Toward a Natural Theology of Abundance: Reorientation to a Sacramental Reality
Abstract
:1. Sacramental Reorientation
2. A Sacramental Reality of Abundance
3. Philosophy’s Material and Immaterial Realities—Theology’s Abundant Nature of Creation
3.1. Material and Immaterial Realities
3.2. The Abundant Nature of Creation
“For God has not only created us from nothing, but also granted us by the grace of the Word to live a life according to God. But human beings, turning away from things eternal…were themselves the cause of corruption in death.”52
“Humans, instead, have the image of God only by clinging to what they are not—that divine image itself—in love. There is only one perfect or express image of God—the second person of the Trinity—and that perfect image becomes humans’ own only through their exceedingly close relationship with it—e.g., by its own actual presence within them, made their own by the first person of the Trinity through the power of the Holy Spirit on the basis of the second person’s incarnation in human flesh.”61
“the lover of human beings and the common Savior of all, takes to himself a body and dwells as human among humans…so that those who think that God is in things corporeal might…know the truth and through him might consider the Father…[O]n whatever they cast their sense perception there they saw themselves being drawn and taught the truth from all sides.”65
4. Philosophy’s Limits and Possibilities of Knowing—Theology’s Abundant Nature of the Human
4.1. The Limits and Possibilities of Knowing
4.2. The Abundant Nature of Human Knowing
“Not one of the heretics is of the opinion that the Word was made flesh…the Word of God [in the heretics’ creeds] is presented as without flesh and incapable of suffering, as is ‘the Christ who is above’. Some say that He revealed Himself as a transfigured man, but was not born or made flesh. Others deny that he took human from at all.”84
“all creatures learn from His Word [Logos] that there is one God and Father, who contains all things in Himself and grants existence to all, as it says in the Gospel: ‘No one has ever seen God; the only Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has made Him known.’” [John 1:18]105
5. Conclusions: Reorientation through a Theology of Abundance
“[Mystery] conveys dynamism and synthesis. It focuses less on the apparent sign, or rather the hidden reality, than on both at the same time: on their mutual relationship, union and implications, on the way in which one passes into the other, or is penetrated by the other.”110
“[M]ystical theology attends to and seeks to understand the mystical presence of God in all things; it seeks to recognize and respond to that presence as a divine invitation to ever-deeper communion, an invitation inherent in the ongoing activity of creation and new creation.”111
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Conflicts of Interest
1 | My immense thanks to Maria Dasios for her generous and impeccably timed feedback on my former draft, and for the reorienting, invigorating resources she passed along that truly made this version of the paper possible. My gratitude, too, for Mitch, who propelled me past limits and into further possibilities for this paper. For the gift of possibility-filled dialogue, I am beyond thankful. |
2 | These are the two characteristic Christian rituals, drawn from the New Testament writings (first century C.E.). See also Ferguson (2009). N.B. The sacraments are discussed and interpreted in myriad ways across Christian history, including into the present; their descriptions are likewise varied in early church writings by various church fathers in different contexts and time periods. Acknowledging this variation, my focus is on the broad metaphysical function of the sacraments, as will be explained, in regards to their two-fold nature of being material and immaterial, or as a site of immanent-transcendence. For more on immanent-transcendence, see note 8 below. |
3 | Hans Boersma expresses this embodied participation succinctly: “The result of this sharing in Christ is that believers participate in heavenly realities”, going on to clarify that “[h]eavenly participation means that life on earth takes on a heavenly dimension”, in Boersma (2011, pp. 4–5). |
4 | As Rowan Williams puts this point regarding early Christian self-understanding: “To be a Christian at this stage was not primarily to possess a certain set of beliefs about a distant God or even a recently active saviour-figure; it was to see and imagine oneself afresh in relation to the stories of the saviour, and to be involved in a rapid but far-reaching reconsideration of what could truthfully be said about both God and humanity in this light The believer is someone who is inhabited, more deeply and comprehensively than others, by the holy presence out of which all things come, and is at the same time an inhabitant of a world that is larger than that immediately visible or tangible”, in Williams (2020, p. 11). |
