The Multiple Dimensions of Confucian Relational Ethics and the “Way of Being With”
Round 1
Reviewer 1 Report
This is a well-researched and grounded essay. Especially it has used many new textual materials to support its claim.
Keep up this good work!
Author Response
I am greatly appreciative for this reviewer’s comments.
Reviewer 2 Report
This paper brings some unduly neglected texts into the contemporary discussion of early Confucian ethics. This is a much-needed effort to diversify this field. However, the paper (1) shows little engagement with the existent literature on this topic, and (2) does not accurately frame the major research question. As for writing mechanics, the paper needs to be thoroughly copy-edited and conform to the citation standard. I will lay out the main problems in turn and then identify some writing issues regarding notes, citation, translation, and errors in non-English characters. Side remarks of the main problems will be given under “Note” right after the discussion of each. I will not attend to the issues in the more local arguments. Only after the main research question is reformulated can we decide which subtheme to retain.
The major contribution that the paper aspires to make is primarily an interpretative one: the existent scholarship in Confucian ethics represented by Fei Xiaotong’s claim that Confucianism relies on a “hierarchical mode of association” and Zhao Tingyang’s claim that Confucianism cannot respond to a modern society ignores one or several important aspects of this tradition. This paper is going to highlight those ignored aspects so that we have a fuller picture. The paper also has a normative/constructive dimension: it argues for the validity of the uncovered aspect of Confucianism as “relational ethics” and responds to a criticism faced by Confucianism: its inability to answer the question of how to deal with strangers.
Lack of Engagement with the Existent Scholarship
It is curious why using a sociologist’s generalization of the social regime of traditional Chinese society and a scholar whose major contribution is in political philosophy as representatives of Confucian ethics. Reconstructions of Confucian ethics in the English-speaking academy, be it virtue ethical or role ethical, emphasize the importance of relationships in Confucian ethics. For example, Bryan Van Norden argues that the Confucian conception of a flourishing life (to which the standard of "virtue" hinges) is relational in Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy, Roger Ames (in Confucian Role Ethics and Human Becomings) and James Behuniak (in Mencius on Becoming Human) argue that the processual conception of humans in Confucianism leads Confucians to regard the facilitation of relationships in the highly reflexive and responsive way as the primary ethical value. Perhaps all of those views have defects. If that is the case, the author needs to expose those problems so as to show the merit of his/her own approach.
Ill-framed Research Question
The author presents his/her goal as supplementary (Line 24-25: “We can provide an answer to this: this kind of understanding only recognizes one Confucian characteristic but conceals its other characteristics.”). Yet if Zhao claims that Confucianism cannot respond to a problem whereas the author claims that it can, the argument of the paper is a refutation, not a supplement. Seeing his/her seeing the paper as a supplement instead of a refutation, the author offers no exposition of his/her opponents' views, thus misses the opportunity to sharpen his/her own point. Framing the paper as a response (see the Line 24-25 quote above; the word “answer” should be replaced by “response” since the author is not answering a question but responding to a critique) without pinpointing the problem it responds to, the author is not clear about what the alleged lacuna(e) of Confucianism is and what he/she provides on behalf of Confucianism. That is, the paper aspires to provide what Zhao claims to be absent in Confucianism, but it never tells us what, according to Zhao, Confucianism lacks. What does Zhao mean by “strangers”? What exactly is the problem posed by strangers to Confucian ethics? The author refers to the problem in quite different ways–the problem of strangers (Line 3-4. So there are several problems? What are they? Which of them is this paper dealing with?), “the problems of the modern ‘society of strangers’” (Line 9-10. Is the problem “strangers” or the modern society?), “the problem of interactions with strangers” (Line 172). Those phrases point to different kinds of problems. “Problems of the modern society of strangers,” for example, has the connotation that modern society estranges members in a community so that people no longer hold themselves morally accountable to each other as community members. In that case the problem seems to lie in the modern society, not strangers, and the Confucian way of dealing with it may well be to rebuild the community. “The problem of interactions with strangers,” on the other hand, may mean that the Confucians lack the ritual codes that guide them to interact with strangers smoothly. The solution may be to develop rituals. Without the problem being identified, it is hard to see what contribution is made here for its solution.
