective alone is insufficient to address the challenges of the Anthropocene today, as it lacks the openness to having one’s provincialism challenged by a non-European tradition; it is therefore essential to contrast and complement it with a Confucian detour, which will be the focus of the second part. Here, we will return to the sources of the Confucian tradition, i.e., the Analects, and examine briefly how it gave rise to its own legacy in Mencius and Zhu Xi. This detour will lead us towards constructing inter-religious ethics, a phenomenon already started by Noël’s interpretation of the Confucian Classics in the Philosophia Sinica. By bringing Aristotelian and Confucian views on courage and self-cultivation into dialogue—within the context of the classical texts that founded these traditions and the commentators who developed them9—it becomes possible to highlight the importance of fostering courage in education to equip individuals to face the challenges of the Anthropocene.

2. Cultivation of the Self and Aristotelian Courage

In ancient Greece, ethical reflections were not isolated from a context primarily influenced by daily life in a city with regulations (nomoi) and the decrees of nature (physis). As early as sophists’ arguments about the relative value of city regulations, Greek philosophers were concerned with how to live a good life in relation to a cultural and natural context. Plato elaborated his theory of ideas to establish a just city in the Republic (from this perspective, Plato’s first concern was ethical and not metaphysical).10 One limit of Plato, however, was to elaborate on an ideal good and not a good that concerns “me, us” in daily life.11 Plato’s student, Aristotle, not only changed the method of investigation on the good (Nichomachean Ethics 1095b) but also questioned the vision of virtue, mainly relying on intellectual activity, presented by Plato—happiness requires the use of external goods, and there is a hierarchy among activities and dispositions:

(NE 1098a25): Then if this is so, the human good turns out to be activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are several virtues, in accordance with the best and most complete.

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In other terms, several activities are conditions of possibility to search for this more complete good evoked by Aristotle. To speak of an activity is to underline the need for a process (“For one swallow does not make a summer, nor one day”, NE 1098a). For Aristotle, the search for happiness is not just a question of logic or theory; there is also a practical dimension: the search for happiness occurs in a city where rulers exercise political science and train themselves (Hadot 2004, pp. 79–80). Consequently, at the end of Book I of the Nichomachean Ethics, the term “Virtue(s)” is used in the plural and refers to praiseworthy inner states; these are dispositions that qualify the wise person. While intellectual virtues can be taught, moral virtues cannot. This second type of virtue is the fruit of a habit; it does not arise by nature. Nature only gives the possibility of them—like in Mencius 2A2 (see Section 2)—but virtue is a seed that needs to be cultivated:

(NE 1103a30): So, virtues arise in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature, but nature gives us the capacity to acquire them, and completion comes through habituation.

Nature gives humans capacities that we actualize more or less through actions. In the city, if the laws are designed to foster good habits, they will aid citizens in cultivating their virtues. Virtues are realized through practice, and the exercise of these virtues will, in turn, encourage citizens to respect the laws, thereby making them “active”. Hence, it is crucial to acquire good habits from early youth. Virtue(s) are, therefore, not only capacities or affections (e.g., pleasure and pain) but dispositions, relatively stable states of the soul that are the fruit of activity. Virtue is a state on which we can act, but not instantaneously; it changes with time (NE 1106a20).

Aristotle then shows, through several metaphors, how virtue makes us aim for a medium between excesses (NE 1106b15). When an agent is capable of limiting excesses, they open the field of fruitful actions for the sake of virtue. Therefore, the general definition of virtue makes it an average decision-making state. This search aims to find a good end with appropriate dispositions; it is an art akin to piloting a ship, where the captain can read signs and adjust the speed of the boat, guiding it in the right direction according to the meteorological circumstances and the capacities of its crew. In this sense, virtue comes from an ability to live within limits (NE 1106b30). As this definition must conform to particular virtues, Aristotle seeks confirmation by examining them.

When he explains the different particular virtues, Aristotle begins with courage, a virtue that allows us to act (NE 1115a). In this sense, courage is the first of the virtues, because without the will and the capacity to take action and persevere in repeated actions that will shape our internal states over time, no transformation of oneself is possible. The vices of courage highlight this: the reckless and rash man is only interested in showing off, not in a true transformation of himself (NE 1116a). In the same way, the coward is the one who refuses to act and is afraid of everything. No process of self-refinement is possible for either of them. Today, we often talk about “leaving our comfort zone” or educational risk (De Chiara-Quenzer 2018, pp. 189–202); this highlights that any transformation of ourselves requires a decision that sets us on the path of self-cultivation, along with a specific dose of courage. For Aristotle, virtue and responsibility in the face of vice depend on us: virtue is within our reach (NE 1113b5); we can desire it, and the will is engaged (there is a deliberation, NE 1139a21-b5) on the condition that bad habits have not taken root and covered up roots of virtue. In this sense, Aristotle’s reflections suggest that responding to the challenges of the Anthropocene requires a certain degree of freedom and, above all, the courage to initiate a change. While other virtues are important, it is courage that is essential for beginning the process of reprogramming our inner dispositions.

