Enhancing Secure Software Development with AZTRM-D: An AI-Integrated Approach Combining DevSecOps, Risk Management, and Zero Trust
Abstract
1. Introduction
Organization of the Paper
2. Related Work and Foundational Concepts
2.1. Software and System Development Life Cycles
2.1.1. Waterfall Method
2.1.2. Agile Method
2.1.3. V-Model
2.1.4. Spiral Method
2.1.5. DevSecOps Method
2.2. Current Landscape of Secure Development Methodologies and Frameworks
2.3. The Rationale for AZTRM-D’s Integrated Approach
2.4. NIST Risk Management Framework
2.4.1. Preparation Phase
2.4.2. Categorization Phase
2.4.3. Selection Phase
2.4.4. Implementation Phase
2.4.5. Assessment Phase
2.4.6. Authorization Phase
2.4.7. Monitoring Phase
3. The Guiding Philosophy: Zero Trust Architecture in AZTRM-D
3.1. Identity
3.2. Devices
3.3. Networks
3.4. Applications and Workloads
3.5. Data
3.6. Cross-Cutting Capabilities: Governance, Automation, and Visibility
3.7. Integrating RMF, ZT, and DevSecOps in AZTRM-D
4. Automated Zero Trust Risk Management with DevSecOps Integration (AZTRM-D)
4.1. Phases of AZTRM-D
4.1.1. Planning Phase
4.1.2. Development Phase
4.1.3. Building Phase
4.1.4. Testing Phase
4.1.5. Release and Deliver Phase
4.1.6. Deployment Phase
4.1.7. Operate, Monitor and Feedback Phase
4.2. NIST Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework
4.3. Implementation of Zero Trust Methodologies on Artificial Intelligence Models/Features
5. AZTRM-D Simulated Real-World Scenario
5.1. Initial Scenario
5.2. AZTRM-D Walkthrough
5.3. AZTRM-D Enabled System Versus the Hacker
6. Lab-Built Scenario and Benchmarking
6.1. Implemented Security Posture
6.2. Security Testing Journey
6.2.1. Security Testing Scenario: Factory Default Configuration
- Outsider Perspective:
- Insider Perspective:
6.2.2. Security Testing Scenario: After Initial Hardening
- Outsider Perspective:
- Insider Perspective:
6.2.3. Security Testing Scenario: After Final Hardening
- Outsider Perspective:
- Insider Perspective:
6.3. Quantitative Benchmarking Results
6.3.1. System Technical Overview
6.3.2. User Interaction with AZTRM-D Implemented System
6.3.3. Future Setup Additions
7. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
Abbreviations
Abbreviation | Spell Out | Abbreviation | Spell Out |
2FA | Two-Factor Authentication | AES | Advanced Encryption Standard |
AI | Artificial Intelligence | AI RMF | AI Risk Management Framework |
ANN-ISM | Artificial Neural Network-Interpretive Structural Modeling | API | Application Programming Interface |
AZTRM-D | Automated Zero Trust Risk Management with DevSecOps Integration | BYOD | Bring Your Own Device |
cATO | Continuous Authorization to Operate | C2 | Command and Control |
CAE | Continuous Access Evaluation | CI/CD | Continuous Integration/Continuous Deployment |
CFO | Chief Financial Officer | CISA | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency |
CIS | Center for Internet Security | CSPM | Cloud Security Posture Management |
CPU | Central Processing Unit | DAST | Dynamic Application Security Testing |
DevSecOps | Development, Security, and Operations | DLP | Data Loss Prevention |
EDR | Endpoint Detection and Response | FedRAMP | Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program |
GDPR | General Data Protection Regulation | GPIO | General Purpose Input/Output |
HIPAA | Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act | HSM | Hardware Security Module |
HTTP | Hypertext Transfer Protocol | HTTPS | Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure |
IaC | Infrastructure as Code | IAM | Identity and Access Management |
ICMP | Internet Control Message Protocol | ICS/SCADA | Industrial Control Systems/Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition |
IDE | Integrated Development Environment | IoBT | Internet of Battlefield Things |
IOCs | Indicators of Compromise | IoT | Internet of Things |
ISO | International Organization for Standardization | ISO/IEC | International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission |
JIT | Just-in-Time | MAC | Media Access Control |
MFA | Multi-Factor Authentication | ML | Machine Learning |
MITM | Man-in-the-Middle | MTTR | Mean Time to Remediate |
NIST | National Institute of Standards and Technology | OS | Operating System |
OWASP | Open Web Application Security Project | PAM | Privileged Access Management |
PCI DSS | Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard | PDP/PEP | Policy Decision/Enforcement Point |
PII | Personally Identifiable Information | PQC | Post-Quantum Cryptography |
QA | Quality Assurance | RASP | Runtime Application Self-Protection |
RBAC | Role-Based Access Control | RF | Radio Frequency |
RMF | Risk Management Framework | SAST | Static Application Security Testing |
SCA | Software Composition Analysis | S-SDLC | Secure Software and System Development Life Cycle |
SDL | Security Development Life Cycle | SFTP | Secure File Transfer Protocol |
SHAP | SHapley Additive exPlanations | SIEM | Security Information and Event Management |
SOAR | Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response | SOX | Sarbanes-Oxley Act |
SSH | Secure Shell | TEE | Trusted Execution Environment |
TLS | Transport Layer Security | UART | Universal Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter |
UML | Unified Modeling Language | USB | Universal Serial Bus |
VNC | Virtual Network Computing | VPN | Virtual Private Network |
