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Open AccessArticle

A Stackelberg Game Approach for Price Response Coordination of Thermostatically Controlled Loads

1
School of Automation, Beijing Institute of Technology (BIT), Beijing 100081, China
2
Automatic Control Laboratory, Department of Information Technology and Electrical Engineering, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH), Zurich 8092, Switzerland
3
China Electronics Standardization Institute (CESI), Beijing 100007, China
*
Authors to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Appl. Sci. 2018, 8(8), 1370; https://doi.org/10.3390/app8081370
Received: 27 May 2018 / Revised: 26 July 2018 / Accepted: 1 August 2018 / Published: 15 August 2018
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Smart Home and Energy Management Systems)
In this paper, we study the demand response of the thermostatically controlled loads (TCLs) to control their set-point temperatures by considering the tradeoff between the electricity payment and TCL user’s comfort preference. Based upon the dynamics of the TCLs, we set up the relationship between the set-point temperature and the energy demand. Then, we define a discomfort function with respect to the associated energy demand which represents the discomfort level of the set-point temperature. More specifically, the system is equipped with a coordinator named electric energy control center (EECC) which can buy energy resources from the electricity market and sell them to TCL users. Due to the interaction between EECC and TCL users, we formulate the specific energy trading process as a one-leader multiple-follower Stackelberg game. As the main contributions of this work, we show the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium for the underlying Stackelberg games, and develop a DR algorithm based on the so-called Backward Induction to achieve the equilibrium. Several numerical simulations are presented to verify the developed results in this work. View Full-Text
Keywords: thermostatically controlled loads; Stackelberg game; set-point temperature; price response; energy management thermostatically controlled loads; Stackelberg game; set-point temperature; price response; energy management
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MDPI and ACS Style

Wang, P.; Zou, S.; Wang, X.; Ma, Z. A Stackelberg Game Approach for Price Response Coordination of Thermostatically Controlled Loads. Appl. Sci. 2018, 8, 1370.

AMA Style

Wang P, Zou S, Wang X, Ma Z. A Stackelberg Game Approach for Price Response Coordination of Thermostatically Controlled Loads. Applied Sciences. 2018; 8(8):1370.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Wang, Peng; Zou, Suli; Wang, Xiaojuan; Ma, Zhongjing. 2018. "A Stackelberg Game Approach for Price Response Coordination of Thermostatically Controlled Loads" Appl. Sci. 8, no. 8: 1370.

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