This is consistent with Aristotle’s definition of courage: the courageous person fears the right object and way at the right time (NE 1115b15-19). To overcome fear is not enough. The courageous act is also oriented to a common and greater cause: “For Aristotle, a courageous person aims for the noble end (τὸ καλὸν τελός), that is, for what is fine or good. He knows what the fine end is, and he wishes for it (βόυλησις). Courageous men are willing to risk their lives for the good of a mission having societal merit; they accept this danger and act because they are aiming at a greater and nobler cause” (De Chiara-Quenzer 2018, p. 199). From this perspective, if we take ancient Greek figures as case studies, such as Socrates and Achilles, the former behaved courageously, while the latter did not. According to an Aristotelian perspective, Socrates acts bravely when he drinks the poison because he hopes something will change in Athens. Socrates hoped that his fellow citizens’ attitudes regarding injustice would change, which made him face death with courage.13 On the other hand, during Troy’s siege, Achilles, who was driven by anger and avenging the death of Patroklos, was not interested in the welfare of the Greek forces. Achilles was not guided by a temperate reason, nor was he trying to fulfill a higher end (Deborah De Chiara-Quenzer 2018, pp. 189–202); therefore, his actions cannot be qualified as courageous. Passionate courage leads to action from the strength of a feeling, not from what reason directs. To find the appropriate disposition implies that the proper habits of relying on the rational part of the soul are taken beforehand. Only the habit or repetition of virtuous actions allows one to place the cursor in the right place between rashness and cowardice. For Aristotle, this courageous disposition requires a certain stability acquired by repetition (Canto-Sperber 1996, p. 334). From an analysis of courage, at the end of Book III of the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle moves to an analysis of pain and pleasure in relation to courage. To perform acts of courage is indeed often painful (NE 1117b): “Aristotle seems to be saying that even though achieving the external goal of a courageous act is pleasant for the courageous person, the courageous act, itself, is typically painful to perform and even to contemplate” (Curzer 1996). This apparent contradiction lies in the fact that, for Aristotle, the pleasure of acting courageously to achieve a good end outweighs the pain caused by the courageous action. The connection with temperance is made here; if someone does not have stable dispositions, where the will and ability to identify the proper end—or the lack thereof—is engaged:

(NE 1119a): “The intemperate person, then, has an appetite for all pleasant things, or the most pleasant, and is led by his appetite to choose them at the cost of everything else”.

This passage compares intemperance to the attitudes of children (when driven solely by appetite) and emphasizes the need for courage in addressing intemperate behaviors in education (NE 1119b); it stresses the importance of “training” the part of the soul related to appetites to accept limits, or else it risks overshadowing other parts of the soul, particularly the rational part, which is essential for good living in the city (as this is the part that engages with language).

Therefore, as several scholars have argued, the sphere of applicability of courage should not be limited to the battlefield (as Aristotle seems to do) but extended to other situations: “Asking young people to ask their lives frequently and consistently seems dangerously foolish. Instead, it seems more plausible that habituating the young would begin by asking them to take social and emotional risks frequently and consistently, as well as less significant physical risks” (Vigani 2017, p. 320). These considerations on courage and self-cultivation show that, according to Aristotle, education starts with the courage to limit intemperate behaviors. This perspective relies on an anthropology built on a tripartite soul. By helping someone to restrict their enslavement to apparent pleasures related to the nutritive and sensitive parts of the soul, courage in the educational process allows access to a second level of pleasure—intellectual pleasures, which offer a greater coherence between the means and ends (Hadot 2004, p. 85). Courage is therefore necessary at the beginning and throughout the cultivation process, but it needs to be framed by boundaries in order to avoid excesses. Today, in the Anthropocene, limiting superficial pleasures and practicing a form of simplicity is what authors such as Pierron advocate when they promote temperance and humility (this also echoes Analects 8.15; see Section 2). This is the first takeaway from going back to Aristotle.

A second valuable aspect of this perspective for the Anthropocene is the recognition that one cannot become fully human alone. For Aristotle, being a human person requires belonging to a community (Politics 1243a30). The political dimension is ever-present in Aristotle’s analysis of “individual virtues” in the Nicomachean Ethics; he prepares future lawmakers (NE 1095a5) to take on public responsibilities, emphasizing that they must understand virtues if they are to cultivate good, law-abiding citizens (NE 1102a10) through laws that foster the appropriate habitus (NE 1103b5). Translating this perspective means that responses to the Anthropocene’s challenges must be both individual and collective.

This Aristotelian perspective on moral and political education was shaped in ancient Greece, within a cosmology that viewed the world as limited in space but not in time. Although Aristotle distinguishes between different levels of the soul, as well as between humans and non-humans, his vision still embraces life as a whole. Aquinas and scholasticism later adopted and transmitted this perspective within the Western tradition, incorporating the biblical pair of creator/creatures into the Aristotelian framework. In his commentary on Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aquinas, while discussing Aristotle’s view on virtues, refers to the biblical idea that humans were created in the image and likeness of God (Gen. 1:27). This perspective is even more evident in the Summa Theologica, where Aquinas draws on Matthew’s Gospel (Matt. 5:48) and Augustine to present cardinal virtues, including courage, in line with Aristotle’s teachings (Aquinas, Summa Theologica Ia IIae, Question 61); additionally, he provides a detailed analysis of the virtue of courage (fortitudo) (Aquinas, Summa Theologica IIa IIae, Question 123), drawing on both Aristotle and biblical scriptures (Wis. 8:7; 2 Cor. 12:9; Heb. 11:34; Gal. 5:22). Later, Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), one of the main interpreters of Aristotle and Aquinas at the dawn of the modern era, commented on virtues and courage, extending their perspectives to address the challenges of modernity.

