From Noncoercive Action to Shapelessness: On the Ontological Ground of Laozi’s Political Philosophy

Abstract

The theoretical proposition that sages or ideal rulers wuwei 無為 (act noncoercively) to achieve ziran 自然 of people has been clearly identified as the key claim in the political field, as posed by Laozi. However, this proposition leaves two questions worth further consideration. Firstly, how does this political claim relate to other, somewhat negative, political claims in Laozi, such as bushangxian 不尚賢 (not promoting those of superior character)? Secondly, why and in what sense should ziran of people and things be affirmed? Correspondingly, the purpose of this paper was to elucidate that those seemingly negative political claims are critiques of the ruler’s youwei 有為 (coercive action) in governance, in accordance with the viewpoint of noncoercive action, and to argue that the affirmation of the value of ziran must be established in the metaphysical realm of shapeless Dao instead of in the political realm. On the grounds of Dao, although the content of ziran involves the diversity of states of things, a permanent change of those states really establishes the measures and criteria of the ziran of things.

1. Introduction

Wuwei 無為 (noncoercive action), as a tenet of Daoist political philosophy, has long been noted and discussed by scholars1. As far as the special study of Laozi is concerned, the popular discussion of noncoercive action in academic circles has sorted out its inner theoretical structure, such as the discussion of noncoercive action and ziran (commonly translated as spontaneity, naturalness, or self-so), and the relationship between noncoercive action and Dao and sage. The relationship between noncoercive action and Dao and Sage has also been discussed. These discussions have been concerned with two main issues. First, what is the subject matter of ziran and noncoercive action? Second, what is the meaning of ziran and noncoercive action?2

Since the topic of this paper is centered on noncoercive action, these discussions need to be noted and responded to. First, as far as the subject matter of “noncoercive action” and ziran is concerned, there is a consensus in the academic community on the subject matter of noncoercive action; that is, noncoercive action mainly refers to a ruler’s way of behaving. However, there is no agreement on the subject of ziran amongst academics. The views on this fall into three categories. The first is that ziran should be attributed to the people (Chikyu 2009, p. 27; B. Wang 2010, pp. 49–51; Z. Wang 2010, pp. 39–41; Cao 2017, pp. 109–10; Li 2019, pp. 22–24); the second is that ziran is mainly used to describe the state of Dao according to Heshanggong’s interpretation (Luo 2016, pp. 38–40; Luo 2019, pp. 70–73; Tadd 2019, pp. 4–9)3; and the third view tries to reconcile the first two views by arguing that ziran can describe both the Dao and the people (Song 2015, pp. 80–82; Lin 2017, pp. 1–6). If those interpretations are considered from a purely theoretical point of view, all three views are logical and self-consistent. However, as far as the analysis and interpretation of the text are concerned, there are still differences in interpretative validity among these interpretations.

In addition, when examining the research of contemporary scholars, adherence to a category-historical approach has led many to understand the connotations of concepts in their relationships. For example, many scholars have pointed out that noncoercive action is the means to achieve ziran, while ziran is the purpose of noncoercive action (Liu 1996, p. 146; Meng 2018, pp. 38–39). This reveals a relationship of conceptual structure. However, if one limits his or her attention to the relationship between concepts only, the critical quality of the philosophy of Laozi will inevitably be missed.

The problem I reviewed above can in fact be summarized as the disadvantage of the hollow content brought about by merely theoretical analysis, and to circumvent this problem, it is necessary to use an approach of the history of thoughts to depict the problems that the thought of Laozi faces. If noncoercive action proposed by Daoism in the political sphere is considered from the perspective of the history of thought, then this claim is first of all an intentional term; that is, a response to coercive action 有為 (you wei). The latter is directly related to the political tradition of de and li of Zhou Dynasty 周朝德禮傳統 (the tradition of Virtue and Ritual of Zhou Dynasty, More detailed discussions of this tradition of Zhou Dynasty, see Zheng 2009, pp. 74–95). It can be said that the direct cause of the term noncoercive action is a reflection on the real political system, and the ziran of the people is the theoretical result of this reflection, i.e., the highest purpose of the political sphere. In recent years, this approach has gradually received increasing attention from scholars (Zheng 2013; Ye 2014), but it has not yet consciously used the chapter order presented in the excavated documents and systematically argued for Laozi as a work of political philosophy through a detailed interpretation of the chapters.

This discussion also leaves unanswered a profound question, namely, why ziran in the political sphere should be affirmed. As we know, Xunzi 荀子 argues that conforming to the ziran of things will lead to a bad social order, and thus, they had a distrustful attitude toward ziran. What is the reason for Daoism’s affirmation of ziran? This requires a more in-depth study of ziran.

