Accidents in the Production, Transport, and Handling of Explosives: TOL Method Hazard Analysis with a Mining Case Study

Abstract

Explosives (EXP) are an essential component of technological processes across numerous civil industry sectors, particularly in surface mining. Despite their technological benefits, their use is associated with a high risk of serious accidents. This study aimed to present available data sources on explosive-related incidents and to highlight the limitations in their accessibility, quality, and comparability. The analysis included the SAFEX, eMARS, and PAR databases, as well as national reports from the Polish State Mining Authority, focusing on discrepancies in the classification and description of events. The review was complemented by an analysis of an accident in a Polish open-pit mine, in which an excavator operator was injured due to the uncontrolled detonation of an unexploded charge. The TOL method was employed to analyze the root causes, allowing for the identification of technical, organizational, and human contributing factors, with specific adaptations for the explosives domain such as safety barrier verification, post-blast supervision, and quality control of detonators. The results indicate that most incidents arise from the interaction of multiple causes rather than a single error. The study underscores the need for more effective verification procedures, improved oversight of post-blast operations, and enhanced protective equipment. The article highlights the importance of a systems-based approach to safety management, encompassing both consistent incident data analysis and practical preventive actions throughout the entire life cycle of explosives.

1. Introduction

Explosives (EXP) are widely used in mining [1,2,3], infrastructure construction [4,5], and demolition operations [6,7,8,9] as a highly effective method for rock fragmentation and structure dismantling. While their application significantly enhances the efficiency of technological processes, it also presents a substantial risk to human health, the environment, and surrounding infrastructure. Despite the existence of strict legal regulations and the application of safety procedures [10], accidents involving explosives still occur—often with severe consequences. Globally, this issue is the subject of ongoing research focusing on organizational, engineering, and case-specific aspects [11,12,13,14].

Risk management related to explosives requires a holistic approach encompassing the entire life cycle—from manufacturing and storage to transport, use, and disposal. In the transportation sector, despite a high level of perceived risk among the public, data from the United States show that most transportation-related incidents have been effectively minimized through stringent procedures and cooperation between governmental agencies and industry stakeholders [15,16]. Conversely, transport-related accidents in regions such as Asia and South America still result in numerous casualties and losses, primarily due to organizational shortcomings and inadequate evacuation planning [15].

Storage and handling of explosives also represent critical hazard areas, where non-compliance with environmental and technical standards can lead to catastrophic explosions or fires [17,18]. Case studies from Central and Eastern Europe highlight recurring issues related to operational errors, improper storage conditions, and insufficient staff training. On the other hand, advances in technology—such as thermokinetic analyses—allow for increasingly accurate identification of thermal hazards associated with explosive mixtures, which is essential for effective prevention [13].

In the mining industry, particularly in surface operations, significant attention is given to accidents resulting from insufficient blast area security, flyrock, and unauthorized access to hazardous zones [12]. Analyses by organizations such as the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) in the U.S. clearly indicate that poor work organization and lack of technical safeguards are among the primary causes of fatal incidents. These findings are consistent with national and international observations [19,20,21].

Despite the availability of various incident databases—such as SAFEX [22], eMARS [23], and PAR [24]—a unified, open-access system for collecting and analyzing data across all sectors utilizing explosives remains lacking. A notable example of good practice is provided by the Department of Resources of Queensland (Australia) [25], which regularly publishes incident reports that include classification and root cause analysis. Similarly, SAFEX International maintains a database of accidents related to explosives production and use. Its members are required to report all incidents, fostering a culture of safety through information sharing and risk management benchmarking. SAFEX collaborates with the UK’s Health and Safety Executive (HSE), whose Explosives Incidents Database Advisory Service (EIDAS) contains over 20,000 records dating back to the early 20th century [26].

In the European context, particular attention is given to the eMARS (Major Accident Reporting System) platform, operated by the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission. This system collects data on major industrial accidents involving hazardous substances, including explosives. Under the Seveso III Directive (2012/18/EU) [27], EU member states are obligated to report incidents that meet defined quantitative and qualitative thresholds. The platform facilitates root and secondary cause analysis and supports the dissemination of best practices and preventive strategies.

In contrast, the situation in Poland is less straightforward. While the State Mining Authority (SMA) maintains a detailed registry of accidents and dangerous events related to blasting operations in mining [20], no comprehensive database exists for other sectors that use explosives. Some companies have implemented internal reporting systems; however, these datasets are not publicly available, limiting their value for comparative and systemic research [28,29].

In the UK, initiatives such as those led by the Institute of Explosives Engineers (IExpE) [24] and the Sector Skills Strategy Group (SSSG) have developed the Past Accident Review (PAR) database, which includes records dating back to the 18th century. This initiative aims not only to analyze incident causes but also to identify historical patterns and enduring practices that may still pose risks today.

International experience shows that effective accident risk management for explosives requires more than robust safety protocols—it also depends on open information exchange and systematic incident data analysis. The limited global availability of such data, particularly in civil applications, remains a significant research and operational challenge [29].

Furthermore, the literature emphasizes that standardizing information, an open safety culture, and applying advanced analytical methods—such as the TOL (Technical, Organizational, and Human) root cause analysis—can substantially enhance preventive measures and reduce the consequences of future incidents [10,11,13,16]. This article aims to provide a comprehensive review of the currently available data sources on accidents and incidents involving explosives in civil applications, with particular attention to their accessibility, reliability, and comparability across different reporting systems. A key objective is to identify the most critical information gaps that hinder systematic learning from past events and to assess the extent to which existing databases support evidence-based risk management. To that end, the study addresses the following central research questions: (i) What are the strengths and limitations of the principal databases documenting explosives-related accidents? (ii) To what degree do inconsistencies in classification, reporting practices, and data transparency affect the ability to conduct comparative analyses across sectors and regions? (iii) How can methodological approaches, such as the TOL method, enhance our understanding of multifactorial root causes when applied to real accident scenarios in the explosives domain?

In pursuing these questions, the article also emphasizes the specific adaptations of the TOL method for analyzing explosives-related incidents. These include the evaluation of barrier effectiveness, particularly post-blast supervision practices, and the role of quality control procedures for detonators and initiation systems. Such considerations are essential in explosives safety yet are often overlooked in generic industrial safety studies.