5 | Augustine is known as the source for this definition, but it is reiterated throughout church history. See, for example, Hugh of St. Victor, Peter Lombard, Thomas Aquinas. Interestingly, Philipp W. Rosemann’s point regarding Augustine’s definition corroborates this paper’s thesis: “If, as Augustine had it, a sacrament is ‘a visible sign of an invisible grace,’ then the entire created universe can be understood as a vast sacramental system that points to its Creator”, in Rosemann (2017, p. 65). He goes on to say that Peter Lombard’s Sentences, and his definition of the sacraments therein, clarified the sacraments in their sanctifying role to address this issue: “the sacraments were instituted not only for the sake of signifying, but of sanctifying as well”, Lombard, Sentences, book III, dist. 1, chap. 4, No. 2, 2:233, as quoted in Rosemann (2017, p. 66). See also Thomas L. Humphries, Jr., “St. Augustine of Hippo”, in the same volume. |
6 | |
7 | David Bradshaw’s article corroborates this idea of reorientation with an argument concerning how the early Church “designated the Christian sacraments and their rites as ‘mystical’ because they draw participants into a higher level of reality,” in Bradshaw (2015, p. 137). He points out “that the mystical (that is, the mystikos) originally had nothing to do with extraordinary states of consciousness! It instead pertained precisely to the sort of event or relationship epitomized by the Transfiguration: the use by God of the sensible, not only to reveal a higher reality, but to place the participants in communion with that reality”, (p. 145), emphasis in original. Thus the liturgy brings one into a “higher reality” that is always there: it is “[the act] of all of creation joined in worship around the throne of the Creator. It is, in other words, not something that any earthly body creates by its own performance, but an eternally existing reality into which one enters, as a member of the body which is the Church, into communion,” (p. 151). |
8 | The related dichotomy of “immanence” and “transcendence” is helpful for further understanding the relation between the material and immaterial. In recent works, the troubling of the opposed character of immanence and transcendence has been helpfully offered in discussions on these two terms, and variations thereof, and these works have significantly impacted the development of this paper’s thought. See, for example: Haynes (2014); Taylor (2007); Dupré (1993); Otten (2020); Hampton (2019); Davison (2019); Wirzba (2015); Foltz (2014); Desmond (1995); Macquarrie (1984); Sherman (2014); MacKendrick (2021); Kerr (1997); Williams (2018). See also the essays offered in Hampton and Kenney (2021) for more on how the relationship between transcendence and immanence is developed in different ways (and in varied terms) throughout Christian history and thought. See Chenu et al. (1997) for the developments around “nature” in Christian thought. |
9 | This idea has precedence in recent thought, for example: Boersma’s (2011) work argues for a vision of sacramental reality, and he argues that the Catholic ressourcement movement assumes a sacramental ontology in Boersma (2009). I believe that the recent scholarly conversations around immanent-transcendence (see previous note) are likewise arguing for such a view of reality. |
10 | While I am focusing on parts of a theology of creation and of a theological anthropology, this theology of abundance could also be developed in relation to the abundant nature of speaking, which has its precedence in scholarship on apophaticism. Boesel and Keller’s (2010) volume is endlessly rich on the topics of apophatic materiality, apophatic theological anthropology, and apophasis in language. See especially the following chapters, which greatly influenced the development of this paper: Cox Miller (2010); Stang (2010); Burrus and MacKendrick (2010); Tanner (2010b). See also Sells (1994). |
11 | “Abound”. Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/abound. (accessed on 21 April 2022). |
12 | Thanks to Willemien Otten for emphasizing, in a personal conversation, the theologically necessary distinction between abundance and excess. |
13 | Boersma argues for a sacramental reality and likewise draws on early philosophically-infused Christian sources in Boersma (2011). Similar ideas are present in Chryssavgis and Foltz’s (2013) volume. See also Wirzba (2015); Davison (2019); Williams (2018); Foltz (2014). For more on Christian Platonism, see Hampton and Kenney (2021). See more on sacramental reality and immanent-transcendence in note 8 above. |
14 | I have chosen the two early Christian bishops Irenaeus of Lyons (c.130–c.200 C.E.) and Athanasius of Alexandria (299–373 C.E.) (although I present them in reverse order, for explanatory purposes). However, the themes I draw out are present in many other early church fathers, including Origen of Alexandria, the Cappodocians (especially Gregory of Nyssa), Augustine of Hippo, Pseudo-Dionysius, Maximus the Confessor, and John of Damascus. The reason for this prevalence is that these theologians engage and develop, in varied ways, the broad areas touched on here, that is, theologies of creation and theological anthropologies, as well as, relatedly, theologies of language and speaking. Building on these insights, and developing their own, later theologians likewise engage these themes into the medieval period: see for example John Scotus Eriugena, the Victorines, Nicholas of Cusa, Meister Eckhart. Based on this prevalence, I am convinced that the entirety of Christian thought can be engaged through this concept of a theology of abundance. |
15 | Athanasius (2011, §1, p. 51). Citations are numbered sections and corresponding page numbers in this edition. Athanasius’s reference here is to 1 Corinthians 1:23: “but we proclaim Christ crucified, a stumbling-block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles”. |