In the past, academic discussions on ziran were often limited to the question of why and in what sense ziran should be affirmed in the political sphere. But why and in what sense is ziran affirmed in the realm of existence? The discussion on this topic is still rather superficial and one-sided, and scholars tend to answer it by resorting to the proposition that Dao fa ziran 道法自然 (Dao follows ziran). How should the ziran be understood, though? Answering this question requires a deep understanding of the criteria and limits of ziran, because it is obvious that ziran in Laozi does not affirm the content of things without distinction, and it is incompatible with excessive desires. But what is the excess of desire? What is the standard of desire? In recent years, there has been a conscious attempt to clarify the meaning of ziran through linguistic approaches, and the results have been widely discussed and accepted in the academic community. According to this discussion, the meaning of ziran is “natural” and “absence of external force” (Liu 1995, pp. 94–95; Qingjie Wang 2004, pp. 41–49; Zheng 2019, p. 228; Li 2019, pp. 21–24). However, this description is still phenomenal and describes only the literal meaning of ziran; it does not help to answer the question posed above.

To answer this question, we must further explore the theoretical relationship between these two concepts of noncoercive action and ziran to deepen our understanding of ziran. According to this structure, the result to be achieved by noncoercive action can be subsumed within the connotation of ziran, while the change of state and the constancy of this change are likewise shown to be inherent in ziran. On this basis, this paper also aims at addressing this question that has not been specifically discussed; namely, what is the criterion of ziran? Otherwise, what is the limit of reasonable desire? These two questions are two sides of the same coin.

Based on these two understandings, this paper will first clarify the dialogue between Daoism’s noncoercive action and traditional governance of Virtue and Ritual and outline the meaning of the political philosophy of noncoercive action and ziran. Then, based on the theoretical structure of noncoercive action and ziran, this paper will explore the meaning of ziran as the political foundation of noncoercive action and how Dao laid the groundwork for ziran.

2. Superior Virtue and Noncoercive Action in the Context of Political Philosophy

Examining various versions of Laozi, it will become obvious that different excavated versions of Laozi both place the passage of de 德 (Virtue), composed of 44 chapters, before the passage of Dao 道, composed of 37 chapters in different forms4. This phenomenon can be also seen in the “Jielao” chapter of Hanfenzi (Wang 1998, pp. 133–56). Taking the facts of the literature into account, it is unwise to still hold that this ancient and classic order of chapters in Laozi and Hanfeizi are outcomes of subjective selection or blind choice. Instead, this order in Laozi may reveal a more accessible approach to the original text of Laozi in contrast to the prevalent texts of it.

According to this vision of the history of thought, it is more appropriate to take Virtue as the starting point to research the thought of Laozi. The system of de and li 德禮 (Virtue and Ritual) was undoubtedly the most important ideological background and value system before the philosophical period. This can be seen in two ways.

Firstly, Chunqiu Zuozhuan 春秋左傳 and Guoyu 國語 show the textbooks and rituals in the pre-philosophical period, which were used to teach the nobles living in this period and which were valued and modeled by Virtue and Righteousness (yi 義). Both of the latter two values were the fundamentals of the kingdoms’ interests, so there was a famous statement of their function: “poetry and books are the houses of Yi; rituals and music are the rules of De; Virtue and Righteousness are the essence of profit” 詩書, 義之府也; 禮樂, 德之則也; 德義, 利之本也 (Legge 1960a, pp. 200–1). In addition, Guo Yu 國語 also considered the purpose of Righteousness to guangde 廣德 (promote Virtue) (Xu 2002, p. 358). Thus, Virtue and Righteousness can also be understood as Virtue in a broad sense. Accordingly, Virtue can be regarded as the most important value of the kingdoms from Western Zhou to the Spring and Autumn Period.

Secondly, when we look at the Book of Poetry 詩經, Book of Documents 尚書, Chunqiu Zuozhuan 春秋左傳, and Guoyu 國語, Virtue and Ritual always served as the criteria of value for judging social actions and personal character at that time. Evaluative judgments, such as “the people have lost their Virtue” (Legge 1960b, p. 255), “every noble guest has excellent Virtue” (Legge 1960b, pp. 276–77), and the claims that one action is “ritual” or “not ritual”, were prevalent everywhere. From this situation, it is not difficult to infer that the value system of Virtue and Ritual permeated political and social life from the early Western Zhou to the Spring and Autumn period. Zheng Kai has argued that the scope of Virtue involves political initiatives (provincial or hunting), social customs (Virtue and surname), political means (Virtue and Punishment), and political ideas (Zheng 2009). Although it is not wise to endorse the extreme view that all philosophers of pre-Qin were derived from posts of government of the Zhou Dynasty (Hu 2013, pp. 299–306), as long as we acknowledge that those value-bearing claims made by each of the philosophers were objectively shrouded in the shadow of the grand tradition of Virtue and Ritual, then those philosophers had to respond to this tradition, evidently or not, in a targeted manner (Schwartz 1975, p. 3)5.

