Spiritual Addiction: Searching for Love in a Coldly Indifferent World
Abstract
:“Most of us achieve only at rare moments a clear realization of the fact that they have never tasted the fulfillment of existence, that their life does not participate in true, fulfilled existence, that, as it were, it passes true existence by. We nevertheless feel the deficiency at every moment, and in some measure strive to find—somewhere—what we are seeking”.
1. Introduction
1.1. Defining Spirituality
1.2. Structure of the Paper or Steps to Realize This Aim
2. Case Presentation
2.1. Brandon
2.2. A Typical Day
2.3. Therapy and an Existential Crisis
2.4. Moments of Hope
2.5. A Closer Look at Brandon’s Addictive Behavior
2.6. A Concrete Example of Brandon’s Powerlessness
2.7. Therapeutic Misattunement and Confession
2.8. Toward a Cure
2.9. A Call for a Collective Confession
2.10. Toward Further Elucidating the Meaning of Spiritual Addiction and Why It Matters
3. Review of the Addiction Literature
3.1. Physical Addiction
3.2. Current Approaches to Addiction
3.3. Psychological Addiction
3.4. AA Model of Spirituality and Addiction through the Lens of Lance Dodes
3.5. Further Reflections on Dodes’ Myths
4. Analysis and Solution
Moral vs. Social Power and Weakness
5. Social Influences or Causes
5.1. Parental Asymmetrical Role
5.2. Simplicity of the Law of Moral/Spiritual Personality Change
5.3. On the Complexity of Personality Change: The Role of Religion
5.4. Good Parent Syndrome
6. Conclusions
“I will remind you of an innocent and ancient story, of a king and his new clothes… Tailors deceived a king, telling them they would weave him a wonderful suit which would be invisible to any but good men… In the end the naked king paraded out into the street where all the people were gathered to admire his suit of clothes, and all did admire it until a child dared to point out that the king was naked… Have you and I forgotten that our vocation, as innocent bystanders—and the very condition of our terrible innocence—is to do what the child did, and keep on saying the king is naked, at the cost of being condemned criminals? Remember… if the child had not been there, they would all have been madmen, or criminals. It was the child’s cry that saved them.”
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
1 | I define “witness” as one marked by both their authenticity or conscientious devotion to the truth and their relative fullness of experiential insight. |
2 | It is worth pointing out that despite the popular appeal to “faith vs. reason”, no one can avoid faith commitments, as without them our beliefs could not be subjected to a process of experiential verification and thus serve as true premises in sound arguments leading to an advance in our discovery of truth. This is different from blind and/or bad faith, implying either unexamined prejudices and/or an unwillingness to subject our prejudices to rational verification. |
3 | This should not be taken to mean an exact 50/50 split, but anywhere in between the two sides. However, I am not suggesting that there are no cases of perpetrators and innocent victims. |
4 | The humanist psychologist Carl Rogers (1961) presents these qualities as the mark not only of the ideal psychotherapist, but also as qualities defining what it means to become a person in the fullest sense of the word. |
5 | An expression often used by Dallas Willard. |
6 | Rogers was one of the founders of humanistic or person-centered psychotherapy; Plato (or Socrates), along with Aristotle, the founders of Western philosophy; Freud, the founder of classical psychoanalysis; Frankl, the founder of logotherapy; and Sorokin, the founder of modern sociology. |
7 | Although I generally use “moral” and “spiritual” interchangeably, I define spiritual as disembodied personal power, which is not opposed to it being tangibly embodied in the lives of both individuals and groups. I have in mind primarily the spirit of a person as the life of a person which is more than one’s body. It is that which most defines what it means to be a person in the fullest, most evolved, or actualized sense. It refers to the essence or nature of being human, which includes above all a capacity for moral freedom, i.e., to know and embrace (as well as willingly reject) truth and true goodness. I am defining morality as the fruit or manifestation of this spirit in and through human intentions and actions in relation to a subjectively and objectively perceived reality of moral values. Given this freedom and these values, an actualized spiritual and moral life manifests itself in terms of moral character, i.e., a will sufficiently guided or conscientiously governed by its fidelity to truth and what is truly good that it permeates all one thinks, feels, and does as it extends beyond one’s self to influence all reality. |
8 | In way of example, consider the position of “The Four Horsemen” (Hitchens et al. 2019). |
9 | Parents commonly acknowledge some difference between what they call the world of children and the “real” world. In the former, they generally have in mind a world in which goodness reigns and anything seems possible—a world of fantasy conveyed in the story books we read to them and the movies we watch with them. By the latter, they generally have in mind a world permeated by selfish cold indifference, i.e., a ruthless, unscrupulous world, akin to a prison, in which we must sacrifice conscience to survive if not thrive. |