16 | For example, Plato, Phaedo, 57a-118a (on beauty) and Plato, Republic, 327a-621d (on justice); Cooper (1997, pp. 49–100, 971–1224). |
17 | |
18 | For example, Plato, Phaedo, 57a–118a; Symposium, 172a–223d; Phaedrus, 227a–279c; Republic, 327a–621d; Cooper (1997, pp. 49–100, 457–56, 971–1224). |
19 | To avoid confusion and error, it is worth clarifying my use of the word “reality” here. As I will explain, Plato holds that there is only one true reality (of Forms), insofar as Forms are the only real things; however, what is experienced in the world (a material instance of a Form) is experienced as reality. The image of a mirror helps elucidate this point: a face reflected in a mirror is not the real thing, the actual face; but that reflected image is experienced as a reality (revealing a real face), and one can know in part the actual reality of the face through this image, though only in part—for example, physical facial features, but not the personality that accompanies the face. To reference Plato’s own allegory of the cave (Republic, Book VII), the Sun is actual reality; but the fire within the cave, or rather, what is produced by the fire, namely, the shadows, are experienced as reality. On this account, it is perhaps more accurate to say that, for Plato, there is one reality with its reflections; however, the language of two realities in this paper intends to render explicit that the material and the immaterial can each be experienced as distinct realities. |
20 | Socrates’s own words, concerning beauty, are worth citing at length to see the contrast between a particular characteristic that all beautiful things display and the presence of the Form that makes those things beautiful: “I think that, if there is anything beautiful besides the Beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than that it shares in that Beautiful, and I say so with everything…I no longer understand or recognize those other sophisticated causes, and if someone tells me that a thing is beautiful because it has a bright color or shape or any such thing, I ignore these other reasons—for all these confuse me—but I simply, naively and perhaps foolishly cling to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful…it is through Beauty that beautiful things are made Beautiful” (Plato, Phaedo, 100c–e; Cooper 1997, p. 86). Socrates likewise communicates the participatory relation elsewhere, such as in the Parmenides, Republic, Phaedrus, and Symposium. |
21 | |
22 | As Andrew Davison helpfully points out: because of this priority of Form over material instance, it is more accurate to reverse the directionality (and move the active verb) and say, rather, that Beauty (actively) participates the beautiful thing, or even projects beauty into a beautiful thing. See Davison (2019, pp. 36–37). This directionality is likewise described succinctly, albeit in different terms, in the chapters mentioned above (previous note). Davison and Sherman describe it as causal, calling it “a relation of derivation that is abiding and continuous” (2021, p. 360). Hampton likewise points to the implication built into Plato’s language of derivation that “the one participating is ontologically distinct by its contingent sharing in the non-contingent form in which it participates”(2021, p. 388). This issue of ontological distance will return shortly in this paper. For his part, Rudi te Velde expresses the point, and corroborates the notion of “two realities”, with the language of “the truth behind” changeable material reality: “[participation] signifies the relationship between the changeable reality of the senses and the transcendent reality of the Forms. [It] connects the world of Becoming with the world of true Being; what comes to be is explained by reference to an eternal paradigm, which is the truth behind the changing reality of our experience. Participation entails the presence of the higher in the lower, of the universal Form in the particular instance of the Form” (2021, p. 122). |
23 | On this point of images, and the related issue of similarity and dissimilarity, Davison and Sherman point out that, while “the participatory language of imitation brings in the idea of likeness, it entails an equally important note of unlikeness” (2021, p. 360). |
24 | For example, Plato, Republic.VII, 514a–519d (education described with the allegory of the cave), especially 517b–d (the upward journey into the light of the Sun); Cooper (1997, pp. 1132–36, esp. p. 1135), a passage which greatly informs this paragraph. In this passage, Socrates distinguishes between the visible, knowable realm and the intelligible realm, which “controls and provides truth and understanding” (517c). Cf. Republic.VI, 506d–509d (the analogy of the sun as the Good); Cooper (1997, pp. 1127–30). |
25 | |
26 | See Murdoch (1970, especially pp. 54, 68–70, 90–101). Murdoch “suggest[s] that God was (or is) a single perfect transcendent non-representable and necessarily real object of attention” and argues that “moral philosophy should attempt to retain a central concept which has all these characteristics” (p. 54), emphasis in original. |