Given the above description, the assertion that Laozi starts with the passage of Virtue and begins with this proposition that shangde bude 上德不德 (the highest Virtue does not possess traditional Virtue) is not abrupt6, but is in line with the laws of the history of thought. According to this understanding, Laozi used this proposition to challenge the traditional value system of Virtue of Zhou (zhoude 周德), which is also called brilliant Virtue (mingde 明德) 7. Thus, this proposition can also be understood as that the highest Virtue is different from traditional Virtue, because traditional Virtue is not considered to have true value according to the proposition that xiade bushi de, shiyi wude 下德不失德, 是以無德 (inferior Virtue does not lose traditional Virtue, so it does not have true virtue), while true value can only be found in the highest Virtue.

However, Laozi’s distinction between the highest Virtue and the lower Virtue is only formal. This formal distinction will be confusing if not given any substantive content. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, since traditional Virtue involves many aspects of social life, the scope of critique can either be partial, such as criticizing a specific initiative, or universal, i.e., reflecting on political ideas. In short, the critique of traditional Virtues must have a clear focus; otherwise, it will result in a blurring of thought. Secondly, if the meaning of the newly proposed Virtues can only be understood negatively without positive claims and discourses, then even if the critique of traditional Virtues is successful, it will at most have a deconstructive effect without a constructive project. As a result, the highest Virtue is not even proposed positively. Bearing this reflection in mind, we can better understand the profundity of the theory of noncoercive action in Chapter 38, which is cited below:

• “The highest Virtue does not have traditional Virtue; thus, it possesses true virtue, while inferior Virtue does not lose traditional Virtue, so it does not have true virtue. The (ruler of) highest Virtue acts noncoercively, and people do not think that there is coercive action (of a ruler) upon them8. The (ruler of) inferior Virtue acts coercively, and people consider that there is coercive action (of a ruler) upon them. The (ruler of) highest Benevolence acts coercively, and people do not feel the coercive action (of a ruler) upon them. The (ruler of) highest Righteousness acts coercively, and people consider that there is coercive action (of a ruler) upon them. The (ruler of) highest Ritual acts coercively, and if people do not respond to it, a ruler will yank their arms and drag them along with him.”9 上德不德, 是以有德; 下德不失德, 是以無德。上德無為而無以為; 下德為之而有以為。上仁為之而無以為; 上義為之而有以為。上禮為之而莫之應, 則攘臂而扔之。 (Daodejing Chapter 38. Lou 1980, p. 93)

After dividing the highest Virtue and inferior Virtue, Laozi directly uses noncoercive action and coercive action to define them, respectively. Let us suspend the complex and difficult controversial issue of the text of inferior Virtue and the highest righteousness here (for a more specific and comprehensive discussion, Cf. Meng 1987; Chen 2003); inferior Virtue, the highest Benevolence, the highest Righteousness, and the highest Ritual share the same principle of coercive action. Thus, they can be unified into the scope of traditional Virtue, because the latter is labeled as coercive action. In this sense, coercive action is a theoretical diagnosis of traditional Virtue made by Laozi.

It is worth pointing out that this diagnosis is not directed at any specific initiative, but rather at the underlying principle behind the specific initiatives. The superlative implied by “highest” suggests ideal pictures of these different methods of coercive governance. However, all of them will invade people to different extents. In order to overcome those drawbacks, Laozi poses the slogan of the highest Virtue, which is based on the principle of noncoercive action.

Thus, the key question is what the precise meanings of noncoercive action and coercive action in Laozi are, and what consequences they have for people. If we review the texts of coercive action and noncoercive action in Laozi, they always relate to politics and express the methods of a ruler’s governance. This can be justified by the three following paragraphs:

