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Article

Indonesian Islamic Students’ Fear of Demographic Changes: The Nexus of Arabic Education, Religiosity, and Political Preferences

by
Kamaluddin Abu Nawas
1,*,
Abdul Rasyid Masri
2 and
Alim Syariati
3
1
Arabic Education Department, Universitas Islam Negeri Alauddin Makassar, Gowa 92118, Indonesia
2
Islamic Community Development Department, Universitas Islam Negeri Alauddin Makassar, Gowa 92118, Indonesia
3
Management Department, Universitas Islam Negeri Alauddin Makassar, Gowa 92118, Indonesia
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Religions 2022, 13(4), 320; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13040320
Submission received: 21 February 2022 / Revised: 30 March 2022 / Accepted: 31 March 2022 / Published: 2 April 2022
(This article belongs to the Section Religions and Health/Psychology/Social Sciences)
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Abstract

:
Demographic changes have sparked several debates on the interconnected identities of citizens, with some transitions observed in previous studies to be smooth as indicated by the continuous emergence of conflicts. The fear of within-boundary demographic changes also drives potential tensions among native people. Therefore, this study posited that the basic knowledge of the Arabic language has the ability to contribute to the formation of religiosity, political preference, and fear of demographic changes. This was determined quantitatively by distributing questionnaires to 496 students of Islamic state universities, and the findings confirmed nearly all the direct relationships aside from religiosity and political preference. This also shows the complex formation of fear due to demographic changes. The possession of the Arabic language is observed to be causing an increase in discomfort while being religious decreases it. Additionally, further discussions and implications are presented.

1. Introduction

The demographic changes currently being experienced worldwide are the inevitable consequences of the interconnecting globalization. This means there is a need for academic conversations to determine the constantly evolving demographic, religious, political, economic, and regulatory transitions. This is evident in the recent USA election, which showed that most of Donald Trump’s voters are dominated by those aged 50 and over and Caucasians (see Edison Research for the National Election Pool). It can be observed that a demographic shift is one of the hotbed issues during the election, and Indonesia has a similar trend. This is indicated by the case of the suspected religious blasphemy of Basuki Tjahaya Purnama (an Indonesian Chinese) that divided the country and fueled the increasing fear of demographic change (Winarni et al. 2019). The anatomy of this fear is the object of interest in this study, focusing on the interacting relationships among the youths, specifically Islamic university students, in Indonesia.
This study investigates how the youths’ fear of demographic changes can be explained by the concentration of Arabic knowledge possession, religiosity, and political preference. This is since basic Arabic language has become a mandatory course in every Indonesia Islamic University in addition to a pair of other mandatory Islamic courses such as fiqh, hadith, muamalah, or Islamic histories as an effort by the universities to integrate Islamic teaching and conventional educational majors including Accounting, Business, Pharmacy, and several others. It is also one of the differentiating prerequisites compared to conventional colleges in this country (El Junusi and Mubarok 2021). Meanwhile, the contribution of language to the discourse on demographic identity is evident in South Korea, where English mastery is considered superior to the mother language (Lee 2004), as well as the use of English and the national language, Malay, by Malaysians in their conversation on cyberspace (Wang and Xu 2018). The application of Arabic as the language of Islamic holy scriptures and teachings signifies its role as a specific identity associated with spiritual mastery (LeBlanc 1999; Alfa et al. 2015; Ayyad 2022; Fitriani and Wulandari 2021). This led to the consideration of its possession as a method to shape the ability of the youths to identify their religiosity, political preference, and demographic changes.
There has been a continuous discussion on the ability of religious issues to affect political construction. This is observed from the significant debates and frictions created concerning religious identity against secularism by Islamic immigrants in France (Karimi 2018; Käsehage 2022). The Pakistani has also witnessed the rise of Islamic Socialism by Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto during 1970, which was based on the propaganda of achieving better economic welfare but later declared part of the atheistic agenda of the proponent party (Sanghro and Chandio 2019). Another study conducted on social media users in Western Europe showed that those associated with right-wing politicians present Christians positively and Muslims negatively in their messages (Schwörer and Romero-Vidal 2020). Moreover, the Islamic agenda was considered the enemy of the Western liberal values by the far-right politician Geert Wilders, thereby creating prejudice and discrimination tensions in the Netherlands (Verkuyten 2013). These previous investigations provided insights, but there is little attention on the psychological drivers of demographic changes and political preference. The potential contribution of this present study is associated with niche conversation on knowledge construction in the form of bilingualism.
The Bahasa, which is the national language of Indonesia, is usually used for conventional conversation and practical purposes across the country with different indigenous languages. It is important to note that there is a slight difference in college education due to the existence of religious-based schools with different learning activities such as the inclusion of mandatory courses in the form of Quran, Hadith, fiqh, or Arabic language alongside pharmacy, business, and several other conventional courses. Therefore, this present study posits that the knowledge of the Arabic language possessed by Indonesian students can contribute to their fear of demographic changes. This is because there is less attention on students’ interaction with religiosity and political preference, as well as the influence of religious attributions on fear. The relationship between these constructs was quantitatively analyzed and discussed.
This is different from the previous discussion on the ability of intergroup contacts to exhibit a favorable outcome by eliminating prejudice from the perspective of intergroup emotion theory (Tufan et al. 2019). The theory explains that when individuals form a social identity in a group with the same interests, they have several interpretations of their impact on the group rather than personal effects. It has also been previously reported that a higher appreciation of the identity usually leads to a more extreme perception of the different things associated with the concept (Smith et al. 2007; Brown and Hewstone 2005; Skitka et al. 2004). This is different from social identity theory (SIT) which explains that an individual is bound by social perception and not unique and independent (Outten et al. 2012). Therefore, fear of demographic changes was constructed as a structured demographic identity binding individuals to a common background. The threat to this concept was reported to have the potential to cause regional sentiment to be expressed either in emotions, statements, or actions (Amodio and Cikara 2021). This theory hypothesized the presence of two potential outcomes: negative such as fear and anger, or positive such as respect and satisfaction due to changes (Leonard et al. 2011). This serves as the foundation to discuss the interacting changes and the influence of basic Arabic knowledge on religiosity and political preference in a relationship construction.