To illustrate these issues, special emphasis is placed on a case study of an accident at a Polish mining facility, which serves as a practical example of how the adapted TOL method can capture the complex interactions of technical, organizational, and human factors. The ultimate goal is not only to describe existing challenges but also to formulate recommendations for improving accident reporting systems and to contribute to the development of preventive strategies. By integrating data-driven insights with root cause analysis tailored to explosives operations, the study aspires to support the construction of a resilient and adaptive safety management system across all civil sectors that utilize explosives, thereby reducing the likelihood and severity of future incidents.

2. Materials and Methods

2.1. TOL as a Classical Method for Analyzing Accidents and Hazardous Events

Accident and near-miss analysis is a crucial component of effective occupational health and safety (OHS) management. It facilitates the identification of both direct and indirect causes while enabling the assessment of the effectiveness of current procedures, work organization, and protective measures. A systematic approach to incident investigation allows for the implementation of corrective and preventive actions that minimize the risk of recurrence, ultimately reducing injury rates as well as material and organizational losses [30].

The literature emphasizes that effective incident analysis should not be limited to technical aspects but must also encompass organizational and human factors, including psychosocial and cultural dimensions. Proper documentation, transparent reporting, and a strong safety culture support a better understanding of the mechanisms leading to accidents, thereby reinforcing the OHS system through continuous improvement [31,32]. The analysis of near misses—events that did not cause harm but had the potential to—is also of paramount importance. Research indicates that for every serious accident, numerous precursor events occur that can be interpreted as “warning signals” [33]. Ignoring such signals may lead to significant health, legal, and financial consequences.

One of the classical tools used for accident investigation is the TOL method, which focuses on three main categories of root causes: technical, organizational, and human. The TOL methodology exists in two forms. The basic version focuses on cause identification, while the extended version additionally incorporates accident sequence analysis and barrier evaluation [34].

In its standard application, the TOL method is employed to determine the causes of accidents and hazardous events. The procedure assumes that every incident results from a combination of:

• Technical causes—e.g., equipment design flaws, improper maintenance;
• Organizational causes—e.g., lack of supervision, inadequate procedures, poor work planning;
• Human causes—e.g., operator errors, unsafe behaviours, compromised psycho-physical condition.

The analysis is carried out in two key stages. The first involves identifying the immediate cause—namely, the direct factor that resulted in injury (e.g., fall, machinery contact, impact). The second stage involves root cause analysis, which categorizes underlying contributors into technical (T), organizational (O), and human (L) domains. This stage typically utilizes structured checklists to identify deviations from standards.

The advantages of the TOL method include ease of implementation, flexibility, and low resource requirements. However, limitations include its subjective nature, the potential to overlook simultaneous interactions among factors, and limited capacity for analyzing incident dynamics. To limit the influence of subjectivity in analyses using the TOL method the following can be applied:

• Expert validation—analysis results are verified by a panel of independent experts. Such verification increases the objectivity of assessments and reduces the risk of misclassification of causes [35];
• Standardized checklists—the analysis is based on structured auxiliary tools with standardized questions for each cause category, which limits interpretive discretion [36];
• Scoring methods—in selected cases, a weighted assessment of individual factors is used, following a modified approach akin to the Loughborough scale, enabling a quantitative appraisal of the significance of specific irregularities [37,38].

In practice, the method is used:

• As a primary tool for post-incident investigation committees in Poland;
• In combination with the “5 WHY” technique, as schematically illustrated in Figure 1.

Applications of the TOL method in the mining industry have confirmed its practical value and effectiveness [39,40,41].

2.2. Sources of Data on Explosives Accidents

The analysis of accidents and incidents involving explosives was conducted based on information available in multiple online databases concerning reported events. For illustrative purposes, selected examples were compiled into tables that grouped and categorized incidents according to their underlying causes.

Table 1. Selected examples of explosives-related accidents from the SAFEX database.

Date	Location/Country	Casualties	Type of Event
16 April 2021	–	1 person slightly injured	Explosion at wastewater treatment plant and nitroglycerin storage tanks.
14 February 2022	Krupski Młyn, Poland	2 fatalities	Explosion during nitroester mixture production.
4 August 2023	Lorena, Brazil	0	Near-miss event—failure to comply with safety procedures during lead azide production.
30 August 2024	Queensland, Australia	1 person slightly injured, 1 fatality	Road tanker transporting 41.5 tonne of AECI S100 Ammonium Nitrate Emulsion (ANE, AECI Mining Explosives, Bajool, Queensland, Australia) was involved in a collision with a utility vehicle travelling in the opposite direction. The collision started a fire that provided approx. 4 h of uncontrolled heating to the ANE within the road tankers & at approx. 0927 h one of the ANE road tankers exploded.
25 March 2025	Lima, Peru	0	An explosion occurred at the black powder mill during the discharge process.

presents a subset of cases, intentionally including events that may also appear in other databases—for example, a notable accident in Queensland reported both in SAFEX records and in the Queensland Accident Reports. These overlaps are not duplicates in the analytical sense; rather, they highlight how different reporting systems may document the same event from distinct perspectives. In our overall analysis, each unique accident was considered only once, while the inclusion of such examples in the tables serves to demonstrate the complementarity and limitations of the available data sources.

2.2.1. SAFEX Accident Reports

As previously mentioned, SAFEX International collects data on accidents and incidents related to the use of explosives, which are submitted by member organizations. The exchange of this information takes place exclusively within a closed network of registered participants. Access to SAFEX reports used in this analysis was made possible through cooperation with the Polish Association of Blasting Engineers and the company Nitroerg S.A.

Each SAFEX report pertains to a specific incident and includes details such as the date and location of the event, involved entities, a brief description of the sequence of events, a preliminary hypothesis regarding the cause, and an assessment of the consequences.

For the purposes of the analysis summarized in Table 1, 25 accidents and hazardous incidents involving explosives from around the world were selected, covering the period from April 2021 to March 2025. The analysis encompassed all stages of the explosive life cycle: production, transport, storage, use, and disposal. Among the 25 reviewed incidents, 12 resulted in no injuries or fatalities. In the remaining 13 cases, a total of 12 fatalities and 12 injuries were recorded. The identified root causes were classified as follows: 10 cases involved technical failures, 5 cases were attributed to human error, and 4 to organizational deficiencies. In 6 incidents, the causes could not be conclusively determined due to insufficient information in the reports or ongoing investigations.

An excerpt from the SAFEX database is presented in Table 1, illustrating 5 selected explosives-related events.

2.2.2. Queensland Accident Reports

The government of Queensland (Australia) conducts systematic monitoring and reporting of accidents and incidents related to the use of explosives in the mining industry [25]. These data are published annually in the form of reports that include monthly summaries and year-on-year comparisons, enabling the analysis of incident dynamics over time. The reports provide detailed statistics on all reported safety and security incidents involving explosives within a given year, including consolidated summaries for the past twelve months.