• “Not to promote those of superior ability is the way to keep the people from rivalry among themselves; not to prize articles that are difficult to procure is the way to keep them from becoming thieves; not to show them what is likely to excite their desires is the way to keep their minds from disorder. Therefore, the sage, in the exercise of his government, empties their minds, fills their bellies, weakens their wills, and strengthens their bones. He constantly (tries to) keeps them unprincipled in their knowing and objectless in their desires and, where there are sophists, to keep them at bay. It is simply in doing things noncoercively that everything is governed properly.”10不尚賢, 使民不爭; 不貴難得之貨, 使民不為盜; 不見可欲, 使心不亂。是以聖人之治, 虛其心, 實其腹, 弱其志, 強其骨。常使民無知無欲。使夫知者不敢為也。為無為, 則無不治。 (Chapter 3. Lou 1980, p. 8).
• “If anyone should wish to get the world and then act coercively, I see that he will not succeed. The world is a sacred vessel and cannot be treated coercively and arbitrarily. A ruler who acts in this way will destroy it; he who would hold it in his grasp will lose it.” 將欲取天下而為之, 吾見其不得已。天下神器, 不可為也, 不可執也, 為者敗之, 執者失之。 (Chapter 29. Lou 1980, p. 76; Legge 2008, pp. 53–54).
• “Dao acts noncoercively and achieves everything. If princes and rulers are able to maintain this feature, all things would of themselves be transformed by themselves.” 道常無為而無不為。侯王若能守之, 萬物將自化。 (Chapter 37. Lou 1980, pp. 90–91; Legge 2008, p. 67).

In those paragraphs, the meaning of noncoercive action is concretized into an ideal method of political governance, which involves two related items: the ruler (sage-ruler) and the people (people, everything)11. The reason this method of governance is ideal or supreme is expressed through both negative and positive aspects.

On the negative side, Laozi points out shortcomings of the ruler’s coercive governance by criticizing those specific initiatives under the principle of coercive action in Chapter 3 and goes on to state the positive results of the ruler’s implementation of the principle of noncoercive action, i.e., “It is simply in doing things noncoercively, that everything is governed properly” 為無為, 則無不治.

This series of assertions, “not to promote those of superior ability”, “not to prize articles which are difficult to procure”, and “not to show them what is likely to excite their desires”, do not directly explain what ideal governance is like, but they show an evident intention to dialogize and criticize those specific initiatives under the principle of coercive action. These political initiatives are to be reflected upon and rejected precisely because they lead to social and political ills such as political and social disorder and even mental disorders among the people.

Since the principle of sage governance is noncoercive action, this series of assertions of “not to” should be understood as concrete expressions of this principle in a political context. In contrast, those slogans including “to promote those of superior ability” are particular examples of coercive action. Therefore, the aim of Chapter 3 is clear. Laozi argues for the necessity of the principle of noncoercive action by reflecting on the shortcomings of those specific measures based on the principle of coercive action. According to this aim, what the proposition “everything is governed properly” reveals is only how the principle of noncoercive action overcomes the drawbacks that coercive governing brings, so that social order and mental order will not be confused. However, this proposition still does not outline the ideal political vision based on the principle of noncoercive action in a positive narrative.

The positive aspects of noncoercive action in governance can be seen from the injury that coercive action imposes on the ziran of people and things. Since specific initiatives such as “promoting those of superior ability” set forth a standard for measuring the value of people, those who failed to meet this standard were relegated to uselessness and discarded. Thus, there exists a contradiction between the singularity of standards and the diversity in the ziran of people and things. Laozi addresses this contradiction by stating that the sage’s governance under the principle of noncoercive action allows and admits the unique value of each person in society12:

• “The sage is always skillful at saving men, and so he does not cast away any man; he is always skillful at saving things, and so he does not cast away anything.” 聖人常善救人, 故無棄人; 常善救物, 故無棄物。 (Chapter 27. Lou 1980, p. 71; Legge 2008, p. 49)
• “The sage has no invariable mind of his own; he makes the mind of the people his mind. To those who are good (to me), I am good, and to those who are not good (to me), I am also good, and thus, (all) get to be good. To those who are sincere (with me), I am sincere, and to those who are not sincere (with me), I am also sincere, and thus, (all) get to be sincere.” 聖人無常心, 以百姓心為心。善者, 吾善之, 不善者, 吾亦善之; 德善。信者, 吾信之, 不信者, 吾亦信之, 德信。 (Chapter 49. Lou 1980, p. 129; Legge 2008, p. 88)

The essence of the sage’s governance lies in the abandonment of selfishness (“no invariable mind”) to set standards for all people by himself (or a few people) and take the mind of the people as the standard for his mind. This principle was later developed by Huanglao Daoists as the “art of supreme governance”. Its content is expressed by this proposition that “the wise and the foolish do not abandon each other, and the capable and the despised do not leave each other behind” in the “Dadao” chapter of yinwenzi (Wang 1957, p. 27).

At this point, the highest Virtue in Laozi acquires its concrete connotation only through noncoercive action, and the meaning of the highest Virtue is an ideal political social picture or ideal political order presented by the noncoercive action of a ruler. In this picture, nothing is discarded or sacrificed, and the unique value of every individual can be recognized and promoted, which is also a positive solution and response to the chaos of society and mental disorders of people. If the core concern of political philosophy is “what is the best political order” (Strauss 1988, pp. 56–57), then the political picture of the highest Virtue, unfolded by the principle of noncoercive action, can undoubtedly be called the Daoist version of political philosophy, or Daoist political philosophy.