27 | Lloyd P. Gerson describes how “at the apex of the intelligible world is the superordinate Idea of the Good, the unhypothetical principle of all. It is this principle that provides the explanation for the existence and essence of the Forms, and, indirectly, for everything else” (Gerson 2021, p. 16). See his discussion of reason (p. 19) and his description in the rest of the chapter around the shifts concerning the Good, especially its identity with the One, in the development of Platonism’s different strains. |
28 | Often referred to as soma-sema, from the Greek. See, for example, Plato, Cratylus 400c; Cooper (1997, p. 118) (“some people say that the body [sōma] is the tomb [sēma] of the soul”); Phaedo 82e; Cooper (1997, p. 72) (“[the soul] is imprisoned in…the body”); Phaedrus 250c; Cooper (1997, p. 528) (“buried in this thing…we call a body”); Gorgias 493a; Cooper (1997, p. 836) (“I even heard one of the wise men say…that our bodies are our tombs”). |
29 | Although it is broadly true that Socrates presents a devalued understanding of the material world, the Platonic legacy in its varied interpretations were not so straightforward. This is because, arguably, the participatory ontology of material things already betrays an abundance insofar as the beauty present to the naked eye is only beautiful on the basis of the immaterial Form—there is more to this instance of beauty than it seems. Christian Platonism, as alluded to in the rest of this paper, takes this implication to its end point by continuously pointing to the Creator source of created beauty. |
30 | The philosophical concept of logos was later clarified—as the principle of intelligibility between the material and immaterial realms—by Plotinus, the significant 3rd century C.E. philosopher, who offered the world his systematic Enneads, and, in so doing, the synthesis of Plato and Aristotle which is now known as Neo-Platonism. For the place of logos (reason/intellect/thought) in different strains of Greek philosophy, see the selections in Inwood and Gerson (1997). |
31 | |
32 | John 1:1. Commentaries on John’s Gospel in particular were penned throughout church history (e.g., Origen, Cyril, Aquinas, Eriugena). |
33 | John 1:14. |
34 | Colossians 1:15–20. |
35 | Kathryn Tanner points out: “Because the divine image is all that its archetype is, it is not an image by participation at all, if participation means sharing in something that one is not” in Tanner (2010a, p. 7). John Behr corroborates this point by discussing Athanasius’s “contrast between what is ‘proper’, what belongs to something as its ‘own’, and what is ‘outside’. Christ is the ‘proper’ Son and Word of God, in contrast to those who, from ‘outside’ God, are adopted as sons, who, by participation in his ‘own’ Word share in the property of being ‘rational’ [logos]” in Behr (2011, p. 28). Further clarifying: “Created beings, brought into being from non-existence, are intrinsically ‘from outside’, external to God, though they can come to participate in God. The Son, on the other hand, is God’s ‘own’ Word, and so is divine, not by participation, but in himself…He is what it is to be God, and so is the exact image of the Father” (p. 35). |
36 | Jean-Luc Marion articulates the shift to seeing the immaterial in the material especially well: “it is necessary to cease looking at the face of Jesus simply as such, and to see it in a certain way, according to a double visibility, as putting into view the in-visible of the Father” in Marion (2016, p. 104). |
37 | John Behr, in his Introduction to his translation of Athanasius, says that On the Incarnation’s “influence on all later theology cannot be understated” in Behr (2011, p. 21). N.B. While Athanasius is not chronologically prior to Irenaeus (in the next section), his explicit development of the Word of God is used in this first section with the understanding of its priority for the theological developments to follow in this paper. |
38 | Behr (2011, p. 22). |
39 | |
40 | Behr (2011, p. 23). |
41 | Behr (2011, p. 29), citing Athanasius, Against the Gentiles §3. Athanasius’s clarification that “their own things” or “what is closer to themselves” refers to their bodies is found on p. 30. Behr’s note on this elucidates the consequence of this idolatry: “In this way, humans fell into the chaos of the fleshly desire of the body, forgetting what they had originally received from God. With their souls directed towards the body, in, by, and for itself, the body is now the very point of human separation from God, not because of its materiality, but because it has become an idol” (p. 30). |
42 | Willemien Otten discusses Augustine’s similar issue with “idolatry—that is, the worship of simulacra”, going on to articulate the misplaced focus: “Because, in Augustine’s view, pagans lack any recognition of God as the author of creation, they mistake creatures and their artifacts for the creator”, in Otten (2020, p. 114). See also previous note above, where Behr describes this idolatry as a focus on the body. |
43 | Behr (2011, p. 24). |
44 | Athanasius (2011, §1; p. 51). |
45 | Behr (2011, p. 36, 37), emphases added. |
46 | Athanasius (2011, §3; p. 57). |
47 | With the disclaimer that, although he uses the language of participation in places, Athanasius is careful to distinguish himself from the philosophers, including Plato, and philosophers’ creation stories, in particular creation from existing material. See Athanasius (2011, §2; p. 53). |
48 | Athanasius (2011, §3; p. 57). |
49 | Athanasius (2011, §3; p. 57). |
