The Realm of Tianfang Advocated by the Daoist Philosophy of Naturalism
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Analyzing Key Concepts
When things are accomplished, the common people say, “It’s ourselves who accomplished these things 我自然.”(Laozi, chp. 17)2
Keep orders to a minimum. Always be ziran. 希言自然(Laozi, chp. 23)
Dao imitates ziran 道法自然.(Laozi, chp. 25)
The dignity of Dao and De 德 lies in the fact that they never give orders but always keep ziran 夫莫之命而常自然.(Laozi, chp. 51)
… help the myriad things follow their own course and do not dare to interfere with them 以輔萬物之自然而不敢為.(Laozi, chp. 64)
I suppose that those who are really good at managing the world would not do so. People have their constant inborn nature. They weave cloth to get dressed and plow lands to get fed. This is the common nature they share. (The ruler treats them) equally without partiality 一而不黨. This is called tianfang.
Here, tianfang acts as an adjective, indicating a state of being free and released. In summary, tianfang can be comprehended in two highly related aspects: as a way of governing, it means that the monarch must not interfere with the common people (whether viciously or well-intentionedly) but let them follow their own course; as the consequent living state, it means that the common people are free from external constraint and enslavement, thus feel emancipated and at ease (many stories about plants and beasts in Daoist literature allude to the human world). If we cope with self-others relation like this, we may attain a realm in which all kinds of species coexist and each grows according to its own inborn nature, a pattern of existence in which individuals are free while the whole group is very harmonious.All living things like to keep their own nature. So being cut up is not what cassia trees and lacquer trees wish; being deplumed or torn are not what pheasants and kingfishers want; being tightened the reins or bridled with snaffles are not out of horses’ inborn nature; bearing load is not what oxen are willing to do… People always cut roots of live plants to decorate useless things, and catch birds as their plaything. They pierce originally intact noses and fetter feet in the state of tianfang. All these actions are presumably not in accordance with the intent of all things coexisting.
3. The Pattern of Relationship between Dao and the Myriad Things
3.1. No Difference of Being Real or Illusory
3.2. Dao: Not a God-like Creator or Designer
However, the creation of Dao has been expressed quite clearly in the two books Laozi and Zhuangzi, so it is not that things can lead themselves (completely). However, Lao-Zhuang consider that the creation of Dao is not out of will, nor with an intention, but creates things without knowing itself is creating. Hence, Dao creates all things, but since it has no will or purpose, it breeds things without dominating them… as if all things were self-created. It is not that Lao-Zhuang seriously believe all things are self-created.
Mr. Xu believed that Dao gives birth to everything, so everything is not acting on its own. However, since Dao has no will, all things appear to be created by themselves. This view has indeed grasped Lao-Zhuang’s true intention. The main reason why Zhuangzi emphasized that everything depended on Dao to some degree and could not master its own life was to break people’s persistence in body and thus make them be content with their fate and accept any change. However, generally speaking, Zhuangzi paid more attention to Dao’s characteristic of not controlling, lest controlling should make things unable to live freely. It is much better to step back and let all things lead themselves, so that each individual can act as the initiator of his/her own life.7Like Laozi, Zhuangzi takes Dao as the ontological Creator. Additionally, the so-called “ziran” means: although Dao creates things, it has no will and no purpose. Its function in the process of creation is so intangible that it seems Dao has “done nothing”. After things are created, Dao does not interfere with them at all. Therefore, though all things are created by Dao, they are as if they have been created by themselves.
