Is Theism Incompatible with the Pauline Principle?

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

See attached file.

Comments for author File: Comments.pdf

Author Response

Reviewer 1 listed several grammatic errors. I have gone through the manuscript and corrected these.

Reviewer 1 also listed several objections to the original paper. First, the author argued that my response to Tony Alimi was “inadequate” because while some obligations are inapplicable to God, others are. I have incorporated a response to this as part of an introduction to 4.2.

The same reviewer also objected that “it would be hypocritical” for God “not to abide by what one expects of others (even if created) would be hypocritical.” I have incorporated a response to this objection in my discussion under section 5:6. I have also clarified my position in this section on the relationship between the underlying virtue expressed by a command and the specific action commanded to address the reviewer’s concerns that “specific actions might differ (in the way the obligations are implemented), but the values behind them would still be the same.”.

I have added to the discussion of Section 5.5 to address the reviewer’s concern that my argument implies that “there must be a standard of good that governs God’s commands independent of those commands and that governs not only those commands but also God in making them.”

The reviewer also raises several questions about my response to the objection that a divine command theory makes it difficult to claim that God is good coherently.  The reviewer asks, “ Further, if God’s goodness is non-moral or better amoral, do we strip God of all moral goodness? If so, what do our terms like good, loving, etc. mean when applied to God, or when we call God good or perfect?” and raises questions about biblical accounts of God being bound by covenants and oaths.  I have attempted to answer and clarify these issues at the end of 5.7. I explain that God can be impartial and benevolent without being obligated to be impartial and benevolent. That differences between human agents and God means the way they promote the common good will differ, so the content of their morality will differ even if the underlying values are the same. I also make some suggestions about Covenants.

Reviewer 2 Report

I found the argument of the paper to be both clear and compelling.  The only problem I see is that there are a few incomplete sentences, for example dependent clauses that need an independent clause. The use of Berkeley makes the article especially valuable.  It is not only a contribution to a current debate but to the interpretation of Berkeley and the history of divine command theory.

The author could reference more recent divine command theory (Adams, Hare, Evans, for example) but I would not say this is necessary for publication.

Author Response

As far as I can tell, the second reviewer does not specify any revisions. He notes that I do not interact much with contemporary divine command theorists such as Adams, Hare or Evans. Obviously, the work of these thinkers on divine command ethics is important. However, my purpose in this essay is focused not on divine command ethics in general but on how a divine command theorist might respond to a particular form of the problem of evil. A form that invokes the Pauline principle. Because Berkeley and other 18th-century divine command theorists (like Paley) had specific things to say on the relationship between God’s commands and the Pauline principle and contemporary divine command theorists hardly mention this issue, it seemed to me unnecessary to focus on a paradigmatic 18th-century theorist who specifically discussed the Pauline principle. I take it reviewer two agrees with this because while he says that “The author could reference more recent divine command theory (Adams, Hare, Evans, for example) “, He “would not say this is necessary for publication.”