The reports present figures on casualties—both among industry personnel and third parties—categorized by fatalities and injuries, disaggregated by month and annual cumulative totals. In addition to numerical data, the reports include brief descriptions of selected incidents, probable causes, and classification of events by mine type—distinguishing between underground and surface mining operations. Complaints from residents in proximity to mining sites concerning the operation of facilities or blasting activities are also documented [25].

Table 2. Summary of incident types reported in Queensland by year [25].

Type of Incident	Date of Incident
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Misfires	690	605	438	285	359	213	212	239	256	244	294	367	107
Vehicle incident	31	44	25	27	15	18	28	21	38	34	53	54	10
Unsecured explosives	11		15	11	10	18	8	16	18	26	6	14	3
Explosives discrepancy	7	11	10	10	9	12	9	15	17	11	12	18	8
Fume event	36	23	19	24	21	10	7	8	10	5	13	8	3
Damage to explosives/packaging	22	8	20	11	6	6	11	12	12	10	13	13	12
Explosives found	14	8	5	3	4	4	5	2	4	2	4	9	1
Illegal activity		4	7		5	5	2	4	6	6
Breach exclusion zone		3		6	9	17	11	7	4	13	9	11	10
Inne (other)	8	32	23	26	16	7	13	5	4	4	8	4	9
Unintended initiation	4	12		2	1	6	3	2	2	5	1	1
Flyrock	8	4	4	4	6	5	4	2	2	4	6		1
Theft of Explosives		3	2		2		1		1	2	1	1
Unauthorized possession of explosive	3					1			1	1	2
Pump incident		8	3	6	2	2	1		1				2
Ground vibration						1		1	1		1	1
Storage				1	1	6	3	2		4	4
Overpressure	3							1		1	2
Drill into/near explosives	3	4	3	1	1	3	3	1		6	1
Fireworks, blasting complaints	46	11	55	53	87	93	103
Product failure					3	1	3			2		1	2
Unauthorized entry to reserve	3	2		1
Homemade explosives		3	3
Sum of incidents other than misfires)	199	180	194	186	198	215	215	99	121	136	136	135	61
Fatality	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Injury	2	8	9	0	3	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	0

summarizes data on explosives-related incidents reported in Queensland between 2012 and 2024. The classification includes the types of events recorded during the reference period. In every year, misfires represented the most frequently reported type of incident. The main causes of misfires included: Explosives Found During Excavation, Electronic Detonator “No-Read/No-Log,” Product Slumping, Column Dislocation (explosives found during mucking), Downline Cut (during loading/stemming), Improper Tie-In, and Connector Failure.

It was also observed that, aside from misfires, the second most prevalent category of incidents involved vehicles. This included road accidents during the transport of explosives, incidents with MEMU (Mobile Explosive Manufacturing Units), and mining machinery operating at extraction sites.

During the analyzed period, one fatality and 26 injury cases resulting from explosives-related incidents were recorded.

2.2.3. Selected Accident Reports from the PAR Database

The analysis incorporated data from the Past Accident Review (PAR) database [24], developed by the Sector Skills Strategy Group (SSSG). This database comprises 2336 incidents involving explosives, recorded globally between 1723 and 2014. The dataset includes events related to civilian applications of explosives as well as incidents of a military, terrorist, or pyrotechnic nature. Each record in the PAR database provides information on the location and year of occurrence, industrial sector, number of casualties, a brief description of the event, and the identified general and immediate causes. Additionally, the PAR database contains information on mitigation measures taken and key lessons learned, which can serve as a foundation for future preventive strategies.

Despite the breadth of information collected, the PAR database is also characterized by a significant number of missing data points concerning specific incident aspects [24].

For detailed analysis, 70 incidents from the years 2005–2013 were selected, focusing exclusively on civilian-use explosive events. Among these, 12 cases were classified as having technical causes, 22 as organizational, and 17 as human-related. In 19 cases, the root cause could not be conclusively identified due to insufficient data. The reviewed incidents resulted in a total of 95 fatalities and 157 injuries.

Selected descriptions of 10 incidents with the highest casualty rates are presented in

Table 3. Examples of accidents from the PAR database [24].

Year	Location/Country	Industry Sector	Casualties	Type of Incident
2005	Brantham, United Kingdom	Manufacturing	1 injured	Explosion due to improper handling and use of dried nitrocellulose before mixing
2006	Murcia, Spain	Manufacturing	1 fatality, 3 injured	Explosion at an explosives plant, likely while workers were cleaning
2006	Espoo, Finland	Transport	10 injured	Explosion on a construction site caused by a falling rock hitting a truck carrying ~30 kg of dynamite
2006	Bao, Vietnam	Use	5 fatalities, 2 injured	Unplanned explosion of an explosives batch in a limestone quarry
2008	-, India	Storage	8 fatalities, 17 injured	Explosion of blasting materials in a storage magazine at a mining site
2008	Rasvumchorrsky, Russia	Use	13 fatalities, 5 injured	Explosion during pneumatic loading of ANFO mixture into boreholes in an underground mine
2010	Karadiyanaru, Sri Lanka	Transport/Unloading	25 fatalities, 52 injured	Explosion of containers with road construction explosives
2011	-, Bulgaria	Use	2 fatalities	Unplanned explosion of explosives in an underground mine
2012	Yingde, China	Transport/Unloading	10 fatalities, 20 injured	Detonation of detonators during unloading of delivery truck at a mine
2013	-, Peru	Use	2 fatalities	Unplanned dynamite explosion in a mine

.

2.2.4. Selected Accident Reports from the eMARS Database

In 2015, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) released a special bulletin dedicated to explosive-related incidents reported to the eMARS database [42]. This publication was based on an analysis of 62 accidents. The majority of these incidents were associated with the production and storage stages of explosives—accounting for at least 10 cases. It was also determined that such incidents continue to occur regularly, with an average of two to four per year since 2000. During the five-year period preceding the bulletin’s release, 20 major explosive-related accidents were identified across Europe [26,42].

Several of the analyzed incidents were recurring, having occurred multiple times at the same facility over several years. From January 2016 to the end of 2024, an additional 8 production-related incidents were recorded in the eMARS system. This brought the total number of such accidents between 2010 and 2024 to 32, resulting in 45 fatalities and 28 injuries.