3. A Confucian Detour

In antiquity, Confucius also reflected on the virtues that must be implemented in education in order to prepare students for social responsibilities. Despite this analogous purpose with Aristotle, Confucius and his disciples lived in a different context and developed a different anthropology to describe their perspectives.14 Indeed, from a Confucian perspective, human beings and other natural elements are made of a similar material: Qi (氣). In the case of humans, this material needs to be refined (Mencius 2A2).15 Unlike the Western tradition, Confucian anthropology insists more on continuity rather than a discontinuity between human beings and nature and between the soul and the body.16 Therefore, we will not find a direct equivalent to the Aristotelian’s perspective on moral education and courage in the Confucian Classics, only resonances (i.e., analogical practices) that might trigger dynamism in return in the Western perspective on moral education.17 This Confucian detour offers an alternative to the Aristotelian framework. If the Anthropocene is also a consequence of globalization, then it is impossible to address it adequately from only one tradition; doing so would reinforce provincialism.18

3.1. Confucian Perspective on Education and Moral Cultivation

Confucius (Kongzi 孔子, 551–479 BCE) was born during a time of corruption and chaos, where several states competed for hegemony over China. The culture that had helped manage various social relationships was collapsing, and Confucius took on the responsibility of transmitting a cultural legacy through the education of his disciples. He was China’s first teacher, but not its first writer, as he claimed to be a transmitter rather than a creator (An. 7.1). The Analects (lunyu 論語) is a compilation of more than 510 sentences and dialogues between Confucius and his disciples.19 The following sentence is often presented as “Confucius’s biography”:

An. 2.4: The Master said, “At age fifteen I set my heart upon learning (xue 學); at thirty I took my stand (li 立); at forty I became free of doubts; at fifty I understood the Heavenly Mandate; at sixty my ear was attuned; and at seventy I could follow my heart’s desire without overstepping the bounds of propriety.”

20

Here, Confucius is offering a curriculum and presenting key features of his philosophy more than he is speaking about his experience. From a Confucian perspective, learning (xue 學) and becoming a scholar leads to political responsibility. In Analects 2.4, li 立 refers to being able to hold a position at the court (An. 4.14), which implies imbuing oneself with classics and rituals. For Confucius, the purpose of education was to prepare students for social responsibilities thanks to a cultural heritage.

According to the traditional narrative, to transmit this culture, Confucius compiled and edited texts received from the Zhou dynasty (An. 3.14), in particular the Five Classics (the Book of Poetry, Book of Documents, Book of Rites, Book of Changes, and Spring and Autumn Annals).21 By transmitting the Zhou tradition, Confucius also interpreted this heritage, particularly in relation to rituals (An. 17.21) and the interpretation of the Classics, such as the Book of Poetry, which he regarded as a comprehensive guide for personal action (An. 2.2). For Confucius, reading the Book of Poetry and the Five Classics was the first step in developing one’s character (An. 8.8). Literature, and especially the Book of Poetry, could serve as a reservoir of symbolic tools to adequately interact with inner dispositions and name living beings (An. 17.9). This is the first step in Confucian moral education.

As Analects 2.4, 4.14, 8.8, and 12.15 describe it, the second step is to be able to stand in public offices (li 立) by becoming acquainted with a sense of rituals (li 禮) that help to persist in self-cultivation and train oneself to do what is right (yi 義). In the Analects, courage appears here, in connection with rituals and seeing what is right to do. This type of courage can be called “rightness-courage”:

An. 2.24: The Master said, “To sacrifice to spirits that are not one’s own is to be presumptuous. To see what is right (yi 義), but to fail to do it, is to be lacking in courage (yong 勇).”

For Confucius, rituals are essential for guiding actions in a way that cultivates character. Without rituals—and immersion in the Classics—bold actions and untamed initiatives can easily go astray:

An. 8.2: The Master said, “If you are respectful but lack ritual you will become exasperating; if you are careful but lack ritual you will become timid; if you are courageous (yong 勇) but lack ritual (li 禮) you will become unruly; and if you are upright but lack ritual you will become inflexible.” […].

Analects 8.2 displays the main Confucian value in the Analects, humanity (ren 仁), which is an ability to handle interpersonal relationships according to the appropriate social role.22 For Confucius, everything should be oriented to acquiring this value (An. 4.6 and 7.30), and several dialogues of the Analects show him explaining humanity to his disciples (An. 6.22, 12.1.2.3.22, 13.19, 17.6). For Confucius, everything should be sacrificed to achieve humanity (An.15.9). Therefore, from Confucius’s perspective, achieving humanity implies a dose of courage. This type of courage can be called “humanity-courage”:

An. 14.4: The Master said, “[…] Those who are humane (ren 仁) will necessarily display courage (yong 勇), but those who display courage are not necessarily humane (ren 仁).”

Thus, courage alone is insufficient for achieving moral cultivation. Courage and the ability to confront fears do not fully define what it means to become a Junzi (君子), a morally trained person prepared to assume public responsibilities. For Confucius, as for Aristotle, courage alone does not suffice for moral cultivation; in fact, it is quite the opposite: Confucius first proposes a framework for self-improvement before addressing the question of courage. The Confucian understanding of courage—relevant for tackling the challenges of the Anthropocene—must be interpreted considering the goal of preparing students for public responsibilities.

3.2. Preparing Disciples for Responsibilities and Courage

For Confucius, learning the Five Classics was essential, but it was not the end of moral education; the most important thing was learning to handle relationships, i.e., to work on one’s inner dispositions so as to facilitate fruitful social interactions23:

This explains why Confucius not only had conversations with his students but also tried to educate them through osmosis (An. 4.1, 4.17, 4.25), always inviting them to grow (An. 7.6, 7.7, 7.8); he also offered several exercises, such as self-examination (An. 1.4). Confucius’s comments on this practice show that human relationships are always contextual. To become “humane” then implies considering the situation of each interlocutor rather than applying an external principle indifferent to reality. This also explains why Confucius gives his students different answers to the same question (An. 2.7; 2.8, 5.26; 11.22). Like in Aristotle’s reflection on decision, different contexts must be integrated into moral reflection. This does not imply that Confucius does not have a unified vision of his teachings:

An. 4.15: The Master said, “Zengzi! All that I teach is unified by one guiding principle.” Zengzi answered, “Yes.” After the Master left, the other disciples asked, “What did he mean by that?” Zengzi said, “All of what the Master teaches amounts to nothing more than loyolty (zhong 忠), ‘loyalty,’ tempered by empathy (shu 恕)”.