10 | My aim in using this case is to direct the reader’s attention less to the characteristics that define his subjective experience than to those attributes of his experience actually or potentially shared with others—especially value qualities such as authenticity, empathy, and unconditional love. My aim is to bring these latter qualities to the foreground of our investigation to enable the reader to see for themselves whether and to what extent those features are, or potentially may be, embedded in their own “lived experience”. These “empirically”, i.e., experientially, verified value data provide, I claim, the necessary ground for any sound theory of addiction. |
11 | A period that began shortly before the COVID-19 pandemic. |
12 | Although when asked about the days, weeks, and months of such experiences of hope, he intellectually acknowledges those times, but says they generally seem so experientially distant it is as if they were little more than dreams. |
13 | He is currently smoking at least 10 cigarettes per day. |
14 | He managed to throw the rest away. |
15 | I remember putting my son on a block wall in our backyard and standing a foot or so away asking him to jump into my arms. And he did. I stood a step further away and asked him to jump again. And he did. But there was a point at which he could not jump, despite the fact that I knew I could catch him. It was beyond his present ability to trust that I could. An ability that could only be realized as he increasingly discovered he could trust me to that extent. Such examples, as we shall see, reveal an experiential process of moving from “faith to faith” by a rational form of experiential insight. That is, from lower forms of faith to higher forms by means of a fuller, more comprehensive awareness of reality or truth. |
16 | As we shall also see, moral power is distinctly different in kind from, e.g., physical, psychological, and social or political forms of power. |
17 | As we shall also see, such a “spiritual” appeal is not necessarily reducible to a “religious” appeal. See, for example, the atheist, Sam Harris’ reference to such self-transcending experiences (Hitchens et al. 2019, pp. 48–49; Dennett, p. 51). |
18 | By this I mean that AA, or any other moral, religious, or spiritual approach, may itself be subject to its own forms of prejudice. It is true that the founders of AA, despite writing for a primarily Christian audience, were aware of the difficulty bound up with their appeal to a “higher power”. It is also true that AA has evolved to include atheist, agnostic and non-Christian groups, allowing for broader interpretations of such a higher power. But such groups may still fall far short of providing sufficient access to that spirit of truth that alone provides the requisite power to overcome our suffering. |
19 | To avoid misinterpretation, I am not denying forms of pathological altruism. I am pointing to the sense in which the pervasive lack of healthy altruism or unconditional love, may tempt us to doubt its accessibility and realizability as the primary value of human life. Aristotle’s, Nicomachean Ethics, for example, was an attempt to relativize an ethical life for most of us in view of the fact that even Socrates fell short of such a Good. It was not an attempt to deny its value insofar as it could be achieved. The same holds true for the history of Christianity, in which the majority of Christian denominations reacted to precisely this striving after “perfect love” as heretical (see, for example, references to the early Friends or Quakers). In a nutshell, how many of us can say with any genuine authority that we are truly and primarily oriented toward realizing, much less governed in all we think, plan, and do, by our love for truth and goodness? Yet, is that not the foundation upon which all religions purport to stand? |
20 | |
21 | As we shall see, Dodes’ calls into question such a disease model, whether presented on scientific grounds or AA, in favor of an alternative account amenable to psychological moderation. |
22 | The point here is not whether there are, or may be, forms of reciprocal causality, i.e., behavior causing neurochemical and neuroanatomical changes which then causally influence behavior. It is the problem of limiting, reducing, or even emphasizing biological causes over psychological and, as we shall see, moral and spiritual causes. |
23 | Studies demonstrating that even with rats addiction is far more complex than appeals to biological causes alone. |
24 | Alternatively, one might interpret this “response” as an equally extreme prejudicial reaction to religious forms of prejudice. |
25 | Although I am not claiming that understanding the role the brain plays in addiction is not “useful” for understanding how addiction works, is the claim above that the ordinary person cannot understand the cause of their addictions and a way to overcome them without them understanding how their brains work? Does that mean that only “someday” (given such adequate understanding) will we have sufficient knowledge to heal our addictions? Moreover, are the only relevant factors here physical and psychological? In psychotherapy, for example, we may observe how different orientations focus on different aspects of a more complex whole, e.g., physical, psychological, volitional, transpersonal, multi-cultural. Is everything but the physical to be reduced to environmental? |
26 | Experienced peripherally in the act and moving into the foreground afterwards. |
27 | I realize that looking at AA through the lens of Dodes’ criticism of AA potentially carries with it any misinterpretations he has about AA’s actual theories. However, although my intention is not to misinterpret AA or Dodes’ position (or interpretations of AA), I am not primarily concerned with either position. Rather, my concern is with a far broader or more generic problem. |
28 | Prejudice is not limited to its more obvious forms. Just as “experts” may be tempted to conflate (and, thereby, misrepresent) current forms of cognitive-behavioral-therapy or contemporary relational psychonalysis with their original classical forms, so too may one do the same with AA. Dodes, for example, seems to limit his attention to a more popular and narrow religious/Christian form of interpretation of AA tenets without acknowledging even the possibility of other, more rational, interpretations. More significantly, however, is his seeming use of such myths to reject any form of religious and moral basis for addiction. |
29 | Although “addict” is an objectifying term in contrast to “one suffering from an addiction”, for simplicity’s sake I will often use the former. |
30 | See, for example, Alloy and Abramson (1979) on “depressed realism”. |
31 | As pointed out in the introduction, I can appreciate the offense taken by atheists to any reference to “religious witnesses”, just as I can appreciate the offense taken by theists to “atheist witnesses”. However, I would ask those on both sides to recall my definition of a reliable witness in terms of sincerity and insight and recognize these are attributes both sides can lay claim to. What marks such witnesses is precisely their tendency to embrace the spirit of religion above blind faith in any dogma and ritualistic practices. |
32 | This reality includes the nature and knowledge of numbers and numerical relations; logical propositions and logical relations; aesthetic and moral values; the nature of persons including the self, mind, our ideas and their lawful relationships; and so on. |
33 | As inconsistent as “unconscious thoughts” or “unconscious forms of consciousness” are or appear, we generally distinguish forms of consciousness or awareness of objects in the forefront of our minds from our awareness of objects in the periphery or background of our minds. One can be aware that one is breathing without focusing on or being mindful of one’s breath. For a more in-depth look at how complex this issue tends to be, see Ellenberger (1970). With respect to these various layers of awareness, see also Assagioli (1965). |
34 | This is what we take Husserl to mean by phenomenology as a “presuppositionless philosophy”: not an idealized assumption of us being able to undertake a phenomenological investigation from a position without presuppositions, but an ethical attitude or orientation willing to subject any and all presuppositions to an intersubjective rigorous evaluation of their truth. |
35 | |
36 | I am claiming that there is a distinction between judgments and a judgmental attitude. No one should, can, or does avoid judgments, since that is how we distinguish one thing from another, but a judgmental or fault-seeking attitude should and can be avoided. |
37 | I should point out that every culture appeals to some doctrine of “original sin”. My approach differs in its appeal to, or emphasis on, our own experience as the basis for any sound doctrine of this origin, rather than taking for granted, or exercising blind faith in, any particular religious theory and its traditionally accepted assumptions. This includes assumptions about a “phenomenological” approach. As I see it, the value of Husserl’s “realist” vs. the generally accepted “idealist” approach is precisely its appeal to the use of experiential knowledge in its evaluation of the nature of knowledge itself. |
38 | Both specific and generic in the sense that the specific tangible character of the parent is experienced along with the generic character of that unconditional love that may tangibly manifested by others as well. |
39 | If it is not already clear, my general use of the male gender pronoun is not intended to reflect a male bias. It merely seemed to me more consistent or less confusing given the primacy placed on Brandon’s case. In this regard, I do not attribute to a “God” male gender and in such contexts often use the female gender despite the conviction that “God” would include and transcend such gender limitations. |
40 | As per my previous claim, by “reason” here I have in view the kind of abstract reason Hume refers to when he claims “reason is the slave of the passions” (Wyner 1988). |