Hypotheses

This study presents Arabic education as a potential contributor to the construction of students’ religiosity, political preference, and fear of demographic changes. Previous studies often focused on the ability of language to create understanding (Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004; Hauser et al. 2002; Chiu et al. 2006) and another analyzed the religiosity scale associated with beliefs and languages (Huber 2016). Most studies on Islamic teaching are in Arabic, which means there is a need for further understanding to open the gate of figurative meanings beyond translation. This requires extensive seeking activities (Al-Wreikat et al. 2015; Shehata 2019). The ability of non-native speakers to learn a language, specifically those associated with the holy scripture, can increase their religiosity, enhance the capacity to absorb more of the teachings in daily life (Shehata 2019), and be considered sacred (Haeri 2003).
The propagation of the Arabic language as a religious identity is causing social diffusion or social-politics differentiations. The evidence in Northern Africa supports this argument (Sharkey 2008). Furthermore, the language was used as the early Moriscos to identify leadership stance (Perry 2013) and further amplified by Arabic non-native speakers that mainly rely on translation as a strategic means to bridge the understanding or sharpen the differences among readers (Elshakry 2008; Uhlmann 2011). In another circumstance, the Arabic language serves as a nationalist movement identity for Algerian immigrants (MacMaster 2011), as well as a social class segregating the rich and the poor among the Moroccans (Chakrani 2017) and general immigrants across the world (Armbruster and Belabbas 2021). On the other hand, citizens in Scandinavian countries have developed an interest in learning Arabic due to the influx of migrants (Calafato 2020). Thus, previous studies provided information on the potential link between language and attitudes toward demographic transition.
The Islamic tradition differentiates the use of the translation in understanding the Quran, given its global believers and the interpretations. The art of Quranic interpretation has been associated with rich contributions from Muslim scholars (Burge 2015). It has been highlighted that the potential selection of a strict translation and interpretation of the scriptures has led to the emergence of the hardline movement such as ISIS, Jamaat Islamiyah, Al-Qaida, and several others (Venkatraman 2007). It is also important to note that reading books or other materials can present different perspectives towards the world. This is why it is possible to connect this specific language to the attitude shifts toward demographic changes. Therefore, this study presents a unique take on the seemingly neglected issues among the constructs’ relationships and investigates them in the hypothesized constructions.
Hypothesis 1 (H1).
Early education in the Arabic language is a strong foundation for students’ religiosity.
Hypothesis 2 (H2).
Having at least a passive Arabic knowledge can elicit a change in students’ political preference.
Hypothesis 3 (H3).
Understanding basic Arabic in the traditional scriptures increases the ideological belief, which further contributes to the fear of demographic changes among students.
Most religious teachings affect the daily life of their believers. Moreover, the segregation of Democrat and Republican parties in the USA provided the big picture of the tendency of one’s party to be identified as representing a particular religion in the political contestation (Layman and Carsey 2002). This is evident in one party’s inclination towards presenting policies that reject LGBT rights, same-sex marriage, or abortion (Sherkat et al. 2011) and further reinforces the idea that religion affects people’s perspective towards demographic changes (Cohen 2003). This American experience provides a clue on the possibility of non-religious people leaning towards a more liberal or democratic value (Hout and Fischer 2002). A previous study also found that religion plays an active part in the contrasting demographic pattern in Zimbabwe (Gregson et al. 1999). Therefore, the following hypotheses were formulated.
Hypothesis 4 (H4).
Students’ religiosity affects their political preferences.
Hypothesis 5 (H5).
The level of students’ religiosity is foundational to the fear of demographic change.
The understanding that a person’s political stance contributes to the perspective towards the changes in the neighborhood has been well-documented. The condition was also amplified through the role of economic factors in demographic changes (Perkins et al. 2022). Interesting findings were also reported in other countries where the conservatives were observed to have developed a higher fear towards the COVID-19 and immigration issues than liberals, supporting our case of demographic changes (Lippold et al. 2020). This political preference serves as a bonding indentity among voters and creates a unified feeling towards the outgroup presence, i.e., immigrants, or a pro-segregation attitude (Hatemi et al. 2013). Similar perceptions were also discovered towards the demographic changes in the establishment of party voters, as evidenced by the strong waves of anti-EU integration protests (Capelos and Katsanidou 2018). These discussions show how people change to become more conservative when their inherent existence is threatened. It is important to note that political preference is defined as the unifying bonds among certain voters, which usually leads to group differentiation such that those on the right wings usually are more offensive against LGBT rights, abortion, and matters related to immigrants when compared to those associated with more moderate and liberal views. Therefore, it is believed that political preference influences the concentration of fear among the united natives towards the demographic changes, which was used to formulate the sixth hypothesis.
Hypotheses 6 (H6).
The political preference of an individual influences the fear of demographic changes.

2. Materials and Methods

2.1. Design

A quantitative study design was employed to explore the potentiality of relationships between the hypothesized variables. Although this paper is preliminary and explorative, but the variables were analyzed using the covariance-based structural-equation-modeling (CB-SEM). This technique involves requesting a specific assumption on normality and data robustness in the goodness of fit statistics. Moreover, four variables hypothesized to have direct and indirect relationships include primary Arabic education, religiosity, political preference, and fear of demographic changes, as indicated in Figure 1. Arabic education is the independent variable affecting other variables directly and indirectly. The selection of SEM was due to its ability to capture the psychological aspects in the assessed indicators of each variable effectively. At the same time, Lisrel software was applied to analyze the relationships with extended quality criteria.
Several steps were used in the analysis. This involves the application of goodness of fit, which is one critical criterion in the CB-SEM method, followed by the extension of the quality of the data presentation by providing loading factors, convergent validity, discriminant validity, and multicollinearity assumptions. According to Hair et al. (2010), combining these measures with the goodness of fit usually leads to the production of a better model. Therefore, Smartpls 3 tools were used to provide the evidence of the added quality criteria in partial-least-square structural-equation-modelling (PLS-SEM), leading to some indicators were removed due to their impact on the stability of the model (Hair et al. 2014). These prerequisite techniques were implemented to ensure the data were presented effectively to provide a comprehensive platform for testing the hypotheses.