Note 1: Zhao’s view is not clear to me in his own article. If he demands, in ethics, a (set of) propositional statement(s) that regulates our actions toward “strangers” understood to be individuals stripped off all personal qualities with no relationship whatsoever with the agent, it is questionable whether that is a legitimate demand in the first place. In Against Individualism, Henry Rosemont says that it is not. Philosophers outside Confucian studies such as Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy) and Annette Baier (Postures of the Mind) would like to join him. If what he demands is just some general articulations of value in dealing with relationships less institutionally-regulated than those in families and the small circle of friends, again, why are the previously mentioned reconstructions of Confucian ethics by virtue ethicists and role ethicists not enough? Since the paper is perfused with virtue terms, and there is a whole section discussing the virtue of wisdom (Section 3), why, particularly, is a virtue ethical interpretation of Confucianism with the ethical ideal as the sage equipped with every virtue conducive to mutually fulfilling interactions not enough? It seems that the general strategy of this paper is to put “strangers” into a relationship of “being with” the agent (hence there is the phrase “relations between strangers” in Line 96-97). That looks promising. But arguing this way is not providing what Zhao demand for an ethics of treating strangers but rather rejecting that demand–in human interactions, there is no real “stranger.”
Note 2: If the paper is mainly about how Confucianism deals with strangers, what are the passages about the ideal relationship in families and between friends doing? And what is Section 4 on self-love doing? What do they contribute to the discussion of the ethics of strangers?
Note 3: Why use Hanfeizi (p. 14) to reconstruct a Confucian view? What is the use of Laozi on p. 8? Granted that the author of the Daodejing happens to agree with the Confucian at some points, does this fact add any force to the argument of this paper?
Writing mechanics
Word Choice
The paper uses "theory" in a deflationary manner and uses "discourse" and "theory" interchangeably ("Confucianism established this ethical discourse and theory," Line 36-37). An ethical discourse can be a cluster of more or less connected articulations of value that are discursively developed in a community with considerable internal tensions. An identifiable discourse does not have to have conclusions deducible from articulated premises and is not necessarily coherent. A theory in normative ethics, on the other hand, formulates propositional statements about the object of study (for instance, “an action is right if and only if it is done out of a maxim that conforms to the categorical imperative,” or “a character is good if and only if it is a component to eudaimonia”) and can be defended based on the soundness of its factual assumptions and its logical coherence. It might be helpful to reconsider whether many views (e.g., Yan Hui's "theory" of self-love) mentioned in this paper amount to a theory and whether the paper itself is launching a theory (if so, the requirement of robustness is raised).
Footnote/endnote
The paper switches from endnote to footnote on p. 13.
Translation
Many texts quoted in the paper have widely-used, reasonably reliable English translations. If the author provides his/her own translation from the original text, he/she should indicate that somewhere to avoid confusion.
Citation
The standard way to cite Mengzi indicates not only the chapter number but also the section number, e.g., Mengzi 3A4.
The standard way to cite the Nicomachean Ethics is to indicate the Greek edition, e.g., (NE 1097b17-20). Other ways may exist. But this is the most responsible way.
(The author uses two different Chinese translations of the NE. This should be explained.)
Though not a standard, given that the author is writing to an English-speaking audience, it is highly desirable to refer to one of the following Knoblock’s translation, Hutton’s translation, the Harvard-Yenching Index Series Concordance to the Xunzi (HYIS), and Chinese University of Hong Kong Institute of Chinese Studies Ancient Chinese Texts Concordance Series Concordance to the Xunzi (HKCS).
Non-English Characters
Line 513 史記·中你底子列傳 should be 史記·仲尼弟子列傳
Line 830 於 should be與
Author Response
I appreciate all of the work that must have gone into the reviewer’s review and for all of their suggestsions.