50 | As Tanner states this point clearly: “Humans are not simply the image but ‘in’ or ‘after’ it, as the verses say (Gen 1.27), because the image referred to here is itself divine—either the second person of the Trinity or the Word Incarnate”, in “In the Image of the Invisible”, in Tanner (2010b, p. 120). Athanasius himself uses the language of one’s own vs. outside (see note 35), which Tanner echoes when she says that humans, “[b]ecause they are not God, come to image God only by receiving what is not their own”, that is, God himself. She draws out the subsequent distinction between weak and strong participation in Tanner (2010a, esp. pp. 6–13, in pp. 1–57 (Chapter 1: “Human Nature”)). |
51 | On ontological distance, see previous note, and Tanner (2010b). For example: “Since there is no ontological continuum spanning the difference between God and creatures, one cannot hope to become the divine image, this perfect or proper image, by approximating divine qualities” (p. 127); and, emphasizing the necessity of the Incarnation: “humans, considered in and of themselves, never become a proper image of God at all even when formed according to it. The image of God in a proper sense is just God, the second person of the Trinity. Not being God, humans can therefore never simply become that image in and of themselves through any process of transformation…And yet, without abolishing or mitigating the difference between God and humans, humans do become the divine image—by attaching themselves to it. It is by being identified with what they are not that the divine image becomes their own” (p. 127). |
52 | Athanasius (2011, §5; p. 61). As he addresses the reality of death elsewhere, revealing the urgency of a solution: “with death holding greater sway and corruption remaining fast against human beings, the race of humans was perishing, and the human being, made rational and in the image, was disappearing, and the work made by God was being obliterated” (§6, p. 63). |
53 | It is helpful to contrast this self-determined material focus of idols with their opposite, icons, which, as images of the divine, have an affective power on the viewer. This is drawn out in the contemporary work of Wirzba (2015), and Foltz (2014). As Wirzba puts it, the icon “overwhelms us and calls into question the expectations through which we [at first] approached it” (2015, p. 71). Foltz, with a different emphasis, presents the ancient practice of theoria in connection to nature, as active contemplation, an attentive and active “seeing” of the invisible divine in the visible world, with the result of not “fix[ing] in place” what is seen, in Foltz (2014, pp. 3–4). |
54 | Athanasius (2011, §8; pp. 65, 67). |
55 | Athanasius (2011, §16; p. 85). |
56 | Athanasius (2011, §16; p. 85). |
57 | Athanasius (2011, §8; p. 65). |
58 | It is worth recalling that an ontological distance is upheld, no matter the status of the relational distance. See notes 50 and 51 on ontological distance. |
59 | Athanasius (2011, §1, p. 53), emphasis added. |
60 | Athanasius (2011, §13, p. 79), emphasis added. |
61 | Tanner (2010b, pp. 127–28), emphasis added. |
62 | Athanasius (2011, §15, p. 83). Recall, too, how Logos includes the significations of discourse, reason, and principle, clearly very related to teaching. |
63 | See note 8 on the related dichotomy of the terms “immanence” and “transcendence”. |
64 | |
65 | Athanasius (2011, §15, p. 83), emphasis added. |
66 | As Behr puts this: “Once human beings had their sights set only on material, bodily things, how else could God grab our attention, as it were, apart from through a body….Although first seen as a human being, by the works he does in the body, works which are clearly not human but divine, Christ makes himself known not merely as a human being but as the Word of God himself”(Behr 2011, p. 39). |
67 | Behr points out that this sentiment is already present in Against the Gentiles: “Athanasius continues, following Paul, human beings could still have learnt about God through their sense perception for ‘he so ordered creation that although he cannot be seen by nature, yet he can be known from his works’ (Gent. 35). The order and harmony of creation demonstrate not only that there was a creator, but that there is one creator” (Behr 2011, p. 31). |
68 | Athanasius (2011, §16, p. 85). Contemporary engagements on materiality in late antiquity speak to the way attention is directed to God through material objects and people (saints), as conduits of Christ’s power. See, for example, Dasios (2022); and Cox Miller (2010). |
69 | |
70 | |
71 | Some take the relaying of Socrates’s ignorance as disingenuous; I take it at face value in the service of the philosophical dialogues which concern themselves with the pursuit of truth, the movement from ignorance to knowledge. |
72 | As Karmen MacKendrick puts this point: “Though Plato is very fond of knowledge, he and his followers always insist that human knowing is narrowly limited in comparison to all possible (and especially divine) knowing” MacKendrick (2021, p. 4). |
73 | Sells (1994, p. 8). |