2.2. Sample

This study focuses on the young students in the university with explicit attention placed on basic Arabic knowledge. This led to data collection from the Islamic State University in Indonesia, which was selected because it lists the Arabic language as an introductory prerequisite course in the first semester to expose students to basic and advanced education in Arabic. Students were born between 2000 and 2003, characterized as part of Generation Z, and also showed by the Pew Research Center’s analysis in 2020 to be more advocative towards government policy and more open in discussing ethnic, religious, and sexual preferences. The perspectives of this demographic pool were investigated to provide early evidence on the objectives of this study.
It is estimated that more than one million students are currently enrolled in the Islamic State University, and this means a substantial minimum sample size needs to be achieved to ensure better representation of this population. Therefore, the perspectives of students were collected using sampling criteria not specified but applied through the administration of an online survey conducted by mouth-to-mouth recommendation. This convenient sampling technique was used to code 496 responses, and the sample size satisfies most of the 5% margin of error in the statistical tests associated with several formulas (Yamane 1967; Roscoe 1975), as well as the minimum 200 required to employ SEM (Kline 1998; Boomsma 1985).

2.3. Measures

A model comprising the inter-relationships between the four variables of interest was developed, and all the variables were measured through several indicators. The independent or exogeneous variable, Arabic education literacy, either written or spoken, has three indicators. It is important to note that the mastery of the Arabic course is required to form students’ religiosity, political preference, and fear of demographic change. Its content in the Islamic State University of Indonesia includes an introduction, sentence formation, parts of speech, and simple conversation with other lessons in the Quran, Hadith, and other traditional texts. It is a mandatory course in the first semester and further amplified in other introductory Islamic courses, which collectively serve as a basis to ensure Islamic ethical identity among students (Alwi et al. 2021).
The religiosity variable was measured based on the methods applied in Dali et al. (2019). This construct captures the essence of intrinsic and extrinsic factors in religious value, influences the students to articulate their lives in the Islamic way, and affects the political preference of students. The indicators used in Haidt and Graham (2007) were adopted with a specific tendency towards a more liberal view of the government, which led to the focus on LGBT rights, radicalism, and early sex education. Moreover, the fear of demographic change was used to capture the feelings of students concerning non-native residents immigrating to take full advantage of the economy in their perceived territory such as home, residence, city, or even state (see Appendix A for the survey).