Point 1: It is curious why using a sociologist’s generalization of the social regime of traditional Chinese society and a scholar whose major contribution is in political philosophy as representatives of Confucian ethics. Reconstructions of Confucian ethics in the English-speaking academy, be it virtue ethical or role ethical, emphasize the importance of relationships in Confucian ethics. For example, Bryan Van Norden argues that the Confucian conception of a flourishing life (to which the standard of "virtue" hinges) is relational in Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy, Roger Ames (in Confucian Role Ethics and Human Becomings) and James Behuniak (in Mencius on Becoming Human) argue that the processual conception of humans in Confucianism leads Confucians to regard the facilitation of relationships in the highly reflexive and responsive way as the primary ethical value. Perhaps all of those views have defects. If that is the case, the author needs to expose those problems so as to show the merit of his/her own approach.
Response 1: I agree with the reviewer’s point regarding the need to pay more attention to English language literature on Confucianism. Therefore, I have added references to Bryan van Norden’s Introduction to Classical Chinese Philosophy, Roger Ames’ Confucian Role Ethics, and others; at the same time, I have added references to Chen Lai’s 陈来 Ruxue meidelun 儒学美德论 (On Confucian Virtue), Huang Yong’s 黄勇 Dangdai meide lunli 当代美的伦理 (Contemporary Virtue Ethics), and others. Regarding Fei Xiaotong and Zhao Tingyang, neither can be considered experts in Confucian ethics from an academic standpoint. The reason why I reference Fei Xiaotong on Confucianism is not simply because he is more than simple sociology but because his summarization of Confucian ethics has had, and still has, a great influence in modern Chinese intellectual culture. This is led many people to incorrectly criticize Confucian ethics. Zhao Tingyang is someone who has been influenced by Fei Xiaotong and has us his ideas on Confucian ethics to argue that it cannot adapt to the modern society of strangers. At the same time, Zhao Tingyang is not a simple political philosopher. In recent years he has begun to research Chinese philosophy and Confucian ethics achieving a certain degree of influence thereby guiding people to incorrect understandings of Confucianism. Actually, it is not the case that only Confucianism has been misunderstood, but a great number of scholars in the fields of Chinese philosophy, religion, and ethics still misconstrue Confucian ethics as being n more than based on kin relations, family feelings, and ancestral lineages thinking that this are natural limitations for Confucianism. This arguments conceal the universal value of Confucian ethics. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify Confucian ethics in order to defend it.
Point 2 (including Note 1): The author presents his/her goal as supplementary (Line 24-25: “We can provide an answer to this: this kind of understanding only recognizes one Confucian characteristic but conceals its other characteristics.”). Yet if Zhao claims that Confucianism cannot respond to a problem whereas the author claims that it can, the argument of the paper is a refutation, not a supplement. Seeing his/her seeing the paper as a supplement instead of a refutation, the author offers no exposition of his/her opponents' views, thus misses the opportunity to sharpen his/her own point. Framing the paper as a response (see the Line 24-25 quote above; the word “answer” should be replaced by “response” since the author is not answering a question but responding to a critique) without pinpointing the problem it responds to, the author is not clear about what the alleged lacuna(e) of Confucianism is and what he/she provides on behalf of Confucianism. That is, the paper aspires to provide what Zhao claims to be absent in Confucianism, but it never tells us what, according to Zhao, Confucianism lacks. What does Zhao mean by “strangers”? What exactly is the problem posed by strangers to Confucian ethics? The author refers to the problem in quite different ways–the problem of strangers (Line 3-4. So there are several problems? What are they? Which of them is this paper dealing with?), “the problems of the modern ‘society of strangers’” (Line 9-10. Is the problem “strangers” or the modern society?), “the problem of interactions with strangers” (Line 172). Those phrases point to different kinds of problems. “Problems of the modern society of strangers,” for example, has the connotation that modern society estranges members in a community so that people no longer hold themselves morally accountable to each other as community members. In that case the problem seems to lie in the modern society, not strangers, and the Confucian way of dealing with it may well be to rebuild the community. “The problem of interactions with strangers,” on the other hand, may mean that the Confucians lack the ritual codes that guide them to interact with strangers smoothly. The solution may be to develop rituals. Without the problem being identified, it is hard to see what contribution is made here for its solution.