In addition, the political philosophy of Daoism is not as confined to a small city-state as the classical Greek political philosophy, but it has a much larger and more universal scope: tianxia 天下 (world). This also constitutes a major feature of the ideal political picture of the highest Virtue. When the world is referred to as shenqi 神器 (the sacred vessel) in Chapter 29, the adjective “sacred” already has the meaning of superlative. This can be proven by the fact that one version of Chapter 29 has written shenqi as daqi 大器 (the greatest vessel) (Wenzi, Wang 2009, p. 231). According to Chapter 28, this vessel is to be understood specifically as a worldwide political community composed of sages and people. In Laozi’s case, this broad sphere of governance is intertwined with the noncoercive action for governing, and “the greatest vessel” for governing requires a different approach to governance than the secular one.

Chapters 3 and 37 point out the ideal effect brought by executing the principle of noncoercive action from different perspectives. I have analyzed the perspective from Chapter 3 above, and now, I begin with the analysis of Chapter 37. Chapter 37 further explains the substance of this ideal effect on the people; this is “all things would of themselves be transformed by themselves” 萬物將自化13. To put this proposition in another way, people will live according to their ziran. Thus, we can conclude that the purpose of noncoercive action is to achieve the ziran of all people and even all things (Cao 2017, p. 109; Zheng 2019, pp. 49–50). As Chapter 64 says, the sage “helps all things achieve their ziran and dares not to act coercively” 以輔萬物之自然而不敢為 (Lou 1980, p. 160). Combined with the above analysis, this structure, consisting of noncoercive action of rulers and ziran of people, is the theoretical expression of Daoism’s ideal political picture of the highest Virtue, where the value of all people and things is affirmed fully.

However, there is still a problem with this structure. Since it presupposes a fundamental insight into the ziran of people and things if we do not consider that self-transformation of people and things according to their ziran will not lead to a good social order but rather, as Xunzi 荀子 said, that ziran of people will inevitably lead to a chaotic social order if left to its own development14; then, the doctrine of Daoism will not be broken and can be disregarded. For this reason, Daoism should and must give an account of the understanding of things. Laozi has given such an account, although in an unconscious way. Compared to the ideal political order (the ideal way of governance and the ideal picture of political life) discussed above, which is still connected to everyday political life while transcending it, Laozi’s theory of the ziran of things has a more metaphysical or philosophical feature, despite this theory still being closely connected with things and the ideal political order.

3. The Ontological Foundation of Noncoercive Action

In the above, I sketched out the ideal political society of the highest Virtue. There is a fact worth noting that although the ruler rules people in a noncoercive manner, this practice was fundamentally dependent on the emulation of the Dao (Chapter 37). In this case, the reason the ruler acts noncoercively depends on the theoretical relationship between Dao and all things. Therefore, if Laozi advocates that the nature of people realized by the ruler’s noncoercive action forms an ideal harmonious order, then insight into the possibility of realizing the ideal order can only come from understanding of this theoretical relationship. In essence, the way Dao acts on things lays the theoretical foundation for the understanding of ziran of things from the ontological level, which ultimately determines the ideal political picture of Daoism.

However, Laozi still has a very deep understanding of the way things develop themselves and the laws of the world without talking about Dao:

• “The course and nature of things are such that what was in front is now behind; what was warm is now freezing; what was strong is now weak; what was accumulating is now collapsing.” 故物或行或隨; 或歔或吹; 或強或羸; 或挫或隳。 (Chapter 29. Lou 1980, p. 76; Legge 2008, p. 53).
• “A violent wind does not last for a whole morning; a sudden rain does not last for the whole day. To whom is it that these (two) things are owing? To Heaven and Earth. If Heaven and Earth cannot make such actions last long, how much less can man!” 希言自然, 故飄風不終朝, 驟雨不終日。孰為此者？天地。天地尚不能久, 而況於人乎？ (Chapter 23. Lou 1980, p. 57; Legge 2008, p. 43).
• “When one is about to take inspiration, he is sure to make an (previous) expiration; when he is going to weaken another, he will first strengthen him; when he is going to overthrow another, he will first have raised him; when he is going to despoil another, he will first have made gifts to him.” 將欲歙之, 必固張之; 將欲弱之, 必固強之; 將欲廢之, 必固興之; 將欲奪之, 必固與之。是謂微明。 (Chapter 36. Lou 1980, pp. 88–89; Legge 2008, p. 65).