WSN | Wireless Sensor Network | WPA3 | Wi-Fi Protected Access 3 |
XAI | eXplainable Artificial Intelligence | ZT | Zero Trust |
ZTNA | Zero Trust Network Access |
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Method | Key Focus/Approach | Core Characteristics |
---|---|---|
Embedded Security in Traditional SDLC [20] | This method integrates security deeply into each phase of the traditional SDLC. | It identifies security requirements early, uses threat modeling for design, prioritizes secure coding and static analysis, employs layered testing, and focuses on continuous monitoring and patch management. |
Early and Continuous Integration [21] | This approach emphasizes early and continuous security integration through stakeholder involvement and education. | It aligns security requirements with business objectives, involves security experts and stakeholders, fosters a culture of security awareness, and integrates automated, continuous security testing throughout all phases. |
Agile-Adapted Security [5] | This method integrates security into Agile methodologies, making it well-suited for dynamic and iterative development. | It embeds security activities like threat modeling and reviews directly into Agile sprints. Security testing is performed iteratively, and a “security backlog” helps prioritize and manage tasks. |
Common Criteria (CC) Certification Aligned [23] | This approach is tailored to meet the rigorous requirements of CC certification. | It emphasizes aligning with specific CC security controls and extensive documentation. Formal risk management is key, requiring detailed risk assessments (e.g., ISO/IEC 27005) to systematically identify and mitigate threats. |
DevSecOps Transformation [6,24] | This method transforms the DevOps process into a holistic DevSecOps approach, ensuring security is a shared responsibility across all stages. | Key features include automated security integration into the CI/CD pipeline, fostering a collaborative culture between development, operations, and security teams, and using continuous monitoring with real-time feedback for rapid remediation. |
Categorized Software Security Strategies [25] | This method is based on a comprehensive study that categorized software security strategies into five main approaches. | These include Secure Requirements Modeling; Vulnerability Identification via static and dynamic analysis; Software Security-Focus Processes using frameworks like Microsoft SDL; Extended UML-Based Secure Modeling; and Non-UML-Based Secure Modeling. |
Proposed AZTRM-D Methodology (This Work) [26,27] | This is a unified, AI-augmented process that builds upon existing S-SDLC methods. | It integrates proactive DevSecOps, structured NIST RMF, and stringent Zero Trust (ZT) access controls. A unique aspect is its direct application of ZT principles to the AI systems within the SDLC, ensuring automation tools are continuously verified. This creates a more resilient security framework. |
Framework/Approach | Core Principles | AI/Automation Focus | Gap Addressed by AZTRM-D |
---|---|---|---|
Standard DevSecOps [17] | Integration of security into CI/CD; automation of security checks; shared responsibility culture. | Automated SAST/DAST scanning; CI/CD pipeline automation. | Lacks a prescribed, formal risk management structure (like RMF) and a guiding access control philosophy (like ZT). Security can still be ad hoc. |
AI-Enhanced Threat Modeling [29] | Using ML/AI to predict and identify design-level security threats early in the life cycle. | Automated generation of threat models from system artifacts; predictive vulnerability analysis. | Primarily focused on the “left side” (design/planning). Does not extend across the full operational life cycle, including runtime monitoring and incident response. |
Zero Trust Supply Chain [30] | Extending ZT principles (“never trust, always verify”) to all third-party software components, dependencies, and build processes. | Automated dependency scanning (SCA); cryptographic verification of software artifacts (signing). | Focuses heavily on supply chain and artifact integrity but does not inherently include continuous operational risk management or a full DevSecOps pipeline structure. |
AZTRM-D (This Work) | Synergistic integration of DevSecOps, NIST RMF, and ZT principles. | Pervasive AI orchestration across all phases, from AI-driven risk assessment and policy generation to automated ZT enforcement and adaptive threat response. | Provides a single, holistic framework that unifies agile development, structured risk governance, and adaptive access control, ensuring security is continuous, risk-based, and context-aware from planning to operations. |
Pillar | Traditional Weakness | Zero Trust Objective (Optimal Maturity) | AI-Enhanced Role in AZTRM-D |
---|---|---|---|
Identity | Static credentials (passwords) and roles grant broad, persistent access once authenticated. | Grant access on a per-session basis based on dynamic risk assessments of the user and their context. Enforce least privilege. | AI provides continuous, risk-based authentication by analyzing user behavior in real time. It automates adaptive controls, such as triggering MFA or revoking sessions upon detecting anomalous activity [56]. |