Note 1: Zhao’s view is not clear to me in his own article. If he demands, in ethics, a (set of) propositional statement(s) that regulates our actions toward “strangers” understood to be individuals stripped off all personal qualities with no relationship whatsoever with the agent, it is questionable whether that is a legitimate demand in the first place. In Against Individualism, Henry Rosemont says that it is not. Philosophers outside Confucian studies such as Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy) and Annette Baier (Postures of the Mind) would like to join him. If what he demands is just some general articulations of value in dealing with relationships less institutionally-regulated than those in families and the small circle of friends, again, why are the previously mentioned reconstructions of Confucian ethics by virtue ethicists and role ethicists not enough? Since the paper is perfused with virtue terms, and there is a whole section discussing the virtue of wisdom (Section 3), why, particularly, is a virtue ethical interpretation of Confucianism with the ethical ideal as the sage equipped with every virtue conducive to mutually fulfilling interactions not enough? It seems that the general strategy of this paper is to put “strangers” into a relationship of “being with” the agent (hence there is the phrase “relations between strangers” in Line 96-97). That looks promising. But arguing this way is not providing what Zhao demand for an ethics of treating strangers but rather rejecting that demand–in human interactions, there is no real “stranger.”
Response 2: In the above criticism and in “Note 1,” the reviewer casts doubt on the relevance of the article as a whole and the connectedness of its parts. Therefore, I will answer these two together. This article uses Fei Xiaotong and Zhao Tingyang as examples in order to present some of the suspicions about Confucian ethics. Therefore, it is not primarily concerned with supplementing or refuting Zhao’s arguments or responding to Fei Xiaotong directly. My argument begins from two often neglected Confucian passages and shows the universal ethics and value of Confucianism that they contain as well as presenting the various dimensions of Confucian ethics within the context of the Confucian school of thought. By fully developing the universal image of Confucianism we can forcefully answer the questions raised by Zhao Tingyang and others and thereby also refute their arguments.
Zhao Tingyang knows what the concept of “stranger” means, he also knows how modern society has solved the problem of strangers and the problem of their existence. The focus of his article is the relationship between Confucian ethics and the modern society of strangers. There is no real difference between Zhao’s usage of “strangers” and my own, otherwise if I said that Confucianism can adapt to a society of strangers then I would have not provided an solution to his problem. Related to this, as for Zhao Tingyang, as long as an ethics is not founded on kinship and ancestral relationships than it will be able to adapt to a society of strangers. However, because it is from these things that Confucian ethics begins and is founded on, therefore it leads to a certain ossification of unequal and classist traditional social structures. When it comes to modern society that favors individual freedom and the opening of social resources for all to use where strangers interact with each other on a daily basis on a large scale, this kind of ethics is not suitable. Zhao Tingyang is also aware of the different studies on Confucian ethics both inside and outside of China. He hoped that people will look the faults of Confucianism straight in the face and try to provide solutions to them. This article is a response to scholars like Zhao who have cast doubts on and criticized Confucian ethics. This article not only tries to correct his misunderstanding of Confucianism but is also a refutation of his argument. I hope that this explanation has satisfied the reviewer’s concern over the purpose and significance of the article.
Point 2: If the paper is mainly about how Confucianism deals with strangers, what are the passages about the ideal relationship in families and between friends doing? And what is Section 4 on self-love doing? What do they contribute to the discussion of the ethics of strangers?
Response 2: This article discusses “friendship” because this relationship best embodies that which obtains between “self” and “other” in a general sense. As one of the five standard Confucian relationships that goes beyond kin and familial relationships, it is open to all strangers. It does not exclude the possibility that a stranger can become an associate or close friend. Therefore, “friendship” in Confucian ethics is an example that directly refutes the claim that Confucianism is not fit for a modern society of strangers.
Point 3: Why use Hanfeizi (p. 14) to reconstruct a Confucian view? What is the use of Laozi on p. 8? Granted that the author of the Daodejing happens to agree with the Confucian at some points, does this fact add any force to the argument of this paper?
Response 3: Just because different schools of thought debate with and criticize each does not mean there is no common ground between them. It is an argumentative method to use what those who “oppose” each other all agree on as a piece of evidence. I hope that the review will accept this.