This unique principle, described through two key concepts—loyalty (zhong 忠) and empathy (shu 恕)—cannot be applied uniformly to all situations. Loyalty and empathy are, by nature, relational and contextual. Empathy is a principle of reciprocity, allowing one to put oneself in the place of others (An. 15.24). Loyalty implies being faithful to one’s role in a community; Confucius aimed to construct a moral society in which different statuses existed.24 Therefore, “In this moral hierarchy, everyone is assigned a moral role depending on how he or she is related to others […] In this sense, loyalty can be defined as ‘doing what one is supposed to do’ or ‘being loyal to one s role’. In other words, a social role is not simply a social assignment; it’s also a moral assignment.”25 However, the moral virtue of loyalty applies to everybody; it is an attitude defined by mutual roles, especially in one’s relationships with superiors (An. 1.8, 7.24, 12:11, 12.14).

Loyalty and empathy are principles that limit and correct one another. This double dynamism allows a balance: if empathy is to be able to feel for other people, loyalty is to be trustful to oneself and one’s role. Conflicts are due to overstepping boundaries or not fulfilling roles appropriately (this is developed in Mencius 3A3, and Socrates expresses an analogous idea in Republic IV). For Confucius, establishing a proper social structure where everyone respects their social role is the only way to fight against injustice and violence. This perspective translates as “correcting the names” in Analects 12.11 and 13.3. For Confucius, in a social organization, there is a question of using names properly, which implies courage.26 Language, especially names, performs not only a function of description but also one of prescription (defining statuses and roles27). Therefore, to name reality appropriately requires the ability to face reality. This dimension of necessary courage, in connection with the correct use of language (and titles) in politics, was the subject of several conversations between Zhu Xi and his disciples regarding Zilu’s courage shown when serving in Wei. From Zhu Xi’s perspective, the inability to fully understand the situation in Wei prevented Zilu from demonstrating courage.28 This third type of courage can be called “knowledge-courage”.

Another type of vocabulary describing the preparation for social responsibilities is the term Junzi (君子), a morally exemplary person. For Confucius, all humans are perfectible (An. 17.2). To be concerned with doing right and virtuous actions is the first step to becoming a Junzi. In contrast, interest only in profit and possession leads to being an inferior person (An. 4.11). In other words, the Junzi is concerned with the way (Dao 道), not with poverty or riches (An. 4.4, 4.9). Ultimately, to become a Junzi is also to strive to influence others to do good through governance, acting as a true ruler (An. 2.1 and 9.14). This perspective, later developed by Mencius (Mencius 1A7), demonstrates that, for Confucius, as for Aristotle, moral cultivation aims to prepare students for public responsibilities. Virtue ethics reveals its relevance in the Anthropocene: why would the morality of isolated actions matter when common life and just life are endangered? Moral considerations must be viewed in a much broader context than just individual actions. This also explains why, for Confucius and Aristotle, courage does not stand alone among the virtues; it needs to be limited and guided by other, more important dispositions (i.e., temperance and rituals).29

Therefore, achieving courage is not Confucius’s main purpose in moral training (it is not in the “list of virtues” in Analects 17.6). One reason not to insist too much on courage in the Analects is its ambiguity. For Confucius, the difference between courage and rashness is sometimes not easy to make, and courage alone may create chaos:

An. 8.10: The Master said, “A person who is fond of courage (haoyong 好勇) but who despises simplicity (pin 貧) will become rebellious (luan 亂). A person who is not humane (ren 仁), and who is excessively criticised for it, will also become rebellious (luan 亂).”

(See also An. 8.2 and 17.22)

Courage without humanity always risks creating confusion in the hierarchy of values (An. 14.4 quoted above). Therefore, Confucius prioritizes humanity and rituals as key dispositions (An. 3.3), not courage. This explains his comments on Zi Lu, one of his disciples, who was fond of courage:

An. 17.23 Zilu asked, “Does the Junzi admire courage? (yong 勇)”. The Master said, “The gentleman admires rightness (yi 義) above all. A Junzi who possessed courage but lacked a sense of rightness would create political disorder (luan 亂), while a common person who possessed courage but lacked a sense of rightness would become a bandit.”.

(See also An. 14.12, 17.8)

In An. 17.23, Confucius insists on the dimension of rightness that will be developed by Mencius in close relation with humanity, especially at a political level (Mencius 1A1 and 7B47) (Chen 2012). Zilu’s rashness and wrong commitment in Wei would be the topic of several exchanges between Zhu Xi and his disciples when explaining Analects 12.11 and 13.3. Zhu Xi especially developed the idea that courage not guided by rituals will fail.

To summarize from the perspective of this article, for Confucius, courage alone is not enough; it has to be understood in the whole framework of Confucian moral cultivation, based on developing humanity and a sense of rituals (An. 8.2). The problem with Zilu in An. 17.23 is that his courage is not framed according to virtues such as a sense of rituals, rightness, and humanity. As Chen Lisheng observed, “[in the Analects], Courage, as the capability to act and venture out regardless of external danger, can be called “righteousness-based courage” if connected with right and wrong. If connected with knowledge of how to act, it can be called “wisdom-based courage.” As a part of an ideal personality, the virtue of courage is indispensable for a man of benevolence. With such a power of perseverance, a courageous man can resist external temptations, overcome his desires, and tolerate rough living conditions. In this sense, it can be called ‘courage of benevolence’” (Chen 2010, p. 6).