It is important to note that the actual number of reported cases is likely to increase, as the reporting process in eMARS can be significantly delayed. From the time of the incident to its publication in the system, up to three years may pass due to the need for investigations, internal analyses, and translations. Legal proceedings may further prolong this timeline. Two examples from Poland illustrate this issue: incidents from January 2021 [43] and February 2022 [44]. The former resulted in one fatality and one severe injury, while the latter caused two fatalities. Neither of these cases has yet been included in the eMARS database.

For illustration purposes, selected information from the eMARS database concerning explosive-related incidents since 2015 is presented in

Table 4. Examples of accidents from the eMARS database [23].

Accident ID	Accident Title	Start Date	Seveso II Status	Industry Type	Accident Description
000956	Explosions in a pyrotechnic workshop causing several casualties	31 August 2015	Upper tier	Production and storage of fireworks	Several explosions occurred within seconds. Based on fragment distribution, the initial blast likely originated in drying installation no. 23, in the colours manufacturing area, possibly while a worker was handling production samples. The subsequent explosions spread through the powder and colour storage areas, reaching the assembly section. According to emergency teams, an industrial truck nearby, loaded with explosives, may have intensified the blast and contributed to the propagation of the shockwave.
000008	Explosion and fire at a facility handling explosive substances	8 September 2015	Upper tier	Production, destruction and storage of explosives	Due to an internal fault in the kneading process in a kneader (kneading powder cake), an explosion occurred, resulting in a fire Safety function: Blast wall, automatic supply of extinguishing water, fire brigade automatically alerted.
001069	Fire of smokeless powder	9 September 2015	Upper tier	Production, destruction and storage of explosives	Burning smokeless dust on the ramp of an object and then extending the fire to the entire object. Because of the smokeless dust feature, the whole object burned.
001071	Explosion of warehouse of explosives	21 September 2015	Upper tier	Production, destruction and storage of explosives	An explosive initiation and a subsequent detonation occurred during the transfer of the explosive and explosive composition and the movement of the explosives during the process.
001068	Explosion and Fire	23 February 2017	Upper tier	Production, destruction and storage of explosives	An explosion in an ammunition factory. The accident occurred when pressing charges of plastic explosives.
001074	Explosion of nitroesters	2 March 2017	Upper tier	Production, destruction and storage of explosives	The accident occurred during construction work inside the blending unit. An electric hammer struck nitroesters unexpectedly present in the concrete floor, causing an explosion. Prior to the works: (a) the unit had been shut down (no pro-duction, storage, or transport of hazardous substances); (b) the floor was cleaned with 10% NaOH solution; (c) contractors received training according to internal procedures.
001108	Explosion in bunker for manufacturing detonators	7 May 2017	Upper tier	Production, destruction and storage of explosives	An explosion occurred in the cap loading line room at Orica Sweden AB’s Gyttorp plant, where detonators are filled and pressed with explosives and delay compositions. One operator presents at the time suffered fatal injuries. The accident happened during a shift change, with no witnesses. Damage was confined to the cap loading line room.
001149	Explosion and release of substances in an explosives production plant	26 October 2018	Upper tier	Production, destruction and storage of explosives	Explosion in the crushing room.
001332	Combustion of smokeless powder	1 November 2019	Upper tier	Production, destruction and storage of explosives	The dropping of a 70 kg handling package on the floor, which contained dry smokeless powder, caused the ignition and combustion.
001220	Explosion at a plant producing, destroying and storing explosives	21 December 2020	Upper tier	Production, destruction and storage of explosives	On 21 December 2020 at around 2:15 p.m., an explosion occurred near room 80 during the incineration of explosive materials in a static furnace. The blast originated under the canopy near the furnace, where materials were fed via a metal slide. At the time, nautical flares, composite propellant fragments, and TNT-contaminated wood were being destroyed. The explosion, likely about 2 m from the left side of the furnace, caused fatal injuries to three workers present.
001295	Explosion in an explosives storage facility	10 November 2021	Upper tier	Production, destruction and storage of explosives	Police and internal investigations, supported by experts, ruled out electrical faults, third-party interference, or atmospheric causes. An expert report confirmed no link between the electrical system and the fire. The operator assumes spontaneous combustion of nitrocellulose (NC) as a possible chemical cause, leading to a fire in the storage chamber and subsequent deflagration. The blast blew off the bunker roof, scattering debris up to 50 m, with some items found 100 m away. The impact stayed within legal hazard limits and safety margins. Post-incident, the area was safe, and no urgent measures were required beyond temporary closure.

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2.2.5. Accident Reports from the State Mining Authority

The State Mining Authority of Poland systematically collects data on hazardous incidents involving explosives in the mining industry. These data are published annually in a consolidated report titled “Assessment of the State of Occupational Safety, Mining Rescue, and Public Safety in Relation to Mining and Geological Activities.” Additionally, SMA publishes descriptions of individual explosive-related incidents on its official website. Each record includes the location and date of the event, a brief description of the facility, a narrative of the incident, and an indication of whether an investigation was initiated [20].

Table 5. Explosives-related accidents from the SMA database [20].

Date	Location	Casualties	Type of Incident
21 August 2008	KGHM Rudna	1 slightly injured	Detonation of a drilled misfire
22 January 2010	Mine Strzelin	0	Flyrock
25 February 2010	KGHM Lubin	1 fatality, 3 severely injured, 1 slightly injured	Drilling into a loaded and primed blast hole
13 March 2010	KGHM Lubin	1 slightly injured, 1 severely injured	Drilling into a misfire and detonation
26 August 2010	KGHM Polkowice-Sieroszowice	1 slightly injured	Drilling into a misfire and detonation
2 September 2010	Mine Ogorzelec	0	Flyrock
12 October 2010	Mine Józefka	1 slightly injured	Misfire detonation during mucking
21 October 2011	Hard Coal Mine Mysłowice-Wesoła	1 slightly injured	Worker struck by flyrock after unauthorized presence in danger zone
21 August 2012	Hard Coal Mine Ziemowit	1 slightly injured	Worker struck by flyrock after unauthorized presence in danger zone
26 July 2013	Mine Czernica-Granit	1 severely injured	Worker struck by flyrock after drilling into misfire during secondary rock splitting
2 July 2014	Mine Barwałd Dolny	0	Flyrock
11 July 2015	Hard Coal Mine Sośnica	4 slightly injured	Methane ignition due to improper blasting operations
15 June 2016	Mine Łagów IV	0	Flyrock
16 June 2016	Mine Chwałków I	0	Flyrock
31 July 2017	Mine Łagów II	0	Flyrock
23 October 2017	Mine Strzelin	0	Flyrock
25 March 2018	Hard Coal Mine Ruda Bielszowice	1 slightly injured	Worker struck by flyrock after unauthorized presence in danger zone
12 April 2018	Mine Łażany II	0	Flyrock
13 March 2019	Mine Osielec	0	Flyrock
18 July 2019	Mine Małogoszczt	0	Flyrock
17 June 2020	Mine Łagów IV	0	Flyrock
24 August 2020	Hard Coal Mine Bobrek-Piekary	1 slightly injured	Hammer impact on undetonated explosive from previous blasting
13 April 2022	Mine Chwałków I	0	Flyrock
6 May 2022	Mine Tłumaczów Wschód	0	Flyrock
8 May 2023	Mine Mucharz	0	Flyrock
24 October 2023	Mine Kujawy	0	Flyrock
6 February 2024	Mine Kujawy	0	Flyrock
7 June 2024	Mine Skała 1	0	Flyrock
22 April 2025	Mine Żelatowa	0	Flyrock