Devices | Any device on the “trusted” network is allowed access, with only periodic checks for compliance (e.g., antivirus). | Continuously verify the security posture of every device attempting to access resources and grant access based on device health. | AI-driven endpoint analytics continuously validate device posture (patch level, integrity, running processes). It can automatically isolate non-compliant or compromised devices to prevent them from accessing resources [8]. |
Networks | A hard outer perimeter with a soft, trusted interior (“castle-and-moat”). Attackers can move laterally with ease once inside. | Use micro-segmentation to create granular security zones. Encrypt all traffic and log every access request. | AI-powered network traffic analysis detects anomalous east-west traffic patterns indicative of lateral movement. It can dynamically adjust firewall rules and micro-segments to contain threats in real time. |
Applications & Workloads | Applications are trusted by default once deployed. Security is focused on the perimeter, not the application itself. | Secure application access for all users, secure application-to-application communication, and harden workloads against runtime threats. | AI enhances runtime application self-protection (RASP) by detecting and blocking exploits in real time. It automates vulnerability scanning and patching within the CI/CD pipeline, ensuring secure configurations [29]. |
Data | Data is protected primarily by controlling access to the network or server where it resides. | Categorize and classify data based on sensitivity. Enforce access controls and encrypt data at rest, in transit, and in use. | AI automates data discovery and classification across all systems. It monitors data access patterns to detect and block potential exfiltration attempts before they succeed [42]. |
Cross-Cutting Capabilities | Manual governance, fragmented visibility, and reactive, human-driven security responses. | Achieve comprehensive visibility, automate security orchestration, and maintain dynamic governance across all pillars. | AI serves as the engine for all three: providing advanced analytics for visibility, orchestrating automated incident response, and dynamically updating governance policies based on emerging threats and risks [8]. |
Security Metric | Baseline (Factory Default NVIDIA Orin) | AZTRM-D Hardened Configuration (NVIDIA Orin) |
---|---|---|
Open Network Ports | 4 Ports (SSH, VNC, HTTP, HTTPS) | 0 Ports (Complete elimination of network attack surface). |
Initial Access Time (External) | <5 min (via default credential brute-force). | Not Possible (No remote or physical vectors found). |
Privilege Escalation | Immediate (single sudo su command from default nvidia user). | Blocked (Requires explicit, multi-step validation; default paths removed). |
Vulnerability Detection Rate (CI/CD) | 0% (No automated scanning integrated into development pipeline). | 98% (Automated SAST, DAST, SCA, CSPM, and IaC scans). |
Mean Time to Remediate (MTTR) | Weeks to Months (Manual patching, firmware updates, or re-flashing). | 1–3 days (Automated alerting and patching pipeline, with AI-driven remediation or automated rollback). |
Supply Chain Vulnerability | High (No dependency scanning or artifact signing for device software). | Low (Mandatory SBOM validation and cryptographic signing for all software components). |
Performance Metric | Measurement | Significance |
---|---|---|
Resource Utilization (AI Scans) | 12–18% average CPU overhead during CI/CD pipeline scans (SAST/SCA). | Demonstrates that continuous security scanning is computationally feasible on edge devices without crippling performance. |
Policy Enforcement Latency | <40 ms for ZT access policy evaluation at the Policy Enforcement Point. | Ensures that stringent, real-time access checks do not introduce significant delays that would impact user experience or system-to-system communication. |
AI Model Training Time (Initial) | 14 h to train the insider threat model using three months of log data on a standard cloud GPU instance. | Quantifies the initial setup cost for the AI components, providing a baseline for resource planning. |
Scalability Test (Endpoints) | Successfully managed and monitored up to 1000 concurrent IoT devices per orchestrator instance in a simulated environment. | Validates the framework’s architecture can scale to support large enterprise deployments. |
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Coston, I.; Hezel, K.D.; Plotnizky, E.; Nojoumian, M. Enhancing Secure Software Development with AZTRM-D: An AI-Integrated Approach Combining DevSecOps, Risk Management, and Zero Trust. Appl. Sci. 2025, 15, 8163. https://doi.org/10.3390/app15158163
Coston I, Hezel KD, Plotnizky E, Nojoumian M. Enhancing Secure Software Development with AZTRM-D: An AI-Integrated Approach Combining DevSecOps, Risk Management, and Zero Trust. Applied Sciences. 2025; 15(15):8163. https://doi.org/10.3390/app15158163
Chicago/Turabian StyleCoston, Ian, Karl David Hezel, Eadan Plotnizky, and Mehrdad Nojoumian. 2025. "Enhancing Secure Software Development with AZTRM-D: An AI-Integrated Approach Combining DevSecOps, Risk Management, and Zero Trust" Applied Sciences 15, no. 15: 8163. https://doi.org/10.3390/app15158163
APA StyleCoston, I., Hezel, K. D., Plotnizky, E., & Nojoumian, M. (2025). Enhancing Secure Software Development with AZTRM-D: An AI-Integrated Approach Combining DevSecOps, Risk Management, and Zero Trust. Applied Sciences, 15(15), 8163. https://doi.org/10.3390/app15158163