Later, Chinese thinkers would explore the nuances of these different types of courage. In particular, Mencius articulated the relationship between humanity and righteousness to respond to injustice through empathy. For Mencius, there are different types of courage (Mencius 1B3): one type is too bold, not directed at the proper object, and opposed to filial piety and, thus, to humanity (Mencius 4B30). Another type of courage arises from the empathy felt in the face of mortal danger and is translated into action (Mencius 2A6). Mencius also distinguishes the courage of a king who decides to act as a true ruler—faithful to his role—and the courage of persevering in self-cultivation (Mencius 2A2).30 These views are developments of Confucius’s insights on self-cultivation, empathy, and loyalty: humans consist of a continuum of psychophysical material (Qi 氣)—neither pure matter nor pure spirit—that forms the substratum of every element in the cosmos. However, becoming truly human also requires reflection (Si 思) and practices such as self-examination (fanxing 反省) (Analects 1.4 and 2.15) and learning (Xue 學). Here, reflection is an activity in which the heart-mind (xin 心) identifies and desires what is appropriate for the individual and their social and natural environment. Therefore, Confucian courage is a condition of steadfastness within the social and natural embodiment of the Classics and rituals. These views influenced neo-Confucianism and François Noël’s understanding of courage, and they echo elements of the scholastic tradition.

Without delving too deeply into the contemporary debate on the commensurability of Confucian and Aristotelian ethics, we can observe echoes between the two perspectives introduced thus far. Aristotle’s viewpoint helps to complement the set of virtues proposed by Pierron in addressing the challenges of the Anthropocene. Confucian courage further enriches this perspective, as it carries a broader meaning that is not confined to the battlefield; it emphasizes cultivating character, through self-cultivation via learning, rituals, and other practices, to ensure a rightful response in the face of injustice.

This Confucian detour demonstrates that both Aristotelianism and Confucianism emphasize the importance of shaping inner dispositions through a process that involves belonging to and caring for the good of a community. Both traditions underscore the necessity of this process from the outset and throughout, as well as the ambiguity of courage, which can become rash if not tempered by other virtues, such as a sense of ritual and temperance. If not directed towards a rightful purpose—embodying humanity and fostering hope for change within the community—courage may lose its moral grounding. We can also observe here how Aristotelian tradition and Confucianism put into dialogue on concrete issues, rather than theoretical ones, can trigger dynamism in moral reflections regarding contemporary challenges.31 Courage, as a condition of involvement in government tasks, is therefore valid for the Anthropocene: is the logic of private interests (Analects 4.16 and Mencius 1A1) alone going to regulate human relationships and attitude towards nature? The inter-religious perspective offered by an Aristotelian–Confucian dialogue provides an invaluable contribution: the Anthropocene’s challenges are not problems that can be dealt with using Western resources alone. This dialogue started four hundred years ago with Matteo Ricci and his successor, Francois Noël.

4. François Noël and Courage

When the Jesuits arrived in China, they were struck by a civilization that had highly developed educational structures. They invested considerable energy in learning the local language and customs. They also tried to understand how a long tradition had formed classics whose importance seemed equivalent to that of the Greek philosophers and the Bible. Faced with this new culture, the Jesuits chose to engage in dialogue with “Confucianism”. This choice of interlocutor led the Jesuits to translate and comment on the Confucian Classics, which offered resources for spiritual cultivation. Of course, for the missionaries, the aim of this enterprise was, on the one hand, to promote Christianity in China and, on the other, to defend their mission in Europe. The major work that attracts interest regarding ethics is the Philosophia Sinica (Chinese Philosophy), written by François Noël (1651–1729) and published in 1711. This book systematically presents Chinese philosophy in a scholastic framework inherited from Aquinas, Suarez, and other Aristotelian commentators in the 17th century.32 The Philosophia Sinica, Third Treatise on Ethics displays how Jesuits integrated Confucianism into their ethical perspective after one century of dialogue.

4.1. Noël’s General Ethical Framework

François Noël was born on 18 August 1651, in Hestrud, Hainaut and joined the Society of Jesus in 1668. During his training in Douai, he became acquainted with Aquinas’s and Suarez’s perspectives (Suarez’s books served as manuals in Jesuit colleges). He was then sent to China in 1684, where he stayed for around fifteen years until he was called to Rome in the context of the Rites Controversy.33 He was then sent back to Europe in 1701 to give voice to the testimonies collected in China. However, Noël’s first trip to Europe was unsuccessful, as the Pope sent his legate to issue a ban on Chinese rites in 1703. Afterward, Noël returned to China for a few years, before coming back to Europe permanently in 1709. In this context, François Noël published two works introducing the Chinese tradition in 1711 in Prague: a translation of six Confucian classics (Sinensis Imperii Libri Classici Sex), and a presentation of Chinese philosophy (Philosophia Sinica) in three treatises—the first volume focuses on the first being, the second on rituals, and the third on ethics. Noël systematized his presentation of Chinese philosophy by integrating it into an Aristotelian framework, making it more accessible to a European audience. Another specificity of Noël’s understanding of Chinese tradition is his close reading of the Mencius.34 Having studied Aquinas and Suárez during his training, Noël (1732) continued to engage with their works after his return from China, publishing a compendium of Suárez’s thought in 1732 (which shows familiarity with the latter author).35

In the preface to the Third Treatise of the Philosophia Sinica, Noël mentions that, for the “Chinese”, there is no clear difference between natural philosophy and ethics (ecocentric and anthropocentric ethics). Here, his understanding of Chinese ethics is connected with a general anthropological framework. This explains why he starts by describing human beings in light of the four causes (material, efficient, formal, and final) described in the second book of Aristotle’s Physics. In the Aristotelian perspective, pleasure and the desire for good are positive forces in the search for ethical truth. In his presentation of Chinese ethics, Noël employs this dimension of the desirable, of being attracted by the good. The first chapter of the Third Treatise, entitled “On the final principles of human Actions”, summarizes Aristotle’s views:

According to Aristotle in the First Book of the Magna Moralia, the Good is taken in different ways, and he divides it as follow: first, the Good by essence, or the Good with a goodness not received from another thing, namely God (I); then there is the good by participation, or good with a goodness derived from another, as is the case with every creature (II). Second, there are the faculties or goods of fortune which are indifferent to good or bad use, such as honors, wealth, etc. (III) Third, there are Good (things) worthy of praise, such as virtues (IV). Fourth, there are those goods which are honorable, that is goods which are desired on their own account, such as objective beatitude (V).