3. Results

Several steps were involved in the analysis conducted in this study, which led to the specific separation of the outer and inner models. Meanwhile, the descriptive data of the respondents are presented in Table 1.
The data distribution showed a score of 3 and 4 patterns in the Likert Scale across all the variables, while an inter-relation with some negative correlation was also observed. Moreover, an inferential test was conducted after all the data quality requirements had been satisfied. The use of CB-SEM in the statistical analysis required a confirmatory factor analysis to sort the indicators using Lisrel, thereby reducing the items from 21 to 14, as indicated in Table 2 and Appendix A for the specific indicators. Furthermore, the adjustment of the scales was followed by the application of the goodness of fit criteria to determine the quality of the model with χ2 = 80.07; df = 67; CFI = 0.654; RMSEA = 0.020; 0.990; GFI = 0.977. The indices were also modified by correlating four error residuals in the model to improve the fitness. This process is permissible when the correlated indicators are kept to a minimum and not across unrepresented constructs (see Figure 2 for the specific changes). Therefore, the CFA and goodness of fit showed that the model is a close fit.
The previous tests were technically considered sufficient, but composite confirmatory analysis (CCA) with partial least square structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) was also added, as suggested by Hair et al. (2010). This involved the loading factor, convergent validity, discriminant validity, and collinearity tests (Schuberth et al. 2018) conducted using the Smartpls software, and the results are presented in Table 2.
Table 2 shows that all indicators have a loading factor higher than 0.5, except for PolP2, with a low value. However, Hair et al. (2017) does not suggest the deletion as long as it does not improve the model’s convergent validity, such as Cronbach’s alpha, rho alpha, composite reliability, and the average variance extractor (AVE). Different combinations of the indicators were tried, and no improvement was observed in the validity, thereby leading to the retainment of the sole indicator. Moreover, the alpha value showed that only religiosity passed the 0.7 cut-offs, but the composite reliability is still reliable. Hair et al. (2014) also indicated that AVE is a stricter criterion after applying the CCA. The results provided partial support because only the Arabic education and fear of demographic change variables satisfied the 0.5 scores.
Multicollinearity and common-bias problems were also monitored (Kock 2017; Podsakoff et al. 2003) with the simple rule of thumb that all indicators with a variance inflation factor (VIF) value above 0.2 and below 3 indicate the absence of these problems. The data presented in Table 2 showed that this condition is fulfilled while the discriminant validity test results conducted through the heterotrait-monotrait (HTMT) test are presented in Table 3.
The HTMT test was used to ensure the indicators represent their specific constructs and can be compared to the Fornell–Larcker or cross-loading tests (Henseler et al. 2015). The values below the 0.9 cut-offs indicate that the model possesses discriminant validity. These tests were conducted to ensure the data and model used in this study meet the highest form of statistical standards before executing the inferential statistics in the inner model. The significance and relevance tests results are summarized in Table 4 and presented graphically in Figure 2.
All the direct relationships except religiosity and political preference were significant, as indicated by a 1.96 t-value for p-value under 0.05, while all indirect relationships were not statistically significant. Figure 2 highlights the t-value and some intriguing ideas concerning the constructs’ formulation with negative relationships. It is important to reiterate that this study focuses on the complex psychological construction among the youth concerning possessed language, religion, political preference, and demographic changes. As discussed in the following section, more parsimonious findings were recorded in the direct relationships than indirect ones.