The expression is that what was in a state of A is now in that of B in Chapter 29, which shows that things are not static, but are in the process of becoming. Chapter 23 further reveals that the change of things follows a certain law: the extreme state cannot last, and it will be changed. Laozi describes an application of this law in Chapter 36. Since the state of things will transform to the opposite side of one state when it reaches the extreme, if someone wants something to transform into one state, he or she can develop the other state of this thing to its extreme in the light of this law.

Above, Laozi’s observation of the phenomenon of change in things and his summary of the law of change have been revealed, but questions also arise at the same time. Since the law of things has been so thoroughly observed by Laozi, why does he still need the term Dao to explain or guarantee ziran of things? Moreover, if everything is in a process of change, and the change of things is reasonable, then why did Laozi, after saying that ”when things have attained their strong maturity, they become old” 物壯則老 in Chapter 30, further make the negative value judgment that ”this may be said to be not in accordance with Dao, and what is not in accordance with it soon comes to an end” 是謂不道, 不道早已?

These two questions suggest that the laws of things analyzed and discussed above are not enough to constitute a comprehensive understanding of ziran of things in Daoism and that a comprehensive understanding of things must be obtained through Dao. These negative judgments that “ Heaven and Earth cannot make such actions last long” 天地尚不能久 and “what is not in accordance with it [Dao] soon comes to an end” 不道早已 present us with a positive and substantial perspective to understand Laozi’s examination of the relationship between Dao and things: changjiu 長久 (longevity).

If we take longevity as a clue to consciously review Laozi’s text, then we will find that longevity is indeed an important value that Laozi pays attention to and affirms. We explore whether the sage’s imitation of the heaven and earth’s “not living for themselves” to achieve “longevity” in Chapter 7; or the portrayal of “Possessed of the Dao, he [ideal ruler] endures long” in Chapter 16; and finally, the pursuit to “longevity” of life and governance respectively in Chapter 44 and 59 all reflect the recognition and importance of “longevity” in the political philosophy of Daoism. In this regard, longevity also constitutes the core feature of Daoism’s ideal political picture, together with the achievement of every being in society.

How can this longevity or permanence (which can be considered a more philosophical expression of longevity) be understood in things? And how should this understanding relate to the diagnosis of “what is not in accordance with it [Dao] soon comes to an end”?

For first question, since it is determined that the longevity of things is to be understood in terms of the relationship to Dao, then this longevity is to be understood as the permanence of change of states of things, because the role of “giving things life” is the core function of Dao, as held by Laozi. The following chapter makes this apparent:

• “Lives of all things are given by the Dao and nourished by Virtue. As a result, things receive their shapes and become tools when they are completed15. Therefore, all things without exception honor the Dao and exalt Virtue. This honoring of the Dao and exalting of Virtue is not the result of any ordination, but always a spontaneous tribute. Thus, it is that the Dao gives all things lives, nourishes them, brings them to their full growth, nurses them, completes them, matures them, maintains them, and overspreads them. It gives them lives and makes no claim to their possession of them; it carries them through their processes and does not vaunt its ability in doing so16, it nurtures them to maturity and exercises no control over them. This is called Dark Virtue.” 道生之, 德畜之, 物形之, 勢（器）成之。是以萬物莫不尊道而貴德。道之尊, 德之貴, 夫莫之命常自然。故道生之, 畜之; 長之育之; 亭之毒之; 養之覆之。生而不有, 為而不恃, 長而不宰, 是謂玄德。 (Chapter 51. Lou 1980, p. 129; Legge 2008, p. 92).

In addition to the role of Dao in giving things lives, this passage is noteworthy for its emphasis on the role of Virtue in the nourishing of all things. It is the first and only time that Laozi juxtaposes Dao and Virtue in an ontological context.

On the one hand, the roles of giving things lives and nourishing them from Dao and Virtue exist along the generating process of things all the time. Those functional descriptions of “bringing them to their full growth”, “nursing them” and “completing them” show the permanent function of Dao and Virtue in all things. On the other hand, the shapes and tools received by things further explain particular functions of Dao and Virtue. Now, if we continue to take the lasting change of states of things and permanent functioning of Dao and Virtue into consideration, then their functions are not only to make the determinate features or states of all things possible, but to ensure that the transformation of those determinate features and states last forever. In this sense, the longevity of things grounded in Dao and Virtue shows itself as a permanent change of states.

In the above analysis, Dao and Virtue are treated as a whole to show their ontological function in things without considering their possible differences. But their distinction in Laozi also needs to be clarified to set forth the fundamental and unique features of Dao.