presents a compilation of incidents involving explosives, based on SMA data. The analysis covers events reported between January 2008 and May 2025, including information on location, date, type of event, and number of casualties.

Due to the limited number of incidents in the examined period, the dataset also includes other hazardous events, such as flyrock occurrences. A total of 29 cases were reviewed. Among these, one resulted in a fatality, and 18 individuals were injured—5 of them sustaining serious injuries. In 7 cases involving flyrock, the causes could not be definitively determined or were unrelated to worker actions.

For the remaining cases, 14 incidents were attributed to human error, and 8 to organizational deficiencies. No incidents were identified where technical failure was deemed the primary cause.

The principal databases documenting explosives-related accidents—such as SAFEX, eMARS, the Queensland Accident Reports, and the Past Accident Review (PAR)—each demonstrate distinct strengths and limitations. Their main strengths lie in the systematic collection of incident records, the provision of structured summaries, and, in some cases, the inclusion of root cause classifications that enable trend analysis and lessons learned. For example, SAFEX offers a global industry-driven perspective, eMARS provides legally mandated records under the Seveso III Directive, Queensland reports deliver highly detailed regional statistics, and the PAR database contributes historical depth across centuries of practice. However, their limitations are equally evident: SAFEX is restricted to member organizations, eMARS suffers from delayed reporting and incomplete case details, Queensland reports are regionally confined, and PAR often lacks key contextual data. These discrepancies in scope, accessibility, and level of detail make it difficult to integrate findings across databases. Inconsistencies in classification systems, variations in reporting practices, and differences in data transparency further complicate comparative analyses across sectors and regions. For instance, the same type of incident may be categorized differently depending on the database, while missing or non-standardized information (such as precise causes, injury severity, or preventive measures) reduces comparability. Reports of the State Mining Authority do not provide a consistent analysis of events, because each mine-level post-incident investigation committee conducts its own, often uncoordinated, determination of accident circumstances and causes. Moreover, blasting operations are most commonly performed by external contractors, which hampers the assessment of contractor competence and organizational accountability within the mine’s safety management system. As a result, although each database individually provides valuable insights, their fragmented and heterogeneous nature poses a significant challenge to developing unified conclusions about global accident trends involving the civilian use of explosives.

3. Results

Every work environment is characterized by the presence of various factors and hazards which, through their interaction, may affect workers during operational processes. These influences can lead to a range of health consequences—from temporary ailments to chronic conditions or direct injury. In the context of surface mining, the number of identifiable risk factors significantly increases due to the specific nature of the working environment (open-pit operations with constantly changing topography), the types of machinery and equipment used (e.g., excavators, loaders, crushers, screens), and the employed technologies (e.g., mechanical excavation, drilling and blasting using explosives).

Particularly high levels of risk are associated with the extensive use of explosives, which are integral to the extraction technology in surface rock mining. Activities involving explosives are inherently dangerous and may lead to fatal, severe, or collective accidents [45].

The identification of hazards at workstations in surface mining operations involving explosives can be structured using different classification criteria [46,47], as summarized in

Table 6. Classification Criteria for Hazards Related to Explosives Use in Surface Mining Operations.

Classification Criterion	Type/Description
Hazards by Job Position	Specialist positions (blasting supervisor, shotfirer, explosives issuer, shotfirer’s assistant)
	Specialist positions not explicitly regulated by mining law (MEMU operator, escort personnel, explosives transport driver)
	Non-specialist positions not directly handling explosives (excavator operator, loader operator, rock miner)
Hazards by Activity in Blasting Operations	External transport on public roads
	Internal on-site transport
	Storage of blasting agents
	Priming and loading explosives into blast holes
	Preparation and connection of the initiation system
	Initiation of explosive charges
	Post-blast face inspection
	Auxiliary and emergency operations
Hazards by Technology or Type of Explosive Used	Mechanized loading of emulsion or ammonium nitrate-based explosives
	Manual loading of nitroester-based explosives
Hazards by Potential Consequences and General Mining Hazards	Hazards likely to cause fatal accidents (e.g., due to weather, rockfall from unstable overhangs)
	Hazards likely to cause disability or occupational illness (e.g., exposure to vibration, noise, dust)
	Hazards likely to cause temporary health issues (e.g., poor ergonomics, physical or mental overload)

.

In this article, hazard identification was carried out based on individual activities undertaken during blasting operations in surface mining plants, expanding upon existing classifications.

3.1. Major Hazards Associated with the Transport of Explosives

Hazards related to the transport of explosives can be categorized into those occurring during external transport (via public roads) and internal plant transport. Among the most significant risks during the transportation of hazardous materials is the potential for occupational injuries resulting from traffic accidents. In the context of modern security concerns, another serious threat is the possibility of an attack on the convoy, including theft or assault. There is also considerable danger associated with the uncontrolled detonation of explosives following a traffic collision or the accidental dropping of a charge during loading or unloading [46,47].

3.2. Major Hazards Associated with the Storage of Blasting Agents

Storage of explosives may take place in stationary or mobile magazines within the mining site or directly at the blasting location. The primary risks during storage include the possibility of unintentional detonation due to dropping or impact during handling, and ignition or detonation resulting from fire involving a mobile explosives vehicle. Additional hazards include theft of hazardous materials and the risk of skin, respiratory irritation, or mild poisoning, particularly during frequent contact with nitroglycerin-based explosives. Environmental conditions—such as extreme cold, high humidity, or elevated temperature—can alter the properties of stored explosives, leading to misfires or increased sensitivity (e.g., dynamite hardening at low temperatures) [46,47].

3.3. Major Hazards Associated with Priming and Loading Explosives into Blast Holes and Stemming

During the assembly of primers, there is a risk of mechanical damage to the detonator, which may result in a misfire. Manual handling of explosive cartridges may also cause skin and respiratory irritation or mild poisoning (e.g., from dynamite or TNT). One of the most critical hazards is the unintentional initiation of a detonator or primed cartridge, especially due to static electricity or stray currents in the case of electric detonators. Additional risks during primer insertion include the accidental dropping of lead wires into the borehole, potential blockage from rock fragments, or damage to the initiating system.

The introduction of impact charges may cause discontinuity in the firing circuit due to cable abrasion or rupture. Uncontrolled detonation may also occur due to stray currents, static electricity, or mechanical shock when the primer hits the borehole bottom.

Explosives may be loaded into blast holes using:

• manual loading of bulk explosives (e.g., ANFO);
• manual loading of cartridge explosives;
• mechanical loading of emulsion or granulated explosives.

General hazards during any loading method include borehole blockage from rock fragments, damage to detonator leads, and uncontrolled detonation. Both manual and mechanical loading of granulated explosives may release fine dust, such as ammonium nitrate, which can irritate the respiratory tract and cause mild poisoning. Additionally, ANFO dust is sensitive to ignition from static discharge.

In the case of cartridge explosives, horizontal boreholes may present a risk of cartridge jamming, which could result in unintended detonation when clearing the borehole with a tamping rod. Mechanical loading poses hazards such as rupture of the production hose in ANFO systems or unintentional expulsion of emulsion explosives from hoses or fittings. Overloading of blast holes due to fractured rock mass and insufficient operator attention may also occur [46,47].

3.4. Major Hazards Associated with Initiating Explosive Charges

When using electric initiation systems, major hazards include stray currents, static electricity, and electromagnetic waves—any of which can lead to unintentional detonation (including from lightning strikes). Additionally, variations in detonator resistance and the use of defective or improperly selected initiation equipment can cause misfires or unintended detonations.

Initiation also presents direct hazards such as excessive flyrock, posing danger not only to workers but also to bystanders in the vicinity of the mine. Further hazards include excessive dust, blast fumes (causing mucosal irritation, eye injury, or poisoning), and high-intensity impulsive noise during detonation. For non-electric initiation systems, misfires may result from disrupted signal transmission due to gaps in the explosive dust layer on the signal tube [46,47].

3.5. Major Hazards Associated with Post-Blast Face Inspection

After detonation, the post-blast face is inspected by the shotfirer before the all-clear signal is issued. The primary risks during this task are unintentional detonation of misfires (e.g., charges buried in muck) and exposure to excessive dust and blast fumes, which can irritate mucous membranes, cause eye injuries, or lead to poisoning [46,47].

3.6. Major Hazards Related to Mucking Operations

Mucking, the removal and transport of blasted rock, poses significant residual risks after blasting. The most critical hazard is the presence of undetonated explosives (misfires) hidden in the muck pile. Mechanical contact with excavator buckets or loaders may initiate unplanned detonations, often involving operators who are not explosives specialists and may be unaware of these risks.

Another concern arises when undetected misfires are loaded onto haul trucks and transported to processing plants. In such cases, the explosive may enter crushers or screens, where mechanical impact can trigger detonation, leading to catastrophic consequences for both a larger number of workers and greater damage of equipment.

The analysis presented in Section 3 demonstrates that hazards associated with the use of explosives in surface mining extend across the entire operational cycle, from transport and storage to loading, initiation, and post-blast activities. While many of these hazards are well recognized and addressed through established safety protocols, residual risks remain—particularly during routine operations such as mucking. As highlighted in Section 3.6, undetected misfires in muck piles pose a unique and severe threat, not only during excavation and hauling but also at later stages of processing, where explosives may inadvertently enter crushers or screens.

The decision to focus the subsequent case study on an accident involving mucking operations is therefore deliberate. This example illustrates how residual hazards, insufficient communication, and organizational shortcomings can combine to cause serious incidents even when formal blasting procedures have been properly followed. By analyzing this case with the TOL method, the study seeks to demonstrate the multifactorial nature of such events and to highlight practical lessons that can improve occupational risk management strategies in surface mining. It also points to the validity of using advanced methods in the standard procedure for determining the circumstances and causes of accidents at work.

4. Case Study and Discussion

4.1. Description of a Selected Explosives-Related Incident in a Polish Mine

For the analysis, a specific accident was selected that occurred at a surface mine utilizing explosives for mineral extraction. The incident involved a worker engaged in mucking operations after blasting—an employee whose job responsibilities did not include handling explosives or initiating systems. Although this event took place a long time ago, it demonstrates how a misfire can seriously injure a worker not directly involved in blasting, highlighting a persistent but often marginalized hazard in surface mining. This event was chosen for analysis for several reasons:

• Unclear risk exposure—The injured worker was not directly involved in blasting operations, highlighting the importance of analyzing indirect risk to employees in such environments;
• Need to reconstruct the event sequence and assess barriers—The TOL method supports a broad evaluation of both actual and potential causes, which is especially valuable in seemingly incidental accidents;
• Preventive significance—Analyzing this event can uncover weaknesses in the technological or organizational framework of the mine;
• Applicability to safety system improvements—The results can support managerial decisions to develop better preventive strategies and training for workers not directly involved in blasting but potentially exposed to its consequences.

This incident thus offers a valuable case study for applying the TOL method, with the primary aim of preventing similar accidents in the future.

The accident occurred at the “Józefka” Mine in Górno, which extracts Devonian dolomite and limestone deposits. According to the terms of its licence, mineral extraction is performed using blasting techniques. Blasting operations were outsourced to an external company, under a formal written agreement outlining the division of responsibilities between the mine operator and the contractor performing tasks within the active mining zone. Mining is carried out in a bench-and-pit system, across four operational benches. The deposits on benches I to III had already been depleted, with ongoing extraction taking place at bench IV. The mine operates in three shifts: Shift I: 06:00–14:00, Shift II: 14:00–22:00, Shift III: 22:00–06:00. The mined material is hauled from the pit using wheeled transport and processed at a stationary plant located outside the excavation area.