Reviewer 3 Report
This article offers an intriguing discussion of a very important topic. In fact, many have ignored the issue of strangers and the universal applicability of Confucian relation ethics. These are difficult topics that are not discussed explicitly in classic Confucian texts. The author of this paper has made a solid attempt to bring this issues to the forefront and explore important ways to think about them. Overall the article is significant for these reasons. However, I think it would could improved in a number of respects. First, the author uses “universal” as a sounding point, but does not sufficiently discuss what this means in the body of the paper. I think a more concentrated elaboration of what the author means by “universal” and how the Confucian texts discussed express a type of “universality” would greatly improve the article.
Second, the same problem as the first applies to “stranger.” Like “universal” the author somehow assumes that broad or minor suggestions in classic texts are sufficient. I think more imagination is required, and instead of trying to simply anchor either “universal” or a discussion of “strangers” entirely in the classics the author could explore how the classics might be more creatively interpreted.
Third, the author sometimes refers to particular Western vocabulary, such as “I and You” (which, is more accurately “I and Thou”—and this is already a huge mistake), but I am not sure why. Using this vocabulary only distracts the reader and does not make any significant contribution to the argument as a whole.
Fourth, there are many good recourses on this topic in English. The author has done a wonderful job discussing the Chinese language literature, but reference to English language literature, especially since the article is in English, would greatly improve this work.
None of this are major problems, nor are they reasons to reject the article. They are simply suggestions, and I hope the author(s) take them seriously.
Author Response
I am greatly appreciative for this reviewer’s comments and for pointing out relevant issues with the article.
Point 1: This article offers an intriguing discussion of a very important topic. In fact, many have ignored the issue of strangers and the universal applicability of Confucian relation ethics. These are difficult topics that are not discussed explicitly in classic Confucian texts. The author of this paper has made a solid attempt to bring this issues to the forefront and explore important ways to think about them. Overall the article is significant for these reasons. However, I think it would could improved in a number of respects. First, the author uses “universal” as a sounding point, but does not sufficiently discuss what this means in the body of the paper. I think a more concentrated elaboration of what the author means by “universal” and how the Confucian texts discussed express a type of “universality” would greatly improve the article.
Response 1: The term “universal” (Ch. pubianxing 普遍性) that I use refers to “universality” in the sense of a general applicability regardless of time and place (Ch. pushixing 普世性). That both of these Chinese terms are translated into English as “universal” is an unfortunate cause for confusion. I have added a footnote explaining my usage of “universal.”
Point 2: The same problem as the first applies to “stranger.” Like “universal” the author somehow assumes that broad or minor suggestions in classic texts are sufficient. I think more imagination is required, and instead of trying to simply anchor either “universal” or a discussion of “strangers” entirely in the classics the author could explore how the classics might be more creatively interpreted.
Response 2: The term “stranger” is an interdisciplinary concept that involves sociology, psychology, ethics and many more fields of study. That there were strangers in traditional societies does not need to be mentioned, especially for those people who all lived in cities. However, the connotation of the term “stranger” is much broader when it comes to modern society and it especially refers to people who live in cities and the great number of social interactions that they entail. People are packed tightly in cities and they rub shoulders with people they do not even know or even pay attention to at all. This is a state of affairs that those who lived in the country and in villages of ancient society could not imagine. When Zhao Tingyang says that Confucian traditional ethics is incapable of adapting to a society of strangers he is referring to people who live in modern cities. This can be explained in a footnote. Because there are limitations on the length of the article therefore this concept is being used in a general sense and cannot be expanded on much further. This article summarizes Confucian ethics of interpersonal relationships into four kinds: punitive, altruistic, tolerant, and Utmost Good. This is not an explanation that is limited to the classical texts themselves but is a new contribution. Regarding the mention of Confucian “relational ethics,” even though this article intersects with Roger Ames “role ethics” it nonetheless has its own dimension.
Point 3: The author sometimes refers to particular Western vocabulary, such as “I and You” (which, is more accurately “I and Thou”—and this is already a huge mistake), but I am not sure why. Using this vocabulary only distracts the reader and does not make any significant contribution to the argument as a whole.
Response 3: This is not a problem in the original Chinese as the Chinese translation for “I and Thou” is generally known and would not be confused by the general terminology employed. However, I have removed the two instances of “I and Thou” to remove the possibility for this confusion.
