The Transimmanence of the Real: Ontological Pluralism in the School of Ibn ʻArabī

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Let me first begin that, for the most part, I enjoyed reading this paper and found it well researched and written, as well as original. In my ratings above, I honestly was wavering back and forth between High and Average, and for the following reasons:

1. One significant monograph critically engaging the pluralism of the Akbarian school is missing: Rethinking Ibn 'Arabi, by Gregory A. Lipton. Now, to be fair, this monograph narrowly focuses on Ibn Arabi and on particular modern interpreters of his thought, from Chittick to Schuon. However, Lipton makes a strong case that Ibn Arabi is not as pluralistic and inclusive as readers think. The author, then, should engage this critical work constructively: are later Akbarian authors, particularly the two whom the author discusses, offering a pluralism based on Ibn Arabi's thought that in fact is more pluralistic? So, are they extending and going beyond his thought (this might even play into the author's arguments on transimmanence and explain, perhaps, why later interpreters are more pluralistic than Ibn Arabi). Engaging this work is necessary, in any case.

2. On the top of p. 2, it seems we effectively have the thesis or "the point" of the essay. It seems that the presumption of the author is that ontological pluralism is a positive development in the history of metaphysics. Is it? If it is, inform the reader in some way--even at a basic level that living in a de facto pluralist society demands ontological pluralism for political, civic and civil discourse.

3. Also on p. 2, I can already see how the author could refine their argument to make it more pertinent. Like Nair’s book, these thinkers from the 17th century subcontinent provide non-Eurocentric knowledges to add to the THEORY side of religion and political philosophy—they are not just objects of study by us moderns, but rather worthy of attention for their theories and how their theories contribute to modern, constructive political, philosophical, and/or theological thought. Indeed, this approach could, with clarification, even be considered decolonial. To make the article more pertinent, they could perhaps frame it as a step in decolonizing the field.

4. A technical point: Author should note that Ibn Arabi never used the phrase waḥdat al-wujūd, —later interpreters deployed this phrase to describe their interpretive projects. Again, perhaps a product of their expanding or moving beyond Ibn Arabi (see #1 above).

5. On p. 2, the author employs for the first time the Persian phrase madhhab-i 'ishq. They would do well to inform readers that this term is emic to the tradition and constitutes a separate genealogy than Ibn Arabi's and the Akbarian school, even though around the time of Fakhr al-Dīn 'Irāqī, the two schools begin to coalesce (mostly through 'Irāqī, in fact; see Chittick's introduction to Fakhruddin Iraqi: Divine Flashes [Classics of Western Spirituality Series]), and what we have in the subcontinent is, for the most part, a combination of Akbarian and madhhab-i 'ishq.

6. I suggest using sūra instead of "Chapter" when referring to Qur'ān

7. On p. 4, the author uses "dialectic" to describe what Ibn Arabi is doing regarding tanzīh and tashbīh. However, “Dialectic” has many meanings and perhaps they could offer how they are using it. Because, if in the sense of reaching a SYNTHESIS, it can be argued that Ibn Arabi is NOT doing that, but rather maintaining a tension, a dynamic tension.

8. Throughout (beginning p. 4), Q 42:11 should be translated more literally, which gets to Ibn Arabi’s point: “There is nothing like His likeness” (or something similar that renders ka-mithlahi). In fact, later, IA’s commentary (which the author summarizes) does not make sense without the English properly translated and without the Arabic transliterated.

9. On p. 5, the author writes: "or in Akbarian terms the incomparability of the world". Here the move from incomparability of God to "of the world," as the author makes, is explained with a citation from the Futuhat. This is good, but the transition is sudden, since all that has been explained in the preceding pages was on the incomparability of God. 

10. p. 6: al-haq should be al-ḥaqq

11. Section 4: This is a long section going into the details of Heidegger. However, I am not sure how much it adds to the essay. It can be shortened, for sure. 

12. As the author explains Dārā Shikōh and the Majma‘ al-Baḥrayn in section 5, I had the following query. On p. 9-10, they write: " a whole politics of interpretation born out of a particular understanding of wujūd – one that allows for plural and inexhaustible possibilities of thinking of Reality." But, I ask: Are there limits to the possibilities? Are there judgements on morally just and unjust acts, for instance? What prevents this position from being political quietist, then? On the other side of the colonial world, Sufis (just as impacted by the Akbarian school) in West Africa and elsewhere in the continent are a century or two away from recognizing the injustice of colonialism and revolting against Italy, France, and other European colonizers. So, not all possibilities are just, then. How is this reconciled?

13. On p. 11, the author makes a central point to how transimmance emerges in Dara Shikoh: "Majma‘ al-Baḥrayn, with all its endeavours to find resonances between Sufism and Vedanta, bears full testimony to the fact of Dārā Shikōh’s being a pious Muslim. However, his Muslim identity allows him a pluriform conception of truth, his Muslim identity, through his transimmanent understanding of being, is in fact a Muslim becoming, to use Milani’s term." I understand this to mean that D. Sh.'s transimmanent realization is a feature of his Muslim identity and his "being Islamic" (as Shahab Ahmed would say). However, I ask: Is this transimmanent realization, however, *only* available to Muslims? Is *Muslim* becoming the only valid path to the realization of transimmance? If so, we have, then, *some* sort of hierarchy (only the Muslim path can lead to transimmanent realization, even if the path leads beyond the Muslim). If not, do all paths have equal access to transimmanent realization? If so, what does that mean about pluralism, relativism, and so on?

14. On p. 12 and elsewhere, the author uses "antinomian". Elsewhere, the author draws on Shahab Ahmed’s book What is Islam?—the author here and elsewhere uses “antinomian” to describe some practices. However, here and elsewhere perhaps the author can employ para-nomian or supra-nomian as Ahmed does to characterize these analogous practices. The author can find Ahmed’s discussion on this topic in the book, via the index I think. As "beyond" it works well with the author's engagement of Milani's " journey through Islam and beyond" on p. 13.

To conclude, I recommend revisions based on my comments above. I urge the author especially to attend to # 1,  #3, #12, #13,  and #14.

Author Response

Please see the attachment

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 2 Report

The author offers a nuanced (and accurate) account of Ibn al-'Arabi's dual notion of God's transcendence-immanence (or transimmanence), and helpfully relates this to Heidegger's ontology's, before considering its implications in the life and teachings of two South Asian Sufis. Appropriate sources are used throughout. This is an original, engaging, and well-crafted paper. I see little in the way of revisions needed. It does attempt to integrate several disparate strands, however, and hence can, at times, give the reader a sense of disorientation, though it is not an uninteresting one.

The only issue that I think needs to be addressed, is that the article seems to equivocate somewhat on the exact nature of Akbarian and hence South Asian Sufi modes of pluralism. While the author notes such pluralisms are not a simple equation of all beliefs, it remains unclear then what precisely such modes of pluralism consist of vis a vis Islam and other religions. I think this should be clarified around lines 527 - 534: what is the difference, exactly (and practically), between pluralism as the possibility of truth manifesting variably and actually doing so? What precisely is, say, the relationship between Vedanta and Sufism, according to the Sufi figures considered?

Gregory A. Lipton's Rethinking Ibn 'Arabi (2018) may be of use in fleshing this question out just a bit further, as his work critiques strong pluralist or perennialist readings of Ibn al-'Arabi.

Author Response

Please see the attachment

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf