Economic Development Leads to Stronger Support among Religious Individuals for Clerical Influence in Politics

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

The paper is very coherent and well based on the evidence. It deals with a most relevant and important question and will undoubtedly evoke much interest in relevant research communities.

There is a moment of incoherence between the examination of highly differentiated religious and social factors and the chapter of the conclusion which relates almost solely to the economic factor. I fully understand the limits of such a short paper but still would appreciate a somewhat more nuanced analysis of different religious affiliations. If there are differences between, say, Catholics and Protestants, not to mention Muslims, Jews, and Buddhists, then I would like to hear more about it. If no such differences are evident, this seems to be a significant piece of evidence in itself!

Moreover, reading the conclusion, it seems that the research differentiates religious affiliations only on an individual basis. Is there no difference between relatively homogenous societies dominated by a specific denomination and more pluralistic urban societies? Are Catholics to behave the same in a catholic land and as a minority in more cosmopolitan settings like in the USA?

 

Again, I'm fully aware of the limits of such a focused study and a short paper, but perhaps some of these broader aspects could be addressed shortly.

Author Response

Response to Reviewer 1’s Comments

Point 1. There is a moment of incoherence between the examination of highly differentiated religious and social factors and the chapter of the conclusion which relates almost solely to the economic factor. I fully understand the limits of such a short paper but still would appreciate a somewhat more nuanced analysis of different religious affiliations. If there are differences between, say, Catholics and Protestants, not to mention Muslims, Jews, and Buddhists, then I would like to hear more about it. If no such differences are evident, this seems to be a significant piece of evidence in itself!

Response 1. The reviewer suggests more analysis of the relationship between religious affiliations and attitudes toward clerical influence in politics. I agree with the reviewer that it is important to analyze this relationship and thus add discussion in the sensitivity analyses section of the revised manuscript (p.9). To examine the effects of religious affiliations, I estimate an additional model in which I set the Protestant group as the reference (Model 1, Appendix Table 3 in the revised manuscript). There is no significant difference between Protestants, Catholics, Orthodoxy Christians, Jews, and Hindus. Muslim respondents are more likely to support clerical influence in politics relative to Protestants. This finding aligns with the literature noting the Islamic tradition that emphasizes religion’s role in politics (e.g., Esposito 1998). Moreover, Buddhists are more likely to support the political role of clerics than Protestants. Future research may explain the attitudes of Buddhists.

Ref.

Esposito, John L. 1998. Islam and Politics. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press.

 

Point 2. Moreover, reading the conclusion, it seems that the research differentiates religious affiliations only on an individual basis. Is there no difference between relatively homogenous societies dominated by a specific denomination and more pluralistic urban societies? Are Catholics to behave the same in a catholic land and as a minority in more cosmopolitan settings like in the USA?

Response 2. The reviewer raises several questions in this comment. The first is related to the differences between religiously homogenous and pluralistic societies. In fact, the original models in the manuscript (Table 2) have touched upon this question. The religious fractionalization index, a control variable in the models, measures the degree of religious diversity. The fractionalization index is not significantly related to the attitudes toward clerical influence in politics. This finding suggests there is no substantial difference between homogenous and pluralistic societies in this regard.

The second question seems to suggest an interaction between individual-level religious affiliations and country-level Catholic group size. Therefore, I estimate a model to examine this interaction (Model 2, Appendix Table 3 in the revised manuscript). The model shows that the interaction between individual-level Catholic affiliation and country-level Catholic group size is not significant. Therefore, Catholics’ attitudes toward clerical influence in politics do not vary across countries with different Catholic group sizes. In addition, I explore if Muslims’ attitudes change across countries (Model 3, Appendix Table 3 in the revised manuscript). According to the model result, individual Islamic affiliation is not significantly interacted with country-level Muslim group size. I summarize these results in the sensitivity analyses section of the revised manuscript (p.9).

Reviewer 2 Report

The paper is relevant as it problematizes the taken-for-granted secularization of “developed” societies and, more specifically, challenges the apparent positive relationship, in cross-cultural/cross-national studies, between levels of religiosity and a particular indicator of secularization: support for clerical influence in politics. The paper argues that the support for clerical influence in politics from individuals with high levels of religiosity can be observed in countries with high(er) levels of GDP; while the difference between high- and low- religiosity individuals and their support for clerical influence would remain analitically irrelevant in low GDP countries, or in “developing societies”. More generally, the paper suggests that the corelation between religion and public opinion is contingent on national economic/societal contexts. Whereas the critical edge and main finding of the paper is relevant, I find major conceptual weaknesses and a methodological issue that I think should be addressed if the paper is to be accepted:

-the paper reflects a particularly narrow (economicist) understanding of secularization in contemporary societies. If we think of secularizations as complex processes with a range of material, institutional and discursive factors, “economic development” is certainly not the only explanatory element. It can be argued that a huge range of causes and mechanisms may lead to different processes of secularization in different societies –from increasing levels of education, scientific endeavors and an increasing belief in science to the sustained (and somewhat contingent) success of liberal political factions/parties in the political arena, as well as dynamics of globalization with their corresponding cultural influence. To get just a glimpse of these decades-long debates: Casanova (2006) Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective; Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt (2012) Multiple Secularities: Toward a Cultural Sociology of Secular Modernities. Testing statistically for the factors above would indeed go beyond the scope of the paper, yet a significantly broader, and at the same time nuanced, definition of and approach to the “secularization paradigm” is needed in the paper.

 

-Whereas I find relevant for current debates the Hyphotesis 2 and the paper’s main finding (support for clerics’ political inlfuence higher in developed countries), I think the part of the author’s comparative reasoning that refers to “developing societies” remaining “traditional” and close to “most religions’ social teachings” is a sweeeping generalization that has to be at least nuanced, if not substantially modified. In my opinion, the author may either go beyond the quantitative cross-national literature and thus acknowledge the increasing (if not historical) heterogeneity of, and range of conservative-progressive religious agents/institutions in, developing societies’ socio-religious fields, or modify substantially what is now a reductionist “developing societies=traditional values” type of argument for justifying the hypotheses. As may be inferred from the above, I also suggest to modify correspondingly the “explanations” in the paper’s last section, or present them as future research questions instead.

-The autor may also want to re-elaborate on the last paragraph in the Conclusion –that the relation between religion and politics/public opinion depends on the societal contexts comes across as a rather vague/introductory statement.

-regarding the methodology: why to take only GDP per capita as indicator of economic development and not other indicators or an index? –see for instance, Yeganeh (2015) “Religiosity, socio-economic development and work values: a cross-national study”, or Barber (2011) “A Cross-National Test of the Uncertainty Hypothesis of Religious Belief”.

Author Response

Response to Reviewer 2’s Comments

Point 1. the paper reflects a particularly narrow (economicist) understanding of secularization in contemporary societies. If we think of secularizations as complex processes with a range of material, institutional and discursive factors, “economic development” is certainly not the only explanatory element. It can be argued that a huge range of causes and mechanisms may lead to different processes of secularization in different societies –from increasing levels of education, scientific endeavors and an increasing belief in science to the sustained (and somewhat contingent) success of liberal political factions/parties in the political arena, as well as dynamics of globalization with their corresponding cultural influence. To get just a glimpse of these decades-long debates: Casanova (2006) Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective; Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt (2012) Multiple Secularities: Toward a Cultural Sociology of Secular Modernities. Testing statistically for the factors above would indeed go beyond the scope of the paper, yet a significantly broader, and at the same time nuanced, definition of and approach to the “secularization paradigm” is needed in the paper.

Response 1: The reviewer suggests a further explanation for the economic approach and a more nuanced discussion of the “secularization paradigm.” Following this suggestion, I have revised the front end of the paper (pp.1-2). In the revised version, I emphasize several points: (1) the secularization paradigm has three different connotations: the decline of religious beliefs and practices, privatization of religion, and differentiation of the secular spheres (Casanova 2006). Casanova (1994) has challenged the privatization hypothesis by analyzing several religion-related political movements, such as Iran Islamic Revolution and Christian Right in the U.S. However, Casanova has not explicitly examined the effect of economic development on the privatization of religion. (2) Norris and Inglehart’s research (2011) has noted that economic development leads to lower levels of religious beliefs and practices. However, their research has not explored the issue of the privatization of religion. (3) The present study focuses on people’s attitudes toward clerical influence in politics, which is related to the issue of privatization of religion. This study contributes to the discussion of privatization by examining how economic development influences the attitudes toward clerical influence in politics.

Ref.

Casanova, Jose. 1994. Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

------. 2006. “Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective.” Hedgehog Review 8(1-2):7-22.

 

Point 2. Whereas I find relevant for current debates the Hypothesis 2 and the paper’s main finding (support for clerics’ political influence higher in developed countries), I think the part of the author’s comparative reasoning that refers to “developing societies” remaining “traditional” and close to “most religions’ social teachings” is a sweeping generalization that has to be at least nuanced, if not substantially modified. In my opinion, the author may either go beyond the quantitative cross-national literature and thus acknowledge the increasing (if not historical) heterogeneity of, and range of conservative-progressive religious agents/institutions in, developing societies’ socio-religious fields, or modify substantially what is now a reductionist “developing societies=traditional values” type of argument for justifying the hypotheses. As may be inferred from the above, I also suggest modifying correspondingly the “explanations” in the paper’s last section, or present them as future research questions instead.

Response 2. The reviewer is correct in pointing out that developing societies are not equal to being traditional. Following the reviewer’s suggestion, I add a paragraph below Hypothesis 2 to acknowledge the heterogeneity in developing societies’ socio-religious landscapes (p.3). In addition, I suggest future research to explore the diversity among developing societies in the last section (p.10).