3.3. The Theoretical Motive of Lao-Zhuang’s Dao Theory
4. Transcending Anthropocentrism under the Guidance of Daoism
4.1. Confucianism: Ranking the Myriad Things in a Hierarchical Sequence
Heaven gives birth to hundred kinds of things. Among them, humans are the noblest.(“Collected Speeches I 語叢一”, Jingmen Municipal Museum 1998, p. 194)
Confucius saw Rong Qiqi wearing a deer-fur coat, playing a plucked instrument and singing. Confucius asked, “Why are you so happy?” (Rong) replied, “I enjoy many things. Among all things born by heaven, humans are the most honorable. Now that I have been born as a human, this is my first joy…”(“Miscellaneous Words” of Garden of Anecdotes 說苑·雜言, Xiang 1987, p. 428)
So, humans are products of the virtue of heaven and earth, the intersection of yin and yang 陰陽, the convergence of ghosts and gods, and the condensation of the elegant qi of the five elements 五行之秀氣.(“Liyun” of the Book of Rites 禮記·禮運, Sun 1989, p. 608)
4.2. Daoism: Stressing the Equality of Human and Nonhuman
5. The Daoist Art of Self-Control
5.1. The Direct Purpose of Setting Limits for Oneself: To Attain the Realm of wuji or sangwo
The more people know about bows, cross-bows, hand-nets, tailed arrows and like contraptions, the more the birds in the sky will be troubled. The more people know about hooks, baits, various kinds of nets and bamboo traps, the more the fish in the water will be bothered. The more people know about pitfalls, cages and various kinds of nets, the more the animals in the swamps will be disturbed… Hence whenever the world falls into great disorder, the fault lies in fondness of knowledge.
5.2. The Ultimate Purpose of Setting Limits for Oneself: To Grant Others More Living Space
6. Co-Existence and Co-Prosperity of the Myriad Things
6.1. The Equality of Things’ Different Natures
From the point of view of Dao, things are neither noble nor humble. From the point of view of things, each regards itself as noble and others as humble.
From the standpoint of Dao, what is noble and what is humble? … All things being equal, which is short and which is long?
A ridgepole can be used to knock down a city wall but cannot be employed to block up a hole. This refers to the difference in function. The horses Qiji and Hualiu can run1000 li in one day, but when it comes to catching rats, they cannot do better than a leopard cat. This refers to the difference in skill. An owl can catch fleas at night and discern the tip of hair, but if it comes out in the daytime, no matter how wide it opens its eyes, it cannot see a mound. This refers to the difference in nature.
Observed in the light of function, if we regard a thing as useful because it has a certain function, then among all things there is nothing that is not useful. If we regard a thing as useless because it does not have a specific function, then among all things there is nothing that is not useless. Once you know that east and west are opposite but mutually indispensable, the division of things’ functions will be determined.
6.2. No Destroying Things’ Inborn Nature by Human Action
Ducks’ legs are short, but if we try to lengthen them, it will cause misery. Cranes’ legs are long, but if we try to cut off a portion of them, it will produce grief. Hence, what is long by nature needs no cutting short; what is short by nature needs no stretching.(“Webbed Toes 駢拇", Guo 1961, p. 317)
Once a seabird alighted in the suburbs of Lu state. The feudal king himself offered it wine in the ancestral temple, told his subordinates to perform the music of Nine Shao 九韶 for it to listen to and present it with the top-ranked sacrifice (tailao 太牢) to feast on. Nevertheless, the bird looked bewildered and sad, refusing to eat a single piece of meat or drink a cup of wine, and in three days it died. This is to raise birds as to raise the king himself 以己養養鳥, not to raise birds as birds 以鳥養養鳥. To raise birds as birds, we should let them roost in deep forests, roam around raised platforms and flat ground, float on rivers and lakes, eat mudfish and minnows…
6.3. The Great Harmony between Human and Nature
As for the ultimate men, they seek food and pleasures in the universe together. They do not come into conflict of interest, or do mischief or plot against each other…(“Gengsang Chu”, Guo 1961, p. 789)
(So the sage) plays together with things and takes pleasure in the fulfillment of others while holding on to being himself.(“Zeyang”, Guo 1961, p. 878)
The sage lives with others but does not hurt them. People who do not hurt others will not be hurt by others. Only people who do no harm can get on well with others.(“Zhi Travels North 知北遊", Guo 1961, p. 765)
6.4. The Liberty of Aesthetic Objects
At that time, there were no paths or tunnels on the hills and no boats or bridges on the waters. All creatures lived in companies, with their settlements next to one another. Birds and beasts multiplied to groups; grass and trees thrived. So beasts might be led about by tying a cord; nestles could be climbed up to and peeped into without disturbing them. In the age of Perfect Virtue 至德之世, humans dwelled together with birds and beasts, and mingled with the myriad things. How could they know the distinctions between “gentleman” and “snob”?