36

Noël’s presentation highlights the discontinuity between the first two types of good: good by essence and good by participation. Following Suarez, this interpretation of Aristotle in a creator–creature(s) framework rests on the assumption that objective beatitude—full union with God—constitutes the desirable end of human life. Noël then highlights the dimension of pleasure that one experiences in achieving moral–spiritual cultivation (a view that echoes Confucius in Analects 6.23): the good attracts human actions and decisions, or should, as it also depends on the habits created:

According to the Chinese, the relative Good is something that can be desired; or what is desirable and to be wished for; but on the other hand, evil in and of itself cannot be desired (A).

(Noël 1711, III.I.1, p. 8)

Quote (A) comes from Zhu Xi’s commentary on the chapter “Jinxin xia” (盡心下) of the Mencius (Mengzi jizhu 孟子集注) and builds on the analogy between li (理) as pattern coherence and human desire:

A.1 Chapter 8 ‘Jinxin xia’ in the Second Book of the Mencius states as follows: ‘What can be desired is called Good.’ Therefore, the interpreter Zhu Xi comments: ‘The good is that which common reason (ratio) judges as desirable, and evil is that which is hateful.’ (‘天下之理，其善者必可欲，其恶者必可恶’)”.

37

By translating li (理) as reason (ratio), Noël promotes a vision where objective (i.e., theoretical) and subjective (i.e., moral–spiritual) knowledge are bound together—something not foreign to understanding philosophy as a process that changes the agent (see Pierre Hadot’s perspective, mentioned in Section 1). In Noël’s text, a pattern of continuity emerges between the natural and supernatural layers:

And the Good consists in the continuity and conformity which it has with the law of Heaven and the human heart (B).

(Noël 1711, III.I.1, p. 8)

Noël is already far away from Platonism, in which the idea of good is disconnected from concrete life, and scientific and ethical inquiry are disengaged from one another. In contrast, Noël builds on Aristotelian and Confucian perspectives by presenting the good as something at hand and not contradicting human desires (another echo to Analects 7.30). There is a continuity between different aspects of human life: natural, sensitive, and intellectual virtues do not lead to opposing ends. Quote (B) comes from Zhang Juzheng’s (張居正) Commentaries on the Four Books (Sishu zhijie 四書直解), where the connection is made between the reason of Heaven and the ability of the human heart to desire and follow it.38 For Noël, the highest goodness is rational and “attracts” human reason because reason is infused into human beings:

From the highest and absolute goodness, which is often called the law of Heaven or reason, rational nature is transmitted and diffused into people (E).

(Noël 1711, III.I.1, p. 9)

Quote (E) comes from the commentary on the Zhongyong (中庸) in the Daily explanations of the Four Books (Rijiang sishu 日講四書)39, which develops Noël’s interpretation:

E.5. In Rijiang sishu or the Daily explanations of the Four Books, which was published by the Kangxi Emperor, volume 2 when discussing Zhongyong art. 1. states: ‘When Heaven was producing man, after it gave him air and sensible matter for the composition of his body, then it infused into him reason to establish his nature, that is, a rational nature.’ (蓋天之生人，既與之氣以成形，即賦之理以成性).

40

In other terms, Heaven created the human person with sensible matter (qi 氣) and a rational principle (li 理)—an ability to reflect. For Noël, following Mencius, this rational principle has a tendency to goodness in the sense that it participates in it:

This rational nature, since it is infused and transmitted, according to what Mencius proves convincingly, is good (F); that is to say, it possesses derivative and participative goodness.

(Noël 1711, III.I.1, p. 9)

Quote (F) refers to Book 6 of the Mencius, which introduces the debates between Mencius and Gaozi about human nature (xing 性). Here, Noël is creating a new interpretation of the Chinese Classics and their commentaries by introducing the creator–creature(s) framework in Chinese cosmology. Despite the apparent naivety of this construction, Noël is aware of the differences between traditions:

Now, truly, the Chinese organize their understanding of these different Goods in a different way. First, according to them, Heaven or the Lord of Heaven is the first and supreme good; for the Way of Heaven is without any iniquity (C) and is always joined to reason and equity (D).

41

Noël assimilates the notion of Heaven (tian 天) in Chinese Classics with the Christian God, which should today be dismissed as a projection of a Western concept onto Chinese texts.42 He quotes the Book of Rites (C) and the Yijing (D) to make this point. However, despite this problematic understanding of the Confucian Classics, Noël creates a framework that bridges Western ethics with the Chinese tradition, as exemplified above by his commentaries on Mencius. By emphasizing human life’s end, Noël highlights that actions cannot be disconnected from a broader narrative of human existence, which is more important than assessing the value of isolated actions:

According to the Chinese, each thing has a propensity bestowed from Heaven, so that it tends to acquire its due perfection, which once acquired, constitutes the end of that thing. (A). A human being tends toward perfection to be acquired, by reasoning, and other things without reason. (B). The ultimate end of man, when simply considered, is the supreme truth and the supreme good. For the whole life of a person, they must be oriented to the acquisition of the supreme truth by the means of speculation in the mind, affection in the heart, and actions in work. […] His ultimate end considered relatively is the blessed life and peace of all peoples in the whole empire; the intermediate end is the dutiful and just reign of the family and of the kingdom. The end of an action by which someone acts well, is self-renewal; the end of the agent is the renewal of the neighbor (D).