 

Point 3. The author may also want to re-elaborate on the last paragraph in the Conclusion –that the relation between religion and politics/public opinion depends on the societal contexts comes across as a rather vague/introductory statement.

Response 3. Per the suggestion, I revise the last paragraph to make it more accurate and closer to the study’s findings (p.10).

 

Point 4. regarding the methodology: why to take only GDP per capita as indicator of economic development and not other indicators or an index? –see for instance, Yeganeh (2015) “Religiosity, socio-economic development and work values: a cross-national study”, or Barber (2011) “A Cross-National Test of the Uncertainty Hypothesis of Religious Belief”.

Response 4. I thank the reviewer for mentioning this issue. Most studies that examined the national variation in attitudes toward clerical influence in politics used GDP per capita as an economic control variable (Buckley 2015; Carlson & Listhaug 2006; Karakoç & Başkan 2012). Thus, this paper follows the existing studies’ approach. 

Ref.

Buckley, David. 2015. "Demanding the Divine? Explaining Cross-National Support for Clerical Control of Politics." Comparative Political Studies 49(3):357-90.

Carlson, Matthew and O. L. A. Listhaug. 2006. "Public Opinion on the Role of Religion in Political Leadership: A Multi-Level Analysis of Sixty-Three Countries." Japanese Journal of Political Science 7(3):251-71.

Karakoç, Ekrem and Birol Başkan. 2012. "Religion in Politics: How Does Inequality Affect Public Secularization." Comparative Political Studies 45(12):1510-41.

Reviewer 3 Report

This is a thorough and substantial contribution providing a significant fillip to assumptions about the secularization paradigm/thesis. It is worth nothing that this paradigm also suggested the disappearance of religion that too has not happen. There seems to be a parallel finding when it comes to religion and polotical mutual influences.

It is also worth elaborating on the point that in economically developed contexts, religious centres and leaders have more capacity and finance to invest in various activities and networks. While they tend to more transparency in democratic cases, note also clandestine networks such as Freemasons 

Views on modernity going astray, haywire and too fast necessitates the need for an anchor as well. This may well be religious

Note also how populist movements draw upon religion to provide moral succour to their political appeal. These are evident everywhere so not dependent on economics at all

Explain what kinds of clerics the author is addressing. They also have different kinds of roles with the laity depending upon their religious orientation and beliefs, which need to be alluded to 

Also explain this line is not just about division but also antagonism based on a sense of moral threat to their life and worldviews. The antagonism seems to lend more obduracy to either side. - 'Due to the correlation between individual religiosity and value orientation, many developed societies are culturally divided between the religious-conservative and the secular-liberal groups (Halman and van Ingen 2015; Wilkins-Laflamme 2016).'

Author Response

Response to Reviewer 3’s Comments

Point 1. It is worth nothing that this paradigm also suggested the disappearance of religion that too has not happen. There seems to be a parallel finding when it comes to religion and politics mutual influences.

Response 1. Thanks for the reviewer’s suggestion. I add more discussion on the issue of the disappearance of religion in the first paragraph of the literature review section (p.2).

 

Point 2. It is also worth elaborating on the point that in economically developed contexts, religious centers and leaders have more capacity and finance to invest in various activities and networks. While they tend to more transparency in democratic cases, note also clandestine networks such as Freemasons.

Response 2. This suggestion helps polish the argument of this study. Following this comment, I enhance the discussion on how economic prosperity empowers religious elites to mobilize laypeople (in the paragraph above Hypothesis 2, p.3).

 

Point 3. Views on modernity going astray, haywire and too fast necessitates the need for an anchor as well. This may well be religious.

Response 3. I incorporate this comment into the discussion (in the paragraph below Hypothesis 1, p.3)

 

Point 4. Note also how populist movements draw upon religion to provide moral support to their political appeal. These are evident everywhere so not dependent on economics at all

Response 4. I agree with the reviewer on the relationship between religion and populist movements, and I provide more discussion on this point as a potential direction for future research (p.10).

 

Point 5. Explain what kinds of clerics the author is addressing. They also have different kinds of roles with the laity depending upon their religious orientation and beliefs, which need to be alluded to.

Response 5. Per the suggestion, I elaborate on the type of clerics that this study focuses on (in the paragraph above Hypothesis 2, p.3).

 

Point 6. Also explain this line is not just about division but also antagonism based on a sense of moral threat to their life and worldviews. The antagonism seems to lend more obduracy to either side. - 'Due to the correlation between individual religiosity and value orientation, many developed societies are culturally divided between the religious-conservative and the secular-liberal groups (Halman and van Ingen 2015; Wilkins-Laflamme 2016).'

Response 6. I incorporate this helpful comment into the discussion (in the paragraph below Hypothesis 1, p.3). This comment helps improve the argument on how economic development leads to stronger support for the political role of religion among religious people.

Round 2

Reviewer 2 Report

The paper's analytical reductionisms have been addressed and have been acceptably nuanced.