74 | MacKendrick (2021, p. 4). Here she is referencing the view of “neo-Platonic theurgy”. Part of her central point is that mystery and the unknowable is not just an accepted part of life in these older traditions, but is emphatically and specifically valued, precisely for its appeal to being beyond comprehension. The “dominance of human knowing”, in contrast, relates to what Fergus Kerr calls “an ideal of total comprehension”, when relaying Karl Rahner’s position that resists such an ideal, relevant here: “Rahner…thinks that we are haunted by an inhuman ideal of human knowledge…The dominance of an ideal of knowledge as total comprehension, which Rahner seeks to demythologize…, thus distorts theological understanding of the hiddenness of God” in Kerr (1997, p. 182), emphasis added. This hiddenness of God is likewise positively held rather than understood negatively as a lack. |
75 | |
76 | We can reference the powerful phrase “mystery not mastery”, of the Levinas scholar Michael Purcell, to make the point stronger. Quoted in Fergus Kerr (1997, p. 180). Kerr develops this phrase in relation to Karl Rahner. See especially pp. 182–84. He relays that “Rahner wants to locate the incomprehensibility of the divine mystery properly, not just to free us from illusory ideals of knowledge. The divine mystery is not to be viewed as something to be mastered” (p. 183). |
77 | Apart from its manifestation in philosophical dialogue, dialectic (or, logic) was also the third and culminating liberal art, after grammar and rhetoric. These three liberal arts (called the “Trivium” in the middle ages), whose development stemmed especially from Aristotle’s Organon, were central to the education of the Church Fathers, whose sermons, letters, and other writings are often studied for their rhetorical power. |
78 | Sells (1994, p. 2). |
79 | As Tanner puts it in the opening of her essay, “In the Image of the Invisible”: “Christian theologians often maintain that God is incomprehensible, beyond human powers of positive explication through concepts and speech… The absolute fullness of being and goodness, God transcends all divisions between kinds and exceeds all bounds of a particular nature or mode of being that might allow God to be set alongside others or encompassed by anything it is not” in Tanner (2010b, p. 117). She goes on to argue for an apophatic theological anthropology, contending that, if we humans are made in this incomprehensible image, we too must be incomprehensible “both in our natural capacities and in what we become in relation to the true image, the Word Incarnate” (p. 133). This idea has significantly influenced the argument of this paper. |
80 | David Brakke acknowledges the difficult categorization of “Gnosticism” while he also carefully argues for and investigates “a Gnostic school of thought, the literary remnants of which can be identified and therefore can be described and studied, albeit sketchily” in Brakke (2010, p. x). Speaking to the retroactive naming and categorization issue: “Suffice it to say that in the seventeenth century Henry More (1614–1687) invented the term ‘Gnosticism’ for all the heresies that Irenaeus and his heresiological successors attacked. In the centuries that followed, scholars developed, refined, and debated theories of how Gnosticism arose and interacted with Christianity” (p. 19). He also discusses the “secret knowledge” aspect emphasized among a group of scholars who, at a 1966 conference, “decided that ‘Gnosis’ should be taken to refer to the general idea of knowledge reserved for an elite group and thus is a widespread phenomenon in the history of religions” (p. 20). While this view of Gnosticism as a category has recently been questioned and critically engaged, as Brakke elucidates, I refer to it here, notwithstanding its variations and complexities, as “a school of thought”, to use Brakke’s own phrase, insofar as Gnosticism demonstrates, when described by Irenaeus (who himself is the classic early source for descriptions of positions held by later-called Gnostics, such as Valentinus), a theological emphasis on what I am calling the “one side” of knowing, as opposed to one we see in Irenaeus’s own view, as we will see. On this “school of thought” approach, see Brakke (2006, especially p. 248). See also: King (2003), who says that “Gnosticism is, rather, a term invented in the early modern period to aid in defining the boundaries of normative Christianity”, which she takes issue with for, “[s]o long as the category of Gnosticism continues to serve as the heretical other of orthodox Christianity, it will be inadequate for interpretation of the primary materials and for historical reconstruction” (pp. 2, 3). For the opposite position (treating it as a useful category), Hans Urs von Balthasar describes its contours as a heresy in his “Introduction” in von Balthasar (1990). |
81 | Brakke discusses recent scholarship on the issue of orthodoxy as “identity formation”, which he says emphasizes “the strategies by which individuals and groups sought to define themselves” Brakke (2010, p. 11). As Karen King describes it: “It aims to understand the discursive strategies and processes by which early Christians developed notions of themselves as distinct from others within the Mediterranean world (and were recognized as such by others), including the multiple ways in which Christians produced various constructions of what it means to be Christian”, quoted in Brakke (2010, p. 11). He in turn discusses “varieties of Christianity”, referencing Ehrman (2003). For the development of orthodoxy in ecclesial history, see Davis (1983). |