4. Discussion

This study conducted an exploration and confirmation process on several relationships between variables related to religious moderation in Islam among the youths from the perspective of Arabic mastery. It combined several areas of discussion investigated quantitatively to support the main objective of understanding the religious feeling of young people, specifically those engaged in university education with Islamic backgrounds. The findings showed the confirmation of Hypothesis 1, i.e., Early education in the Arabic language is a strong foundation for students’ religiosity.
Nascent students at Islamic-based universities worldwide have mandatory courses related to the Arabic language. This is also reinforced at state Islamic universities on students with a strong background in Islamic knowledge and Arabic or vice versa. Previous studies argued that the aspects of language and religiosity are relatively new studies, even though they have a long-rooted logical rationale (Mavisakalyan et al. 2021). A contrary finding also showed that Arabic speakers were not moderated by the aspect of religiosity (Barabadi et al. 2021), while another reported that an increase in the usage of offensive language reduces religious sentiment on social media (Thomas et al. 2019). Another exciting investigation found the congruence of language acquisition and religiosity in understanding the health problems experienced by patients and cultural differences (Muscat et al. 2018; Benstead and Reif 2013). It is also important to note that the use of the original Arabic language as an expression of religion led to the interaction of Indonesian and Arabic in showing a sense of individual religiosity as indicated by terms such as akhi, ukhti, or Ikhwan (Herniti 2016). Another study provided an interesting fact that Arabic poetry was used as a tool to enforce public religiosity in the past (Anwari 2012).
Several previous studies showed a congruence of opinions related to the role of language in increasing the sense of religiosity of its adherents. This reflects the additional capacity of young speakers from Islamic higher education in Indonesia to master a second language, which positively influences their religious sense measured by intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity. Moreover, bilingualism was also related to students’ political choices, as indicated by the findings, confirming Hypothesis two, i.e., having at least a passive Arabic knowledge can elicit a change in students’ political preference. This means the mastery of Arabic can reduce the tendency of students to have a liberal political view. This is observed from the fact that politicians supporting LGBT freedom, anti-radicalism, and child sex education from an early age in this country are generally not supported by students with a basic understanding of the Arabic language. The interesting implication of this finding is that the young people of this country, as the largest Muslim country in the world, with religious views tend to be conservative because their exposure to Arabic from an early age coupled with mandatory learning of Islamic studies in higher education has created a unique view against issues related to liberalism. Previous studies also showed that Arabic speakers use nominal sentences, which causes social conservatism (Cichocka et al. 2016). It is also important to note that the ownership of a language is one of the main identities related to the political aspirations of its native speakers (Belmihoub 2018) and serves as a feature for the supporters or rejectors of a political idea (Nordenson 2017). Moreover, the mastery of a language as part of an individual’s identity serves as a collective unit to support or deny the existence of things that can change the demographic structure.
This study also investigated the relationship between essential Arabic mastery and fear of demographic changes among students at Islamic universities. The statistical result showed that the third hypothesis was supported, i.e., Understanding basic Arabic in the traditional scriptures increases the ideological belief, which further contributes to the fear of demographic changes among students. This finding also correlates with the inferiority complex phenomenon among the majority in a region (Levchak and Levchak 2020). In line with the social identity theory, this shows that the students accumulate the perceptions in shared languages to express their discomfort towards other people with the potential to threaten their status quo (Smith et al. 2007; Skitka et al. 2004). Moreover, a cross-country study previously found people that tend towards social conservatism to prefer maximizing the use of nouns, e.g., the selection of “Jew” than “Jewish,” or she is a “homosexual” than she is “homosexual” (Cichocka et al. 2016). This led to the creation of shared religious expressions such as akhi, antum, ikhwan, mumtaz, or syukran through the acquisition of the Arabic language among some Indonesian students (Herniti 2016). These words are often classified as heavenly language because Islamic holy scriptures present Arabic to be superior, as evident from the obligation associated with its application in reciting the Quran and also reinforced by a hadith mentioning the Prophet Muhammad to have said that “Hubb Arab Îmân wa bugduhum kufrun” (loving the Arabs is faith and hating them is infidel). The conservatives often propagate this seemingly prophetical message as a unifying Islamic identity despite the hadith’s authenticity critiques (Imtyas et al. 2020). This present study showed that every challenge towards this identity is usually expressed extremely.