41 | See Maslow and Frankl’s correspondence leading to the former’s realization that without a self-transcendent good there can be no self-actualization. |
42 | As a psychologist patient once put it, “If my mother didn’t hold me, kiss me, and tell me that she loved me, who is now going to do that in my life?”. |
43 | I suggest that if one looks closely enough at the actual descriptions of reality—not just humanity in its present contingent state—by many “existentialist” philosophers one may observe no mere reference to any value-neutral “meaninglessness” but precisely a cold indifference, i.e., an opposition to true goodness. Note, for example, Sartre’s description of reality in his Nausea (Sartre 1964). “Had I dreamed of this enormous presence?... all soft, sticky, soiling everything… I hated this ignoble mess… spilling over, filling everything with its gelatinous slither… I knew it was the World, the naked World suddenly revealing itself, and I choked with rage at this gross, absurd being… I shouted “filth! what rotten filth!” and shook myself to get rid of this sticky filth… I had already detected everywhere a sort of conspiratioral air… it was there, waiting, looking at one… I had learned all I could know about existence” (pp. 134–35). |
44 | As previously mentioned, Brandchaft et al. (2010) uses the expression “pathological accommodation” to refer to instances such as this in which a child feels forced to subordinate his own emerging experiential sense of what is true, right, and good (i.e., his own voice or true sense of self) for the sake of retaining needed relational ties. See also Winnicott’s (1965) appeal to a false vs. true self. New Testament authors refer to the contrast between the “carnal mind” and the “mind of the spirit”. |
45 | This is evident in the way an adopted child, over time, tends to take on characterological qualities of his non-biological parents in the same way as the biological children. As previously described, how the child initially sees and values reality and himself primarily depends upon this parent–child relationship, regardless of any inherited biological characteristics. |
46 | With respect to this original relational inheritance, I am not claiming that we can erase or in that sense “cure” any form of trauma, much less severe relational trauma. I am, however, claiming we have the capacity to transcend this relational trauma. There is a form and degree of moral goodness that has sufficient power to enable us to transcend not only physical and psychological but even moral trauma. Insofar as one’s capacity for moral growth is not entirely lost, one has some form and measure of access to this primary value underlying real and substantial moral and spiritual transformation. |
47 | To be clear, I am not at all suggesting that substantial personality change is limited to the young. I merely have in mind the way the young are initially more open to such change whereas insofar as we are increasingly subjected to prejudicial conformity with the world, we may be tempted to doubt this possibility. |
48 | Gandhi contrasts this predominant empty form of Christian profession with a “truly” spiritual Christianity incarnated in the life of his dear friend C. F. Andrews (Gandhi 1993; Gandhi and Andrews 1989) and other friends such as Jones (1976, p. 44): “The decision of the Mahatma not to be a Christian was arrived at in South Africa… How could he really see Christ through all this racism? He did see Christ in C.F. Andrews… this racism was often very deeply religious and held to in the name of religion… his (Christ’s) followers made him the sponsor of white rule and white ascendancy. How could Gandhi see Christ through that?” In Gandhi’s words, “The church did not make a favorable impression on me… They were not an assembly of devout souls… going to church for recreation and in conformity to custom… I soon gave up attending the service” (ibid., p. 45). From a Sikh perspective, see (Andrews 1934, p. 35): “Neither would he (Sadhu) separate either Hinduism or the Sikh religion by hard and fast lines from the Christian Faith. They were woven out of one texture by the Divine Spirit, and they needed to be interwoven again into one perfect fabric”. |
49 | As in the case of the atheist Four Horsemen. |
50 | |
51 | For we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places (Ephesians 6:12). |
52 | We must acknowledge that for more than 100 years we have focused on the wrong factors in psychotherapy… we must teach students how to create a caring therapeutic environment that emphasizes the personal and interpersonal dimensions of therapy… The aim would be to cultivate the trainee’s capacity to connect with clients at a profound level so that clients feel deeply accepted, supported, and understood (Elkins 2015, p. 414). |
References
- Alloy, Lauren B., and Lyn Y. Abramson. 1979. Judgment of contingency in depressed and nondepressed students: Sadder but wiser? Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 108: 441–85. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Amery, Jean. 1980. At the Mind’s Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and Its Realities. Translated by Sidney Rosenfeld, and Stella P. Rosenfeld. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. [Google Scholar]