82 | Brakke (2006, p. 245) and Behr (2013, p. 13). Behr (2013) helpfully challenges the idea that Irenaeus was intolerant of certain strands of Christian thought in this work “against the heresies”, arguing that his response was to those who had already excluded themselves from the Church: “It was … the ‘heretics’ that were intolerant, and the Catholic Church that preached toleration and was open to diversity” (p. 2). See also Chapter 1, “Irenaeus of Lyons: Ambassador for Peace, Reconciliation, and Toleration” (pp. 13–71). Boersma corroborates this idea, calling Irenaeus “the theologian of unity” (Boersma 2011, p. 41). For his part, David Bentley Hart calls Irenaeus “[p]erhaps the finest theological mind of that period [from the middle to late second century]” in Hart (2009, p. 96). |
83 | Regarding the positions of two examples of Gnostics, Marcion and Valentinus, who both left the church in different contexts and for their own reasons, but saw their own teachings as the true ones, Behr says: “Marcion and his followers were also accused of drawing two particular conclusions from their ditheism. First, a radical disdain for the material order, finding expression in a radical asceticism that proscribed marriage and prescribed sexual abstinence. And, second, a docetic understanding of Christ, denying his real human existence and thus the reality of his birth and death” Behr (2013, p. 26); and, regarding the followers of Valentinus: “Valentinian ecclesiology thus differentiates between an inner circle of the ‘spiritual’, and an outer circle of ‘psychics’ who remained beholden to an impoverished understanding of the Scriptures…needing further education and growth to flower into true knowledge…The very language deployed by Valentinus, differentiating between the ‘pneumatic’ [spiritual] Christians and the ‘psychic’ Christians, the former with a higher knowledge of things unknown to and misunderstood by the latter, is already evidence of their own recognition of their difference from the majority of other Christians in Rome” (pp. 31, 34). See also Hart’s succinct chapter, “The Gnostics”, in Hart (2009). |
84 | Irenaeus (III.11.3); von Balthasar (1990, p. 14). N.B. Hereafter, I reference Irenaeus and von Balthasar’s (1990, III.11.3, p. 14) Against Heresies section numbers and the corresponding page numbers from this translation. |
85 | Irenaeus (III.18.5–6,); von Balthasar (1990, p. 16). |
86 | Irenaeus (II.13.8); von Balthasar (1990, p. 22). |
87 | Irenaeus (D.30f); von Balthasar (1990, p. 15). |
88 | Irenaeus (II.10.2); von Balthasar (1990, p. 33), emphasis added. |
89 | Irenaeus (II.18.6); von Balthasar (1990, p. 39), emphases added. As von Balthasar explains: “[Gnosticism] wants to get to know all of God’s mysteries by its own powers. However surprising it may seem, it does appeal to the Scriptures, and so it is forced to posit a secret tradition, coming down from Jesus and the apostles, alongside the official proclamation of God for the simple”, in von Balthasar (1990, p. 30). |
90 | Irenaeus (II.25.2–4); von Balthasar (1990, p. 42). |
91 | Irenaeus (III.24.2); von Balthasar (1990, pp. 38–39). |
92 | Irenaeus (IV.35.4); von Balthasar (1990, p. 38). |
93 | Irenaeus (II.28.7); von Balthasar (1990, p. 35). |
94 | Irenaeus (II.25.2–4); von Balthasar (1990, p. 42). |
95 | Irenaeus (III.11.5); von Balthasar (1990, p. 90). |
96 | Irenaeus (IV.20.6–7); von Balthasar (1990, p. 44). |
97 | Irenaeus (II.27.7); von Balthasar (1990, p. 35). |
98 | Boersma relays the position of the twentieth-century nouvelle theologians, who corroborate this sense of mystery as outside of discursive knowing: “For the nouvelle theologians, ‘mysteries’ did not simply refer to unknown or obscure divine truths that rational, discursive thought would gradually be able to uncover. An intellectualist approach like this implied that theology’s task was to grasp and overcome mystery. According to nouvelle théologie, however, the purpose of theology was rather to enter into mystery’s hidden depths. Truth was the dynamic realization of existential, loving engagement of the known object rather than abstract, objective analysis” (Boersma 2009, pp. 5–6). |
99 | Irenaeus (III.24.2); von Balthasar (1990, p. 38). |
100 | For more on the logos, see notes 30 and 31. |
101 | Irenaeus (II.6.1–2); von Balthasar (1990, p. 32), emphasis added. |
102 | What I am calling abundance, Tanner characterizes as “plasticity”, in human freedom and undetermined variability: “The early Eastern church’s stress on free will as the image of God—or often secondarily, rule in the sense of self-rule—could now be taken in a new light, not as the promotion of some vaunted power in a positive sense, an imitation of divine omnipotence, but as an interest in the unusual plasticity of human lives absent any predetermined direction by nature. Free will is an indication of variability” in Tanner (2010b, p. 125). Boersma puts the point this way: “The created order—and the spirit of the human person, in particular—sacramentally represented the supernatural reality of the mystery of God” in Boersma (2009, p. 7). |
103 | Irenaeus (III.10.2); von Balthasar (1990, p. 46). |
104 | Irenaeus (V.1.1); von Balthasar (1990, p. 57). |
105 | Irenaeus (II.10.2); von Balthasar (1990, p. 33). |
106 | Irenaeus (IV.6.3); von Balthasar (1990, p. 50). |
107 | Tanner again expresses this beautifully: “Humans, it is true, are determined to God—being formed in the image of God is their good, by nature. But that is just not to be determined in any particular direction as other things are, since God is the absolute good and not a limited one” (2010, p. 125). |