Point 4: There are many good recourses on this topic in English. The author has done a wonderful job discussing the Chinese language literature, but reference to English language literature, especially since the article is in English, would greatly improve this work.
Response 4: Thank you for suggesting that there should be a greater concern for relevant English language literature and for providing some possible references.
Round 2
Reviewer 2 Report
The response and the added endnotes (esp. Endnote 2) clarified some issues. Now I got a better sense of what the paper is about. I am sympathetic to the relational approach and believe in the value of the larger project behind the paper-length work. (I am not sure if there is one, but the chronicle span of the selected texts and the comprehensiveness of the relations included–all self-other and even self-to-self relations–suggest an ambitious project.) However, I still think the paper in the current shape does not exhibit enough contribution to the field. The author’s aim is to reconstruct a relational Confucian ethic by bringing our attention to some neglected texts in this tradition to show that Zhao’s and Fei’s influential views are wrong. Contributions can be from any of the three aspects. First, it may criticize the influential views of Zhao and Fei. Second, it may reconstruct Confucian ethic in an innovative way superior to other ways. Third, it may reveal the insights of the neglected texts. I will comment on those three aspects one by one.
Regarding the significance of the Zhao’s mistake and by extension, the significance of the author’s correction of it: The author claims that the statements of Zhao and Fei “led many people to incorrectly criticize Confucian ethics” and “a great number of scholars in the fields of Chinese philosophy, religion, and ethics still misconstrue Confucian ethics as being no more than based on kin relations, family feelings, and ancestral lineages thinking.” I do not recognize those “many people” and that “great number of scholars,” and would like to learn who, in which work, showed that misunderstanding. To my knowledge, no major interpreter of Confucian ethics in the English speaking world is influenced by that mistake. I regret for my ignorance. But if I’m not familiar with them, perhaps neither do other potential readers of this paper. Contextualizing the argument will help the readers see that the paper is not fighting a strawman.
Related to that issue is the uniqueness of the author’s view.
I keep referring to works in the English-speaking academy because, if the alleged problem of Confucian ethics is that it has nothing to offer outside kinship and ancestral relationships, then all the literature I referred to can be a refutation in their own way to this charge. (More can be added; Tu Wei-ming’s works, Stephen Angle’s Contemporary Confucian Political Philosophy, etc.) Those works do not mention the mistaken view because that view not influential, not because it cannot be sufficiently refuted by the existent interpretations of Confucianism. If those interpretations of Confucianism cannot refute the mistaken view, the author needs to show where they fail. If those interpretations can, the author needs to show why yet another interpretation of Confucian ethics is needed. The author’s response clarifies that by “strangers” he/she does not mean individuals who bears no relationship with the agent whatsoever, but people in general, that is, people who may enter relationships with the agent in one way or another, and most potentially, friendship. And the author selects friendship “because this relationship best embodies that which obtains between ‘self’ and ‘other’ in a general sense.” So the paper is offering a Confucian form of ethics applicable to general self-other relationships. All the reconstructions in the aforementioned works on Confucian ethics are reconstructions of this kind in one way or another. What is uniquely valuable in the author’s approach? After all, if the main point of the paper is that the Confucian way to deal with strangers is to respond to them under the guidance of the ideals of virtues in a context-sensitive way as the strangers enter a relationship with the agent, I do not see any scholar in the field of Confucian ethics in the English-speaking world would find this idea surprising.
One contribution that the author wants to make is to call our attention to some neglected texts. That is certainly welcome. But the neglected texts used (Story A and Story B) are more like prologues, not the source of the normative ethical conclusions of Confucian ethics. The ideas that the authors draws from Story A (Section 2) are not based on a close exegesis of the story itself (which does not contain a judgment regarding how to treat people in general), but instead are extracted from texts which are not that unfamiliar (the Analects, the Book of Rituals, for example). More so with Story B. Large parts of the sections on this story (Sections 3 & 4) consist in the analysis of well-studied texts such as the Analects, the Mengzi, and the Xunzi, although some oft-neglected texts, like Qi-lunyu and Guo-yu, are included. It does not amount to a contribution to merely show that there are some less discussed texts. What makes a contribution is to show that discussing those texts tells us something new about Confucian ethics, something that we have not already seen in the more familiar texts. That “something new” is lacking in this paper. This lacuna, as the other two, can be alleviated by more engagement with the existent scholarship.