Another finding of this present study is that students’ religiosity, represented by both intrinsic and extrinsic piety, is not related to political choices, and this led to the rejection of the fourth hypothesis, i.e., Students’ religiosity affects their political preferences. This contradicts most previous studies, such as the recent ones that confirmed some aspects of religiosity and political choice had become considerations in heeding advice on health during the pandemic (Byrd and Białek 2021). It was also reported that an attachment to a particular religious affiliation does not affect confident political choices (Collins and Owen 2012). These show that the aspects of religiosity and political choice have specific dimensions associated with their relationship, and this explains the insignificant results reported in this study. Moreover, issues related to religion and political choice typically become increasingly important as political friction heats up, as observed in the United States 2016 election due to the disparity of voters in the Republican and Democratic parties (Edgell 2017; Baldassarri and Goldberg 2014). A similar experience was also reported among the voters in Israel that voted based on the perceptions of the country’s relationship with Palestine (Maoz and Eidelson 2007). It is important to note that several previous studies provided diverse perspectives on the relationship between these two constructs, even though a correlation has been established through mainstream study.
The relationship between religiosity and fear of demographic changes of students at Islamic universities was also investigated, and this serves as an opportunity to discuss one of the discussion niches considered to be under-discussed, specifically among young people. The statistical results found a significant negative relationship between these variables, confirming the fifth hypothesis, i.e., the level of students’ religiosity is foundational to the fear of demographic change. This is quite interesting since high religious conservatism has been generally associated with group insecurity through the social identity theory (Heyat 2006). Meanwhile, the Islamic students studied emphasized high confidence in their religious basis, which is why they do not fear any changes in the demographic structure.
One of the central tenets of Islamic religiosity is the concept of tawakal (complete surrender to God). Muslims must accept the highest order in the Quran Surah Al-Hujurat 13, which narrates the diversity of human identities because the most superior hereafter is the pious one instead of skin colors, races, or genders. A strong understanding of this pluralistic message combined with massive campaigns from religious leaders on the naturality (sunnatullah) of being different has enormous potential to convince Muslims. The racial conditions of Indonesia as indicated by 300 tribes and 700 local languages reinforce this logic, and this led the religious movement in the country to picture the adjustment of the intersections between different cultural expressions and religion to secure a more pluralist agenda in the region (Menchik 2016; Hefner 2011; Howell 2005). This phenomenon is considered the reason for religiosity reducing the tendency to fear demographic changes. Therefore, this study showed that Islamic religiosity constrains the excessive use of the Arabic language in presenting negative propaganda.
Islam generally respects human diversity but not towards liberalization or a secularist agenda. This fact was established from the moderate direct relationships, thereby confirming the sixth hypothesis, i.e., the political preference of an individual influences the fear of demographic changes. The political preference variable was constructed to be based more on the liberalistic view, which was discovered to be the reason for this result. Students of Islamic universities are more inclined to conservative political thought, and previous studies showed their disdain for significant demographic changes. Meanwhile, an extensive multinational survey of over 300,000 samples provided a conflicting result with those having reported existential fear and preferring more conservative leaders (Jost et al. 2017). Students have their conservative and secular ideological struggles (Ibrahim 2011) amplified by the transformation of technology and globalized digital platforms (Ananta 2020). It is also important to note that the strong influence of Islamic values encourages a conservative political direction, as indicated by the lack of support for free sex, secular views, abortion, early sex education, and LGBT rights. It was discovered that those with liberal views usually show a higher sense of tolerance for different changes, such as the issue of immigrants, instead of accumulative fear of demographic changes (Ellermann and Goenaga 2019). This article formulation provides a breeding ground for the conversation in the psychological-attitude relations toward globalization changes and the religions.