108 | Boersma (2011, p. 9), emphasis added. |
109 | The biblical Greek instances of mysterion, whence “mystery” is derived, was translated into Latin as sacramentum, whence “sacrament” is derived. Mystery and sacrament are intrinsically connected. |
110 | de Lubac (2006, p. 51), emphasis added. |
111 | Mark A. McIntosh (2020, p. 27), emphases added. |
112 | |
113 | McGinn (1991, p. xvii). Building upon this insight, Hampton notes that “[t]he challenge for the mystic is to find a form [of communication] that records and enacts the unique nature of their experience”, and thus discusses the special place of poetics, in its approximative capacities, for communicating the mystical experience, in Hampton (2020, p. 242). |
114 | In contrast to kataphatic or positive theology, which are affirmative statements that posit assertions about God, the mode of denying or “away-from-saying” (Greek: apo-phanai) relies on qualifying any positive knowledge of God with the admission that we only know what God is not—e.g., God is good, but God is not good by our human standards of good; rather, God is good beyond our human conceptions of good. These have traditionally been understood as the two modes of speaking about God; but in the most powerful theology, they must always be paired—any affirmation must be paired with a denial or negating qualification. Discussions on apophaticism abound. See, for example, the thought-provoking essays in Boesel and Keller (2010), especially Stang (2010). |
115 | Lisa H. Sideris powerfully expresses this point about nature’s own voice when she says that “the sounds of nature [are] voices that call on us without necessarily speaking to or about us”, in “Listening to the Pandemic: Decentering humans through silence and sound” in Sideris (2021, p. 125). Otten draws out the voice of nature and its impact upon the human self in relation to the thought of Eriugena and Emerson in particular. On her account, “thinking nature” has the double meaning of both “nature (doing the) thinking” and “(a person who is) thinking nature” in Otten (2020, p. 6), emphases added. She clarifies that this is “a concept of nature that is fully set free, released from the constraints of human, or even divine, control and that seems to actualize most concretely there where it is able to melt with pure thinking…performing what Emerson calls ‘onwardness,’ the notion that humans are never completely in control of their own thoughts insofar as nature is always prospective, putting us on our way”, 6. See also her passage on nature’s expression as “a meaningful conduit with ties to both God and the human self” with the metaphors of mirror, wall, and veil, (p. 15). |
116 | As Jame Schaefer succinctly puts it, drawing on Ignatius of Loyola’s Spiritual Exercises: “From an Ignatian perspective, our gratitude must be demonstrated through actions, not simply words” in Schaefer (2022, p. 252). |
117 | Emily Brady draws on nature writers such as John Muir, Annie Dillard, Robin Wall Kimmerer, and Rachel Carson to elucidate wonder as “a quasi-aesthetic experience of nature which is deeply receptive and questioning”, which leads to “[m]eaningful human-nature relationships [that] aim at co-flourishing” in Brady (2022, pp. 223, 226). |
118 | This can be attention to the human or non-human, but either way its role is, as Sideris puts it, “decentering the self”, which “effect[s] meaningful change in our lives” (2021, p. 125). This point draws on Simone Weil’s “understand[ing] of extreme attention as a form of prayer” (p. 125), a notion that Iris Murdoch likewise echoes in describing “loving attention” “to express the idea of a just and loving gaze directed upon an individual reality”, in Murdoch (1970, p. 33). Also called “unselfing attention”, Murdoch posits it as an antidote to the following problem: “Briefly put, our picture of ourselves has become too grand, we have isolated, and identified ourselves with, an unrealistic conception of will, we have lost the vision of a reality separate from ourselves” (p. 46). |
119 | As Rowan Williams puts it beautifully, in relation to “being radically receptive to God’s initiative”: “the effect of this is not to create a single purified individual or series of individuals; it is to create a people whose lives are defined by mutual responsibility, mutual nurture, the building up of each other by selfless love. What manifests the divine life to the world is not a series of isolated saintly lives but the fact of a church in which every life is at the disposal of every other, so that each life is valued as uniquely gifted” in Williams (2020). |
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Thiessen, A.R. Toward a Natural Theology of Abundance: Reorientation to a Sacramental Reality. Religions 2023, 14, 1125. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14091125
Thiessen AR. Toward a Natural Theology of Abundance: Reorientation to a Sacramental Reality. Religions. 2023; 14(9):1125. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14091125
Chicago/Turabian StyleThiessen, Annalea Rose. 2023. "Toward a Natural Theology of Abundance: Reorientation to a Sacramental Reality" Religions 14, no. 9: 1125. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14091125
APA StyleThiessen, A. R. (2023). Toward a Natural Theology of Abundance: Reorientation to a Sacramental Reality. Religions, 14(9), 1125. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14091125