I have some worries about using texts as heterogeneous as the Classic of Poetry, the Analects, the Xunzi, the Han-shi-wai-zhuan, and others to reconstruct a single Confucian ethic. But I do not pursue the suspicion here.
Regarding Response 3:
Author: Just because different schools of thought debate with and criticize each does not mean there is no common ground between them. It is an argumentative method to use what those who “oppose” each other all agree on as a piece of evidence. I hope that the review will accept this.
I am not saying that different schools do not have common grounds. I am saying that if the argument is that “Confucian ethics can meet the challenge A by holding X,” the fact that the Daoists and the Legalists also hold X is irrelevant. In that argument you are trying to show
(1) Confucians hold X, and
(2) X is right (so it meets Challenge A).
Citing other schools does not show (1) since the cited sources are not from Confucianism. It neither helps for (2), because whether a view is right does not depend on the number of people holding them. To cite as many supporters as possible may be an efficient way to persuade people in motivational speeches or public writing, but I don’t think it contributes to one’s argumentative goal in academic writing.
Author Response
I am greatly appreciative of the reviewer’s comments on my earlier responses and clarifications as it allowed me opportunities to explain more fully the contribution of my essay to Confucian ethics, to improve its readability for a Western audience through expanding its discussion on the debates surrounding Confucianism in modern China, and to discuss in more depth the reasoning behind the sources and materials employed in this essay. I will treat each of these one by one as separate points.
Regarding the first point: the meaning and value of academic research can be abstractly expressed in such terms as creativity and innovation. This is a self-evident presupposition. For any kind of creativity within the realm of the humanities and historical Chinese and Confucian philosophy, as long as I can, through my own limited knowledge, express “at least” one aspect in terms of a new idea, new argument, new perspective or new resources, then I will have made a valuable contribution. Otherwise, to give expression to all such things would be to have written an article with exceedingly high value and meaning. If the reviewer mostly acknowledges and accepts this judgment, then the reviewer will know that this essay does not, at the outset, accept one of the earliest and most prevalent positions of “Confucian universalism” as its own position. One of the most common methods of researching Confucian philosophy both within and outside China develops, expands, and strengthens this position by making use of many different methodologies such Du Weiming’s 杜维明 “Confucian spiritual humanism,” Roger Ames’ “Confucian role ethics,” Wang Qingjie’s 王庆节“Confucian normative ethics,” and Huang Yong’s 黄勇 “Confucian virtue ethics.” That Li Minghui 李明辉 does not think that Confucian ethics is a virtue ethics but rather that is a “duty ethics” is another example. There are many different kinds of ethical universalisms. Accordingly, there are obviously many different interpretations and explanations of what Confucian universal ethics really is. All these various studies attempt to further the discussion in different aspects on what kind universal ethics Confucian universal ethics actually is.
At the same time, the “Confucian relational ethics” proposed by this essay other than attempting to reveal the features of kinship and lineage in Confucian ethics, also investigates the general relationships between people by exploring “how” Confucianism establishes universally effective ethical values and standards. The perspective and method of proposing the concept of “Confucian relational ethics” itself is beneficial to expanding our understanding of what Confucian universal ethics is. This is the first place wherein the value of this essay lies. In the study of history, one standard of whether an essay has value or not is in what kinds of resources it uses, whether they are important or new. This essay uses two textual records that are not unimportant yet have gone mostly unnoticed. As such, this is the second place wherein the value of this essay lies. This essay analyzes the diversity and complexity of the Confucian relational ethics contained in these two texts in combination with other early Confucian ethical discussions, gives expression to the universality of Confucian relational ethics through these different structures and systems, and in addition responds to the doubts cast on the universality of Confucian ethics. This is the third place wherein the value of this essay lies. This is also its biggest contribution to academia. Regarding its construction of a universal Confucian relational ethics, this essay summarizes the four ethical models of “altruistic,” “punitive,” “tolerant,” and “Utmost Good” where each represents a different kind of universal ethical value. It also provides an interpretation of the important notion that “He who is benevolent loves himself” to present the diversity and abundance of meaning of the Confucian concept of ren 仁 on the one hand and, on the other hand, it explains how the notions of “He who is benevolent loves others” and “moral learning for oneself” can be fused together. This is how Confucian relational ethics can transcend “egoism” and “utilitarianism” in their general senses. This is the fourth place wherein the value of this essay lies. If none of this can be recognized as constituting the academic contribution of this essay, then it is hard to even get a sense of what the standards for determining the value of a humanities paper or where an objective determination can be found. It is also impossible to find where innovation can be found regarding Confucian ethics research or what can even be considered innovation in the first place. This is one of the places where I must express my concern regarding the reviewer’s conclusions.