5. Conclusions

This study investigated the interacting relationships between Arabic language possession, religiosity, political preference, and fear for demographic changes among the youth studying to earn a college degree in an Islamic university in Indonesia. The findings showed that Arabic education increases the religiosity and fear of demographic changes but decreases the liberal political preference among students. Moreover, students’ religiosity was found not to correlate with political preference. However, it can reduce the fear of demographic changes due to the inherent messages of pluralism in the Islamic holy scripture, which serves as the foundation of this tolerance. It is important to note, although tolerance towards humanity is one of the basic teachings of Islam, there is a lesser stance towards liberal views. This fact was reinforced by the negative relationship observed between the liberal view constructed in the political preference and the fear of demographic changes.
This study is limited by the fact that its formulation and interpretation did not meet all quality criteria. This means there is a need for a more in-depth conversation to obtain a holistic view concerning the reason for the accumulation of fear of demographic changes across time by students. A panel study across different times can also be used to obtain different results. Future studies need to further discuss these concepts by making a comparison based on age and gender.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, K.A.N. and A.R.M.; methodology, A.S.; software, A.S.; validation, A.S.; formal analysis, A.S.; investigation, K.A.N.; resources, K.A.N.; data curation, A.R.M.; writing—original draft preparation, K.A.N.; writing—review and editing, K.A.N. and A.R.M.; visualization, K.A.N.; supervision, K.A.N. and A.R.M.; project administration, A.S. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This study received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

The study did not report any data.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declared no conflict of interest.