On 11 October 2010, during the first shift, blasting operations were planned using standard vertical boreholes at the pit floor to deepen the excavation and reach the target elevation of level IV. Two blast fields—north and south—were prepared, each drilled with three series of short vertical boreholes. Each series consisted of 32 holes arranged in 4–5 rows. The boreholes had diameters of 102 and 105 mm and depths ranging from 2.0 to 3.0 m. Each borehole was loaded with 4.5 kg of Emulinit 2 explosive in 80 mm cartridges (3000 g each), initiated by a single impact cartridge made of Ergodyn 30E (300 g) and a non-electric Nitronel detonator. A non-electric initiation system was used. The remaining borehole length was stemmed with cuttings and fine aggregate. Blasting supervision was provided by a qualified explosives engineer from the external contractor. Responsibility for securing the flyrock zone and ensuring personnel and equipment evacuation fell under the mine’s supervisory personnel. The blasts were initiated in three time intervals: 10:30–10:40, 13:00–13:15, and 13:40–14:00. Mucking of blasted rock from both fields began during the second shift and continued into the third, with operations limited to the northern field during the third shift, using an E 303 electric excavator.

At approximately 03:00, while the excavator operator was loading rock into the bucket, an explosive charge remaining in the muck detonated. Two rock fragments penetrated the front windshield of the excavator cab, striking the operator. The injuries included facial and neck lacerations, damage to the left median nerve, a comminuted fracture of the jaw body, and fracture of the left condylar process. According to the medical report, the injuries were classified as moderately severe.

The post-accident investigation concluded that the cause of the incident was the impact of flyrock generated by the unintentional detonation of unexploded blasting material (misfire) left in the muck after the earlier blasting operations.

4.2. Detailed Analysis Using the TOL Method

A sample checklist for analyzing the accident using the TOL method is provided in

Table 7. Detailed TOL analysis of a selected hazardous event involving explosives in a surface mine.

T—TECHNICAL CAUSES (Related to Equipment, Materials, Infrastructure)
No.	Question	Answer (Yes/No)	Remarks
1.	Was the equipment technically operational?		The main equipment involved consisted of a drilling rig and an excavator.
	(a) During blasting operations	Yes
	(b) During excavator operation	No
2.	Were appropriate technical safeguards (shields, locks) applied?		The use of technical safeguards during blasting operations is not feasible due to the technological process. The excavator was not equipped with windshield protection.
	(a) During blasting operations	Yes
	(b) During excavator operation	No
3.	Were environmental conditions (lighting, noise, temperature) adequate?		The operator was working during the third shift under artificial lighting.
	(a) During blasting operations	Yes
	(b) During excavator operation	No
4.	Were appropriate tools/materials used?		The tools and materials used complied with the blasting log and the extraction technology design.
	(a) During blasting operations	Yes
	(b) During excavator operation	Yes
5.	Were the materials and means used free of defects?		It cannot be definitively ruled out that the detonator was defective.
	(a) During blasting operations	No
	(b) During excavator operation	Yes
6.	Were the devices free of malfunctions and damage?		Blasting and loading operations proceeded without complications or deviations from the plan.
	(a) During blasting operations	Yes
	(b) During excavator operation	Yes
O—ORGANIZATIONAL CAUSES (related to management, procedures, supervision)
No.	Question	Answer (Yes/No)	Remarks
1.	Was there a documented procedure for the performed task?		An appropriate blasting log and extraction plan were in place.
	(a) During blasting operations	Yes
	(b) During excavator operation	Yes
2.	Was the employee properly trained?		Employees were qualified to perform their assigned duties.
	(a) Shotfirer	Yes
	(b) Excavator operator	Yes
3.	Was supervision present and acting appropriately?		Supervision by an authorized person is mandatory during blasting operation.
	(a) During blasting operations	Yes
	(b) During excavator operation	Yes
4.	Were the work schedule and shift organization appropriate?		Blasting operations were carried out on the first shift, and mucking was performed during the third shift.
	(a) During blasting operations	Yes
	(b) During excavator operation	Yes
5.	Was communication maintained (e.g., between shifts)?		Information about work progress was exchanged between supervisory personnel during shift transitions: from the first to the second and from the second to the third.
	(a) During blasting operations	Yes
	(b) During excavator operation	No
L—HUMAN CAUSES (related to behaviour, mistakes, psychophysical condition of the worker)
No.	Question	Answer (Yes/No)	Remarks
1.	Was the worker equipped with and using personal protective equipment (PPE)?		Employees were equipped with personal protective equipment in accordance with the occupational risk assessment.
	(a) Shotfirer	Yes
	(b) Excavator operator	Yes
2.	Did the worker follow the applicable instructions?		It cannot be clearly determined whether the shotfirer verified the correctness of the connection or failed to detect any faults.
	(a) Shotfirer	No
	(b) Excavator operator	Yes
3.	Was the worker rested and focused?		The operator’s third-shift work may have affected his psychophysical condition.
	(a) Shotfirer	Yes
	(b) Excavator operator	No
4.	Were the worker’s behaviours compliant with safety principles (absence of risky actions)?		Employees did not engage in any risky behaviours.
	(a) Shotfirer	Yes
	(b) Excavator operator	Yes
5.	Was the worker aware of the hazards associated with the task?		Authorization to perform the work was granted based on a signed acknowledgment of the occupational risk assessment.
	(a) Shotfirer	Yes
	(b) Excavator operator	Yes

, corresponding to the selected incident in the mine. This tool involves answering YES or NO to all questions grouped into three categories: T—Technical causes, O—Organizational causes, and L—Human-related causes.

The above TOL analysis was performed using a purpose-built standardized checklist, and its results were validated by an independent panel of experts in occupational health and safety (OHS), mining engineering, and work organization. This reduced the risk of misclassification of causes and increased the objectivity of the assessments.

4.3. Case Analysis Summary Using the TOL Method

The analysis of the incident involving an excavator operator who sustained serious injuries as a result of the uncontrolled detonation of a misfire remaining in the muck reveals several significant shortcomings in technical, organizational, and human areas that—through their interaction—contributed to the accident. A key finding is that despite formal compliance in preparing the blasting operations and no identified violations during subsequent mining activities, there were hidden weaknesses in the safety system. These primarily concerned the final face inspection procedure, shift-to-shift communication, and the psychophysical condition of workers.

From the technical perspective, although the equipment used during both blasting and loading operations was compliant and operational, the lack of a protective shield on the excavator’s windshield increased the severity of the operator’s injuries. Additionally, while definitive evidence is lacking, the potential failure of the detonator or another initiating component cannot be ruled out, underscoring the need for more thorough quality control of explosives.