43

Here, Noël introduces a double distinction: human beings do have the capacity to formally know their end and the relationship between ends and means, while other beings do not see this connection because they do not possess a capacity for moral reflection—reflective ability (si 思), which is one specificity of the Junzi in Analects 16.10. This is supported by quotations from Zhang Juzheng’s commentary on the Four Books and the Compendium on Nature and Principle (Xinglidaquan 性理大圈). Interestingly, for Noël, the end of the agent can be expressed in two ways: as renewing the neighbor (Confucian formulation), or as spiritual–ethical transformation, i.e., “beatitude” (Western formulation), which remains the ultimate perspective:

Next, the end is divided into the end of the agent and the end of the action; and then into the intermediary end and ultimate end; and then the ultimate end is further divided into the end considered relatively and the end considered simply. The end considered simply is beatitude.

44

The end of the agent is not the end of the action—something that Noël bases on the Confucian Classics but which is discussed in Francisco Suarez’s anthropology (Suarez 1597).

For Noël, there is a parallelism between Confucian and Aristotelian virtue ethics structures. Both perspectives maintain that objective beatitude is obtained through reflection and achieving perfect wisdom, including the discernment of good and evil and a process leading to this stage of awareness.45 In this process, the pure activity of the mind has to be translated into human actions and relationships. Its purpose is less to enjoy a form of solipsism (i.e., a mind always absorbed in intellectual contemplation) than to establish quality relationships with others (and with nature).

In building this inter-religious perspective, Noël is evaluating Confucian concepts positively. For him, this general narrative of human existence is the most important. Noël’s construction is an invitation to a form of “courage” (creativity) in revisiting ancient resources.

4.2. Francois Noël on Courage

In the Philosophia Sinica, comments on courage are located in the third chapter of the Third Treatise, which deals with different specific virtues. Unsurprisingly, following the Aristotelian and Confucian perspectives, for Noël, courage is subordinated to the virtue of justice (Noël 1711, III.III.3.6., p. 82). He then continues the section by presenting the Confucian perspective:

First, the definition of courage according to the Chinese is as follows: courage is a mind determined to do difficult things (A). Courage is a power that is ready and eager both to resolve doubts and to overcome dangers (B). There are two kinds of courage; one pertains to small men and arises from the rush of boiling blood; the other pertains to heroes and is directed with the one justice and reason (C).

(Noël 1711, III.III.3.6., p. 82)

Quote (A) comes from Zhang Juzheng’s Commentaries on the Four Books and Cai Qing’s (蔡清) Primer on the Four Books (Sishu mengyin 《四書蒙引》) on the 20th article of the Zhongyong; it emphasizes the importance of perseverance, especially in learning. Unsurprisingly, quotes (B) and (C) are both from Zhang Juzheng’s commentary on Mencius 2A2:

B.3. Sishu zhijie, volume 15, states as follows in Mencius, book 1, chapter 3 ‘Gongsun Chou shang’: ‘The disciple Gongun Chou asked Mencius, “Is there a [way of] knowing how to strengthen immovably the heart?” Mencius replied, “There is, and indeed, what is most required is an unencumbered freedom and an eagerness to dissolve doubts and overcome dangers.”’

46

Following this passage, Noël classifies different types of courage following Mencius and the Zhongyong’s 11th article:

Courage can further be divided into three other kinds: one pertains to the southern peoples, who are by nature soft; another to the northern peoples, who are naturally strong; the last to wise men, who are naturally just (D).

(Noël 1711, III.III.3.6., p. 82)

Zhang Juzheng’s commentary, quote (D), develops the importance of preserving self-cultivation and governing for the common good:

As long as someone acting alone firmly establishes the unchangeable mean of virtue in himself and does not deviate at all to the right or to the left, ah! How excellent is this type of true courage! As long as someone in a well-governed kingdom does not change his character after receiving honours, ah! How excellent is this type of true courage! As long as someone in a completely disturbed Kingdom does not change his intention to pursue virtue, even if he has to die, alas! How excellent is this form of true courage!

47

After these considerations on courage are conceived as inner disposition, appropriate government, and steadfast intention, Noël moves to examine acts of courage and property, following the distinction between ends and actions in moral reflection (see the previous paragraph):

Second, the act of courage. An act of courage is the firm undertaking of an arduous task that is judged as just (E). […] Thirdly, the property of courage. The property of courage is to control anger and fear (H). To prevent the heart from being shaken in matters of doubt or danger (I). Acting privately, to preserve firmly the mean of right reason; in dealing with others, to have harmony; to not change one’s behavior because of the honors one has received; amid tumults, despite having to die, to stay steadfast in the pursuit of virtue (K).

(Noël 1711, III.III.3.6., p. 82)

Relying mainly on neo-Confucian commentaries on the Zhongyong and on Mencius, Noël exposes how courage does not stand alone but needs to remain in the “balance of right reason”, which is another way of saying that justice and temperance are necessary for the appropriate expression of courage. In the last part of this section, Noël returns to the Analects as a primary source for the presentation of Chinese tradition; he then explores the consequences of courage’s connection with other virtues on the subject’s self-cultivation and government’s ability:

Fourthly, the integral and subjective parts of courage are as follows: constant perseverance in the way of virtue and patience in adversity (L). Although the disciple Yan Hui only had a wooden dish for eating food, a rustic gourd for his drink, and lived in a poor place, he lived happily and contentedly (M). Passion for progress (N). Nobility of mind, just punishment of crimes, protection of the afflicted (O).