The second point is closely connected to the first. This is primarily a question of whether or not it is tenable that the object of criticism chosen in this article can at the same time be taken as one of its presuppositions. The reviewer doubts its tenability and even claims that the author has set up a “strawman.” There is certainly a problem of the different linguistic English and Chinese contexts. In order to alleviate the reviewer’s concerns, I have made supplements in the form of extra content and footnotes. In China, at least, there has always been a debate regarding the universality or particularity of Confucian ethics in modern times. Fei Xiaotong 费孝通 with his “hierarchical mode of association” and Zhao Tingyang 赵汀阳 who accepts that there are certain problems with Confucianism both agree that Confucian ethics lacks universality. This kind of appraisal accepts that Confucian ethics is a kind of “particularistic ethics” and is therefore severely insufficient. Being unable to face a society of strangers is only one of its difficulties. The modern world with its focus on cultural diversity in its reflections on the universalism of the Enlightenment proposed a different justice and rationality (see for example Alasdair MacIntyre’s Whose Justice? Which Rationality?). People either thought Confucianism was a particularism due to their focus on difference (see Zhang Xianglong 张详龙: “The philosophical feature of Confucianism and its position in inter-cultural dialogue: Universalism or non-universalism” in Frontiers of Philosophy in China, vo. 4 no. 4, 2009: 483-492) or they thought it was a universalism by affirming its universal values (see Yu Ying-shih’s Zhongguo sixiang chuantong de xiandai quanshi 中国思想传统的现代诠释). A debate on Confucianism’s particularism or universalism raged around its idea that “relatives conceal each other” (Guo Qiyong 郭齐勇: Rujia lunli zhengming ji 儒家伦理争鸣集, 2006; Deng Xiaomang 邓晓芒: Rujia lunli xinpipan 儒家伦理新批判, 2004; and Guo Qiyong: Rujia lunli xinpipan zhi pipan 儒家伦理新批判之批判, 2019). The reviewer certainly knows that Confucianism faced all kinds of challenges raised by Daoism, Legalism, and Mohism during the Eastern Zhou; much of those original debates are still going on, such as which of Confucianism’s “love is ranked” and Mohism’s “impartial love” is universalist and which is particularist (Shen Xiaoyang 沈晓阳: “Ai you chadeng yu ai wu chadeng bianxi 爱有差的于爱无差等辨析,” 1992). Regarding non-Chinese scholarship, the prominent debates on Confucian theories and ethics mostly revolve around degrees of difference between positions. Joseph Levenson’s Confucian China and its Modern Fate greatly doubted Confucianism’s modern turn and the challenges it faced and Du Weiming thinks that our responses have not yet done enough. In order to assuage the reviewer’s doubts, I have included all of this within the body of the essay as well as the footnotes.
As for the third point, the reviewer does not agree with citing relevant passages from Laozi and Hanfeizi saying that authority and quantity cannot serve as evidence for argument. I agree with this. My use of them was not an appeal to authority or quantity in principle but rather the appropriateness of their interpretation. Generally speaking, citations and references are a normative requirement of research as well as a means of deepening discussion. Whatever materials are cited and referenced are basically chosen based on the value of their research and not on whether a particular scholar is authoritative or how many people hold a certain view—even if the reason why true authority is authority is based on the novelty of its research. The reviewer maintains that it is not necessary to retain the quotations from Laozi and Hanfeizi and, on the whole, removing this two quotations will not lessen the overall argument of the essay.