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1 | Likewise, the proposition “Heaven and human are integrated as one 天人合一” has become a very fashionable idiom, but it is almost distorted into a slogan of Greenpeace. In fact, its original meaning is definitely not the harmony between human and nature; rather, it is stressing from the perspective of virtue that humans should conform to heaven, i.e., to imitate the virtue of heaven 法天and match with heaven 配天. If a person’s virtue has reached the height of heaven, then we can say he/she and heaven have been integrated as one. In short, we should be aware of the difference between interpreting the original thought 照著講 and extending the thought to other domains 接著講, otherwise we may drift away from the text and fall into boundless association. |
2 | |
3 | Wuwei is often distorted into doing nothing or no action. Actually, it only negates invasive actions or actions which are not in accordance with Dao. Meanwhile, it advocates doing what Dao is doing. Roger T. Ames properly translated it as “noncoercive action that is in accordance with the de of things” (Ames and Hall 2003, p. 66). |
4 | |
5 | Cui Zhuan’s 崔譔 version of Zhuangzi mistakes tianfang for “tianmu 天牧” (in Guo 1961, p. 335). Apparently, this is a clerical error caused by a similar form (放 vs. 牧), and has violated the rhyme reading too (黨 and 放). Some scholars like Wang Shumin 王叔岷, however, read it as “fangtian 放天” (S. Wang 1999, p. 335). This was to misunderstand 放 as a borrowed character of 仿, so as to conform to the Daoist thought of learning from heaven. |
6 | Naturally this kind of discussion from traditional Western metaphysics has its special value, but it is problematic to apply it to distinguish the real and the illusory and pursue the essential world behind the empirical world. |
7 | Inspired by this, Heidegger put forward “Sein-lassen” (see Ye 1995, pp. 140–41). |
8 | See the silk text “Five Virtues 五行” (Lab of Ancient Literature of National Cultural Heritage Administration 1980, p. 23); “Ruling Institutions” of Xunzi 荀子·王制 (X. Wang 1988, p. 164). |
9 | People usually misunderstand the proposition of “見小曰明”. To illustrate, Wing-Tsit Chan translated it into “Seeing what is small is called enlightenment” (Chan 1963, p. 164), while Philip J. Ivanhoe translated it as “To discern the minute is called ‘enlightenment’” (Ivanhoe 2002, p. 184). The main reason for such typical misinterpretations is that they have not realized that here “見” must be pronounced as “xian 現”. For detailed analysis of the ancient and modern commentaries on this proposition and my own interpretation, see (S. Wang 2015). |
10 | Under the influence of Zhuangzi, Heidegger also said, ”Innerhalb des Seienden im Ganzen ist kein Rechtsgrund zu finden für die Hervorhebung gerade des Seienden, das man Mensch nennt und zu dem wir selbst zufällig gehören.” (Heidegger 1953, p. 6). |
11 | 謨 is an interchangeable word of 謀 since they have the same pronunciation. |
12 | People often think that Zhuangzi insisted all things were identical, or wanted to use external standards to make things uniform. Quite the opposite, Zhuangzi acknowledged the existence of differences and tried to justify them so as to remind us not to distinguish them axiologically. |
13 | The fable that Hundun 渾沌 was chiseled to death at the end of the chapter “Conforming Makes an Emperor” (Guo 1961, p. 309) is also a typical case of doing bad things with a good intention. (see B. Wang 2004, p. 141) |
14 | Mohist’s theory of “advocating sameness 尚同” has more drawbacks. Even Xunzi criticized them “only knowing uniformity, not knowing diversity 有見於齊,無見於畸” (“On Heaven“ of Xunzi 荀子·天論, X. Wang 1988, p. 319). |
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Wang, S. The Realm of Tianfang Advocated by the Daoist Philosophy of Naturalism. Religions 2023, 14, 519. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14040519
Wang S. The Realm of Tianfang Advocated by the Daoist Philosophy of Naturalism. Religions. 2023; 14(4):519. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14040519
Chicago/Turabian StyleWang, Shaojun. 2023. "The Realm of Tianfang Advocated by the Daoist Philosophy of Naturalism" Religions 14, no. 4: 519. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14040519
APA StyleWang, S. (2023). The Realm of Tianfang Advocated by the Daoist Philosophy of Naturalism. Religions, 14(4), 519. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14040519