- Andrews, Charles F. 1934. Sadhu Sundar Singh: A Personal Memoir. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers. [Google Scholar]
- Aristotle. 1962. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by Martin Ostwald. New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. [Google Scholar]
- Assagioli, Roberto. 1965. Psychosynthesis: A Manual of Principles and Techniques. New York: Hobbs. [Google Scholar]
- Brandchaft, Bernard, Shelley Doctor, and Dorienne Sorter. 2010. Toward an Emancipatory Psychoanalysis: Brandchaft’s Intersubjective Vision. New York: Routledge. [Google Scholar]
- Buber, Martin. 1958. Hasidism and Modern Man. Translated and Edited by Maurice S. Friedman. New York: Horizon Press. [Google Scholar]
- Buber, Martin. 1970. I and Thou. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. [Google Scholar]
- Dodes, Lance. M. 2002. The Heart of Addiction. New York: Harper Collins. [Google Scholar]
- Elkins, David. 2015. Toward a common focus in psychotherapy research. In The Handbook of Humanistic Psychology: Theory, Research, and Practice, 2nd ed. Edited by Kirk Schneider, J. Fraser Pierson and James Bugental. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. [Google Scholar]
- Ellenberger, Henri F. 1970. The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry. New York: Basic Books, Inc. [Google Scholar]
- Gandhi, Mohandes, and Charles F. Andrews. 1989. Gandhi and Charlie: The Story of a Friendship. As Told through the Letters and Writings of Mohandes K. Gandhi and the Rev’d Charles Freer Andrews. Edited by David McI Gracie. Cambridge: Cowley Publications. [Google Scholar]
- Gandhi, Mohandes. 1993. Gandhi on Christianity. Edited by Robert Ellsberg. Maryknoll: Orbis Books. [Google Scholar]
- Heilig, Markus, James MacKillop, Diana Martinez, Jürgen Rehm, Lorenzo Leggio, and Louk J. M. J. Vanderschuren. 2021. Addiction as a brain disease revised: Why it still matters, and the need for consilience. Neuropsychopharmacology 46: 1715–23. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed]
- Hitchens, Christopher, Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, and Daniel Dennett. 2019. The Four Horsemaen: The Conversation that Sparked an Atheist Revolution. New York: Random House. [Google Scholar]
- Jones, E. Stanley. 1976. Gandhi: Portrait of a Friend. Nashville: Abingdon Press. [Google Scholar]
- Levi, Primo. 1986. The Drowned and the Saved. Translated by Raymond Rosenthal. New York: Summit Books. [Google Scholar]
- Merton, Thomas. 1966. Letter to an innocent bystander. In Raids on the Unspeakable. New York: New Directions. [Google Scholar]
- Nhat Hanh, Thich. 1999. Going Home: Jesus and Buddha as Brothers. New York: Riverhead Books. [Google Scholar]
- Oakley, Barbara, Ariel Knafo, Guruprasad Madhavan, and David S. Wilson, eds. 2012. Pathological Altruism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar]
- Peele, Stanton, and Bruce Alexander. 1998. Theories of addiction. In The Meaning of Addiction: An Unconventional View. Edited by Stanton Peele. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. [Google Scholar]
- Rogers, Carl. 1961. On Becoming a Person: A Therapist’s View of Psychotherapy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. [Google Scholar]
- Sartre, Jean Paul. 1964. Nausea. Translated by Lloyd Alexander. New York: New Directions Publishing Corporation. [Google Scholar]
- Sorokin, Pitirim A. 1954. The Ways and Power of Love: Types, Factors, and Techniques of Moral Transformation. Boston: Beacon Press. [Google Scholar]
- Stolorow, Robert D. 2011. World, Affectivity, Trauma: Heidegger and Post-Cartesian Psychoanalysis. New York: Routledge. [Google Scholar]
- Willard, Dallas. 2018. The Disappearance of Moral Knowledge. Edited by Steven Porter, Aaron Preston and Gregg A. Ten Elshof. New York: Routledge. [Google Scholar]
- Winnicott, Donald W. 1965. The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment: Studies in the Theory of Emotional Development. London: Karnac Books. [Google Scholar]
- Wyner, Gary. 1988. Toward a Phenomenology of Conscientious Action and a Theory of the Practicality of Reason. Ph.D. thesis, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA. [Google Scholar]
- Wyner, Garret. 2012. The Wounded Healer: Finding Meaning in Suffering. Santa Barbara: Antioch University. [Google Scholar]
Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. |
© 2022 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Share and Cite
Wyner, G.B. Spiritual Addiction: Searching for Love in a Coldly Indifferent World. Religions 2022, 13, 300. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13040300
Wyner GB. Spiritual Addiction: Searching for Love in a Coldly Indifferent World. Religions. 2022; 13(4):300. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13040300
Chicago/Turabian StyleWyner, Garret B. 2022. "Spiritual Addiction: Searching for Love in a Coldly Indifferent World" Religions 13, no. 4: 300. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13040300
APA StyleWyner, G. B. (2022). Spiritual Addiction: Searching for Love in a Coldly Indifferent World. Religions, 13(4), 300. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13040300