Appendix A

ItemsStatementsSource
Arabi2I can read basic Arabic
Arabi3I learned basic ArabicSelf-designed
Arabi5I learned basic Arabic from my childhood
FearDem1I am a proud native of my region
FearDem2I am concerned if newcomers taking advantage of my regionSelf-designed
FearDem3The native and indigenous people must most benefit from the economy
PolP1I support a congressman advocating early sex education(Haidt and Graham 2007)
PolP2I support the future president with a strong position against radicalism
PolP3the government must support the LGBT rights
Religio1My religion has clear directions toward permissible consumption(Dali et al. 2019)
Religio2I cannot obtain something unpermissible
Religio4My life strictly follows Islamic teaching
Religio5I maintain my time to pray and contemplate my life
Religio6I firmly believe Islamic teaching as the afterlife live-saver

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Religions 13 00320 g001 550
Figure 1. Conceptual framework (Source: authors’ formulation).
Figure 1. Conceptual framework (Source: authors’ formulation).
Religions 13 00320 g001
Religions 13 00320 g002 550
Figure 2. The t-value of the model (Source: Lisrel output).
Figure 2. The t-value of the model (Source: Lisrel output).
Religions 13 00320 g002
Table
Table 1. Mean, standardized deviations, and correlations of constructs.
Table 1. Mean, standardized deviations, and correlations of constructs.
No.VariableMeanSt. Dev.1234
1Political Preference 3.5690.8411.000
2Fear of Demographic Change4.1270.781−0.1081.000
3Arabic Education3.5130.68−0.2650.2291.000
4Religiosity4.2290.704−0.134−0.0770.1401.000
Correlation above 0.15 is significant at 0.05, and 0.20 is significant at 0.01. Source: Adapted Smartpls 3 output.
Table
Table 2. Measurement specifications of the outer model.
Table 2. Measurement specifications of the outer model.
ConstructsIndicatorsLoadingAlpharho_ACRAVEVIF
Arabi20.607 1.118
Arabic EducationArabi30.7280.5670.6120.7730.5361.195
Arabi50.843 1.270
FearDem10.859 1.267
Fear of demographic changeFearDem20.7110.6760.7530.8130.5941.343
FearDem30.733 1.345
PolP10.677 1.423
Political preferencePolP20.4240.610.7640.7280.4921.323
PolP50.916 1.127
Religio10.816 1.600
Religio20.687 1.430
ReligiosityReligio40.8210.7430.8080.8240.4901.775
Religio50.611 1.306
Religio60.516 1.225
Source: Adapted Smartpls3 output.
Table
Table 3. HTMT.
Table 3. HTMT.
Constructs123
1Arabic Education
2Fear of demographic change0.378
3Political preference0.4190.173
4Religiosity0.2470.1770.190
Source: Smartpls 3 output.
Table
Table 4. The summary of significance and relevance tests.
Table 4. The summary of significance and relevance tests.
RelationshipsEffectt-Value
Arabic Education -> Religiosity0.2573.854
Arabic Education -> Political preference−0.216−2.903
Arabic Education -> Fear of demographic change0.5184.439
Religiosity -> Political preference−0.051−1.687
Religiosity -> Fear of demographic change−0.428−5.033
Political preference -> Fear of demographic change−0.398−2.056
R2 to religiosity 0.056
R2 to political preference 0.204
R2 to fear of demographic change 0.198
Source: Adapted Lisrel Output.
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Nawas, K.A.; Masri, A.R.; Syariati, A. Indonesian Islamic Students’ Fear of Demographic Changes: The Nexus of Arabic Education, Religiosity, and Political Preferences. Religions 2022, 13, 320. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13040320

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Nawas KA, Masri AR, Syariati A. Indonesian Islamic Students’ Fear of Demographic Changes: The Nexus of Arabic Education, Religiosity, and Political Preferences. Religions. 2022; 13(4):320. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13040320

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Nawas, Kamaluddin Abu, Abdul Rasyid Masri, and Alim Syariati. 2022. "Indonesian Islamic Students’ Fear of Demographic Changes: The Nexus of Arabic Education, Religiosity, and Political Preferences" Religions 13, no. 4: 320. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13040320

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