Organizationally, the supervision during different work phases was found to be inconsistent. While blasting was performed according to procedures and under supervision, the subsequent mucking activities occurred at night without direct oversight. Although formal regulations do not mandate supervision during loading, the residual risk of misfires justifies reconsidering organizational rules and possibly extending oversight to post-blast operations. Communication between supervisory personnel was also inconsistent, limited to shift transitions (first to second, second to third), which may lead to gaps or losses in critical safety information—particularly regarding residual risks in dynamically changing work environments.

The most concerning findings stem from the analysis of human factors. Although both the shotfirer and the excavator operator were qualified and equipped with PPE, it could not be conclusively confirmed whether all connections in the firing circuit were properly checked prior to detonation. The likely oversight of a misfire suggests human error—not intentional, but perhaps due to inattention, routine, or time pressure. Moreover, the operator’s night-shift work under artificial lighting may have negatively influenced his psychophysical state, which should be considered in future work organization design.

This event illustrates the need for several preventive and corrective actions. First, it is recommended to implement a two-step verification system for blasting circuit completeness and correctness, for example using checklists and mandatory cross-verification by a second worker. It is also advisable to consider retrofitting working machinery—especially excavators operating in potentially hazardous zones—with passive safety features (e.g., reinforced cabins or protective windows). Increasing supervisory presence during night shifts, particularly at the initial stage of mucking after blasting, and introducing written documentation for shift-to-shift handover regarding explosive-related work, should also be evaluated.

The conclusions confirm that the effectiveness of the safety system in surface mining depends not only on compliance with formal procedures but also on the ability to adapt them to dynamically changing working conditions and the presence of residual risks. Integrating TOL-type analyses with day-to-day supervisory practices and implementing continuous risk assessment mechanisms may significantly enhance safety in mines using explosives.

The analysis confirms that accidents involving explosives typically result from the interaction of technical, organizational, and human factors. This underlines the need for preventive strategies that extend across the entire explosives life cycle.

Database evidence and the case study both highlight the importance of verification procedures, as misfires and delayed detonations often stem from insufficient post-blast checks. Strengthening verification through systematic inspections and logging of blasting parameters is therefore a key preventive measure.

The findings also stress the need for improved oversight of post-blast operations. Incidents frequently occur during mucking or hauling, when workers not directly involved in blasting are exposed to residual risks. Enhanced supervision and targeted training for such personnel can reduce these hazards.

In addition, protective equipment plays a critical role in mitigating injury severity. As demonstrated in the Polish case study, more advanced PPE and operator protection systems could substantially reduce consequences in the event of an accident.

By linking these recommendations directly to both cross-database findings and TOL case analysis, the study provides evidence-based guidance for strengthening safety practices. These measures address persistent but often under-recognized hazards and contribute to the development of more resilient preventive strategies.

5. Conclusions

The analysis of accident and incident data involving explosives used in the civil sector, based on both national and international sources, reveals numerous issues related to insufficient data availability, fragmentation, and lack of standardization. Despite growing awareness of the importance of systematic risk management in blasting operations, data transparency remains limited. This hinders comparative analysis and the development of clear preventive insights. Databases such as eMARS, SAFEX, and PAR demonstrate that effective incident reporting systems must be centralized, integrated, and based on principles of openness, mandatory reporting, and international cooperation.

The principal databases documenting explosives-related accidents—SAFEX, eMARS, the Queensland Accident Reports, and the Past Accident Review (PAR)—each show clear strengths and weaknesses. Their structured records, global or regional perspectives, and in some cases causal information provide valuable insights for trend analysis. Yet their limitations are significant: SAFEX is member-restricted, eMARS faces delays and incomplete details, Queensland reports are regionally confined, and PAR often lacks context. Differences in scope, reporting practices, and classification systems make cross-database comparisons difficult, as similar incidents may be categorized differently or lack standardized data. Thus, while individually useful, their fragmented and heterogeneous nature remains a key barrier to unified conclusions on global accident trends.

In the context of the Polish industrial sector, only the mining industry—primarily due to the activities of the State Mining Authority —has a relatively well-developed system for recording and monitoring explosive-related incidents. However, limitations remain, such as the absence of standardized methodologies for cause assessment and the incomplete inclusion of near-miss events, which are crucial for early hazard detection. Furthermore, there is no comprehensive database covering explosives use beyond mining, such as in infrastructure construction or demolition sectors.

A quantitative comparison of international databases shows that most incidents occur during the production, transport, and application phases of explosives. The main categories of causes (as per the TOL method) include technical, organizational, and human errors—with the latter appearing with surprising frequency, even under conditions formally compliant with safety regulations. These findings highlight the need not only to refine procedures but also to adopt analytical tools capable of identifying weak points in safety systems. Data analysis, including statistical aggregation and visualization, can support preventive decision-making and effectively complement standard safety protocols, especially when combined with modern technologies such as VR, AI, or robotics in training and safety monitoring.

The case study of the surface mine incident in Poland demonstrated that the TOL method is effective in capturing the multifactorial nature of events, addressing technical aspects (e.g., lack of cabin shielding), organizational factors (e.g., shift-based division of labour), and human elements (e.g., unclear verification of blasting connections). This case underscores that even when operations follow formal procedures, residual risks may remain undetected—potentially leading to severe health consequences for workers. The results point to the need for implementing two-stage verification of blasting circuits, extending supervision to subsequent phases of the operation cycle, and equipping machinery operating in blast zones with additional protective features.

Moreover, a comprehensive approach to occupational hazard analysis—one that integrates technical, organizational, and human dimensions—greatly enhances the identification of root causes and improves accident investigation.

In summary, effective safety management in the use of explosives requires the integration of three key components: a coherent system for incident data reporting, a methodical approach to incident cause analysis, and continuous improvement of work organization and risk awareness among personnel. However, the effectiveness of such a system is currently limited by several critical challenges highlighted in our study. First, the availability and quality of national reports remain uneven, with incomplete or outdated datasets that reduce the comprehensiveness of comparative analyses. Second, discrepancies in event classification across different databases—such as variations in how misfires or organizational failures are categorized—create difficulties in aligning results and identifying global trends. Third, while preventive recommendations have been formulated, there remains a pressing need for detailed organizational measures and training programmes to improve risk perception among workers, particularly those not directly engaged in blasting operations but still exposed to residual hazards. Finally, methodological transparency is essential: incident cause analysis must clearly document the frameworks applied (such as TOL), the criteria for categorization, and the procedures for handling overlaps or gaps in data sources. Addressing these issues through harmonized reporting, improved methodological rigour, and targeted preventive strategies will strengthen both the reliability of research findings and the practical effectiveness of safety management systems in industrial sectors where the use of explosives constitutes a fundamental technological process.