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Quote (L) refers to Analects 15.2, which is not without reference to Analects 8.2 (see Section 2). Quote (M) mentions Analects 6.3 and 4.9, Mencius 4B14, and quote (N) from Analects 1.4 successively. Interestingly, in all of these quotes, Noël translates the term Junzi sometimes as sapiens, the “wise man” (Analects 15.2 and Mencius 4B14), and sometimes as sapientiae Alumnus, “the student of virtue” (Analects 4.9). This reflects the need for a process: to become a Junzi is somehow endless. However, in the case of Analects 6.3, sapiens is translated as “fond of learning” (haoxue 好學), which puts the focus on the Confucian curriculum. Analects 1.14 makes this connection, as Junzi is translated again as sapientiae Alumnus, and love of learning as discendi studiosus:

N. 16. In Lunyu, article 1, Confucius says as follows: ‘A student of wisdom (Sapientiae Alumnus) who not only does not seek satisfaction in food and comfort in housing, and is diligent in his work while careful in his words, but also approaches teachers and guides of the right way to perfect himself better, surely can he be truly called eager for learning? (discendi studiosus)’.

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Despite what could appear to be inconsistencies if we understand translation as a process made term to term, for Noël, the role of the Junzi is very much bound to Confucian learning as a way of searching for wisdom and preparing oneself for public responsibilities; quote (O) closes the passage by referring to Mencius 1A7 and the different desires present in King Xuan of Qi’s heart that Mencius is trying to help to name, channel, and reorient toward proper government.

In the end, François Noël, in the Third Treatise of the Philosophia Sinica, relies on a framework inherited from scholasticism and 17th century commentaries, as exemplified by Suarez. This framework integrates the biblical concepts of creator–creature(s) with the Aristotelian description of humans in the context of the Greek city, and with Physis. This framework is then challenged by exposure to the Confucian Classics, especially the Analects and the Mencius, as well as neo-Confucian commentaries of these Classics. In doing so, Noël opens the door to the construction of inter-religious anthropology, emphasizing the continuity of Qi in humans and among living beings while maintaining the creator–creature(s) dichotomy. Regarding ethics, Noël’s presentation keeps an objective dimension of knowledge bound together with a subjective dimension: knowledge is not neutral; it is constantly interacting with the construction of our identity—if not individual, then collective. This is an insightful reminder for the Anthropocene: scientific knowledge is not neutral; it affects social structures and, therefore, ethics and spirituality. One of the limits of Noël’s approach is restraining the Chinese perspective to orthodox Confucianism. This is also due to his position: between two orthodoxies that do not cope well with hybrids. Finally, even if he quotes the Analects abundantly in building his anthropological framework, Noël is more a follower of Mencius, especially 1A7 and 2A2, which is consistent with its use of neo-Confucian sources.50

5. Conclusions

In this paper, I started by exposing Aristotle’s general framework on virtue ethics, before focusing on his understanding of courage. For Aristotle, moral cultivation is a process in a social community where habits shape inner dispositions. Courage is not alone but is connected with other virtues, such as temperance and justice; it has to be oriented at the proper object, in the appropriate manner (i.e., balanced between two excesses), with the highest end: the hope that something will change in the community. In the West, this Aristotelian perspective was later integrated into a biblical framework, where the dichotomy between the creator and creatures is essential. While Aquinas still maintained a certain balance, modernity later shifted towards a perspective that emphasized dichotomies between body and soul, as well as between humans and other living beings. This shift fostered a mindset of exploiting the planet, viewing nature merely as a resource to be plundered.51 This first shows that humility, temperance, and hospitality are not enough to face Anthropocene’s challenges—there is a need for the virtue of courage.

In Section 3, I effectuated a detour by way of the Confucian tradition that relies on a different anthropology to highlight how, for Confucius, there is also a general framework concerned with moral education in a community. In the Analects, the primary purpose is not courage but humanity, embodied in empathy and loyalty. Therefore, courage has to be balanced by a sense of rituals and rightness. Mencius, and later Zhu Xi, developed this perspective by distinguishing different types of courage and offering a double-sided invitation: courage is, on the one hand, the ability to maintain the self-cultivation process, and on the other hand, the ability of the ruler to make the right and appropriate decisions, nourished by a sense of empathy for his people and for other living beings. This Confucian perspective, by putting forward a broader understanding of empathy and insisting more on the exercises that are necessary for self-cultivation, helps to overcome the tendency of Western tradition to divide too stiffly between soul and body and between humans and other living beings.

In the last part of this paper, I showed how the dialogue between these two traditions had already started four hundred years ago. Indeed, Noël’s Philosophia Sinica offers an inter-religious construction of ethics (and spirituality) based on Aristotelian and Confucian sources through their commentaries (Aquinas and Suarez on one side, and Zhu Xi, Zhang Juzheng, and Cai Qing on the other). This construction needs to be challenged today, as the mutual conversation between the West and China has given us far more tools with which to assess mutual resources and perspectives. In Noël’s construction, Mencius displays an essential role, especially through the idea that empathy is built in continuity between humans and nature (Mencius 1A7 read in connection with 2A6), and that humans, as well as other beings, are all made of Qi (氣), (Mencius 2A2).

Finally, Westerners do not understand their modernity (the times in which Noël was living) in the same way today. Another philosopher trained in a system similar to Noël—Descartes—arrived at a very different framework to handle ethics, spirituality, and the human relationship with nature. As Pierron and other contemporary virtue ethicists have pointed out, Descartes’ naturalistic approach led to a mechanical vision of nature that saw it simply as a source of wealth to be used, which led to unrestrained exploitation of nature and the development of techniques “as master and possessor of nature”. Pierron’s proposal to promote temperance, humility, and hospitality for the Anthropocene moment finds here an echo and a confirmation in Noël’s historical testimony, with the difference that, as exemplified by Mencius’s reflections on courage, a dose of perseverance is necessary to change our habits in the light of the current ecological emergencies. This courage does not stand alone; it must be balanced by temperance, a sense of rituals (i.e., a sense of life’s tempos; see Mencius 1A7), and rightness. Noël’s construction also shows that inter-religious constructions are much easier to build within the ethical sphere than the metaphysical one; this is because, when practices in the face of concrete challenges are at stake, theoretical knowledge, which also bears the risk of being vacuous language, becomes nugatory.