Firstly, there is hardly a difference between Dao and Virtue according to the principle of noncoercive action. As far as the “dark Virtue” in Chapter 51 is concerned, it has the same metaphysical character as Dao does, and its function and content can also be reduced to Dao. This can be seen in the change in the subject of nourishing things from Virtue to Dao in the same chapter in all prevalent versions of Laozi. At the beginning of Chapter 51 in those versions, Dao and Virtue still have their respective functions, but the function of Virtue is transplanted into Dao later. The same situation also occurs in Chapter 34, where Dao was granted content similar to “dark Virtue”. In addition, since dark Virtue functions in all things in a non-controlling way, this way of acting can be identified with noncoercive action. Thus, the difference between Dao and dark Virtue or Virtue will disappear from the viewpoint of noncoercive action.

On the other hand, when we focus on the function of Dao grounding diverse and colorful determinations and the state of all things, then the shapeless feature of Dao will appear, and this feature is not necessarily included in the meaning of noncoercive action. As pointed out above, Virtue or noncoercive action can be attributed not only to Dao, but to rulers. Furthermore, noncoercive action involves a description of the way in which all things are treated and nurtured; this already presupposes the existence of diverse determinations of all things, but the possibility of those determinations still needs a transcendental ground. If everything obtains the possibility of its own determination only from itself, then everything is the cause of its own determination, yet they do not exist in themselves until they have those colorful states. It is impossible for a thing to generate itself when it does not exist. If things with certain determinations are to exist, there must be a transcendental being different from them. Accordingly, Laozi argues that the determination of things can only be secured through shapeless Dao:

• “It [Dao] is ever so indefinite and vague. Though vague and indefinite, there are images within it. Though indefinite and vague, there are events within it.”17 道之為物, 唯恍唯惚。忽兮恍兮, 其中有象; 恍兮忽兮, 其中有物。 (Chapter 21, Lou 1980, p. 52; Ames 2004, pp. 131–32).
• “Looking and yet seeing it, we thus call it “elusive”. Listening and yet not hearing it, we thus call it “inaudible”. Groping and yet not getting it, we thus call it “intangible”. Because in sight, sound, and touch it is beyond determination, we construe it as inseparably one. As for this “one”, its surface is not dazzling nor is its underside dark. Ever so tangled, it defies discrimination, and reverts again to indeterminacy. This is what is called the form of the formless and the image of indeterminacy. This is what is called the vague and indefinite.” 視之不見, 名曰夷; 聽之不聞, 名曰希; 搏之不得, 名曰微。此三者不可致詰, 故混而為一。其上不皦, 其下不昧。繩繩不可名, 復歸於無物。是謂無狀之狀, 無物之象, 是謂惚恍。 (Chapter 14, Lou 1980, pp. 31–32; Ames 2004, pp. 114–15).
• “All-pervading is the Great Dao! It may be found on the left hand and on the right.” 大道泛兮, 其可左右 (Chapter 34. Lou 1980, p. 85; Legge 2008, p. 62).

Chapter 21 first shows that huanghu 恍惚 (indefinite and vague) is a state presented by Dao. Chapter 14 further reveals the special features of this state. According to this revelation, Dao cannot be touched by ordinary perception, and thus, it has the characteristics of being invisible (wei 微) and inaudible (xi 希) at the same time. However, this does not mean Dao cannot be grasped by us at all; it presents itself in a special form and a special situation, so that it is finally understood as a state “between existence and absence” (Wang 2011). This is why it is also called “form of the formless” and “image of indeterminacy”.

It is worth pointing out that the interpretation of indefinite and vague in Chapter 21 also suggests a close connection between Dao in a special state and things. In this shapeless and nameless state lies the possibility of things. Furthermore, Chapter 34 directly states that Dao can ground different determinations of things. This viewpoint was accepted and developed by later Daoists, such as Zhuangzi and Wenzi. This proposition of “shapes are generated from shapelessness” (Guo 2012, p. 741; Wang 2009, p. 52), raised by both of them, no doubt shows the spirit of Laozi.

In this regard, the shapelessness of Dao is distinct from noncoercive action in the meaning of nurturing things, because it involves the role of laying the foundation for determination and the shapes of things. Since the highest Virtue or dark Virtue is centered on noncoercive action, shapelessness also makes Dao fundamentally different from Virtue. However, acting noncoercively is also included in the connotation of Dao.

Dao must have these two features in itself at the same time, because it grounds the existence of all things or colorful determinations of all things. If Dao has only the meaning of shapelessness, then even if it makes possible many determinations of things, these determinations may not be preserved without distinction in constant transformation. In other words, if the shapeless or invisible Dao gives all things lives by a principle of coercive action that carries certain determinate criteria and aims, then this principle will lead to a negation of the existence and value of certain things and their states. However, this possibility has been falsified by the existence of opposing phenomena, such as being and not being; length and shortness; wisdom and idiot. Thus, it should be said that Dao is the fundamental guarantee of the diversity of things in the world due to its two features.

Moreover, since specific changes of all things present diverse laws of things, Dao is also the basis of these relatively specific laws. This idea was posed by Hanfei in the proposition that All laws of things are generated from Dao 道者…萬理之所稽也 (Wang 1998, p. 146). However, Laozi does not consciously explain this but only emphasizes the unpredictability of changing states of things. In any case, these various laws are not in conflict with colorful states of things, but they are unified under the invisible Dao with them18.

Therefore, the existence of all things can be truly secured only if Dao has both the meanings of shapelessness and noncoercive action, which ground and generate the role of Dao. From this, Dao must also have the meaning of Virtue or dark Virtue at the same time19.

Now we can re-examine the knowledge of things obtained from Dao. Under the noncoercive action of the invisible Dao, the transformation of specific states of things is continuous and long-lasting, and this continuous and long-lasting process, based on invisible Dao, ensures the richness of the content of things themselves and fully affirms the value of things in each state. Lastly, this is an affirmation of the value of things as a whole in an infinitely changing process.

Now, the proposition that “When things have attained their strong maturity, they become old; this may be said to be not in accordance with Dao” 物壯則老, 是謂不道 can be understood in a more profound way. The statement that “a skillful (commander) strikes a decisive blow and stops. He does not dare (by continuing his operations) to assert and complete his mastery” 善有果而已, 不敢以取強, as well as the following statements in this chapter, give a helpful hint to understand this proposition. Although a good person encounters a certain state or situation, even if it is a beneficial state or situation, he does not cling to it. This implies that this judgment of “not in accordance with Dao” is not directed at a certain state or situation of things but at an attitude of clinging to a certain state or situation. This judgment can be understood in the light of the knowledge of things mentioned above.

Chapter 23, in which “it is natural to speak only rarely” with “longevity”, already suggests the inclusion of the longevity of things in the standard of their ziran through a critique of the extreme states of heaven and earth. This further reveals the relationship between the ziran of things and longevity. This point was also corroborated in Chapter 7, in which heaven and earth are “long-lasting” by being “not living for themselves” or “selfless”. The latter two are more specific explanations of “noncoercive action” in Laozi. Thus, longevity is actually the result of “noncoercive action20, and longevity undoubtedly also belongs to the meaning of ziran.

As things are in the process of lasting transformation ensured by Dao, insisting on a certain state and taking it by force is undoubtedly a deviation from the function of Dao. Therefore, when Chapter 29 discusses the change of things from state A to state B, Laozi points out that a sage puts away excessive effort, extravagance, and easy indulgence. This also shows that the sage has no attachment to certain states of things, but rather, he seeks to achieve the natural presentation of all states of things. Based on this understanding of things, the sage’s responsibility and mission is also to free the people from the bondage of attachment to a certain state (desire)21 and return them to their natural change of states. This is how a sage helps Dao. To put it more precisely, the sage’s noncoercive action guarantee Dao’s noncoercive action of nurturing things. It is because the states of all things and their transformation have been obeyed that the kingdom or even the world under the rule of the sage can last as long as the existence of all things and will not be swallowed up by all things.

4. Conclusions

According to above discussion, Laozi’s claim of noncoercive action is proposed in response to traditional Virtue, whose main feature has been judged as coercive governance by Laozi. On the other hand, Laozi firmly affirms and complements the ziran of each person and thing in the political sphere, that is, the existence and value of each person and thing. This political picture is the answer Laozi gives to the question “what is the best political order” and, thus, shows the politically philosophical characteristics of Laozi’s thought.

However, since the affirmation of the ziran of the people and all things cannot be founded in the political realm, Laozi traces its basis back to the realm of the relationship between Dao and things. In other words, the recognition and affirmation of the ziran of all things are based on the fact that Dao lays the foundation for the diversity of states of all things and their transformation, and the latter constitutes the basic content of the ziran of all things. However, this affirmation of the state of everything and its transformation is still conditional. Things must grow under the premise of permanence to be natural. In other words, individual states of things must not interfere with the process of their overall change. Thus, the affirmation of ziran actually sets the boundary of things’ desires. In this regard, the ziran of all things is the total process of change of states of things, and the rationality of this totality is guaranteed by Dao.

Since Dao generates a diverse and ever-changing world with its two features of shapelessness and noncoercive action, the role of the sage is to fulfill this world. This accomplishment, expressed through coercive action, on the one hand, is to preserve the diversity of all things and not to destroy differences by universal and homogeneous measures or criteria. On the other hand, sages need to help all people and even things to change in accordance with their ziran. It is only by conforming to and complementing the states of all things and their transformation that the political order can last as long as the Dao of heaven and earth generates and feed all things.